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HISTORY
OF THE
CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE
OF
FRANCE UNDER NAPOLEON.

BY
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HISTORY
OF
THE CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE v. 1

FRANCE
UNDER
N A P O L E O N.

BOOK I.

CONSTITUTION OF THE YEAR VIII.

The Provisional Consuls enter upon their Functions—Division of Duties between Sieyès and General Bonaparte—The General secures for himself the Administration of Affairs, and leaves the digesting of the new Constitution to Sieyès—State of France in Brumaire, Year VIII.—Disorder in the Administration of the Finances—Extreme Destitution of the Armies—Disturbances in La Vendée—Agitation of the Revolutionary Party in some of the Cities of the South—First efforts of the Provisional Consuls to restore order in the different departments of the Government—Appointment of Cambacérès to the Ministry of Justice, Laplace to the Ministry of the Interior, Foucquier to the Ministry of the Police, Talleyrand to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Berthier to the Ministry of War, Forfait to the Ministry of the Marine, Gaudin to the Ministry of the Finances—First Financial Measures—Suppression of the Progressive Forced Loan—Institution of the Agency of Direct Contributions, and immediate preparation of the Assessments left in arrear for several years—Creation of Bonds of the Receivers-general—Confidence begins to be restored; the Bankers of Paris lend the Government the first Funds that it has need of—Relief sent to the Armies—Political Acts of the Provisional Consuls—Repeal of the Law of Hostages; Release of the Priests in confinement and of the Persons Shipwrecked off Calais—Parleys with the Chiefs of the Royalist Party—Suspension of Arms in La Vendée concluded with Messrs. de Bourmont, d'Autichamp, and de Châtillon—Commencement of Relations with Foreign Cabinets—State of Europe—England and Austria bent on continuing the War—Paul I. irritated against his Allies, is disposed to withdraw from the Coalition, and to accede to the System of Neutrality adopted by Prussia—Importance of Prussia at that Moment—General Bonaparte sends his Aid-de-Camp, Dorne, to Berlin—Rumours of Peace—Sensible Improvement in the material and moral State of France, in consequence of the first Acts of the Provisional Consuls—The Subject of the Constitution begins to be taken up—Plan of Sieyès long before projected and matured—List of Notables, the Conservative Senate, the Legislative Body, the Tribunal, the Grand Elector—Disagreement between Sieyès and Bonaparte relative to the Organization of the Executive Power—Danger of a Rupture between those two Personages—They are reconciled through the Mediation of Friends—The Grand Electors superseded by Three Consuls—Adoption of the Constitution of the Year VIII., and the Commencement of its Operation fixed for the 4th of Nivose.

THE events of the 18th of Brumaire had terminated the existence of the Directory.

The men who, after the storms of the Convention, devised that sort of republic were not thoroughly convinced of the excellence and solidity of their work; but, on emerging from the reign of blood which they had just witnessed, it was difficult for them to do better or otherwise than they did. It was impossible, in fact, to think of the Bourbons, to whom public opinion was decidedly hostile; it was equally impossible to throw themselves into the arms of an illustrious general; for, at that period, none of our military men had acquired sufficient glory to subjugate the national mind. All illusions, moreover, were not yet dispelled by experience. The nation had just escaped from the hands of the Com-

mittee of Public Welfare; it had yet tried only the sanguinary republic of '93, consisting of a single assembly, which exercised all powers at once: a last trial was yet left to be made, that of a moderate republic, in which the supreme power should be judiciously divided, and the administration of which should be committed to new men, who had no hand in those excesses which had filled France with horror. The Directory was in consequence devised.

This newly-contrived republic lasted four years, from the 14th of Brumaire, year IV., till the 18th of Brumaire, year VIII. It was set on foot honestly and heartily by men, most of whom were upright, and animated by excellent intentions. Some persons of violent character or suspected integrity, such as Barras

caused him to be held a man of resolution, but he was not so. He had no preconceived opinion on any portion of public affairs.—*Opinion of Napoleon. Las Cases, ii. 143.*

Naturally indolent, haughty, and voluptuous; accessible to corruption; profligate, and extravagant; ill-qualified for the fatigues and the exertion of ordinary

* BARRAS was originally an officer of the regiment of the Isle of France. Deputy to the National Convention. He had no talent for the tribune, and no business habits. . . . He had never served or risen above the rank of Captain, neither had he any knowledge of the art of war. . . . The passion with which he spoke would have
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for instance, had contrived to introduce themselves into the list of governors, who, during those four years, transmitted the supreme power from one to another; but Rewbell,¹ La Reveillère-Lepaux,² Le Tourneur,³ Carnot,⁴ Barthelemy,⁵ Roger-Ducos,⁶ Sieyès,⁷ were men of integrity, some of them of considerable ability, and the last, M. Sieyès, possessed a very superior mind. And yet the directorial republic had very soon exhibited a scene of distressing confusion: less cruelty but more anarchy—such had been the character of the new government. The Directory gave up guillotining; it only transported. It ceased to force people to take assignats upon pain of death; but it paid nobody. Our soldiers, without arms and without bread, were beaten instead of being victorious. Terror was succeeded by a feeling of intolerable uneasiness. And, as weakness also has its gusts of passion, this republic, moderate in intention, had resorted at last to two measures that were absolutely tyrannical—the progressive forced loan, and the law of the hostages. This latter measure, in particular, though there was nothing sanguinary in it, was one of the most odious vexations invented by the cruel and fertile imagination of parties.

Is it surprising that France, to which the Bourbons could not be presented in 1799, and which, after the ill success of the directoral constitution, began to have no faith in the republic—is it surprising, I say, that France should throw herself into the arms of that young general who had conquered Italy and Egypt, a stranger to all the parties, affecting to disdain them all, endowed with an energetic will, showing equal aptness for military and civil affairs, and affording glimpses of ambition which, instead of alarming the nation, was then hailed by it as a hope? Less glory than he had acquired would have sufficed to enable a man to seize the reins of government; for, some time previously, General Joubert had been sent to Novi, that he might there earn those titles which he still wanted for effecting the revolution, since styled in our

annals that of the 18th of Brumaire. The unfortunate Joubert was defeated and fell at Novi; but young Bonaparte, always fortunate and victorious, at least at that time, escaping the dangers of the sea as well as the dangers of battles, had returned from Egypt to France in an almost miraculous manner; and, on his first appearance, the Directory succumbed. All parties hastened to meet him, demanding of him order, victory, and peace.

It was not, however, in a day that the authority of one could supersede that mot government in which so many, alternately oppressed or oppressors, had enjoyed for a moment a share of the supreme power. It was necessary in order to save appearances, and to induce harassed France to submit to absolute power, that she should pass through a glorious, restorative, and semi-republican government. It was requisite, in short, that the Consulate should pave the way to the Empire.

It is this portion of our contemporary history of which I am now about to treat. Fifteen years have elapsed since I recorded the events of our first revolution. Those fifteen years have been passed amid the storms of public life: I have seen an ancient throne crumble to pieces and a new throne arise; I have seen the French revolution pursue its invincible course. Though the scenes which I have witnessed have not excited in me any great surprise, I have not the presumption to believe that the experience of men and of business has taught me nothing; I have the confidence, on the contrary, that I have learned much, and that I am thus, perhaps, more apt to appreciate and describe the great things done by our fathers during those heroic times. But I am certain that experience has not frozen within me the generous sentiments of my youth; I am certain that I love, as I ever did love, the liberty and the glory of France.

I now resume my narrative from the 18th Brumaire, year VIII.—November 9th, 1799.

The law of the 19th of Brumaire, which instituted the Provisional Consulate, being passed, the three new consuls, Bonaparte, Sieyès,

business, he was yet possessed of firmness, decision, and audacity, which fitted him to be a leader of importance in perilous emergencies.—*Alison*, l. 483. H.

¹ REWBELL, an Alsatian by birth, and a lawyer by profession, was destitute of either firmness or eloquence; but owed his elevation to his habits of business, his knowledge of forms, and the pertinacity with which he represented the feelings of the multitude.—*Alison*, l. 483. H.

² LA REVEILLERE-LEPAUX, a native of Angers, was of the lower class of citizens, small, hump-backed, and of an exterior as disagreeable as can be imagined. He was an absolute Esop. He wrote tolerably. His mind was of no compass; he had neither business habits, nor knowledge of men. . . . For the rest, he was a warm and sincere patriot, an honest man, a worthy and intelligent citizen. He entered the Directory poor, and poor he quitted it.—*Opinion of Napoleon*. *Las Cases*, ii. 145. H.

³ LE TOURNEUR DE LA MANCHE. Born in Normandy, he had little talent, little information, little character. . . . For the rest, he was an upright and honest man. He left the Directory poor.—*Opinion of Napoleon*. *Las Cases*, ii. 150. H.

⁴ CARNOT exhibited the combination, rare in a corrupted age, of Republican energy with private virtue.—*Alison*, iii. 36.

A native of Burgundy, he entered the army early, and

was a Chevalier of St. Louis at the time of the revolution, which he embraced warmly. He was named to the convention, and member of the Committee of Safety with Robespierre, &c. Very hostile to the nobles. A man of business, always sincere, but with no talent for intrigue, and easy to be deceived. He always showed great moral courage.—*Opinion of Napoleon*. *Las Cases*, ii. 149. H.

⁵ BARTHELEMY. A respectable man, of royalist principles.—*Alison*, l. 489. H.

⁶ DUCOS was a man of limited and easy character.—*Gourgaud, Memoirs Nap.* H.

⁷ SIEYÈS had been long known to Napoleon. Born at Prejus. He was named to the Constituent Assembly by the electors of the third estate in Paris. He was not a man of execution, he knew little of men, and had no capacity for influencing their actions. His studies were all metaphysical, and he had the fault of all metaphysicians, that he too often despised practical opinions; but was capable of giving useful and luminous advice in the most serious situations.—*Gourgaud, Memoirs Napoleon*. H.

⁸ JOUBERT. A general under the Directory. Conquered the Italian Tyrol, while Napoleon was overrunning Carinthia, whom he afterwards joined at Klagenfurt, by a masterly retreat, in 1797. Superadded Moreau near Genoa, was defeated by Suwarrow, and fell gallantly in the action, at Novi. H.

and Roger-Ducos, left St. Cloud, and repaired to Paris. Sieyès and Roger-Ducos, members of the late Directory, were already settled in the palace of the Luxembourg. Bonaparte quitted his small house in the Rue de la Victoire, and, with his wife, his adopted children, and his aides-de-camp, took up his residence in the apartments of the Petit-Luxembourg. There, in proximity to his two colleagues, surrounded by the fragments of the late government, and the elements of the new one, he fell to work with that unerring and rapid intelligence, and with that extraordinary activity, which had always marked his operations in the field.

With him were associated two colleagues, Roger-Ducos and Sieyès, both of whom had belonged to the Directory, and had been busily engaged in destroying that government which they despised. Sieyès, in particular, had been placed beside General Bonaparte, because he was the second personage of the republic. Author of the grandest and best conceptions of the French revolution, such as the union of the three orders, the division of France into departments, and the institution of the national guard, Sieyès, destitute of eloquence, had rivalled Mirabeau in the early days of our revolution, when oratory conferred more power than all other qualifications; and now that universal war assigned the first place to military genius, Sieyès, who had never worn a sword, was almost the equal of General Bonaparte. So great is power of mind, even unaccompanied by the talents which render it useful or applicable. But now that it was necessary to apply himself to business, Sieyès, who was indolent, peevish, obstinate in his ideas, irritated or confused by the slightest contradiction, could not long vie in influence with his young colleague, who was capable of working night and day, whom no contradiction ruffled, who was abrupt but not testy, who could win the good-will of men when he pleased, and who, at any rate, when he neglected to do so, had always the alternative of carrying his point by force.

There was, however, a task which was generally assigned to Sieyès—that of preparing

the new constitution, which the provisional consuls were directed to digest, and to propose to France without delay. At this period people were still somewhat imbued with the ideas of the eighteenth century; it was less generally but still too much believed, that human institutions might be purely a work of mind, and that the constitution of a nation might spring ready made from the brain of a legislator. Assuredly, if the French revolution must have had a Solon or a Lycurgus, M. Sieyès was worthy of being so; but there is only one real legislator in modern times,—that is experience. This idea was not so common then as it is now-a-days, and it was universally agreed that M. Sieyès should be the author of the new constitution: this was hoped, this was said; it was asserted that he possessed one, which was the result of long meditation; that it was a profound, an admirable production, and that, being now rid of the obstacles which revolutionary passion threw in his way, he could bring it forward; that he would be the legislator, and General Bonaparte the administrator of the new government, and that between them they would render France powerful and happy. Every period of the revolution had had its illusions: the present period is not free from them; but these, it is true, are likely to be the last.

It was, therefore, agreed by common consent that Sieyès should prepare the constitution, and that General Bonaparte should govern by it. It was urgent, in fact, that some one should govern; for the state of the country in all respects was deplorable: disorder, both moral and material, was at its height.

The stanch revolutionists, beaten at St. Cloud, still had partisans in the Society of the Riding House—Manège, as it was called—and in similar societies in different parts of France. They had at their head few of the leading men of the two assemblies: but they numbered among them several officers highly esteemed in our armies: Bernadotte,² a man of moderate abilities, and of a vain and ambitious disposition; Augereau,³ a brave soldier, supremely unreasonable, and luckily possessing but little influence; lastly, Jourdan,⁴ a good citizen and

¹ MIRABEAU. It would be as presumptuous on one individual to write an encyclopedia, as a character of Mirabeau. It should embrace all the talents, and all the vices, every merit and every defect, every glory and every disgrace. Remember, for one moment, what he was—student, voluptuary, soldier, prisoner, author, diplomatist, exile, pauper, courtier, democrat, deputy, orator, statesman, traitor; he had seen more, suffered more, learned more, felt more, done more, than any man of his own or any other age. He lived in two worlds, the one of thought, the other of action, and he mastered them both.—*Hon. George Sydney Smythe.* H.

² BERNADOTTE. His father was an attorney of small means at Pau in Bearn, born 1764. Enlisted as a private in the royal marines at the age of 15. In 1790 he was still a sergeant; in 1792 he was a colonel in the army of General Custines, and in the following year was made general of brigade. Distinguishing him-self on all occasions, after the peace of Campo Formio, he was selected by Napoleon to present the standards taken at Rivoli to the Directory. He appears always to have distrusted Napoleon, who, however, on one occasion, spoke of him as possessing "a French head with the heart of a Roman," &c.—*Court and Camp of Napoleon.* H.

³ AUGEREAU. The son of a green grocer in Paris, born 1757. Entered the Neapolitan service, and was still a private, at thirty. In 1793, volunteered into the republic-

can army of the South. In 1794, brigadier-general. In 1796, general of division, carried the bridge of Lodi, and the strong position of Castiglione. Was the first man across the bridge of Arcole. After the fall of Mantua, despatched with sixty stand of colours to be presented to the Directory. In July, 1797, sent to Paris by Napoleon to intrigue with the Directory. Appointed to the command of the army of the Rhine and Moselle, vacant by the death of Hoche.

His bravery, great as it was, was eclipsed and sullied by his shameful avarice, &c.—*Court and Camp of Napoleon.* H.

⁴ JOURDAN. The son of a surgeon at Limoges. Born in 1762. At sixteen enrolled in the regiment Auxerrois, and served in the American war. In 1791, a commander of a battalion under Dumouriez. In 1792, fought at Jemappes, under Egalité 2d, now Louis Philippe. In 1793 general of division, and gained the battle of Wattignies. Obtained the command of the army of the Moselle, and gained the battle of Fleurus. In 1795, crossed the Rhine, was defeated at Rastatt, recalled and superseded by Beurnonville. In 1797 represented Upper Vienne in the council of five hundred. In November was appointed to the army of the Danube; defeated by the Archduke at Stockach; superseded by Massena. Rechosen member of the five hundred, and in September, proposed his famous resolution, seconded by Augereau, that the country is in danger, &c.—*Court and Camp of Napoleon.* H.

a good general, whose military miscarriages had soured his temper, and thrown him into an exaggerated opposition. There was reason to fear that the fugitives of the Council of Five Hundred would assemble in some considerable city,—form there a sort of Legislative Body and Directory, and rally around them the men who still retained all the ardour of revolutionary sentiments; some because they were compromised by excesses, or were in possession of national domains; others because they loved the republican system for its own sake, and were afraid lest they should see it overturned by the hand of a new Cromwell. Such an attempt would have occasioned serious embarrassment in a juncture already extremely difficult; and apprehensions were entertained that it might be made in Paris itself.

In regard to the opposite faction also, there was ground for serious fears; for La Vendée was again in a flame. M. de Châtillon¹ on the right bank of the Loire, M. d'Autichamp² on the left bank, Georges Cadoudal³ in Morbihan, M. de Bourmont⁴ in Le Maine, M. de Frotté⁵ on the coast of Normandy, all excited and supported by the English, had renewed the civil war. The law respecting hostages, the weakness of the government, the defeats of our armies—such were the motives which had induced them to take up arms again. M. de Châtillon had for a moment occupied Nantes; he had entered the city but made no stay in it. This circumstance had been sufficient to induce the large communes in the insurgent districts to throw up hasty entrenchments, and to surround themselves with palisades where they had not the protection of walls. Some with a view of providing for their own defence, retained the little money which the insurgent country contributed to the public exchequer, alleging that, since the government did nothing for their protection, it was right that they should take care of themselves.

The Directory, though resolved to shun the excesses of the Convention, had not been able to resist all the violent measures which the war in La Vendée, as soon as it broke out again, led the revolutionary party to propose.

Hurried along by the movement of the popular mind, it had passed the law of the hostages, by virtue of which all relations or supposed accomplices of the Vendéans were to be confined and to be punished with certain penalties by way of repressing acts committed in the localities for which they were responsible as hostages. This unjust and violent law had but inflamed the passions, without disarming a single hand in La Vendée, and had excited inexpressible animosity against the Directory.

The war abroad had been somewhat less disastrous towards the conclusion of the last campaigns. The victories of General Masséna⁶ at Zurich,⁷ and of General Brune at the Texel,⁸ had driven back the enemy to a considerable distance from our frontiers; but our soldiers were in a state of absolute destitution. They were neither paid, nor clothed, nor fed. The army which had defeated the combined English and Russians in Holland,⁹ having the advantage of being maintained by the Batavian republic, was better off than the others; but the army of the Rhine, which had lost the battle of Stockach, and that of Helvetia, which had gained the battle of Zurich, were in the utmost want. The army of the Rhine, stationed on French ground, practised there, without mercy and without benefit, the system of requisitions; that of Helvetia subsisted by means of war contributions imposed upon Basle, Zurich, Berne—contributions badly levied and badly employed, and which, quite insufficient for the subsistence of the soldiers, disgusted the spirit of independence and economy that distinguishes the Swiss. The army of Italy, which, since the disasters of Novi and the Trebbia, had fallen back upon the Apennines into a sterile country ravaged by the war, was a prey to diseases and to the most distressing privations. Those soldiers, who had endured the greatest reverses with unshaken constancy, and had shown heroic fortitude in ill fortune, covered with rags, consumed by fever and famine, solicited charity on the roads in the Apennines, having nothing to eat but the little nutritious fruits growing in the arid soil of those parts. Many of them deserted, or joined the

¹ M. DE CHÂTILLON was an old gentleman of sixty, virtuous, loyal, possessing little wit but some vigour. He had lately married, which contributed to render him faithful to his promises.—*Gourgaud, Mémoires Nap.* M.

² M. D'AUTICHPAMP had served several campaigns as a private hunter in the republican armies during the reign of terror. He was a man of limited ability, but possessing the air, the manners, and the elegance which became his education and station in society.—*Gourgaud, Mémoires Nap.* H.

³ GEORGES CADOU DAL. The son of a village miller—when Bretagne took up arms he entered service as a common horseman, and in 1795 was considered the head of the plebeian party. In 1796 and the three ensuing years, was the only general-in-chief who was not noble. In 1800 he made peace with the French government.—*Encyclopædia Americana.* H.

⁴ M. DE BOURMONT, a Choann leader. He commanded the bands of Maine, submitted together with La Revelaye, and went up to Paris.—*Gourgaud, Mémoires Nap.* M.

⁵ M. FROTTÉ. A young, active, and artful chief of the Choanns. He commanded the bands of Normandy, maintained the war after the submission of de Bourmont, and gave much trouble to the government. He was surprised in the house of Guidal, the general in command at Alençon, who was in correspondence with and betrayed him. He was tried and shot.—*Gourgaud, Mémoires Nap.* M.

⁶ MASSÉNA, born at Nice, 1758. Made two voyages in a merchant ship. Entered the Royal Italian regiment at seventeen as a private. In 1789, left the army in disgust as a sergeant. Married a tradesman's daughter at Antibes, and settled at Nice. Re-entered the republican armies, and in 1793 was general of division. In 1796 he was present at every action of note, and so highly did Bonaparte esteem him, that he wrote him word, your own services are worth 6000 men. He was unpopular with the soldiers, owing to his insatiable avarice and rapacity. He superseded Jourdan after the defeat at Stockach, and though himself hard pressed for a time, by the Archduke Charles, finally gained a considerable advantage over the Austro-Russian army at Zurich.—*Court and Camp of Napoleon.* M.

⁷ ZURICH, see the preceding. M.

⁸ TEXEL, see below. M.

⁹ ANGLO-RUSSIAN. In 1799, a joint expedition was agreed on by England and Russia against Holland. Twelve thousand men were landed under Sir Ralph Abercromby at the Helder, and defeated the Dutch under General Daendels. The Dutch fleet in the Texel surrendered without firing a shot. The British troops were at first successful, and before the arrival of the Russians repulsed Vandamme at Alcmær, but finally after much hard fighting were ultimately compelled to capitulate, quitting Holland with a mutual restoration of all prisoners.—*Atlas*, ii. 51—53. M.

troops of banditti that infested the high roads in the south, as well as in the west of France. Whole corps were seen quitting their posts without orders from their generals, and occupying others where they hoped to live less wretchedly. The sea, scoured by the English, exhibited in all directions none but an enemy's flag, and never brought them any succour. There were divisions whose pay had been withheld for eighteen months. Some provisions were levied by means of requisitions; but as for muskets, cannon, and ammunition, which are not to be procured by requisitions—the want of these our soldiers had no means of supplying. The horses, already inadequate to the services of the artillery and of the cavalry, were almost all swept off by disease and famine.

Such were the results of a weak, ill-regulated administration, and more especially of extreme financial embarrassment. The armies of the republic had, for several years, lived upon assignats and victory. The assignats no longer existed; and Victory, after suddenly forsaking us, had scarcely begun to show herself again to our legions, and had not yet opened to them the abundant plains of Germany and Italy.

It is necessary here to give an idea of our financial situation—the principal cause of the sufferings of our armies. This situation exceeded all that had ever been seen at former periods. The Constituent Assembly had committed two faults, which had been remedied, to a certain extent, by means of the assignats, but for which, since the discredit of that paper-money, there was left no palliative. These two faults were, firstly, the suppression of the indirect contributions imposed upon liquors, salt, and articles of consumption in general; secondly, the right granted to the municipal administrations of making themselves the assessments of the land-tax and of the other direct contributions.

By the suppression of the indirect contributions the treasury had lost, without compensation, one-third of its revenues. The produce of the state domains being reduced to almost nothing by a vicious administration, that of the registration, by the falling off of private business, and that of the customs by the war, the direct contributions formed almost the only resource of the exchequer; but these contributions, amounting to about 300,000,000 in a budget of 500,000,000, were extraordinarily in arrear. There were outstanding debits for the year V., the year VI., and the year VII. The assessments for the year VI. were not completed; for the year VII., one-third yet remained to be made out; and for the current year, that is to say, the year VIII., they were scarcely begun. Owing to this delay in the preparation of the assessments, the current contributions could not be levied, and the accumulation of those in arrear occasioned new difficulties to the collectors, who frequently had to demand payment for several years at once.

This state of things proceeded from the adoption of a principle apparently just, but in reality mischievous; namely, that of leaving the local administrations to tax themselves, in

some measure, by preparing the assessments themselves. The departmental and municipal administrations were then conjoined, as every one knows. Instead of prefects, sub-prefects and mayors, who were instituted at a later period, there were attached to all these administrations commissioners, having a consultative voice, and whose duty it was to originate and urge the acceleration of the administrative operations, but not to execute these themselves. The system of cantonal municipalities, uniting the 44,000 communes of France into 5000 collective communes, had increased the disorder. All local business was suspended; but what was a still greater misfortune, the two grand points of state-business, the recruiting of the army and the collection of taxes, were completely neglected. To make amends for this default of administrative action, the 5000 commissioners attached to the cantonal municipalities were charged with the duty of accelerating the preparation of the assessments; but they had not the only power which could be efficacious, that of acting themselves; and besides, engaged in a thousand different occupations, they paid but little attention to that important work, the preparation of the assessments. The indemnity granted to them for this service, being much more expensive than it has been since the institution of the office of the direct contributions, was a heavy charge on the treasury, and without any corresponding advantage.

Thus the direct contributions, the principal branch of the revenue of the state, were not collected. Besides the permanent deficit arising from the default of receipts, there was another, arising from the amount of the expenditure, which at that time far exceeded the receipts. The ordinary expenditure might have been provided for by means of a revenue of about 500,000,000; but the war had raised it to nearly 700,000,000. Nothing was left to meet the deficiency but the national domains, absorbed for the greater part, and which it was, moreover, difficult to realize advantageously, because the definitive triumph of the revolution was still a matter of great doubt.

This state of things had led to revolting abuses, and to a situation which it is necessary to describe for the instruction of nations and governments.

The assignats, as we have just observed, had long ceased to exist. The mandates, which succeeded them, had disappeared also. Paper money was, therefore, completely abandoned; and, great as the void might be, it was better not to fill it up at all for the present, than to fill it, as had before been done, with a forced paper, which was scarcely taken in payments, though forced, and which uselessly furnished occasion for the exercise of all the rigours of the law, in order to compel its acceptance. In lieu of this suppressed paper-money the following system was introduced.

In the first place, the government ceased to pay the civil functionaries, even in paper, so that in Brumaire, year VIII., they had received nothing for ten months. It was necessary, however, to give something to the annuitants and pensioners of the state. To these were

delivered *bons d'arrérage*, the sole value of which consisted in their being taken as money in payment of the contributions. The pay of the troops was withheld; but what the armies took upon the spot for their subsistence was paid for by means of *bons de réquisition*, likewise receivable in discharge of the taxes. The companies which had contracted to supply some of the wants of the soldier, performing that service ill, and sometimes not at all, obtained, instead of money, orders upon the first receipts of the treasury; and by virtue of titles of this sort, granted very arbitrarily, they laid their hands upon almost all the cash that found its way into the public exchequer. Lastly, *rescriptions* on the national domains, receivable in payment for those domains, were another sort of paper-money added to all those we have just enumerated, and contributing to the most frightful stock-jobbing.

These papers, in fact, had not a forced currency like the assignats; but, thrown into circulation, incessantly bought and sold in the market of Paris, rising or falling on the slightest whisper of good or bad news, they were the subject of a speculation ruinous to the state, and of a deplorable demoralization of the public. The men of business, depositaries of all the ready money, could procure them at a very easy rate. They bought them up from the annuitants, the contractors, or the other holders, at the lowest price; then sent them into the treasury in payment of the contributions, passing for 100 francs what had cost them at most eighty, and sometimes sixty or even fifty. The collectors themselves embarked in this kind of speculation, and, while they received money from part of the tax-payers, they paid into the coffers of the state at par the paper which they had bought at the lowest rate. Thus very few persons paid their contributions in cash; there was too much inducement to discharge them in paper. In this manner, the treasury scarcely ever received any specie, and its distress, in consequence, increased every day.

As the irritation against the Vendéans had produced the law of the hostages, the irritation against the jobbers had led, in like manner, to the measure of the progressive forced loan, destined to reach the great capitalists, and to make them contribute to the expenses of the war. This is what had been called in France, during the days of terror, the tax upon the rich; it is what in England was denominated the income-tax—a tax to which Mr. Pitt had at this time recourse, in order to carry on the furious war which he was waging against France. This tax, proportioned not to the extent of immovable property, which constitutes a sure basis, but to the supposed wealth of individuals, could be raised, though with considerable trouble, in England, where order

prevailed, and the fury of parties did not make the assessment of fortunes a medium of vengeance. But this was not feasible in France, for amidst the disorders of the times, the jury had been a sort of revolutionary committee, capriciously attributing wealth or poverty at the dictates of its passions, and never esteemed just even when it was just, which is almost equivalent to never being so. The government dared not bring forward this measure, as formerly, under the mere simple form of a tax; they disguised it under the name of a *forced loan*, repayable, it was said, in national property, and divided, according to the supposed faculties of each, by an assessment-jury.

Thus this measure had become one of the calamities of the moment. That and the law of the hostages formed the two grievances most frequently alleged against the Directory. It was not the cause, as it was asserted, of the poverty of the treasury, a poverty arising from a complication of circumstances; but it kept aloof the rich speculators, whose aid was indispensable to the government, and of whom it was under the absolute necessity of availing itself, if but for a moment, that it might be able to exist without them afterwards.

This financial situation was, as we have said, the principal cause of the destitution and the reverses of our armies. Being well known to foreign powers, it inspired them with confidence that they should conquer us by a little perseverance. The two victories of Zurich and the Texel had, to be sure, removed those powers somewhat farther from the object which they had in view, but not diverted them from the pursuit. Austria, proud of having reconquered Italy, was determined to fight to the last extremity rather than yield again. Her bearing there was that of an absolute power. Occupying Piedmont, Tuscany, the Roman States, she had not recalled either the King of Sardinia to Turin, or the Grand Duke of Tuscany to Florence, or the pontifical government to Rome. The defeat of Korsakoff¹ and Suwaroff² at Zurich gave her less concern than might have been expected. It was in her eyes a check to the Russian, not to the Austrian arms; a fault of Generals Korsakoff and Suwaroff,—a military mishap, not very difficult to be retrieved, and of no great consequence, unless it should disgust the Russians with the war. But she confidently hoped, by means of British influence and subsidies, to bring them back into the field.

As for England, rich from the income-tax, which already produced more than 200,000,000*l.* a year; blockading Malta, which she expected soon to take by famine; intercepting all succours sent to our army in Egypt, which she hoped before long to reduce by privations and force, England was fully resolved to pursue

¹ KORSKOFF, a Russian general. He commanded in Switzerland, while Suwaroff was fighting in Italy. Through extreme arrogance, and absurd contempt of his enemy, he was surprised at Zurich by Massena, and, though he cut his way through the French army with undaunted resolution, lost all his artillery and baggage. Suwaroff joined the army a few days later, and made his wonderful retreat across the Glarus.

² SUWAROFF. Alexander Rimniski, a Russian field-marshal, born 1730, of a noble family. In 1742 he enlisted as a private. In 1762, a colonel, he had gained distinction

in the Seven Years' War. In 1774, and many years after, he was engaged in constant warfare with the Turks. Took Ismail in 1790, and in 1792, Warsaw. In 1799 he took the command in Italy against the French, and defeated Moreau; shortly afterward the coalition between Russia and Austria was dissolved, and he was recalled and shortly after died. He had great talents, great information, great vivacity, considerable wit, much facility in various languages; was exceedingly eccentric and original, a man of decided genius—the most daring and dashing general of the old school.

all the objects which her policy flattered itself with the prospect of attaining, before she laid down her arms. She calculated, moreover, upon a sort of social dissolution in France, which would soon change our country into an open country, accessible to all who might think fit to enter it.

Prussia, the only one of the northern powers that had not taken part in the war, maintained a reserve full of coldness towards the French government. Spain, obliged by the treaty of St. Ildefonso to make common cause with us, appeared extremely grieved at this community of interests. No one, indeed, seemed to care about having relations with a government that was ready to fall. The victories of Zurich and the Texel had regained for it an outward show of respect, but not the confidence of the cabinets with which it was at peace or in alliance.

Thus, at home, La Vendée again in insurrection—abroad, the principal powers of Europe in arms,—rendered the dangers of the war doubly pressing. It was necessary, by the adoption of some financial measure, to supply the first wants of the famished armies; it was necessary to re-organize them, to move them forward, to give them able commanders, and to add new victories to those which had been gained at the conclusion of the last campaign. It was necessary, above all, to cure foreign cabinets of the notion of an approaching social dissolution in France, which rendered some so confident in the result of the war, others so shy in their relations with us. And all this could only be accomplished by a strong government, able to curb parties, and to enforce unity of action, without which there cannot be, in the exertions which it makes to save itself, either harmony, energy, or success.

The disease had arrived at that height which is frequently followed by a favourable turn; on one condition indeed, that the patient shall have sufficient strength left to get over the crisis. Fortunately, the strength of France was still great. The revolution, though decried by those whom it had overthrown, or whose illusions it had not realized, was, after all, the cause of justice and of reason, and it still excited the attachment which a great cause always excites. It had, moreover, numerous partisans, bound to its fortunes, in all those who had acquired new situations, bought the possessions of emigrants, or acted a part by which they had compromised themselves. In short, the nation was not so exhausted, morally or physically, as to submit quietly to the invasion of its territory by the Austrians and Russians. On the contrary, it felt indignant at the idea. Its armies swarmed with admirable soldiers, officers, generals, who needed only a good direction. All these forces were ready to unite spontaneously in a single hand, if that hand were capable of directing them. Circumstance, therefore, favoured the man of genius who was about to present himself, for genius itself requires the aid of circumstance.

Had young Bonaparte, for example, come forward in 1789, even with his talents and his glory, to rescue French society, at that time leaning on all sides to dissolution, because its

elements had become incompatible, in vain would he have propped it with his mighty arms. His human strength would have availed nothing against the powers of Nature. At this period, on the contrary, when that old society, broken up, as it was requisite that it should be before being recast in a new mould, presented only elements, scattered indeed, but tending of themselves to approximate, it was prepared to accommodate itself to all the efforts of the able hand that knew how to grapple it. General Bonaparte, therefore, had on his side both his own genius and the force of circumstances. He had a whole society to organize, but a society willing to be organized, and, by him, because it had immens. confidence in him, inspired by his unparalleled successes.

The law which decreed the Provisional Consulship, conferred extensive powers on the three consuls. This law invested them with the plenitude of "directorial power;" it specially charged them to "restore order in all the departments of the administration," to "restore domestic tranquillity," and to "obtain for France an honourable and solid peace." It associated with them two legislative commissions, of twenty-five members each, selected from the Council of the Ancients and that of the Five Hundred, to supply the place of the Legislative Body, and to give a legal character to the acts of the Consuls. It authorized these two commissions to decree all necessary measures, on the proposition of the executive authority. It confided to them, moreover, the highly important duty of preparing a new constitution. And yet, as such powers could not be conferred on them for an unlimited time, the same law enacted that, on the 1st of the following Ventose, the two Councils of the Ancients and the Five Hundred should have full right to assemble again, if, in the interim, a new constitution had not been promulgated and accepted. In that event the members of the then Legislative Body would retain their powers, excepting sixty of them, erased from the list of the councils by an extraordinary measure. The eventual re-assembling being fixed for the 1st of Ventose, the dictatorship confided to the provisional consuls was limited to three months. It was, in fact, a real dictatorship with which they had been invested: for these commissions, deliberating with closed doors; divided into different sections, of finance, legislation, constitution; meeting together only to legalize what the government had to propose to them; were the surest and most convenient instruments for acting with promptness. For the rest, there was little reason to fear that these powers would be abused; for, when there is so much good to be done, and so short a space to do it in, men do not waste time in doing evil.

On the very day on which the three Provisional Consuls removed to the Luxembourg, they met to deliberate on the most urgent affairs of the state. It was the 11th of November, 1799—20th of Brumaire. It was necessary to choose a president; the age and position of M. Sieyès seemed to call him to that distinction, but Roger Ducos, though his friend, as if carried away by the feeling of the moment,

said to General Bonaparte, "Take the arm-chair, and let us deliberate." Bonaparte immediately complied. The official acts of the Provisional Consuls, however, made no mention of a president. They entered into a first summary examination of the state of the country. Young Bonaparte was ignorant of many things, but he guessed intuitively those which he was not acquainted with. He had carried on war, provided for the maintenance of numerous armies, administered conquered provinces, negotiated with Europe. He could not have served a better apprenticeship in the art of governing. For superior minds, but for those alone, war is an excellent school. In it a man learns to command, to decide, but above all to govern. Thus the new Consul appeared to have on all subjects either an opinion ready formed, or one that formed itself with the rapidity of lightning, particularly after he had listened to special men, the only men to whom he did listen, and solely on the subject of their special pursuit.

He was still deficient in a species of knowledge most serviceable in the exercise of the supreme authority—the knowledge not of men generally, but of individuals. As for men in general, his knowledge of them was profound; but, having always lived with armies, he was a stranger to the individuals who had figured in the Revolution. To supply this deficiency he had recourse to the testimony of his colleagues. But, gifted with rapid penetration and a prodigious memory, he very soon made himself as well acquainted with the personnel of the government, as with that of his army.

After this first conference, the parts were taken and accepted. The young general, without waiting for the opinion of his colleagues, gave his own on the instant, summed up and settled every affair with the decision of an acting man. It was evident that the impulse would thenceforth proceed from him alone. They separated, after agreeing upon the things most urgent to be done; and Sieyès, with a resignation which does honour to his reason and patriotism, said in the evening to Messrs. de Talleyrand and Rœderer, "We

have a master who knows how to do every thing, who can do every thing, and who will do every thing." He thence wisely concluded that it was best to let him act, for, at that moment, personal rivalries would have ruined France. It was agreed anew, by a sort of voluntary division of the official duties, that, during this dictatorship, which it was necessary to render brief and serviceable, General Bonaparte should govern, and that M. Sieyès should undertake the preparation of the constitution. This, as we have already said, was a task which public opinion adjudged to the latter, and in the accomplishment of which his colleague was not disposed to cross him much—a single point excepted—the organization of the executive power.

The most urgent matter of all was the composition of the ministry. In a monarchy, it is the first men in a country who are called to it. In a republic, those first men having become themselves the heads of the republic, there are left for the ministry only second-rate men, mere clerks, without any responsibility, because the real responsibility has ascended higher. When such persons as M. Sieyès and General Bonaparte were Consuls, highly distinguished men, like Messrs. Fouché,¹ Cambacérès,² Reinhard,³ de Talleyrand,⁴ could not be real ministers. The choice of these had no other importance than a certain political significance and the due despatch of business. It is in this respect alone that their selection can be considered as of any moment.

The lawyer Cambacérès, a scholar and a philosopher, whom we shall notice more particularly by and by, was retained, without opposition, as minister of justice. After a brisk discussion among the Consuls, M. Fouché was continued in the ministry of the police. M. Sieyès would have rejected him, because, he said, he was not to be depended on, and a creature of Barras, the Director. General Bonaparte supported him, and caused him to be confirmed in his post. He considered himself bound to this course by the services which Fouché had done him during the events of the 18th of Brumaire. Besides, he united to a very shrewd mind a profound knowledge of

¹ FOUCHÉ, born at Nantes, in 1753, was at first intended for the sea, but afterward became professor of mathematics in Arras, &c. Here he formed an intimate acquaintance with Robespierre. He was sent to the National Convention from the department of the lower Loire—joined the party of the mountain, voted for the death of the king with extreme ferocity. In 1793 distinguished himself by his cruelty and hatred of the priests, as conventional deputy in the department of the Aube, and the Nièvre; and yet farther by his infamous atrocities in conjunction with Collot d'Herbois at Lyons. He fell into disgrace with Robespierre, and probably escaped death only by his fall. In 1795, he was expelled the Convention as a *thief and terrorist*, and for several years scarcely earned a bare and wretched livelihood as spy to the Directory. In 1798, he was sent on an embassy to Milan, and afterward to Holland. In 1799 installed by Sieyès head of the police. A baser, bloodier, more cowardly and brutal miscreant never disgraced humanity.—*Court and Camp of Napoleon.* M.

² CAMBACÉRÈS, born at Montpellier in 1753, of a poor but noble family. Educated a lawyer. In 1791 made president of the criminal tribunal in the department of Herault. In 1792 member of the National Convention, voted after much tergiversation for the death of the king. In 1790 he was appointed minister of justice. He was a wily schemer, a cringer to all parties when in power, a sensualist and a glutton.—*Court and Camp of Napoleon.* M.

³ REINHART was a native of Wirtemberg, an honest man of ordinary capacity.—*Gourgaud, Mémoires.* M.

⁴ TALLEYRAND, born in Paris, in 1754, eldest son of a younger branch of the Counts de Périgord. He was educated at St. Sulpice with Sieyès, and forced into the church, wherein he became bishop of Autun at thirty-four. Before this time, however, he had been designated by Mirabeau as "one of the most subtle and powerful intellects of the age." In 1789 he was returned to the meeting of the States General by the clergy of his diocese. He carried, in the National Assembly, the confiscation and sale of the church property. In 1791 was chosen a member of the Departmental Convention. In 1793 sent with Chevelli, minister to England. In 1794 escaped to America, where he remained until the reign of terror was at an end. In 1795 he was recalled. In 1797 appointed minister of foreign affairs under the Directory. In 1799 resigned and quarrelled with the Directory, and joined Napoleon, on his return from Egypt.

The truth is, that Prince Talleyrand's career has been remarkably free from violence, and that he swayed the destinies of France, not by terror, but by the sheer strength and prompitude of his talents.—*Court and Camp of Napoleon.* M.

The sagest politician, the shrewdest statesman, the deepest judge of human nature, the wittiest if not the wisest man of his own, or perhaps any other day. M.

the men and things of the revolution. Public opinion, at that time, marked him out for the minister of police; as M. de Talleyrand, from his familiarity with courts, his experience in business of importance, his acute understanding, and his conciliatory spirit, was marked out for the minister of foreign affairs. M. Fouché was retained; but such was the animosity of the revolutionists against M. de Talleyrand, either on account of his constant connection with the moderate party, or in consequence of the part which he had played in recent events, that it was found expedient to defer for a few weeks his return to the ministry for foreign affairs. M. de Reinhart was kept for a fortnight longer in that post. General Berthier,¹ the faithful companion of the conqueror of Italy and Egypt, the inseparable chief of his staff, who could so thoroughly comprehend and issue his orders—General Berthier received the portfolio of war, in the place of M. Dubois-Crancé,² who was considered as much too warm in his opinions. M. Quinette³ was superseded in the ministry of the interior by an illustrious *savant*, M. de La Place.⁴ This was a signal and just homage paid to science, but it was not a service rendered to the administration. His superior genius was not fitted for the details of business. M. Forfait, an engineer and naval constructor of ability, succeeded M. Bourdon—de l'Oise—in the ministry of the marine.

At this moment, the most important choice to be made, perhaps, was that of minister of finance. In the departments already specified, the Consuls could supply the place of ministers, especially in the two most important departments—war and foreign affairs. General Bonaparte, in fact, could perfectly well perform all the duties of Messrs. Berthier and de Reinhart. But that was not the case with finance. This is a subject upon which technical knowledge is indispensable; and there was not in the ministry, that went out with the Directory, any man who could labour effectively at a reorganization of the finances, which had become necessary and urgent. There was a person who had formerly been chief clerk, a man not of brilliant but of solid understanding, and possessing great experience, who had rendered, both during the old system and in the early period of the revolution, those secret but valuable administrative services, with which governments cannot dispense, and which they ought to appreciate

highly. The first clerk to whom I allude here was M. Gaudin, since Duke of Gacé. M. Sieyès, well qualified to judge of men, though not to control them, had discovered M. Gaudin, and had been desirous to commit to his hands the portfolio of finance toward the end of the Directory. M. Gaudin, a good financier, but a timid citizen, had declined the offer made to him under an expiring government, which wanted the first requisites of credit, strength and the appearance of stability. But when power seemed to fall without opposition into able and firm hands, he could no longer feel the same repugnance. General Bonaparte, having a decided partiality for practical men, joined without hesitation in the opinion of his colleague, Sieyès, and offered to M. Gaudin the administration of finance. M. Gaudin accepted this post, in which he never ceased, for fifteen years, to render eminent services.

All the departments of the ministry were thus filled. Another appointment was added to the preceding—that of M. Maret, since Duke of Bassano, who became secretary to the Consuls, with the title of secretary of state. Charged to prepare for the Consuls the elements of their labour, frequently to draw up their resolutions, and to communicate them to the heads of different departments, to keep the secrets of the state, he had a kind of ministry, destined sometimes to supply, to complete, or to control the deficiencies of the others. A cultivated mind, a certain acquaintance with Europe, with which he had already negotiated—particularly at Lisle, with Lord Malmesbury—a tenacious memory, a fidelity not to be shaken, caused him to become one of the most serviceable, and most constantly employed fellow-labourers about General Bonaparte. In those who served him, the general preferred exactness and intelligence to brilliancy. It is a partiality common to superior genius, which desires to be comprehended and obeyed, but wants no substitute. Such was the secret of the high favour also enjoyed by M. Berthier for twenty years. M. Maret, though far from equalling him, had, in civil affairs, some of the merits displayed by the illustrious chief of the staff in his military career.

General Lefebvre⁵ was retained in the command of the 17th military division. It will be recollected that, at first, in the morning of the 18th of Brumaire, he had shown some hesitation; and that he had afterwards blindly thrown himself into the arms of the new dictator. He

¹ BERTHIER, born at Versailles in 1753, the son of an eminent surgeon. He served in the American war on Rochambeau's staff. Held a command in the National Guards at Versailles. After their defection, served in the republican armies, was Kellerman's quarter-master in the army of Italy, and, when Bonaparte took that command, attached himself to his fortunes, and never quitted him.—*Court and Camp of Napoleon*.

² He was totally destitute of the vigour and decision necessary to form a great commander, but was the essence of order itself, indefatigable in exertion, unwearied in application and methodical in habit.—*ibidem*, iv. 163.

³ DUBOIS-CRANCÉ was a party man, slightly esteemed, and with no habit of business or order. He was incapable of performing the duties of his office. His office was filled with partisans, who, instead of attending to their duties, wasted their time in deliberation. It was an absolute chaos.—*Gourgaud, Mémoires*.

⁴ QUINETTE had been one of the republican com-
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missioners appointed to arrest Dumouriez.—*Thiers' Revolution*.

⁵ LA PLACE. A geometrician of the highest order, who nevertheless showed himself to be not even of moderate abilities as a minister. From his very first appointment, the Consuls perceived that they had committed an error. La Place grasped no question in its true point of view. He was always aiming at subtleties, had none save problematical ideas, and carried the smallest possible degree of mind into the administration of affairs.—*Gourgaud, Mémoires*.

⁶ LEFEBVRE. A native of Ruffec, born of an humble family in 1755. The revolution found him a veteran sergeant. In 1793, he was raised from the rank of captain to that of adjutant-general. In December of the same year he was general of brigade, and the following month, of division. He fought under Pichegru, Moreau, Huche and Jourdan, in the Netherlands and Germany. He served Napoleon well in the revolution of the 18th of Brumaire.—*Camp and Court of Napoleon*.

was rewarded for it by the 17th military division and the command of Paris. Thenceforward his fidelity might be depended upon.

Members of the two councils, who had distinguished themselves by their co-operation in the 18th of Brumaire, were sent into the provinces to explain and justify that event, and, if necessary, to supersede such of the agents of authority as might prove either refractory or inadequate to their functions. The result of the 18th of Brumaire was everywhere hailed with joy. The revolutionary party had, nevertheless, in the men compromised by their excesses, adherents who might have become dangerous, especially towards the provinces of the south. Where they did show themselves, the *gilded youth*, as they were called, were quite ready to come to blows with them. The defeat or the victory of either, might have produced serious inconveniences.

Some changes were made in the distribution of the great military commands. General Moreau,¹ deeply irritated against the Directory, which had so ill rewarded his patriotic devotedness during the campaign of 1799, had consented to be the lieutenant of General Bonaparte, to assist him in consummating the revolution of the 18th of Brumaire. At the head of 300 men, he had condescended to act the part of keeper of the Luxembourg, the palace in which the directors found themselves prisoners, while their deposition was determined on at St. Cloud. General Bonaparte, who, by skillfully feeding the pride and resentments of Moreau, had induced him to accept that singular part, owed him some compensation. He united the two armies of the Rhine and of Helvetia into one, and gave him the command of it. This was the most numerous, the finest army of the Republic, and it could not have been put into better hands. General Moreau had gained but little glory during the last campaign. His services, though substantial, especially when, with a handful of men, he stopped the triumphant career of Suwaroff, were nevertheless no victories, and were not appreciated at their proper value. At this period the battle of Zurich had eclipsed every thing. Besides, the political conduct of Moreau on the 18th of Fructidor, when he denounced Pichegru,² either too soon or too late, had injured him in public opinion, and caused him to be considered as a weak character, wholly beneath himself when he was not upon the field of battle. General Bonaparte, therefore, raised him considerably,

by conferring on him so extensive a command; and he came to another very wise determination. The legions of the Rhine and of Helvetia comprehended the most ardent republicans of the army, and many who were envious of the glory acquired in Italy and in Egypt. Masséna commanded them, and he had but little affection for General Bonaparte, though subjugated by his genius. In regard to him, he passed alternately from admiration to ill-humour. There was reason to fear, on his part, some unpleasant demonstration on account of the 18th of Brumaire. The choice of Moreau cut short all possible manifestations, by removing an ill-disposed general from a discontented army. This choice was likewise a good one in a military point of view; for this army of the Rhine and of Helvetia was destined, in case the war were renewed, to operate in Germany, and no one had so thoroughly studied this part of the theatre of war as Moreau.

Masséna was sent to the army of Italy, to places, and among soldiers, with whom he was perfectly acquainted. It was honourable to him to be selected as the repairer of faults committed in 1799, and the continuator of the exploits of General Bonaparte in 1796. Separated from the army among which he had just won a victory and made himself supporters, he was to be transferred to a new army, to which the Directory was odious, and in which he would find none but approvers of the 18th of Brumaire. This choice, like the preceding, was highly judicious in a military point of view. It was the Apennines that the French would have to dispute with the Austrians; and, for a war of this kind, on such a theatre of operations, Masséna had not his equal.

After they had decided upon these indispensable appointments, the Consuls had to direct their attention to an affair not less urgent, namely, that of the finances. Before they could obtain money from the capitalists, it was requisite that they should give them the satisfaction of suppressing the progressive forced loan, which, like the law of hostages, had incurred universal reprobation. The forced loan, as well as the law of hostages, was far from having produced all the evils that were attributed to them. But these two measures, truly paltry in regard to utility, were vicious in a moral point of view, inasmuch as they revived the most odious recollections of the reign of terror. All, therefore, agreed in condemning them. The revolution-

¹ MOREAU, born at Morlaix in Brittany, in 1763. He was a law student at Rennes, in the commencement of the revolution. In 1793, he was made brigadier-general. In 1794, general of division, and conquered the Netherlands and Holland, together with Pichegru. In 1796, commander-in-chief of the army of the Rhine and Moselle, he defeated Wurmser, but after an indecisive engagement with the Archduke Charles was compelled to retreat through the Black Forest. Discovered, in 1797, the treason of Pichegru, but delayed so long before denouncing him, that he was looked upon with suspicion by the Directory. In 1799, appointed to the army of Italy, and while in Paris awaiting instructions, he was invited to aid in subverting the government, which, like Bernadotte, he refused to do.—*Court and Camp of Napoleon.*

He was a great captain, a sincere and honest republican, a simple, unaffected and pure-minded man.

² PICHEGRU, born in 1761, at Arbois, of poor but re-

spectable parents, was teacher of mathematics at Brienne to Napoleon Bonaparte. At the age of eighteen, he enlisted as a private of artillery; served three years as a sergeant in the American war. In 1789, was appointed adjutant. In 1792, owing to the partiality of St. Just, he was appointed general-in-chief. He displayed rare talents; beat the Austrians at all points, was appointed commandant of Paris in 1795, and overturned the projects of the terrorists. While in command of the army of the Rhine, he entered into correspondence with the Bourbons, was discovered by the Directory, who dared not punish him. Retired to Bellevue, and remained in retirement, until he was returned to the council of five hundred from the Upper Saône. He was discovered in farther plots with Moreau in behalf of the royal family, and was transported to Cayenne, whence, after eight months' exile, he escaped to England, via Patagonia.—*Court and Camp of Napoleon.*

ists themselves, who, in their patriotic ardour, had demanded these measures of the Directory, by a reaction very common to parties, had suddenly declared themselves hostile to them as soon as they perceived their failure and unpopularity.

No sooner was Gaudin installed minister, than, by order of the Consuls, he submitted to the legislative commissions a resolution, the object of which was the suppression of the progressive forced loan. This suppression took place amidst universal applause. In lieu of the forced loan there was substituted a war-supply, consisting of an addition of 25 per cent. to the principal of the land-tax, the tax on movable property, and the personal tax. This supply was payable like the other taxes, in money or state paper of any kind; but, owing to the urgency of the case, it was required that half the amount should be paid in cash.

The war-supply, which had thus superseded the progressive forced loan, could not furnish immediate relief, for it was only to be levied upon the assessments of the direct contributions, and at the same time with those contributions, of which it was in reality but an augmentation, in the proportion of one-fourth. It was requisite for the current service, and more particularly for the troops, that the treasury should be immediately replenished. M. Gaudin, on the strength of this new measure, destined more especially to please the great capitalists, appealed to the principal bankers of the capital, and applied to them for assistance, the urgency of which was felt by all. General Bonaparte entered into direct communication with them, and the sum of 12,000,000*fr.* in cash was immediately lent to the government. It was to be repaid out of the first receipts of the war contribution.

This accommodation was a great boon, and reflected honour on the public spirit of the bankers of the capital. But it was a supply for a few days only. More durable supplies were needed.

We have seen, at the beginning of this book, how the suppression of the indirect contributions, decreed at the very outset of the revolution, had reduced the treasury to the mere produce of the direct contributions; how this revenue had itself been almost annulled by the delay in the preparation of the assessments; and lastly, how the assignats, the ordinary medium for supplying all deficits, having totally disappeared, recourse was had to paper of various kinds; which, not having the forced currency of coin, was no longer a clog, as before, on private business, but left the government without resources, and gave rise to the most hideous stock-jobbing. It was necessary to put an end to this state of things, and to reorganize the collection, if the government wished to open again the sources of the public revenue, and, with the sources of the public revenue, those of public credit.

In every country where there exist taxes on property and person, which we term in France direct contributions, it is requisite to have a return of that property, with an estimate of its produce, and a list of the names of persons,

with an estimate of their pecuniary means. It is requisite that these returns be modified every year, according to the transfer of property from hand to hand, according to the birth, death, or removal of persons. It is then requisite to apportion every year among the properties and the persons the amount of taxes that has been decreed. Lastly, there must be a collection, at once exact and prudent: exact to ensure the receipts; prudent not to harass the payers. Nothing of this kind existed in the year VIII.—1799.

The register of real property—*cadastre*—a work which has occupied the last¹ forty years, was not yet begun. There were ancient terriers in some communes, and a general return of properties was undertaken in the time of the Constituent Assembly. These data, though by no means accurate, were turned to account. But the operations which consist in revising the lists of properties and persons, according to their incessant changes, and in apportioning annually among them the amount of taxes decreed—these operations, which properly constitute what is called the preparation of the assessments, were left to the municipal administrations, to whose disorganization and carelessness we have already adverted.

The collection was in not less disorder. It was given to the lowest bidder; that is, to those who undertook the duty at the cheapest rate. These collectors paid over the funds levied by them to receivers, who acted as intermediate agents between them and the receiver-general. Both the one and the other were in arrear. The disorder prevailing in every department did not permit a strict eye to be kept upon them. Besides, the non-preparation of the assessments always furnished them with a plausible pretext for deferring the payments, and stock-jobbing with the means of making those payments in depreciated paper. In short, they received little, and paid less.

On the recommendation of M. Gaudin, the Consuls were not afraid to revert to certain practices of the old government, which experience had proved to be sound and useful. Upon the improved model of the ancient administration of the *vingtièmes*, there was instituted the agency of direct contributions, hitherto constantly rejected, from the mischievous idea of leaving the local administrations to tax themselves. A director and an inspector in each department, and 840 comptrollers, distributed in greater or less numbers in the *arrondissements*, were themselves to perform the duty of preparing the assessments; that is to say, of drawing up the list of properties and persons, of ascertaining the changes which had taken place during the year, and of charging them with their fair proportion of the tax. Thus, instead of the 5000 commissioners of cantons, who could do no more than urge the communes to the preparation of the assessments, there were to be 99 directors, 99 inspectors, and 840 comptrollers, performing the duty themselves, at an expense to the state of

¹ The reader will perceive that this portion of the work was written some years ago.—Translator.

three millions instead of five. It was hoped that in six weeks this administration would be completely organized, and that in two or three months it would have finished the third part yet remaining to be made of the assessments of the year VII.—the last year; all those of the year VIII.—the current year; lastly all those of the year IX.—the next year.

Courage was required to overcome some prejudices, but General Bonaparte was not the man to let prejudices stop him. The legislative commissions, debating with closed doors, adopted the proposed plan after some observations. Guarantees were granted to such persons liable to the contribution as had claims to make—guarantees which have since been rendered more secure by means of the institution of councils of prefecture. The basis of all regular contribution was thus re-established.

This done, it was requisite to organize the collection and the payment of the funds into the treasury.

At the present day, in consequence of the perfect order which the Empire and the subsequent governments have successively introduced into our finances, the levy of the funds of the treasury is executed with a facility and regularity that leave nothing to be desired. Collectors receive, month by month, the *direct contributions*, that is to say the taxes imposed upon land, buildings, and persons, which they pay over to the particular receiver stationed in the principal place of every arrondissement, and the latter to the receiver-general resident in the chief town of the department. The receivers of the *indirect contributions*, consisting of customs levied on the frontiers upon foreign merchandise; duties of registration chargeable on transfers of property and on judicial acts; lastly, duties imposed upon articles of consumption of various kinds, such as liquors, tobacco, salt, &c.: the receivers of these contributions pay over the proceeds as they receive them to the particular receiver, and the latter again to the receiver-general, the real banker of the state, whose duty it is to amass the funds, and to dispose of them agreeably to the orders transmitted to him by the administration of the treasury.

The equal distribution of public burdens and the general prosperity have rendered the payment of taxes so easy at the present day; moreover, the periodical returns, which contain a summary of all the operations connected with the receipts and expenditure, have become so clear; that the taxes are paid on the day specified—frequently before—and that the precise date of their receipt and appropriation is also known. Thus government has found means to establish a system grounded on the truth itself of facts, according as they take place. It is, therefore, the nature of *direct contributions* levied upon property and persons—which are thus a species of rent—that they are capable of being fixed before-hand, both as to the amount and as to the term of payment. They are demanded, therefore, a twelfth at a time, and monthly. The receivers are *debited* with them, that is to say, constituted debtors for their amount, every month. But it is pre-

sumed that they have not received them till two or three months after each twelfth or instalment is due, in order to leave them the means of exercising forbearance towards the payers; and, at the same time, to create in themselves a motive for collecting in the tax, for, if they receive it before the time at which they have to pay it in, they derive a profit, by interest, proportionate to the despatch of the collection. It is, on the contrary, the nature of *indirect contributions*—which are levied only upon the importation of foreign goods into France, upon transfers of property, or upon the consumption of articles of different sorts—that they are received but irregularly, and according to the extent of the transactions in the articles upon which they are laid. The receivers are therefore *debited*, that is to say, constituted debtors, for them, at the very moment when they come into their hands, and not by twelfths and monthly, as is the practice with *direct contributions*. Every ten days the receiver-general is constituted debtor for what has come in during the past ten.

As soon as he is *debited*, no matter for what kind of contribution, the receiver-general pays interest upon the sums with which he is *debited*, till the day that he pays them away for account of the public services. On the other hand, from the day that he pays any sum whatever on account of the state, before he is in debt to it, the state, in its turn, gives him credit for the interest. A balance is afterwards struck between the interest owing by the receiver-general upon the sums that have remained in his hands beyond the time prescribed, and the interest due by the treasury upon the sums that have been advanced to it; so that not a single day's interest is lost either by the one or the other; and the receiver-general becomes a real banker, having a running account with the treasury, obliged to hold constantly at the disposal of the government the funds which the wants of the service may require, no matter to what extent.

Such is the system which experience on the one hand, and the improved circumstances of the tax-payers on the other, have gradually introduced in the collection of the funds of the treasury.

But at the period, the history of which we are recording, the taxes came in irregularly, and the system of accounts was confused. The collector, who was in arrear, might allege the delay in the preparation of the assessments, or the distress of those from whom they were to be levied. He might, moreover, conceal the amount of his receipts, owing to the want of clearness in the returns of the operations. The government knew not, as at present, what was passing every day in the several thousand coffers, great and small, composing the general exchequer of the state.

M. Gaudin proposed, and prevailed on General Bonaparte to adopt, a system borrowed in a great measure from the old government, an ingenious system, which has gradually led us to the organization at present established. This system was that of bills of the receivers-general. These receivers, real bankers of the treasury, as we have called them, were to

give bills, falling due from month to month, for the total amount of the direct contributions, that is to say, for 300,000,000*fr.* of the 500,000,000*fr.* then composing the budget of the state. These bills, when due, were made payable at the office of the receiver-general. To compensate for the delay afforded to the contributor in paying his tax, it was assumed that each twelfth was discharged about four months after the period when it was due. Thus the bills for the twelfth, payable on the 31st of January, were to be drawn so as to fall due on the 31st of May; by which means the receiver-general, having before him a term of four months, was at once enabled to grant indulgence to the payer of the tax, and stimulated to obtain payment earlier; for, if he could collect it before the expiration of two months instead of four, he gained two months' interest.

This combination, besides possessing the advantage of sparing the payer of the tax and interesting the collector in collecting it, had the merit of preventing the receivers-general from delaying payment. For the treasury had bills of exchange upon them at a fixed date, which they were obliged to pay upon pain of their being protested. Such a combination, it is true, was not possible till after the preparation of the assessments, and the ensurance of collections; the receivers-general being unable to pay punctually unless they were supplied punctually. But, this being accomplished by the means which we have stated, it was easy to establish the system of bills; and independently of the advantages enumerated, it was attended with this, that, on the first day of the year, it placed at the disposal of the treasury the 300,000,000*fr.* of direct contributions, in bills of exchange, which could be surely and easily discounted.

To give credit to this paper, destined to answer the purpose which the royal *bons* fulfil at this day in France, and the exchequer bills in England, the *caisse d'amortissement*—sinking fund—was devised. This institution, which we shall see, ere long, intrusted with the management of the entire public debt, had at first no other object than to support the bills of the receiver-general. The manner in which this was managed was as follows. The collectors of the public money, as a guarantee for their operations, gave at that time a security in immovable property only. This kind of security, exposing the state to the difficulties of a forced ejectment, when it was obliged to proceed against the grantor, did not sufficiently answer the object of its institution. It was therefore determined to require of the receivers a security in money. They were then making such large profits, by jobbing with the produce of the tax itself, as to submit cheerfully to this condition rather than resign their posts.

These securities, paid into the *caisse d'amortissement*, were destined to serve as a guarantee to the bills. Every bill, when due, was to be paid at the office of the receiver-general, or, in default, at that of the *caisse d'amortissement*, which was to discharge it on presentation, if attested, out of the security of the grantor.

The bill, in consequence, immediately equalled in character the best commercial paper. Nor was this the only advantage of this combination. Probably a small portion of the securities might suffice to uphold the credit of the bills, for few of the receivers-general would be tempted to suffer their paper to be protested: the surplus would then be left at the disposal of the treasury, which might settle for it with the *caisse*, by ceding to it immovable property or *rentes*.

The government had, therefore, by means of this institution, the advantage of giving assured currency to the bills, and of procuring for itself a certain sum in cash, that might be made forthwith available—a resource which, just then, came most seasonably.

Such was the system of collection and of payment, which in a short time set the treasury at its ease. It consisted, as we have seen, in making up the assessment of contributions, and in putting them in a train to be collected with punctuality and despatch; secondly in drawing bills on the principal receivers for the total amount of the tax—bills readily discounted, owing to the means devised to enable the receivers-general to discharge their obligations themselves, which otherwise the *caisse d'amortissement* could discharge for them.

We have adverted to the direct contributions only. As for the indirect contributions, which did not come in regularly, or by twelfths, the receivers-general were, after the receipt of them, but not till then, to transmit to the treasury bills *at sight* on their chest; so that these were not available till after the drawer had received the amount. This part of the service, which left too great an enjoyment of funds to the receivers-general, was subsequently improved.

At the moment of the introduction of every new system, there are inconveniences of transition, arising from the difficulty of adjusting the present state of things with that which one purposes to create in its stead. Thus the *bons d'arrérages* delivered to the annuitants, the *bons de réquisition* delivered to the farmers, whose commodities had been taken on the spot, lastly, the *délégations* on funds to be paid into the chests, delivered with a culpable license to certain contractors, were likely to derange all the calculations. Different methods were adopted to remedy the inconveniences which resulted from the presence of all this paper in circulation. The *bons d'arrérages*, given to the annuitants, had exclusively the favour of being still received in payment of taxes; but the amount of them for the current year was known, and by so much the sum of the obligations which the receivers-general were to subscribe was diminished.

As for the *bons de réquisition* and the *délégations*, papers of suspicious origin, and the amount of which was unknown, they were subjected to a particular liquidation. They were discharged at a later period, partly with national property, partly with paper of different kinds and with due regard to equity.

By paying the annuitants in money, as it was proposed soon to do, whenever the due receipt of the contributions should be secured—by

providing for the armies, and relieving them from the necessity of recurring to the system of requisitions—and by obstinately refusing to the contractors the irregular *delegations*, which had before been granted to them on the receipts of the treasury, the government could not fail to dry up the source of the paper circulation, and to re-establish everywhere the collection of taxes in cash.

With these means, devised for insuring the revenues of the state, were combined measures, some of them quite legitimate at any time, others still having the character of expedients and the excuse of necessity. The purchasers of national domains, doing as every body then did, that is to say, disregarding the laws, withheld the price of the immovable property which they had bought. They were required to pay it within four months, upon pain of forfeiture. This obligation could not but bring in a great part of the papers in circulation, which was specially receivable in payment for national domains. Certain classes of purchasers were to pay a portion of the price in cash. For this portion they were obliged to sign negotiable engagements. These papers were safe and easy to be disposed of; for those who had signed them were threatened with the loss of their purchases, if they suffered their engagements to be protested.

National domains to the value of 300,000,000*fr.* or 400,000,000*fr.*, still remained unsold. This value, entirely hypothetical, founded on the estimates of 1790, might, if better times were waited for, be worth double, treble, and even more. The best course would have been not to dispose of them. Urgent necessity, however, caused recourse to be had to a new alienation. It was decided that *rescriptions*, representative of the price of the domains proposed to be sold, should be negotiated to speculators, to the amount of 150,000,000*fr.* Luckily, a very small part only of this sum was issued.

Lastly, a scheme was adopted for representing by paper of the same kind the capital of certain ground-rents belonging to the state, which anterior laws had permitted the debtors to redeem. This produced well-nigh 40,000,000*fr.* The parties who owed these rents had ceased to pay them, without having, however, effected their redemption. Paper, destined to represent this capital of 40,000,000*fr.*, and negotiable, like the *rescriptions* on the national domains, through the medium of stock-brokers, was issued.

These emissions of artificial securities were the last concessions made to pressing wants. Disposed of to speculators, they were destined to procure some resources till the re-establishment of the finances, which there was reason to expect from the punctual preparation of the assessments, and the system of the bills of the receivers-general. For the rest, these papers, as we shall see by and by, were issued with great reserve, and had not the usual disadvantageous effect, namely, the depreciation and the alienation at a low price of the resources of the state.

The solidity of these various schemes, undoubtedly good in themselves, depended en-

tirely on the solidity of the government itself. Founded on the supposed return of order, they would yield the results which were hoped from them, if order were actually restored; if the executive power displayed vigour and perseverance in the execution of its plans; if it organized well and speedily the new administration of the direct contributions; if it took constant care to require that the assessments should be made out, and put in train to be collected within the time prescribed; if it provided that the bills of the receivers-general should be subscribed and paid when due; if it saw that the securities should be promptly furnished and deposited in the *caisse d'amortissement* in sufficient amount to uphold the credit of the bills; if, finally, it abandoned for ever those ruinous expedients, such as *bons d'arrérages*, *bons de réquisition*, and *delegations*, which it had promised itself to renounce. If all this were effected, government was certain to obtain the beneficial results which were expected from the new financial system. There was reason to hope for this too from the intelligence and firmness of General Bonaparte. All these plans he had himself discussed, approved, nay, frequently modified and improved. He appreciated their importance and their merit, and he was firmly resolved to see that they were strictly executed. No sooner were they decided upon than they were sent to the legislative commissions, which converted them into laws, without the loss of a moment. Twenty days sufficed for conceiving, for digesting, for clothing them with a legal character, and for carrying them partly into effect. General Bonaparte was at work several times a week with the minister of finance, and he thus took the best method of putting an end to those pernicious *delegations*, which were frequently granted on the solicitation or through the corrupting influence of the contractors. Every week he made the ministers bring him a statement of their necessary expenses, compared it with the statement of the probable receipts furnished by the treasury, and divided among them the real resources, in proportion to the wants of each. He disposed, therefore, of that only which was certain to be collected; and, in consequence of this firmness, the principal abuse, that of the *delegations*, was destined very soon to disappear.

In the mean time, till the assessments should be completed, and put in train for collection, and till the bills of the receivers-general should be transmitted to the treasury and discounted, the government had for its present wants, besides the 12,000,000*fr.* lent by some of the bankers, the sums lodged by the receivers-general in the *caisse d'amortissement*; whatever amount could be raised, through stock-brokers, upon the newly-created securities; and, lastly, the current income or receipts, with which, imperfect as it was, a shift had hitherto been made. The confidence inspired by the Provisional Consuls had a good effect upon the brokers; means were found to negotiate the new securities now, though not a creature would have taken them a few days before.

It was by these united means that the government was enabled to relieve the naked and

famished armies, and to procure for them a first supply, of which they were in such urgent want. So great was the disorder that, even at the office of the minister of war, there were no returns of the troops, their number, or their quarters. The office of the artillery was the only one which possessed returns of this kind for the troops of that arm. But, as the army was neither fed nor clothed, as the battalions of conscripts, raised in the departments and equipped with the *bons de fourniture*, had been most frequently organized without the intervention of the central authority, the latter knew scarcely any thing concerning them. General Bonaparte was obliged to send officers of the staff to the armies themselves to procure such documents as he wanted. He transmitted, at the same time, to the different corps, some supplies, but these very inadequate to the extent of their necessities. Addressing them, by proclamation, in that language which he could render so impressive to soldiers, he conjured them to have patience a few days longer, and to display, under hardships, the same courage which they had often displayed in battle.

"Soldiers," said he, "your wants are great; all possible measures are taken to supply them. The first quality of a soldier is constancy in enduring fatigue and privation; valour is but the second. Several corps have quitted their positions; they have turned a deaf ear to the voice of their officers. The 17th Light is of this number. Are they all dead then—those heroes who fought at Castiglione,¹ at Rivoli,² and at Neumark?³ They would have perished rather than abandon their colours, and they would have recalled their young comrades to honour and to their duty. Soldiers, your rations have not been regularly distributed, you say. What would you have done, if, like the 4th and 22d Light, and the 18th and 32d of the line, you had found yourselves in the midst of a desert, without bread or water, feeding on horses' and mules' flesh? 'Victory will give us bread,' said they—and you quit your colours!"

"Soldiers of Italy, a new general commands you; he was always in the advanced guard in the most brilliant days of your glory. Surround him with your confidence; he will restore victory to your ranks."

"I shall have a daily account sent me of the conduct of each corps, and especially of that of the 17th Light, and of the 63d of the line; they will recollect the confidence that I had in them."

The administration of the finances, and that of the armies, were not the only departments of the government which claimed, in a press-

ing manner, the attention of the new Consuls. It was necessary, at the same time, to revoke those severities, unworthy of a wise and humane government, which the violence of the parties had wrung from the weakness of the expiring Directory; it was necessary to maintain order, threatened here by the Vendéans in arms, there by the revolutionists, exasperated at the events of the 18th of Brumaire.

The first political measure of the new Consuls was relative to the law of the hostages. This law, which made the relations of the Vendéans and Chouans responsible for acts committed in the revolted provinces, punished some with imprisonment, others with transportation. It shared with the law of the progressive forced loan, and, with much better reason, the public animadversion. It was, in fact, only under the influence of the blind passions of this time, that men dared to hold the relations of the insurgents responsible for acts which they had not committed, even though they wished them success. The Consuls dealt with this law as they had done with the law of the progressive forced loan; they proposed its repeal to the legislative commissions, by which it was immediately decreed. General Bonaparte went himself to the prison of the Temple, where many of these hostages were confined, to break their fetters with his glorious hands, and to receive those numerous benedictions, which the reparative acts of the Consulate so invariably and so justly called forth.

To this measure were added others of a like kind, which stamped the policy of the Provisional Consuls with a character precisely similar. Many priests, though they had taken that oath, as to the civil constitution of the clergy, which became the origin of the schism, had nevertheless been persecuted. These priests, who were distinguished by the epithet *assermentés*—sworn—were some of them concealed or fugitives; others imprisoned in the isles of Ré and Oléron. The Consuls issued orders for the release of all who were still in confinement. This measure had the effect of drawing from their retreats, or bringing back to France, all the priests of the same class, who had sought their safety in flight or concealment.

Several emigrants, shipwrecked off Calais, had been for some time a subject of deep interest to the public mind. These unfortunate persons, placed between the horrors of shipwreck and the rigour of the laws against emigration, had not hesitated to throw themselves on the shore of France, not imagining that their country could be as pitiless to them as the tempest. The partisans of measures of

¹ CASTIGLIONE. On the 3d of August, 1796, Napoleon advanced with 25,000 men upon Lonato, while Augereau's division moved toward Castiglione. Both attacks were completely successful, Napoleon cutting the Austrian army in sunder, and Augereau, after some very hard fighting, carrying the town of Castiglione and driving the Austrians back upon Mantua.—*Alison*, i. 410.

In these battles the Austrians had thirty thousand men. There were 18,000 at Castiglione. Lypiat formed the advanced guard, so that it required all the vigour of his excellent division, reinforced by the reserve of cavalry, to take the town and beat the enemy.—*Montolieu*, *Mémoires*, i. 10.

² RIVOLI. Fought on January 14, 1797, between 40,000

men under Alvinzi and Quasdonovich, and Napoleon with 20,000. At first the chances of the day appeared to be against the French, but by a wily ruse their leader outwitted the Austrian chiefs and gained a complete victory.—*Alison*, i. 418.

The armies of Alvinzi and Provera were stronger than is supposed. Their loss amounted to 30,000 killed, wounded, or prisoners, the number of the last being 19,000 men.—*Montolieu*, *Mémoires*, i. 21.

³ NEUMARK. An affair in the Tyrol, April 2, 1797, between the Austrians under the Archduke Charles, and the French division of Massena. The gorge, though of terrific strength, was forced, almost instantly, the imperialists losing 1500 men.—*Alison*, i. 405.

severity alleged, and the thing was nearly certain, that these emigrants were going to Vendée, to take part in the renewal of the civil war; and thence they argued that it was right to apply to them the terrible laws of the time against emigration. But public humanity, luckily awakened, was adverse to this mode of reasoning. The question had been several times resolved in a contrary spirit. At the instigation of the new Consuls it was finally decided that these emigrants should be liberated, but transported out of the territories of the Republic. Among them were several members of the highest families in France, and, in particular, that Duke de Choiseul, whom we have since found invariably among the steady friends of a discreet liberty, the only liberty that honest men can love and defend.

The acts which we have just recorded gave universal satisfaction. Admire the difference that may exist between one government and another! Had these acts emanated from the Directory, they would have been termed unworthy concessions made to the emigrant party! Emanating from the new consular government, at the head of which figured an illustrious general, whose presence, wherever he might happen to be, instantaneously suggested the idea of strength, these acts were regarded as signs of a vigorous but moderate policy. So true it is, that to be moderate with honour and with advantage, one must needs be powerful!

In this first moment, it was only in regard to the revolutionary party that the policy of the Provisional Consuls was deficient in moderation. It was against this party that they had striven in the recent struggle on the 18th and 19th of Brumaire. Some irritation and distrust were naturally felt towards it; and, among these acts of a conciliatory and reparative policy, severity was exercised against it alone. The news of the 18th of Brumaire had produced a strong sensation among the patriots of the South. The societies affiliated to the parent society of the Riding-House, formed in Paris, manifested redoubled indignation. It was reported that the deputies, deprived by the law of the 19th of Brumaire of their quality of members of the legislative body, were about to assemble at Toulouse, for the purpose of installing there a sort of Directory. General Bonaparte, now that he had in his hands the government and the army, was afraid of nothing. He had shown, on the 13th of Vendémiaire, that he well knew how to quell insurrections, and he felt no uneasiness about what a few hot-headed patriots, without soldiers, were likely to do. But his colleagues, Sieyès and Roger-Ducos, had not the like confidence. Several of the ministers joined them, and they persuaded him that it was necessary to take precautions. Inclined himself, from disposition, to energetic measures, though disposed to moderation from

policy, he consented to doom thirty-eight members of the revolutionary party to transportation, and eighteen others to confinement at La Rochelle. Among the number were several wretches, one, in particular, who boasted of having murdered the Princess de Lamballe; but there were also honourable men, members of the two Councils, and one distinguished and respectable personage, General Jourdan. His public opposition to the 18th of Brumaire had at the moment excited some apprehensions. To inscribe the name of such a man on such a list was a fault upon a fault.

Public opinion, though unfavourably disposed towards the revolutionists, treated this measure with coldness and almost with censure. Such was the aversion to severity, to reactions, that they were disapproved, even when exercised against those who had themselves hesitated at nothing. Remonstrances poured in from all quarters, and some of them from very high ones, in favour of certain names included in this list of proscription. The Court of Cassation presented a memorial in behalf of one of its members, Xavier Audouin, who had not deserved that so much trouble should be taken on his account. M. de Talleyrand, always mild from disposition, always adroit in his proceedings, whom the revolutionary party had contributed by its aversion to keep out of the ministry of foreign affairs, had the good feeling to interpose in favour of one Jorry, who had publicly insulted him. He did so, he said, for fear the insertion of this vulgar offender's name in the list of the new proscripts might be attributed to revenge on his part. His published letter did him honour, and saved the person for whom he pleaded. In compliance with a public demand, as it were, General Jourdan's name also was erased. Most fortunately, the speedy and favourable turn taken by events allowed the abrogation of this act, which was only an accidental deviation from a course otherwise firm and straightforward.

General Bonaparte had sent his devoted lieutenant, General Lannes,¹ to Toulouse. On the mere appearance of this officer, all preparations for resistance ceased. Tranquillity was restored in the city of Toulouse; the societies auxiliary to that of the Riding-House, in all the cities of the South, were put to silence. The hot-headed revolutionists soon saw that public opinion, re-acting against them, was no longer in their favour, and they perceived at the head of the government a man whom nobody could hope to be able to resist. Besides, the more rational of them could not forget that it was this same man who, on the 13th of Vendémiaire, had dispersed the royalist bands of the sections of Paris, which had risen against the Convention; and who, under the Directory, by lending a hand to the government, had furnished it with the means of

¹ LANNES. Born at Lectoure, in Normandy, in 1769, the son of a poor mechanic. He served first in the Pyrenees. In 1795, was chief of brigade under General Lefebvre. Was employed by Bonaparte in the affair of the Sections, and afterward joined the army of Italy. Distinguished himself at Millesimo, and was the first man across the bridge of Lodi. Napoleon himself being second. In

Egypt, he was foremost in every danger, fought desperately at Aboukir, and was severely wounded at Acra. He returned to France with Napoleon, and assisted in overturning the Directory.

He was one of the best of Napoleon's generals, though at first his during predominated over his judgment.—*Camp and Court of Napoleon* II.

bringing about the 18th of Fructidor. They submitted, therefore; the most violent uttering some cries of rage which were soon stifled; the others hoping at least that under the military government of the new Cromwell, as they then called him, the Revolution and France would not be conquered for the advantage of the Bourbons, the English, the Austrians, and the Russians.

A single act of resistance, not by force, but by legal means, was offered to the 18th of Brumaire. The president of the criminal tribunal of the Yonne, named Barnabé, following the example of the ancient parliaments, refused to register the law of the 19th of Brumaire, constituting the provisional government. This magistrate, denounced to the legislative commissions, was charged with having refused to perform his duties, suspended, and removed from his seat. He submitted to his fate with resignation and dignity.

The speedy defeat of these attempts at resistance allowed the government to rescind a measure, which was in contradiction with its prudent policy. On a report from Cambacérés, minister of justice, stating that order was re-established in the departments, and that the laws were everywhere executed without impediment, the transportation decreed against the thirty-eight individuals, and the confinement at Rochelle of eighteen others, were commuted into mere *surveillance*, and this, too, was soon discontinued.

This measure was soon eclipsed by the series of sensible, judicious, and vigorous acts which marked the new government. La Vendée had, in its turn, created some uneasiness. A recent rising had been attempted toward the end of the Directory. But the accession of General Bonaparte completely changed the face of things, and the views entertained in all parts of the Republic. The leaders of the new royalist insurrection had been excited to take up arms as much by the late severities of the Directory, as by the hope of the speedy overthrow of that government. But, on the one hand, the repeal of the law of hostages, the liberation of priests, the grant of life to the shipwrecked emigrants, had a conciliatory effect; while, on the other, the attainment of General Bonaparte to power put an end to all hope of witnessing the dissolution of the order of things which had sprung from the Revolution. The 18th of Brumaire had been productive of a change of sentiment in La Vendée, as in other quarters, and given birth to feelings altogether new.

The royalist chiefs, some of whom were fighting in the fields of La Vendée, while others were in Paris engaged in political intrigues, worked up, like every party which seeks to overturn a government, to a continual activity of mind, and incessantly in quest of new combinations for rendering their cause triumphant, conceived that there might perhaps be some way of coming to an understanding with General Bonaparte. They thought that so eminent a personage could not be very desirous of

figuring for a few days on the shifting stage of the French Revolution, only to disappear, like his predecessors, in the abyss opened beneath their feet; and that he would much rather occupy a place in a peaceable and regularly constituted monarchy, of which he would be the ornament and support. They were, in short, so credulous as to hope that the part of Monk would suit a man who considered even that of Cromwell as not great enough for him. They availed themselves of the medium of one of those foreign diplomatic agents, who, under the pretext of studying the country to which they are accredited, dabble in all the underhand intrigues of parties; and thus obtained an introduction to General Bonaparte. Messrs. Hyde de Neuville, and D'Andigné,¹ were the royalists who ventured upon this step.

It is unnecessary to demonstrate how very erroneous the judgment which they had formed of General Bonaparte must have been. This extraordinary man, now sensible of his strength and his greatness, would not be the servant of any party. If he was not fond of disorder, he was fond of the Revolution; if he did not believe in the full extent of liberty, he wished at least to carry out, to its fullest extent, that social reformation which it aimed at accomplishing. He desired, therefore, to appropriate the triumph of this revolution; he desired the glory of bringing it to the close, of causing it to end in a peaceable and regular state of things: he desired to remain the leader of it, under, it mattered not what title, and with, it mattered not what form of government. But, to submit to be an instrument in the hands of any power, other than that of Providence, he had already too much glory, and was too conscious of his own powerful superiority.

He received, therefore, Messrs. Hyde de Neuville and D'Andigné, listened to their insinuations, more or less perspicuous as it might be, declared frankly his intention of putting an end to persecution, of reconciling the different parties to the government, but of suffering none to become ascendant save that of the Revolution itself, of the Revolution in its best signification. He declared to them formally his resolution to treat with the chieftains of La Vendée on reasonable terms, or in default of that, to exterminate them to a man. The interview therefore led to nothing unless it were the making the royalist party better acquainted with the character of General Bonaparte.

While these communications were in progress between General Bonaparte, and some of the friends of the Bourbons in Paris, others were going forward in La Vendée itself between the insurgent leaders and the generals of the Republic. Toward the close of the Directory when no one knew to whom obedience was due, a sort of slackness nearly akin to disloyalty crept into the ranks of the army which guarded La Vendée, and more than one republican officer, doubting the continued existence of the Republic, had begun to turn their eyes toward the royalist faction. Every thing having

¹ HYDE DE NEUVILLE. D'ANDIGNÉ. Two agents of the Bourbons in Paris; they were received by Napoleon, and engaged to bring over the Vendean chiefs.

Hyde de Neuville appeared a young man of intellect, ardent, without being passionate. Andigné appeared a madman.—Gourgaud, *Mémoires* i 127.

changed, on the accession to power of General Bonaparte, these communications, previously dangerous, now became useful to the state, and the parleys took a different turn.

The royalist chiefs, who had been bringing over to their party the officers of the Republican army, were in their turn brought over by those very officers to the government of the Republic. It was not difficult to convince them how trifling must be the hope of conquering the conqueror of Italy and Egypt; and how great on the contrary was that of obtaining at his hands a mild and restorative sway which should render the condition of all parties grateful and peaceable. Such language failed not of success. There was, at this crisis, a wise, conciliatory, and faithful general, at the head of the army of the west; a man, much employed by General Hoche,¹ from the period of the first pacification of La Vendée—General Hedouville.² He grasped at once all these clues, and offered to place them in the hands of the new Consul.

He took possession of them instantly, and ordered General Hedouville to treat with the Vendean leaders. These leaders, intimidated by the presence of General Bonaparte at the helm of affairs, showed themselves well disposed to treat. It was difficult to sign a capitulation, and to agree upon the articles thereof without some delay; but an armistice did not present the same objections. It was proposed to sign one forthwith. It was accepted on behalf of the government, and in a few days Messrs. de Châtillon, d'Autichamp, and de Bourmont signed a suspension of hostilities for La Vendée and a part of Brittany. It was proposed moreover that application should be had to Georges Cadoudal and to M. Frotté, in order to the adoption of the same in Morbihan and Normandy.

There was no loss of time in this action of the new government, for it was concluded in the beginning of Frimaire, about twenty days after the installation of the Provisional Consuls. It gave general satisfaction, and led to the idea that the pacification of La Vendée was nearer than in truth it was.

Some rumours of the same nature, with regard to foreign powers, led also to the hope, that under the lucky star of Bonaparte, the prompt re-establishment of European peace might be expected.

As it has been already stated at the opening of this book, Prussia and Spain alone were at peace with France; the first always showing a degree of coldness, the second of embarrassment, in her connection with us. Russia, Aus-

tria, England, and all the small powers dependent on them, whether in Italy or Germany, waged deadly war against the French republic. England, to whom the question of war was but a question of finance, had solved that question to her satisfaction, by establishing an *income tax* which gave her abundant revenues. She was resolved, therefore, to continue the war, in order to gain time for the seizure of Malta, which she was blockading; and for the reduction, by means of a blockade likewise, of the French army in Egypt. Austria, in the possession of all Italy, preferred risking all to surrendering that conquest. But the chivalrous Paul the First, who had rushed into warfare under the inspiration of his mad enthusiasm, had recently seen his arms disgraced at Zurich, and had therefore conceived a violent resentment against all the world, but especially against Austria. He had been persuaded into the belief that she was the sole cause of this misfortune; for her soldiers, who ought, according to a concerted movement, to have advanced upon the Rhine and left Switzerland to the Russians, had abandoned the position of Zurich too hastily, and left Korsakoff exposed alone to the blows of Massena; who, when he had overthrown Korsakoff, had little to do in overpowering Suwaroff. Paul the First saw, in this, the act of an interested, perhaps of a treacherous ally. Distrust once awakened, all naturally appeared to him every day more suspicious. He had, he said, taken arms only to support the weak against the strong, and to replace on their thrones the princes whom the French republic had cast down. Then Austria had hoisted her own standard everywhere in Italy, and had not recalled to that country any of the dethroned princes. He began saying to himself that, acting from pure generosity, he was the dupe of his allies, who acted solely from interested motives. Fickle to excess, he gave himself up to these new sentiments, as violently as a short time before he had surrendered himself to feelings directly opposite to these. One last fact had exasperated him in the highest—that the Russian flag had been struck at Ancona, and the Austrian ensign hoisted in its place. It was but the misconduct of an inferior officer, but the wrong, such as it was, grievously incensed him.

The sentiments of absolute princes, in spite of all their pretensions to secrecy, escape as readily as those of free nations. Those can, in truth, be no more easily restrained than these. This new result of the battle of Zurich was beginning to be known in Europe, and

¹ HOCHÉ. Born in 1768. At fourteen, a stable boy in the employment of Louis XVI. At sixteen, entered the French guard. In 1790, carried them over to the people. Exchanged into the municipal guard; and in 1792 was a lieutenant. Served with Dumouriez in Holland. Defended Dunkirk against the Duke of York. In 1793, general of division and commander of the army of the Moselle.

After a series of splendid successes, he drove the Austrians out of Alsace, fell under the suspicions of the Directory, was banished to Nice, arrested and imprisoned in the Conciergerie, was liberated, conquered and pacified La Vendée. In 1796, appointed commander of the Irish invading army, his armament was dispersed by a storm. In 1797, appointed commander of the army of the Sambre and Meuse, and in four days won three

pitched battles and five skirmishes. Died at twenty-nine, of consumption.—*Biographie Moderne*.

Victories, a great pacification, a genius equal to all things, a probity without a stain, a universal idea that he alone could have competed with the conqueror of Rivoli, and the Pyramids, that his ambition would have remained republican, and proved a barrier to that ambition which pretended to a throne; in one word, high achievements, high conjectures, twenty-nine years—these things make his memory. It is surely beautiful enough; let us not regret that he died in youth.—*Honourable George Sidney Smythe*.

² HEDOUVILLE was born in 1755. He had achieved nothing particularly remarkable at this time. Bonaparte subsequently sent him as French ambassador to the court of Russia.

that was not the least advantage we derived from it.

Austria and England had, on this news, redoubled their attentions to Paul the First. They had loaded Suwaroff, the invincible Suwaroff—as he was called until he met Massena—they had loaded him, I say, with honours of every kind; but not by that had they calmed the vexation of the Russian general, or the resentment of the Czar. An entirely new manifestation, on the part of Paul the First, gave rise to apprehension that he was ere long about to abandon the coalition.

In the outburst of his first zeal for the coalition, he had declared war on Spain, because she made common cause with France, and had been on the point of declaring it on Sweden, Denmark, and Prussia, because those cabinets chose to remain neuter. He had broken all relations with Prussia. But since the late events he appeared to be much softened with regard to these courts, against which he was at first so bitter, and he had even sent to Berlin a diplomatist strictly in his confidence, who was to go thither in the character of a private traveller, but with the secret charge of re-establishing relations between the courts of France and Prussia.

We had at that time in Berlin a discreet and able agent, M. Otto,¹ who, since that time, has been so fortunate as to attach his name to the most important acts of the epoch. He had informed the government of the new state of things. It was indeed evident that, if peace were considered more desirable than war, the key of the crisis was at Berlin. Spain, thrust by her geographical position into a corner of Europe, and by the weakness of her government into a corner as to politics, could be of no utility. But Prussia, situate in the midst of the belligerent powers, having continued neutral in spite of their remonstrances, ill-regarded at first by all the cabinets during the early heat of the coalition, but judged more favourably as they grew calmer—Prussia was rapidly becoming a centre of influence, the more so as Russia seemed ready to approach her. What had been termed pusillanimity, was now called wisdom. This court, should she take up with energy the part which seemed to be thrust upon her by events, might serve as a bond of union between France and Europe, might even impose her mediation on the rest; a mode of action, at a later day, much used, and with much profit; the interposing, namely, between exhausted adversaries and

gathering all the fruits of a war, one has no waged, by a peace which he has dictated. Had she dared to do this, never from the days of the great Frederic would she have played a nobler part.

There was, at this time, on the throne of Prussia, a young king, of honourable principles and upright intentions, a sincere lover of peace, who never ceased to deplore his father's error in dissipating by an insane war against the French Republic, the military glory, and vast treasure accumulated by the great Frederic. At this moment, being in amicable relations with the French Republic, he profited of them to recruit by his economy the treasures left by his great uncle, and wasted by his father. At the king's side was a minister of talent, M. d'Haugwitz,² endowed with the highest talent for evading difficulties; like his master, a partisan of peaceful policy, but more ambitious than he, and believing that from a well-directed neutrality greater aggrandisement might accrue to Prussia than from war itself. At this time, that might have been true. He urged his master, therefore, to assume actively the part of Mediator and Pacificator of the Continent. This part doubtless was an arduous one for the young and timid Frederic William, but this prince could have played it to a greater or less extent, and have assumed a portion, if not the whole of it.

General Bonaparte having perceived all this immediately applied himself eagerly to the proposition of the court of Berlin. It had, at a previous period, been useful to him to be a member of the Institute; so that he could figure under that title in certain solemnities in which it did not suit him to appear politically, especially in the celebrated fêtes of the 21st of January. It was now useful to him to be a general, and to have aids-de-camp whom he could send whither it seemed good to him. The idea occurred to him of following the example of princes ascending the throne, who announce their accession by the mission of great dignitaries. He in fact did the same thing, with less pomp, despatching one of his aides-de-camp to Berlin, a step which a statesman of a purely military character might certainly venture on taking, without transcending the privileges of his office.

Among those who served him in this capacity was one, prudent, discreet, intelligent, uniting perfect manners to an agreeable exterior. This was Duroc,³ who had returned from Egypt with his general, bearing on his brow a

¹ OTTO. Born at Strasburg, in 1753. Was mentioned to the government by the university of that city as a capital man in the diplomatic line. From 1777 to 1778 secretary of legation to Bavaria. Then secretary of legation to the United States, then minister of France to the same country until 1792. In 1793, having returned to France, head of the first political division in the administration of foreign affairs, until 1795; after which he was secretary of the embassy, and then chargé d'affaires at Berlin until 1800.—*Biographie Moderne*. H.

² HAUGWITZ. Prussian minister. A man of decided character and talents. H.

³ DUROC was a native of Nancy, in the department of La Meurthe. The son of a scrivener. Napoleon found him at the siege of Toulon, and interested himself in him immediately. He became his chief aid-de-camp, afterwards a leader of brigade, distinguished himself at the siege of Lissos; accompanied Bonaparte to Egypt,

and returned thence with him in 1798.—*Biographie Moderne*.

I have heard the emperor say at other times that, in his whole career, Duroc alone had possessed his blind confidence, and received all the outpourings of his heart. Duroc was not brilliant, but he had excellent judgment, and performed essential services, which his own modesty, and their own nature, conspired to keep unknown.—*Las Cases*.

"Duroc," said he, "had lively, tender, and secret feelings, which his exterior coldness led no one to expect. I was long without knowing him, so exact and regular was his conduct. It was only when my day's work was ended, and I was thinking of repose, that his began. Chance or accident only caused me to know him. Duroc was pure and moral, perfectly disinterested in receiving, and as generous in dispensing, favours"—*Las Cases Opinion of Napoleon*.

of the glory of the pyramids. The new Consul commanded him to repair immediately to Berlin, to carry thither his compliments to the King and Queen of Prussia, to present himself there as one merely charged with a mission of courtesy and deference, but to take the first opportunity of explaining the last revolution which had taken place in France, to set it forth as a return to order, to all wholesome usages, and, above all, to pacific intentions. Duroc was directed to flatter the young king, and to let him perceive that he would be accepted willingly, should he desire it, as the arbiter of future peace. The Republic relying on the victories of the Texel and Zurich, and on all those for which the name of General Bonaparte might be esteemed a pledge in future, could, without fearing for her dignity, present herself with the olive of peace in her hand.

While he was despatching Duroc to Berlin, General Bonaparte performed in the name of the Provisional Consuls, several other acts, which abroad must have borne the same interpretation. First of all, having delayed for some time the accession of M. de Talleyrand to foreign affairs, he at last called him to that office. No person more conciliatory, or better fitted to treat with Europe; more skilled to please, or even to flatter her; could have been placed there, and that too without lowering the French cabinet from its elevated position. We shall have other occasions for painting this singular and remarkable character. It will be enough to say at this moment that the choice alone of this person clearly proved that, without falling from energy into weakness, the government was passing from the politics of passion to the politics of calculation. There was nothing in M. de Talleyrand, even to the exquisite elegance of his manners, which was not an advantage to the new position which the government was desirous of assuming with regard to foreign powers.

General Bonaparte made some other diplo-

matic appointments conceived in the same spirit. Although M. Otto, who had been chargé d'affaires at Berlin since M. Sieyès had left that post, was an excellent agent, still he was but a chargé d'affaires. Another situation was assigned to him, in which he had the power of rendering himself very useful, and in his place General Beurnonville,¹ an old friend of La Fayette,² who had for a long time been a prisoner of Austria, and one of those members of the minority of the French revolution who had, in 1789, sincerely espoused the cause of the Revolution, was appointed.

General Beurnonville was a frank soldier, loyal, open-hearted, moderate in his opinions, and perfectly suited to the representation of the new government. For Austria, whose prisoner he had been for a long time, he entertained a degree of hatred, which was well calculated to render him popular at Berlin, where nearly the same sentiments were felt toward that power, as in the times of Frederick the Great.

We had as our representative at Madrid an old demagogue, without the slightest influence, who has left no name behind him in the diplomatic career into which chance alone cast him. He was replaced by a member of the constituent assembly, a prudent, intellectual, learned man, who has figured honourably in the diplomacy of the times; this was M. Alquier. To conclude, at Copenhagen, where the principles of maritime neutrality, openly violated by England, might lead to the growth of feelings, which it would be wise for us to cultivate, M. Bourgoing was nominated, in place of a creature of the Directory, Grouville³ by name. The choice in all these cases was excellent, and very proper, as indicating the spirit of prudence and moderation which was beginning to prevail in the relations of France with foreign powers.

To the choice of these men, the Consuls were desirous of adding some actions which might serve as a reply to a reproach widely spread

¹ BEURNONVILLE, PIERRE RYEL DE. General of division, war minister, member of the Conservative Senate, &c., &c. Born in 1753, at Champignerol, intended for the church but entered the army. Served under Dumouriez with distinction—war minister in 1793. Was sent to arrest Dumouriez at St. Amand, but was himself arrested and carried before Clarfalt, and detained at Olmutz until 1795. In 1797, was appointed to command the French army in Holland. In 1799, made inspector-general, and assisted Bonaparte in the revolution of the 9th and 10th of November, 1799.

² LA FAYETTE. Born in Auvergne. He volunteered his services to America, very early in the war of the Independence. Returned to France a major-general and a republican. He insisted, after the union of the three orders, on the removal of the troops from Paris. On the 15th of July, was appointed president of the Parisian National Guard. At the time of Louis XVI.'s flight he was accused by the Jacobins of aiding it, and by the royalists of causing his arrest. He shortly afterward resigned the command of the National Guard. Took the command of the central army at Metz, in 1793, was beat at Philippsburgh, but joined Gouvion. Attempted to persuade the king to leave Paris and repair to the army. After the catastrophe of August the 10th, he endeavoured to excite the army in favour of the king, and though he at first succeeded, he soon fled in distrust. He was declared an emigrant—treated as a prisoner by Austria and Prussia; and imprisoned first at Magdeburgh and then at Olmutz. In 1799, he was liberated at the request of Napoleon, withdrew to Hamburgh, and after the 18th Brumaire, retired to his estates, which were restored to him. The farther facts of his life, as regarding the consulate and empire, will be found

in the text; but it may be as well to state that, in August, 1831, he landed at New York on a visit to the United States, and was received throughout the country with the warmest enthusiasm. He passed through the twenty-four states in a sort of triumphal procession, all parties uniting to do him honour. He was sent home by the nation in the frigate Brandywine. In December preceding, Congress had made him a grant of 200,000 dollars and a township of land, "in consideration of his important services and expenditures during the American Revolution." In November, 1837, the Chamber of Deputies was dissolved, when La Fayette was again returned a member at the new elections. Shortly before 1830, travelling through Lyons, he was enthusiastically received there. During the Revolution of July, 1830, he was appointed general-in-chief of the National Guards of Paris, and, though not personally engaged in the fight, his name and activity were of great service. When the National Guards were established throughout the whole of France, he was appointed their commander-in-chief. Shortly afterward, he was made a marshal of France. He was soon after distrusted by the government, who feared his republican principles, and resigned his command. His virtues, his purity, and his love of liberty will ever render him a favourite with men.—*Encyclopedia Americana*.

³ GROUVILLE, a comic poet before the Revolution. The pupil and copyist of Champfort and secretary to the Prince of Condé. He declared in favour of the Revolution, and figured as a member of the society of 1799. He edited "the village paper" under Carutti. Was sent to Ilenmark as minister in 1793, and returned in February, 1796, but was again there in 1799. A weak, vain, cold, narrow-minded man.—*Biographie Moderne*.

in the courts of Europe, to the end that the French Republic incessantly violated the rights of nations, and the treaties made with her. Assuredly she had violated the rights of nations and her own treaties in a less degree than Austria, England, and all the other courts at war with us; but it was the custom to pretend that no relations could be entertained with a fickle, passionate government, incessantly represented by new men, who never held themselves bound either by their own engagements, or by the usages of the public right of Europe. This reproach might have been cast back with more justice against the European cabinets, which had done worse, without the excuse either of revolutionary passions, or of continual changes of government. To give a more just idea of the policy of the Consuls, Bonaparte performed a first act of justice towards the unhappy knights of Malta, to whom promises had been made on the seizure of their isle, that those of their order who spoke the French language should not be treated in France as emigrants. Yet they had not hitherto been permitted to enjoy this condition of their capitulation, whether as regarded their persons or their properties. General Bonaparte caused all the advantages of that capitulation to be granted to them.

With regard to Denmark also, he adopted a measure of excellent effect, and of equitable benevolence. There were, in the French ports, many Danish vessels, stopped under the Directory, in consequence of representations touching the rights of neutrals. They were reproached with not having caused the rights of maritime neutrality to be respected. With having allowed the English to visit them, and to seize the French property which composed their cargoes. The Directory had declared that it would make them undergo precisely the same violence which they had borne at the hand of England, in order to compel them to defend more energetically the principles of the law of nations, in virtue of which they sailed the ocean. This would certainly have been an act of justice, if, having the power to make their rights respected, they had not chosen to exert it. But the poor people did as alone they were able to do. And it was hard to punish them for violence on one hand, by violence on the other. In pursuance of this system, many of their traders had been arrested. General Bonaparte commanded that they should all be released, in token of a more moderate and more equitable policy.

Duroc, the envoy to Berlin, arrived there speedily, and was presented by M. Otto, who was yet there. According to the strict rules of etiquette, Duroc, a simple aide-de-camp, could not be placed in direct communication with the court. All these rules were, however, set aside in behalf of an officer attached to the person of General Bonaparte. He was received by the king, by the queen, and was constantly invited to Potsdam. Curiosity had as large a part as policy in this eagerness: for glory, beyond its own glitter, has also its material advantages in business. To see, to listen to the aide-de-camp Duroc, was, as I may say, to approach, though still at a distance, the extra-

ordinary man who occupied the world. Duroc had assisted at the battles of the Pyramids, of Mount Thabor, of Aboukir. A thousand questions were proposed to him, to which he replied moderately and simply. He appeared gentle, polite, moderate, deeply devoted to his general; and he conveyed the most favourable impression of the line of conduct which that general imposed on those about him. Duroc's success at Berlin was complete. The queen showed him the highest consideration, and on all sides the French Republic began to be spoken of in the most favourable terms. Duroc found the young king, very well pleased at seeing a new government arise in Paris, combining strength with moderation, very much flattered at being an object of attention at once to France and Russia, very desirous of playing the part of mediator, but at the same time more desirous than capable of doing so, and showing at all times great zeal and ardour to accomplish that end.

The success of this journey occupied all the courts of Europe, and resounded even to Paris. The idea of approaching peace began to circulate among the minds of all. A very specious circumstance, though really of very small importance, contributed strangely to the spread of this opinion.

The French and Austrian armies were face to face along the Rhine, and on the crests of the Alps and Apennines. On the Rhine they were divided by an obstacle sufficient to hinder any serious operation. For a passage of the Rhine by either party was a bold stroke, such as is tried only when a campaign is about to commence. Now it was the month of Frimaire, that is to say, December. It could not therefore be thought of. Skirmishes on the banks of the river became a mere wanton waste of blood.

For that frontier, then, an armistice was readily arranged. As to that of the Alps and Apennines, it was a different question. In the midst of that broken country, a well-combined operation in this or that valley might at any moment secure an enviable position for the resumption of hostilities. It was not desirable, therefore, to tie up the hands of the government in that quarter, and no armistice was made. But no attention was paid to any except that recently signed, touching the Rhine; and in the number of happy changes, which the world pleased itself at that time by expecting from the new government, was included the possibility, nay, more, the probability of an immediate peace.

In all public calamities there is some real, and some imaginary evil, the one tending to make the other insupportable. It is much accomplished, to put an end to the imaginary ill; for thereby the sensation of the real ill is diminished, and patience is imparted to the sufferer to await the cure, and, what is yet more, a disposition is given him to believe therein. Under the Directory, it was a settled matter, that nothing more was to be expected from a weak and inconsiderate government, which, for the suppression of factious proceedings, was willing to have recourse to violence, without obtaining any of the benefits of strong measures.

Every thing that proceeded from it was taken in ill part, no good was expected from it, no one would even believe it, when by chance it did accomplish some small matter. Victory—for in its last days of existence victory had appeared to return to it—victory, I say, which would have been counted as glory to others, had not sufficed to gain for it the smallest honour.

The accession of General Bonaparte, from whom men had accustomed themselves to hope all things in consequence of his success, had altered this tendency. The imaginary evil was cured. Confidence was restored, every thing was now taken in good part. Assuredly, the facts were good in themselves, for it was good to deliver up the hostages, to discharge the priests, and to show a pacific disposition toward Europe; but the world was predisposed to receive them as good.

A symptom of reconciliation, such as the reception of an aide-de-camp, or an armistice without any consequences, like that signed recently touching the Rhine, were hailed as pledges of peace. Such is the magic influence of confidence! To new-born governments it is all in all; and, as to that of the consuls, it was all-powerful already. Moreover, money flowed into the treasury, and from the treasury was sent to the armies, which now, content with this first satisfaction, patiently waited for that which was promised in future. In the presence of a force reputed to be superior to all chances of resistance, all parties yielded; the oppressors without the hope of persecuting farther, the oppressed trusting that they should now obtain toleration. The good already accomplished was doubtless great; but all that, which time had not permitted to reach accomplishment, expectation added as perfect.

One thing was already spread far and wide, from the daily report of those who had worked with the young consul. It was said that this soldier, above whom was rated no general of the present age, if any of the past, was a consummate manager of affairs, a clear-headed politician. All the leading men, with whom he had surrounded himself, and to whom he had often listened with attention, themselves in turn enlightened by the justice and rapidity of his perceptions, never came from his presence without being subjugated and filled with admiration. This they admitted the more willingly, because within a few days it had become the fashion both to think and to speak thus. Sometimes a false and unreal merit has been seen to captivate the public eye for a

moment; to fascinate all minds, and extort from them the most incredible exaggerations. But sometimes again it happens that real merit, true genius, inspires the same sort of caprice, and that caprice then becomes a passion.

It was but a month since General Bonaparte had possessed himself of the government, and yet the impression already made on all around him by his puissant intellect was no less profound than it was general. The good Roger-Ducos would not surrender his opinion of him. The humorist, Sieyès, little wont to yield to fashion, especially when he was not himself its favourite, admitted his superiority, and paid him the sincerest homage, by suffering him to act his pleasure. To those who admired him from conviction, were added those who admired him from interest; who, seeing in General Bonaparte the evident head of the new republic, set no bounds to the expression of their enthusiasm. He had, however, among his admirers those who were truly sincere, Messrs. de Talleyrand, Regnault de St. Jean d'Angely,¹ Rœderer,² Boulay de la Meurthe,³ Defermon,⁴ Real,⁵ Dufresne, &c., who repeated everywhere that such promptitude, such certainty, so wide a grasp of intellect, so marvellous an energy, had never been seen before. And it is true, that what he had effected in a month in all the departments of the state was immense, and—what is rarely the case—that the truth in this instance equalled the utmost scope of flattery.

On all sides he was looked upon as the man to whom the new constitution was bound to allot the greater share of executive power. No one wished for a Cromwell—that must be admitted to the honour of the worthy characters of that time; and the friends of the general were wont to say aloud that the parts of Cæsar and Cromwell were worn out and unworthy the genius and virtues of the young saviour of France. All parties wished to see such a concentration of authority in his hands, with certain guaranties in behalf of liberty, as would enable him to govern the Republic prosperously and mightily. Such was the desire of the moderate revolutionists, at that time the most numerous party. The ultra-revolutionists were determined to discover in the young general a Cromwell or a Cæsar, yet desired, at the same time, for the preservation of their own heads, or of their rational property, that he should have time granted him enough to drive away the Bourbons, and the

¹ REGNAULT, a barrister, deputy of the tiers-etat of St. Jean d'Angely to the States-General. At first attached to the popular party, but afterwards inclined to the royalists, and published a paper, *Le Courier de Versailles*, in their favour. He was an eloquent speaker, and mingled in all the business of those stirring times. In 1796 he attached himself to Bonaparte, followed him to Milan and Malta, and in 1799 was chosen a member of the council of state.—*Biographie Moderne*. H.

² RŒDERER, whose probity and noble sentiments he, Bonaparte, admired.—*Gourgaud*.

Counsellor in the parliament of Metz, sent thence as deputy of the tiers-etat, joined the revolutionary party. He proposed the abolition of religious orders, opposed the Catholic, as the national religion, and defended the Duke of Orleans. In 1798 he truckled to all parties, but finally compromised himself by siding with the king. After this he kept himself very quiet until the 18th Brumaire, when, with Volney and De Talleyrand, he was

most strenuous in bringing on the revolution of that day.—*Biographie Moderne*. H.

³ BOULAY DE LA MEURTHE, a barrister at Nancy at the period of the revolution, the cause of which he embraced with moderation, and continued to act throughout those stormy times, with dignity, consistency, and honour.—*Biographie Moderne*. H.

⁴ DEFERMON DES CHAPPELLIERES, a lawyer of Bretagne, deputy of the tiers-etat from Rennes. A moderate and consistent reformer throughout the revolution.

⁵ REAL, a native of the Austrian Netherlands. Public accuser to the criminal tribunal of Aug. 10, 1793. Then substitute for the attorney of the communes. Declared in favour of the revolution of May 31. Was very zealous in promoting levies against La Vendée. Was many times in great danger during the reign of terror, &c., for his defence of the Montagne, of the committee of No tes, the Vendemiaire, Royalists, &c. Active in the revolution of the 18th Brumaire.—*Biographie Moderne*. H.

Austrians. The royalists asked him to save them from the revolutionists, and to reconstitute the kingly power; nor were they without certain vague hopes that, after having reconstituted it, he would replace it in their hands, and they were disposed, in that case, to pay him for the restoration by assigning him the part of Constable to Louis the XVIII., should he insist on it.

Thus all parties conceded to him the supreme power, more or less absolutely, for a longer or shorter period, and under different views. Sieyès, the new legislator, had therefore the task of assigning him his place in the constitution which he was preparing. But M. Sieyès was a dogmatist, as a legislator; labouring according to the nature of things, as he understood them, and not according to circumstances, still less according to the character of any man, be he whom he might. This will appear from what follows:

M. Sieyès, while his indefatigable colleague was swaying the helm of state, had at length applied himself to his allotted task. To give a constitution to France—not one of those ephemeral constitutions, the absurd productions of factious ignorance and factious passion, but a learned constitution, one founded on his observations of society and the lessons of his experience—this had been the dream of his life. In his anxious and solitary meditations he was ever busied with this. He had thought it over amid the sincere but unreflected impulses of the Constituent Assembly, amid the grim furies of the Convention, amid the weakness of the Directory. In every epoch he had altered and remodelled his work; at length he had fixed it, and once fixed, nothing could induce him to alter his plan. He would sacrifice nothing to the circumstances of the times, not even to the greatest of those circumstances, Bonaparte; whose station it was nevertheless necessary that he should designate in a style suited to the genius and character of him who was to occupy it.

This singular legislator, always musing, but writing scarce more than he acted, had never written out his constitution. It was in his head, and he had now to produce it thence. Nor was this altogether easy to him, anxious although he was to see it produced and converted into law. He was urged strenuously to make it known, and he resolved at last on communicating his ideas to one of his friends, M. Boulay de la Meurthe, who took upon himself the task of transcribing it as fast as he should learn it from their conversations together. It is by these means that this remarkable conception was collected accurately, and handed down to posterity, of which it is well worthy.

M. Sieyès had made a powerful effort of mind toward the reconciling republican and monarchial principles; toward borrowing from each, that which each possessed most useful or most necessary. But thus borrowing, he had distrusted both too much. He had taken infinite precautions against the rule of demagogues on the one hand, of despots on the other. He had produced thus a wise and complicated work, but one in which all the parts depended one on the other. And if this con-

stitution, remodelled by and for General Bonaparte, should lose one of its counterpoises, its result could only be, contrary to the wish of its author, a pure despotism.

The first care of M. Sieyès in his combinations, was to keep them thoroughly defended from all passions of demagogues. Without entirely stripping the nation of that vast participation in public affairs, which it had enjoyed so unhappily for itself, he wished to leave it such powers only as it could not abuse. One word, which, perhaps, for the first time was in the mouth of every one, the term *representative government*, conveys an exact idea of what state men's minds were in at that epoch. It was meant by that term that the nation ought to take part in the government, only through intermediate hands; that is to say, that it ought to be represented; and, as we shall soon see, it was very indirectly that it was intended to be so.

The elections, under the Directory, had brought forward, in turn, the royalists at one time, the Jacobins at another, and it had been found necessary to exclude the former violently on the 18th Fructidor, the latter on the 22d Floreal. Moreover, the system of elections, and, above all, of direct elections, was greatly suspected by every one. Perhaps had they dared to reduce the whole number of electors to a hundred and fifty or two hundred thousand, they might have tried once more to brave the agitation of an election. But an electoral body reduced to a lower rate than ours would, perhaps, have wounded the spirits of men without reassuring them. Two hundred thousand electors granted to a nation which had been enjoying universal suffrage would have appeared an aristocracy; and at the same time the electors, however small their number, naming their members directly, with liberty to yield to all momentary passions, would have appeared a renewal of those constant reactions, which had been seen under the Directory. Direct but limited election, as it exists now among us, was not to be thought of in any combination. M. Sieyès, with his usual dogmatism, had made to himself a maxim. "*Confidence*," he used to say, "*should arise from beneath, and power ascend from aloft*." He had conceived, therefore, in order to realize this maxim, the system of national representation which I am about to lay before my readers.

Every individual of twenty-one years, being a French subject, was obliged, if he wished to enjoy his rights, to have himself inscribed on certain rolls, termed the civic register. This would form a number of five or six million citizens, admitted to the exercise of political rights. They were intended to assemble in their *arrondissements*, a territorial definition which did not as yet exist, but which was to be established, and to select every tenth man of their number. This appointment of the tenth man would give a primary list of from five to six hundred thousand persons. These five or six hundred thousand persons were to assemble again in their departments, and again selecting every tenth from their number, were called upon to form a secondary list of fifty or

sixty thousand citizens. These again making a last selection, and once more reducing themselves to a tenth, would constitute the last list, which would be limited to five or six thousand candidates. These three lists were called lists of notability. The first, of five or six hundred thousand individuals, was called the list of notability of the communes. Hence were to be chosen the members of municipal administrations, those of the councils of the arrondissements, and the administrators answering to these, such as mayors, the officers whom we now call sub-prefects, judges of the first instance, &c. The second list of fifty or sixty thousand individuals, was called the list of notability of the departments, and hence it was that the members of the councils of the departments, the officers now called prefects, the judges of appeal, &c., and, in a word, all functionaries of that class should be appointed. To conclude, the third and last list, of five or six thousand persons, composed the list of national notability, whence were to be taken, of necessity, the members of the legislative body, all the dignitaries of high rank, councillors of state, ministers, judges of the court of cassation, &c., &c. M. Sieyès, borrowing a figure from geometry, called this system a pyramid, to give an exact idea of this scheme of national representation, broad at the base and narrow toward the summit.

It will be seen that, without giving the nation the right of designating itself the members who should represent it, or the functionaries who should govern it, M. Sieyès limited his scheme to the formation of a list of candidates, from which should be drawn equally the representatives of the country, and the agents of the government. Each year the mass of citizens were to assemble, in order to strike off from the lists the names of those who should be unworthy to figure there, and to replace them by others. It is to be remarked that, if this power of designation were very indirect, it embraced not only the members of the deliberative assemblies, but the executive officers likewise. It was at the same time greater, and less than what ordinarily exists in the system of representative monarchy. At the same time, all those agents called to fulfil functions clearly special; all such as suppose no political confidence, accountants for instance; and all those agents called to the performance of duties so difficult, that merit, when it is found, ought to be appointed to them at once wherever it is found, such as generals, ambassadors, and the like—all those agents, I say, were not to be chosen of necessity from the lists of notability.

We have displayed the method by which M. Sieyès, following his maxim, expected to cause confidence to arise from beneath. We are now about to see how he would make power descend from aloft.

Under the influence of momentary impressions, he dreaded the power of election, because he had seen passionate electors name representatives as passionate as themselves. He renounced this method, therefore, and desired that from these lists of notability, formed by the public confidence, the legislative and executive powers should designate their own

members, and thus compose themselves. But, before entering into the mode of formation of these powers, it will be necessary to describe their organization. The legislative power was to be organized thus: first, the legislative body proper, placed between two bodies opposed one to the other, the tribunate and the council of state; then, apart from these and above them both, the conservative senate.

The legislative body was to be composed of three hundred members, hearing the laws discussed, but not debating themselves, and voting on them in silence. Now we shall see how and among whom the discussion was to be carried on.

A body of one hundred members, called the tribunate, with the duty of representing in this constitution the spirit of liberality, innovation, and contradiction, was bound to receive communications and propositions relative to laws; was bound to discuss them publicly, and to vote on them, but so far only as to ascertain whether it should urge their adoption or rejection on the legislative body. It was then bound to name three of its members, who should maintain before the legislative body the opinion which had prevailed within itself.

A council of state, the origin of that which now exists, but more considerable in importance and in attributes, was attached to the government, in order to digest the projected laws. It presented them to the legislative body, and sent three of its members to discuss them in opposition to the members of the tribunate. Thus, the council of state pleading in the affirmative, and the tribunate in the negative, supposing the latter to have voted against the law, the legislative body cast a silent vote to adopt or reject. Its vote alone gave the character of law to the propositions of the government. The council of state was, moreover, bound to complete the laws, by enactments necessary to their execution.

Last of all, we come to the senate. This body, composed of one hundred members, took no part in the work of legislation. Its duty was, either originating the action itself, or on the denunciation of the tribunate, to break any law or enactment of the government which should appear to it *unconstitutional*. On this account, it was called the *conservative senate*. It was intended to be composed of men who should have attained a ripe age; who should *ipso facto* by their admission to the senate be disqualified from any active duty, being of consequence exclusively confined to their duty of conservators; and who should have a considerable interest in its well performance, for it was M. Sieyès's intention that they should be liberally endowed.

Such was the distribution of the deliberative powers; and now of the mode of their formation.

The senate composed itself, electing its own members from the list of the national notability. Again, it appointed the members of the legislative body, of the tribunate, of the tribunal of appeal, choosing them by ballot from the same list of national notability.

The executive power was also the author of its own formation, choosing all its agents in that one of the three lists of notability etc

responding to the functions for which it should be necessary to provide. It took the ministers, the councillors of state, in short all the superior agents, from the list of national notability. It took from the list of notability of departments, first of all, those councillors of departments, who, like the council of state, were considered as being purely administrative authorities. It took thence, moreover, the prefects and functionaries of that territorial definition. Lastly, it found in the list of notability of communes, the municipal councils, the mayors, and all the officers of the same rank.

Thus, as M. Sieyès desired to have it: "*Confidence arose from beneath, power descended from aloft.*"

But in the same manner as there was a supreme creator above the legislative power, which was the senate, so must there be above the executive power a supreme creator, who should name the ministers, who were thereafter to name the subordinate functionaries, down to the last step of the scale. At the head of the executive power, therefore, there was to be an originating power. M. Sieyès had given to this officer a title analogous to his office, naming him the grand elector.—This supreme magistrate was limited to the performance of a single act. He was to choose two superior agents, alone in their rank and in the nature of their office; styled, one, the consul of peace, the other the consul of war. These should name the ministers, who, on their personal responsibility, should choose from the lists of notability all the agents of power; who should, in a word, govern, administer, and carry on the whole business of the state.

A magnificent existence was destined to the grand elector. He was the originating principle of the government, and was moreover its external representative. That inaction, to which, for the purpose of securing their impartiality, M. Sieyès had limited his senators, and which he had endowed with an annual income of one hundred thousand livres in the national domains—that inaction, I say, which, for a similar reason, he had imposed on the grand elector, was, in his case, yet more richly salaried than in that of the senators; since his function was to represent the whole republic. M. Sieyès proposed to assign to him an income of six millions, sumptuous habitations, such as the Tuileries in Paris, and Versailles in the country; and yet more, a guard of three thousand men. It was in his name that justice should be executed; that the laws should be promulgated, and the acts of government performed. It was to him that foreign ministers should be accredited; it was his signature that should invest the treaties between France and foreign powers with their binding character. In one word, he was destined to combine with the important duty of choosing the two active heads of the government, the brilliancy, vain as it may be called, of external representation. In him was to shine all the luxury of a polished, an elegant, a magnificent nation. Now, was this grand elector himself to be elective or hereditary? If the latter, he was a king, and monarchy would be re-established in France. But M. Sieyès,

whether he wished this or not, dared not to propose it openly. It was necessary, therefore, to elect, by the most impartial body of the state, the senate, that supreme magistrate, who was raised to rank so sublime, only to render him as impartial as possible in the two choices which he was to perform.

A last and formidable disposition of power completed this complicated system.

The senate, which had the power of annulling every unconstitutional act, law, or measure of the government, received, in addition to this the power of tearing the grand elector from his office by naming him a senator in his own despite. This power M. Sieyès called *absorption*. And this power the senate could exercise on any citizen, whose talents or importance should be deemed perilous to the republic. By this plan, a recompense was given to the citizen thus compelled to inaction by *absorption* in the senate; the rich leisure, namely, and the importance attached to members of that body, which, unable to act itself, could yet, by its veto, paralyze and prevent the action of all others in the state.

In this singular, but profound conception, who cannot perceive a dim resemblance, perchance intentionally darkened, to a representative monarchy? The legislative body, the senate, the grand elector, were, in fact, a lower house, an upper house, and a king; the whole resting as a base on a species of universal suffrage; but the whole fabric loaded with so many precautions, that the elements of democracy, aristocracy, and royalty were admitted. It is true, into this constitution, but admitted only in order to be annulled. The lists of notability, from which all the deliberative bodies, and all the executive functionaries were to be derived, were in fact universal suffrage—universal, but null and void; for they composed so wide a range of fitness for office, that the obligation to choose within this circle was, in fact, an absolute liberty of choice, from the whole nation, granted to the government and senate. The mute legislative body, hearing the laws discussed, but unable itself to discuss them, having conjoined with it the tribunate, charged with the duty of discussion, and opposed therein to the council of state, was a sort of house of commons, cut in two, one half having the right of voting, the other of discussing measures, and both halves annulled, as it were, by the separation—since the former was exposed to the danger of falling asleep in silence, the latter to that of exhausting itself in fruitless agitation. The senate, nominating itself and all the deliberative bodies, naming the chief of the executive power, and, if need were, absorbing him in itself—the senate, all powerful thus far, yet deprived of all active duties, taking no part in legislation, limited in its scope to the breaking an unconstitutional enactment—the senate, reduced thus to a sort of inactivity, for the sake of keeping it disinterested, and animated only by a spirit of conservatism—the senate, I say, was but a learned, though exaggerated imitation of an aristocratic peerage, taking little part in the movement of business, sometimes arresting it by its veto, and receiving into its number those who, after

a stirring career, come willingly to seek repose in the bosom of a grave, influential, honourable body. The grand elector, to conclude, was, in fact, royalty itself, reduced to a part of small action, yet still considerable, that, namely, of choosing the real heads of the government. It was royalty, hampered, however, by infinite precautions against its origin and duration, for it issued, as it were, from the senatorial room, and might be returned thither in emergency. In a word, this universal suffrage, this legislative body, this tribunate, this senate, this grand elector, so composed, so weakened, so neutralized, one by the other, bore evidence to a prodigious effort of human capacity, in the combination of all known forms of government, and in the abrogation of them all by dint of subsequent precautions.

It must be confessed that representative monarchy, with less pains and slighter effort, by confiding more fully in human nature, has, for two centuries, given a lively yet not destructive freedom to one of the first nations in the world. Simple and natural in its method, the British constitution admits royalty, aristocracy, democracy; then, having admitted them, it leaves them free to act, imposing on them no condition, but that they shall act and rule in concord. It does not limit the king to this prerogative or to that; it does not create him by election to nullify him, when created, by the same. It does not interdict active functions to the peerage. It does not prohibit the right of speech to the elective assembly. It does not grant universal suffrage, in order to abrogate it, by rendering it indirect. It leaves royalty and aristocracy to spring from their natural source, hereditary descent. It admits a king; it admits an hereditary peerage; but on the other hand it gives the nation the right of designating directly, according to its pleasure or passion of the moment, an assembly, owning the sole right of granting or withholding the supplies, without which royalty cannot rule; and, therefore capable of compelling it to select, as the actual directors of the government, men who have gained the confidence of the public.

All that the legislator Sieyès aimed at effecting, is here almost infallibly accomplished. Royalty, aristocracy, have no farther power, than he desired that they should have; they merely check too sudden or too violent impulses of the popular will. The elective assembly, full of the passions of the people, but restrained by two other powers, in reality chooses the true chiefs of the state, gives them the government, upholds them in it, or expels them from it, if they cease to fulfil its expectations. This is a true and simple constitution, because it is the offspring of nature and of time; not, like that of M. Sieyès, the learned but artificial scheme of a mind disgusted with monarchy by the last Bourbon reigns, and terrified of republics, by ten years of storm and strife.

Now, then, let us imagine calmer times, let us imagine this constitution of M. Sieyès put peaceably into action at a period when the necessity for a powerful hand, like that of General Bonaparte, at the helm, should not

have overruled all other considerations. Let us imagine this vast notability established, this senate freely drawing from it the bodies of the state, and the heads of the government, what would have been the consequence?

Ere long the nation would have felt no interest in the renovation of those lists, which were, in fact, but a powerless method of expressing its wishes. Those lists would have become nearly permanent. The senate would have chosen thence, at its own will, the bodies of the state, and the grand elector; and having the power of nominating the executive chief, or of abrogating his office at any moment, holding him thus in absolute dependence. The senate would have become nearly all in all—It would have become, what? A Venetian aristocracy, with its book of gold, its pompous and powerless doge, whose only privilege was that of annually espousing the Adriatic sea. Most curious spectacle, and worthy of deep meditation!—M. Sieyès, a deep and lofty spirit, sincerely attached to the liberty of his country, had run through, in the last ten years, that circle of agitations, terrors, and disgusts, which had brought down most of the republics of the middle ages, and the most celebrated of them all, Venice, to a golden book, and a nominal chief magistrate. He had come, therefore, to the choice of a Venetian aristocracy, constituted for the benefit of the men of the Revolution; for during ten years he limited the privilege of figuring on the lists of notability to those who had held office of some kind since 1789; and he desired, moreover, to reserve to himself and three or four distinguished persons of the day, the right of nominating, for the first time, the members of all the different bodies of the state.

But aristocracies cannot be made at a moment's notice. It is despotism only that can be so created. Society, harassed as it then was, could repose only in the arms of one puissant individual. All was about to be approved, all to be received, of this extraordinary constitution, with the exception of the grand elector, richly endowed, and apparently powerless. He was to be replaced by an active and energetic head; and, a single spring only altered, the complicated machine of the constitution would, without any acquiescence of its author, be changed into that imperial sway which we have seen for fifteen years, governing France, with a conservative senate, and a mute legislature, in a manner glorious indeed, but not for that the less despotical.

When M. Sieyès, by a great personal effort, had succeeded in drawing out, from the depths of his mind, all these combinations, which had remained buried as it were there for so long a time, he exposed them to his friend, M. Boulay de la Meurthe, who committed them to writing, and to different members of the two legislative assemblies who spread them around on all sides. The two legislative commissions had divided themselves into sections, and in each of the two was found a section of the constitution. It was to these two actions combined that M. Sieyès, when he could make himself master of his own thoughts, offered his system. It seized at once all spirits by

the novelty, the singularity, the infinite art of its combinations.

At first, the interests of M. Sieyès's auditors were perfectly well satisfied, for he had, as I have just shown, adopted a temporary disposition, which was entirely necessary.

With the avowed object of saving the Revolution, by upholding the power of the men who had brought it about, he proposed a resolution, nearly similar to that by which the convention had perpetuated itself in the two councils of the Ancients and the Five Hundred. He desired, moreover, that all the men who, since the year 1789, had performed any public duties, who had been members of the different assemblies, whether of the legislature, the departments, or the municipalities, should be borne of right on the lists of notability, and that these lists should not be remodelled within the space of ten years. Moreover, Messrs. Sieyès and Roger-Ducos, and General Bonaparte, were to select, for the first time, the individuals of the bodies of state, according to the right which they gave to themselves in making the new constitution. But it is worthy of remark, that all the new men who were returned at the elections, animated by the spirit of reaction, which at that time was general, and yielding to the common habit of blaming whatsoever they had not themselves a hand in doing, expressed openly their hatred to the measures and the men of the Revolution, even while they united in its principles. M. Sieyès, then, had taken his precautions against the necessity of a second 18th Fructidor, by securing the practical operation of his constitution in hands of which he felt sure. The ideas of M. Sieyès seemed to be such as would prove satisfactory to all interests. Already every one thought himself sure of being a senator, a legislator, a state councillor, or a tribune, and all these offices were richly salaried. Interested motives apart, the combinations seemed, moreover, to be as able as they were new. Men are easily moved to enthusiasm in behalf of military genius—but are moved quite as easily by any thing which bears the stamp of intellectual depth. Sieyès, the legislator, had his own, as Bonaparte, the general, his own enthusiasts. The lists of notability appeared the happiest of combinations, especially in the state of discredit into which the elective system had fallen, since the elections which had returned the *Clichéens*,¹ excluded by the revolution of Fructidor, and the Jacobins, excluded by means of the *Scissions*.² The council of state and the tribunate, pleading the one in the affirmative and the other in the negative before a mute body of legislature,

pleased those minds which, weary of discussion, urgently sought for repose. The senate, placed so loftily, and with an office so useful to the maintenance of the general good, and capable of ostracizing citizens, too eminent or too dangerous for the state, had also numerous admirers.

The grand elector, alone, appeared an absurdity to men who, not having considered the English constitution deeply, could not comprehend the object of having a magistrate limited to the single duty of choosing the superior agents of the government. They thought the power too trifling for a king, and the show too great for the simple president of a republic. No one, in short, thought the place fitted for the person destined to hold it, that is to say, for General Bonaparte. The place had too much outward splendour, and too little real power. Too much outward splendour, because it was necessary to avoid alarming men's imaginations by rendering the return to monarchical principles evident. Too little real power, because it was necessary that a man, charged with the entire reorganization of all France, should have almost unlimited authority. Certain spirits, incapable of appreciating the disinterestedness of a deep thinker, who had only aimed at making his conceptions harmonize with each other, and who had never thought at all of framing a constitution with views of personal advantage—certain spirits, I say, affirmed that the office of grand elector could not have been invented for a character so active as that of General Bonaparte, and that from the beginning M. Sieyès could only have intended it for himself, destined to his young colleague the office of war consul. That was a base and malevolent conjecture. M. Sieyès united to great strength of imagination, a remarkable quickness of observation, and he esteemed too correctly his own personal position, and that of the conqueror of Italy, to believe, for one moment, that he could have been that elective king, if he might so be called, and Bonaparte no more than his minister. In all this, he had obeyed solely the spirit of system.

Other interpreters, less malevolent than these, believed, in their turn, that M. Sieyès, in fact, intended the place of grand elector for General Bonaparte, but with the intention of fettering his hands; and, above all, of speedily causing him to be absorbed in the conservative senate. For this, the friends of liberty bore him no ill-will. But the partisans of General Bonaparte could not speak of this invention of the grand elector without uttering loud outcries, and among these, Lucien Bonaparte,³—who has, by

¹ CLICHÉENS. The chief strength of the royalist party lay in the club of Cliché, which acquired as preponderating an influence at this epoch as that of the Jacobins had done at an earlier stage of the Revolution. Few among their number were in direct communication with the royalists, but they were all animated with hatred at the Jacobins, and an anxious desire to prevent their regaining their ascendancy in the government. May, 1797.—*Alison, Hist. Eur.*

² Thus fell the club of the Jacobins, the victim of the crimes it had sanctioned and the reaction it had produced. Within its walls all the great chances of the Revolution had been prepared, and all its principal scenes rehearsed. From its energy the triumph of the democracy had sprung, and from its atrocity its destruction

arose: a signal proof of the tendency of revolutionary violence to precipitate its supporters into crime, and render them at last the victims of the atrocities which they have committed.—*Alison, Hist. Eur.*

³ LUCIEN BONAPARTE. Napoleon's second brother, born at Ajaccio in 1775. At fifteen he was taken to France by M. Semonville, who made him a zealous revolutionist and clubbist. In 1793, when Corsica was given up to the English by Paoli, he fled to Provence. In 1794 was appointed to the civil administration in the army of the Maritime Alps, and married Christine, the daughter of M. Boyer, innkeeper, at St. Maximin. In 1795 he was appointed commissary at war for the Belgic provinces. In 1797 he was nominated to the council of Five Hundred by the electors of the Liamone, his native dis-

turns, served and injured the head of his family, but both capriciously, without consistency, without moderation, at one time playing the brother enraptured of his brother's glory, at another the citizen inveighing against despotism—Lucien, Bonaparte was the most violent declaimer against the project of M. Sieyès. He said aloud, that there should be a republican president, a council of state, and little more. That the country was weary of fools, and called for none but men of action. These inconsiderate propositions were of a nature to produce the worst results, but fortunately no one attached much weight to the words of Lucien.

General Bonaparte, even in the midst of his incessant labours, had heard the reports spread around him concerning the projects of M. Sieyès. He suffered his colleague to act his pleasure, in accordance with a kind of partnership in functions which had been agreed on between them, and he would not mix himself in the constitution, until the time should arrive when it would be his duty to digest it definitively, promising it to himself, that he would then arrange, to his own taste, the place destined for his own occupation. Notwithstanding this, the reports which harassed him on all sides, irritated him in the end, and he expressed his displeasure, with his customary vivacity of language—vivacity, much to be regretted, which he could not at all times control. The disapprobation which he expressed concerning some portions of the projected constitution even reached the ears of its author. M. Sieyès was deeply afflicted at this. He imagined, in fact, that after he had once lost, through the ignorance and violence of former times, the opportunity of becoming the legislator of France, he should again lose it through the despotical humour of the fellow-labourer whom he had given himself when he brought about the revolution of the 18th of Brumaire. Although wanting in intrigue and energy, he yet set himself strenuously to conquer, one by one, the members of the two legislative sections.

Nevertheless, his own friend, M. Boulay de la Meurthe, and two intimate acquaintances of General Bonaparte, Messrs. Rœderer and De Talleyrand, wishing to keep up good feeling between men so important, employed themselves actively in bringing them to terms. M. Boulay de la Meurthe had accepted the office of transcribing the ideas of M. Sieyès, and had become his confidant in the scheme. M. Rœderer was a former member of the Constituent Assembly, a man of intellect, a true publicist, after the fashion of the eighteenth century, much addicted to reasoning on the

origin and organization of society, and to making projects for constitutions, combining with all this monarchical predilections of the strongest kind. M. de Talleyrand, endowed with the ability to comprehend and appreciate minds even the most opposite to his own, was equally observant of the active energetic genius of young Bonaparte, and of the speculative genius of the philosopher, Sieyès. He felt a lively inclination toward each of these. He believed farther, that the two men mutually stood in need each of the other's aid, and he felt a warm interest in bringing the affairs of the new government to a successful issue. Messrs. Boulay de la Meurthe, Rœderer, and De Talleyrand employed themselves, therefore, in reconciling the general and the legislator. An interview was appointed, which was to take place at General Bonaparte's house in the presence of Messrs. Rœderer and De Talleyrand. It was accomplished, but ended in nothing. General Bonaparte was under the influence of the reports which he had heard, concerning the functions of the grand elector, an inactive personage liable to absorption in the senate. M. Sieyès, on the contrary, was full of the disadvantageous expressions which had been attributed to the general, and which had doubtless been exaggerated. They came together, therefore, with unfavourable dispositions, displayed to one another their ill-feelings only, and addressed to one another the most cutting expressions. M. Sieyès, to whom it was indispensable to be calm in order to bring forth his ideas in their proper light, was unable at this time to explain them with the proper clearness and connection. General Bonaparte, on the other side, was rude and impatient. They behaved ill, each to the other, and parted almost enemies.

The conciliators, now alarmed, applied themselves to repair the ill-effects of the interview; they told M. Sieyès that he ought to have argued patiently, to have taken every pains to convince the general, and above all, to have made concessions. They told the general that more management was necessary than he appeared to imagine; that without the support of M. Sieyès, and his influence with the council of Ancients, he, General Bonaparte, would never have been able to obtain, on the 18th of Brumaire, that decree which had put power into his hand—that M. Sieyès, as a political character, had immense power over the minds of men; and that, in case of a conflict between the legislator and the general, many people would pronounce in favour of the legislator as the representative of revolution and liberty oppressed by the sword. The first moment was unfavourable to the effecting a reconcilia-

partment. In 1798 he argued for the toleration of Catholicism. In 1799 he strenuously opposed Jourdan's motion that the country was in danger, and combated the idea of a dictatorship. On Napoleon's return to France, he presided at all the private meetings preparatory to the revolution of the 18th Brumaire. On that celebrated day, he was president of the council of the Five Hundred, and it is to him that the success of this revolution, in the progress of which he displayed conduct, courage, and ready wit, may be chiefly ascribed. He was rewarded for these services by the office of minister of the interior. In this, though but twenty-five years old, he displayed much ability—*Court and Camp of Napoleon.*

Joseph, in any country, would have been the ornament of society; Lucien, in like wise, that of any political assembly.—*Opinions of Napoleon.*

I saw Prince Lucien, with good opportunities of judging his character after the return from Elba. It would have been difficult for any person to exhibit sounder or more striking political opinions; or a devotion more absolute, with better intentions.—*Las Cases*

He wrote a poem of 30,000 lines, called *Charlemagne*, of no merit at all. His unequal marriage probably operated, in as great a degree as his opposition to his brother's will on some points, to disqualify him for a crown.

non. A little time was requisite to that end. Messrs. Boulay de la Meurthe and Roderer endeavoured to contrive some new scheme for the executive power, which should remove the two points of difficulty on which Bonaparte seemed to be inflexible—the inactivity of the grand elector, and the threat of ostracism suspended over his head. At first they thought of a consul, assisted by two colleagues, who should sit with him—then of a grand elector, similar to the officer of M. Sieyès, who should name the two consuls of peace and war, preside at their deliberations, and hold the casting vote.

This was not enough to satisfy General Bonaparte, and too much by far for M. Sieyès, whose whole scheme of government it would have subverted. Every time that it was proposed to M. Sieyès to give the chief of the executive power a direct participation in the government, he replied, "It is our ancient monarchy which you wish me to re-establish, and I will none of it."

He would in fact admit only the royalty of the British constitution, and that shorn of the royal title, the perpetuity of office, and the hereditary succession. They were completely at issue; and M. Sieyès, with that proneness to be discouraged, which is peculiar to speculative temperaments, when they encounter obstacles opposed to them by the nature of things, said that he would give up the whole, leave Paris, retire to the country, and leave young Bonaparte, revealed to the eyes of all men, alone, in his newborn despotism.

"He wishes to go," said the general. "Let him go! I will cause a constitution to be digested by Roderer; I will propose it to the two legislative sections, and thus satisfy public opinion, which asks urgently for a settlement of the matter." He was in error, when he spoke thus; for it was yet too early to show France his sword thoroughly unsheathed. He would have met resistance of which he little dreamed.

Nevertheless, these two men who, despite their instinctive distrust, had succeeded in coming to a mutual understanding for a moment, in order to effect the revolution of the 18th of Brumaire, were destined again to come together for the formation of a constitution. The rumours which had gained circulation aroused the legislative commissions. They knew what expressions Lucien Bonaparte had uttered, how decided a tone the general took in all the matter, how greatly M. Sieyès felt disposed to abandon the whole project. They said, therefore, among themselves, and with much show of reason, that it was themselves, in the end, to whom the care of selecting a constitution was especially entrusted; that it was for them to fulfil their duty, to digest a project, to present it to the consuls, and to compel them forcibly to an agreement, after having endeavoured to bring about a reasonable understanding between them.

They set themselves to work, therefore; and as several of the members who composed them had received some of his ideas from M. Sieyès, and appreciated them, they adopted

his plan as the base of their operations. With regard to the spirit of his system, the adoption of all his ideas, save one only, would have annoyed him as deeply as the rejection of the whole. It was, however, an important point that the project of M. Sieyès should be adopted as the base of the new constitution. Wherefore, in the end, he became somewhat better satisfied; and General Bonaparte, seeing that the sections had possessed themselves of their proper functions and were discharging them resolutely, moderated his conduct very sensibly. This moment was seized to bring about a new conciliation. There was a second interview between M. Sieyès and the general, in the presence of Messrs. Boulay de la Meurthe, Roderer, and De Talleyrand. This time the two principal speakers were calmer and better disposed to listen to each other. Instead of rushing to a shock, as the first time, by showing their ill feelings as of preference, they endeavoured, on the contrary, to come to terms, by showing the coincident points of their opinions. M. Sieyès was moderate and full of tact; the general displayed his customary good sense and originality of thought. The matter under discussion was the state of France, the vices in preceding constitutions, and the precautions necessary to be taken, in the formation of a new one, for the prevention of the past disorders. On all these matters they naturally agreed. They parted then, well satisfied with each other, and with mutual promises that, when the sections should have completed their work, they would assemble them in order to adopt or modify their propositions, and at length get rid of the provisional government with which the world was growing dissatisfied. M. Sieyès henceforth was well convinced that, with the exception of his grand elector, and some attributes of his conservative senate, his constitution would be adopted entire.

In the first ten days of Frimaire—from the 20th of November to the 1st of December—the sections completed their labours. General Bonaparte invited them to his house, to form meetings at which the consuls should be present. Some members of the sections looked upon that summons as little conformable to their dignity; and yet, deciding that it was their business to get rid of difficulties and to concede much to a man who was so necessary to them, went to his house.

The sessions commenced instantly. At the first, M. Sieyès was called upon to disclose his project, since this project was the base of the labours of the sections. He opened it with a power of thought and language which produced the liveliest impression on all present. "All this is very fine, and very profound," said the general. "Nevertheless there are several points which require a serious discussion. But let us proceed in order. Let us deal with each portion of the project necessarily and in its place, and let us choose a secretary. Citizen Daunou,¹ take the pen."—M. Daunou be-

¹ DAUNOU was born at Boulogne. In 1791, member of the Oratorical Society, grand vicar to the constitutional bishop of the Pas-de-Calais. Sent to the convention in 1792. On the trial of Louis XVI. voted for his confinement.

came thus the secretary and author of the new constitution. This labour lasted during several sittings, and the following dispositions were resolved upon.

The lists of notability of the communes, the departments, and the nation, were successively adopted. These reduced the popular action so completely, by rendering it indirect, that they could not fail to be agreeable both to the apprehensions of the moment, and to the tastes of General Bonaparte. Two accessory dispositions, the one agreeable, the other contrary to the ideas of M. Sieyès, were adopted. It was determined that the functionaries of all ranks should not be necessarily chosen from the lists of notability, until the constitution should have designated them by name. That they should choose from them, in fact, the members of the deliberative bodies, the consuls, ministers, judges, administrators, was extremely well; but for generals and ambassadors—that appeared indeed extravagant. On this point, all parties were agreed. The second disposition related, not to the base of the project, but to the necessity which existed for adapting it to the present state of things. Instead of delaying the remodelling of the lists until the expiration of ten years, it was to be deferred to the year IX, that is, to the end of the one year. And it was added that all the individuals of the great bodies of the state should be named forthwith, by an act of the constituent power, and that the individuals thus named should be borne as of right on the first lists. The revision, instead of being annual, should be triennial.

Hence they passed to the organization of the great powers. The maxim of M. de Sieyès, "*Confidence must arise from beneath, and power descend from aloft*," prevailed from the first to the last. It was aloft that the right of selection was placed, but with the obligation of selecting out of the lists of notability. The senate of M. de Sieyès was adopted, as well as his legislative body, placed between the council of state and the tribunate. The senate had the power of choosing from the lists of notability; first, the senators themselves, then the members of the legislative body, of the tribunate, of the tribunal of cassation, of the commission of accounts—since called the court of accounts—and, to conclude, the chief or chiefs of the executive power. Nevertheless, and this was a considerable reduction of their power, it was determined that the senate should name no senator save on the presentation of three candidates, one designated by the consuls, the second by the legislative body, and the third by the tribunate. As to the council of state, that body, forming a part of the executive power, should, it was resolved, be nominated by that power itself. Independently of the right to make the most important nominations, the senate also received the su-

preme attribute of breaking all laws or acts of the government which it should deem unconstitutional. It should, on the contrary, have no part in the making of laws, nor should its members exercise any active function.

The legislative body, mute as M. Sieyès proposed that it should be, should hear three councillors of state, and afterward three tribunes argue on opposite sides, and should then vote, without debate, on the proposals of the government.

The tribunate alone should have the privilege of debating publicly on the laws, but it should only vote, in order to determine which side it should take when pleading before the legislative body. Its vote, though it were negative, should not prevent the enactment of the law, if adopted by the legislative body. The tribunate should not have the origination of legal propositions, but might propound its wishes. It might receive petitions, and send them up to the different authorities which they should concern.

The senate should be composed of 80 members, instead of 100, as M. Sieyès had at first desired. Of these, 60 should be named forthwith, 20 in the ten years next ensuing. The legislative body was to be composed of 300 members; the tribunate, of 100. The senators were to have 25,000 francs of annual salary; the legislators 10,000f.; the tribunes 15,000f. Up to this point, the project of M. Sieyès was adopted entire, except that a few reductions had been made in the authority of the senate. But his plan was now to undergo a considerable alteration in the organization of the executive power.

This was the capital point, and that on which General Bonaparte was inflexible. M. Sieyès, already resigned to the idea that this part of his plan would be set aside, was still requested to state his views. He proposed, therefore, in presence of the united commissions, the institution of the grand elector. No one, it must be admitted, not even General Bonaparte, had at that time reflected sufficiently on the organization of the executive power under a free government, to be able to comprehend the depth of this conception, or to seize the analogy which it presented to the king of the English monarchy. But General Bonaparte, had his mind even discovered this analogy in the question, would not have accepted it on any terms, from motives entirely personal, and easy enough to be comprehended. He strenuously criticised this grand elector. He said concerning his richly-endowed indolence, that which all kings say, only with less intelligence and with less foundation than he; for in the face of a disordered society to be reorganized, of sanguinary factions to be subjected to authority, of a world to be conquered, it is natural enough that he should have wished to reserve all the labour

ment during the war, and his banishment on the restoration of peace. Was proscribed with the Girondins. Re-admitted to the Convention in 1791, and elected secretary soon after. In 1795, he was appointed a commissioner to organize the laws of the constitution of 1793. Member and president of the Council of Five Hundred. In 1798, he was intrusted with the organi-

zation of the Roman republic. In the same year delivered the solemn discourse on the foundation of the republic. Was an active promoter of the revolution of the 18th Brumaire, and was rewarded for his services therein by being appointed one of the commissioners to organize the new constitution. *Biographie Moderne*

and honour to his own genius. But if in those early days of his consulate, when it appeared that there was so much to be accomplished, he was, perhaps, wise in refusing to permit his talents to be fettered, he must at a later day, in the sublimity of his misfortunes at St. Helena, have regretted that so much liberty was given him to exercise them beyond measure. Restricted in the employment of his faculties, he could not, it is true, have performed deeds so mighty; but then he would have attempted none so extravagant. And, it is probable, that the sceptre and the sword would have remained, until death, in his glorious hands.

"Your grand elector," said he to M. Sieyès, "is a pageant king, and the day for pageant kings has passed away. Where is the man of intellect and heart who, for an income of six millions and a lodging in the Tuileries, would endure such a life of useless idleness? What! nominate men who shall act, and not act himself!—absurd! And again, do you imagine that you can compel your grand elector by these means to take no share in the government? If I were that grand elector, be very sure that I would easily effect all that, which you desire that I should not. I would say to the two Consuls of Peace and of War, if you do not appoint such a man, or if you do not adopt such a measure, I dismiss you. And so I would oblige them to walk according to my will. I would become the master by a stratagem."

Here General Bonaparte himself, with his wonted sagacity, fell into the truth; and admitted that the inaction of the grand elector was not in truth a state of nullity. For this supreme magistrate possessed, in certain moments, the means of rendering himself all powerful on the arena whereon the various parties were struggling for the mastery, by withdrawing the power from these, to confer it upon those. But this high superintendence, possessed by the royalty of England over the government—reduced, in fact, to the power of casting into the scales of contending ambition the preponderating weight of its decisive will—was not suited to that young and ardent man. And he must be pardoned therefor, since it was neither the time nor the place for constitutional royalty.

The grand elector perished under the sarcasm of the young general, and under an influence far greater than that of any sarcasm—the potency of present necessity. The truth is, that an absolute dictatorship was at that moment requisite; and the authority bestowed on the grand elector was far from meeting the emergencies of the case.

There was another point in the institutions proposed by M. Sieyès, which General Bonaparte rejected as strenuously as this, because he saw in it a stratagem aimed against himself. It was the power granted to the senate of absorbing in itself not the grand elector only, but any distinguished citizen, at whose greatness it might choose to take umbrage.

The general would not that the power should exist which, after years of eminent service, might bury him alive in the senate,

and reduce him to a forced inaction, recompensed by a salary of twenty-five thousand francs. He was satisfied on this score, likewise. And this was the organization of the executive power which was definitively adopted.

A first consul was created, accompanied by two others, to conceal, in some degree, the absolute power of the first. This first consul had the direct and sole nomination of the members of the general administration of the republic; of the members of all the councils, whether of communes, departments, or municipalities; of the administrators since styled prefects and sub-prefects, of the municipal agents, &c. He had the nomination of all officers of the army and marine; of the foreign ministers, of all the civil and criminal judges, with the exception of the judges of peace, and the members of the court of cassation. He could not displace judges once nominated. Perpetuity of office was substituted to election as a guaranty of independence for these.

Beside the nomination of all individuals in the administration, the army, and the judiciary, the first consul had the whole government in his hands; the direction of war and of diplomacy. He signed all treaties, except that they were subject to the discussion and adoption of the legislative bodies, in the same mode as the laws. In these different functions he was to be assisted by two other consuls, who had a voice in consultation only, but who might enter their opinions in a register of deliberations kept for that purpose. These two consuls were evidently appointed merely for the purpose of diverting attention from the immense authority conferred on General Bonaparte—an authority which was already very long, and might well become perpetual; for the three consuls were chosen for ten years, and were indefinitely re-eligible to office.

Something was still retained of M. Sieyès's absorption. The first consul, quitting his office, whether by dismissal or otherwise, became a senator *ex officio*, or in other words, was excluded in future from the performance of public functions.

The two other consuls, not having exercised this plenary power, were free from the compulsory acceptance of this opulent annihilation, and did not become senators without their own consent. The first consul was endowed with a revenue of 500,000 francs, each of the others with 300,000. All three were entitled to lodgings in the Tuileries, and a consular guard of honour was assigned to them.

Such were the principal dispositions of the celebrated constitution of the year VIII. M. Sieyès thus saw the authority of his senate diminished, and an all-powerful chief substituted for his powerless grand elector—changes, which caused this constitution to give way at a later day, not to an aristocracy, but to a despotism.

This constitution contained no declaration of rights; but by means of certain general dispositions it assured individual liberty, the inviolability of the citizens' dwellings, the responsibility of ministers, and of all inferior agents, excepting, in the case of the latter, that the

prosecutions must be previously approved by the council of state. It provided that a law might, in certain departments and in certain extraordinary cases, suspend the action of the constitution, corresponding to that which we have since termed the declaration of a state of siege. It secured pensions to the widows and children of military men; and then returning, as it were, to ideas proscribed long ago, it set up as a principle, that national rewards might be granted to men who should perform eminent services. This was the germ of an institution, which has since that time become famous, the Legion of Honour.

The project of M. Sieyès contained two fine and powerful ideas, both of which have been retained in our administrative organization—the territorial circumscription of *arrondissements*, and the councils of state.

M. Sieyès ought, therefore, to be held the author of all the administrative circumscriptions of France. He had already devised and procured the adoption of its division into departments. He procured, on this occasion, that administrations of *arrondissements* should be substituted, as a far less numerous and a far more convenient medium between the commune and department, to those of the cantons, which numbered five thousand. The principle of this only was laid down in the constitution; but it was determined that ere long a law on this principle should reform the system of French administration, and put an end to the anarchy of the communes, of which a lamentable picture has already been presented to the reader. There was to be appointed a tribunal of the first instance in every *arrondissement*, and a tribunal of appeal in several departments combined.

The second of the creations of M. Sieyès, which belongs to him as his own, is the council of state, a deliberative body attached to the executive power, preparing laws, upholding them in presence of the legislative power, adding to them the standing orders which should accompany all laws, and rendering justice administrative. This is the most practical of all his conceptions, and it deserves, with the preceding, to survive the present age, and to exist in far futurity. Let us say so much to the honour of the legislator. Time has swept away all the ephemeral constitutions of the republic; but the only parts of those constitutions which have survived were his work. All was not finished when the dispositions of the new constitution were determined. It was indispensable to add to these the individual representatives of these powers, to find them in men of the Revolution, and to designate them in the body of the constitutional enactment. It was necessary, then, after all the dispositions, which have been enumerated, were digested, it was necessary, I say, to turn to the choice of individuals.

General Bonaparte was nominated First Consul for ten years. It would not be correct

to say that he was chosen, so much was he indicated by his position. He was received, rather, from the hands of victory and necessity. His situation once fixed, it was next desirable to find a position for M. Sieyès. This great person loved business little, and secondary parts yet less. It was not fitting that he should be the assistant of the youthful Bonaparte, and he refused in consequence to be the second consul. It will soon appear what place, more conformable to his character, was assigned to him. M. Cambacères,¹ an eminent lawyer, who had acquired great importance among the political persons of the time, by much learning, tact, and prudence, was chosen second consul. He was at this moment minister of justice. M. Lebrun,¹ a distinguished writer, who had formerly digested the Maupeou edicts, esteemed, under the ancient regime, one of those men disposed to wise reforms, yet always faithful to the cause of moderate revolution, very well informed on matters of finance, and too gentle to be violently contradictory—M. Lebrun was named third consul. M. Cambacères could assist General Bonaparte in the administration of justice; M. Lebrun could second him admirably in that of finance; and both could aid him much without giving him any inconvenience. It was impossible to have associated men together who were better calculated to compose the new government; and from the choice of these naturally flowed all the rest, in the organization of the executive power.

The next step was to proceed to the composition of the deliberative bodies. And here was readily discovered the part naturally suited to M. Sieyès. It had been inserted as a written clause in the constitution, that the senate should select all the members of the deliberative assemblies. But it remained to be determined, who should compose the senate, for the first time. It was resolved by an especial article of the constitution, that Messrs. Sieyès and Roger-Ducos, who would now cease to be consuls, united with Messrs. Cambacères and Lebrun, who were about to become consuls, should nominate the absolute majority of the senate—that is, 31 members out of the 60. The 31 senators thus elected were then to choose by ballot the 29 other senators remaining to be appointed. And the senate, once completed, was entitled to fill up the legislative body, the tribunate, and the tribunal of cassation.

By means of these different combinations, General Bonaparte found himself the chief of the executive power; but a sort of prudence was observed, at the same time, in excluding him from the composition of the deliberative bodies destined to control his actions. This case was committed more particularly to the Legislator of France, to M. Sieyès, whose active part was henceforth finished, and to whom the presidency of the senate was secured as a retreat from business. The positions of all

¹ The emperor said that in Cambacères and Lebrun he had chosen two men of merit, two distinguished persons, both wise, moderate, capable, but of dispositions precisely opposite.

The former was the defender of abuses, of prejudices.

of ancient institutions, of a return to hereditary honours, distinctions, &c. The latter, cold, severe, insensible, striving against all these things, yielding to them without illusion, and naturally falling into Ideology.—*Opinion of Napoleon, Las Cases.*

parties were thus properly assigned, and appearances saved thereby.

It was now decided that the constitution should be submitted to the vote of the whole nation, by means of registers opened in the offices of the mayors, justices of peace, and notaries, and in the courts of record of the several tribunals; and that until the acceptance should be received, concerning which no one appeared to entertain any doubts, the First Consul, the two quitting, and the two entering office, should proceed to the various duties with which they were charged, in order that, on the first of Nivose, the great powers of the state should be constituted, and ready to put the new constitution into practice. This was indispensable, in order that the dictatorship of the Provisional Consuls, at which some spirits began to take umbrage, should be brought to a close; and that the general impatience of all parties, to have at length a definitive government, should be satisfied. For, in a word, every one ardently desired a just and stable government, which should assure strength and unity of power, without strangling liberty; and under which all honest and capable men, of all ranks, and of all parties, might find their proper place. These wishes, it must be admitted, might possibly have been gratified under the constitution of the year VIII. It would, indeed, have satisfied them completely, but for the violence to which an extraordinary genius subjected it at a later date; a genius, which, for the rest, favoured as it was by circumstance, would have easily overcome stronger barriers than could have been opposed to it by the legislative handiwork of M. Sieyès, or any other that could at that time have been imagined.

The constitution, adopted during the night of the 12th and 13th of December—21st and 22d of Frimaire—was promulgated on the 15th of December, 1799—24th Frimaire of the year VIII—to the great satisfaction of its authors and of the public also.

It charmed all spirits by the novelty of its ideas, and the cleverness of its devices. Every one reposed hopes in it, and in the men who were about to put it into execution.

It was preceded by this preamble.

"Citizens, a constitution is offered to you.

"It brings to a close the uncertainties which the provisional government caused in our foreign relations, in the domestic and military condition of the republic.

"It places, in the institutions which it has established, the first magistrates whose devotion appears necessary to its activity.

"The constitution is founded on the true principles of representative government, on

the sacred rights of property, equality, and liberty.

"The powers which it institutes, will be strong and stable; such as they ought to be in order to guaranty the rights of the citizens, and the interests of the state.

"Citizens, the Revolution is settled on the very principles with which it began. It is ended."

Two men, such as General Bonaparte and M. Sieyès, crying out, in 1800, the Revolution is ended! How singular a proof of the illusions of the human spirit! Nevertheless, it must be admitted that something was then ended—that something was anarchy!

With all those, who had put their hands to this work, the joy at seeing it completed was great. Some of the ideas of M. Sieyès had been rejected, but his constitution had, nevertheless, been accepted almost entire, and, unless by a power absolute as that of Solon, Lycurgus, or Mahomet—a power which no man could obtain in our era of doubt and distrust, wherein all confidence in individuals is destroyed—it was scarce possible for one person to transfuse a larger portion of his own thoughts into the constitution of a great people. And such as it was, if the conqueror of Marengo had not introduced into it at a later period two considerable changes, the hereditary imperial sway added, and the tribunate subtracted, this constitution might have shown forth a career, other than the triumph of absolute power. M. Sieyès, after having placed in the hands of General Bonaparte the sword which had served to overturn the Directory, and after having made a constitution, was about to deliver France over to the devouring activity of the young Consul, and to withdraw himself into that meditative inaction which he preferred to the anxious turmoil of business.

The new First Consul now wished to give to the legislator of France a testimonial of national gratitude. He caused a proposition to be made to the legislative commissioners to vote him the estate of Crosne as an honorary gift. This gift was voted and announced to M. Sieyès with the noblest expressions of public gratitude; and M. Sieyès accepted it with lively satisfaction, for, notwithstanding his unimpeachable probity, he was sensible of the enjoyments of a large fortune, and he could not but be touched by the delicate and elevated forms with which this national recompense was voted to him.

After this, every thing was so arranged that the constitution should be put in force in the first days of January, 1800—Nivose of the year VIII—or, in other words, in the first days of the last year of that eventful century.

BOOK II.

INTERNAL ADMINISTRATION.

Definitive Constitution of the Consular Government—Composition of the Senate, of the Legislative Body, of the Tribunal, and of the Council of State—Declaration of the First Consul to the European Powers—Public offers of Peace to England and Austria—Proclamation addressed to La Vendée—Opening of the First Session—Symptoms of Opposition in the Tribunal—Speeches of the Tribunes Duveyrier and Benjamin Constant—A considerable majority adopts the Project of the Consuls—Numerous Laws of Organization—Institution of Prefectures and Sub-prefectures—Creation of Tribunals of the First Instance, and of Appeal—Closing of the List of Emigrants—Re-establishment of the Right of making Wills—Law of Receipts and Expenditures—Banque of France—Consequences of the Negotiations with Europe—Refusal of England to listen to Propositions of Peace—Warm discussion on the subject in the British Parliament—Austria returns a gentler, but no less positive, refusal than England—Necessity of re-commencing Hostilities—Unable to reconcile the belligerent Powers, the First Consul tries to attach Prussia to himself, and explains himself to her frankly—He sets him strenuously to terminate the war with La Vendée before opening the Campaign of 1800—Position of Parties in La Vendée—Conduct of the Abbé Bernier—Peace of Montfaucon—Messrs. d'Autichamp, de Châtillon, de Bourmont, Georges Cadoudal go to Paris, and visit the First Consul—M. de Frotté is shot—Final Submission of La Vendée—The Troops are marched to the Frontier—Peaceable Termination of the Session of the Year VIII—Police Regulation touching the Press—Funeral Ceremony on the Occasion of the Death of Washington—The First Consul takes up his residence in the Palace of the Tuilleries.

THE Fourth of Nivose, in the year VIII—25th December, 1799—was the day fixed for the entrance of the consuls on their duties, and for the first assembling of the conservative senate. Numerous nominations must be made previously to that moment, for it was necessary to constitute at once the executive power and the senate, before either of them could act.

General Bonaparte, who was charged with the nomination of the executive power; Messrs. Sieyès, Roger-Ducos, Cambacérès, and Lebrun, charged with the selection of the senators, who were, in their turn, to appoint the legislative body, and the tribunal, were besieged by innumerable solicitations of all kinds. It was the object, indeed, of the petitioners to obtain the office of senators, of members of the legislative body, of tribunes, of councillors of state, of prefects; and, in truth, these high offices, all distributed at once, all amply endowed, had much wherewith to tempt ambition.

Many ardent revolutionists, enemies of the 18th Brumaire, were already much appeased in their opposition. Many of those doubters, who decide only after success has clearly declared itself on one side, began to speak aloud. There was at that time, as indeed there always is, an expression current, which perfectly described the state of men's minds. It was necessary, men said, to *show themselves*. It was necessary to show that, far from wishing to create obstacles to the new government, they were ready to help it to conquer those who beset it. The whole of which amounted to this—that they were desirous of attracting to themselves the attention of the five persons who composed it, and who were intrusted with all the nominations. There were even petitioners who, in order to obtain admission to the tribunal, promised absolute devotion to the consular government; though, at the same time, they were firmly resolved beforehand to give it their strongest opposition.

When, in revolutions, the fire of passion begins to subside, it is always the case that avidity succeeds to violence, and from terror men pass suddenly to disgust. If acts of exalted virtue, if deeds of heroism did not occur to conceal by their splendour all the sad details; and, above all, if the vast and beneficial results, which social revolutions procured for

nations, did not compensate the present evil by the immensity of future good, it would be necessary to turn away our eyes from the spectacle such revolutions offer to the world. But they are the test to which Providence subjects human societies in order to their regeneration. And we ought, therefore, to observe carefully, and, if we can, profitably, their picture, by turns so repulsive and so sublime.

It seems that the stir among all ambitious men was so marked as to strike the editors, and to occupy their pens. Even the *Moniteur*, which was not at that time the official journal, but which became so a few days afterward—on the 7th of Nivose—judged it expedient to wither this baseness in the bud.

"Since the constitution," it said, "has created a quantity of places richly endowed, how many persons are there not in motion! How many faces, little known, in haste to show themselves! How many long-forgotten names, stirring again beneath the dust of the Revolution! How many proud republicans, of the year VIII, diminishing themselves in order to creep into the notice of the powerful man who can give them place! How many Brutuses begging office! How many petty talents magnified! How many slender services exaggerated! How many bloody stains disguised! This astounding change of scene has occurred in a moment. Let us hope that the hero of liberty, he who has yet borne no stamp in the Revolution but of benefits conferred, will see these manœuvres with the disgust which they must inspire to every elevated soul; and that he will not suffer a crowd of obscure or dishonoured names to enwrap themselves in the splendour of his glory."—*Moniteur of the 3d of Nivose*.

Let us, however, draw our picture justly, omitting neither the good nor the evil; and do not let us imagine that this view was that of the whole nation. If there were men who debased themselves, and others, who, without debasing, bestirred themselves at least, some, on the contrary, awaited with dignity the call which the government was sure to make on their enlightenment and zeal. If M. Constant,

¹ BENJAMIN DE CONSTANT DE RESECQUE, born in Lausanne in 1767, and one of the most distinguished orators and authors of the French Revolution, was the son of a general in the Dutch service. Was educated at

for instance, solicited his admission to the tribunate with great urgency and many professions of devotion to the family of Bonaparte, Messrs. De Tracy,¹ Volney,² Monge,³ Carnot,⁴ Ginguéné,⁵ and Ducis,⁶ solicited nothing, and left the care of comprising them in this vast distribution of public offices to the free-will of the constituent power.

On the 24th of December—the 3d of Nivose—the new consuls met, in order to proceed to the composition of the council of state, and thus to place themselves in a position to install the government, on the 25th of December—the 4th of Nivose. Messrs. Sieyès and Roger-Ducos, the consuls retiring, and Messrs. Cambacérés and Lebrun, the consuls entering into office, repaired afterward to the Luxembourg in order to nominate the half of the senate, with the addition of one, in order that the senate might also assemble on the following day, complete itself, and proceed to the composition of the great deliberating bodies. The council of state was divided into five sections. The first of finance, the second of civil and criminal legislation, the third of war, the fourth of the marine, the fifth of the interior. Every section was to have a councillor of state as presiding officer, the whole council to have the First Consul, or in his absence one or the other of his colleagues, Cambacérés or Lebrun, as president.

Every section was charged with digesting the projects of the law, or the regulations relative to the business it was competent to perform. These projects and regulations were destined afterward to be debated in general assembly of all the sections combined. The council of state was charged, moreover, to pronounce on all debatable points

of the administration, and to decide all questions of competency, whether between the civil tribunals and the administration, or between the tribunals themselves. These are the privileges which it enjoys to this very day. But it had then the obligatory duty of digesting laws, and the exclusive right of discussing them before the legislative body, and, farther yet, the cognisance of great questions of government, and sometimes even of foreign politics; as will appear from certain examples to be adduced hereafter. The council of state was then, at this epoch, not only a council of administration, but an actual council of government.

Some members of this body were, moreover, charged, in different capacities, with certain special powers of administration, to which it was desired to attach greater importance, or to ensure more particular care. Such were public instruction, the treasury, the state domains, the colonies, and the public works. The councillors of state, charged with the direction of these different parties, were placed under the authority of the competent minister. The members of the council of state, largely endowed, were destined to receive each twenty five thousand francs as salary, and the presidents thirty-five thousand. Such sums, as it is well known, were at that time far greater than they now are, in proportion. Places in the council of state were coveted far more than places in the senate, for with the same salary and equal consideration, the councillors of state were admitted, as much as the ministers themselves, to the management of the most important affairs.

The principal members of this great body were, in the section of war, Messrs. Lacuée,⁷ Brune,⁸ and Marmont.⁹ In the section of the

Brunswick and studied the law. At the period of the Revolution, went to Paris, and, with equal courage and sternness of purpose, opposed both anarchy and despotism. In 1797, he distinguished himself much by his oratory, was elected to the office of tribune. He was one of the principal causes of the appointment of De Talleyrand to the foreign office. His boldness of speech and writing rendered him odious to the First Consul, who turned him out of office in 1802.—*Encyclopædia Americana*. H.

² TRACY, DESTUTT DE, a consistent liberal, and friend of Volney. H.

³ VOLNEY, CONSTANTINE FRANÇOIS CHASSEBEUF, Count de. Peer of France, born at Craon in Brittany, in 1755. Travelled and lived many years in Syria. Published a celebrated work there-on. In 1789, Deputy of the tiers-etat of Anjou. In 1791, published his delictual work called *Le Ruinée*. Suffered persecution, and was imprisoned ten months during the reign of terror, but was liberated on the fall of Robespierre. Visited the United States in 1795, returned home in 1798. And was made senator under the new constitution. It appears that he would have been second consul, but that his opinions were too liberal to please Napoleon.—*Encyclopædia Americana*. H.

⁴ MONGE. A member of the French Institute. By the patronage of Condorcet was made minister of the Marine, and temporarily of War, also; in which capacity he signed the death-warrant of Louis XVI. January 19, 1793, member, and in 1794, secretary and president of the Jacobins' club, though accused of favouring the Girondins. In 1794, employed in making an inventory of maps, medals, &c. connected with the marine. In 1798, sent to Italy to superintend the plunder of works of art. In 1799, member of the senate. A personal friend of Napoleon.—*Biographie Moderne*. H.

⁵ CARNOT. See note to p. 4.

⁶ GINGUENÉ, PIERRE LOUIS. Born at Rennes in Brittany, in 1748, of a poor but an ancient family. Acquired some distinction in painting, poetry, and music. In 1791 and 1793, he was connected with Grouvelle in publishing the *Faibles Villages*, and from 1793 to 1795 published a *Moniteur*. From 1794 to 1807, he published *The Decade*

Philosophique, Littéraire, et Politique, a consistent and impartial paper, which almost alone preserved its character throughout the whole Revolution. Director-General of the public schools until 1798, when he was sent ambassador to Turin. On his return, a member of the tribune, but rejected by the senate for opposing Napoleon in 1802.—*Encyclopædia Americana*. H.

⁷ DUCIS, JEAN FRANÇOIS. A French dramatic writer, famous for his attempt to adapt Shakespeare to the French theatre. He also wrote the *Edipe chez Admète* in imitation of the Greek. Abufar, or the Arabian Family, is his best piece. His style is harsh, but his sentiments dignified and noble. He was private secretary to Louis XVIII., and never swerved from his faith to him. When almost starving, refused the place of senator with a large salary, and the cross of the Legion of Honour offered him by Bonaparte. He lived long enough to rejoice at the restoration of his king.—*Encyclopædia Americana*. H.

⁸ LACUÉE, J. G., the younger. Born at La Massana, in 1753. Captain in the Dauphin's regiment. Syndic attorney to the department of Lot and Garonne, and deputy to the legislature. While in the assembly, moderate, and engaged chiefly on military matters. In 1792 opposed Dumouriez. In 1790 accused of rebellion against the authorities of Toulon. In 1791 escaped proscription. In 1795 nominated to the Council of Ancients. In 1797 member of the committee of inspectors. In 1789 went out of this council, and was re-elected into the Five Hundred. Declared in favour of the revolution of the 18th Brumaire.—*Biographie Moderne*. H.

⁹ BRUNE, C. M. A. Son of a barrister at Brives la Gaillarde. At the period of the Revolution was a printer, and also a man of letters. A member of the Cordeliers and friend of Danton. Arrested July, 1791, when La Fayette dispersed the mob. In 1793 joined the revolutionary army in the Gironde. He distinguished himself elsewhere, and at Arcola. In 1797 he was appointed commander of the army of Switzerland. In 1799 left the army of Italy for that of Holland. On the news of the 18th Brumaire, sent in his own and his army's adhesions to the consuls.—*Biographie Moderne*. H.

¹⁰ MARMONT, AUGUSTUS-FRÉDÉRIC-LOUIS VIKING DE

marine, Messrs. de Champagny, Ganteaume,¹ Fleuriu.² In the section of finance, Messrs. Defermon, Duchatel, Dufresne. In the section of justice, Messrs. Boulay de la Meurthe, Berlier, Real. In the section of the interior, Messrs. Røderer, Cretet, Chapal.³ Regnault de St. Jean d'Angely, Fourcroy.⁴ The five presidents appointed were Messrs. Brune, Ganteaume, Defermon, Boulay de la Meurthe, and Røderer. It would have been impossible, indeed, to compose this body of names more distinguished, of talents more real or more diversified. It must be admitted that the French Revolution had been prodigiously fruitful in men, in all departments, of ability, and if it were desired to take no note of exclusions declared by factions, the one against the other, the means were ready for composing a government the most varied, the most capable, and, let us add, the most glorious, that can be imagined. This it was which the new Consul attempted. He chose, for example, to the department of finance, M. Devaisnes, much accused of leaning to royalty, but having in his own line much practical knowledge, which had been before, and was thereafter, of great utility to the state.

On this 24th day of December—the 3d of Nivose—Messrs. Sieyès, Roger-Ducos, Cambacérès, and Lebrun, assembled in order to de-

signate the twenty-nine senators who, with the two consuls retiring, should constitute the number of thirty-one. The list had been naturally prepared beforehand. It contained the most respectable names. Messrs. Berthollet,⁵ Laplace—he had recently retired from the ministry of the interior—Monge, Tracy, Volney, Cabanis,⁶ Kellerman,⁷ Garat,⁸ Lacedepè.⁹ Ducis. The last refused the nomination.

The following day, the 25th of December—4th of Nivose—the council of state assembled for the first time. The consuls, accompanied by the ministers, were present at the sitting. A projected law was discussed for the regulation of the relations of the great bodies of the state, one with the other; other projects were also agreed on, as requisite to be prepared for presentation at the approaching session of the legislative body.

The senate again assembled in the palace of the Luxemburg, and completed itself by the election of twenty-nine new members, who, added to the thirty-one already chosen, carried the whole number of the senators up to sixty. It will be remembered that this number was intended, at a later period, to be increased to eighty. In this supplementary list again there were included some of the proud-est celebrities of France, Messrs. Lagrange,¹⁰

Born at Chatillon-sur-Seine in 1774, of a noble family. At fifteen he entered an infantry regiment, but soon quitted that arm for the artillery. At Toulon attracted the observation of Napoleon. He distinguished himself at Lodi, Castiglione, and St. George. Married the daughter of the banker Perrezeau. Accompanied Napoleon to Egypt: was the first man who landed at Malta. Commanded the 4th demi-brigade at Alexandria, and made governor of that town when Napoleon advanced on Syria. Returned home with Napoleon, and served him on the 18th of Brumaire.—*Court and Camp of Napoleon.*

Vanity destroyed Marmont, said he, posterity will justly brand his life, but his heart is worth more than his renown.—*Opinion of Napoleon. Las Cases.* H.

¹ Rear-admiral GANTEAUME. The officer on whom, after the terrible day of the first of August, the command of the shattered remains of the fleet at the mouth of the Nile had devolved. Ganteaume was, I am convinced, from the whole history of his career, a very brave and enterprising officer.—*Brenton's Naval History of Great Britain.*

² FLEURIU, CHARLES-PIERRE-CLARET, Count of. Born at Lyons in 1738. Entered the navy at thirteen, and served with credit through the Seven Years' War. He and the watchmaker, Berthoud, invented the sea chronometer, the utility of which he fairly established in 1768 and 1769, while in command of the frigate Iris. In 1790 he was minister of the marine. During the heat of the Revolution he devoted himself wholly to pursuits of science. In 1797 he became a member of the Council of Ancients, and afterwards of the council of state.—*Encyclopædia Americana.* H.

³ CHAPAL, JEAN ANTOINE CLAUDE. Count of Chanteloup, peer of France. Born in 1756. Devoted himself to medicine and science. Rendered himself conspicuous as a revolutionist in the assault on the citadel of Montpelier. In 1793 called to Paris by his chemical knowledge. Furnished from the factory at Grenoble 3500 pounds of gunpowder per diem. In 1798 was made member of the Institute. Assisted in the revolution of the 18th of Brumaire, and in 1799 was appointed by the first consul councillor of state.—*Encyclopædia Americana.* H.

⁴ FOURCROY, ANTHONY FRANÇOIS DE. A celebrated French chemist. Born in Paris. In 1784, after having attained great celebrity as a man of science, he was made professor of chemistry in the Jardin du Roy. Sent deputy from Paris to the National Convention, but did not take his seat until after the fall of Robespierre. In 1794 he was a member of the Committee of Public Safety. In 1795 of the Council of Ancients. In 1797 he resigned his seat, and in 1799 was appointed by Napoleon to the council of state.—*Encyclopædia Americana.* H.

⁵ BERTHOLLET, CLAUDE LOUIS, Count de. Member of all the scientific academies of Europe, and one of the most eminent theoretical chemists of the age. Born in Savoy in 1748. In 1764 was professor in the normal school in Paris. In 1768 sent to Italy to superintend the plunder of the works of art. He followed Bonaparte to Egypt, and returned with him in 1799. After the 18th of Brumaire was made a member of the Conservative Senate.—*Encyclopædia Americana.* H.

⁶ CABANIS, PIERRE JEAN-GEORGES. Physician, philosopher, *literateur*. Born at Cognac in 1737. Went to Warsaw, in his 16th year, as secretary to a Polish lord. A personal friend of Mirabeau and Condorcet. Member of the senate from 1799 to his death, in 1806.—*Encyclopædia Americana.*

⁷ KELLERMAN. Born at Strasburg in 1735. Entered the Confians legion as a hussar in 1752. He was appointed to command the army of Moselle; formed a junction with Dumouriez and drove back the allies from Valmy in 1792, thereby deciding the fate of France and of Europe until 1813.—*Encyclopædia Americana.*

His son was a distinguished man likewise, and it is his charge of cavalry to which some have attributed the victory of Marengo.

⁸ GARAT, D. J., the younger. A man of letters. The tiers-etat of Labour sent him to the states-general, and, though he seldom appeared in the convention, he made known his opinions through the *Journal de Paris*. He is accused strenuously of having abstracted papers exculpatory of the king. In 1793 he was minister of the interior, and justified Roche and Hebert. He was in some danger during the reign of terror. In 1794 commissioner of public instruction. In 1798 sent ambassador to Naples. In 1799 favoured the revolution of the 18th Brumaire, and was made a senator.

Garat, possessed of talents, found the secret of getting himself spoken of as a writer void of sense. Endued with domestic virtues, he was supposed a wicked being.—*Biographie Moderne.*

⁹ LACEDÈDE, B. G. E. A celebrated naturalist, born at Agen in 1756; a pupil of Buffon and Daubenton. In the Revolution, member for the department of Paris. In 1799 took the oath of hatred to royalty in the Council of Five Hundred. In October, 1799, was made member of the Institute of Bologna and afterwards appointed to the conservative senate by Napoleon.—*Biographie Moderne.*

N. B. The other names either have been noted above, or are those of men comparatively obscure.

¹⁰ LAGRANGE, L. DE. A celebrated geometrician, born at Turin, of French parents. Frederic the Great induced him to settle at Berlin. On his death he returned to Paris, where he received a pension of 6000 livres, which was several times withdrawn and restored. In 1794 a member of the committee on education. In 1799

Darcet,¹ François de Neufchâteau,² Daubenton,³ Bougainville,⁴ the banker Perrégaux, and, to conclude, a very ancient name, M. de Choiseul Praslin.

On the following days the senate was occupied by the composition of the legislative body and of the tribunate. To the legislative body were admitted the moderate men of all the periods of the Revolution, members of the Constituent Assembly, of the Legislative Assembly, of the National Convention, and, lastly, Deputies of the Five Hundred.

Care was had to choose in the different assemblies men who had aimed but little at fame, success, or agitation, in state matters, reserving for the tribunate those well known for tastes directly opposite. The three hundred names, therefore, which composed the legislative body, could not be conspicuous for their brilliancy, and in this numerous list it would be difficult to find two or three which are known to this day. Among them, however, was the modest and brave Latour d'Auvergne,⁵ a hero worthy of antiquity for his virtues, his great deeds, and his noble end.

The hundred names of the tribunate chosen with an intention very natural, but before long bitterly regretted, of making room, namely, for all active and stirring spirits, spirits enamoured of renown—these hundred names, I say, contained celebrities, some of which are, it is true, somewhat effaced, but not forgotten even to-day, while I am writing; such as are Messrs. Chenier,⁶ Andrieux,⁷ Chauvelin,⁸ Stanislaus de Girardin, Benjamin Constant, Daunou, Riouffe,⁹ Berenger,¹⁰ Ganih, Ginguéné, Laromiguière, Jean Baptiste Say,¹¹ &c.

The composition of these bodies once

finished, the quarters destined for their reception were next to be prepared. The Tuileries were reserved for the three consuls, the Luxembourg was devoted to the senate, the Palais-Bourbon to the legislative body, and the Palais-Royal to the tribunate. A sum of some hundred thousand francs was voted to render the Tuileries habitable, and until the necessary works should be performed, the consuls occupied the Lesser Luxembourg.

General Bonaparte had done much already since his return from Egypt. He had overthrown the Directory, and had acquired a sway, inferior in appearance to constitutional royalty, though vastly superior to it in reality. But he was scarcely master of that authority, and it was necessary that he should legalize his possession of it by useful works and great actions. There remained to him, therefore, vast things to be done; and his first efforts at reorganization were but an effort—a happy effort without doubt, but one which still left in the country great disorders, deep suffering, restrictions on the treasury, misery in the army, the flames of civil war in La Vendée, doubt among the neutral powers, and real desperation in carrying on the struggle among the belligerents. And yet, this assumption of power, coming after his first works, and preceding the vast labours, of effecting which thereafter he entertained ample confidence, had charms enough for his ambitious heart.

He performed, in order to celebrate his installation into his government, a train of measures carefully matured, which were full of deep policy, of evident and sensible joy, and of that generosity which is inspired by contentment into every lively and benevolent soul.

nominated to the Conservative Senate, in which he sat until 1806.—*Biographie Moderne*.

¹ DARCET, JEAN. An eminent French chemist, born at Douaelt, in Guenne, in 1725. He devoted himself to chemistry, and among other discoveries, demonstrated the combustibility of the diamond. During the reign of terror his life was saved by Fourcroy, who got his name obliterated from the lists of Robespierre. In 1799 member of the Conservative Senate, in which office he died, in 1861.—*Encyclopædia Americana*.

² FRANÇOIS DE NEUFCHÂTEAU, N. Born in Lorraine in 1750. He devoted himself almost entirely to letters. In 1783 nominated attorney-general to the chief council of the Cape of St. Domingo. In 1789 joined the revolutionary party. In 1791 deputed to the legislature. He held a variety of offices throughout the Revolution, but without obtaining any very great eminence, except for his literary talents, by which he deserved and acquired a high rank.—*Biographie Moderne*.

³ DAUBENTON, J. L. M. Born in 1716, at Montber. A physician, naturalist, and fellow-student of Voltaire. His life was entirely devoted to science. He was appointed a member of the Conservative Senate, and died of apoplexy in 1799.—*Biographie Moderne*.

⁴ BOUGAINVILLE, DE. Born in 1730. Celebrated for his voyage round the world. In 1790 received the command of the squadron at Brest, where he distinguished himself. Manifested great attachment to Louis XVI. and was constantly about his person. Was arrested, but spared in 1793. In 1799 the Council of Five Hundred presented him as a candidate for the Directory. In 1799 he was made a conservative senator.—*Biographie Moderne*.

⁵ LATOUR D'AUVERGNE, THEOPHILUS DE. One of the bravest soldiers mentioned in history, born at Carhaix, in the department of Finistère, in 1743. Was aid-de-camp to the Duke de Crillon at the siege of Mahon. He was among the first to join the standard of the Revolution, and distinguished himself above 8000 grenadiers in the Pyrenees. Higher appointments were offered to him, which he never would accept, saying that he was only fit to lead a column of grenadiers. He fell gloriously at Newburg in 1803, with the army of the Rhine, hav-

ing been named not long before, First Grenadier of France, by the First Consul. His head was embalmed and carried at the head of his company in a silver box. His name was always called when the regiment was mustered, and the bravest grenadier answered "died on the field of honour."—*Encyclopædia Americana*.

⁶ CHENIER, M. J. Born in 1762, at Constantinople; son of the French consul. In 1789 pleaded for the total liberty of the press. Wrote many revolutionary dramatic pieces. Voted for the death of Louis XVI. In 1793 opposed the terrorists and procured the erasure of Talleyrand's name from the list of emigrants. A member of the Council of Five Hundred. Engaged in all the various acts of the Revolution up to 1799, when he became a tribune. He had some genius as a writer.—*Biographie Moderne*.

⁷ ANDRIEUX. A distinguished French dramatist. Born at Strasburg in 1759. In 1798 entered the legislature for the department of the Seine. After the 18th Brumaire became a tribune.—*Encyclopædia Americana*.

⁸ CHAUVELIN, FRANÇOIS, MURQUIS DE. Born in 1770. In 1791 was aid-de-camp to Rochambeau. In 1792 was appointed, at Dumouriez's suggestion, ambassador to England. Was imprisoned during the reign of terror, but liberated on the 9th of Thermidor. Appointed by the senate to the tribunate. A friend of Benjamin Constant.—*Encyclopædia Americana*.

⁹ RIOUFFE, H. A man of letters. Fled from Paris in 1793. Went to Bordeaux, where he was arrested by Tallien and imprisoned in Paris until after the fall of Robespierre. In 1799 a member of the tribunate, and offended his colleagues by too violent praise of Bonaparte, and having the air of defending him when no one attacked him.—*Biographie Moderne*.

¹⁰ BERENGIER. The celebrated poet and song-writer.

¹¹ SAY, JEAN BAPTISTE. A distinguished political economist, born at Lyons in 1769. One of the establishers of the *Decade Philosophique*. In 1799 a member of the tribunate.—*Encyclopædia Americana*.

N B. The other names, either noted before, or comparatively unworthy of notice.

These measures followed one another from the 25th of December—4th of Nivose—the day on which the consular government was installed, to the 1st of January, 1800—11th of Nivose—the day on which the first legislative session was opened.

First, an act of the council of state of the 27th of December—the 6th of Nivose—decided that the laws which excluded the relations of emigrants, and the former nobility, from public functions, were abrogated *ad ipso facto*, such laws being contrary to the spirit of the new constitution. A certain number of individuals belonging to the revolutionary party, were ordered, as I have stated, to be transported or imprisoned in compliance with an act, not sufficiently considered, which was passed a few days after the 18th of Brumaire.

Transportation and imprisonment had been commuted for strict superintendence of the

police. This superintendence was itself suppressed by a decree of the 5th of Nivose. After this reparation made to those who had not even endured the first severity of the act, the First Consul granted one yet more important, and more necessary, to the victims of the Directory, and of the governments anterior to it. Those who had been transported without trial were regularly authorized to return to France, with no condition, except that of residing in the places indicated. This disposition was applied to all the persons proscribed at any time, but especially to those of the 18th Fructidor. Messrs. Boissy d'Anglas,¹ Dumolard,² and Pastoret,³ were recalled and authorised to live, the first at Annonay, the second at Grenoble, the third at Dejon. Messrs. Carnot, Portalis,⁴ Quatremere de Quincy,⁵ Simeon, Villaret-Joyeuse,⁶ Barbé-Marbois,⁷ Barère,⁸ also recalled, were permitted to live in Paris. The

¹ BOISSY D'ANGLAS, FRANÇOIS ANTOINE. A barrister in the Parliament, maître d'hôtel of Monsieur. In 1789 deputy of the tiers-etat from Annonay. At first was tolerably moderate. In 1791, one of the minority in favour of the right of men of colour. At the trial of Louis XVI. voted for detention until deportation should be necessary. Kept himself aside during the reign of terror, and did not re-appear in the tribune until the 9th of Thermidor, year II—July, 1794. In February, 1791, he procured an act for the free exercise of all forms of religion. In the same year took charge of the provisioning of Paris, and on the insurrection of the 1st Prairial displayed great firmness, being in the chair, above twenty muskets being aimed at him, and the head of the deputy, Feraud, on a pike, being thrust in his face. In the same year he voted for the abolition of all barbarity from the revolutionary laws, for the recall of De Talleyrand, and the reunion of Holland. He opposed the amnesty for the crimes of the Revolution, consistently advocated all liberal measures, and was sentenced to deportation on the 18th of Fructidor, year V—Sept. 4th, 1797—but escaped, was recalled to France as above.—*Biographie Moderne*. H.

² DUMOLARD, J. V. A lawyer of Grenoble. Born at Vigille, in Dauphiny. Appointed to the legislature at the age of twenty-five by the department of Isere. For a time was rather a violent revolutionist, but became more moderate. In 1792 he tried vainly to defend the queen, and the justice of peace Larivière. He was nearly assassinated by the Jacobins for opposing the accusation of La Fayette. He consistently and strenuously opposed all cruel, all impious, all destructive measures, in short, all the measures of the Jacobins. Was sentenced to deportation in 1797, but escaped, and was not deported to Cayenne. But subsequently delivering himself up, was carried to Oleron. Recalled by the consuls as above.—*Biographie Moderne*. H.

³ PASTORET, EMM. CL. JOS. PIERRE. Born at Marseilles in 1756. An advocate before the Revolution. In September, 1790, appointed by Louis XVI. minister of the interior. In 1791 deputy from Paris to the legislature. He was rather a moderate revolutionist, opposing some atrocities, though he voted for the amnesty of revolutionary crimes. He opposed the accusation of La Fayette. Took no share in the reign of terror, and, becoming more moderate, was one of the firmest defenders of the *Clichons* in 1795. Spoke eloquently in favour of the fugitive priests, and opposed the marching of troops to Paris by the Directory. Banished to Cayenne, but escaped, and went to Oleron, in 1798, whence he was recalled, as above, by the consul in 1799. He was a voluminous, elegant, and perspicuous writer.—*Biographie Moderne*. H.

⁴ PORTALIS, J. E. M. Born at Bausset. A lawyer before the Revolution. Sent in 1795 to the council of Ancients by the department of Seine. Constantly showed himself adverse to the directorial party, and displayed a character full of nobleness and moderation. In 1796 made a report for the erasure of the lists of emigrants. Opposed Latouche's speech against priests, and, in fact, all violent and Jacobinical measures. Sentenced to transportation in 1797, but escaped, and was recalled, as above.—*Biographie Moderne*. H.

⁵ QUATREMERE DE QUINCY, ANTOINE CHRYSTOWNE. An ancient counsellor of the Chatelet. Embraced the cause of the Revolution with moderation. He was the reporter of the cause of Favras. He opposed all violence, and his abhorrence of the Terrorists led him to

head one of the sections in the insurrection of the 13th Vendémiaire, 1798, for which he was sentenced to death by the Terrorists, but escaped. In 1796 he reappeared in public, and, by his continued hatred of the Jacobin party, drew on himself the sentence of deportation in 1797, from which he escaped, and was recalled, as above, in 1799.—*Biographie Moderne*. H.

⁶ VILLARET-JOYEUSE, LOUIS THOMAS. A French vice-admiral. Served at first in the infantry. Left the army in consequence of a duel; entered the navy; was employed under Suffren; distinguished himself in India; commanded a frigate there, and was taken by the Scapila, but afterwards exchanged. In 1788 declared for the Revolution. From 1793 to 1798 commanded the French fleets with distinction. Was persecuted by the Jacobins for his moderation. In 1796 quitted the marine. In 1797 deputy from Morbihan to the council of Five Hundred. Declared against the Terrorists; was sentenced to deportation, escaped the first search, and was sent to Oleron. Recalled by the consuls in 1799.—*Biographie Moderne*. H.

Admiral Villaret. An officer of great merit of the old school. Villaret was a gentleman of high polish, and one of the best officers Suffren had in his fleet in the East Indies; he was a man of talent and bravery.—*Brenton's Naval History of Great Britain*.

He commanded 26 ships of the line, and 8 frigates, in Lord Howe's action of the 1st of June, 1794, against 24 British ships of the line and 7 frigates. In his flag-ship, the *Montagne*, 130, he engaged the English admiral in the *Queen Charlotte*, 100, and lost 300 men in killed and wounded; Jean Bon St. André, the revolutionary commissioner of the French people, running below at the first broadside, and continuing in the cockpit during the whole action. Villaret lost seven ships of the line, six taken and one sunk, but saved the American Convoy.—*Brenton, N. H.*

⁷ BARBÉ-MARBOIS. Born at Metz, and was made Governor of St. Domingo. In 1791 was sent by the king to the diet of Ratisbon, and the next year to Vienna with M. de Noailles, the ambassador. He returned to France, and remained in obscurity until 1795, when he was sent by the department of the Moselle to the Council of Ancients. Was an enemy of the Directory, and transported to Cayenne in 1797; but was recalled, as above, in 1799.—*Biographie Moderne*. H.

⁸ BARÈRE, BERNARD DE VIEUXAC. Born at Jasbez, of a respectable family. In 1789 deputed to the tiers-etat from Bigorre. In 1798 defended the perpetrators of the massacre of September. Voted for the death of Louis, and congratulated the people on the tyrant's death. He declared for the Montagnards, and for a while displeased Robespierre and that party. He was again a member of the Committee of Public Safety, became its habitual organ, and proposed in its name most of the measures which signalized the reign of terror. The banishment of the Bourbons; trial of the queen; exhumation of the French kings at St. Denis; the death of all alarmists; the prohibition of a deputy to defend himself before sentence; the slaughter of English and Hanoverian prisoners, and the massacre of the garrisons of Condé and Valenciennes. And when this last decree was not executed, he used these words, "Temporize today, they will murder you to-morrow. No, no, none but the dead are to be trusted!" He uttered a violent eulogium of Robespierre the day before his fall, but then truckled to the other party. He was afterward condemned to deportation; but was not sentenced. Was not in-

care taken in collecting at the capital, although it were not their place of birth, such men as Messrs. Carnot, Simeon, and Portalis, proved sufficiently that it was the intention of government to employ their talents.

Other measures were adopted with regard to worship and the free exercise of that right. On the 28th of December, it was directed that the edifices destined to religious ceremonies should continue to receive that destination, or should receive it anew, in case they had not been restored already to the ministers of the different creeds. Certain local authorities, wishing to hinder the exercise of Catholicism, had forbidden the opening of churches on Sunday, and authorized it only on the tenth days. These municipal decrees the consuls broke; and added to the restitution of religious buildings, the free faculty of using the various days appointed holy by the various creeds. Nevertheless, they did not as yet venture to put a stop to the ceremonies of the *theophilanthropists*, which took place in the churches, on certain week days, and which the Catholics regarded as profanations.

The consuls caused the formula of the obligation entered into by priests to be modified. They had been formerly required to take a special oath, binding them to the civil constitution of the clergy—an oath which bound them, as some said, to a legislation contrary to the laws of the church.

It was now proposed to make them take a simple promise of obedience to the constitution of the state, a thing which none of them could refuse to do, without refusing *that obedience to Cæsar* which is strictly prescribed by the laws of the Catholic church. This is what was afterwards called the promise, as opposed to the oath, which immediately recalled many priests to the altar. Those who had sworn, had already obtained the favour of the government. It was now the turn of those who had not sworn.

To conclude, to the measures of this kind the new First Consul added one which should, in the eyes of all the world, be attributed to him directly, because it recalled relations which were in some sort personal to himself. He had negotiated with Pius VI., the late pope, and signed, at the gates of Rome, the treaty of Tolentino. He had, from the year 1797, affected great regard for the head of the Catholic church, and had received from him marked testimonies of good will. Pius VI. who died at Valence in Dauphiny, had not yet received the honours of burial. His mortal remains were deposited in a sacristy in that town. General Bonaparte, on his return from Egypt, saw Cardinal Spina, at Valence, and promised him that he would soon remedy so discreditable a piece of forgetfulness.

As early, therefore, as the 30th of December—the 9th Nivose—he caused a decree to be issued by the consuls, resting on the noblest considerations.

"The consuls," thus ran this document, "considering that the body of Pius VI. has been deposited in the town of Valence, deprived of any funeral honors;

"That, if this old man, venerable for his misfortunes, was for a little time the enemy of France, it was but that he was led astray by the councils of men who worked upon the weakness of his old age;

"That it is for the honour of the French nation, and in conformity with its character, to pay the highest marks of consideration to a man who occupied one of the loftiest dignities on earth;

"The consuls decree, &c., &c." And here followed dispositions ordering, at the same time, funeral honours to the pontiff, and a monument which should declare the rank of the buried prince.

This demonstration produced, perhaps, a greater effect than more humane measures, because it struck and astonished imaginations accustomed to very different spectacles. So that an immense crowd hurried to Valence, to take advantage of the authority accorded to them to make a religious demonstration.

The catalogue of revolutionary festivals contained one very unhappily conceived. It was that which celebrated the 21st of January. Whatever might be the opinion of men with regard to the tragical events recalled to mind by that date, it was a barbarous festival, having for object the commemoration of a bloody catastrophe. General Bonaparte, under the Directory, had manifested a strong indisposition to appear at it; not that he dreamed at that day of paying deference to royalty, which, thereafter he was destined to re-establish, but that he did not love publicly to brave those passions which he did not share.

Having now become the head of the government, he caused a decision to be entered by the legislative commissions, that there should be but two of these festivals; that, namely, of the 14th of July, the anniversary of the first day of the Revolution, and that of the first day of Vendemiaire, the anniversary of the first day of the republic. "These days," he said, "are imperishable in the memory of our citizens. They have been accepted by all France with unanimous transports, and they awaken no recollection likely to introduce division among the friends of the republic."

It required all the power, and all the boldness likewise, of the head of the new government to venture on a train of measures which, just, politic, and moral in themselves, appeared nevertheless, to many excitable spirits, as many preliminary steps toward a complete counter-revolution. But in accomplishing all this, General Bonaparte had taken care, at one time, to set, himself, the first example of forgetfulness of political hatreds; at another to awaken, in its most stirring shape, that sentiment of glory, by which he led the men of that day, and diverted them from base factious

cluded in the law of amnesty, and being appointed to the legislature in 1797, was formally expelled. Was included in the act which recalled all the exiles in 1799.—*Biographie Moderne*.

The whole annals of the Revolution do not exhibit a

baser or more bloody heart than Barrère. He had neither courage nor consistency. His talents were as trifling as his conduct was vile and shuffling, and we shall look in vain for one redeeming trait in his character.

fury. Thus General Augereau had offended him by unbecoming conduct on the 18th of Brumaire; nevertheless, he named him commander of the army of Holland.

"Prove," he said, in a letter which has been subsequently published, "Prove, in all the acts which your command will justify you in performing, that you are above all those miserable party differences, the conflict of which, during the last ten years, has caused the convulsions which tore all France asunder. Should circumstances oblige me to make war in person, feel sure that I will not leave you in Holland, and that I never shall forget your glorious day's work at Castiglione."

At the same time he took the first step toward the foundation of the Legion of Honour, in the institution of arms of honour. The French spirit of democracy which attached an idea of horror to all personal distinctions, could then, at the most, admit only of recompenses for military services. As a consequence of the first article of the constitution, the First Consul decided, that for every brilliant action, a musket of honour should be voted to every infantry soldier, a carbine of honour to every cavalry soldier, grenades of honour to every artilleryman, and, to conclude, a sabre of honour to officers of all ranks. To the institution which was voted on the 26th of December—the 4th of Nivose—the First Consul added positive actions. On the following day, he decreed a sabre to General St. Cyr,¹ for the brilliant battle he had lately fought in the Apennines. "Receive," he said to him, "in testimony of my satisfaction, a handsome sabre, which you will always wear on days of battle. Let the soldiers know, who are under your orders, that I am well pleased with them, and that I hope to be so, yet more, in future." To these acts, which announced his assumption of the reins of government; which marked the character that government was to bear; and which caused his intention of placing himself above all party spirit to display itself in lively colours, the First Consul immediately added measures of far greater importance, as well with regard to La Vendée, as to foreign powers.

An armistice had been signed with the Vendéans, parleys had been opened with them, and yet the pacification did not advance. General Bonaparte had left little doubt in the minds of the royalists, who had applied to him, in order to sound his intentions, and to learn whether he would not be satisfied to become the restorer, the support, and the first subject of the house of Bourbon. He had speedily undeceived them, by showing himself irrevocably attached to the cause of the French Revolution. This frankness in his declarations had not rendered the reconciliation, which had been set on foot, the more easy. The Ven-

deans hesitated; they were placed between the fear with which the energy of the new government assailed them, and the urgency of the emigrants in London, who were authorized to promise, in behalf of Mr. Pitt, arms, moneys, and a disembarkation on their coasts.

It was on a new insurrection in La Vendée that England especially relied. She was meditating an attempt, similar to that which had been made on Holland, on that part of our coasts. The ill-success of the latter had not discouraged her, and she urgently asked the Emperor Paul for the aid of his troops, though, in fact, with but small hope of obtaining it. Prussia, indeed, which was beginning to display a sort of interest in the consular government, never ceased repeating to Duroc, and to M. Otto, the French chargé d'affaires, "Get done with La Vendée; for it is there that they will aim the most dangerous blows at you."

General Bonaparte knew this well. Independently of the injury La Vendée was doing to the armies of the republic, by absorbing a portion of their force, the civil war appeared to him not only a misfortune, but a sort of dishonour to the government, for it proved a deplorable state of internal affairs. He had taken, therefore, the most effectual measures to bring it to an end. He had recalled from Holland a part of that army, which, under General Brune, had recently conquered the Anglo-Russians. He had united to it a portion of the garrison of Paris, which he had no hesitation in diminishing considerably, supplying the want of material force by the influence of his name. And thus he had succeeded in bringing together in the west an excellent army of about sixty thousand men. General Brune was placed at the head of that army, with a strong recommendation to retain, as his principal lieutenant, the wise and conciliatory Hédouville, who held all the threads of the negotiation with the royalists in his hands. The name of General Brune was a sufficient reply to those who reckoned on a second descent of the Anglo-Russians. But before striking a decisive blow, as he proposed to do, in case the conditions of pacification should be rejected, the First Consul thought himself bound to address a proclamation to the Vendéans on the very day of his installation.

On the 29th of December—the 8th of Nivose—he caused a proclamation and decree of the consuls to be transmitted to the department of the west, in these words—"An impious war threatens a second time to enkindle the departments of the west. The duty of the First Magistrates of the Republic is to prevent its progress, and to extinguish it on the very hearth; but they desire not to have recourse to violence, until they shall have exhausted the means of persuasion and justice."

¹ ST. CYR, LOUIS GOUVION. Born of respectable parents in the department of La Meurthe, in 1764. In his youth, he was destined for a painter, and visited Rome in order to study the old masters. Previously to the Revolution he returned to France, and entered the army as a private volunteer. He was soon afterward sent with the troops to the Rhine. In 1793, he was a general of division, and distinguished himself on several occasions. In 1798, he served in Italy under Massena, and, when an insurrection of the army drove that officer out

of Rome, the Directory gave him the command, and he soon restored discipline. In 1799, he passed to the army of the Rhine under Moreau, took Fribourg, and contributed to the victory of Hohenlinden. In the autumn of the same year, he attacked the Austrians with an inferior force at Borea, near Gavi and Novi, drove them across the Arqui and took 1500 men and several cannon. This is the victory alluded to in the text.—*Court and Camp of Napoleon.*

Making a distinction between the guilty men, sold to the foreigner and enemy, and for ever irreconcilable to the republic, and the misguided citizens, who had only made war in order to resist cruel persecution, the First Consul called their attention to all the acts which would tend to reassure these last, such as the revocation of the law of hostages, the restitution of the churches to the priests, the permission to all men to observe the Sabbath as they pleased. He promised, in the second place, a complete and perfect amnesty to all those who should submit and abandon the assemblies of insurgents, and lay down the arms furnished by England. But he announced, also, that force would be immediately put forth sternly against those who should persist in insurrection. He announced the suspension of the constitution, that is to say, the employment of extraordinary jurisdictions in places where insurgent bands should continue to show themselves in arms. "The government," said the proclamation of the consuls, in its conclusion, "will pardon, will show mercy to repentance. Its indulgence will be complete and absolute. But it will strike any person who, after this declaration, shall presume still to resist the sovereignty of the nation. But no! henceforward we will acknowledge but one sentiment, the love of country. The ministers of a God of peace shall be the first movers of reconciliation and concord. Let them speak to the hearts of men the language they have learned in the school of their master. Let them go into the temples, which are reopened to them, and offer the sacrifice which shall expiate the crimes of war, and the blood which she has caused to be shed."

This manifestation, supported by a formidable force, was of a nature to produce the most powerful effect, especially when coming from a new government, entirely clear from all the excesses and crimes which had afforded a pretext for the civil war.

After having proceeded thus, with reference to internal enemies, the First Consul, addressing himself to the external foe, resolved to make solemn advances to two of the powers which had not as yet shown any symptoms of relenting toward France; but which, on the contrary, appeared desperately bent on war; I mean Austria and Great Britain.

Prussia had very kindly received, as we have seen, the aide-de-camp Duroc, and did not cease from giving daily to the First Consul the liveliest testimonies of sympathy. Satisfied with her own relations with him, she desired the success of his government against anarchy, the success of his arms against Austria. As to the project of rendering herself a mediator, she always cherished the idea thereof, but dared not to take the first step;

¹ SEMONVILLE, HUGUET DE. Councillor in the parliament of Paris; attached to the popular party; a friend of La Fayette. In 1792 ambassador of the French Republic to Genoa. He was appointed minister to Turin and Constantinople, but the King of Sardinia and the states of Venice and Genoa refused to suffer him to enter their territories. In May, 1793, he was sent by the Directory as minister plenipotentiary to the Pope. The Emperor of Germany violated the law of nations, by causing him to be arrested near the Lake of Chiavenna, with immense treasures destined as presents to the Sultan. He was detained a close prisoner until 1795, when he was exchanged at Bale for the daughter of Louis the XVI. After the 18th of Brumaire he was first put in nomination for the council of state, and afterward appointed ambassador to Holland, whither he went in January, 1800. — *Biographie Moderne*.

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thinking the moment of peace still far off, and being unwilling to take a step, the results of which could not be foreseen at so early a period.

Any person, in fact, who closely observed the state of things in Europe, could easily discover that, in order to disunite the bonds which attached Austria to England, there must needs be another campaign. The court of Madrid had also seen with satisfaction the accession of General Bonaparte; because, with him at the helm of state, it appeared to her that the French alliance would at once be more honourable and more profitable. But the horizon did not clear up completely in any quarter. General Bonaparte resolved then, on the very day on which the constitution formally invested him with a new character, to address himself publicly to those powers which were decidedly hostile, in order to put them in the wrong if they should refuse. After that, it would be at his option to undertake war, with the world's opinion on his side.

First of all, he gave orders for the departure of the French agents, whom I have mentioned above, and who had not yet left Paris, because it was desired that they should be accredited in the name of a government definitively constituted. General Beurnonville therefore set out for Berlin; M. Alquier for Madrid; M. de Semonville¹ for the Hague; M. Bourgoing for Copenhagen. General Beurnonville was entrusted with a well-conceived piece of flattery to the King of Prussia, which was, to request, at his hands, a bust of the Great Frederic, destined to be placed in the great gallery of Diana in the Tuileries. The First Consul was causing the images of all great men, who were objects of his admiration, to be disposed in this gallery. M. Alquier, who bore to Madrid the most caressing speeches to the king and queen, was charged also with the duty of presenting a gift to the Prince of Peace, who, although at that time no longer the minister, still possessed considerable influence. This gift consisted of splendid arms, manufactured at Versailles, which was then celebrated for the perfection of its fabrics throughout all Europe.

This done, the First Consul directed his attention to the measure projected, with regard to the two hostile courts of England and Austria. In general, it has been the custom to conceal overtures of this kind, in order to avoid the humiliation of a refusal. General Bonaparte, however, in speaking to England and Austria, wished to speak to the whole world; and to that end, it was necessary for him to make a solemn overture, which, departing entirely from wonted usages, should address itself to the hearts of the sovereigns themselves, either to flatter or embarrass them. Therefore, instead of causing his notes to be forwarded to Lord Grenville, or to M.

Lord Grenville was at this time the English minister for foreign affairs. The mode of this communication probably, caused suspicion, rather than conciliation.

Thug it he wrote directly to the King of England and the Emperor of Germany two letters, which the ministers of those courts were charged to deliver forthwith to their respective sovereigns.

The letter to the King of England ran in the following terms:

"Paris—5th Nivose, year VIII—Dec. 26, 1799.

"Called, sire, by the wishes of the French nation, to occupy the first magistracy of the Republic, I judge it well, on entering my office, to address myself directly to your majesty.

"Must the war, which for the last eight years has devastated the four quarters of the world, be eternal? Are there no means of coming to an understanding?

"How can the two most enlightened nations of Europe, stronger already and more powerful than their safety or their independence requires, sacrifice, to ideas of vain-glory, the well-being of commerce, internal prosperity, and the peace of families? How is it, that they do not feel peace to be the first necessities, as the first of glories?

"These sentiments cannot be strangers to the heart of your majesty, who governs a free people, with the sole aim of rendering it happy.

"Your majesty will perceive only in this overture the sincerity of my desire to contribute efficaciously, for the second time, to a general pacification by this prompt advance, perfectly confidential, and disembarassed of those forms, which, perhaps necessary to disguise the dependence of weak states, reveal, when adopted by strong states, only the wish of mutual deception.

"France and England, by the misuse of their powers, may yet, for a long period, retard, to the misery of all nations, their exhaustion. But I venture to say, that the fate of all civilized nations is connected with the termination of a war which has set the whole world in flames.

"Signed, **BONAPARTE,**
"*First Consul of the French Republic.*"

On the same day, the French consul addressed the following letter to the Emperor of Germany:

"Having returned to Europe, after an absence of eighteen months, I find a war kindled between the French Republic and your majesty.

"The French nation has called me to the occupation of the First Magistracy.

"A stranger to every feeling of vain-glory, the first of my wishes is to stop the effusion of blood which is about to flow. Every thing

leads me to foresee, that in the next campaign numerous armies, ably conducted, will treble the number of the victims, who have already fallen since the resumption of hostilities. The well known character of your majesty leaves me no doubt as to the secret wishes of your heart. If those wishes only are listened to, I perceive the possibility of reconciling the interests of the two nations.

"In the relations which I have formerly entertained with your majesty, you have shown me some personal regard. I beg you, therefore, to see in this overture, which I have made to you, the desire to respond to that regard, and to convince your majesty more and more of the very distinguished consideration which I feel toward you.

"Signed, **BONAPARTE,**
"*First Consul of the French Republic.*"

Such was the mode by which the French consul announced his accession to power, whether to the factions which divided France or to the foreign cabinets in coalition against her. He offered peace, being prepared to compel it forcibly, should he fail to obtain it amicably. It was his intention to employ the winter in carrying on a short and decisive campaign in La Vendée, in order that he might have the power, thereafter in the spring, of throwing back upon the Rhine and Alps those troops which, after the settlement of domestic peace, would be again disposable for foreign operations.

While waiting these results, on the first of January, 1800—11th of Nivose, year VIII—he opened the legislative session, and determined to consecrate that session of four months to the preparing, by means of good laws, the administrative organization of France, which was yet scarcely commenced. He had of late substituted his brother, Lucien, to the learned Laplace, in the internal administration; and in the ministry of justice, M. Abrial,² a very honest man of business, to M. Cambacérés, who had become consul.

On the first of January, 1800, the Senate, the Legislative Body, and the Tribunal assembled. The Senate chose M. Sieyès, as their president—the Legislative Body, M. Perrin des Vosges—the Tribunal, M. Daunou.

Numerous drafts of laws were immediately laid before the Legislative Body.

There reigned at this period a species of anxiety concerning these deliberative assemblies, thus newly combined. Men were weary of agitation, athirst for repose. They had recovered from that keen taste for political eloquence, which had so much enthralled all France in eighty-nine, when Mirabeau,³ Bar-

¹ THUGUT. Foreign minister of Austria. He was the son of a poor boatman at Linz. By the energy of his parents, he was sent to the school of Oriental languages at Vienna, where his abilities attracted the notice of Maria Theresa, who thenceforth became his warm patroness. At fifteen he was sent as interpreter to the Austrian ambassador at Constantinople. Thence he gradually rose to the portfolio of foreign affairs. He resided long at Paris, and was intimate with Mirabeau, but was ever a steadfast opponent of republican principles, an honourable, upright, energetic, patriotic statesman.—*Milton's History*. H.

² ABRIAL, ANDRÉ-JOSEPH. Born in 1750 at Annonay, in the department of Ardèche. Now count and peer of France. Studied law in Paris, embraced the principles

of the Revolution, and was for a long time commissioner of the executive power in the Courts of Cassation. In 1799, he organized the republican government of Naples.—*Encyclopædia Americana*. H.

³ BARNAVE, ANTOINE PIERRE JOSEPH MARIE. A distinguished French orator. Born at Grenoble in 1761. The son of a rich *procurer*. He was a Protestant and a lawyer. Deputy of the *tiers-etat*, and early showed himself an open enemy of the court. After the arrest of the royal family, he became much more moderate. He defended La Fayette, maintained the inviolability of the royal person. He opposed the ordinance against refractory priests, lost all influence with the revolutionists, and was guillotined in 1793.—*Encyclopædia Americana*. H.

nave, Maury,¹ and Cazalès,² opened to her a new career of glory, in the rostrum.

The dis^{tin} to advocates was universal. There was a perfect rage for men of action, capable of giving France victories and peace. Nevertheless, they had not yet resolved on the establishment of absolute power—they did not yet wish to strangle all liberty, or to stifle all sage discussion. If the power of action, which a new legislator had introduced into the constitution, by the creation of a First Consul, and the appointment to that office of the greatest captain of his age—if, I say, that power was incompatible with liberty, men were prepared to sacrifice the former. But every one would have been delighted if the reconciliation of liberty with a strong government should prove feasible. It was not vulgar agitators or obstinate republicans who reasoned thus. It was the wise, enlightened spirits, who would not have the Revolution so soon belie herself, and that so completely. Wherefore indifferent spectators asked curiously of each other, while good citizens asked with heartfelt anxiety, how the tribunate, the only body which had the power of debate, would bear itself toward the government; and how the government would endure opposition, should opposition arise.

When any reaction declares itself, however general it may be, it cannot carry every one with it; and those whom it does not carry with it, it irritates and even disgusts. Messrs. Chenier, Andrieux, Ginguéné, Daunou, Benjamin Constant, who sat in the Tribunate; Messrs. De Tracy, Volney, and Cabanis, who sat in the Senate, even while they deplored the crimes of the reign of terror, were not disposed to admit that the French Revolution was in the

wrong, when compared to its opponents. Monarchical and religious opinions, which were returning into their view, offended them, especially by the immoderate haste with which the retrocession to ancient opinions was operating. They were discontented to a degree which they cared not to disguise. The greater part of these men were sincere. Strongly attached to the Revolution, they approved the whole of it, if it were not the blood and spoliation, and would on no account consent to that which they fancied they could discover in the deep foresight of the new dictator. Let the persecution of the priests be abandoned; well! But let them not be so far favoured as to be replaced at the altar. This was too much for the faithful followers of the philosophy of the eighteenth century. Let somewhat more of unity and power be conceded to the government; well, again! but let not that care be carried so far as to the establishment of monarchical unity for the benefit of a soldier. That was in their eyes going much too far. For the rest, as it always happens, their motives were different. If such were the opinions of Messrs. Chenier, Ginguéné, Daunou, Tracy, Cabanis, they could not be those of M. Constant, who certainly had drawn from the society of the family of Necker,³ in which he lived, neither an aversion to religious ideas, nor an exclusive taste for the French Revolution. Admitted to the Tribunate, thanks to the solicitations of his friends, he had become within a few days the most active as well as the most intelligent of the new opposition. He was moved by his sneering spirit, and yet more by the discontent of the Necker family, in which he participated. Madame de Staël,⁴ who represented at that time, in her own person only,

¹ MAURY, JEAN SIFFREY. Born of obscure parents, in Provence, in 1746. He took orders, and soon received a benefice. His eulogy of Fénélon and his great eloquence won him court favour, which he repaid by exerting all his courage and eloquence in behalf of the throne, in the States-General. In 1789, so much was the popular indignation raised against him, that, on leaving the Assembly, he was greeted with shouts of "To the lamp-post with the Abbé Maury!" and the crowd would probably have hanged him, had he not replied promptly, "Here he is! here is the Abbé Maury! Do you think, when you have put me in place of the lamp, that you will have more light?" A repartee which made them laugh and saved his life. In 1793, he retired to Rome, and, in 1794, was made bishop of Montefascone and Corneto and cardinal. During the Revolution, he remained peaceably at Rome, aloof from its horrors, which he reprobated strongly in his pastoral letters.—*Encyclopædia Americana*.

² CAZALÈS, DE. Son of a counsellor of Thoulous, captain of the regiment of Flanders horse-chasseurs. Deputy of Rivière Verdun to the States-General, where at he was one of the most strenuous defenders of the monarchy, and displayed oratorical abilities which made all parties consider him one of the most eloquent members of the Constituent Assembly. He vigorously opposed the union of the three chambers, and, when told that Louis desired it, he cried out that, if the monarch wished to ruin himself, it was necessary to save the monarchy. He several times humbled Robespierre in the Tribune, and, in 1790, when Menou accused the ministers of having betrayed the people, he opposed him with the memorable words, "I also accuse the ministers, but it is of having betrayed the royal authority." He fought a duel with Barnave, in the same year. On the flight of Louis XVI. for Varennes, he was arrested, but liberated by the Assembly, when he escaped to England. Returned to Paris in 1795, when he was again obliged to fly. He served the French princes in Germany, in the campaign of 1793, when he again returned to England, where he remained until 1803.—*Encyclopædia Americana*.

³ NECKER, JAMES. Minister of finance, born at Geneva in 1734. Entered the banking-house of his uncle, M. Vernet, in Paris, and speedily became one of the richest bankers in France. In 1769 he was the advocate of the East India Company against Morillet and Lacrosette, and distinguished himself by his talent. He gained a prize in the French Academy by his *Eloge de Colbert*, and published a work on the exportation of grain, which gained him much celebrity. In 1776 he was made controller of the Royal Treasury, and soon became controller-general. He was not successful in his administration, and retired, in 1781, to his estate at Copet, near Geneva. He was recalled in 1788. Favoured the convocation of the States-General, and the double representation of the tiers-etat, which was the first death-blow to the monarchy of France. He was again dismissed and ordered to leave France within twenty-four hours. He was again recalled, after the storming of the Bastille, but his opinions were as moderate as his policy was feeble. He was not the man to contend with Mirabeau. In 1790 he left Paris never to return, unmixed and unregretted.—*Encyclopædia Americana*.

⁴ MADAME DE STAËL HOLSTEIN. ANNA LOUISA GERMAINE, Baroness de Necker. This celebrated woman and most distinguished female writer of her own, if not of any age, is too well known to require a long notice. She was the daughter of the celebrated Necker, and one of the most pleasing traits in her character was her unbounded love and veneration for her father. In 1786 she married the Baron de Staël Holstein, Swedish Ambassador at the Court of France, a man older than herself. At first she was a violent favourer of liberty, but was early disgusted with the excesses of the Revolution, and narrowly escaped the guillotine. The incident alluded to in the text, which caused her bitter personal hatred to Napoleon, relates to an interview with him shortly after his return from Egypt, when on her asking him "Whom he considered the most eminent of women?" He replied, "The most prolific." She never forgave him; and he hated her for her literary attacks with unrelenting animosity.

that illustrious family, had greatly admired General Bonaparte; and it would have been very easy for him to have won over completely a lady, whose lively imagination rendered her particularly sensible to all that was great and noble. But although endowed with wit, as largely as with genius, he had wounded, by some rude expressions, the self-esteem of a woman whom he disliked, because he considered that her pretensions were unsuited to her sex; and by these means had produced in her heart a bitter irritation, which, if not formidable, was yet annoying to him. Every error, how light soever, brings its fruits after it. The First Consul was about to receive the fruits of his error, at the hands of those who were within the influence of Madame de Staël's seductive intellect. M. Constant was of this number.

The Tribune had been established in the Palais Royal, undoubtedly without any particular intention, and merely of necessity. The Tuileries had been assigned to the head of the government. The Luxembourg, formerly occupied by the Council of Ancients, was naturally given up to the Senate. The Palais Bourbon had been allotted to the Body Legislative. The Palais Royal remained, alone, disposable to the Tribune. The disposition to take in ill part the simplest actions was so great, among spirits of a certain order, that they complained bitterly of the choice of this palace, and affected to believe that it had been selected with a view to the debasement of the Tribune, by allocating it to the habitual resort of disorder and debauchery. Certain articles of regulation were in course of discussion in this assembly on the 2d and 3d of January, when suddenly one of its members, M. Duveyrier, rose to speak, in order to complain of some measures, which, as he said, gave annoyance to the proprietors of several establishments which had existed for many years in the Palais Royal. The complainants were not of a very interesting character, and had moreover been fully indemnified. The tribune Duveyrier cried out bitterly against this pretended injustice, and declared that there was an intention to render the national representation unpopular, by rendering it responsible for the severities committed in its name. Then passing to the choice of their place of assembly, he said, "I am not one of those who are offended, because the Tribune has been allocated to this spot, a spot the ordinary theatre of every species of excess and disorder. I see neither danger nor discredit likely to accrue to us from the selection. On the contrary, I give homage to the popular intention of those who decided that the tribunes of the people should sit in the midst of the people, that the defenders of liberty should be

placed in the precincts which witnessed the first triumph of that liberty. I thank them for having given us the opportunity of beholding from this very tribunal, the place where the noble Camille Desmoulins, giving the signal for a glorious movement, hoisted that national cockade, our noblest trophy, our eternal rallying-point—that cockade which has witnessed the performance of so many prodigies, to which so many heroes owe the celebrity of their arms, and which we will lay down only with our lives. I thank them for having given us to see places which, should they wish to elevate an idol of some fifteen days, will recall to our minds the downfall of an idol of some fifteen centuries."

This sudden attack produced a lively sensation in the assembly, and very shortly in all Paris. The Tribune proceeded to the order of the day, the majority of the members disapproving such an outbreak. But the effect was none the less, and it was an evil opening for an assembly, which, if it wished to save liberty from the dangers which then threatened it, in consequence of a general reaction, ought to have used infinite management, both as regarded those spirits, ever prompt to take alarm, and the chief of a government as prompt to take offence.

Such a scene could not fail to have ill consequences. The rage of the First Consul was fiercely aroused, and the humble adorers of his growing power uttered fierce cries of anger. Messrs. Stanislas de Girardin, Chauvelin, and others, who did not indeed wish to abdicate all power to the new government, yet greatly disapproved this untimely opposition, spoke at the next sitting, and proposed, in order to correct the effect of the discourse of the tribune Duveyrier, to take a sort of oath to the constitution.

"Before proceeding to our work," said M. de Girardin, "I think that we ought to give the nation a distinguished proof of our attachment to the constitution. I will not propose to you to take an oath to support it. I know, and you all know, the fruitlessness of oaths; but I think it desirable that, on accepting our functions, we should promise to perform them loyally. Let us follow the example of the Conservative Senate and the Council of State, and thus we shall fix for ourselves the opinion which men shall hold of us. We shall thus silence the malevolence which spreads abroad the cry, even now, that the Tribune is an organized opposition to the government. No! the Tribune is not a focus of opposition, but a focus of light. No! the Tribune does not propose to strive without relaxation against the measures of the government. It is ready, on the contrary, to receive them with joy, when conformable to the public interest.

¹ CAMILLE DESMOULINS. One of the most unmitigated ruffians of the Revolution. A lawyer, born in Picardy, in 1762. His first appearance at the bar was to plead against his own father. He became the bosom friend of Robespierre, excited the people to arms at the Palais Royal, and invented the tri-colour cockade. He assumed the title of attorney-general of the lamp-post. He organized, with Danton, the massacre in the prisons in September. He defended the Duke of Orleans, and afterwards General Dillon, by which he lost his popularity. He was guillotined in 1794, and died raving and blaspheming. — *Biographie Minère*.

The incident alluded to in the text, is thus related by Alison. "The Palais Royal resounded with the cry to arms, and a leader of future distinction, Camille Desmoulins, armed with pistols, gave the signal for insurrection by breaking a branch of a tree in the garden, which he placed in his hat. The foliage was instantly stripped off the trees, and the crowds decorated themselves with the symbols of revolt." — *Alison*, i. 76.

The branches were changed for green cockades, and the tricolour was substituted, because green was the colour of the Comte d'Artois.

The Tribunal will exert itself to calm instead of exciting passions. Its moderation ought to interpose itself between all factions, to reunite them into one body, and dissolve their separate organization. It is the moderate men who brought about the 18th of Brumaire, that salutary and glorious day which preserved France from intestine anarchy and foreign invasion. Let us return, in order to preserve the republic, to the principles which gave it birth. But let us avoid returning to the excesses which have so often nearly destroyed it. If we see hence the spot where first men hoisted the signal of liberty, hence, also, we see the spot where were conceived all the crimes, which stained the Revolution with blood. I am far from applauding, on my part, the choice made of this palace for our sittings. I regret it rather. But, for the rest, the recollections which it recalls to mind are happily far aloof. The time of vehement harangues, of appeals to the seditious groups of the Palais Royal, has long passed away. Nevertheless, if certain declamations cannot now destroy us, they may at least retard the return of the state to perfect well-being. Resounding from this tribunal through all Paris, from Paris through all Europe, they may alarm the minds of men, furnish pretexts, and thus retard that peace which we all desire! Peace," added M. de Girardin, "Peace ought to occupy incessantly our thoughts, and when we hold that mighty interest always present before us, we shall no longer permit to ourselves such expressions as sell the other day from one of our colleagues, and which no one of us took up, because they had no application; for in France we recognise no idol." And the orator concluded his discourse, by asking that each tribune should make the following declaration: "*I promise to fulfil faithfully the functions which the constitution has assigned to me.*"

This proposition was adopted. M. Duveyrier, vexed at the scandal which had arisen from his speech, endeavoured to excuse himself, and wished to be the first to make the declaration of which M. Girardin had given the first idea. All the members of the Tribunal hastened to take it after him.

The effect of the first scene was then somewhat repaired. The First Consul took an insurmountable aversion to the Tribunal, which he would have entertained, however, toward any free assembly, using and abusing the privilege of debate. He caused some very bitter observations to be inserted in the *Moniteur* concerning the tribunes of France and the tribunes of Rome.

The following sittings produced new manifestations, quite as much to be regretted as those which had gone before. The first proposition of the government was intended to regulate the forms to be used in the discussion and adoption of projected laws. This was one of those subjects which had been neglected by the constitution of the year VIII, and left to the legislature. The Tribunal was not, in the intended dispositions, the object of much consideration. The project of the government decreed that the laws should be carried by three councillors of state up to the Legislative Body,

that they should then be communicated to the Tribunal, and that, on a fixed day, the Tribunal should be in readiness to discuss them by the voice of its three orators in the presence of the Legislative Body. Nevertheless, the Tribunal was given the privilege of demanding a delay from the Legislative Body, which had the power of deciding whether that delay should be granted. It must be admitted that in this respect the Tribunal was very much slighted, for it was insisted on that it should have performed its task on a stated day, a thing which no one would venture to require even of a section of the council of state, or of the office of a minister. No one at this day would permit himself to fix the day and the duration of any discussion to a deliberative assembly. That is a care left to its own intelligence, and to its zeal, if it be a matter of urgency. But parliamentary usages, which are, like politeness, the growth of custom, could not precede, with us the existence of a representative government. From revolutionary violence the state passed, almost without a period of transition, to military abruptness. The commissions, which had just ceased from exerting all their legislative powers within one month, had, by debating with doors closed, and by expediting laws within four-and-twenty hours, developed yet further the tastes of the First Consul, always desirous of being served and satisfied on the instant. This it is which may explain, without excusing, the inconceivable dispositions of the project of government.

The increasing opposition of the Tribunal, then, which resisted this project, was justified by the right. But, after having commenced operations by an unseemly outburst, it was unfortunate that it should have been compelled to resist the first project emanating from the consuls, for this gave it the appearance of being a faction determined to attack every thing; and to this misfortune was added another, in point of formality, which was vexatious. The most vehement attack proceeded from M. Constant. In a witty and ironical speech, such as he well knew how to deliver, he asked that the Tribunal should have a determinate period for the examination of the projected laws, which should be submitted to it, and that it should not be called to examine them on the instant. He called to mind, on this subject, the peril of those *laws of urgency*, passed during the Revolution, which had in all cases been disastrous laws. He asked why it was, that so much care was taken to bring the business of the Tribunal so quickly to a termination! why it was, that it was esteemed so hostile, that the passage of the laws through its chamber should be abridged to a minimum of time! "All this," he added, "arises from the false idea that we are a body of opposition, destined to do nothing else than annoy the government incessantly—a thing which is not true, which never will be true, and which will nevertheless weaken us in public opinion. This false notion has impressed all the articles of this project with an uneasy and unmeasured impatience. It has caused these propositions to be presented to us as I may say, on the wing, in the hope that we

might be unable to grapple them. It is the desire of government to make them pass through our examination, as if through a hostile army, transforming them into law before we can attain them."

Many acute reflections were intermingled with his long speech, which produced a great sensation. M. Constant had taken especial care to maintain that the Tribunal was not a body especially devoted to contradiction, that it would act in the opposition solely when the public interest should force it to do so. But he had repeated these assertions in such a manner as to obtain no credence, and rather, indeed, so as to make the intent of systematic opposition, which he desired so strenuously, only the more evident.

The tribune, Riouffe, well known for his faithful and courageous friendship to the proscribed Girondists, was one of those men whom the horrors of '93 had so deeply shaken, that they were ready to cast themselves blindly into the arms of the new government, whatever that government might do. He judged it wisest then to refute the attacks of M. Benjamin Constant, which he considered to be ill-timed.

"Marks of distrust," said he, "as injurious as those to which we listened yesterday, would suffice to break off all ulterior intercourse in the relations of man with man; and it would be impossible that authorities destined to live and act together should long be able to treat one with the other, if regard to the decencies of intercourse were not held a sacred duty, from which they should never swerve."

The orator then declared that, for his part, he had the most perfect confidence in the government, and he undertook a true eulogium of the First Consul, but one far too long and far too unmeasured in terms. "When one orator," he said, "praises Camille Desmoulins in this place, and another the National Convention, I will not wrap myself in the *silence of conspiracy*. I also will praise him whom the whole world praises. Never having heretofore praised any virtue but that which was proscribed, I will now have a new sort of courage—that of extolling genius in the lap of victory and of power. I am proud to see at the head of the republic him who has won at the sword's point for the French nation the right to be styled the Great Nation; I will proclaim him great, clement, and just." M. Riouffe went on comparing General Bonaparte to Hannibal and Cæsar, until his legitimate but ill-timed admiration provoked unpleasant interruptions. Several voices cried out, "Speak of the laws." "I will speak," replied M. Riouffe, "of the man whom the universe admires!" "Speak of the law!" again cried the same voices, and he was compelled to return to his subject. Whether it was that M. Riouffe, provoked by the sincere, but diffuse and unskilful manifestation of his feelings, the impatience of those who interrupted him, or that the admiration which he expressed was not participated by the Tribunal, the effect produced by his speech was unfortunate. M. Chauvelin endeavoured to correct that ill-effect by a speech in favour of the projected law.

He confessed its defects. "But circumstances," he said, "Circumstances which surround us, the state of several departments, which may call for prompt and even urgent measures, powerful political considerations; the calumny which is watching us, the divisions among us, which she already takes delight in recording; the pressing necessity for union among the powers of the state; all these things should engage us to vote the adoption of the project which is presented to us."

The project was then put to the vote, and carried by a majority which ought to have satisfied the government. Fifty-four voices, against twenty-six, decided that the orators of the Tribunal, charged with the duty of speaking before the Legislative Body, should support the law proposed. The Legislative Body received it yet more favourably, and adopted it by a majority of two hundred and three, against twenty-three voices.¹ Nothing could have been desired more favourable. For, in fact, a majority of two-thirds in the Tribunal—a body, the opposition of which decided nothing, since it did not vote on the law—and a majority of nine-tenths in the Legislative Body—the only body whose vote was decisive—ought to have satisfied the First Consul and his adherents, and to have rendered them easy to this last manifestation of the liberal spirit, and indulgent to mere wrongs in matters of form, which, after all, are a right of liberty itself. But the First Consul, who could not be seriously alarmed, appeared to be wounded to the quick, and expressed himself with no sort of moderation or reserve. He began to make great use of the public press, and though he had no regard for it, he nevertheless knew well how to turn it to his own advantage. He caused a very unseemly article to be inserted in the *Moniteur* of January 8th—18th of Nivose—in which he started, himself, with the idea of demonstrating the want of consistency of this opposition, of proving that it would shrink from nothing that could annoy the government; and then proceeded to attribute this to a desire on the part of some minds to bring about a degree of perfection impossible under human laws; and, on the part of others, to a fondness for making an empty noise and tumult. "Thus," added the official paper, "every thing leads us to the conclusion, that there exists in the Tribunal no combined and systematic opposition—in a word, no real opposition. But every one is athirst for glory—every one wishes to commit his name to the hundred mouths of Fame, and some ignorant folks have not yet learned that consideration is less surely won by eagerness to speak well, than by constancy in serving usefully, if humbly, that public which alone judges and applauds."

This mode of treating one of the great bodies of the state, was unbecoming; it proved, on the part of the First Consul, a disposition to dare all, and, on the part of France, a disposition to endure all. Nevertheless, these

¹ This is not strictly correct. One hundred and eighty is the majority. Two hundred and three, and twenty-three, the votes. I do not choose, however, to alter the text.

impressions yielded rapidly to others. The vast works of the government, in which the Legislative Body and the Tribunal were called to co-operate, soon attracted the attention of all minds, and occupied them exclusively. The First Consul caused two projects of law of the highest importance to be laid before the Legislative Body. The object of one was the administration of departments and municipalities, and became the famous law of the 28th of Pluviose of the year VIII, which established administrative centralization in France. The object of the other was the organization of justice, an organization which has endured to the present day. To these two projects were added others relative to the emigrants, whose fate it was necessary to arrange quickly; to the right of making wills, the re-establishment of which all families demanded; to the tribunal of prizes, which must be erected on account of our relations with neutral powers; to the creation of new accountable officers, admitted to be necessary; and, to conclude, to the receipts and expenditures of the year VIII.

The administration of France, as I have stated above, was, in 1799, in the most deplorable condition. There are in every country two kinds of business to be managed—that of the state, which consists in recruiting, taxation, works of general utility, and the application of laws—that of the provinces and communes, which consists in the transaction of all matters of local interest whatsoever. If a country be given up to itself, that is to say, if it be not ruled by a general administration at once intelligent and strong, its first business, that of the state, is not done at all; the second encounters, in the interest of the provinces or communes, a principle of zeal, it is true, but of zeal which is capricious, partial, unjust, and rarely enlightened. Administrations of provinces, or communes, do not surely lack the taste for occupying themselves with that which especially concerns them, but they are prodigal, vexatious, and always hostile to the rule of the community. The tyrannical extravagances of the middle ages had no other origin than this. As soon as the central authority has withdrawn itself from any country, there is no sort of disorder into which the local interests are not ready to cast themselves, their own ruin included. In 1789, the communes everywhere had enjoyed some liberty, and they were in a state of general bankruptcy. The most of the free towns in Germany, when they were suppressed in 1803, were utterly ruined. Thus, without a strong general administration, state business is not done at all, and local business is done ill. The Constituent Assembly, and the National Convention, after having successively remodelled the administrative organization of France, had come to a state of things at last, which was anarchy itself. Collective administrations, on all scales, perpetually deliberating, never acting, having at their elbows agents of the central government, charged to solicit of them either the expedition of state affairs, or the execution of the laws, but deprived of the power of acting themselves—such was on the

18th of Brumaire—the government of the departments and municipalities in its full force. As to the government of municipalities in particular, a sort of municipality of cantons had been invented, which added yet more to the general administrative confusion. The number of communes had been found too great, for it amounted to above forty thousand. Assuredly, the superintendence of so large a number of petty local governments, sufficiently difficult in itself, became impossible to authorities constituted as authorities then were. The prefects are sufficient to the duty now, with the aid of sub-prefects, but only by dint of great application. But let us imagine the prefects, without sub-prefects, and, in their place, small deliberative assemblies, and we shall comprehend the disorder existing under such an administration. These forty and odd thousand communes were reduced, then, to five thousand municipalities of cantons, composed each of the assemblage of several communes into one canton. It was supposed that, by thus combining several communes under one single government, a primary government would be given to them in the first place; and that, in the second, as being brought nearer to the central authority, they would be more subject to its superintendence. There arose from this a confusion more hideous than that which it was desired to bring to a close. These five thousand municipalities of cantons were too numerous, and too remote from the central authority, to be observed by it; and, without being brought near enough to the government, they were vexatiously removed to a distance from the population which they were destined to sway. The administration of communes is intended to be placed as near as possible to their own localities. The magistrate who verifies births, deaths, and marriages; who superintends the police, the salubrity of cities; who keeps in repair the fountain, the church, the hospital of the village or of the town, ought to reside in the village or the town itself—to live, in short, in the midst of his fellow citizens. These municipalities, then, of cantons, had brought about only a useless displacement of domestic authority, without having placed the local business sufficiently under the eyes of the government to allow its superintendence. Add to this, that nothing was done well in those days, owing to the disorder of the times, and it will be evident that this vicious form of institutions, combined with the vicious state of circumstances, necessarily produced confusion.

A last cause of disorder was yet superadded to the rest. It is necessary not only to administer the accounts of the state, and of the communes, but to judge them also. For citizens may have cause of complaint, either when in running a street or road encroachments are made on their property, or when in the valuation of their property, for assessment, it is unjustly valued. Under the ancient regime, the ordinary courts of justice, at that time the only check on the executive authority—as was very clearly expressed by the resistance of the parliaments to the court—the ordinary courts of justice had taken complete possession of all

that which may be called the litigious part of the administration. This was a grave evil, for civil judges are ill calculated to the performance of administrative justice, from a want of comprehending its spirit. Our early legislators of the Revolution perceiving that difficulty, clearly thought, that they could solve the difficulty, by giving up all the litigious part of administration to the small local assemblies, to which they had assigned the administration itself. Let us imagine now these collective administrations filling the office of what we now call prefects, sub-prefects and mayors, charged with the performance of all their duties, and with the judgment of all the cases which now belong to the councils of prefecture, and we shall have a tolerable correct idea of the confusion which reigned then on all sides. Even with the spirit of order which is now prevalent, the results would be a chaos. But, when all revolutionary passions were added thereto, we can scarcely picture to ourselves what the chaos was. It was thus that the rolls of contribution never were completed; that the collection of the taxes was in arrear for several years; that the finances were in ruin, the armies in misery. Recruiting only was sometimes carried into effect; thanks to the revolutionary passions which had done the evil, but which had contributed in some degree to repair it; for having, as their principle, an ardent though ill-regulated love for France, her greatness and her liberty, they drove her population headlong into her armies.

It was to a country situated thus, that the First Consul came, as if really sent by Providence. His simple and just spirit, directed by an active and energetic character, might lead to the true solution of these difficulties. The constitution had set at the head of the state a legislative and an executive power: the executive power concentrated almost entirely into a single chief; the legislative power divided among several deliberative assemblies. It was natural to place on each step of the ladder of administration, a representative of the executive power especially empowered to act; and at his side, to control, or perhaps only to enlighten him, a small deliberative assembly, such as the council of a department, of an arrondissement, or of a commune. To this simple, clear, and fruitful idea is due the excellent administration which exists in France at this day. The First Consul proposed that there should be in each department a prefect, empowered not merely to solicit the expedition of state business at the hands of a collective administration, but to expedite it himself—empowered likewise to administer the business of the department, but this in concert with a council of the department, and with the resources voted by the council. As the system of municipalities of cantons was universally condemned; and as M. Sieyès, the author of all the territorial circumscriptions of France, had, in the new constitution, laid down the principle of circumscription by arrondissements, the First Consul thought it well to adopt this plan in order to get rid of the administration of cantons. First of all, the administration of communes was replaced where it should be, that

is to say, in the commune, town, or village itself; and between the commune and the department there was created a step of intermediate administration; that is to say, the arrondissement. Between the prefects and the mayor, there grew necessarily then the sub-prefect, charged, under the superintendence of the prefect, with the direction of a certain number of communes, sixty, eighty, or a hundred, more or less, according to the importance of the department. To conclude, in the commune itself, there was a mayor, an executive power likewise, having by his side his own deliberative power in the municipal council; a mayor, a direct and dependent agent of the general authority, for the expedition of state business; and at the same time an agent of the commune as to local business, administering the latter in accordance with the council of the commune; always under the superintendence of the prefect, and sub-prefect, and therefore of the state.

Such is this admirable system of grades, to which France owes an administration incomparable for energy, for precision of action, for regularity of accounts, which is so excellent that it sufficed in six months, as will shortly appear, to bring back order to every part of France, under the impulsion, it is true, of a singular genius, that of the First Consul, and with the favour of circumstances, singular likewise—on every side, there was a wide-spread hatred of irregularity and thirst for order, a disgust for child's play and foolery, and a craving after prompt and positive results.

The question of the litigious portion, that is to say, of administrative justice, yet remained—what officer, namely, should be empowered to see that the contributions imposed should not be beyond the means of the contributor; that the proprietor bordering on a stream or a street should not be invaded or made subject to encroachment; that the contractor of town or state-works should find a judge of his bargains with the commune or the government. A difficult question this! the ordinary courts being admitted as improper for the performing this sort of justice. The principle of a wise division of powers was here employed with great benefit. The prefect, the sub-prefect, and the mayor, charged with the administrative action, might be suspected of partiality, might be inclined to lean toward their own pleasure, since those injured would usually have invoked their juridical power to decide on their own actions.

The councils of the department, the arrondissement and the commune, might be suspected likewise, for they too have generally an interest adverse to the complainant. To render justice, moreover, is a long and continuous work; again, there was no desire to have either permanent councils of departments or of communes. The first consuls wished that they should be assembled for fifteen days, once a year, just long enough to submit their own business to them, to take their advice, and to enable them to vote their expenses. It was necessary, on the other hand, that there should be an administrative tribunal sitting without interruption. A special court was therefore created a tribunal of four or five judges sitting with the

prefect, judging with him, acting like a little council of state, enlightening the prefect on matters of justice, precisely as the Council of State enlightens ministers on the same, and still subject to the jurisdiction of the supreme council on appeals. These are the councils which are to this day styled the councils of prefecture, and of which the equity has never been contested.

Such was the government of provinces and communes throughout France. A single chief, prefect, sub-prefect, and mayor, expediting all business; a deliberative council, a council of department, of arrondissement, and of commune, voting the local expenses. Then a little judicial body, placed near the prefect only to perform administrative justice. A government absolutely subordinate to the general government in all state affairs, overlooked and directed, yet having its own views and powers as to the affairs of the departments and communes. Neither order, nor justice, have failed for a moment, since the creation among us of this beautiful and simple institution, that is to say, for half a century—it being understood that the words order and justice, like all other human words, have but a comparative value, and simply must be understood as saying, that, in France, under the head of administration, there is as little disorder, and as little injustice as can well be desired, in a great state.

The First Consul was naturally desirous that the prefects, sub-prefects, and mayors, should be appointed by the executive power, being in fact its direct agents, and it being proper that they should be fully imbued with its will. And as to local affairs, which they are bound to administer in accordance with local views, they were bound also to administer these in accordance with the general spirit of the state. But it would not have been natural that the executive power should nominate the members of the councils of departments, arrondissements, and communes, empowered to control the agents of administration, and to vote their supplies. The constitution itself justified that pretension, as it led to it. *Confidence should arise from beneath, M. Sieyès had said; power should descend from aloft.* According to that maxim, the nation gave its confidence by inscription on the lists of notability; the supreme authority conferred the power by choosing its agents on those lists. The Senate was empowered to elect all the deliberative political bodies. But the councils occupied about local interests were held to be a part of the general administration of the republic, and the executive power, according to the constitution, was bound to appoint them, chosen from the lists of notability. In virtue then of the spirit, and even of the letter of the constitution, the First Consul had the right of choosing, from the lists of notability of departments, the members of the councils of departments; from the lists of notability of arrondissements, the members of the councils of arrondissements; and, to conclude, from the lists of notability of communes, the members of the councils of communes. This power, which would have been excessive at any ordinary time, was at this moment necessary. Election, in fact, was impossible, for the formation of lo-

cal councils, as it was for the formation of the great political assemblies. It would have produced nothing but fatal agitation, small alternating triumphs of extreme factions, instead of a peaceable and prolific fusion of all moderate parties—a fusion which was indispensable to the creation of a new society from the reunited fragments of an old society.

The judiciary organization was not less ably imagined. Its double end was to place justice within easy reach of those amenable to it, and at the same time to secure to them, above the local justice, should they choose to have recourse to it, a justice of appeal, distant, but set aloft, and possessing both light and impartiality, as consequences of the distance and the height of its position.

Our first revolutionary legislators had suppressed courts of appeal, in consequence of the hatred they bore to parliaments, and had placed a single tribunal in each department, offering a first degree of justice to those amenable in the department, and a second degree of jurisdiction, a tribunal of appeal, for the neighbouring departments. The appeal had its recourse, not from the lower to the higher tribunal, but from one, to another, adjacent tribunal. Above these were the justices of peace, and above these again the courts of cassation. The single tribunal in each department being oftentimes very far distant from those amenable, the cognizance of the justices of peace had been extended in order to save the citizens from having to resort too often to the chief court. Four or five hundred tribunals of correction had also been created, charged with the suppression of petty offences. The criminal jury sat at the chief place of the department with the central tribunal.

This judicial organization had failed as signally as the municipalities of cantons. The justices of peace, whose cognizance had been extended too far, were above their tasks. The justice of the first degree, by residing at the chief place, was situated too remotely. The court of appeal became almost illusory, because there is no meaning in appeal unless when it is directed to superior enlightenment. Sovereign courts, such as the parliaments were formerly, and as the royal courts of the present day, uniting in their own bodies eminent magistrates, and having around them a famous bar, present a superiority of knowledge to which men are tempted to recur, but to appeal from one tribunal of the first instance, to another tribunal of the first instance, is in itself absurd. The tribunals of police for correction were too numerous, and were, moreover, limited to a single employment. The First Consul, adopting the ideas of his colleague, Cambacérès, to whom he gave, on this occasion, the support of all his good sense and courage, caused the organization which exists to this day to be put into force. The circumscription of the arrondissement, which had just been imagined for the administration of departments, offered a great convenience for the administration of justice. It offered the means of creating a first local judiciary in the midst of those amenable thereunto, with a ready method of recourse to a judiciary of

appeal, placed more remote, and higher. A tribunal of first instance was, therefore, created for each *arrondissement*, forming a first degree of jurisdiction. Then, without any fear of appearing to recreate the old parliaments, they took the measure of creating tribunals of appeal. One for each department would have been too much, as regards number; too little, as regards importance and height of jurisdiction. Twenty-nine were created, which gave them, in point of fact, nearly all the importance of the old parliaments, and they were assigned to the places which had formerly enjoyed the presence of sovereign courts. This was an advantage to restore, to places which had been stripped thereof. These were old depositories of judicial traditions, the fragments of which well deserved to be collected. The bars of Aix, of Dijon, of Toulouse, of Bordeaux, of Rennes, and of Paris, were foci of science and of talent which it was necessary to rekindle.

The tribunals of first instance, established in each *arrondissement*, were empowered at the same time to attend to the correctional police, which doubled their usefulness, and placed the civil and preventive justice both in the first degree within the *arrondissement*. Criminal justice, always intrusted to the jury, must needs reside at the chief place of the department, by means of judges detached from the tribunals of appeal, and coming round to direct the juries, or, in one word, to hold assizes. This portion was not completely regulated until a later period.

The justice of peace ought, in consequence of the preceding dispositions, to have been brought back to more limited powers. But the law destined for this reformation was delayed until the next session. For it was impossible to do every thing at once. But it was very desirable to preserve, while improving, that popular, paternal, expeditious, and cheap plan of justice. At the summit of the whole judicial edifice was still maintained with some modifications, and a repressive jurisdiction over all magistrates, the Tribunal of Cassation. This is one of the noblest institutions of the French Revolution; a tribunal which is not intended to judge, a third time, that which the tribunals of the first instance and of appeal have already judged twice; but which, leaving aside the base of the suit, interferes only when a doubt is raised on the true sense of the law; determines this sense by a series of decisions; and thus adds to the unity of the text emanating from the legislature, a unity of interpretation emanating from a supreme jurisdiction, and common to the whole territory.

It is, then, from the year 1800, that wonderfully prolific year, that our judicial organization dates. It has consisted, since that time, of about two thousand judges of peace, popular magistrates, dispensing justice to the poor man at a trivial expense—of about three hundred tribunals of the first instance, one to each *arrondissement*, dispensing civil and corrective justice in the first degree; of twenty-nine

sovereign tribunals, dispensing civil justice on appeals, and criminal justice by detached judges, who go round holding their assizes in the chief place of every department; and, to conclude, of a supreme tribunal, placed above the whole judicial system, interpreting the laws, and completing the unity of legislation, by the unity of jurisprudence.

The two laws of which I have been speaking were too urgent and too well conceived to meet any serious opposition. They were, however, objects of more than one attack in the Tribunal. Very futile cavils were raised against the administrative system proposed. Little complaint was made of the concentration of authority in the hands of the prefect sub-prefect, and mayors, for that was conformable to the ideas of the time; and was imitated from the constitution, which set a single chief at the head of the state. But strong opposition was made to the creation of three steps in the ladder of administration: the departments, the *arrondissement*, and the commune. It was asserted especially, that the commune should not have been reconstituted, because there would be difficulty in finding mayors sufficiently enlightened. It was nevertheless the restoration of domestic authority, and, in that point of view, the most popular conception that can be imagined. As to the organization of the judiciary, an outcry was made concerning the restoration of Parliaments; and particular complaint was made touching the jurisdiction of the Tribunal of Cassation over the inferior magistrates: all objections unworthy of notice. Nevertheless, both the proposed laws were adopted. The twenty or thirty voices composing the regular opposition in the Tribunal, pronounced against these laws, but three-fourths of the whole declared in favour of them. The Legislative Body adopted them almost unanimously. The law relative to the administration of departments took the date, which has remained famous ever since, of the 28th of Pluviose of the year VIII. That relative to the organization of the judiciary bore date of the 27th of Ventose in the same year.

The First Consul, not wishing that they should remain a dead letter in the code of laws, immediately nominated prefects, sub-prefects, and mayors. He exposed himself indeed to the commission of several errors, as must always be the case when many functionaries are chosen hastily and at once. But an enlightened and vigilant government soon rectifies errors made in a first choice. Now the spirit of its selections was excellent; at once firm, impartial, conciliatory. The First Consul sought out, on all sides, men reputed honest and capable, excluding only the violent, and sometimes admitting even these, if experience and time appeared to have brought them back to that moderation which formed the essential character of his politics. He called to the prefectures, which were important and well-paid places—for the prefects were to receive 12, 15, and as much even as 24,000 francs salary, which was double the salary of

¹ I only give here approximative quantities, because the number of tribunals has varied considerably ever since that date, in consequence of the territorial changes

which France has undergone. There are, for instance, at this moment but twenty-seven royal courts, or tribunals of appeal.—*Author's note.*

the same appointments now—he called, I say, persons who had figured honourably in the great political assemblies, and who clearly displayed the intention of his selections. For me, if they are neither facts nor principles, at least represent both to the eyes of the people. The First Consul nominated to Marseilles, for example, M. Charles Lacroix, ex-minister of foreign affairs; to Saintes, M. Français de Nantes;¹ to Lyons, M. Vermilhac, an ex-ambassador; to Nantes, M. Letourneur, an ex-minister of the Directory; to Brussels, M. de Ponticoulant; to Rouen, M. Buegnot; to Amiens, M. Quinette; to Ghent, M. Faypoult, ex-minister of finance. All these men, and others—who were sought out in the Constituent and the Legislative Assemblies, in the Convention, and in the Five Hundred, who were taken from among the ministers, directors, and ambassadors of the republic—were appointed, in order to raise the character of these new administrative functions, and to give to the government of the provinces that importance which it deserves. Most of these men held their offices during the whole sway of the First Consul and the Emperor. One of them, M. de Jessaint, was still prefect but four years ago. The First Consul chose to the prefecture of Paris M. Frochot; and gave him as a colleague in the prefecture of police, M. Dubois, a magistrate whose energy was very serviceable in cleansing the capital from that swarm of malefactors which party-spirit had vomited into its bosom.

The same spirit prevailed in judicial appointments. Distinguished names, chosen from the ancient bar, and the ancient magistracy, were mingled, as much as possible, with recent names, borne by respectable people. When he could embellish his assemblies with celebrated names, the First Consul did not fail to do so, for he loved brilliancy in every thing, and the moment had arrived when he could, without too much danger, borrow from the past. A magistrate named D'Aguesseau headed the list of judicial nominations, as president of the Court of Appeals of Paris, now the Royal Court. These functionaries, as soon as appointed, were ordered instantly to take possession of their offices, and to play their parts in the work of re-organization, with which the young general was constantly occupied, on which he wished to found his reputation, and which, after his prodigious victories, constitutes, in fact, his most substantial glory.

It was necessary to attend to every thing at the same time, in this state of society, upstart, as it was, from its foundation. Emigration, at once so guilty and unfortunate—a fair subject of interest, at once, and abhorrence, since in its ranks there were found both persons cruelly persecuted, and false Frenchmen, who had conspired against their country—emigration, I say, required the particular attention of the government. According to the latest legislation, a decree of the Directory, or of the administrations of departments, was sufficient to

place any individual on the list of emigrants. From that moment, the property of that absent individual was confiscated, and if he were found on the soil of the republic, the law decreed his death. A host of individuals, either real emigrants, or only men in concealment, who had not yet been inscribed on the fatal list, either because they had been forgotten, or had not encountered an enemy to denounce them, might still be placed thereon. To place them thereon at once, it was only necessary that such an enemy should appear, and they must then fall beneath the stroke of the laws of proscription. Many Frenchmen lived, therefore, in continual anxiety. As for those who had been inscribed on the lists, properly or improperly, they arrived in great numbers, to procure the erasure of their names. Their rash eagerness attested the confidence they placed in the humanity of the government, while it alarmed certain revolutionists, some of whom were conscious of past excesses, committed upon the persons, while others of them had acquired the property of returning emigrants. This presented a new occasion for disorder; and if it were no longer just to proscribe, neither was it just to expose men, who had taken part in the Revolution, even violently, to a life of anxiety. Absolute security was due to those who had exposed themselves in its cause; for, unfortunately, men are either cold egotists or passionate partisans of the cause they embrace, and in the latter case moderation is not their usual merit.

The call was urgent to provide a remedy for such a state of affairs. The government presented the draft of a law, the first enactment of which was intended to close the famous List of Emigrants. From and after the 4th of Nivose of the year VIII—December 25, 1799—the day on which the constitution went into effect, the list was declared closed; that is to say, that all absence in fact, subsequent to that period, should no longer be deemed emigration, subjecting parties to the penalties thereof. It became lawful in future for any one to absent himself, to pass from France to foreign parts, or from foreign parts to France, without criminality. For it is true, that, during the last ten years, for any one to absent himself was a crime. Liberty to come and go was thus restored to all citizens.

To this first enactment was added the following: individuals more or less liable to be accused of emigration, some of whom had quitted momentarily the territory, others of whom had concealed themselves solely to escape persecution, and who, fortunately, had been omitted from the list of emigrants, could no longer be placed there, except by a decision of the proper tribunals, that is to say, of a jury. To these persons, also, this was, in some sort, a closing of the list, for there was no danger of its being increased by the addition of fresh names, under the prevailing feeling of the tribunals.

In short, while those who had not been in-

¹ FRANÇAIS DE NANTES, a municipal officer there in 1791, when he was sent from the Lower Loire to the Legislative Assembly. There he immediately drew much attention, but was forgotten in the reign of terror.

In 1793 he was re-elected by Isère to the Council of Five Hundred, and was its president in 1799. At a later period than that of the text he was called to the Council of State.—*Biographie Moderne*.

scribed were left to the tribunals, thus securing to them proper justice, the administrative authority took charge both of those who had been improperly inscribed, and of those who, insisting that they had been so, now claimed the right to be stricken from the list. In this appeared the indulgent feeling of the new government toward them; for the new administrative authorities, imbued with its feeling, could not fail to receive with alacrity claims of this character. To present certificates of residence in any part of France—certificates often false—sufficed in fact to prove that the parties presenting them had been unjustly declared absent; and thus to procure their erasure from the list. Aided by the general inclination which tended to the violation of tyrannical laws, this method was sure to succeed. And in addition to this, emigrants who sought to procure this result, were permitted to return to France under the superintendence of the high police. In the language of the day, this was called "*obtaining superintendence*:" many availed themselves of the advantage, and the most anxious emigrants obtained in this way the means of anticipating the moment of their erasure from the list. This superintendence became, indeed, to those who availed themselves of it, in the end, absolute restoration. As regarded those emigrants whose names could not be erased from the fatal list, because of the notoriety of their emigration, the existing laws were maintained. The spirit of the time was such that it was impossible to do otherwise; for though compassion was felt for the unfortunate, strong feeling existed against the guilty, who had left the soil in order themselves to bear arms against their country, or to excite the arms of foreigners against her. Besides, under all circumstances, stricken or not stricken from the list, no emigrants had claims upon their property which had been sold. These sales were irrevocable, as well by virtue of the constitution as by the provisions of the new law. Those emigrants only who succeeded in causing their names to be erased, and whose property had been *sequestered*, and not *sold*, could reasonably hope to have it restored.

Such was the law proposed, and adopted by an immense majority, notwithstanding some opposition in the Tribunate, by those who deemed it too favourable, and by some who thought it not favourable enough, on the subject of emigrants.

Among the number of legal enactments then in force, and deemed an intolerable tyranny, was the interdiction of the right of testamentary disposition. The existing laws permitted the disposition, by will, of the tenth of the testator's fortune, if he had children, and of the sixth part if he were childless. These enactments were the result of the early revolutionary indignation against the abuses of the ancient French society—an aristocracy, in which paternal vanity sought at one time to enrich an eldest child, at another to outrage the affections of other children, by ill-assorted unions, plundering some to enrich the others. Through an excitement natural to the human mind, instead of restraining the paternal power they had enchained it completely. A father

had no longer the power either to reward or to punish. He could, if he had children, dispose of hardly any thing in favour of that one which had deserved all his affection; and, what was more extraordinary, a testator, if he had only nephews, or great-nephews, could only bestow upon them the very trifling portion of a sixth of his fortune. It was a direct outrage on the rights of property, and one of the rigorous measures of the revolutionary regime which was most severely felt; for death is of daily occurrence, and thousands of the dying expired, without power to fulfil the wishes of their hearts toward those by whom they had been attended, nursed, and consoled in old age.

It was impossible, with a view to the reform of such a state of things, to await the preparation of the civil code. A law was passed to establish the right of testamentary disposition with certain limitations. By virtue of this law, a dying father who had less than four children, might dispose of a fourth of his fortune; of the fifth, if he had less than five; and so on in the same proportion. A testator might dispose of the half of his estate, where he had only relations in the ascending lines or collaterals, and the whole of it when he had no relations capable of inheriting at all.

This measure was that most severely handled in the Tribunate; particularly by Andrieux, an honest, sincere man, but possessed of more wit than knowledge. He insisted that they were about to return to the abuse of the right of primogeniture, to all the constraints of the old regime upon the children of a family, &c. The law passed, however, as did the others, by an immense majority.

The government next re-established, by law, a prize court, which had become indispensable to render impartial justice to neutrals, and to bring them back, by better treatment, to intercourse with France. Finally, the attention of the two assemblies was called to the laws of finance.

There was little to be said upon this subject in the Legislative Body; two legislative sections having already reported the necessary laws. The administrative labours which the government had undertaken, in consequence of these laws, with the view of reorganizing the finance, were hardly fit matters for discussion. It was, nevertheless, necessary, for form's sake, to prepare the budget of the year VIII—1799. If the receipts had been regular, if the taxes imposed had been paid with exactitude, and not only paid by the taxables, but faithfully accounted for to the receiver of public moneys, the finances of the state would have been in a wholesome condition. The ordinary taxes might produce about 430,000,000*fr.*; and that was the amount to which it was expected that the public expenses might be reduced in time of peace—the government flattered itself that it would be able to reduce them to much less. Experience, however, soon proved that it was impossible, even in time of peace, to reduce them to less than 500,000,000*fr.*; but it proved, at the same time, that it was easy to raise the taxes to that amount, without augmenting the rates. Putting out of the question the expenses of collection, and incidental charges, the budget

at this period would amount, reckoning as is done at the present day, to 600,000,000*fr.* or 620,000,000*fr.*

The insufficiency of the receipts was only great and certain in regard to the expenses of the war; and in this there was nothing extraordinary, for it is so everywhere. No country can ever carry on war with the ordinary revenue of peace. If it could be done, it would amount to proof, that, in time of peace, the taxes had been needlessly increased. But, thanks to the confusion of the past, it was unknown whether, in case of war, the budget would be raised to 600,000,000*fr.*, 700,000,000*fr.*, or 800,000,000*fr.* Some said 600,000,000*fr.*, others 800,000,000*fr.* Every one, as regards this subject, made different conjectures. Experience, indeed, proved that with about 150,000,000*fr.* added to the ordinary budget, the demands of war could be met, at all events with victorious armies, who subsisted on the territory of the enemy. The budget of the year, therefore, was estimated at 600,000,000*fr.*, both of expenses and receipts. The ordinary revenues amounted to 430,000,000*fr.*, and arrears existed of 170,000,000*fr.* This did not, however, constitute the real difficulty. It would have been too much to expect not only to escape from a financial chaos, but immediately to attain an equilibrium of receipts and expenses. The ordinary taxes must first be collected. If this result could be obtained, a certainty would exist of procuring all that would be necessary to meet the most pressing demands, as credit would very promptly revive, and with the assets of different kinds, the creation of which has been heretofore mentioned, the means were at hand to obtain from capitalists the funds necessary for all branches of the administration. It was to this end that M. Gaudin laboured incessantly, aided, against all the difficulties he encountered, by the powerful and steady will of the First Consul. The administration of direct taxes recently established, exhibited the greatest activity. The lists were much advanced towards completion, and already in a course of collection. The obligations of the receivers-general began to be received at the treasury, and were discounted at a reasonable rate. The embarrassment, in regard to this system of obligations, always was the amount of the old paper circulation, which it was difficult to ascertain, especially as regarded each office of general receipt. A receiver-general, who was entitled to receive 20,000,000*fr.*, for example, could not sign obligations for that sum, if he reckoned on having 6,000,000 or 8,000,000*fr.* tendered to him in certificates of arrears, or of requisition, &c. The minister endeavoured to call in this sort of paper, so as to form a calculated average of the amount likely to be presented at every office of general receipt, and to take the obligations of the receivers-general for the amount of specie funds, the receipt of which might be reckoned on at their several offices.

During this same session was created a new class of accounting officers, intended to produce increased accuracy in the rendition of the treasury funds. These were the receivers of each *arrondissement*. Until this period,

there had existed no other intermediate officer between the tax-collector, in direct communication with the tax-payer, and the receiver-general, the head of the operation, unless it were the overseers of receipt—agents of the receiver-general, dependent upon him, and telling the truth only to him. It was, nevertheless, one of the points of transition, at which it was the easiest to observe and calculate the entrance of receipts into the public coffers. This point, however, was unhappily neglected. Special receivers were appointed in every *arrondissement*, dependent on the state, owing to it the account of what they received and transmitted to the receiver-general, well-informed and disinterested witnesses of the movement of the funds; for it is not they, who derived advantage from the stagnation of the public moneys in the coffers of the accountable officers. By this creation, the advantage of being accurately informed on the state of finances was gained; as well as that of acquiring fresh securities convertible into cash, a thing which now would be of no moment, but which was then important. Furthermore the advantage of finding yet another use in the circumscription of territory into *arrondissements*, which had but recently been imagined, is to be added to the rest. Already civil and corrective justice, and a considerable share of the administration of the communes had been established in the centre of each *arrondissement*; by assigning to the same a share also of financial administration, a farther utility was given to that circumscription, at which certain spirits had been inclined to take umbrage, as being a merely arbitrary subdivision of territory. Since, however, on certain accounts it was held to be indispensable, it was the best plan to multiply the uses to which it could be applied, proving thus the reality of that, which, it was insisted, was purely artificial.

The prefects and sub-prefects had orders to hold themselves near the receivers, and to watch, by the inspection of their books, over the correctness of their accounts. We are fortunately no longer reduced to such necessity, but at that period, when every thing was in a mere model form, it was a useful incitement to the accountable officers, to send the prefects and sub-prefects to examine their coffers.

The reorganization of finances could not therefore be advanced more rapidly. But assemblies never appreciate results, until fully realized. All the real benefits that were wrought were not discoverable from the inner seats of the administration. Discussions were held within the Tribunal on the great question of the equilibrium of receipts and expenditures, by much talking at random; complaints were made concerning the deficit; and a thousand systems were proposed, and there were some minds so insensate as to propose that no vote for laws of finance should be taken until the government had found a method of settling the receipts and expenditures in equilibrio. But all these propositions brought about no grand result.

The laws were adopted, as they were proposed; by a great majority in the Tribunal, almost unanimously in the Legislative Body

A institution, worthy of historical mention, was also added to those, of which we have already recorded the creation. This was the Bank of France. The old establishments of discount had fallen, amid the disorders of the Revolution. It was not possible, however, that Paris could do without a bank. In every centre of commerce, wherein there is a certain degree of activity, there must be a monetary accommodation for payments, that is to say, a paper money, and an establishment which discounts commercial bills on a great scale. These two services mutually aid each other, for the funds deposited, in payment of bills of exchange, are the same which are applied to commercial loans in the way of discount. Everywhere, in fact, where there is the slightest commercial activity, a bank must succeed, if it discounts none other than good paper, and if it does not put into circulation an excess of notes. In one word, if it proportions its operations to the true necessities of the place in which it is situated. It is this, which it was necessary to do in Paris, and which, if well done, must of necessity succeed. This new bank was intended to carry on, in addition to its transactions with individuals, transactions with the treasury also, and consequently to receive as great benefit therefrom, as therefor it should perform service. The government called forth the principal bankers of the capital, at the head of whom stood M. Perregaux, a financier whose name is connected with all the great services done to the state; and of them was composed an association for the creation of a bank, which was called the Bank of France, the same which exists to this day. A capital of 30,000,000 was made up for it. Its government was to be by twelve agents, and a directing committee, of three, for which committee a governor was substituted at a late day. It was intended, according to its statutes, to discount commercial bills representing real transactions, but not bills of accommodation; to circulate bank notes redeemable in cash, and to keep itself aloof from all speculations, other than those of discounts and exchange. Faithful to its statutes, it has become the finest establishment of its kind known in the world. It will soon be perceived what it was, that caused the government to give the operations of that bank an impulse so rapid as to decide its prosperity from the first days of its existence. While the consular government, in concert with the Legislative Body, was devoting itself to these grand works of internal administration, the negotiations with foreign powers, whether friendly or belligerent, were continued without interruption. The letter of the First Consul to the King of England was followed by an immediate reply. The First Consul wrote on the 26th of December—the 5th of Nivose. He received an answer on the 4th of January—the 14th of Nivose. It was to this effect, that the English cabinet had already chosen its part, and had no room left for deliberation. England, in truth, might, in 1797, well think of treating and of sending Lord Malmesbury to Lisle, when her finances were embarrassed, when Austria was compelled to sign, at Campo Formio, the peace of the whole continent. But now, when the creation of the income-tax brought back ease and

plenty to the Exchequer, now, when Austria was in a state to renew the war with us, and had advanced her armies over to our frontiers; now, when there were prospects of taking from us Malta and Egypt, and of avenging the disaster of the Texel, peace was naturally not much to the taste of that power. She had, besides, a yet stronger reason than this for refusing. It was, that war suited both the passions and interests of Mr. Pitt. This celebrated chief of the British cabinet had made the war with France his mission, his glory, the very foundation of his political existence. If peace should become necessary, it would perhaps become necessary that he should retire. He brought to this struggle that tenacity of character, which united to his oratorical talents, had rendered him a statesman, not very enlightened but very powerful.

The reply could not be doubtful, it was negative and ungracious. The English cabinet did not even do the First Consul the honor of addressing this reply directly to him, excusing themselves by the custom, which by the way is an excellent one, of communicating between minister and minister; they replied by a note from Lord Grenville to M. de Talleyrand. This note, maladroitly, suffered it to appear how much Mr. Pitt was annoyed by this challenge, not to war but to peace, addressed by the First Consul to the King of England. It contained a recapitulation, which had been reproduced eternally for some years, of the causes which led to the commencement of the war. It imputed the first aggression to the French republic, reproached it, in violent language, with the ravages committed in Germany, in Holland, in Switzerland, in Italy; spoke even of the individual acts of plunder committed by generals in the latter country. It added to this reproach, that of wishing to overthrow everywhere, the throne and the altar. Then, coming to the last overtures of the First Consul, the English minister said that these feints of pacific demonstrations were not the first of the same kind; that the different revolutionary governments, successively raised to power, and overthrown within the last ten years, had several times made similar overtures; that his majesty the King of Great Britain could not perceive, in what was passing in France, any change of principles, sufficient to satisfy and tranquillize Europe; that the only change, which could completely reassure it, would be the restoration of the house of Bourbon; that thereby only would it be made apparent that social order was no longer endangered; that, for the rest, the reinstatement of that house would not be absolutely insisted on as a condition of peace with the French republic, but that, until new symptoms should arise, more significant and more satisfactory, England would persist in the war, as well for her own security as for that of her allies.

This unbecoming note, which was disapproved by all sensible men of all countries, did little honour to Mr. Pitt; it showed that he was actuated by passion rather than by reason. It proved that a new government, in order to be respected, must have been very often victorious; for the actual government had gained many victories, and those glorious, yet evi-

dently it had need of more, and those more decisive. The First Consul was not, however, disconcerted, and wishing to profit by the good position which his moderate counsel had given him in the eyes of the world, replied gently but firmly, not again in the form of a letter to the king, but of a despatch directed to Lord Grenville, the minister of foreign affairs. Recapitulating, in a few words, the first events of the war, it proved, with great reserve of language, that France had taken arms solely to resist a European conspiracy, formed against her safety. Admitting the evils which the Revolution had brought upon the whole world, it insinuated, transiently, that those who had attacked the French republic with such bitter fury, might justly reproach themselves as the cause of much of its violence, so often deplored. But, it added, to what good end all these reminiscences? Here is now a government well disposed to put an end to war. Is the war to be eternal, because this or that party was the first aggressor? And, if it be not desired to render it eternal, must there not first be an end made of these endless recriminations? Assuredly it cannot be expected that the re-establishment of the Bourbons can be forced upon France. Is it then becoming to make insinuations similar to those which have been thrown out? What would be said, were France, in her communications, to insist on the restoration of the Stuarts to the throne of England, whence they were ejected only in the last century? But leaving, on one side, these irritating questions, added the note dictated by the First Consul, if you deplore as we do the ills of warfare, let us agree on an armistice; let us designate a town, Dunkirk, for instance, or any other at your option, where our negotiators may meet. The French government puts its passports at the disposal of Great Britain for the ministers whom she may invest with powers to treat.

This calmness of attitude produced the ordinary effect which coolness in one man produces on another in a passion. It provoked, from Lord Grenville, a reply, more keen, more bitter, and with worse reasoning than his first note. In his reply, the English minister endeavoured to palliate the error he had committed in alluding to the house of Bourbon; he answered that it was not for them that England waged war, but for the security of all governments; and declared anew, that hostilities would be carried on without relaxation. His last communication was dated the 20th of January—30th of Nivose. There was not a word more to be said. General Bonaparte, confident in his own glory, had not feared to offer peace. He had offered it without much hope, but in good faith, and he had gained by this step the double advantage of discovering, to the eyes of France, and to those of the English opposition, the unreasonable passions of Mr. Pitt. Happy would it have been, if, in all times, he had combined with his power moderation of conduct so ably calculated as was this.

The communications of Austria were couched in language more becoming, but without giving any greater hope of peace. That power, not believing that the intentions of the First

Consul, though pacific, could extend to the length of abandoning Italy in her favour, was resolved to maintain the war. But knowing the conqueror of Castiglione and Rivoli, knowing that she could not reckon surely on victory against such an adversary, she did not choose to shut the door against all possibility of future negotiations.

As if Austria had an understanding with England as to the form, the emperor's reply to the First Consul was conveyed in a note from M. Thugut to M. de Talleyrand. That despatch bore the date of January 15th, 1800—25th of Nivose. The base was the same with that of the English notes. The war, it said, was carried on only to preserve Europe from a general earthquake; nothing more was desired than to see France well disposed to peace. But what guarantee could she give of her new dispositions? It was admitted, withal, that more moderation, both at home and abroad; more stability of views, and more fidelity to engagements undertaken, were hoped for, under the First Consul; and farther, that more chances would result therefrom of a solid and durable peace. This change was to be expected from his great talents. But without saying it directly, it was insinuated that when he should be fully established they would then think of negotiating.

The First Consul acted toward Austria, as he had done toward England. He would not hold himself satisfied by that evasive style of explanation; and, without allowing himself to be discouraged by the vagueness of the reply, determined on compelling the cabinet of Austria to explain itself positively, and either to accept or refuse the proffered peace categorically. On the 28th of February—the 9th of Ventose—M. de Talleyrand was instructed to write to M. Thugut, offering to take for a base of negotiations the treaty of Campo Formio. This treaty, said he, was an act of great moderation on the part of General Bonaparte, toward the Emperor of Austria. For, having it in his power, in 1797, to exact great sacrifices from that prince, by the menacing position of the French army at the gates of Vienna, he had, in the hope of a durable peace, preferred moderate advantages, to others more extensive. He had even, added the French minister, incurred, by his favourable dispositions to the Imperial court, the anger of the Directory. M. de Talleyrand farther declared that the house of Austria should receive in Italy those compensations, which, by the treaty of Campo Formio, had been promised to her in Germany.

In order to comprehend the bearing of the First Consul's propositions, it is necessary to recall to mind that the treaty of Campo Formio conceded to France, Belgium and the Luxembourg; to the Cisalpine republic, Lombardy, the Mantuan territories, the Legations, &c.: and that Austria received Venice and the greater part of the Venetian states. As to the frontier of the Rhine, embracing, besides Belgium and the Luxembourg, the countries comprised within the Meuse, the Moselle, and the Rhine, in a word those which we now call the Rhinish provinces, Austria was bound to mediate for their concession to France by

the Germanic empire. Austria yielded on the spot, so far as she was concerned, the country of Falkenstein, situate between Lorraine and Alsatia, and bound herself to open to the French troops the gates of Mayence, which she held under the empire. Austria, in compensation, should receive the bishopric of Salzburg, on the side of Bavaria, when the ecclesiastical provinces should be secularized.

These different arrangements ought to have been negotiated at the Congress of Rastadt, so tragically terminated, in 1799, by the assassination of the French plenipotentiaries.¹ Such was the treaty of Campo Formio.

In offering this treaty as the base of a new negotiation, the First Consul did not then touch upon the question of the frontier of the Rhine, so far as concerned the Rhenish provinces. He only decided the question of Belgium, irrevocably ceded to France, leaving the question of the Rhenish provinces to an ulterior negotiation with the empire; and in offering the compensations in Italy, which previously had been stipulated for Germany, he insinuated that the successes gained by Austria in Italy should be taken into consideration, so as to place that country in a better state as regarded Austria. He added that, for the secondary European powers, a *system of guarantees* should be stipulated, *such as should re-establish in all its force that right of nations, on which rested essentially the security and happiness of nations.* This was an allusion to the invasion of Switzerland, of Piedmont, of Tuscany, of the States of the Pope, and of Naples, for which the Directory had been so much reproached, and which had been made the pretext of a second coalition. It was a very clear offer to re-establish those different states, and thus to reassure Europe touching the pretended invasions of the French republic.

Nothing more could be conceded. It required even all the urgency of obtaining peace, which France at that time felt, to induce the First Consul to make such offers, and as he never did things by halves, he addressed to Austria, as he had done to England, a formal proposition for an armistice, not merely on the Rhine, where an armistice at that time existed, but on the Alps and Apennines, where it did not as yet exist.

On the 24th of March—3d of Germinal—M. de Thugut replied, in terms otherwise very moderate, that the treaty of Campo Formio, violated as soon as concluded, did not contain a system of pacification which could reassure the belligerent powers, that the true principle, adopted in all negotiations, was to take as a base the state in which the fortune of arms had left each power; and that this was the only base which Austria could accept. M. de Thu-

gut added, that, before proceeding farther, he had an explanation to demand in relation to the form of the proposed negotiation; that it was material that he should know whether France would be willing to admit negotiators from all the states at war, in order to arrive at a general peace; the only peace which could be sincere and secure; the only peace in fact to which Austria could accede. This language presented two things—first, that Austria, in insisting on the actual state, as the starting point of negotiation, that is to say, on the state in which the last campaign had left each party, entertained great pretensions to Italy; and secondly, that she would not separate herself from England, to which power she was strictly bound by the treaties of subsidy. This fidelity to England was on her part a duty owing to her position, which influenced, as will appear hereafter, the fate of the negotiations and of the war.

Such a reply, although couched in seemingly terms, left little hopes of an amicable understanding, since it left the conduct of a power well disposed to listen to terms of peace dependent on the conduct of a power resolved to listen to no terms at all. Nevertheless, General Bonaparte caused a new reply to be made, that in offering the compensations in Italy, which had previously been stipulated for Germany, he had implicitly proposed to commence not from the *status ante bellum*, but from the *status post bellum*, that is to say, to give Austria credit for her successes in Italy; that the overtures which he had made to England proved the sincerity of his desire to render the peace general; that he had little hope of any negotiation common to all the belligerent powers, for that England was not desirous of an accommodation; but that he purely and simply admitted the propositions of Austria: that he waited for her nomination of a place where they might treat, and that, since, the war was destined to proceed, such place must be designated, *without* the theatre of operation.

Austria replied that, such being the intentions of the French cabinet, she would proceed to consult the allies, but that, until she had done so, it was impossible for her to designate any precise spot. This was, in fact, to postpone the negotiation indefinitely.

The First Consul, in addressing these overtures to England and to Austria, never laboured under any illusion as to their probable result. But he had chosen to try pacific measures, first, because he wished for peace, regarding it as necessary to the organization of the new government; and secondly, because he thought that, after such a step, he should stand better in the judgment of France and of Europe. His calculations were fully justified by that which followed in the English parliament.

¹ The three ministers, Jean Debry, Bonnier, and Robergeot, set out at nine in the evening of the 9th of Floreal—April 28. They occupied three carriages with their families. They were followed by the Ligurian legation, and the secretaries of the legation. At first an objection was made to permit them to leave Rastadt, but at length all obstacles were removed, and they were allowed to depart. They were scarce fifty paces from Rastadt, when a troop of Szeckler hussars rushed upon them with drawn swords, and stopped the carriages. That of Jean Debry was the first. They opened the door, and asked in a semi-barbarous jargon if he was

Jean Debry. On his reply in the affirmative, they seized him by the throat, dragged him out of the carriage, and in the presence of his wife and children, fell on him with their sabres. Believing him to be dead, they went to the other carriages and murdered Robergeot and Bonnier in the arms of their families.—*Thiers's History of the French Revolution.*

This crime was long attributed to the court of Austria; but I have positive evidence that the queen of Naples and the colonel of the Szeckler hussars were the sole authors of the murder.—*Duchess d'Angoulême.*

Mr. Pitt, by his brutal manner of replying to the overtures of France, drew down upon himself violent and well founded attacks. Never was the opposition to Messrs. Fox and Sheridan more full of noble inspiration. Never had it cast forth a broader lustre, or deserved more justly the esteem of honest men in all countries.

The continuation of the war, in fact, had very few motives; for England was in a position to obtain at that time all that she reasonably could desire. Doubtless she could not have obtained the release of Egypt, but submitting as she did a few months later to leave it to us—ulterior negotiations will prove this fact—she might as well have consented to it at once; she would thus have preserved her Indian conquests, and avoided the risk of vast dangers, to which her obstinacy afterward exposed her. It was owing, therefore, to ministerial interests only, that the British cabinet resolved to carry on the war to the utmost. The reclamations of the opposition were earnest and incessantly reiterated. It insisted on, and obtained the production of the papers relative to the negotiation, and thereupon followed violent debates. The ministers maintained that it was useless to negotiate with the French government, because there was no security in treating with it—that it had succeeded, by its breach of faith, involved itself in war with the whole world, Denmark and Sweden alone excepted, and that its relations, even with the latter of those countries, were endangered; that every peace concluded with that government had been faithless and fatal, witness the states of Italy; that, after having been the aggressor against all the princes in Europe, it had aimed at dethroning them all, for it was devoured by an incessant thirst for destruction and conquest; that General Bonaparte offered no surer guarantees than his predecessors; that, if the new government was no longer terrorist, it was still revolutionary, and that, with French Revolution, neither peace nor truce could be hoped; that, if it could not be crushed, it might at least be exhausted, until it should be so far weakened as to present no cause of apprehension. The English ministers, Lord Grenville especially, employed, with regard to the First Consul, language the most insulting. They had applied none more severe even to Robespierre.

Messrs. Fox, Sheridan, and Tierney, the Duke of Bedford and Lord Holland, replied, with the strongest reason, to all these allegations—"You ask, who was the aggressor," said they, "and what matters that? You say that it is France; and France says that it is England. Is it, then, necessary to maintain internecine war, until both nations shall agree on a point of history? And what matters it, who is the aggressor, if that party, which is accused thereof, be the first which offers to lay down its arms? You say, that it is useless to treat with France, yet yourselves sent Lord Malmsbury to Lillie to treat with the Directory. Prussia and Spain have treated with the French republic, and have had no cause for complaint. You speak of the crimes of that government, yet your ally, the court

of Naples, commits crimes, more atrocious than those of the convention, since she has not the excuse of popular excitement. You speak of ambition; but Russia, Prussia, and Austria, have divided Poland—but Austria has reconquered Italy, without restoring to their states the princes dispossessed by France—yourselves, you take possession of India, of part of the Spanish colonies, of all the Dutch colonies. Who shall dare to say, that one is less interested than another, in this strife of avarice and rage, kindled among all states? Either you will never treat at all with the French republic, or you will never find a moment more favourable for doing so than this; for a man powerful and implicitly obeyed has seized the power, and seems disposed to use it with justice and moderation. Is it worthy the English government to load with outrage an illustrious individual, the chief of one of the greatest nations in the world, who is, at least, a great captain, be the virtues or the vices what they may, which after-times shall bring to light in his character? Unless it be confessed that Great Britain, her blood, her treasure, all her resources, the most precious, are to be wasted for the re-establishment of the house of Bourbon, no good reason can be assigned why we should now refuse to treat."

No answer could be made to arguments so cogent and so true.¹ Mr. Tierney, profiting by the blunder of the English ministry, when speaking in its notes of the re-establishment of the house of Bourbon, made a special proposition relating to that house. He proposed to issue a formal declaration for separating the cause of England from that of the Bourbons, so fatal to both countries, to Great Britain, he exclaimed, as much so as to France. "I have heard," he continued, "I have heard many of the partisans of Mr. Pitt's administration say that the French government having offered no collective negotiation, it was justified in refusing an isolated negotiation, which could only have weakened us, by separating us from our allies; but I have not seen one who did not blame severely this mode of fixing the termination of this war at the re-establishment of the house of Bourbon!" And it is true, as Mr. Tierney said, that all the world did blame that blunder; and that the cabinet of Austria, less passionate than that of England, took good care not to imitate it. The English ministers replied, that they had not presented that condition as absolute or indispensable. But it was replied to them again, that the mere indication of it was a violation of the right of nations, and an attempt on the liberty of nations. And what should you say, cried Mr. Tierney, repeating the argument of the French cabinet, what should you say were General Bonaparte, victorious, to declare that he would not treat but with the Stuarts? "Moreover," he added, "is it from gratitude to the house of Bourbon that you would lavish on them our treasures and our blood? Do you remember the war with America? Is it not rainer for

¹ This is disingenuous! answers were made. How cogent and how true, those who are curious to inquire will find in Alison, li. 62. They are too long for quotation.

the principle it represents, that you are striving! Do you desire then to unchain against yourselves those passions which raised all France against the Bourbons? Are you about to bring upon your hands all those who would have no more nobles, all those who would have no more tithes, no more feudal rights; all those who acquired national property; all those who have borne arms these ten years for the French Revolution? Do you desire then to shed, to the last drop, the blood of so many Frenchmen, before you think of negotiating? I demand formally," said Mr. Tierney in conclusion, "that England separate her cause from that of the Bourbons."

On another motion, the celebrated Sheridan, always the boldest, the most witty of orators, brought the debate to bear upon the sorest point of the British cabinet, the expedition to Holland, in consequence of which the English and the Russians, conquered by General Brune, had been compelled to capitulate. "It seems," said Mr. Sheridan, "that if our government cannot conclude treaties of peace with the French republic, it can at least conclude capitulations. I call upon it to explain for what motives it signed the evacuation of Holland." Mr. Dundas, when challenged, gave three reasons for the expedition to Holland. The first, to detach the United Provinces from France; the second, to diminish the maritime power of France, and augment that of England, by seizing the Dutch fleet; the third, to make a diversion in favour of the allies; and he added that the British cabinet had succeeded in two out of three, since it had captured the fleet, and had contributed to the winning the battle of Novi, by drawing into Holland the troops destined for Italy. The minister had scarcely finished speaking, when Sheridan, pouncing on him with unequalled vigour, cried, "Yes, you believed the reports of emigrants, and risked an English army upon the continent only to cover it with shame. You desired to detach Holland from France, and you have attached them more closely than ever, by the hostile seizure of her fleet and her colonies. You hold, you say, the Dutch fleet; but you do so by an unheard of and odious proceeding, by encouraging the revolt of its crews, and showing a most fatal spectacle, that namely of sailors in mutiny against their leaders; thus violating that discipline which constitutes the strength of naval forces, and is the glory of our nation. Thus you have stolen that fleet ignominiously, but not for England. In any case, it is for the stadholder that you hold it; since you have been compelled to admit that it belongs to him and not to England. To conclude, you have assisted, you say, the Austrian army at Novi; it is possible that you may have done so; but do you boast, you, the ministers of the king of Great Britain, of having saved an Austrian army by suffering an English army to be slaughtered?"

Virulent, however, as were these attacks,

¹ Because he was backed by a vast majority, nearly four-fifths, in the House of Commons, in its turn backed by the voice of at least four-fifths of the nation. The vote on this debate was two hundred and sixty-five to sixty-four.

they did not prevent Mr. Pitt from obtaining immense financial resources, nearly eleven hundred millions—almost twice the amount of the French budget at that period; with authority to subsidize Austria and the states of southern Germany; with important additions to the *income tax*, which already produced 180,000,000*l.* *per annum*,² with a new suspension of the *habeas corpus*, and, to conclude, with the great measure of the union of Ireland. But men's minds in England were deeply moved by so much reason combined with so much eloquence.

Reasonable men throughout all Europe were also struck by the wrongs which were committed against France, and ere long, victory uniting with justice, Mr. Pitt was made to expiate by cruel humiliations the audacious haughtiness of his political conduct toward the First Consul. Nevertheless Mr. Pitt possessed the power of furnishing the coalition with means for carrying on a new campaign—a campaign, it is true, which was to be the last, in consequence of the exhaustion of all the belligerent parties, but at the same time the most desperate, for the very reason that it was the last.

At this grave juncture the First Consul was desirous of deriving from the court of Prussia all the advantage that could be gained at the moment. That court could only, in the face of adversaries so powerful, have brought about a peace, by imposing it on them through the means of an armed mediation—a part by no means impossible for her to play, but entirely beyond the views of the young king, who was labouring to recruit his treasury and army, while every power around him was exhausting its resources. That prince had already sounded the belligerent powers, and had found them so far from any concert of views, that he had renounced the idea of mediating between them. Moreover, the Prussian cabinet had itself interested views. It was desirous that France should exhaust Austria, and exhaust herself at the same time, by a prolonged struggle; but it was also desirous that she should give up a part of the frontier of the Rhine, and, contenting herself with Belgium and Luxemburg on that side, should not claim the Rhenish provinces. It strongly urged this on the First Consul, saying, that France and Prussia, if less contiguous, would be more harmonious, and that the European cabinet, reassured by this moderation, would be better disposed to peace.

But although the First Consul was extremely cautious with regard to the declaration of his intentions on this point, he had at the bottom little hope of gaining it on this point; and the Prussian cabinet did not perceive in all this the prospect of a peace so satisfactory as to induce it to much exertion. It gave therefore much advice, wrapped up in dogmatical forms, but it took no action.

² The budget stood—	
Receipts	£39,512,000
Expenditures	37,920,000
Showing an excess of receipts of	
	£1,592,000

² Both sums in the text are francs. The income tax for 1800 was £25,300,000.

Nevertheless this cabinet might still be very useful in the maintenance of the neutrality of the north of Germany, in causing the adhesion of the greatest possible number of German provinces to this neutrality, and lastly, in detaching the Emperor Paul entirely from the coalition. As to these matters, it acted in them zealously, because it was desirous of confirming and strengthening the neutrality of the north of Germany, and, above all, of bringing over Russia to its own system. Paul, ever exaggerated in his feelings, was becoming daily more irritated against Austria and England; he said aloud that he would soon compel Austria to replace the Italian princes on the thrones of Italy, which she had reconquered with Russian arms—that he would force England to restore the order of Malta in that island-fortress, of which she was ready to take permanent possession. He entertained, indeed, a strange passion for that ancient order of chivalry, and had made himself its grand-master.

He blamed the manner in which the overtures of the First Consul had been received in London and Vienna, and in his communications—now become confidential—with the court of Prussia, he suffered it to escape him, that he could have wished such overtures to be addressed to his own person. The First Consul had not, however, dared to take this step, for fear of the consequences which might have followed from a character like that of the czar. Prussia, well informed on all these points, communicated them to the cabinet of France, which turned them to its own advantage.

Before opening the campaign, for the season of military operations was approaching, the First Consul invited M. de Sandoz, the Prussian minister, to an interview, and had a perfect and positive explanation with him, on the 5th of March—14th of Ventose. After recapitulating, at some length, all that he had done for the re-establishment of peace, and all the evil proceedings and invincible obstacles which had been thrown in his way, he disclosed the extent of his military preparations, without, however, revealing the depth of his combinations, and suffered the Prussian minister to catch a glimpse of the vastness of those resources which yet remained to France. He then declared to him, that, full of confidence in Prussia, he expected from her new efforts toward a reconciliation between the belligerents, while he should be engaged in warfare; and that, in default of a general peace, little likely to occur before a new campaign, he looked for two services at the hands of King Frederic William, the reconciliation of the republic with Paul the First, and a direct attempt to detach the Elector of Bavaria from the coalition.

Make up the difference between Paul and us, said General Bonaparte, and at the same time determine the Elector of Bavaria to refuse his soldiers and his territory to the coalition, and you will do us two great services, which we shall not forget. If the elector accede to our requests, you may promise him all the consideration he can desire during the war, and the best treatment on the establishment of peace.

The First Consul exposed also his ulterior objects to the Prussian ambassador. He declared to him that the treaty of Campo Formi, being the basis proposed for future negotiations, the frontier of the Rhine would be a question to be discussed with the empire at an after period; that the independence of Holland, Switzerland, and the Italian States should be formally guaranteed, without explaining himself as to the point whereat the Rhine should cease to be the frontier of France. He said that no one could imagine that France would recede from it on this side Mayence, but that above Mayence, the Moselle, or the Meuse, might possibly be adopted as a line. Belgium and Luxembourg were, of course, beyond dispute. He added farther, that if Prussia should perform the services for France which she had the power of performing, he would engage to leave a great degree of influence, in the negotiations of peace, to the court of Berlin. This was indeed the point on which Prussia was the most tenacious, for she desired much to have a hand in these negotiations, in order to the establishment of the German frontiers in a mode better suited to her own views.

This communication, therefore, full as it was of point and candour, had the best effect possible at Berlin. The king replied, that with regard to the Emperor Paul, he had already employed his good offices, and would employ them farther yet to attach him to France; that as to Bavaria, surrounded on every side by Austria, he had no power; but that if the Emperor Paul should declare himself, it might perhaps be possible, by the joint influence of Russia and Prussia, to withdraw the elector from the coalition.

It only remained, therefore, after these well-concerted steps, to commence hostilities as speedily as might be. The season had not, however, completely arrived; and it was evident that it must be later this year than usual, because France had to reorganize her armies, partially dissolved, and Austria had to fill up the space left in the ranks of the coalition by Russia's defection. The First Consul was of opinion, then, that the time had come wherein to put an end to the war in La Vendée—first, in order to close the hideous spectacle of a civil strife; secondly, to render disposable, and transport to the Rhine and Alps, the excellent troops which La Vendée had hitherto detained in the heart of the republic.

The messages sent by him personally, to the insurgent provinces, concurring with the offers of peace made to the authorities, had produced a most powerful effect. Those messages had been backed by an imposing force of about 60,000 men withdrawn from Holland, from the interior, from Paris itself. The First Consul had carried his boldness so far as to remain himself in Paris, then filled with the boiling scum of all parties, with but 2,300 men as a garrison; and this very boldness he augmented by making it public. For as a reply to the English ministers, who pretended that the consular government was not more solid than those which had preceded it, he caused a comparative statement to be published of the forces then in London and in

Paris; the result being this, that London was guarded by 14,000, and Paris by 2300 men. This force was barely sufficient for the maintenance of the ordinary police stations, which watch over the safety of public institutions, and the dwellings of high functionaries. It was evident that the name of General Bonaparte was the safeguard of Paris.

Be this as it might, the insurgent provinces found themselves suddenly surrounded by a formidable army, and thus placed in the alternative of accepting an immediate and generous peace, or enduring a war of extermination, they could not delay in choosing their part. Messieurs d'Andigné and Hyde de Neuville, after having seen the First Consul, had recovered from all their illusions, and believed no longer that he intended the restoration of the Bourbons. Nor did they believe either that they could succeed in conquering such a man. M. Hyde de Neuville, who had been sent by the Count d'Artois¹ to judge of the state of matters, determined on returning to London, not wishing personally to abandon the cause of the Bourbons, yet satisfied of the impossibility of prolonging the war, and leaving his advice to the leaders, to do that which the necessity of the time and places rendered inevitable to them all. M. d'Andigné returned to La Vendée to report what he had seen.

The term of the armistice was on the point of arriving. It was necessary, then, that the leaders of the royalist party should either sign a definitive peace, or decide to commence, on the instant, a death-struggle with a formidable army. In 1793, in the first enthusiasm of the insurrection, they had been unable to conquer the 16,000 men of the garrison of Mayence, and had but succeeded in fighting desperate and bloody battles, to yield after all. What could they now accomplish against 60,000 of the best troops in the world, one half of whom had just driven the Russians and English into the sea? Nothing evidently, and this was the universal opinion in the insurgent provinces. At least it was everywhere more or less general in each of them. On the left bank of the Loire, between Saumur, Nantes, and the Sands, in short, in old La Vendée, exhausted in men and substance, the weariness of warfare was extreme. They there considered the last armed rising, which had been brought about only by the united severity and weakness of the Directory, as, what it was in truth, an act of gross folly. On the right bank, about Mans, a district which, like the other, had been the seat of a desperate struggle, the same feelings prevailed. In Lower Normandy, where the insurrection was of a later date, where M. de Frotté, a young, active, wary, and ambitious leader commanded the royalists, there was a stronger disposition to continue the war. It was the same in Morbihan, where the distance from Paris, the vicinity of the sea, the face of the country, all offered more resources, and where a chieftain of fierce and invincible energy, Georges Cadoudal, supported the courage of the people. In these two provinces, more fre-

quent intercourse with the English contributed to render the resistance of the natives more obstinate.

From one end to the other of La Vendée and Brittany, all was doubt whether side to choose. The emigrants, paid by England, whose devotedness consisted in continually passing to and fro, and who had not to dread the consequences of insurrection, were violently at issue with the inhabitants of the country on whom weighed the burden of this everlasting civil war. Those, maintaining that it was necessary to carry on the civil war; these, on the contrary, that it was indispensable to bring it to a close. These, representatives of an English, rather than a royalist interest, asserted that the consular government, like all the previous revolutionary governments, must needs perish, after a few days of flattering appearances—that it must perish through the disorders of the finance and the administration—that the Russian and English armies would send a detachment into La Vendée, to offer aid to the French royalists—that the latter needed now but a few days of patience, to gather the fruits of eight years of struggles and warfare—and that by persisting they would probably have the honour of leading the Bourbons, in triumph, back to Paris.

The insurgents, who did not retire habitually to London, to live there on English money, who remained on the spot with their peasantry, and saw their estates ravaged, their houses burned, their wives and children dying of cold and hunger—these replied that General Bonaparte had never failed in anything that he had undertaken. Instead of believing that all was hurrying to dissolution, they held, on the contrary, that all was advancing to reorganization in the fortunate hand that newly swayed the republic—that this republic, which the others pretended to be worn out, had already sent an army of 60,000 men against them—that the much vaunted English and Russians had already laid down their arms before one half of that army—that it was an easy matter to frame fine projects in London, to talk of devotion and constancy at a distance from the scene of action, events, and consequences—that on these points, it would be wise to spare lecturing those who had for eight years endured all the miseries of the most frightful civil war. Among these exhausted royalists, some even went so far as to insinuate that General Bonaparte, in his assiduous aim at public good, after having re-established peace, put an end to persecution, and rebuilt the altar, would perhaps also restore the throne. And the tales were repeated, which no longer found credence with the leading royalists, since the interviews of Messieurs d'Andigné and Hyde de Neuville with the First Consul, but which had still retained some credit in the lowest ranks of the insurgent population, and which contributed to conciliate their feeling towards the government.

There was in the heart of La Vendée a simple priest, the Abbé Bernier, curate of Saint Laud, a man destined ere long to take a part in the affairs of the republic and the empire, who, by the influence of great intellect and natural ability, had gained a great ascendancy over the

¹ CHARLES PHILIPPE, brother of Louis XVIII.; afterwards Charles X.

leaders of the royalists. He had seen, close at hand, the whole of this long insurrection, which had ended in calamities only. He judged the cause of the Bourbons lost, at least for the moment, and believed that there was no hope of saving aught from the general anarchy produced by the French Revolution, except the ancient altar of Christianity. Enlightened on this head by the recent acts of the First Consul, and by frequent communications with General Hédouville, he had no longer any doubts; and he reckoned that—by submission—peace, remission of persecution, and toleration at least, if not protection of their worship, might be obtained. He therefore urged submission on all the old leaders of the left hand shore, and by his own influence silenced the tale-bearers who went and came between La Vendée and London. A meeting took place at Montfaucon, and there, in a council of officers, the Abbé Bernier prevailed on M. d'Autichamp, a young gentleman full of courage, but respectful to the superior intelligence of others, to lay down his arms in behalf of the province. The capitulation was signed on the 18th of January—28th of Nivose. The republic promised a perfect amnesty, respect for religious creeds, abandonment of taxation, for some time, in the desolated provinces, and the erasure of all the royalist chiefs from the list of emigrants. The royalists in their turn promised complete submission, and a general laying down of arms.

On the same 18th day of January, the Abbé Bernier wrote to General Hédouville, "Your wishes and mine are accomplished. At two o'clock to-day peace was gratefully accepted at Montfaucon, by all the chiefs and officers of the left bank of the Loire. The right bank will doubtless follow this example, and the olive of peace will ere long replace on both banks of the Loire the gloomy cypresses which war has planted there. I entrust Messieurs de Bauroulier, Duboucher, and Renou, to carry you this happy news. I recommend them to your indulgence, and to that of your government. Falsely inscribed on the fatal lists of the year 1793, they have been stripped of all their property. They made that sacrifice to the exigencies of the times, and nevertheless wished for peace. This peace is your work. Maintain it, general, by justice and mercy, your glory and your happiness depend thereon. In order to accomplish your beneficent views, I will do all that depends on me. Wisdom commands, humanity desires it. My whole heart is devoted to the country I inhabit, and its happiness is the first of my wishes.

BRUNIER."

This example produced its effect. Two days afterward, the insurgents on the right bank, commanded by a brave old gentleman, M. de Chatillon, who were, like him, disgusted that they should serve the views of England, rather than the cause of royalty, surrendered all old Vendée, which was thus pacified. Unbounded was the joy, both in the country places where royalty reigned, and in the towns, which, on the contrary, a revolutionary spirit had pervaded. In several towns, such as Nantes and Angers, the royalist chiefs, wearing the tricoloured cockade, were received with triumph and cherished as brothers. On all sides they

began to lay down their arms, and to submit in good faith, under the influence of an opinion which gradually became general; namely, that the war, without bringing back the Bourbons would only end in the effusion of blood, and the devastation of the country; while submission, on the other hand, would procure repose security, and the re-establishment of religion the thing, above all others, most devoutly to be desired. The pacification, however, encountered more obstacles in Brittany and Normandy. The war in those parts, as we have just said was of more recent origin, and had exhausted the courage of the inhabitants in a lesser degree; there, moreover, profitable things, shameful advantages, were gained by war, whilst in La Vendée nothing came of it but suffering and disaster. It was in the centre of Brittany, and toward the side of Normandy, that all the Chouans had sought an asylum; that is to say, those men whom insurrection had habituated to violence and robbery, and who could not now dispense with those habits or lay them aside. They waged war more against the coffers of the wealthy, against the public conveyances, and the acquirers of national property, than against the republic. They were in correspondence with a set of scoundrels, established in Paris, and from them received the information that directed their expeditions. In short, in Morbihan, which was the strongest hold of the insurrectionists, Georges, the only one of the Veudean chiefs really inexorable, was receiving English gold, that substantial succour, which maintained his resistance, and therefore was little disposed to submit. But preparation was made to crush those of the royalist chiefs who would not surrender.

On the 21st January—1st Pluviose—General Chabot, violating the armistice, marched on the bands in the centre of Brittany, commanded by Messrs. de Bourmont and De la Prevalaye. Near the commune of Mélay he attacked M. de Bourmont, who at the head of 4000 Chouans vigorously defended himself, but he was at length obliged to yield to the republicans, accustomed to conquer soldiers of a very different order from the poor peasantry. Having exposed himself to the greatest dangers, he contrived to escape, though not without much difficulty. Soon afterwards forced to acknowledge that he could do no more for his cause, he gave up his arms on the 24th January—4th Pluviose. General Chabot then marched upon Rennes, that thence he might direct his march on the lower end of Brittany, where General Brune was concentrating a great force. The 25th January—3d Pluviose—several columns having marched from Vannes, Auray, Elven, under Generals Harty and Gency, met Georges' bands, at Grand Champs. The two republican generals had directed convoys of grain and cattle upon Vannes, which they had forcibly taken in the insurgent country. The Chouans, aiming at the recovery of this convoy, were surrounded by the escorting columns, and in spite of the most vigorous resistance, lost 400 of their men, in slain, several of their chiefs, and were utterly routed. Two days afterward, on the 27th, 300 Chouans perished in a severe affair.

at Heni ebon, and all hopes of the insurrection were completely destroyed. Upon the coast, and close in shore, were an English 80 gun ship and some frigates, which had opportunity of seeing how chimerical were the illusions with which the British government had been flattered. For the rest, they had reciprocally deceived each other; the British government, in promising a new expedition, similar to that of Holland, and the Bretons in announcing a general rising. Some royalists recently landed had great difficulty in getting on board the English squadron in the boats, and were received as emigrants who had promised much and done little. Georges saw himself compelled to lay down his arms, and gave up 20,000 muskets and 20 pieces of cannon, which he had just received from the English.

In lower Normandy, M. de Frotté, a young chief of much devotion to the cause, was, after Georges, the most resolute of all the royalists for the maintenance of the war. He was pursued by Generals Gardanne and Chambarlhac, detached from the garrison of Paris. Many sharp affairs took place on different points. On the 25th January—5th of Pluviose—M. de Frotté was attacked by General Gardanne at the forges of Cossé, near De la Motte Fouquet, and lost many of his people. The 26th—6th of Pluviose—one of the chiefs named Duboisgny, was attacked in his chateau of Duboisgny, near Fougeres, and experienced, like M. de Frotté, a considerable loss. At length, the 27th—7th of Pluviose—General Chambarlhac surrounded some companies of Chouans in the neighbourhood of St. Christophe, and put them all to the sword. M. de Frotté, seeing, like the others, but unfortunately too late, that all resistance was impossible, before the numerous columns which had assailed the country—even M. de Frotté thought it was time to surrender. He wrote to General Hédouville, who was at that moment at Angers, to ask for peace, and, while waiting for the answer, he proposed an armistice to General Chambarlhac. The latter answered, that not having the power to treat, he would apply for it to the government, but in the mean time could not take upon himself to suspend hostilities, unless M. de Frotté should consent immediately to deliver up both his men and arms. This was precisely what M. de Frotté most dreaded. He willingly consented to submit, and to sign a momentary truce, but on condition of retaining his arms, so that he could seize, at some future moment, the first favourable occasion, and re-commence the war. He even wrote letters to his lieutenants, in which, in ordering them to surrender, he recommended them to keep their arms. During this lapse of time the First Consul, irritated by the obstinacy of M. de Frotté, issued orders to give him no quarter, and to make an example of him. M. de Frotté, uneasy at not receiving an answer to his proposal, now became desirous to put himself in communication with General Guidal, commanding the department of the Orne, and was arrested with six of his people, while he was endeavouring to see him. Letters found upon him, containing the order to his people to surrender, but to

retain their arms, were held proof of treachery. He was conducted to Verneuil and brought to a court martial. The news of his arrest arriving in Paris, a crowd of persons, interested in his behalf, beset the First Consul, and obtained a suspension of the proceedings against him, which was tantamount to a pardon. But the courier who brought the order of the government arrived too late. The constitution was suspended in the insurgent departments, M. de Frotté had been summarily tried, and when the reprieve arrived, this young and valiant chief had already undergone the penalty of his obstinacy. The duplicity of his conduct, although clearly proved was not sufficiently culpable to prevent deep regret at such an execution; the rather that it was the only one which stained this happy termination of the civil war.

From that day forth the departments of the west were entirely pacified. The wisdom of General Hédouville, the vigour, and promptitude of the means employed, the exhaustion of the insurgents, the mixture of confidence and the fear with which the First Consul inspired them, brought about this rapid pacification. It was completely terminated by the end of February, 1800—the first days of Ventose. The disarming took place everywhere. Some robbers only remained in action on the highways, whom active and unsparing justice would soon put down. The troops in the west were again put en route for Paris, to aid the vast designs of the First Consul.

The constitution, suspended in the four departments, the Lower Loire, Ille-et-Vilaine, Morbihan, and the Côtes du Nord, was re-established in all its vigour, and the greater part of the chiefs who had just laid down their arms were successively induced to visit Paris, for the purpose of bringing them in contact with the First Consul. For he well knew that it was not enough to deprive them of their arms; but that it was necessary to control their highly excited spirits, and to direct them to a noble end. He desired to carry along with him the royalist chiefs, in that immense career which was opening at that time to all Frenchmen, to conduct them to fortune, and to glory, by that path of danger which they had long been accustomed to pursue. He caused them to be invited to visit him. His renown, which inspired all, who had the opportunity, with the greatest desire of approaching him; his benevolence, which already had been much lauded in La Vendée, and which they had yet to invoke in favour of the numberless victims of the civil war, were so many honourable motives to induce the royal chiefs to visit him. The First Consul received them graciously, first of all, the Abbé Bernier; then Messrs. de Bourmont, D'Autichamp, de Chatillon, and at last Georges Cadoudal himself. He received the Abbé Bernier with marked distinction, and resolved to attach him to himself, by employing him in the intricate and difficult affairs of the church. He conversed frequently with the military chiefs in the most touching terms, and induced some of them to take service in the French arms. He even succeeded in gaining the heart of M.

de Chatillon. That gentleman retired from public life, married, and became the invariable and influential advocate of his fellow-citizens, when they had any act of justice or humanity to solicit at the hands of the First Consul. It is glory, clemency, and benevolence, that ever terminate revolutions.

Georges alone resisted this powerful influence. When he was conducted to the Tuileries, the aid-de-camp deputed to introduce him felt so apprehensive, in consequence of his repulsive aspect, that he would not shut the door of the First Consul's apartment, but kept silently peeping in to see what was passing. The interview was long. In vain did General Bonaparte make Georges' ears to re-echo with the words, country and glory; in vain did he try even the seductive bait of ambition on the heart of this wild soldier of the civil war; he succeeded not, and was convinced himself of the fact, as he scanned the visage of his visitor. Georges, on quitting him, took his departure for England with M. Hyde de Neuville. Frequently, when relating his interview to his travelling companion, displaying his brawny arms, he exclaimed: "Of what a folly was I guilty, that I did not strangle that man in these arms."

This prompt pacification of La Vendée produced an important effect on all minds. Some ill-intentioned persons, who were not disposed to account for it by natural causes, that is to say, by the energy of physical, and by the wisdom of moral, means, and above all by the influence of the First Consul's mighty name, pretended that there were secret articles in the treaty with the Vendéans, by which they were promised important compensations. Men did not speak out openly; they insinuated that it would perhaps be much more than the re-establishment of the principles of the ancient regime, much more than that even of the Bourbons themselves. It was the tattling newsmongers of the revolutionary party, who uttered these ridiculous fables; but men of sense better appreciated the acts of General

Bonaparte, saying, that people did not perform such mighty acts for others; and they believed that, if he did not exert himself entirely for France, it was at least for himself, and not for the Bourbons, that he strove. For the rest, in the eyes of all the world, the pacification of La Vendée was the most fortunate of events, portending a peace more important and more difficult,—a peace with Europe. Before opening the campaign for this year, the First Consul had made haste to bring the session of the Legislative Body to a close, and to press the adoption of many drafts of laws, which he had presented. Some members of the Tribunal complained of the rapidity with which they were made to debate and to vote. "We are," said the tribune Sedillez, an impartial and moderate man, "we are dragged into a *whirlwind of urgency*, the rapid movement of which is directed towards the object of our own desires. Would it not be better to yield to the impetuosity of this movement than to risk the shackling of its progress? Next year we shall be able to examine these bills so lately presented to us more at our leisure, and to amend those that require improvement." In fact every thing proceeded rapidly toward the object which the First Consul had proposed to himself. The laws were no sooner passed than put in execution. The functionaries who were appointed hastened to their posts. The new prefects entered at once on their duties; and the administration everywhere acquired a unity of action, and an activity never before witnessed. The contributions in arrears now flowed into the treasury; since the consolidation and order, established in the different parts of the administration, guaranteed to the contributors the legality of the collections. Day after day, new measures more and more clearly marked the political progress of the government. A second list of proscribed emigrants had just obtained the benefit of a recall from exile. The names of distinguished authors figured in this list: Messrs. de Fontanes,¹ De la Harpe,² Suard,³ Sicard,⁴ Michaud,⁵ Fiévée,⁶ were

¹ FONTANES, L. DE NIORET. One of the ablest literary men of France, and of the most decorous in politics. In 1790, he wrote a secular poem on the festival of the 14th of July. During the reign of terror, he had the courage to present a petition in favour of the inhabitants of Lyons. After the 9th of Thermidor, he was made professor in the central schools of Paris. Was proscribed in September, 1797, but recalled after the 18th of Brumaire, and returned to Paris, where he assisted Esminard, Laharpe, and Chateaubriand in editing the *Mercur*. He pronounced Washington's panegyric. His best works are a translation of Pope's Essay on Man, of some fragments of Lucretius, and a poem called *the Orchards*.—*Biographie Moderne*.

² LA HARPE, JEAN FRANÇOIS DE. A French dramatist of eminence. His father was a Swiss captain of artillery in the French service. He commenced his literary career, in 1759, by some heroic epistles; at twenty-five published his tragedy of Warwick, which created greater expectation than his later works justified. He translated Camoëns's *Lusiad*, and Suetonius's *Emperors*, the last but little esteemed. His best work was his *Course of Literature*. In 1792, he was a vehement declaimer in favour of liberty, but the reign of terror opened his eyes. He was imprisoned as a suspected person, and came out a strong defender of religion. In 1794, he spoke boldly against the crimes of the Revolution, was proscribed, and sentenced to deportation in September, 1797, but escaped being sent to Guilenne, and was recalled as above.—*Biographie Moderne*.

³ SICARD, JEAN BAPTISTE ANTOINE. A French miscellaneous writer, born at Besançon, in 1733. Was

editor of the *Journal de Paris*. During the Revolution, he published a work, called *Nouvelles Politiques*, which, professing to oppose democracy, was suppressed, and the author banished. He was recalled as above. He translated Robertson's *Charles V. and History of America*.—*Encyclopædia Americana*.

⁴ SICARD, ROCH AMBROISE CUCURRON. Successor of the Abbé L'Epée, at the Parisian Institution for the deaf and dumb. Born near Toulouse, in 1742, he entered holy orders, but soon devoted himself to the education of the deaf and dumb. In 1786, was a director of a deaf and dumb school at Bordeaux, and in 1789, was appointed successor to L'Epée. In 1792, he was arrested in the midst of his pupils, and narrowly escaped the September massacres. On the foundation of the normal school, he was appointed professor of grammar. He afterward conducted the *Annales Catholiques*, for some articles in which he was proscribed and recalled as above.—*Encyclopædia Americana*.

⁵ MICHAUD, JOSEPH, a man of some literary fame, and well known as a violent partizan of the Bourbons. Born in 1771. In 1791, began to write in the royalist journals. Was in danger, and obliged to conceal himself during the reign of terror. While editor of the *Quotidienne*, he was sentenced by a military commission, and forced to fly, but afterward was enabled to return. Sentenced to deportation to Cayenne after the 18th of Fructidor, he contrived to escape to the mountains of Jura, and was recalled as above.—*Encyclopædia Americana*.

⁶ FIEVÉE, son to the postmaster of Soissons. He was at first a printer. In 1792, published a comedy called the *Rigours of the Cloister*; and in 1793, a pamphlet on the

recalled from their exile, and authorized to leave their retreats. The members of the Constituent Assembly, known to have voted the abolition of feudal institutions, were exempt from all the severities with which the Convention and Directory had overwhelmed them. One celebrated man, but proscribed on the 18th Fructidor, a negotiator and signer of the first treaty of peace of the republic, the ex-director, Barthélemy,¹ was, on the proposal of the consuls, named senator. To conclude, another victim of proscription of the same date, recently recalled from exile, and shortly after named inspector of reviews, was now called to the ministry of war, in the place of General Berthier, who had departed to take the command of one of the armies of the republic. The name of Carnot was at that time a great military name, which was connected with the recollection of the victories of the Convention of 1793, and much as the name of Bonaparte was calculated to make the coalition tremble; that of Carnot, added to his, still produced a decided sensation at foreign head quarters. The session now drawing to a close, the opposition of the Tribunal made a last attempt, which caused some agitation, although rejected by a great majority. The Legislative Body could only sit four months. There was, however, no term assigned to the sessions of the Tribunal. This last body could, therefore, meet, although the termination of the session of the Legislative Body left it unemployed. It was proposed to fill up the time with petitions, which it alone was authorized to receive, and with a declaration of the projects which it was empowered to put forth. M. Benjamin Constant proposed to assign these petitions to distinct commissions, to keep them continually occupied, and by this means to keep in their hands not merely the power of debating on all the acts of the government—a thing in itself very legitimate—but the power of debating on them permanently throughout the whole year. This proposition was rejected in all its important bearings. It was decided that the Tribunal should meet once a fortnight, to hear a report of petitions, and that this report should be made by the bureau of the Assembly, composed of the president and secretaries. Reduced to this, the proposition had nothing that could produce uneasiness. With the exception of this last attempt, the end of the session was perfectly peaceable, even in the Tribunal; the projects of government had obtained even there such a majority, that a great degree of susceptibility must have existed in him who should find fault with an opposition of twenty members.

The First Consul, well disposed to endure no opposition, judged it the best to give himself no trouble on the subject. Thus this first

session of the year VIII, as it was called, by no means realized the apprehensions which certain propagators of bad news had affected to spread abroad. Had affairs continued in this state, this last phantom of deliberative assemblies must necessarily have been tolerated. That frightened generation, and the chief, it had adopted, would equally have supported it.

A little while before the close of the session, the First Consul adopted a measure with respect to the periodical press, which to-day would be nothing less than an impossible phenomenon; but which then, thanks to the silence of the constitution, was perfectly legal. The constitution, in fact, said nothing on the subject of the periodical press; and it will appear extraordinary that a liberty so important as that of writing was not so much as mentioned in the fundamental law of the state. But then the rostrum, as well in the assemblies as in the clubs, had been preferred as the best means of producing revolutionary passions; and the freedom of speech had been so largely used, that little attention was paid to the freedom of writing. At the period of the 18th of Fructidor, the press was somewhat more largely employed, but particularly by the royalists; and this excited in the revolutionists such a feeling against it, that its interests obtained little or no attention at their hands. They permitted it to be proscribed on the 18th of Fructidor, and in the publication of the constitution of the year VIII, all notice of it was omitted, and thenceforth it was given up to the arbitrary pleasure of the government. The First Consul, who had already shown great impatience under the attacks of the royalist journals, while he was simply general of the army of Italy, now began to be uneasy at the indiscretions committed by the press, in regard to military operations, and the virulent attacks it presumed to make upon foreign governments. Constantly applying himself, with extraordinary earnestness, to reconcile the republic with Europe, he feared lest the republican journals, inveterately hostile to those cabinets, particularly since the refusal of the offers from France, should render his efforts at accommodation fruitless. The King of Prussia, particularly, had cause to complain of some French journals, and had even expressed his dissatisfaction. The First Consul, who wished to efface all traces of violence, and who was by no means fettered in regard to the liberty of the press by any firm and decided public opinion, such as that of the present day, took a step by which he suppressed a great number of journals, and designated those that should have the privilege of continuing to appear. These dispositions were intended to remain in force until the establishment of a general peace. The favoured journals were thirteen in number: *Le*

¹ *Necessity of Religion.* Afterwards assisted in editing the French Gazette. In 1799, made himself remarkable for his talents in the section of the Theatre Français, of which he was president. He was included in the decoration of the 18th of Fructidor, but contrived to elude it. He was confined for some months during 1799, in the Temple.—*Encyclopædia Americana.*

² *BARTHÉLEMY FRANÇOIS.* Nephew of the famous Abbé Barthélemy, author of the travels of Anacharsis. Furnished his attention early to diplomacy, accompanying M. de Lamoignon to Italy, the Baron de Breteuil to Swit-

zerland, and M. d'Adhemar, as his secretary, to Sweden. In 1791, he was sent ambassador to England. In 1793, negotiated a peace with Prussia, in the next year with Spain and the Elector of Hesse. He was raised to the Directory on the retirement of Letourneur, by the Clichien party, and soon shared in their downfall. He was sentenced to exile on the 19th of Fructidor, and deported to Cayenne, where he was near to dying. He escaped with De Teller and six others to England, and was recalled as above.—*Biographie Moderne.*

Moniteur Universel, Le Journal des Debats, Le Journal de Paris, Le Bien Informé, Le Publiciste, L'Ami des Lois, La Clef du Cabinet, Le Citoyen Français, La Gazette de France, Le Journal des Hommes Libres, Le Journal du Soir, Le Journal des Défenseurs de la Patrie, La Decade Philosophique. These favoured journals were, moreover, apprized that those which should publish articles against the constitution, against the armies, their glory or their interest, or which should publish invectives against foreign governments friendly or allied to France, would be immediately suppressed. This measure, which would now appear so extraordinary, was received without a murmur, and without astonishment, for the value of such things can only be estimated by the spirit of the time. The votes required from the citizens, on the subject of the new constitution, had been collected and counted. The result of this scrutiny was communicated to the Senate, to the Legislative Body, and to the Tribunate, by a message from the consuls. None of the previous constitutions had been accepted by so large a number of votes. Eighteen hundred votes in the affirmative had been cast, in 1793, for the constitution of that period, and eleven thousand in the negative. In 1795, for the constitution of the Directory, one million and fifty-seven thousand affirmative votes, and forty-nine thousand negative. This time, however, there was presented a total amount of more than three millions voters, of whom three millions adopted the constitution, and only fifteen hundred rejected it.* It is true that such vain formalities as these signify nothing to thinking minds. It is not by these vulgar, and often mendacious, tokens, that the wishes of a community can be judged; it is by its moral aspect. But the difference in the number of voters had, in this instance, an incontestable meaning. It proved, at least, how general was the sentiment which called for a strong and restorative government, a government capable of insuring order, victory, and peace.

The First Consul, before his departure for the army, decided on taking an important step. He established himself in the Tuileries. Under the disposition of the public mind to see in him a Cæsar or a Cromwell, destined to terminate a reign of anarchy by a reign of despotism, his establishment in the palace of the kings was at once bold and dangerous; not in consequence of the resistance it might provoke, but the moral effect it might possibly produce.

The First Consul, however, caused this step to be preceded by a ceremony as imposing as it was happily conceived; Washington had just died—the death of that illustrious person, who had filled the latter end of the last century with the renown of his name, was a subject of regret to all the friends of liberty in Europe. The First Consul, judging that a grand display on the subject would be opportune, addressed his armies in the following order of the day: “Washington is dead! that great man fought against tyranny; he consolidated the independence of his country. His memory will be ever

dear to the French people, as to all freemen of both worlds, and most of all to French soldiers, who like him, and the soldiers of America, are fighting for equality and freedom.” In consequence of this, ten days of mourning were appointed. This mourning was to consist of a black crape suspended to all the colours of the republic. But the First Consul stopped not there, he had a noble and simple solemnity prepared in the Church of the Invalids—a church called, in the ephemeral language of the day, *the Temple of Mars*. The colours taken in Egypt had not yet been presented to the government;—General Lannes was appointed to present them on this occasion to the minister of war, under the magnificent dome raised by the great king, as a monument to aged valour. On the 9th of February—the 20th of Pluviose—all the authorities being assembled at the Invalids, General Lannes presented to the minister of war, Berthier, 96 colours, taken at the Pyramids, at Mount Thabor, and at Aboukir. He pronounced a brief and warlike harangue. Berthier responded in the same spirit. The latter was seated between two invalids, each of whom had attained his hundredth year; in front was the bust of Washington, shaded by a thousand colours victoriously captured from Europe by the armies of republican France. Not far aloof a rostrum was prepared;—one who had been proscribed was seen to ascend it, one who owed his liberty to the policy of the First Consul; it was M. de Fontanes, a brilliant and pure writer, the last who employed that old French language, once so perfect, but now vanished, with the eighteenth century, in the abyss of by-gone times. M. de Fontanes pronounced in a studied, but superb style, a funeral eulogium of the hero of America. He celebrated the warlike virtues of Washington, his valour, his wisdom, and disinterestedness; far above military talent, which can gain victories alone, he placed that regenerating genius which causes civil wars to cease, heals up the wounds of countries, and gives peace to the world. Together with the shade of Washington, he invoked those of Catinat and of Condé, and as if speaking in the name of the great men, he uttered praises, in the most delicate and noble form, which were at this time full of dignity, because they were lessons full of wisdom and sagacity.—“Yes,” cried he, as he closed his discourse, “thy counsels shall be heard. O; Washington, thou warrior, legislator, citizen without reproach!—He who, while but a youth, has surpassed thee in victories, shall close like thee, the bleeding wounds of his country, with triumphant hands. Soon shall we see his strong will, and his warrior genius, should they be necessary, our best defence; soon shall the hymn of peace re-echo through the shrine of war; then shall a universal sentiment of joy efface the recollection of oppression and injustice; already the oppressed forget their woes, and fix their faith upon the future. The acclamations of all ages shall accompany the hero, who lavishes his benevolent gifts on France and on the world, which she has too long harassed!”

The discourse ended, black crape was ar

* These are the exact numbers in 1793: 1,801,918 affirmative, and 11,010 negative votes. In 1795, 1,037,390 affirmative, and 49,935 negative. In 1800, out of 3,012,569 voters, 3,011,007 were affirmative, and only 1,562 negative.

pended to all the ec'ours, and the French republic seemed to be in mourning for the founder of its American sister, like monarchies which put on mourning one for the other's losses. What was there wanting to this pomp, that it should rival those funeral solemnities, whither Louis XIV. came to hear the praises of his warriors flow from the mouth of Flechier or Bossuet? Not certainly the grandeur of the objects, or the men, for it was Washington of whom he spoke, and before General Bonaparte. It was in presence of a society that had seen its Charles I. to mount the scaffold, and even crowned women to follow him thither. And men could utter here the words, *Fleurus, Arcola, Rivoli, Zurich, the Pyramids*, and surely these grand words were as well fitted to adorn a period as the *Dunes and Rocroi*. What, then, was wanting in this solemnity to make it eminently grand? That which the greatest of men was unable to place there. In the first place, religion; not that religion which is induced outwardly, but that which comes purely from the heart, and without which, such celebrations are but unmeaning and cold ceremonies. The genius of Bossuet was wanting, for there are kinds of grandeur that never can return to nations; and if the Turennes, and Condés have had successors, the Bossuets have none. Above all things, sincerity was wanting, for it was evident that this homage to a hero, whose chief glory was the disinterestedness of his ambition, was a broad piece of affectation. However, let us not suppose, as many have interpreted it, that all here was pure hypocrisy. There was some, doubtless, but there were also here the ordinary self-illusions of that time, and of all times. Men, in fact, oftener deceive themselves than they do others. Many Frenchmen, as did the Romans under Augustus, believed still in the existence in a republic, because its name was most discreetly and carefully preserved; nor is it very certain that the chief mourner in this funeral ceremony, that General Bonaparte himself, did not deceive himself when he did this honour to Washington; and that he did not think, in fact, that it might be possible in France, as in America, to be the first, without being king or emperor. This ceremony was the prelude to the installation of the three consuls at the Tuileries.—For a long time the necessary repairs had been in progress; all traces left by the Convention were being swept away, and the red caps, which had been placed by its orders along the gilded cornices, were in process of removal. It was intended that the First Consul should

occupy apartments on the first floor, the same of which the royal family now make use for their evening assemblies. His wife and children were to be lodged above him, in the entresol. The Gallery of Diana was then, as now, the vestibule, which it was necessary to cross before gaining access to the chief of the state. The First Consul caused it to be adorned, with busts of the most illustrious and distinguished men, and took pains to mark, by the choice of these busts, his favourite predilections. These were Demosthenes, Alexander, Hannibal, Scipio, Brutus, Cicero, Cato, Cæsar, Gustavus Adolphus, Turenne, Condé, Dugui Trouin, Marlborough, Eugene, Marshal Saxe, Washington, Frederic the Great, Mirabeau, Dugommier, Dampierre, Marceau, Joubert,—that is to say warriors and orators, defenders of liberty, and conquerors, heroes of the old monarchy, and of the republic, and to make up the list, four generals of the republic killed in battle. His great inclination seemed to be to gather around himself the glories of all countries, and of all times, as he desired to rally round his government men of all parties. But it was not proposed that he alone should occupy the Tuileries; but that his colleagues should divide them with him. To the Consul Le Brun was assigned the Pavilion of Flora. The Consul Cambacérés, however, who ranked above the Consul Le Brun, refused to enter the palace of the kings. This person, with consummate prudence, the only man, perhaps of that time, who did not surrender himself to any illusion, said to his colleague Le Brun, "It is an error that we should be lodged in the Tuileries, it suits neither you nor me; for my part I will not go.—General Bonaparte will soon want to lodge there by himself, and then we shall be suffered to retire. It is better not to go at all."

He did not go, but was presented with a beautiful Hotel on the Place de Carousell, which he retained as long as Napoleon retained the empire. When every thing was ready, some days after the funeral ceremony at the Invalids, the First Consul resolved to take public possession of the Tuileries. He did this with great solemnity. On the 19th of February—30 Pluviose—he quitted the Luxembourg, to take possession of his new palace, preceded and followed by a sumptuous retinue. The fine regiments which had marched from Holland to La Vendée and from La Vendée to Paris, and which were going to immortalize themselves for the hundredth time on the plains of Germany and Italy. Those regiments commanded by Lannes, Murat,¹ and Bessières,²

¹ MURAT, JOACHIM. Born in 1767, at Bastide Frontiniere, the son of an innkeeper, who had been steward to the De Talleyrands. Murat was at first intended for the church, but entered a regiment of chasseurs. He was dismissed for insubordination, but afterward entered the constitutional guard of Louis XVI. During the reign of terror, he passed through the grades of lieutenant, captain, and major. He was Bonaparte's lieutenant in the affair of the Sections, in 1795, and on his personal staff in Italy. Distinguished himself at Montenotte, Millesimo, Dego, Mondovì, Rivoli, Rovereto, everywhere. It was in Egypt especially, where he gained his renown, out-riding, out-fighting, and astonishing the Mamelukes. For his aid at the 18th of Brumaire, he was rewarded with the hand of Caroline, Napoleon's youngest and most ambitious sister. He was

known in the consular and imperial armies as "le preux chevalier." There was a dash of romance in every thing he did, and by his personal beauty, daring splendor, swordsmanship, and skill with the horse, he seemed to bring back the days of chivalry and knight-errantry. The best cavalry officer the world ever saw. *Court and Camp of Napoleon.*

² BESSIÈRES, JEAN BAPTISTE. Born of very humble parents, at Preissac, in 1768. In company with his countryman, Joachim Murat, he travelled up to Paris in 1791. Both were appointed together privates in the constitutional guard. On the 10th of August, 1792, he distinguished himself by his courage and humanity, in rescuing many of the queen's household from massacre. He afterward joined a regiment of chasseurs of the legion of the Pyrenees, in which he rose to be a captain

opened the procession. Then came, in carriages, for the most part hired, the ministers, the councillors of state, the public authorities; at last, in a splendid carriage with six white horses, came the three consuls. These horses were very appropriately introduced at this moment; they were those presented to General Bonaparte by the Emperor of Germany on the occasion of the peace of Campo Formio.

The general had also received from that prince a magnificent sabre, which he took care to wear on that day; thus he displayed around him all that could remind the people of the peace-making warrior. The crowd which filled the streets and quays that led to the Tuileries, hailed his presence with loud acclamations. These acclamations were sincere, for in him they saluted France's glory, and the commencement of her great prosperity. Arrived at the Caroussel, the carriage of the consuls was received by the consular-guard, and passed before two guard-houses, one to the right, the other to the left, of the courtyard of the palace—on one of these still remained the inscription, "*ROYAUME EN FRANCE IS ABOLISHED, AND SHALL ARISE NO MORE.*" The First Consul had scarcely entered the courtyard, before he mounted his horse and reviewed the troops which were drawn up before the palace. On coming in front of the colours of the 96th, and 43d, and 30th demi-brigades, colours all black with smoke, and rent with bullets, he saluted them, and in turn was saluted by the cheers of the soldiers. After having gone through the ranks, he placed himself in front of the Pavilion of Flora, and saw them march past. Above his head, on the balcony of the palace were the consuls, the principal authorities, and, to conclude, his own family, who now began to hold rank in the state. The review ended, he ascended into his apartments; the minister of the interior presented the civil, and the minister of war the military, authorities to him; and the minister of the marine, all the naval officers who were at that time in Paris. A banquet was prepared at the Tuileries, and at the hotels of the ministers. The functions of the consular palace were regulated in the following manner,—a councillor of state, former minister of the interior, M. Benezech, was intrusted with the general administration of the palace. The aides-de-camp, at the head of whom was Duroc, were appointed to do the honours, and to replace that multitude of officers of all descriptions, who usually fill the vast saloons of European sovereigns. Every fifteen days, on the 2d and the 17th of every month, the First Consul received the diplomatic body; once every decade, on different days, and at appointed hours, he received the Senators, the Legislative Body, the Tribunate, and the members of the Court of Cassation. The functionaries who

had occasion to converse with him were bound to apply to the ministers, on whom they were dependent, in order to gain access to his person.

On the 2d of Ventose—February 21st—two days after his installation at the Tuileries, he gave audience to the diplomatic body. Surrounded by a numerous staff, and having the two consuls at his sides, he received the envoys of those states which were not at war with France. Introduced by M. Benezech, presented by the minister of the interior, they delivered their credentials to the First Consul, who transmitted them to the ministers, nearly after the same routine with the sovereigns of monarchical governments. The foreign ministers who figured at this audience were M. de Musquiz, Spanish ambassador; M. de Sandoz Rollin, Prussian minister; M. de Schimmelpenninck, ambassador of Holland; M. de Serbelloni, envoy of the Cisalpine republic; and in addition to these, the *chargés d'affaires* of Denmark, Sweden, Switzerland, Baden, Hesse-Cassel, Rome, Genoa, &c. *Moniteur* of the 4th of Ventose, year VIII.

The presentation ended, these different ministers were introduced to Madame Bonaparte. Every five days the First Consul reviewed the regiments which were passing through Paris on their way to the frontiers. Then it was that he showed himself to the troops and the multitude, which always crowded around him. Thin, pale, and stooping over his horse's neck, he at once impressed and interested all beholders, by his grave melancholy beauty, and by appearance of ill health, at which men were beginning to be alarmed, for never was the preservation of any man's life more earnestly desired than was his.

After these reviews, the officers of the troops were admitted to his table. Foreign ministers, the members of assemblies, magistrates and public functionaries were invited to his board, whereat there reigned a decorous luxury. There were, as yet, in that new-born court neither ladies of honour nor chamberlains; the mode of dress was plain, yet at the same time tasteful. The customs of the Directory were carefully and spontaneously avoided, under which the imitation of the antique dress, added to the dissoluteness of morals, destroyed all the dignity of the external representation of the government. All were silent, observant, eagerly watching the great person who had already performed deeds so mighty, and from whom yet greater deeds might be expected. Men waited for his questions, and replied to them with deference.

The day following that on which he established himself at the Tuileries, General Bonaparte, traversing them with his secretary, M. de Bourrienne, said to him, "Well, Bourrienne, here we are in the Tuileries—now we must take care to remain here."

In this capacity, he attracted the attention of Napoleon, in Italy, in 1796. Was appointed to the command of his corps of *gendarmes*, celebrated as the origin of the famous Imperial Guard. Thereafter he rose, step by step, with

his great master. He was a brave, prudent, moderate, and humane man, and died poor, after holding commands where he might have amassed vast wealth.—*Court and Camp of Napoleon.*

BOOK III.

ULM AND GENOA.

Preparations for war—Forces of the coalition in 1800—Army of Baron Melas in Liguria—Of Marechal Fray in Suabia—Austrian plan of campaign—Importance of Switzerland in this war—General Bonaparte's plan—He forms the resolution of making use of Switzerland, whereby to break down upon the flank of M. de Kray, and on the rear of M. de Melas—Part which he intended for Moreau, and which for himself—Creation of the army of reserve—Instructions to Massena—Commencement of hostilities—Baron Melas attacks the army of Liguria in the Apennines, and cuts it into two parts, one of which is driven back on the Var, the other on Genoa—Massena is shut up in Genoa, and prepares therein for obstinate resistance—Description of Genoa—Heroical defence of Massena—Urgency of the First Consul with Moreau to induce him to commence operations in Germany, in order to succour Massena more speedily—Passage of the Rhine at four points—Moreau succeeds in uniting three out of four *corps d'armée*, and falls, at Engen and Stockach, on the Austrians—Battles of Engen and Maeskirch—Retreat of the Austrians on the Danube—Affair of Saint Cyr, at Biberach—M. de Kray establishes himself in the retrenched camp at Ulm—Moreau manoeuvres to dislodge him—Several false movements of Moreau, from which happily no ill results follow—Moreau at length shuts M. de Kray in Ulm, and takes a strong position in front of Augsburg, in order to await the results of events in Italy—Review of the actions of Moreau—Character of that general.

AFTER having addressed pressing overtures of peace to Europe; overtures which would have been unbecoming from any other than a general covered with glory; it remained only to the First Consul to make war, which he had been strenuously preparing during the winter of 1799, 1800—year VIII. This war was at once the most legitimate, and one of the most glorious, of those heroic times.

Austria, while observing in forms more moderation than England, had, nevertheless, come to the same conclusions, and refused peace. The vain hope of retaining the advantageous situation in Italy, which she owed to the victories of Suwaroff, and the subsidies of England, together with the erroneous idea, that France, exhausted of men and money, could not endure another campaign; and above all the obstinacy of M. de Thugut, who represented the war party at Vienna with as much pertinacity as Mr. Pitt, in London, and who brought to this question far more passion than patriotism—all these causes combined had led the Austrian cabinet to commit one of the most serious political blunders—that of not taking advantage of a good opportunity for negotiation. It needed indeed great blindness, to believe that the success which had been due to the incapacity of the Directory could be maintained in the face of a new government, already thoroughly re-organized, active to a miracle, and directed by the first captain of the age.

The Archduke Charles, who combined with real military talents much modesty and moderation, had pointed out all the dangers connected with the prolongation of the war, and the difficulty of making head against the celebrated adversary who was about to enter the lists. The only reply was, his removal from the command of the Austrian armies; and the only general, under whom they could have fought with a chance of success, was withdrawn. His disgrace was disguised under the title of Governor of Bohemia. The imperial armies greatly regretted the removal of the prince, although they had appointed the Baron de Kray as his successor, who had greatly distinguished himself in the last Italian campaign. M. de Kray was a brave, able, and experienced officer, who did not prove himself unworthy of the command with which he was intrusted.

To fill the void left by the secession of Rus-

sia in the ranks of the coalition, Austria, seconded by the subsidies of England, obtained from the states of the empire a very considerable force. A particular treaty, signed on the 16th of March, by Mr. Wickham, British minister near the elector of Bavaria, obliged that prince to furnish, beside his legal contingent as a member of the empire, a supplemental corps of 12,000 Bavarians. A treaty of the same nature, signed on the 20th of April, with the Duke of Wirtemberg, procured another corps of 6000 Wirtembergers for the army of the coalition. To conclude, on the 30th of April, the same negotiator obtained from the elector of Mayence, a corps of from 4 to 6000 Mayençais, on the same moneyed conditions. In addition to the cost of levying, equipping, and maintaining their troops, England guaranteed to the coalescing princes of Germany that no separate treaty should be made with France apart from them; that their states should be restored to them, let the fate of war be as it might; and made them pledge themselves in return that they would listen to no separate proposition of peace. Of these German troops, the best were the Bavarians, after these ranked the Wirtembergers, but the Mayençais were militia, with neither discipline nor valour. Independently of these regular contingents, the peasantry of the Black Forest had been excited to take arms, by holding out to them the terror of French plunderers, who at that period devastated far less than the Imperialists the cultivated fields of unhappy Germany.

The imperial army of Suabia, including all these auxiliaries, amounted to nearly 150,000 men, 30,000 of whom were shut up in garrison, and 120,000 present for active service. It was provided with a numerous artillery, good, although unequal to the French artillery, and above all a superb cavalry, as is usual with the Austrian armies. The emperor had, moreover, 120,000 men in Lombardy, under Baron Melas. The English fleets, combined in large squadrons in the Mediterranean, and continually cruising in the gulf of Genoa, supported all the operations of the Austrians in Italy. They were destined to bring to them an auxiliary force of English and emigrants, combined already at Mahon, and amounting, it was said, to 20,000 men. It was determined that this corps should be disembarked even at

Toulon in case the Austrian army, intended to operate against the Apennines, should succeed in forcing the line of the Var.

It was hoped that some Russians would have been added to the British troops, and landed on the French coasts, in order to excite risings in Belgium, Brittany, and La Vendée. But the involuntary inaction of the Russians and the pacification of La Vendée had caused the failure of that operation on which the allies had greatly reckoned. It was a mass, therefore, of nearly 300,000 men, 150,000 in Suabia, 120,000 in Italy, 20,000 at Mahon, backed by the whole English navy, that was to carry on this war against France. This force, it must be admitted, would have been very insufficient against France re-organized and in possession of all her means. But against France, hardly emerging from the chaos, into which the weakness of the Directory had plunged her, it was very considerable, and one from which great results might have been obtained, had it been ably employed. It must be added that it was a real force, exposed to undergo little or no diminution, because the 300,000 men of whom it was composed were inured to fatigues, and were already stationed on the very frontier they were destined to attack. An important circumstance; for every newly raised army resists with difficulty the first hardships of war; and, if it has far to march before fighting, is diminished in proportion to the distance to be traversed.

It is necessary now to speak of the distribution of the combined forces, and their intended plan of action.

M. de Kray, at the head of 150,000 men whom he commanded, occupied Suabia, placed in the angle which the Rhine forms in that country, which after having run from east to west, and from Constance to Bâle, turns suddenly to the north, running from Bâle toward Strasburg. In this situation, M. de Kray, having on his left flank Switzerland, and on his right Alsatia, observed all the valleys debouching on the Rhine, by which the French armies could enter Germany. He had no idea of passing that river to invade the soil of the republic. His part, on the opening of the campaign, was intended to be less active. The initiative in the operation was reserved for the army of Italy, 120,000 strong, and advanced, in consequence of the advantages obtained in 1799, even to the foot of the Apennines. It was destined to blockade, and, if possible, to carry Genoa, then to cross the Apennines and the Var, and to advance upon Toulon, where the English and the emigrants of the south, led by General Willot,¹ one of those proscribed in Fructidor, had concerted a junction with the Austrians. A new invasion of that province of France which contained our principal maritime establishment was greatly to the taste of England; and it is to them that must be attributed the plan of that campaign, which has in later days been so severely criticized. When the Austrian army of Italy, which, thanks to the climate of

Liguria, would be enabled to commence operations, before that of Suabia, should have penetrated into Provence, it was supposed that the First Consul would be compelled to weaken his armies on the Rhine in order to cover the Var, and that Marshal Kray would have the means of coming into action. Switzerland, being thus overflowed and smothered as it were between the two armies, must naturally fall, without creating any necessity for the renewal of the impotent attacks of the previous campaign. The exploits of Lecourbe and Massena, in the Alps, had greatly disheartened the Austrians as to any great operation specially directed against Switzerland. As far as regards that country, the plan was, to be content with simple observation. To the extreme left of Marshal de Kray, was assigned this charge in Suabia. To the cavalry of the Baron de Melas, useless in the Apennines, the same duty was committed in Lombardy. The plan of the Austrians consisted, then, in temporizing in Suabia, operating early in Italy, advancing on that side to the Var, then—when the French, obliged to make head on that river, should have weakened the army of the Rhine, to pass that river—advancing in two masses, one to the eastward by way of Bâle, the other to the southward by way of Nice, and thus in taking, without a direct attack, the formidable barrier of Switzerland.

All judges of military operations have greatly blamed Austria for thus neglecting Switzerland, which permitted General Bonaparte to thread its defiles and throw himself on the flank of Marshal de Kray and the rear of the Baron de Melas. I believe, as the reader will be able to judge when he comes to the recital of facts, that no plan could be combined so as to be entirely certain against General Bonaparte, with the difficulty included that Switzerland was in the hands of the French.

To grasp this memorable campaign, and judge soundly of the determinations of the belligerent parties, it is necessary for one to picture to himself exactly the position of Switzerland, and the influence it must have on the military operations, especially when the point at which these operations were in progress is considered.

It is toward the eastern frontiers of France that the Alps begin to surge up from the centre of the European continent. They run thence lengthwise toward the east, dividing Germany from Italy; shedding on one side the Danube and its tributaries, on the other the Po, and all the streams of which that great river is composed. That portion of the Alps nearest to France, forms Switzerland. Their elongation constitutes the Tyrol, which has for centuries belonged to Austria.

When the Austrian armies advance toward France, they are obliged to ascend the valley of the Danube on the one hand, and that of the Po on the other, divided into two masses acting along the line of the Alps. So long as they are in Bavaria and in Lombardy, these two

¹ WILLOT, ANNEÉE. A French general of noble birth. He served the Revolution, in the army of the Pyrenees. Was beaten at Perpignan, and was suspended for a time. Served in La Vendée, with distinction, under Hoche. He

became one of the leaders of the Orléanists, and was deported to Guienne, but escaped with Barthelemy and Pichegru to England, where he was at this period.—*Biographie Moderne.*

cases can maintain communication across the Alps by the Tyrol, which belongs to the emperor; but when they reach Suabia, on the head of the Danube, and Piedmont on the upper Po, they are separated one from the other, without the possibility of communicating across the Alps, because Switzerland, independent and neutral, is ordinarily closed against them.

This neutrality of Switzerland is an obstacle wisely interposed by the policy of Europe between France and Austria, in order to diminish the number of points of attack between those two formidable powers. If, indeed, Switzerland were open to Austria, she might advance with her armies in free communication from the valley of the Danube to that of the Po, menacing the frontiers of France from Bâle even to Nice. This would be a vast danger to France, for she is obliged to be, as it were everywhere, on guard from the mouths of the Rhine to those of the Rhone; while, if the Swiss Alps are closed to her enemies, she may concentrate all her forces on the Rhine, neglecting the attack from the southward; since no imperial operation on the Var has ever succeeded, owing to the length of the circuit. The advantage of the Swiss neutrality is, therefore, great to France.

But it is not less great, however, to Austria; perhaps it is even more so. If, indeed, Switzerland were to become the theatre of hostilities, the French army could invade it the first; and, as its infantry is intelligent, active, brave, and as well adapted to warfare in the mountains as on the plain, there are many chances of her succeeding in its occupation. The proof of this, indeed, is to be found in the campaign of 1799. If, in fact, the Alps are attacked by the great chain, they give that line of defence which Lecourbe held against Suwaroff in the gorges of the St. Gothard; if they are attacked from the side of Germany by the lower part, the line of resistance lies behind lakes and rivers—that line of defence which Massena held behind the lake of Zurich, and which was concluded by the memorable battle bearing that name. Now, when the French army remains mistress of Switzerland, she occupies a most menacing position, and one which may be turned to advantage so as to produce results the most extraordinary; as will appear when we come to the operations of General Bonaparte.

In fact, two Austrian armies, one of which is in Suabia, the other in Piedmont, have no means of intercommunication; and the French, pouring through the valley of Lake Constance, on one hand, and through the defiles of the great Alps on the other, may cast themselves either upon the flanks of the army of Suabia, or on the rear of that of Italy. This danger it is impossible to avoid, by any plan, without falling back fifty leagues to the rear, into Bavaria on one side, and into Lombardy on the other.

The Austrians must therefore have done one of these things—either, losing the advantages they had gained in the last campaign, they must have abandoned both Suabia and Piedmont to us at once; or, refusing to make such a sacrifice, they must have tried to carry

Switzerland by a principal attack, which could hardly have succeeded, for it would have been a front attack on an obstacle almost insurmountable, against which they had once failed already; or, at last, they must have divided themselves into two great armies, as they did, separated by Switzerland, which was thus placed on their flanks and their rear. They might, it is true, in adopting this latter plan, have greatly diminished one of their armies, and so strengthened the other, leaving, for example, only means enough to the Baron de Melas to hold Massena in check, and raising the army of Suabia to 200,000; or the reverse, combining their principal force in Piedmont. But, in the one case, this would have been to surrender Italy—Italy, the sole aim, and ardently contested prize, of the war; and in the other, it was to abandon the Rhine, the Black Forest, and the sources of the Danube, without a battle, and to shorten by so much the route of the French on Vienna. It would have been, in either case, to do the thing of all others most for our interest; for to raise either of the two armies to 200,000 men, was to give the victory to that power which had General Bonaparte on its side. He was, in fact, the only general, who at that time could command 200,000 men.

Therefore was there no plan, entirely safe for Austria, so long as the French held Switzerland: a fact which, by the way, proves that the neutrality of Switzerland is well advised, and for the interest of both parties. She adds, in fact, to their defensive, adding nothing to their offensive, strength. That is to say, she gives to them as much in security, as she takes from them of aggressive power. No better plan could be devised for the maintenance of a general peace.

The Austrians had not then many steps to take, and, for all that has been said on the subject, they perhaps adopted the only one possible; when they decided on temporizing in Suabia, operating actively in Italy, always separated by the obstacle of Switzerland, which they could not abate. But in this position there was a choice in the mode of operation, and it must be admitted that they did not choose the best; that they did not even take means to provide against any of the dangers which threatened them. Obstinate persisting in the belief that the French armies were exhausted, disbelieving that the army of Germany could possibly take the offensive, pass the Rhine in the face of 150,000 Austrians posted in the Black Forest; disbelieving, yet more fixedly, that the Alps could be forced, where there were no roads, and in the snowy season; seeing, moreover, no third army by which the attempt to force them could be made, they gave themselves up to a security which was fatal to them. It must be admitted, if we would be just, that most people would have been deceived as they were; for their security was founded upon the existence of obstacles apparently invincible. But experience soon taught them that, with an enemy such as General Bonaparte, all security, even that which is founded on barriers insurmountable, rivers or icy mountains, is deceitful, may well be come fatal.

France had two armies; that of Germany, raised by the union of the armies of Rhine and Helvetia, to 130,000 men; that of Liguria, reduced to 40,000 men at the utmost. There were troops in Holland, in La Vendée, and in the interior—these were the elements, scattered and dislocated, of a third army; but a very superior degree of administrative ability alone could have united them in time, and, above all, on a sudden, at the point where its presence was needed. General Bonaparte conceived the idea of employing these different means as follows:

Massena, with the army of Liguria, not in the least augmented, reinforced only in supplies and munitions of war, was under orders to take a post on the Apennines, between Genoa and Nice, and to maintain himself as if in Thermopylæ. The army of Germany, under Moreau, increased as rapidly as possible, was instructed to make feints as if about to cross the Rhine at many points from Strasburg to Bâle, and from Bâle to Constance, then to march rapidly behind the curtain which that river forms, to ascend it to Schaffhausen, to cast four bridges there at once across it; to fall in mass upon the flank of Marshal de Kray, surprise him, push him back in disorder to the head of the Danube, out-march him if possible, cut him off from Vienna, perhaps surround him, and crush him by one of those memorable routs of which this century has displayed more than one example. If the army of Moreau should not have this good fortune, it would, at all events, be able to push M. de Kray upon Ulm and Ratisbon, oblige him thus to descend the Danube, and thrust him away from the Alps, so far at least as to hinder him from sending any succours thither. That done, it had orders to detach its right wing toward Switzerland, in order to second the perilous operation, the execution of which General Bonaparte reserved to himself. The third army, called that of reserve, the elements of which were scarcely in existence, was directed to organize itself between Dijon and Geneva, ready to succour Moreau, if he should have occasion for aid. But if Moreau should succeed at least in one part of his plan, this army of reserve, advancing on Geneva, under General Bonaparte, and from Geneva into the Valais, and then extending itself so as to join a detachment drawn from the German army, was destined, by a movement more prodigious than that of Hannibal, to fall upon Piedmont, to take the Baron de Melas, while engaged before Genoa, in the rear, to bring him to a decisive action, and, if victorious, to compel him to lay down his arms.

Assuredly, if the execution should answer to the plan, never would finer conception have proved the genius of any captain, ancient or modern. But it is execution alone which fixes the value of grand military combinations, for deprived of this, they are but vain chimeras.

Execution here consisted in the conquering an infinite variety of obstacles; in reorganizing the armies of Liguria and the Rhine; in creating the army of reserve; in concealing both the creation and destination of the latter; and, to conclude, in forcing the double passage of

the Rhine and the Alps; the second, equal in itself to all, the most extraordinary, that ever has been attempted in the art of war.

The first care of General Bonaparte had been, from the beginning, to recruit his army. Desertions to the interior, sickness, and death in action, had reduced it to 250,000 men, a thing which would be scarcely credible, at a moment when a general coalition was to be resisted, if it were not attested by indubitable documents. Happily, these 250,000 men were thoroughly inured to war, and capable of contending with an enemy of double their own force. The First Consul had demanded 100,000 conscripts of the Legislative Body, which, with a truly patriotic zeal, they had voted to him. The war was so legitimate, so evidently necessary after the offers of peace had been refused, that the slightest hesitation would have been criminal. For the rest, there was nothing to fear, since the zeal of the Legislative Body and the Tribunate amounted to enthusiasm. These 100,000 young conscripts, combined with 250,000 veterans, would form material for an admirable army. The newly appointed prefects, who had already repaired to their posts, carried on the recruiting with an activity which never had been equalled. But these conscripts could not be present under arms, drilled, and fit for service, within five or six months. The First Consul decided therefore on retaining in the interior all the corps which had been thinned and worn out by war, which he would use as skeletons to be filled up from the new levies. On the contrary, he marched to the frontiers all those corps which he judged capable of opening the campaign, taking care to transfer, from those destined to remain in the interior, all the men fit for service. It was the very highest calculation if by this mode he could find 200,000 men fit to be carried instantly into line of battle. But that number was sufficient in his able and puissant hand.

At the same time he made an appeal to the patriotic sentiments of France. Addressing himself to the soldiers of the first requisition, whom the general discouragement, consequent on our reverses, had carried back to their firesides, he compelled those who had gone home, without regular dismissal, to rejoin their regiments; he endeavoured to excite military tastes among all the young men whose imaginations were inflamed already by the name of General Bonaparte. Although the enthusiasm of the first days of the republic had grown cold, the sight of an enemy on our frontiers rekindled every heart, and the succour which might be derived, even now, from the devotedness of volunteers, was not to be despised.

To his care, with regard to recruiting, the First Consul added some useful reforms relative to the administration and composition of the army. First he created inspectors of reviews charged to calculate the number of men present under arms, and to prevent the treasury for paying soldiers who were present only on paper. He made a change of the greatest importance in the artillery. The artillery carriages were at that time driven by wagons belonging to the baggage trains, who, not being

bonded by any sentiment of honour like other soldiers, were wont to cut their traces on the first danger, and to fly, leaving their cannons in the hands of the enemy. The First Consul thought, with reason, that the cannoneer who brings his piece into the place of action, performs as valuable a service as the cannoneer who works it; that he runs the same danger, and requires the same moral stimulus, which is the point of honour. He converted the artillery drivers therefore into soldiers, clad in uniform and belonging to the regiment of that arm. They constituted 10 or 12,000 horsemen, who should feel as much pride in carrying their pieces into action, and bringing them off rapidly, as the gunners in loading, pointing, and discharging them. This reform was but begun at this time, and it was not until a later day that the excellent results could be felt.

The artillery and cavalry were both in want of horses. The First Consul ordered a compulsory and extraordinary levy of every thirtieth horse, having neither the time nor the means to make purchases. It was a hard but unavoidable necessity. The armies were ordered to supply themselves on the spot and in their vicinities, and then from neighbour to neighbour through the surrounding provinces.

The First Consul had sent to Massena such funds as could be disposed, to assist the unfortunate army of Liguria. Of 60,000 men which composed it, by the combination of the armies of Lombardy and Naples, after the bloody battle of Trebbia, it had been reduced, by misery, to 40,000 at the utmost, and of these not above 30,000 combatants, or a little over. Wheat, as it could not be introduced through Piedmont, occupied by the Austrians, nor by the sea, guarded by the English, was very rare. The poor soldiers had nothing then but what came from the harvests of the Apennines, which, as all the world knows, are little or nothing. They would not go into the hospitals, wherein the simplest food was not to be obtained, and they were to be seen all along the road from Nice to Genoa, perishing of famine and fever, and presenting the saddest of all spectacles, that of brave men dying miserably for the country they defend.

Massena, provided with the funds sent by the government, had made some purchases at Marseilles, bought all the wheat that city contained, and forwarded it to Genoa. Unfortunately, during the winter, winds as hostile as the enemy ceased not to prevent, by their contrary gales, all arrivals from Marseilles, and acted in some sort as the blockade, which, during the winter season, the English were unable to maintain. Nevertheless, a few cargoes having been entered successfully, some bread had been distributed among the soldiers of Liguria. Arms, shoes, some clothes, and some hope had been furnished to them. As to military energy, nothing was requisite to inspire them with that; for never had France seen soldiers endure such misery with such firmness. These, the victors of Castiglione, of Arcola, of Rivoli, had come without disorganization the defeats of Cassano, of Novi, of the Trebia. The temper to which they had been hardened would not give way before the blows of fortune. At the

very worst, the presence of General Bonaparte, at the head of the government, and General Massena at the head of the army, would have renewed their heart had it needed renewal. It was necessary only to feed, clothe, and arm them, to make them capable of any thing. In this respect all that could be done was done. Massena, by a few acts of severity, re-established the discipline which had been shaken for a moment, and collected something more than 30,000 men, impatient under his orders to retrace their steps into the fertile Italy. The First Consul gave him directions most ably conceived. Three narrow defiles traversed the Apennines from the inland toward the maritime declivity. They are the defile of Bocchetta, debouching on Genoa; that of Cadibona, on Savona; and that of Tende, on Nice. The First Consul ordered Massena to have very weak detachments only at the Col de Tende, and the Col de Cadibona, just enough to observe those passes, and to concentrate himself with twenty-five or thirty thousand men on Genoa. This town being strongly occupied, the invasion of France was little probable, and in any event little to be feared; for the Austrians would hardly be so rash as to advance beyond the Var upon Toulon, and the mouths of the Rhone, leaving Massena in their rear. Massena would moreover have it in his power to fall with his 30,000 men united, on any corps which should have passed the defiles of the Apennines. It would be a difficult matter, considering the nature of the country, rugged with narrow ways, to bring above 30,000 men against him. But this excellent plan was unfortunately above the execution of any general, but one endowed with the prodigious dexterity of the conqueror of Montenotte. The First Consul, for the rest, was satisfied that in Massena he had an obstinate defender of the steep crests of the Apennines, and that he had prepared for the Baron de Melas such occupation as would delay him in Liguria, for quite as long a time as would be needed for the combined movement of the French armies.

Nevertheless, it must be admitted, that the army of Liguria was treated a little as a sacrificed army. Not a man more was sent to it. Materials of war only were supplied to it; and even, under that head, such only as were absolutely needful. It was in a different direction that the great efforts of the government were exerted, because it was in a different direction that the great blows were to be dealt. The army of Liguria was exposed to destruction in order to gain the time which should render the others victorious. Such is the hard necessity of war, which passes over the heads of these, to strike the heads of those; obliging those to die, that these may live and conquer.

The army treated with especial care was that which, under the orders of Moreau, was destined to operate on Suabia. All that could be furnished to it, was furnished, both of men and material. Immense exertions were made to furnish it with complete artillery, and vast means of transportation, in order that, if need should be, he might pass the Rhine, not only suddenly, but at one point. General Moreau, of whom it has been said that the First Consul

was jealous, was about to have under his orders the most numerous and finest army of the republic, numbering about 130,000; while Massena would not have above thirty-six, or the First Consul above 40,000 at the most. Nor was this a vain piece of flattery addressed to the vanity of Moreau. More serious motives had determined that distribution of his forces. The proposed operation, necessary in order to push back M. de Kray upon Ulm and Ratisbon, was of the highest importance to the general success of the campaign. For, in the presence of those two formidable armies pressing upon our frontier, it was necessary that one should be driven back before a force could be carried across the Alps in order to act on the rear of the other. This first operation then must needs be attempted with means so decisive as should render its success infallible. The First Consul, highly as he rated Moreau's abilities, yet rated his own far higher, and, if one of the two must act with inadequate means, he judged himself more capable of so acting than Moreau. The feeling which directed him on this occasion was a feeling superior even to generosity, in great measures of state; it was love of the common good. This he made take precedence of all interest, his own no less than others.

That army of the Rhine, though clad like all those of the republic, in the rags of misery, was superb. Some few conscripts had been sent to it, but very few, just enough to infuse fresh youth into it. It was composed of a vast majority of those old soldiers, who, under the orders of Pichegru,¹ Kleber, Hoche, and Moreau, had conquered Holland, and the banks of the Rhine, once and again crossed that river, and even shown themselves upon the Danube. It could not be said without injustice that they were braver than the soldiers of Italy, but they displayed all the qualities of the most perfect troops. They were sage, sober, disciplined, skilful, and fearless. The leaders were worthy of the soldiers. The formation of this army into detached divisions, each complete in all arms, and acting as separate armies, had developed to the highest point the talents of the generals of this division. These generals of division were of great but unequal merit. There was Lecourbe, the ablest officer of his day in mountain warfare; there was Lecourbe, whose glorious name was prolonged by the echoes of the Alps. There was Richempagne, who united to audacious gallantry a rare degree of intelligence, and who soon afterward rendered Moreau, on the field of Hohenlinden, the greatest service that ever yet lieutenant rendered to his general. There was Saint Cyr, of a cold, deep spirit, of an unsocial character, but endowed with all the qualities that constitute a general-in-chief. There was, the last, young Ney,²

whom his heroic courage, guided by his quick instinct in war, had made already popular in every army of the republic. At the head of these lieutenants, was Moreau, slow, sometimes undecided, but of solid capacity; one whose indecision led to firm and wise resolutions, where he stood front to front with danger. Experience had singularly formed and improved his military glance. But while his war-like genius was matured by the trials of battle his civil character, which was weak, and easily acted upon by any influence, had given way already, and was yet destined to give way farther, before those trials of politics which strong souls and minds truly elevated can alone overcome. For the rest, the unhappy passion of jealousy had not yet altered his purity of heart, or corrupted his patriotism. By his experience, his habit of command, and his high renown, he was, after General Bonaparte, the only man fit at that time to command 100,000 men.

This was the detailed plan, laid down for him by the First Consul; to enter Suabia by the point which afforded the greatest facilities for acting upon the extreme left of Marshal de Kray, so as to outflank him, cut him off from Bavaria, and hem him in between the upper Danube and the Rhine; in which case, the Austrian army in Suabia would be lost. To effect this, it was necessary to pass the Rhine, not upon two or three points, but upon one only, and that as near as possible to Constance; an operation peculiarly bold and difficult—for the question was of transporting across a river, and in presence of the enemy, one hundred thousand men at once, with all their material; and it must be acknowledged that previous to the battle of Wagram, no general had ever crossed a river with the requisite unity of action and resolution. Hence, great address was necessary in order to deceive the Austrians as to the point chosen; and, together with great address, great daring in the execution of the passage, and, after all, what is ever necessary, good fortune. The First Consul had ordered a considerable mass of boats to be collected in the tributaries to the Rhine, and particularly in the Aar, in order to construct three or four bridges at once, at the distance of some hundred yards one from the other. It yet remained to induce the mind of Moreau, which was cold and far from daring, to grasp such combinations.

After these cares, bestowed with unceasing zeal upon the troops of Liguria and Germany, the First Consul bent his mind on creating, out of nothing, an army, destined in a short space of time to accomplish the greatest things, under the title of the Army of Reserve.

In order that it should fulfil its object, it was

¹ KLEBER. Born in 1750. Was intended for an architect. Went to Austria, and entered that army, and served from 1776 to 1783 in the regiment of Kaunitz. Returned home and was inspector of public buildings at Besfort. In 1790, adjutant-major of volunteers upon the upper Rhine. Distinguished in 1791—1796. Under Pichegru and Jourdan, in January, 1797, commanded the army of the Sambre and Meuse, which he afterward resigned to Hoche. He accompanied Bonaparte to Egypt, and on his return, was left there with 15,000 men. He there distinguished himself greatly, and was assassinated by a fanatic.—*Biographie Moderne*.

² NEY, MICHAEL, called '*le Brave des Braves*.' Born Vol. L.—12

at Sarre Louis, in Lorraine, in 1770. Articled to a notary in that town. Entered the army as a private hussar in 1787. He distinguished himself so much that he was lieutenant in 1793 and captain in 1794. In 1796 he was with the army of the Sambre and Meuse, and there, as ever, was first in the field. In 1797 he commanded the cavalry at Neuwed and was taken prisoner, but was soon liberated. After the peace of Leoben he was in Paris, and declared against the Clichians. In 1799 he was in the army of the Rhine, commanded the cavalry at Fleurus, and gallantly surprised Frankfort. Hereafter his history is one with that of Napoleon.—*Court and Camp of Napoleon*.

not merely necessary to call it into existence, but to call it into existence without any mortal dreaming of the fact. We shall see what measures he took to obtain this twofold result.

In Holland, and in the forces accumulated in Paris by the Directory, the First Consul had found the means of pacifying La Vendée at a most seasonable juncture; and in La Vendée, thus pacified, he found the necessary resources for calling into existence an army; which, when suddenly thrown upon the theatre of military operations, was destined to change the fate of war. Writing to General Brune, the principal commandant of the west, he addressed him in the following striking words, so expressive of his mode of operating, and of that used by all the greatest masters of the art of administration and of war. "Let me know whether, independent of the five demi-brigades, which I asked of you by my last courier, you can still dispose of one or two demi-brigades, even if they should be obliged to return in three months. *We must decide upon striding over France, as we formerly did the valley of the Adige; it is nothing more than the relation which decades bear to days.*" 14th of Ventôse, year VIII.—3d March, 1800. Dépôt of the Secretary of State.

Though the adventure of the English in the Texel must have given them a distaste for any new descents upon the continent, more especially since the secession of the Russians from coalition; we, nevertheless, could not give up to them the vast extent of our coasts, from the Zuiderzee to the Gulf of Gascony, without any means of defence, particularly when it is considered how recent was the pacification of La Vendée. The First Consul therefore left in Holland a force, half French, half Dutch, to protect that important country, the command of which he intrusted to Augereau. It was formed into active divisions, complete in all arms of the service, and ready to march. When, by the sequel of operations, it should become apparent that no descent was to be feared, this corps of Augereau was destined to ascend the Rhine, and cover Moreau's rear in Germany. From among the 60,000 men who had been collected along the coasts, from that of Normandy to those of Brittany and Poitou, the First Consul chose such demi-brigades as were most exhausted, and ordered them to guard the insurgent country. He also took care to reduce their effective force, by transposing to the active army such soldiers as were capable of serving therein; thereby making room for more conscripts, who would be trained in the service of guarding the coasts. These he formed into five small camps, uniting artillery, cavalry, and infantry, ready to march at a moment's notice, and commanded by good officers. Two of these camps were in Belgium; one at Liege, and another at Maestricht, both intended to guard this country, harassed by continual priestcraft, and to concur, were it necessary, in the defence of Holland. There was one at Lisle, ready to throw itself upon the Somme and Normandy, one at St. Lo, and, lastly, one at Rennes. The latter was the most numer-

ous, containing from seven to eight thousand soldiers. The others numbered from four to five thousand. These camps gave employment to about 30,000 men. They would be swelled to at least double that number by the arrival of the conscriptions. They would, at the same time, act as police in the newly conquered countries, such as Belgium; and in the provinces, recently pacified, such as Normandy, Brittany, and Poitou. The First Consul had ordered the woods to be searched for arms that might be concealed there. He had commenced the formation of three or four battalions, composed of individuals who had contracted adventurous habits in the civil war, and whom he conciliated by kind treatment; these he intended, though it was kept a secret, to send into Egypt. As to the officers, he had assigned to all of them residences at a distance from the theatre of civil war, and had softened the bitterness of this exile, by pensions fully adequate to their comfort and respectability.

These dispositions made, there remained, out of the 60,000 men collected for the pacification of the interior, about 30,000 excellent soldiers, drafted into the demi-brigades which had suffered the least. A part had returned to Paris, after the operations undertaken in Normandy against M. de Froté; the others were yet in Brittany and La Vendée. The First Consul formed of these three excellent divisions fit for war; two in Brittany, at Rennes and Nantes, and a third in Paris. These divisions he proposed to complete with all expedition; they would be supplied with such material of war as was at hand, and the rest was to be procured on their route, by means which will be explained hereafter. They had orders to proceed to the eastern frontier, "striding over France," according to the language of the First Consul, as formerly the army of Italy had bestridden the valley of the Adige. Their arrival in Switzerland was certainly fixed for the month of April.

Another resource remained, and that was the dépôts of the army of Egypt, stationed in the south of France; for, as the sea was always guarded by the English, the recruits intended for that body had never been able to join them. By now pouring them into these dépôts, fourteen excellent battalions might be obtained, fully capable of taking the field. Orders were given these to set forward for Lyons, the moment every thing should be completed. This would be an admirable fourth division, and capable of performing good service.

One of the most tedious and difficult operations in the formation of an army, is the organization of its artillery. The First Consul, wishing to form this wing of reserve in the east, had, in the dépôts of Auxonne, Besançon, and Briançon, means for forming a park of sixty guns, with men and material. Two officers of artillery, able and devoted to his interests, the Generals Marmont, and Gassendi were despatched from Paris, with orders to prepare sixty pieces of artillery in the different dépôts in question, without saying whither they were to be concentrated, employed, or combined.

A place of rendezvous for all these scattered

forces was yet to be indicated. To have attempted to conceal such preparations by silence respecting their destination, would have been to betray the secret. It was the First Consul's object to deceive the enemy by the very noise which the subject would cause abroad. He inserted in the *Moniteur* a decree of the consuls, relative to the creation of an army of reserve, which was to be formed at Dijon, and to be composed of 60,000 men. Berthier set off post for Dijon, in order to proceed with its organization. It will be remembered, that, by the entry of Carnot into the war department, Berthier was at this moment unemployed. A warm appeal was made to the old volunteers of the Revolution, who after one or two campaigns, had returned to their homes. They were desired to repair to Dijon. In fact, some of the material of war, and some conscripts were paraded there with a great deal of ostentation. Certain old officers sent to this place, presented the appearance of forming staffs for the instruction of these conscripts. The journalists who were permitted to speak of military affairs only with great reserve, had full latitude allowed them in regard to the army in process of organization at Dijon, and accordingly they were full of details concerning it. This was enough to attract to the spot the spies of all Europe, nor did a goodly number fail to hasten thither.

Had the divisions formed at Nantes, Rennes, and Paris, from the troops drawn from La Vendée; had the division formed at Toulon, Marseilles, and Avignon, from the dépôts of the army of Egypt; had the artillery prepared at Besançon, Auxonne, and Briançon, from the resources of these arsenals; had all these been assembled at Dijon, there had been no need of the First Consul's secret, for all the world believed in the existence of an army of reserve. But he had taken good care not to manage things thus. The divisions in question were ordered to set forward, by different routes, for Geneva and Lausanne, so that public attention was not drawn to any one point in particular. They passed for reinforcements intended for the army of the Rhine, which, as it extended from Strasburg to Constance, might well be deemed the point on which they were marching. The preparations ordered in the arsenals of Auxonne and Besançon passed for a reinforcement of artillery intended for the same army. Those made at Briançon were naturally supposed to be for the troops in Liguria. Supplies of brandy were also sent by the First Consul to Geneva, but neither did this indicate his object, since the army of Germany had its base of operations in Switzerland. He caused two million rations of biscuit to be prepared in the departments bordering upon the Rhine, which were intended for the support of the army of reserve in the midst of the sterility of the Alps. Eighteen hundred thousand rations were secretly carried up the Rhone, toward Geneva, and two hundred thousand more openly sent to Toulon, which it might be supposed were intended for the purposes of the marine. To conclude, the divisions were marched slowly, and without fatiguing them, toward Geneva and Lausanne; in fact, the half of March and

the whole of April were devoted to this purpose, and while on their route they were supplied with every thing of which they stood in need, shoes, clothing, muskets, and horses. The First Consul having determined upon the route they were to take, and carefully considered what the nature of their wants would be, had prepared in the different places through which they had to pass, sometimes one kind of comfort, sometimes another, taking care not to awaken attention by any accumulation of particular articles in any one place. The correspondence relative to the preparations, had been quietly kept out of the offices of the war department. It was carried on solely between himself and the heads of corps. The letters were confided to aides-de-camp who could be relied upon; who went and came post; who saw every thing with their own eyes, and did every thing with their own hands; who were armed with the irresistible orders of the First Consul; and who were, all the while, themselves strangers to the general plan which they were promoting.

The secret, which rested between the First Consul, Berthier, and two or three able officers of artillery, whom they were obliged to initiate into the plan of the campaign, was profoundly kept. In fact, no one of them could betray his trust, inasmuch as secrecy is an act of obedience insisted on by governments in exact proportion to the ascendancy which they possess. On this score, the First Consul had nothing to fear from indiscretion. As for the foreign spies, who had found their way to Dijon, seeing nothing but a handful of conscripts, volunteers, and old officers, they congratulated themselves on their address in discovering that there was nothing serious in all this; that all this ado had been made by the First Consul, evidently with no other object than that of frightening the Baron de Melas, and preventing him from advancing to the mouths of the Rhone, by the supposition that he should find, in the south of France, an army of reserve, capable of arresting his progress. The thing was so understood by all those who thought themselves good judges in the matter, and the English journals amused their readers with a thousand pleasantries on the subject. The caricaturists were also busy about the army of reserve. One represented an infant giving his hand to an invalid with a wooden leg.

This was exactly what the First Consul desired. To be a subject of mockery, at this moment, was the height of his ambition. In the meanwhile, his divisions were on the march, his material was preparing on the eastern frontier; and in the first days of May, an army would be ready, impromptu, either to second Moreau, or to throw itself beyond the Alps, and change the whole face of events.

Nor had the marine department been neglected by the First Consul. Since the cruise which Admiral Bruix had made in the Mediterranean, the year preceding, with the combined forces of France and Spain, the grand fleet under his command had remained at Brest. It consisted of fifteen Spanish, and twenty French ships of the line, and in all amounting to nearly forty vessels. At this mo-

ment they were blockaded by twenty English ships of the line. The First Consul availed himself of the first resources he had been enabled to realize, to send the fleet some provisions, and a part of the pay in arrears. He enjoined the admiral not to allow himself to be blockaded, when he had above thirty ships against twenty, but to come out at once, even if he should have to fight; and, if able, to keep the sea, to pass the straits, present himself before Toulon, take out thence the vessels laden with supplies for Egypt, and afterwards raise the blockades of Malta and Alexandria. The seas once cleared, merchant vessels alone would suffice to victual the French garrisons spread along the borders of the Mediterranean.

Such were the cares devoted by the First Consul to military affairs; while he was, at the same time, engaged with M. Sieyès, Cambacérès, Talleyrand, Gaudin, and others, in reorganizing the government, re-establishing the finances, and forming a civil and judiciary administration, in order at length to be enabled to negotiate with Europe. But it was not enough to conceive plans and prepare the way for their execution; it was necessary for him to make his lieutenants grasp them also—a task not always easy! Though submissive to the consular authority, these men were not so completely subordinate at this time as later, when, under the title of Marshals of France, they paid obedience to an emperor. In particular, the plan laid down for Moreau had disconcerted the cold head and timid character of the man. He was startled at the boldness of the operations intrusted to him. I have already spoken of the country upon which he was to carry on his operations. The Rhine, as I said, flows from east to west, from Constance to Bâle, and at Bâle takes a northern direction, passing by Brisach, Strasburg, and Mayence. In the angle which it thus describes is situated the Black Forest, a woody and mountainous country, broken by defiles, running from the valley of the Rhine to that of the Danube. The French and Austrian armies occupied, in some sort, the three sides of a triangle: two sides were occupied by the French army from Strasburg to Bâle, and from Bâle to Schaffhausen; and one side only by the Austrians, from Strasburg to Constance. The latter had, consequently, the advantage of a more ready concentration. M. de Kray, having his left upon the Prince de Reuss, in the neighbourhood of Constance, his right in the defiles of the Black Forest toward Strasburg, his centre at Donau-Eschingen, at the point of intersection of all the roads, could concentrate himself rapidly on any place which Moreau might select for the passage of the Rhine, whether from Strasburg to Bâle, or from Bâle to Constance. This proved a subject of disquietude to the French general. He was apprehensive lest M. de Kray would present himself *en masse* at the point of passage, and render the passage impossible, nay, perhaps disastrous.

On this point, the First Consul was under no apprehensions. On the contrary, it was his belief that the French army could easily concentrate itself upon the left flank of M. de

Kray, and break through it. With this in view he was desirous, as has already been said, that, taking advantage of the curtain by which it was covered, in other words, the Rhine, the army should ascend the river without loss of time. That it should concentrate between Bâle and Schaffhausen, and, throwing four bridges over the stream with the boats which had been secreted in the tributaries of the river—which was to be done in a single morning—*débouch*, to the number of from eighty to one hundred thousand men, between Stokach and Donau-Eschingen, falling upon the flank of M. de Kray, cutting off his reserves to the left, and driving his shattered forces upon the upper Danube. It was his belief, that, if this operation were executed with promptitude and vigour, the Austrian army of Germany might be cut to pieces. What he performed, somewhat later, starting from a different point, but in the same country, in other words, in the neighbourhood of Ulm; what he performed this very year by way of the St. Bernard, proves that this plan had nothing in it but what was very practicable. He believed that the French army, without operating upon the enemy's ground, since it would ascend by the left bank, having only to march without fighting, might, with proper precautions, gain two or three marches upon M. de Kray, and reach the place of passage before that general should have collected sufficient means to prevent him.

Such was the plan that had disconcerted Moreau's mind, little habituated to such bold combinations. He was fearful lest M. de Kray, having been informed of the movement in time, should advance with the mass of his troops, bear down upon the French army, and drive them into the river. Moreau was for taking advantage of the bridges at Strasburg, Brisach, and Bâle, and so debouching in several columns upon the right bank. He proposed by this means to divert the attention of the Austrians, and draw them toward the defiles of the Black Forest, corresponding to the bridges of Strasburg and Brisach; and, having effected this, suddenly to retire; following the course of the Rhine with the columns which should have crossed the river, and so to place himself before Schaffhausen in order to cover the passage of the rest of the army.

Moreau's plan was not without merit, but at the same time it was not unattended with serious inconveniences: for if, on the one hand, he avoided the danger of a single passage, executed *en masse*; on the other, by dividing this operation, he must submit to the inconvenience of dividing his forces, of throwing upon the enemy's ground two or three detached columns, and of making them execute a dangerous flank-march as far as to Schaffhausen, where they were intended to cover the last and greatest passage of the river. In short, this plan had the disadvantage of yielding small or no results, for it would not allow the French army to throw itself wholly and at once upon the left flank of Marshal Kray; which would have been the only means of outflanking the Austrian general, and cutting him off from Bavaria.

"A spectacle of two men opposed to each other under interesting circumstances, fully calculated to bring out in relief the diversities of their minds and characters, is not unworthy of the attention of history. Moreau's plan, as often happens with the plans of men of secondary genius, had the semblance of prudence, but it had nothing more. It might, however, have succeeded in the execution; for it is necessary continually to bear it in mind, that execution redeems every thing; it sometimes defeats the best combinations, and carries the worst to triumph. Moreau, then, persisted in his view of the subject. The First Consul, desirous of convincing him through the medium of a man of enlightened mind, sent for General Dessoles, to Paris, head of the staff of the army of Germany, a man of acute intellect and solid judgment, and worthy to act as the intermediary between two men of powerful and susceptible minds. Add to this, that he had the tact of conciliating his superiors,—a talent not possessed by many in subordinate stations. Toward the middle of March, therefore, the First Consul called him to Paris, where he retained him for several days. He unfolded to him his ideas, which were perfectly comprehended by the latter, and preferred to those of Moreau. But, with all this, General Dessoles persisted in advising the First Consul to adopt Moreau's plan, because, according to him, it was necessary that the general who acts should do so according to his own ideas and character; provided, always, that he is a man worthy of the command intrusted to him. "Your plan," said he, to the First Consul, "is grander, more decisive, and probably even surer: but it is not adapted to the genius of the man who is to execute it. You have a method of making war which is superior to all others; Moreau has his own,—inferior, doubtless to yours, but still an excellent one. Leave him to himself; he will act well, slowly perhaps, but surely; and he will obtain as many results for you as are necessary for the success of your general combinations. If, on the contrary, you impose your ideas upon him, you will disconcert him, you will wound his self-love, and obtain nothing from him, by seeking to obtain too much." The First Consul, not less profoundly versed in the knowledge of men, than in that of his art, appreciated the wisdom of General Dessoles' advice, and yielded the point. "You are right," said he; "Moreau is not capable of grasping and executing the plan which I have conceived. Let him follow his own course; only let him push back Marshal de Kray upon Ulm and Ratisbon, and afterward move his right wing in time, upon Switzerland. The plan which he does not understand, and dares not execute, I myself will carry out, on another part of the theatre of war. What he dares not attempt upon the Rhine, I will accomplish on the Alps. The day may come when he will regret the glory which he yields to me." Proud and deep speech! containing, as will soon appear, a whole military prophecy.¹

¹ I had the honour, when yet a mere youth, to receive this circumstance from the lips of General Dessoles himself.—*Note by the Author.*

Moreau being thus left to cross the Rhine after his own fashion, another point remained to be settled. The First Consul was very desirous, that the right wing, commanded by Lecourbe, should remain in reserve upon the Swiss territory, ready to succour Moreau, should he have need of it, and that it should not penetrate into Germany, unless its presence should be indispensable there, so that it should not have to retrace its steps in order to reach the Alps. He was well aware how difficult a matter it is to induce a general-in-chief to yield possession of a detachment of his army, operations having once commenced. Moreau insisted upon having Lecourbe, engaging to hand him over to General Bonaparte, the moment he should have succeeded in driving Marshal de Kray upon Ulm. This point also the First Consul conceded, resolved to do every thing to maintain a good understanding; but he insisted that Moreau should sign a stipulation whereby he promised, after pushing back the Austrians upon Ulm, to detach Lecourbe with 20 or 25,000 men toward the Alps. This agreement was signed at Bâle, between Moreau and Berthier, the latter being officially considered as general-in-chief of the army of reserve.

After having satisfactorily settled the points in discussion with the First Consul, General Dessoles quitted Paris. All was agreed; every thing was ready for entering upon the campaign, and it was important to commence operations immediately, in order that, Moreau having executed his portion of the plan, the First Consul might throw himself across the Alps, and extricate Massena before he should be overpowered, for he was contending with 36,000 against 120,000 men. The First Consul urged it, then, that Moreau should act by the middle of April, or, at latest, by the end of that month. But his urgency was vain; Moreau was not ready, and had neither the activity nor the mental resources which supply the deficiency of means. While he lingered, the Austrians, faithful to their plan of taking the initiative in Italy, threw themselves upon Massena, and commenced a struggle with that general, which is worthy of immortal fame from the disproportion of forces employed.

The army of Liguria presented at the most but 36,000 men fit for active service, and these distributed as follows:—

Thirteen or fourteen thousand men, under General Suchet, forming the left of the army, occupied the Col di Tende, Nice, and the line of the Var. Of this wing, a detached corps, amounting to about 4000 men, under the orders of General Thureau, was posted upon the Mount Cenis. Consequently 18,000 men were employed to guard the frontier of France from the Mount Cenis to the Col di Tende.

Ten or twelve thousand men, under General Soult, forming the centre of the army, defended the two principal defiles of the Apennines, that which opens upon Savona and Tivale by the upper Bormida, and that of the Bochetta, which opens upon Genoa.

Seven or eight thousand men, under the intrepid Miollis, guarded Genoa, and a defini-

which opens near that city, on the side opposite to Bocchetta. Thus, the second half of the army, consisting of about 18,000 men, under Generals Soult and Miollis, defended the Apennines and Liguria. The danger of a separation between these two portions of the army, that occupying Nice, and that occupying Genoa, is evident.

These 36,000 French were in the presence of 120,000 Austrians, under Baron de Melas; fresh troops, well rested, well fed, well victualled, and in good condition, thanks to the abundance of every thing in Italy, and to the subsidies furnished by England to Austria. General Kaim, with the heavy artillery, the cavalry, and a corps of infantry, in all 50,000 men, had been left in Piedmont, to serve as a rear-guard, and observe the defiles of Switzerland. The Baron de Melas, with 70,000 men, the greater part infantry, had advanced toward the defiles of the Apennines. Besides superiority of numbers, he had the advantage of a concentric position; for Massena, with his 30,000 men—the surplus occupying the Mount Cenis—was obliged to guard the semicircle formed by the maritime Alps and the Apennines, from Nice to Genoa; a semicircle which is not less than forty leagues in circumference. General de Melas, on the contrary, being posted on the other side of the mountains, in the centre of this semicircle, between Coni, Ceva, and Gavi, had but a short distance to traverse in order to reach whichever of the points he might choose to attack. He could easily make false demonstrations upon one of these points, and rapidly convey himself to the other, and there act *en masse*. Massena, if menaced in this manner, had forty leagues to traverse in going from Nice to the succour of Genoa, or from Genoa to that of Nice.

Upon this state of things was based the advice given by the First Consul to Massena, advice which has been already generally reported, but which it will be now necessary to give here more in detail. Three roads fit for artillery lead from one flank of the mountains to the other; that which opens by Turin, Coni, and Tende upon Nice and the Var; that which, ascending the valley of the Bormida, opens by the defile of Cadibona upon Savona; and lastly, that of the Bocchetta, which, by Tortona and Gavi, descends, on the left of Genoa, into the valley Della Polcevera. The greatest danger would arise from the Baron de Melas throwing himself *en masse* upon the central pass, and cutting the French army in two, throwing the one half upon Nice and the other half upon Genoa. Aware of this danger, the First Consul addressed to Massena letters full of admirable foresight—March 5 and 12—and filled with instructions, of which the following is the substance: "Take care," said he, "not to extend your line too widely. Have but few men on the Alps, or in the defile of the Tende, where the snow will protect you. Leave some detachments upon Nice and the forts in its vicinity, keep four-fifths of your force in Genoa and its neighbourhood. The enemy will debouch upon your right in the direction of Genoa, on your centre in the direction of Savona, and probably on the two points at

once. Refuse one of the two attacks, and throw yourself, with all your forces united, upon one of the enemy's columns. The nature of the ground will not allow him to avail himself of his superiority in artillery and cavalry; he can only attack you with his infantry, and yours is infinitely superior to his; and, favoured by the nature of the place, it may make up for deficiency in number. In that broken country, if you manœuvre well, with 30,000 men you may give battle to 60,000: in order to carry 60,000 light-armed troops into Liguria, M. de Melas must have 90,000, which supposes a total army of 120,000 men at least. M. de Melas possesses neither your talents nor activity; you have no reason to fear him. If he appear in the direction of Nice, you being at Genoa, let him come on, stir not from your position: he will not advance far if you remain in Liguria, ready to throw yourself upon his rear, or upon the troops left in Piedmont."

Various causes prevented Massena from following these wise counsels. In the first place, he was surprised by the rapid irruption of the Austrians, before he had time to rectify the position of his troops and determine upon the dispositions definitively to be taken; secondly, he had not sufficient provisions in the town of Genoa, to be able to concentrate the whole of his army thereupon. Fearing that he should be short of provisions in case of a siege, he wished to avail himself of the resources of Nice, which were much more abundant. In a word, if the truth must be spoken, Massena did not sufficiently comprehend the whole scope of his chief's instructions, to admit of his setting at naught all the inconveniences—and very great they were—of a general concentration upon Genoa. Massena was, perhaps, the first general of his day on the field of battle; in point of decision he may rank with the firmest generals of any age; but, though endowed with great natural talent, the extent of his views was not equal to the quickness of his glance, and the energy of his mind.

Thus, from want of time, from want of provisions, and from a want of feeling the importance of an earlier concentration upon Genoa, he was surprised by the Austrians. The latter were in full activity the 5th of April—15th of Germinal—that is, long before the period when the resumption of hostilities could have been deemed possible. The Baron de Melas advanced with from seventy to seventy-five thousand men, in order to force the chain of the Apennines. His lieutenants, Ott and Hohenzollern, were directed with 25,000 men upon Genoa. General Ott, with 15,000, ascending the Trebbia, presented himself by the defiles of Scoffera and Monte Cretio, which open upon the right of Genoa; General Hohenzollern, with 10,000 men, menaced the Bocchetta, which opens upon the left of the same place. The Baron de Melas, with 50,000 men, ascended the Bormida, and attacked simultaneously all the positions on that route, which we have described as the middle road, passing Cadibona, and terminating at Savona. His intention, as the First Consul had foreseen, was to force our centre, and to

ect of General Suchet from General Soult, who were in communication near this point. A violent struggle had, therefore, commenced from the sources of the Tanaro and Bormida, even to the precipitous heights which overlook Genoa. Generals Elsnitz and Melas maintained fiercely contested affairs against General Suchet, at Rocca, Barbena, Settepani, Melogno, and San Giacomo; and against General Soult at Montelegrino, Stella, Cadibona, and Savona. The soldiers of the republic, taking advantage of this mountainous country, and covering themselves by the inequalities of the ground, made a defence of incomparable bravery, with a loss to the enemy of three times the number of their own slain, for they kept up a plunging fire upon dense and deep masses of men. But, being obliged to fight incessantly, against fresh troops continually succeeding each other, they saw themselves at length obliged to yield the ground, overcome by fatigue and exhaustion, rather than by the Austrians. Generals Suchet and Soult were compelled to separate, and retired, the one upon Borghetto, the other upon Savona. The French line was, therefore, cut in two, as might easily have been foreseen; half the army of Liguria was thrown upon Nice, and half was condemned to shut itself up in Genoa.

On the side of Genoa itself, the success had been doubtful. The attack of the Bocchetta, attempted by Count Hohenzollern with force insufficient to overcome the French, that is with about 10,000 men against 5,000, was repulsed by General Gazan's division. But, to the right of Genoa, that is, toward the positions of Monte Creto and Scoffera, which give access to the valley of Bisagno, General Ott, conquering the division of Miollis, who had not 4,000 men to oppose to 15,000, descended the acclivity of the Apennines, and surrounding all the forts that cover the city, displayed the Austrian flag to the affrighted Genoese. At the same moment the English squadron heaving in sight, showed them the British colours. If the inhabitants of the city were patriots and partisans of the French, the peasantry of the neighbouring villages being, like the Calabrians, attached to the aristocratic party, and feeling the same devotion to Queen Caroline which had actuated the Vendéans in France toward the Bourbons, rose in arms at the sight of the soldiers of the coalition. The tocsin was sounded in every village. A certain Baron d'Aspres, attached to the imperial service, and possessing some influence in the country, excited them to revolt. On the evening of the 6th of April, the unhappy citizens of Genoa, withholding upon the neighbouring mountains the camp-fires of the Austrians, and upon the sea the flag of the English floating far and wide, had every reason to fear, that the oligarchy, already mad with joy, would, in a few days, re-establish their detested sway. But the intrepid Massena was among them. Although separated from General Suchet by the attack directed on his centre, he still numbered from fifteen to eighteen thousand men; and supported by such a garrison, he might defy any enemy, whosoever he might be, to force the gates of Genoa, under his eyes.

To render comprehensible the operations which the French general executed during this memorable siege, it becomes necessary to describe the theatre on which they were carried on. Genoa is situated at the very bottom of the fine gulf which bears its name, at the foot of a spur of the Apennines. This spur running down from the north to the southward, to meet the waters, divides itself, before plunging into them, into two ridges one pointing toward the east, the other toward the west, thus forming an inclined triangle, the summit of which is connected to the Apennines, while the base rests upon the sea. It is along the base of this triangle, but let it be well understood with all the irregularity of nature, that Genoa lies stretched out in elongated streets, bordered by splendid palaces. Nature and art have both done much for its defence. On the sea side two moles, running out one toward the other, until they almost cross, form the port and defend it from hostile squadrons. On the landward, a rampart with bastions surround it, close to the thickly built and populous portion of the town. A second circuit of lines, with bastions like the inner rampart, is drawn along the heights which encompass Genoa, as I have said, with a triangular enclosure. Two forts, arranged in stages one above the other, known as the forts of the Spur and of the Diamond, were placed at the apex of this triangular figure, and commanded all the lines of the fortification by their commanding fire. But these were not the only means of keeping the enemy at a distance. One turning his back to the sea and looking toward Genoa, has the east on his right hand and the west on his left. Two small rivers, that of Bisagno on the east or right hand, that of Polcevera on the west or left, bathe the two sides of the exterior lines. The Bisagno comes down from the very summit of the heights of Monte Creto and Scoffera, which must be crossed in coming up the valley from the Trebbia from the other flank of the Apennine. The slope, farthest from the city, of the dell of the Bisagno, is called the Monte Ratti, and presents several strong positions, from which great damage might be done to Genoa had they not been occupied. Great care has been taken, therefore, to crown them by the three forts of Quezzi, of Richelieu, and of St. Tecla. The valley of the Polcevera, on the contrary, which lies on the left of Genoa, and descends from the heights of Bocchetta, offers no position of eminence which it has been necessary to fortify for the protection of the city. But a long suburb, that of Saint Pierre d'Arena composes a mass of houses both useful and easy to be defended. Thus the fortifications of Genoa present a triangle, at an inclination of 15 degrees to the horizon, being about 9000 yards in extent, connected at its apex with the Apennines, bathed at its base by the sea, and washed on the east and west by the Bisagno and the Polcevera. The Fort of the Spur, and above the Spur that of the Diamond, cover its summit. The forts of Richelieu, of Saint Tecla, and Quezzi prevent a destructive fire from being opened on the city of marble palaces from the flanks of Monte Ratti. Such was Genoa then. Such were

its defences, which art, time, and the contributions imposed on France have since that period vastly improved. Massena could still combine 18,000 men. If, with such a garrison in so strong a place, he had possessed a sufficient quantity of provisions, it would have been invincible. It will now appear how vast may be the influence of energetic character in repairing an error of combination or of foresight.

Massena, resolute to oppose the enemy with an energetical resistance, determined at once on executing two very important projects—the first was to beat back the Austrians, who were pressing Genoa too closely, across the Apennines; the second was to effect a junction with General Suchet, by means of a movement along the road of Corniche.

In order to the execution of his first design, it would be necessary to drive back the Austrians along the Bisagno on one side, and along the Polcevera on the other, to force them over the Monte Creto, and over the Bocchetta to the other declivity of the mountains whence they had come. Without losing even a day, on the day which followed their first appearance, that is to say, on the 7th of April—the 17th Germinal—he issued from Genoa on the eastern side, followed by the brave division of Miollis, which, on the day but one preceding, had been compelled to retire before the superior forces of General Ott. He strengthened this division with a part of his reserve, and putting himself at the head of the whole, marched in two columns. That of the right, under General d'Arnaud, marched along the sea in the direction of Quinto. That of the left, under Miollis, was led against the encampments of the Monte Ratti. A third column under General Petitot followed the valley of the Bisagno, in the ascending line, as it winds round the base of the Monte Ratti. The precision of the movement of these three columns was such, that their fire was heard on all points at the same moment. General Arnaud on one acclivity, and General Miollis on the other, stormed the heights of Monte Ratti with extraordinary vigour. The presence of Massena himself, the desire of avenging the surprise of the previous day, animated the soldiers to the utmost. The Austrians were driven pell-mell into the torrents, and lost all their positions. General Arnaud passed farther, and following the crest of the heights, carried the heights of the Apennines, up to the Col de Scoffera. Massena, followed by some companies of the reserve, rushed down into the valley of the Bisagno, to join the column under General Petitot. That column, thus reinforced, beat the enemy at all points, and ascending the valley of the river, came up and seconded the movement of General Arnaud on Scoffera. Precipitated into those tortuous valleys, the Austrians left 1500 prisoners in the hands of Massena, and at their head the Baron d'Aspres, who had instigated the peasants of La Fonte-Buona to revolt. When, on the evening of the same day Massena re-entered Geneva, after having delivered the Genoese from the sight of their enemies, and bringing in as a prisoner that officer whose triumphant approach had been so widely

bruted, the joy of the patriot population, which was the most numerous by far, was extreme. He was received with acclamations. The inhabitants had prepared litters whereon to carry the wounded; and wine and soups for their nourishment, the people disputing everywhere with one another the honour of receiving them in their houses.

After this act of vigour to the eastward, the most important to relieve from assailants, because on that side only did the Austrians encroach upon the town, Massena determined on taking advantage of the respite which his success had procured him, to make an effort to the west, that is to say, toward Savona, and to re-establish by that method his communication with General Suchet. In order to secure Genoa from the peril of any attack during his absence, he divided the troops which remained to him into two bodies. That of the right under General Miollis, and that of the left under General Soult. That of General Miollis was intended to guard Genoa with two divisions; the division of Arnaud on the east, having his front toward the Bisagno; the division of Spital on the west, with its front toward the Polcevera. The corps of the left, under General Soult, was meant to keep the field, with the two divisions of Gardanne and Gazan. It is with this force of about 10,000 men, that Massena proposed to advance upon Savona, directing Suchet, by secret advices, to attempt a simultaneous movement on the same point. The division of Gardanne was directed along the coast, and the division of Gazan along the crest of the Apennines, with the intention of inducing the enemy to divide his force at the sight of these two separate columns. Manœuvring thereafter very rapidly on this ground, with which he was thoroughly acquainted, Massena proposed, according to circumstances, to unite his two divisions into one, so as to crush, either on the ridge of the Apennines or on the sea-coast, that body of the enemy which should be the most exposed to a blow. He commanded in person the division of Gardanne, having intrusted to General Soult that of Gazan. His plan was this, to follow the coast-road by Veltro, Varaggio, and Savona, his lieutenant-general, Soult, having instructions to ascend, by way of Acqua Bianca, and San Pietro del Alba, upon Sassello.

On the morning of the 9th of April, our troops began their movement. The Baron de Melas, after having cut the French army in two, was bent on shutting up Massena in Genoa, and contracting his own line, at the same moment, which was by far too much extended. For it covered, from the valley of the Tanaro to that of the Trebbia, a space of at least fifteen leagues. The two armies met in their movement, and there ensued, on that difficult and broken ground, a struggle at once most desperate and most disorderly. While Massena was marching in two columns, the Baron de Melas was marching in three, and the Count de Hohenzollern was preparing, with a fourth, a new attack on the Bocchetta. Ten thousand French were on the point of encountering more than forty thousand of the enemy

General Soult, filing through Voltri, discovered the Austrians, who had passed the Bocchetta and crowned the heights around it upon his right. Having reached a place called Aqua-Santa, they were in a condition to threaten the rear of the French columns, and intercept their return to Genoa. General Soult judged it wise, therefore, to repulse them, and delivered that brilliant combat in which Colonel, since *Maréchal* Mouton, and Count Lobau, commander of the 3d demi-brigade, conducted themselves with such distinguished valour. General Soult took some cannon and some prisoners, and succeeded, against a cloud of the enemy, in carrying the mountainous road of Sassello. Nevertheless, the time spent in that combat, which, moreover did not check the ulterior progress of the Austrians, prevented General Soult from reaching Sassello, on the upper side of the Apennines, at the moment when General Massena expected him. The latter had marched along the sea-shore, and, on the next day, the 10th of April, was in the vicinity of Varaggio, formed in two columns, and, endeavouring to place himself in communication with the corps of General Soult, along the heights. For he supposed him to be at Sassello. The enemy, whose forces exceeded ours tenfold, endeavoured to surround the two small columns of Massena, and, more particularly, that which he led in person. Massena, relying on his right hand column, and on the movement of General Soult on Sassello, resisted for a long time, with 1200 men, a corps of eight or ten thousand, and displayed on this occasion extraordinary firmness. Obligated to fight a retreating battle, and having lost sight of his right column, which had remained in the rear, owing to a tardy distribution of provisions, he threw himself into the midst of hideous precipices, and bands of revolted peasantry, in the endeavour to seek it out. Having succeeded in bringing about a junction with it, he hurried it up to join the remainder of the division of Gardanne which had not ceased to follow the shore-road by Varaggio and Cogoletta. The difficulty of concerting movements in ground so broken, having prevented the union of Soult's corps with that of Massena at the time when it could have been useful, the latter determined on rallying his troops, scaling the crest of the Apennines on his right, reuniting himself with his lieutenant, and thus falling on the Austrian corps dispersed in the valleys. But our troops being exhausted, had struggled on the roads, and could not be rallied in time. Massena then took up the project of sending all that were in a state to march, to Soult, as a reinforcement; and with the rest, which was composed of wounded and worn-out men, still following the sea-board, he gained the approaches of Genoa, in order to cover the retreat of the main force, and to secure his entrance into the place. Reduced to a mere handful of men, he was obliged to sustain, several times, the most disproportioned combats, and in one of these encounters a French battalion being surprised and on the point of yielding to a charge of the hussars of Szeckler, he charged the hussars himself,

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with thirty horsemen, and drove them back. He succeeded at length in taking post at Voltri, to await the return of General Soult. He, forced into the mountains, in the midst of detachments of the enemy, five or six times his own superiors in number, after the most glorious efforts, must in the end have been cut off, but for the arrival of the succour which Massena sent to him so timely. Reinforced thus, he was enabled to recover the route to Genoa, after having sustained, with advantage, the most difficult and unequal struggle. At length he rejoined his general-in-chief, and the two entered Genoa together, cutting their way through the enemy, and bringing in with them 4,000 prisoners. General Suchet, on the other hand, had endeavoured to rejoin his general-in-chief, but was unable to pierce the enormous masses of the Austrian army.

The Genoese were transported with admiration at sight of the French general entering their city a second time, preceded by columns of prisoners. His ascendancy had become all powerful. The army and the population obeyed him with the most absolute submission.

From this moment Massena was bound to consider himself as definitively shut up in Genoa. But he had no idea of suffering himself to be cramped for room. It was his plan, to keep the enemy at a distance from the walls, to exhaust him by continual combats, and to occupy him so constantly that he should neither be able to force the Var, nor to return into Lombardy; nor yet to oppose the projected march of the First Consul across the Alps.

Scarce had he entered Genoa, on the 18th of April—28th Germinal—ere he began to occupy himself with the internal police, and the provisioning of the place. Fearing the treachery of which the Genoese nobles might be capable, he took his precautions against any surprise in that quarter. The National Guard, composed of Ligurian patriots, supported by a French force, encamped in the principal square of the place, with loaded cannon and lighted matches, was ordered to run to arms, whenever the drums should beat the general. At this signal the inhabitants not forming a part of it had orders to retire to their houses. The armed troops alone were authorized to go the rounds of the streets. In ordinary times the inhabitants were directed to be in their own houses at ten in the evening, and were never permitted to assemble in numbers.

Massena had taken all the grain that was in Genoa, offering to pay for it, when brought in voluntarily, but seizing it by means of domiciliary visits, when refusals to deliver it occurred. After having thus taken possession of all the grain, he put the army and the people on rations, and so procured food enough to supply the soldiers, and the poor inhabitants, during the first fortnight of the siege. This fortnight had nearly elapsed; but there still remained provisions which the gold of the rich produced at a vast price from certain concealed magazines, though for their own use solely. Under Massena's orders fresh searches were made, and enough was found in grain

of inferior quality, rye, oats, and the like, wherewith to feed the army and the people with bad bread for another fortnight. It was hoped that some change of wind, driving the English squadron off the coast, might admit the provision ships. Some reckoning was also made on the Corsican and Ligurian privateers, to which letters of marque had been delivered in order to board all vessels loaded with corn. After all, Massena having determined to hold out to the last extremity, resolved, rather than surrender, that he would feed his troops on cocoa, with which Genoa was abundantly supplied. Furnished with some money by the First Consul, he reserved it for a last resource in extremities, and used it likewise for the consolation of his unfortunate soldiery from time to time under their cruel sufferings. Already in the succession of actions several thousand men had been put *hors de combat*, and a considerable number were in hospitals. But there were still in the forts, in the two lines of circumvallation, and in reserve, an active force of about 12,000 combatants.

In the midst of these fearful circumstances, Massena, showing himself daily with a calm and fearless aspect, succeeded at length in inspiring all with his own hardy courage. His aid-de-camp, Franceschi, threw himself into a pinnace, intending to run down the coast to Nice, to see the First Consul, and acquaint him with the sufferings, the exploits, and the dangers of the army of Liguria.

On the 30th of April—10th of Floreal—during the morning, a general cannonading, which roared forth from all points at once to the eastward, from the side of the Bisagno, to the westward, from the side of the Polcevera, and, to conclude along the coast, from the sea itself, whence it was maintained by a division of gun-boats, announced some great movement of the enemy. And in fact during that day the Austrians displayed great forces. The Count of Hohenzollern attacked the plateau of the Two Brothers, on which stood the Diamond fort. After a brisk struggle he succeeded in carrying the plateau, and summoned the Diamond fort. The brave officer who commanded that fort, replied to the summons by declaring that he would not give up the post intrusted to him, until it had sustained an attack. This fort was of the highest importance, because it commanded that of the Spur; and, in consequence, the whole of the fortified lines. The Austrian camp of La Coronata, situated on the margin of La Polcevera, toward the western face, opened a violent fire on the suburb of Saint Pierre d'Arena, and several attacks were attempted with a view to narrowing our ground on that side. On the opposite face, that is to say toward the Bisagno, the enemy surrounded Fort Richelieu, and unhappily succeeded in carrying Fort Quezzi, which was entirely finished, when the siege commenced. Afterward he gained possession of the village of Saint Martin d'Albaro, placed under the fire of Saint Tecla, and was on the point of occupying a formidable position, that of the Madonna del Monte, whence the town of Genoa might be cannonaded. Already the soldiers

of General d'Arnaud had abandoned the last houses of the village of Saint Martin d'Albaro, they scarce kept their ranks, and many had dispersed into skirmishing order, when Massena rushed to the spot in person, rallied the men himself, re-established the fight, and checked the enemy.

Half of the day was already spent, but there was time yet to repair the mischief. Massena instantly returned into Genoa, and made the necessary dispositions. He gave General Soult the 73d and 106th demi-brigades, and ordered him to retake the plateau of the Two Brothers. But desiring first to reconquer the fort of Quezzi, and to compel the enemy to evacuate Saint Martin d'Albaro, he directed, in person, the division of General Miollis, against that point, after having reinforced it with two battalions, borrowed from the 2d and 3d of the line.

The division of Arnaud, led forward, turned Saint Martin d'Albaro, drove down the enemy who had occupied it into the ravine of the Sturla, made many prisoners, and thus covered the right of the French columns which were advancing against Fort Quezzi. While the brave Colonel Mouton, at the head of two battalions of the 3d, attacked this Fort Quezzi in front, the Adjutant-General Hector was ordered to turn the Monte Ratti, by the heights of Richelieu. After indescribable efforts, the brave Colonel Mouton was repulsed, but he did not yield the attack until after he had been struck by a musket-ball, which passed through his breast, and left him nearly dead on the field of battle. Massena, who had now but two battalions left, pushed forward one against the right flank of the position occupied by the enemy, and directed one half of the other against the left flank of the same position. A violent combat ensued around Fort Quezzi. Too close to each other to fire, the combatants hurled stones at each other and fought with the butts of their guns. Our soldiers were on the point of yielding to superior numbers, when Massena launched the half battalion which he held in reserve, into the fight, leading it himself, and decided the victory. Fort Quezzi was thus retaken. The Austrians, driven from position to position, left their dead on the field, in great numbers, and many wounded and prisoners. At this moment Massena, who had deferred the attack of the plateau of the Two Brothers, took advantage of the effect produced by this success, and sent orders to General Soult to carry it. Spital, a general of brigade, was assigned to this duty, and met with vigorous resistance. At last, however, our soldiers carried it. And thus, after a whole day's fighting, they recovered at once the plateau of the Two Brothers, which commanded the extreme point of the place; the fort of Quezzi; the posts of Saint Martin d'Albaro; and of the Madonna del Monte; in short, all the decisive positions, without carrying which, the Austrians could not possibly lay close siege to the city. Massena entered Genoa at night, carrying with him the ladders which the enemy had prepared to escalate the walls. The Austrians had lost in this day's fighting 1600 prisoners, 2400 men in killed and wounded.

in all about 4000 me. Including these, Massena had taken and slain, since the opening of hostilities, from 12,000 to 15,000 men, and what is worse, he had exhausted the moral sense of their army, by the extraordinary efforts he had compelled them to make.

All despatch was used in repairing the fort of Quezzi. This work, which seemed to be more than a month's duty, was finished in three days, by means of five or six hundred barrels of earth, which were rolled thither by the soldiers and served to raise the entrenchments. On the 5th of May—15th of Floreal—a small vessel brought in provisions sufficient for five days. But it was becoming urgent that the place should be succoured, without which it would not be able to hold out much longer. Bread was about to fail them.

General Suchet, for his part, seeing that he was overlapped, by the crests of the Apennines, had been forced to leave the position of Borghetto, and even to abandon La Roya, which was no longer tenable, the enemy marching at his ease by the Col de Tende, and menacing Nice and the Var. Nice was even occupied by the Baron de Melas, who entered that town in triumph, delighted to tread a soil which the republic had declared a portion of the French territory. But General Suchet rallied his forces behind the Var, in a position which had been studied, long before, by our engineer officers. The bridge of St. Laurent, across the Var, covered by a bridge-head, presented a defile, to be traversed, of four hundred yards in length, which might be regarded as an insurmountable obstacle. All the right bank, guarded by the French, was covered with batteries from the river's mouth to the mountains. The forts of Montalban and Vintimiglia, situated in front of the Var, had been occupied by French garrisons at the moment of the evacuation of Nice. That of Montalban, situated in the rear of the Austrians, on a height which rendered it visible from the French camp, was surmounted by a telegraph, by means of which General Suchet was informed of all the enemies' movements. All the disposable forces of all arms had been brought up to him from the neighbouring departments; and he numbered about fourteen thousand soldiers, whom, being well covered and in a good position, it would prove difficult to force.

On receiving the news from Liguria, the First Consul addressed urgent solicitations to Moreau to induce him to commence hostilities. It was a month since every thing had been arranged between them, and no difficulty imputable to the government delayed the movement of Moreau's army. But Moreau was by nature a little slow, and not wishing to risk himself on the enemy's ground without a certainty of success, put off, to great disadvantage, the commencement of operations. Every delay to his entering on active operations, was in fact a delay to the army of reserve, and a cruel prolongation of sufferings to Massena and his brave soldiery. "Hasten," such was the tenor of the letters written from Paris to Moreau, "hasten by your success to accelerate the arrival of the moment, at which Massena can be disengaged. That general wants provisions.

For fifteen days he has been enduring, with his debilitated soldiers, a struggle of despair. Your patriotism is addressed, your self-interest; for if Massena shall be compelled to capitulate, it will be necessary to take from you a portion of your forces, to hurry down the Rhone and assist the departments of the south." At last a positive order, by the telegraph, was sent him to pass the Rhine.

The reasons, which prevented Moreau from acting, would have been good under any circumstances less urgent than those of the time. Alsatia was exhausted; Switzerland yet more, having been for two years overrun by the armies of all Europe, was utterly stripped of resources. They were compelled to transport troops of children from the poor to the rich cantons, for want of means to nourish them. Ruined families committed their offspring thus to the benevolence of other families, which still possessed some means of supporting them. Nothing could be demanded from a country in such a condition; a country, moreover, which it would not do to exasperate, for it was the base of operations to our two principal armies. Moreau, as I have stated, was living on the siege magazines of the places on the Rhine. Nevertheless, this was not the real motive of his delays. This would have been rather an inducement to go and support himself as quickly as possible in the enemy's country. But his artillery and cavalry wanted horses. he had no entrenching tools, no camp equipage. If he had the means of making a bridge, that was all. Nevertheless, taking into view the urgency of circumstances, he consented to do without that which he had not, and to advance, in the hope of supplying himself on the road. His army was so admirably constituted, that it might well supply itself with all that which it lacked, or do without it, or, at the worst, win it. At the end of April, then, the first days of Floreal, Moreau determined that he would begin this campaign, the finest of his life, and one of the most memorable in our annals.

He had at his disposal, as I have mentioned nearly one hundred and thirty thousand men more or less; about thirty thousand occupying the garrisons of Strasburg, Landau, Mayence, and the bridge-heads of Bâle, Brisach, Kehl, and Cassel. Of these thirty thousand, six or seven thousand under General Moncey guarded the valleys of St. Gothard and the Simplon, to close them against the Austrians, in case they should attempt to force them. There remained one hundred thousand men to the active army. Its infantry was superb. It numbered eighty-two thousand men; the artillery five thousand, serving one hundred and sixteen pieces; the cavalry thirteen thousand. As it will be seen, the two arms of artillery and cavalry were much below the usual standard, but they were admirably composed, and the quality of the infantry permitted it, moreover, to dispense with all auxiliary arms.

Moreau divided his army into four corps. Lecourbe commanded the right, twenty-five thousand strong, stationed from Lake Constance to Schaffhausen. A second corps under the name of the reserve, amounting to nearly thirty thousand men, and placed direct-

ly under the orders of Moreau, occupied the territory of Bâle. A third, of twenty-five thousand men forming the centre, under the orders of Saint-Cyr, was spread around Old and New Brisach; and, to complete the tale, General Sainte-Suzanne, at the head of about twenty thousand men, having ascended the river from Mayence to Strasburg, occupied that place and Kehl, and formed the left of the army:

Moreau had for a long time adopted the division of the army into separate corps, complete in infantry, artillery, and cavalry, and having the ability of acting by themselves as often as it should be needed. But this produced one disadvantage—that they were apt, as experience showed, to isolate themselves voluntarily, and to act on their own account, especially when the general-in-chief did not act with sufficient vigour of authority to combine them at all times in common operation. This disadvantage was increased, moreover, by a particular arrangement which Moreau himself adopted in this campaign. I mean, by his reserving to himself directly the command of one of these corps, and calling it by the name of reserve. Saint-Cyr, who had long served with Moreau, and had great influence with him, opposed this resolution violently,¹ to which he objected that it obstructed the general-in-chief, obliged him to descend to a part which was not his own, and, above all, that it would be detrimental to the other armies, which are rarely so well treated as the troops placed directly under the general's staff. But these criticisms, the truth of which was proved by the campaign that followed, did not prevail. Moreau persisted in his resolution, from complaisance to the interests of a clique. Having already given the direction of his staff to General Dessolles, and wishing to make a place for General Lahorie, one of those dangerous friends who destroyed him at a later date, he gave him the command in second of the reserve. This circumstance produced a coldness between Moreau and Saint-Cyr, which soon changed itself into an open rupture.

M. de Kray, who was opposed to Moreau, had, as I have mentioned, 150,000 men; 40,000 of whom were in garrison on the Rhine and Danube, and 110,000 in the active army. The infantry, which was made up of Bavarians, Wirtembergers and Mayençais, was tolerably good. The cavalry, numbering 26,000 horses, was superb. The artillery, both numerous and well-served, amounted to three hundred guns. The right of the Austrians observed the course of the Rhine, under the orders of M. de Sztarray, between Mayence and Rastadt, keeping up a connection with the bodies of peasantry commanded by the Baron d'Albini. General Kienmayer covered the defile of Strasburg, in front of the Kinzig. Major Girulay, with a brigade, held the Vale of Hell, and observed Old Brisach. The main strength of the Austrian army was encamped behind the defiles of the Black Forest, at Donau-Eschingen and Villingen, at the point of junction between the roads leading from the Rhine to the Danube. Forty thousand men were

united at this point. And M. de Kray had placed in the forest towns a strong vanguard, under the Archduke Ferdinand, in charge to observe the route of Bâle. He had left a numerous garrison under Prince Joseph of Lorraine, at Stockach, to cover his magazines established in that town, to guard the roads of Ulm and Munich, and to connect himself with Lake Constance, whereon the English William commanded a flotilla. To conclude, the Prince of Reuss, at the head of 30,000 men, some Austrian regiments, some Tyrolese militia, occupied the Reinthal from the Grisons to Constance. This was considered as the left of the imperial army. M. de Kray, in the centre of the net which he had spread on all sides around him, flattered himself that he should be informed at once of the slightest movement of the French.

The project of Moreau, explained heretofore, and consisting in displaying himself on three points, in order to convey himself out of sight afterward, and to ascend the Rhine as far as Schaffhausen, had been adopted without alteration.² On the 25th of April, he put his troops in motion. He had gone to Strasburg in person, in the midst of Sainte-Suzanne's corps, in order to induce the belief that it was his intention to take the direct route from Strasburg across the Black Forest. He had taken another precaution to conceal his movements to advantage, which was not to collect his troops previous to marching. The demi-brigades set forth, each one from its own cantonment for the spot, whereat it was intended to pass the Rhine, and thus were combined on the march to the corps of which they formed integral parts. Every thing being calculated thus three imposing heads of columns, acting simultaneously on a space of thirty leagues crossed at the same moment the bridges on Strasburg, of Old Brisach, and of Bâle. This was on the 25th of April.

General Sainte-Suzanne, who commanded the extreme left, and took his departure from Strasburg, swept every thing that he found before him from his way. He met here and there some detached corps, the resistance of which was hardly worthy of mention. Not being willing, however, to engage himself in any serious combat, he halted between Renchen and Offenbourg, threatening at the same time the two valleys of the Renchen and the Kinzig, but endeavouring above all to persuade the Austrians that it was his intention to gain the Danube through the Black Forest, acting along the valley of the Kinzig. At the same instant Saint-Cyr defied from Old Brisach, and advanced to Fribourg, driving the enemy's detachments suddenly before him, but like Sainte-Suzanne, aware of the danger of engaging himself too much in advance. He found some difficulty at Fribourg. The Austrians had retrenched the heights which surrounded that city, and had placed behind those retrenchments some bands of peasantry raised in the mountains of Suabia, under the pretext of defending their cottages against the

¹ See Mem. of *Maréchal Saint-Cyr*—Campaign of 1800.

² *Maréchal Saint-Cyr*, in his *Mémoires*, appears to be in error on this score. The First Consul had adopted this

plan entire. This fact is established by a letter of General Dessolles, contained in the Memorial of the War, and the MS. correspondence.—*Author*

ravages of the French. All this could not check him. Fribourg was occupied in the twinkling of an eye. Some of the poor peasants were put to the sword, and the remainder were seen no more during the campaign. Saint-Cyr posted himself in such a manner as to leave it to be imagined that he meant to engage in the Vale of Hell. The reserve defiled on the same day across the bridge of Bâle, without meeting any obstacle, and carried one division, that of Richemont, toward Schliengen and Kandern, in order to unite with the corps of Saint-Cyr, who proposed to ascend the Rhine within two days.

During the whole day of the 26th of April—6th of Floreal—Sainte-Suzanne rested in position before Strasburg, and Saint-Cyr before Brisach. The reserve, which had defiled from Bâle, was deployed completely, waiting the movement of the two corps intended to ascend the Rhine thus far. Moreau left Strasburg himself, to withdraw to his head-quarters, which was in the midst of the reserve.

The day of the 27th was still employed in deceiving the enemy as to the direction of our columns. The Austrians were led to believe in a decided movement by the Kinzig and the Vale of Hell. These two passes are in fact the most direct road for an army from the Rhine desirous of reaching the Danube; for they open at some distance one from the other, run in the same direction, and unite at last between Donaun-Eschingen, and Hufingen, not far from Schaffhausen, the point on which lay the corps of General Lecourbe. It was natural to suppose that two strong columns of 20 and 25,000 men each, presenting themselves at the mouth of these defiles, were really about to engage themselves therein, in order so to join Lecourbe. In order to guard them the better, M. de Kray detached from Villingen twelve squadrons, and nine battalions, and sent them to reinforce General Kienmayer. He was obliged to weaken Stockach, in order to replace at Villingen the troops which he had detached thence.

But during the night of the 27th, and in the day of the 28th, while M. de Kray was falling into the trap, the direction of the French columns was suddenly changed. Sainte-Suzanne fell back upon Strasburg, repassed the Rhine with his whole corps, and ascended the left bank, in order that he should not be forced to make, on the enemy's ground, too long a flank movement. Arrived at New Brisach, he again crossed to the right bank, and replaced Saint-Cyr before Fribourg, as if he were about to penetrate the Vale of Hell. Saint-Cyr, for his part, wheeling to the right, but still on the German side of the river, coasted the Rhine with his artillery, his cavalry, and his baggage; and while his heavy trains thus followed the low grounds, a great part of his infantry marched on the flank of the mountains by Saint Hubert, Neuhoft, Todnan, and Saint Blaise. Moreau, by this disposition, wished to avoid blocking up the banks of the Rhine, to reconnoitre the heights of the Black Forest filled with Austrian detachments, and to pass, nearer to their sources, the streams which rising in those mountains fall down into the Rhine through

the territory of the forest cities. Those rivers are the Wiesen, the Alb, and the Westach. Unfortunately the existence of roads, which were not, had been taken for granted; Saint-Cyr was obliged to traverse a frightful country, always close to the enemy, and without artillery. Nevertheless he was not very much retarded, nor was he prevented from reaching Saint Blaise on the Alb, on the appointed day.

At the same time Moreau ascended the Rhine with the reserve, remaining, as Saint-Cyr did, on the German side. Richemont, who directed the vanguard, after having seen the artillery and cavalry of Saint-Cyr defile past, which, as we have seen, followed the banks of the Rhine, set himself in motion for Saint Blaise, in order to connect himself in the mountains with the infantry of the same corps. Generals Delmas and Leclerc, who commanded the other two divisions of the reserve, were directed upon Soeckingen, and then upon the Alb, in front of the bridge of Albruck. This bridge was covered by retrenchments. The Adjutant-general Cohorn, marching at the head of a battalion of the 14th light infantry, of two battalions of the 50th and of the 4th hussars, advanced in column on the retrenchments, and carried them. He then jumped on the shoulders of a grenadier and passed the Alb in that manner, giving the enemy no time to break the bridge. He took cannon and prisoners.

On the 29th of April—9th Floreal—the centre under Saint-Cyr, and the reserve under Moreau were in line on the Alb, from the Abbey of Saint Blaise, to the meeting of the Alb with the Rhine. Sainte-Suzanne had arrived at New Brisach, on the left bank; on our extreme right, Lecourbe assembled his corps, between Diesenhofen and Schaffhausen, ready to execute his passage, when Saint-Cyr and Moreau should have ascended the Rhine so far. The 30th of April, Sainte-Suzanne passed the Rhine, and showed himself at the entrance of the Vale of Hell. Saint-Cyr remained in the vicinity of Saint Blaise, Moreau advanced upon the Wutach. To conclude, on the 1st of May—11th of Floreal—the army made its last step, and that the most decisive—and did it with good fortune. M. de Kray had begun to discover his error, and to recall to himself the troops which had been involved too far in the defiles of the Black Forest. Sainte-Suzanne, destined to pass the Vale of Hell, which opens on the very positions which the French army would occupy, when its movements should all be completed, found the troops of Kienmayer in full retreat, and followed them step by step. Saint-Cyr now ceased coasting along the corps of the Archduke Ferdinand, and drove him from Bettmaringen to Stühlingen, upon the Wutach, where he arrived in the evening. The troops of Moreau passed the Wutach, without encountering much resistance, re-established the bridge, to do which a few beams only were required, and endeavoured to connect themselves with Schaffhausen, on the right, where Lecourbe lay, and on their left, with Stühlingen, where lay Saint-Cyr. It was this moment that Lecourbe posted night to Schaffhausen, should choose to

cross the Rhine. On the morning of the first of May, thirty-four pieces of artillery were placed on the left bank of the river, to sweep, with their fire, the vicinity of the village of Reichlingen. Twenty-five boats conveyed General Molitor to the right bank, with two battalions, in order to cover the construction of a bridge, prepared long before, in the Aar. In an hour and a half, that bridge was thrown across the river. General Vandamme passed over it with a large portion of the troops of Lecourbe's corps, and occupied in an instant the routes leading to Engen and Stockach, important points in the enemy's line. He took the little town of Steia, and the fort of Hohentwiel, reputed to be impregnable, and very well supplied, as well with provisions as with artillery. Gonla's brigade, passing at the same time toward Paradis, met with a sharp resistance in the village of Busingen, which it soon conquered. To conclude, Lorges' division entered Schaffhausen that evening, and made good its junction with the troops of Moreau.

Thus, on the evening of the first of May, the whole army found itself safely across the Rhine. The three principal corps, those of Saint-Cyr, Moreau, Lecourbe, forming a mass of 75,000 to 80,000 men, occupied a line, which ran through Bondorf, Stühlingen, Schaffhausen, Radolfzell, to the point of the Lake of Constance. They were ready to march upon Engen and Stockach, threatening, at once, the line of the enemy's retreat and his magazines. Sainte-Suzanne, with the left, 20,000 strong, was following the Austrians through the Vale of Hell, waiting to defile upon the upper Danube, and unite himself to the main body of the French army, until it should have opened the passes by its advance.

This movement, then, was performed in six days in the happiest manner imaginable. Moreau presenting three heads of columns at the three bridges of Strasburg, Brisach, Bâle, had attracted the enemy to those three passes; then withdrawing himself suddenly, and marching on his right along the Rhine, two of his corps on the German and one on the French side, had ascended as high as Schaffhausen, where he had covered the passage of Lecourbe. The different corps had made 1500 prisoners, taken 6 field-pieces with their material, 40 wall-pieces in the fort of Hohentwiel, and some magazines. The troops had displayed everywhere a steadiness and resolution which could only be expected from old levies full of confidence in themselves and their leaders.

All criticisms on this plan, of course, fall to the ground before its success. It is impossible that movements so complicated should have succeeded more happily; that the enemy should have fallen into the trap more credulously, or the chiefs of the corps acted in unison with greater exactitude. Nevertheless, this plan of the prudent Moreau offered at least as many dangers as that of the First Consul, which had been rejected as too rash. For Saint-Cyr and Moreau had each lent their flank, in a march along the Rhine, several successive days. Saint-Cyr had been at one time separated from his artillery, and now Sainte-Suzanne was marching alone up the Vale of Hell.

If Marshal de Kray, by a sudden inspiration, had thrown himself upon Saint-Cyr, Moreau, or Sainte-Suzanne, he might well have chanced to crush any one of those detached corps, which might have compelled a retrograde movement of the whole French army. But Moreau had two advantages with him. First, he took the offensive, which always disconcerts an enemy; and, secondly, he had excellent troops, which were capable of repairing any unforeseen accident that might occur by their own steadiness, and which did, in fact, repair more than one error of their general-in-chief by their vigour in action.

The moment was now about to arrive, when the two armies, having manœuvred the one to force, the other to defend, the passage of the Rhine, were at length about to meet beyond that river. On the 2d of May—12th of Floreal—Moreau made ready for this encounter; but not supposing it to be so near at hand, he did not take measures toward concentration so promptly or completely as he should have done. He thought of sending Lecourbe forward with his 25,000 men upon Stockach, where lay at once the Austrian rear-guard, their magazines, and their communications with Vorarlberg and the Prince of Reuss. This was the rigorous execution of the plan arranged with the First Consul. For M. de Kray, cut off from Stockach, was detached from Lake Constance, and, of consequence, from the Alps. Moreau then ordered Lecourbe to march on the 3d of May—the 13th of Floreal—in the morning, to take Stockach from the Prince of Lorraine Vaudemont, who, with 12,000 men, guarded that important post. As for Moreau, he marched in person, with his whole reserve, on Engen, keeping his eye upon Lecourbe, and ready to come to his assistance, should that become necessary. He enjoined it upon Saint-Cyr to keep himself in advance, holding an elongated position, from Bettmaringen and Bondorf to Engen, in such a manner as to connect himself with him at one side, and at the other with Sainte-Suzanne, who ought now shortly to make his appearance from the Vale of Hell.

Moreau marched thus in line of battle, having his back to the Rhine, his right to Lake Constance, his left to the passes of the Black Forest, presenting a front of fifteen leagues, exactly parallel to the line of retreat which the Austrians must adopt, should they retire from Donau-Eschingen to Stockach, whither many interests called them. It was a very extended position, especially so near to the enemy, and one which, before an active and resolute adversary, would have exposed the French army to grave consequences. Happily for us, the army of M. de Kray was yet less concentrated than that of Moreau. M. de Kray's position was more favourable than ours to a rapid concentration, since it occupied front Constance to Strasburg the base of a triangle, the two sides of which we held. But, surprised on this day by our movement, having already on his left flank the French, combined to three-fourths of their force, and all transported across the river, he was in a dangerous position. He had given hurried orders to the

detachments of the Austrian army, which were near the Rhine, to fall back by the Black Forest on the upper Danube; but a prompt and well-concerted resolution alone could recover him from his peril. In order to grasp this situation fully, it will be necessary to cast a rapid glance over the theatre of these complicated operations.

That mountainous and wooded country, which is called the Black Forest, around which the Rhine winds without penetrating it, and from which it increases its distance as it flows to the northward; that country, I say, produces, from a trifling spring-head, a very modest stream in its early origin, which is, however, destined to become one of the greatest rivers in the world, the Danube. It sheds this stream to the eastward, whither is its course, with a slight inclination always to the north, which is forced upon it by the extension of the Alpine spurs, at the base of which it runs so far as to Vienna. It receives, in its course, all the waters which descend from this long chain of mountains, which causes its sudden greatness, so different from its trivial origin.

The Austrian generals who defend the valley of the Danube against the French, have two plans from which to choose. They may—when the French have succeeded in penetrating the valley of the Danube, the ordinary road into their country—operate along the foot of the Alps, covering their left with the base of those mountains; and their right with the Danube, and defending in succession all the rivers which fall into that river. Such are the Iller, the Lech, the Isar, and the Inn. Or they may quit the Alps entirely, bestride the Danube, defend its course, stopping on all the great positions which it presents, as those of Ulm, of Ratisbon, &c., ready either to cover themselves by its bed, growing continually wider, or to hurl themselves, in mass, on the imprudent adversary who chanced to make a false step. This latter method has been the most generally preferred by them.

Marshal de Kray might adopt either of these methods; he might support himself upon the Alps, or manœuvre on the Danube. By leaning to the Alps, he countered the First Consul's plan, though without knowing it; since he, in order to descend from those high mountains in safety, on the rear of Baron de Melas, would have desired to have the imperial army aloof from Switzerland or the Tyrol. But in doing this, he sacrificed the right wing of his army, involved far in advance upon the Rhine without a possibility of knowing what had become of it. In adopting, on the other hand, the plan of manœuvring on the Danube, he certainly rallied his right wing, but separated himself from his left wing, commanded by the Prince of Reuss, though without sacrificing it; since, in the Tyrol, it would have both a secure retreat and a profitable employment of its force. In truth, he favoured, though unconsciously, the plan of the First Consul; for he quitted the line of the Alps. But this error was of no great importance, for even had he adhered to it, it is little probable that he would have thought of throwing himself into Lombardy to the assistance of the Baron de Melas.

The plan, therefore, which offered the fewest inconveniences, which suited best with the ordinary route of the imperial armies, was to concentrate upon the upper Danube. But, in order to succeed here, it was necessary to act both promptly and with great decision. Unfortunately for himself, Monsieur de Kray had immense magazines at Stockach, near the Lake of Constance, with a strong rear-guard of 12,000 men under the orders of the Prince of Lorraine Vaudemont. It was necessary for him, then, to recall his rear-guard instantly from Stockach to the upper Danube, and to move thither himself, sacrificing his magazines, which, at all events, it would have been impossible for him to remove. This he did not. But with the intention of manœuvring at a later period on the Danube, he sent M. de Nauendorff with the centre of the Austrian army to Engen, in order to succour Stockach. He ordered Prince Ferdinand, who was in the Black Forest, to move upon the same point; and directed his right under Messrs. Sztarray and De Kienmayer to quit the Rhine, and rejoin him with all speed.

It is a serious disadvantage attached to those vast magazines of provisions, in use among the Germans, that they render armies subordinate to them. The French, subsisted without magazines, spread themselves over the country nightly, in order to collect provisions, and that without any serious deterioration of discipline. They are active, industrious, and know well the art of being at once marauders, and present under their colours. The German troops are rarely exposed to such trials without disbanding and becoming disorganized. There is, however, one advantage in the possession of magazines, that of pressing with less severity on the country which is occupied, and in irritating its inhabitants less against the invading army.

Moreau, marching with his right on Stockach, with his reserve on Engen, while the corps of Saint-Cyr was extended to connect him with Sainte-Suzanne, was on the point, then, of coming in contact with the rear-guard of M. de Kray at Stockach, and with his centre at Engen, and of passing along the line of Prince Ferdinand's troops, now on the march to join the main body of the Austrian army. An unexpected battle must necessarily be the result of this contact, as will often occur in war, when events are not guided by those superior spirits, which are capable both of foreseeing and controlling them.

Early in the morning, Lecourbe marched straight upon Stockach, throwing out Lorges' division to his left, to communicate with Moreau, and pushing directly before him on the high road from Schaffhausen to Stockach, the division of Montrichard, with Nansouty's reserve of horse, and having, to conclude the whole, Vandamme's division on his right, between Stockach and the Lake of Constance. The latter division was divided into two brigades. One of these, under General Leval, manœuvring so as to cut Stockach from the Lake of Constance, by Bodmann and Sernadingen, encountered no obstacle; for the Prince of Reuss, who might have shown himself there, took little pains to keep up his communication

with his general-in-chief. The other, under General Molitor, directed by Vandamme in person, marched upon the rear of Stockach by a by-road, while Nansouty and Montrichard marched thither by the great road of Schaffhausen. In the thickest of the woods some infantry was discovered, falling back; some cavalry also, reconnoitering the country, but falling back likewise. At last the positions were discovered, which the Austrians proposed to defend. Montrichard found these in order of battle behind the village of Steusslingen, covered by a heavy force of cavalry. The French infantry traversed the village in two columns, threatening both flanks of the enemy. At the same instant, the cavalry of Montrichard's division, supported by Nansouty's whole reserve, filed through Steusslingen, charged home, and threw the Imperialists into great disorder, retreating upon Neuzingen. This was the second position, and the principal one of those which form the defence of Stockach. It rested upon that of Wahlwyes, which at the same moment Vandamme was threatening with Molitor's brigade. A numerous infantry was now discovered, blocking the end of the village of Neuzingen, their flanks resting on woods to the right and left, and covered by cannon. A great effort was necessary in order to dislodge them. Montrichard turned them, by a height called the Hellemburg, while Vandamme having burst through Wahlwyes, was deploying on the rear of Neuzingen. The position was carried, and Lecourbe's whole corps poured down in one united mass upon Stockach and carried it. The Austrians would have made head once again beyond Stockach to check us—they offered 4000 infantry in battle array, covered by all their cavalry. Nansouty's regiments charged their cavalry, and drove it in disorder upon the infantry, which now only thought of yielding. Lecourbe made 4000 prisoners, carried off eight guns, 500 horses, and the immense magazines of Stockach. It could not have befallen otherwise. For Lecourbe, with troops capable of fighting against numbers greatly superior to his own, had also twice as many people as the Prince of Lorraine, although he had detached Lorges' division to make good his communication with Moreau. This task was accomplished early; and, if as vigorous a direction had prevailed in the general conduct of operations, he both could, and should, have been employed otherwise; as will now be made to appear.

The division of Lorges, destined to serve as a connecting link between Lecourbe and Moreau, was divided into two brigades. Goulu's brigade had marched on Aach to reconnoitre the country between Stockach and Engen, had found no one to fight with, and sat down at Stockach, where it became useless. General Lorges, with the rest of his division, having joined Moreau's troops, accompanied them toward Engen.

Moreau, with all that which was called the reserve, had marched on Engen, early in the morning. M. de Kray, at the same instant, was passing through this town on his way to defend his magazines at Stockach.

From the number of troops which were deploying before him, he soon perceived that there was about to be a battle and not a mere reconnoissance. He stopped short to give battle, trusting to the 40,000 men, whom he had in hand, and to the strength of the positions upon which chance had thrown him. On quitting the banks of the Rhine near Schaffhausen, on the route for the Danube, in that confused and dislocated country, the declivities of which fall hither and thither at random there is a little valley, that of the Aach, which carries off to the Lake of Constance those waters which flow neither to the Rhine nor to the Danube. In that valley stands the borough of Engen. It is necessary, in order to make a descent upon Engen, to cross several successive ranges of wooded heights very difficult of access. These heights the Austrians had occupied with their infantry. They had their cavalry below in the plain of Engen. It was necessary, then, for Moreau to carry the heights first of all, and then to descend into the plain, there to overthrow the imperial cavalry. He marched himself at the head of Delmas and Bastoul's divisions, and of half that of Lorges. He had directed on this left, by the route called that of Blumenfeld, the division of Richepanse. This division, passing through a succession of small valleys, was intended to turn the enemy by approaches less strongly defended, and all united were destined, if successful, to pour down in concentrated masses upon Engen.

Lorges, who had outmarched the troops of the reserve a little, found a considerable body of the enemy near Waterdingen, and, before attacking, waited for the division of Delmas, which soon arrived. They then all charged together, and dislodged the Austrians. Having gained this point, they had the heights to ascend which surround Engen; and to attain this, it was necessary to scale some steep and difficult highlands, commanded on the right by a position called the Maulberg, and on the left by a very lofty peak, known by the name of the Peak of Hohenhewen. Lorges was commanded to attack the Maulberg. After a slight cannonade he advanced. The enemy retired; Delmas then turning to the left, directed his division on a wood which surrounded the Peak of Hohenhewen, and which was held by eight battalions of the enemy. Two battalions of the 46th advanced upon the wood without firing, while General Grandjean and the Adjutant-general Cohorn turned it, with another detachment. The two battalions of the 46th, the moment they received the enemy's fire, rushed upon them with fixed bayonets. The eight battalions of the Austrians seeing themselves so daringly attacked in front, and being turned on the right, abandoned the wood. Our troops having carried the principal positions which defend the approaches to the valley of Engen, had now only to descend into that valley, which was traversed by a wide brook. The enemy had retired to the Peak of Hohenhewen; they had placed their infantry and artillery on the slopes, and had drawn up 12,000 cavalry in order of battle on the plain of Engen. Moreau determined first of all to carry the Peak of Hohenhewen, and

ordered the division of Delmas instantly to attack it. The division of Delmas, on issuing from the wood of which it had taken possession, was exposed to a murderous fire, but sustained it bravely. General Jocopin putting himself at the head of the infantry, forced his way up the acclivities of the peak, and received a shot in the thigh. But General Grandjean turned the position; the Adjutant-general Cohorn, whom we have seen passing the Alb upon the shoulders of a grenadier, dashed on to the summit with a battalion, and dislodged the Austrians. Our troops were then in possession of all the heights which commanded the plain of Engen, and could deploy on them without difficulty. The enemy retired on the other side of this plain, beyond the rivulet which crossed it, and to the foot of a chain of heights which form the opposite bank. He had drawn out in front his numerous cavalry with the greatest part of his artillery; and in the rear, in the hollows of a dell, at the entrance of which was the little village of Ehingen, a strong reserve of grenadiers. Such was the mass of force it was yet necessary to overthrow, in order to terminate the battle to our advantage. During this time a very heavy firing was heard on the other side of the peak of Hohenhewen and far beyond it, along the range of wooded heights which surround Engen. It was the division of Richepanse, engaged with the troops with which M. de Kray had crowned this part of the field of battle.

General Richepanse had been obliged to break his division into two brigades, for the purpose of seizing two positions, one called that of Leipferdingen, the other that of Waterdingen, in the very bottom of the valleys in which he had been engaged. The combat which he maintained there was obstinate, and full of chances; when fortunately for him, the advance of Saint-Cyr's corps began to appear. These troops came up very late, in consequence of an error in Moreau's arrangements. Saint-Cyr ought to have assisted Sainte-Suzanne, with one of his divisions. He had been obliged to wait for Ney, who was delayed by want of provisions; and also to wait for his artillery, which had always been in the rear since the passage of the Rhine. He had, moreover, found Prince Ferdinand constantly following on his steps; and having but one division to oppose to his three, he felt himself obliged to march with great care and precaution. At length he came up to the succour of Richepanse, at the moment when M. de Kray was trying the experiment of a last and vigorous attack to prevent him from passing clear on to Engen. Moreau, judging from the weight of fire, that Richepanse was in danger, determined to draw the Austrians to their right, and for that purpose thought proper to attack the village of Ehingen, which formed the support of their position on the other side of the plain. We have seen that the enemy had posted there, at the foot of a chain of heights, his cavalry, and artillery, and a strong reserve of grenadiers in a valley of which the village of Ehingen formed the entrance. General Bontemps advanced on it with the 67th demi-brigade, two battalions of the 10th light infantry, and two squadrons of

the 5th hussars. General Hauptpoul followed him with the reserve of cavalry. These troops marching in columns in the plain, under the fire of a battery of twelve pieces of cannon, advanced stoutly to the village of Ehingen, and carried it. But suddenly the eight battalions of grenadiers in the reserve thundered down upon them. The Austrian cavalry supported the eight battalions of grenadiers, by a vigorous charge, and under this unexpected tempest our soldiers were obliged to give up the village. The cavalry of General Hauptpoul was driven back by the great mass of imperial cavalry. The brave General Bontemps received a severe wound in the midst of this confusion, and at this moment, the fire redoubled on our left beyond the peak of Hohenhewen, announcing the perilous position of Richepanse, who was still endeavouring, although as yet without success, to force the line of heights. Moreau, who in difficult moments had the firmness of a true soldier spirit, immediately became aware of his awful situation, and resolved to make a vigorous stroke, to remain master of the field of battle. He caused the remains of Bastoul's division to advance; took with him some companies of grenadiers, whom he had held in hand, animated them, hurried them to the front, overturning every thing he encountered, and carried our troops back victorious into Ehingen. While he fixed the fortune of the day at this point, Richepanse, on his part, was performing prodigies of valour. Saint-Cyr, now joined by Ney, definitively delivered from all apprehensions of the Archduke Ferdinand, sent forward the brigade of General Roussel to the front. It strove in rivalry of courage against the troops of Richepanse, who had been engaged so long, and aided them to conquer the heights so stubbornly contested. The action was decided at all points, in our favour, but at the price of much toil, and much bloodshed; the 4th demi-brigade lost alone, in these combats, between 500 and 600 men. Night was beginning now to fall, and the French redoubled their ardour, while the Austrians, hearing of the destruction of the Prince of Lorraine Vaudemont, at Stockach, began to be discouraged. M. de Kray, fearing to be turned at Stockach, ordered a retreat. He hastened to regain the Danube, by Tuttinger and Liptingen.

The loss of the French army in this series of bloody combats was very considerable. It had lost something above 2000 men of killed and wounded; but the loss of the Austrians amounted to 3000, besides from 4000 to 5000 prisoners, who remained in our hands. The French troops, by their unusual bravery, had made up for the errors committed by their General. His plan, indeed, was very faulty; and it is now easy to perceive its weak points. In the first place it is easy to judge by the results themselves what was the disadvantage of crossing the Rhine at several points. In consequence of this style of operations, there were but three corps ready to march together; and even the third of these, that of Saint-Cyr, was paralyzed by the necessity of maintaining a communication with the fourth, which had

remained behind. The delay of Saint-Cyr's artillery, moreover, is to be attributed to the same system of passing the river at many points, and this last did not a little contribute to delay the succour given to Richepanse. As to the battle itself, Moreau, with 25,000 men, was forced to fight 40,000 at Engen, while Lecourbe, with 20,000, had only 12,000 to engage Stockach, and Saint-Cyr remained almost unengaged, or, at the most, was reduced to the part of a simple corps of observation. The latter, when accused of arriving too late, affirmed, that during the whole day, he had not received a single aide-de-camp from headquarters. Such things will never, or rarely, be seen on fields where the First Consul commanded. However, to act as Moreau acted, shows a general of no ordinary merit. Once in danger, he conducted himself with that coolness and vigour which never abandoned him; and, seconded by the valour of the troops, he, after all, obtained a victory, and acquired a decided superiority over the enemy.

He encamped his army on the field of battle. If, on the following day, he had pushed M. de Kray briskly on the Stockach road to the Danube, he would probably have thrown him into disorder. But Moreau had not sufficient ardour in his character, and was too careful of his troops, to execute those rapid movements, which, without doubt, fatigue men for the moment, but in reality economize their blood, their affection and strength, by precipitating results. The whole day of the 4th of May—14th of Floreal—was employed in rectifying the position of the army, and in marching slowly toward the Danube. Saint-Cyr marched on it by Tutlingen; Moreau and Lecourbe by Mæsskirch, looking out carefully to their right and toward the approaches of the Vorarlberg, whence the Prince de Reuss might attack them. M. de Kray was not yet resigned to give ground without fighting. His army was already much harassed, and weakened likewise by nearly 10,000 men, yet he had the folly to expose it voluntarily to another encounter with the French, before passing the Danube, and connecting himself with the forces under Generals Kienmayer and Sztaray, who were returning from the banks of the Rhine at the same time with the French corps of Sainte-Suzanne. The cover afforded by a great river, some days of respite, and reinforcements, were absolutely necessary, in order that the moral strength of the Austrian army should be restored. The position of Mæsskirch, on which Moreau had given him time to compose himself, inspired M. de Kray with the imprudent, but courageous resolution of fighting yet once more.

This position of Mæsskirch, is, in fact, very strong. The high road, which by Engen and Stockach runs to the Danube, passes, a little way before it reaches Mæsskirch, a range of extensive and elevated table-land, which is called the plateau of Krumbach. This it leaves to the left, then dips into a country covered with wood, and there forms a long narrow defile. It passes out, thereafter, into an open country, at the lower end of which is seen the small town of Mæsskirch a little on the right,

and the village of Heudorf on the left. Behind Mæsskirch extends a line of heights stretching continuously from Mæsskirch to Heudorf, then from Heudorf sweeping backward to the left, and joining the plateau of Krumbach. So that the road passing, in the first place, under the plateau of Krumbach, and then plunging into a wood, enters at length an open country commanded by the fire of the heights, which extend from Mæsskirch to Heudorf. M. de Kray had crowned this position with formidable artillery. The Prince of Lorraine, forming the left of the Austrians, occupied Mæsskirch, and the surrounding heights. M. de Nauendorf, forming their centre, was deployed above Heudorf, having a reserve of grenadiers in his rear. M. de Wrede with the Bavarians, the Archduke Ferdinand and General Giulay united, composed the right of the imperial army on the plateau of Krumbach.

Moreau had no more expectation of an action at Mæsskirch than he had at Engen. Suspecting, however, that he might meet with some resistance there, he had apprized Lecourbe of it, and had sent him word that an effort might perhaps become necessary on that point; without, however, giving him such precise orders for concentrating his force as the imminence of a great battle demands. Lecourbe, being in advance of the army, and marching in three divisions, had thrown Vandamme's division a little distance on his right, to the end always of observing the movements of the Prince de Reuss, toward the Vorarlberg. Part of this division, under General Molitor, was under orders to advance by the road to Pullendorf and Klosterwald, on the flank of Mæsskirch. Lecourbe with the divisions of Montrichard, and Lorges, with the reserve of cavalry, were destined to advance by the high road, which has been already described, and which, after passing the plateau of Krumbach, comes out through the woods in front of Mæsskirch. Moreau followed the same road, keeping himself some distance in the rear. Saint-Cyr covered Moreau's left, at a great distance, astride of the Danube, toward Tutlingen. These, certainly, were not the dispositions for a great battle. Vandamme should not have been thrown alone, with but half a division, on the flank of the position of Mæsskirch. Lecourbe, with all his corps, should have been directed on this point. Moreau should not have set out so late, or crowded himself on the same road with Lecourbe, and that too, in the defiles of a wood; and, to conclude, Saint-Cyr should not have been left at such a distance.

Be this as it may, Lecourbe put himself in motion early in the morning, conformably to the plan adopted. Having arrived at the height of Krumbach, he left that plateau to his left, and entangled himself in the defiles of the wood. Some advanced posts which were encountered in this long defile were promptly driven in, and the mouth of the pass was attained. There was perceived the open country, at the lower end of which stands Mæsskirch, commanded on all sides by heights crowned with the Austrian artillery. At the very mo-

ment in which the heads of the columns appeared, five pieces of artillery firing, full in their front, from Mæsskirch; and twenty others from the flank of Heudorf, vomited forth a storm of round and grape. Two battalions of light infantry were placed on the edge of the wood; and three regiments of cavalry, the 9th hussars, 12th chasseurs, and the 11th dragoons, were pushed forward rapidly to protect the placing of our artillery in position. Under the fire of these twenty-five pieces, which in every sense of the word thundered down destruction on them, our squadrons were forced to retire. Fifteen pieces of cannon, which General Montrichard destined to answer the Austrian artillery, were, more or less, dismounted. The light infantry itself was obliged to seek shelter in the wood. The Austrian cavalry advanced to charge us in its turn, but was smartly repulsed. As often, however, as General Montrichard attempted to advance beyond the wood, a murderous fire arrested his columns. It soon became evident, that this was not the true point of attack for carrying Mæsskirch; but on the contrary that it was by the right, following the lateral road of Klosterwald, over which Vandamme was advancing. But he was not as yet near arriving, in consequence of the distance he had to march. Lecourbe, in the mean time, decided on making an attempt on Heudorf, filing by the left along the border of the woods. The 10th light infantry, in spite of a violent fire of artillery and musketry, entered the village of Heudorf; but was repulsed by superior forces; and while the cavalry was hurried up to its support, the Austrian artillery, placed upon the steep height behind Heudorf, compelled it to make a retrograde movement. This second attempt to open out by the left, was not therefore more successful than that which had been attempted of advancing directly on Mæsskirch.

Encouraged by this check, the Austrians now resolved to assume the offensive, and attempted to débouch from the village of Heudorf, full in the face of Lorges' division. But this was too much to attempt against such hardy troops. The 38th was formed in column, and rushed to the front; eight pieces of artillery covered it with their grape; with admirable coolness it pressed on, and penetrated Heudorf, with levelled bayonets. The steep banks which arise behind the village were covered with wood, and the wood was filled with dense masses of Austrian infantry. Superior forces rushed upon this brave demi-brigade, it was crushed by their numbers, and gave way. But the 67th came to its support, and it rallied instantly. They both charged together and the whole division now dashed forward, overflowed the village, scaled the tremendous heights, and carried off the wooded holds from which the enemy poured on us the most devastating fire. While this terrible combat was in progress on our left, about the village of Heudorf, Vandamme at length opened his attack on our right, upon Mæsskirch, at the head of Molitor's brigade. His disposition for the attack was very skilful, in spite of the Austrian infantry, which kept up a murderous fire from the suburbs of Mæsskirch. This

gallant body charged fiercely into Mæsskirch, while two battalions turned the position, by the heights. Montrichard still shut up in the wood, profited by this moment to march out into the open country, which had at first been so fatal to us. He fell on in four columns, full in front of the Austrian artillery, already somewhat shaken by these simultaneous attacks. The four columns of Montrichard pressed on, crossed a ravine which runs along the foot of the hills, and scaled the height of Mæsskirch, at the moment when Vandamme's troops, having carried Mæsskirch, began to file out of it. The Austrians were routed at all points. Their reserve, placed a little in rear of Rohrdorf, endeavoured thereupon to act in its turn, but was held in check by the united divisions of Vandamme and Montrichard. At this time, we were masters of all the line from Mæsskirch to Heudorf. But M. de Kray, desiring with great accuracy, and a rapid eye, the vulnerable part of our position, drew off a part of his forces unobserved, and carried them to our left, to the plateau of Krumbach, whence he menaced our flanks and rear. Lorges' division, which occupied Heudorf, ran much risk of being overwhelmed. The reserve of Austrian grenadiers threw themselves in one mass on this unfortunate division, which, after having taken and retaken Heudorf several times, was exhausted with fatigue. It was now borne down and crushed at the same time by the fire of the artillery, and the masses of the Austrian infantry. Happily Moreau, apprized of what was in progress, by the violence of the cannonade, had hastened his march. At length he appeared at the entrance of the wood with his corps, composed of the divisions of Delmas, Bastoul and Richepanse. With all speed he sent Delmas's division to the left upon Heudorf, to the support of Lorges. That stout body changed the aspect of affairs in a moment, overthrew the Austrian grenadiers, and retook Heudorf, with all the woods above it. But if we received reinforcement, so did M. de Kray. His right, composed of the Archduke Ferdinand, and General Giulay—whom Saint-Cyr had followed pace by pace from the very commencement of hostilities, though at by far too great a distance—was led rapidly into the field of battle and directed between Heudorf and Krumbach, on the flank of Delmas's division, which was in some danger of being surrounded. The 57th, which in Italy had justly earned the name of "The Terrible," forming in order of battle, sustained the onset of the Austrians for more than an hour, ravaged all the time by sixteen pieces of artillery, to which General Delmas could oppose but five—and even these were soon dismounted. This valiant band remained unshaken by that dreadful fire, and even arrested the progress of the enemy. Moreau, hurrying from one corps to another, to set them in position or support them, brought up Bastoul's division to sustain that of Delmas. He came up at the very moment when the Austrians unable to break the division of Delmas, were endeavouring to deprive it of the succour of Bastoul's division, by deploying on the plateau of Krumbach, so as to intercept our communications. Already they were beginning to pour

down from the plateau upon the road, and breaking in upon the columns of our baggage train. Thus the battle, commencing at Mæsskirch, had extended unto Heudorf, and from Heudorf to Krumbach, embracing the whole angle of that vast position, covering it with fire and blood and carnage. Under these critical circumstances, Bastoul's division worthily supported the efforts of that of Delmas; but it was on the point of being surrounded, should the enemy succeed in descending from the plateau of Krumbach, and taking possession of the high road by which our troops were coming up. Happily the division of Richepanse, led to the critical point at the critical moment, was formed in columns of attack, scaled the plateau of Krumbach under a plunging fire, and out-flanked the archduke, who was striving to out-flank us. After this effort, M. de Kray had no reserve in hand to act against Richepanse, and was obliged to give the signal for retreat. From Krumbach to Heudorf, from Heudorf to Mæsskirch, we were victorious at all points.

At this juncture the corps of Saint-Cyr was but a few leagues distant, at Neuhausen-ob-Eke. Had he come into action, the Austrian army must have been routed; and, instead of gaining an ordinary victory, we should have inflicted on it one of those crushing defeats which terminate a campaign. What fatality was it then that held him inactive, so near the spot on which his presence might have decided the fate of the whole war? This it is difficult to explain. Saint-Cyr asserted on the following day that no orders had been sent to him. Moreau, on the contrary, affirmed that they had been sent, and by several aides-de-camp. Saint-Cyr replied that he was so near at hand, that if a single officer had been sent he must infallibly have reached him. The clique about Moreau insisted that Saint-Cyr, a faithless brother-in-arms, wished to allow his neighbours to be cut up at Mæsskirch, as he had done before at Engen.

Thus, in military as in civil life, men are jealous, utter false accusations, and descend to calumny! Human passions are the same everywhere; nor is war certainly the thing to cool, to moderate, or to render them just. This much is clearly true, that Saint-Cyr, disgusted with the coterie which prevailed with Moreau, affected to shut himself up and limit himself to the command of his own corps, at the head of which he operated with rare ability. But he never anticipated the commands of the general-in-chief, always waiting for orders; orders which it is a lieutenant's part to foresee, especially when within sound of cannon shot. Saint-Cyr, by alleging his own proximity, as a proof that orders, if sent, must have reached him, in fact condemned himself. For that very proximity rendered it inexcusable that he did not come up with one division at least, to the point where the tremendous cannonade announced a violent struggle, perhaps a serious danger. He was, however, destined soon to efface by striking services the wrong he had done himself here.

French and Austrians alike were exhausted at the end of this day's fighting. It is never possible to learn the exact number of killed

and wounded, in the confusion of battles. The number at Mæsskirch must have been very great. Three thousand men must have fallen of the French army; and nearly twice that number of the Austrians. But the French army was full of confidence. It remained master of the field, and was ready on the following day to resume its part in that succession of combats, which, without hitherto gaining for it any decisive results, had nevertheless proved its decided superiority over the enemy. The Austrian army, on the contrary, much shaken, was incapable of long maintaining such a struggle. Every one can of course foresee, after the recital that has been made, the criticisms since raised on Moreau's plan of operations. He had marched into a field of battle without any previous reconnoissance to the front. He had directed too small a force on the true point of attack, which lay by the road from Klosterwald to Mæsskirch, opening on the flank of that little town; he had marched too late, entangled all his divisions, one after another, in a wood whence it was impossible to issue on the plain without a serious loss; and, to conclude the whole, he had not brought up Saint-Cyr, when his presence would have decided the whole. M. de Kray, on his side, after having ably directed his attack on our vulnerable point, the left did wrongly, in suffering Mæsskirch to be taken. But it must be admitted that his troops were far inferior to the French, both in intelligence and steadiness. Moreover, they were beginning to lose confidence; and it was not easy to induce them to bear the sight, much less the charge of the French.

On the following day, the 6th of May—16th of Floreal—M. de Kray hastened to throw himself behind the Danube, in order to establish himself on that grand line of operation. The true plan was now to push him as hard as possible, in order to render his passage of that river impossible, or at least highly difficult. Moreau, marching in line, with his left on the Danube, quite close to the point where the Austrians were crossing, had it in his power to crush them, if he had wheeled to his left. Saint-Cyr formed at this moment the wing resting on the Danube. Not having been engaged the day before, he was both ready and eager to act. He saw with his own eyes the imperial troops thronging down, not without a degree of haste, to the bridge of Sigmaringen. The Danube, which there makes a bend, presents a hollow arc, into which the Austrian army was accumulated in haste to cross over to the farther shore. Saint-Cyr saw it distinctly, within short cannon range, crowded into a space scarce sufficient wherein to manœuvre a division, and so much surprised by the appearance of the French that it suspended its passage before a single brigade of Ney's, put itself into battle order, and covered itself with the fire of sixty pieces of cannon. Saint-Cyr seeing it thus disconcerted and entangled, felt an absolute certainty that by a single charge of his whole corps he could drive it headlong into the Danube. He advanced a few guns, every shot of which swept away entire files, although they

¹ See the *Memoires of Saint-Cyr*, p. 215, &c., t. v. Campaign of 1800.

could not hope to remain in battery against M. de Kray's sixty pieces. He hoped by the noise of this cannonade to attract Moreau's attention, and to bring him from the reserve to the left. Seeing that he did not arrive, he sent an officer to inform him what was passing, and to ask for orders to attack. But all concert was lost. It was believed at head-quarters that Saint-Cyr was desirous of bearing to the left in order to separate himself yet farther from the army, and so to act alone. He was answered by an order to close up to the right and connect himself more nearly than heretofore with the reserve, which formed the centre of the army. "This measure," he was told, "is indispensable, in order that the general-in-chief may dispose of your corps at need." The character of this order clearly proved the temper of the general, and those about him. It was evident that Moreau had suffered himself to be absorbed by the command of a single corps; and that the indecision of his character was producing internal divisions, always fatal, but nowhere so fatal as in an army.

M. de Kray was permitted then to escape without peril, and to rally his army beyond the Danube. M. de Kienmayer had just joined him with the troops coming up from the banks of the Rhine, and M. de Sztarray followed on his heels.

The army of Moreau had found at Stockach and at Donau-Eschingen vast magazines. Nothing was wanting to it. It was animated by successes, and by constantly taking the offensive. On the 7th and 8th of May—17th and 18th of Floreal—Moreau continued to march with his left on the Danube, still offering a line of battle by far too much extended, and making short halts, in order to give Sainte-Suzanne time to come up with him.

On the 9th—19th of Floreal—knowing that Sainte-Suzanne, coming up by the left bank of the Danube, had at last come abreast of the army, Moreau quitted his head-quarters of a day, and passed the Danube in order to inspect the troops recently arrived. These troops hereafter formed his left wing, while Saint-Cyr became the centre, the reserve playing the part of a reserve in reality, as in conformity with its title. According to all probabilities, M. de Kray, engaged in resting his exhausted army, would remain beyond the Danube, and we should be able to make one march forward on the 9th without encountering an enemy. Moreau directed the right, that is to say Lecourbe, to move forward on the 9th between Wurzach and Ochsenhausen; the reserve to move on Ochsenhausen itself; and the centre, that is to say, Saint-Cyr, to advance beyond Biberach, with his left in observation on the Danube. The army was thus advancing to the Iller, describing a line parallel to that tributary of the Danube. Moreau set forth at nine in the morning, believing that he might give up the whole day to the corps of Sainte-Suzanne.

But M. de Kray had been led to adopt a plan, as novel as it was unexpected, by the advice of a council of war, which had judged it necessary to save the immense magazines

of Biberach, so that they should not fall into the hands of the French, like those of Stockach and Engen. He therefore passed over his whole army a second time to the right bank of the Danube, by Riedlingen, and took post in front and in the rear of Biberach. This ground had once already been the theatre of a battle won by Moreau, in 1776, thanks principally to Saint-Cyr. This theatre was again fortunate to the army, and this time to Saint-Cyr himself.

Biberach is situated in the valley of Riess, liable to inundation. This valley is so marshy that a man on horseback cannot enter it without peril, and that it is necessary to pass through Biberach itself, and over the bridge which leads into the little town. The entrance to this vale lies through a sort of pass piercing a range of heights, those of Galgenberg on one side, and those of Mittelibierach on the other. This defile passed, Biberach is in sight at once. The marsh of the Riess is crossed by the bridge leading from the town, and beyond the marsh there is a splendid position called that of the Mittenberg, on which an army well provided with artillery can take up a strong post. M. de Kray had no idea of taking up a position in front of the defile, with so narrow an outlet for retreat. He could only place himself to advantage behind Biberach on the Mittenberg itself. But he could not leave Biberach undefended. Consequently, after establishing the bulk of his army on the position of the Mittenberg, he placed a corps of eight or ten battalions and a dozen squadrons, in advance of the defile of Mittelibierach, in order to give himself time to remove or destroy the greater part of the magazines.

This was a hazardous scheme, particularly with a demoralized army. Saint-Cyr being under orders to march beyond Biberach, before halting for the night, early discovered the position which the Austrians had taken. He was much grieved that the general-in-chief was not with him, to issue suitable orders, and to make the most of this rencontre. But Moreau was absent. General Dessolles was not on the ground. If Saint-Cyr had been at the head of his whole force united, he would not have hesitated to attack with his corps alone; but unfortunately it was scattered. Being obliged to observe the Danube on his left, he had devoted his best division, Ney's, to that service. He sent several officers in search of Ney, but it was no easy task to find and bring him up, entangled as he was among the windings of the river, and in frightfully bad roads. Saint-Cyr, then, to attack a mass of at least 60,000 men, had but the two divisions of Tharreau and Baraguay d'Hilliers, with the cavalry reserve of General Sahuc attached to his corps. The enemy's demoralization tempted him sore; but the disposition of his forces led him to hesitate, when suddenly the fire of General Richepanse made itself heard. He, under orders, to keep himself in communication with Saint-Cyr and to cross the Riess by the bridge of Biberach, had come up by a cross-road, that of Reichenbach, to the same point. Saint-Cyr now had

ing the fine division of Richepanse at his command, in order to supply the gap left by Ney's absence in his lines, no longer hesitated. It was his opinion that, if the detachment left in advance of the defile in front of Biberach could be thrown into disorder, the defeat of that body of eight or ten thousand men would be something more serious than the defeat of a mere advanced guard, and that the morale of the enemy might be deeply shaken thereby. Not giving himself, therefore, even the time to dispose his troops in order of attack, he caused the eighteen battalions and twenty-four squadrons, whom he had in his own hand, to advance at double-quick time; and marched them against the ten thousand Austrians who blockaded the passage of the defile. Overthrown in an instant by this rude shock, the Austrians rushed down pell-mell into Biberach and the valley of the Riess. It would have been an easy thing to make prisoners of them all. But Saint-Cyr would not permit his soldiers to pursue them, fearing that, should he do so, he might not have the power of rallying his divisions quickly enough to complete his principal operation. He contented himself therefore with entering Biberach, establishing himself there, and so securing the safety of the magazines. After having occupied this point firmly, and so secured himself a retreat in any event, he passed the Riess. Richepanse had just arrived on his right by the road of Reichenbach. Reinforced by this fresh division, Saint-Cyr passed the Riess by the bridge of Biberach, and pressed on in person to reconnoitre the enemy's position. At this moment, the few thousand men, who had been driven so abruptly down to the Riess, were passing through the ranks of the Austrian army, which were opening to allow them to gain the rear. And by the whole aspect of the host, it was plain to see how much it was disconcerted. Saint-Cyr now sent out a certain number of skirmishers, who were directed to go and insult the enemy, unless other skirmishers should appear to push them back into the ravine. The opening fire of these detached soldiers drew forth a reply of general discharges, such as disheartened troops are wont to maintain, in order to keep up their spirits by their own noise. Saint-Cyr, when on his ground, was one of the ablest tacticians we have ever had among us. As soon as he discovered the temper and situation of the Austrian army, his part was taken on the moment.

He formed Tharreau's and Baraguay's divisions in two columns, and that of Richepanse in a third, and placed the cavalry in échelon upon the wings. When this arrangement was made, he moved all his columns at once. They mounted the slopes of the Mittenberg with unequalled resolution. The Austrians, at the sight of these soldiers scaling this formidable position with such coolness, from which an army of three times their own force was ready and able to hurl them into the swamps of the Riess below, were seized with astonishment and panic. M. de Kray ordered a retrograde movement, but his soldiers did not execute it as he could have wished. For after a few shots, they gave

up the position of the Mittenberg, and at the same time fled in disorder, leaving several thousand prisoners to Saint-Cyr's corps, and immense magazines, which sufficed to feed the French army for a long time. Night put an end to the pursuit. During these transactions, Moreau arrived unexpectedly; and although a coolness existed between them, he bore on the following day, in presence of Carnot, the minister of war, most distinguished testimony of his satisfaction with Saint-Cyr. Moreau, at this moment, being disembarassed of those unworthy friends, by whom he was beset at head-quarters, had the candour to be just to a lieutenant, who had gained a victory without his presence, and without his orders.

The French army was completely victorious; the Austrians were incapable of checking its progress; and it had but to advance. M. de Kray had, it is impossible to conceive why, detached a body to defend the magazines at Memmingen. Memmingen was on Lecourbe's line of march. The place was occupied, the detachment crushed, and the magazines taken. This was on the 10th of May—20th Floreal. On the 11th and 12th, M. de Kray definitively retreated upon Ulm; and Moreau marched upon an extensive line nearly perpendicular to the Danube. On the 13th of May, he was beyond the Iller, without having met any serious resistance in the passage of that river. His right and reserve were at Ungerhausen, Kellnützt, Iller-Aicheim and Illertissen. Saint-Cyr was posted at the confluence of the Iller and the Danube, astride the Iller, occupying the bridge of Einterkirchberg, and connecting himself with Sainte-Suzanne, who was coming up by the left bank of the Danube. From the Abbey of Wiblingen, where Saint-Cyr had his head-quarters, the Austrians could be distinctly seen in their entrenched camp at Ulm. The two armies had just been joined by all their detached corps. Marshal de Kray had some days before ordered up M. de Kienmayer and Sztarray. Moreau, having Sainte-Suzanne's corps now in hand, found his own numbers complete. Both armies had experienced losses, but that of the Austrians was more considerable than ours. It was estimated at 30,000 men in killed, wounded, and prisoners. History in this case is reduced to conjecture; for on the day of battle a general usually underrates his losses; but when he wants succour or reinforcement from his government, generally exaggerates the number of killed, wounded, and sick. The exact amount of troops under arms is never well known. M. de Kray commenced the campaign with 110,000 or 115,000 men, for active operations, and 35,000 or 40,000 in the garrisons. The utmost he could now have was 80,000, and these exhausted with fatigue, and completely demoralized. The loss of the French army was estimated at 4000 killed, 6000 or 7000 wounded, some sick with fevers, and some prisoners; in all about 12,000 or 13,000 men unserviceable. This calculation reduced Moreau's army of active operation, at the time, to 90,000 soldiers or something under. But it was on the point of sending away a strong detachment, in conformity to the convention

signed with General Berthier, at the opening of the campaign. It was stipulated in this agreement, that M. de Kray once driven eight or ten day's march beyond Constance, Lecourbe should countermarch on the Alps, so as to join the army of reserve. The perilous position of Massena rendered the execution of this agreement most urgent; and it was no contemptible desire of arresting Moreau in the midst of his success, that dictated the idea of re-demanding Lecourbe. It was the most legitimate of reasons, the saving Genoa and Liguria. The army of reserve collected with such difficulty, did not amount to 40,000 men capable of service; it still much needed reinforcement, in order to enable it to attempt the grand operation, it was about to try, beyond the Alps.

The First Consul, now impatient to operate on the side of Italy, earnestly desiring at the same time to give Moreau no offence, and yet to insure the execution of his orders, made choice of the minister of war himself, of Carnot, to carry formal and imperative orders to the head-quarters of the Rhine, for detaching Lecourbe towards Saint Gothard. The letters which accompanied this order were full of cordiality and irresistible in argument. The First Consul well knew it would not be Lecourbe, and 25,000 men, that would be sent him; but if they even sent him 15,000 or 16,000 men only, he would be perfectly satisfied. Moreau received Carnot with displeasure; nevertheless he faithfully executed the orders that were sent to him. Carnot, like a good citizen, dissipated the clouds which might have arisen in that weak and easily deceived mind, and contrived to renew in him that confidence toward the First Consul, which detestable busy-bodies were labouring to destroy. Some historians, who favour Moreau, but who favour him, even since 1615, have swelled the numbers of the detachment sent to the army of Germany to 25,000 men. Moreau himself, in answering the First Consul, estimated them not over 17,000; and this number was exaggerated. Not more than 15,000 or 16,000 soldiers marched into Switzerland in order to pass over the Saint Gothard. There now remained with Moreau about 72,000 combatants; and soon afterward 75,000, by the addition of convalescents from the hospitals, were actually present under arms. These were more than he wanted to fight 80,000 Austrians. In fact, M. de Kray had no more, and those entirely exhausted and incapable of resisting any serious attack of the French.

Moreau, fearing to detract from his army in the eyes of the enemy, still kept up the same number of divisions, and took the 16,000 men whom he destined for the First Consul, from all his different corps. Each of these corps furnished its contingent, and they kept secret, as best they could, this diminution of their force. Moreau wished to keep Lecourbe, who was himself worth a thousand men. Lecourbe was allowed to remain, and the command of the detachment devolved on the brave General

Lorges. Carnot immediately returned to Paris, after having seen the troops destined to pass the Saint Gothard on their march. This operation took place during the 11th, 12th, and 13th of May—21st, 22d, and 23d of Floreal.

The French army still possessed a force of 72,000 men, without reckoning the garrisons of towns, the division of Helvetia, and what they expected from the hospitals. Its effective force, however, was now the same as before the arrival of Sainte-Suzanne; a force which had sufficed to render it ever victorious. M. de Kray had established himself at Ulm, where, for a long time, an entrenched camp had been formed for the protection of the imperial troops. Of the two systems of defence, of which we have spoken, namely, that of retiring along the foot of the Alps, and profiting, in succession, by the cover of all the tributaries of the Danube; or that of holding both sides of the river, so as to operate on both banks of it; the latter had been preferred by the Aulic Council, and was religiously observed by M. de Kray. The first would have been good, had they wished to hold a permanent communication with the two armies of Italy and Germany. It is by no means strong in its advanced échelons; for the Iller, the Lech, the Isar, and the Inn only become obstacles of importance successively; and the last alone is considerable, though by no means totally insuperable. For there is nothing insuperable in war. But an army which, giving up its communications with Italy, places itself on the Danube, itself having all the bridges in its possession, destroying them successively as it retires; and being able to pass from one side of the river to the other, while the enemy is fixed to one side alone; being able, if this enemy wishes to make a dash on Vienna, to follow under cover of the Danube, and attack his rear, so punishing him for the first error he may commit,—an army, I say, thus placed, is generally considered in the best position for covering Austria. M. de Kray then was established at Ulm, where great works had been prepared to receive him. It is well known that, upon this point, the left bank of the Danube, formed by the first declivities of the Suabian mountains, always commands the right bank. Ulm is at the foot of the heights of the left bank, on the Danube itself. The body of the place had been repaired. A bridge head had been constructed on the opposite bank. All the heights behind Ulm, particularly the Michelsberg, were covered with artillery. If the French should present themselves, by the right bank, the Austrian army, resting with one wing on Ulm, and the other on the elevated convent of Elchingen, covered by the river, and sweeping all the open country of the right bank with its cannon shot, was inexpugnable. If the French should present themselves by the left bank, the Austrian army again had a position as certain and secure. It is necessary, for the perfect comprehension

* It is in accordance with the correspondence of Moreau, himself, that I state these numbers. All the calculations in his correspondence are exaggerated to his own advantage. He estimates his own battalions at 650 men, and those for the detachment sent to Italy, at 700 men.

This calculation cannot be true, for if he sent the corps as they were, if the battalions were reduced to 660 in his army, they could not be 700 in the corps from which they were detached.

of this, to know that the position of Ulm is covered on the right bank by the river Blau, which descends from the mountains of Suabia to join the Danube quite close to Ulm, forming a deep ravine. If, then, the French should pass the Danube above Ulm, in order to attack by the left bank, the Austrian army would change its position. Instead of facing the course of the Danube, it would turn its back upon it, and cover itself by the course of the Blau; its left wing would then be at Ulm, its centre at Michelsberg, its right wing at Lahr and Jungingen. Several marches on the left bank would be required to turn this new position, and, moreover, the right bank must be entirely abandoned, which would destroy all the combinations of the campaign. For, thus, the road over the Alps would be uncovered. Such was the camp wherein the exhausted soldiers of M. de Kray found an asylum for a time.

Saint-Cyr was at the convent of Wiblingen. From the windows of this convent he distinctly saw, even without the assistance of a telescope, the position of the Austrians. Full of confidence in the daring of the French, he offered, and many general officers with him, to storm the camp by open force. They answered for its success with their heads, and one must acknowledge that if the audacity of some of them, such as Ney or Richepanse, might have caused some mistrust, that profound tactician, Saint-Cyr, cool, methodical, and certain, deserved all confidence. But Moreau was too prudent to hazard an assault of this nature, so furnish M. de Kray with an opportunity of gaining a defensive battle. It is true that, if Moreau were victorious, the Austrian army, thrown into the Danube, would have been half destroyed, and the campaign terminated. But Moreau, failing in his attack, would have been forced to retreat; the campaign would have been jeopardized; and, more than all, the decisive campaign in Italy would perhaps have been rendered impossible. But Moreau ever operated in war without grandeur of design, though with great certainty. He allowed the brave men who answered for the success of the attack on the Austrian camp, to talk on; and refused to attempt a direct storm. The war, therefore, must needs be one of manœuvres. It was possible to cross over to the left bank above Ulm; the movement I have just described; but it would then be necessary, in order to turn the Austrians in their position, to involve the army so far on the left bank, that Switzerland would cease to be covered; and that the detachment sent toward the Alps might be endangered. It was possible, still remaining on the right bank, to descend the Danube, far below Ulm, cross it at a distance from the Austrians, and so render their position useless, by cutting them off from the Lower Danube. But on descending the river the rear of the army would be exposed and the road to Switzerland would still be left open. Moreau renounced, therefore, the idea of forcing M. de Kray from his position by any of these means; and although, taking the quality of his troops into consideration, he might have hazarded all, yet he must not be blamed for his caution and, above all,

for his scrupulous attention to the conduct of the plan which best covered the operations of the First Consul, his chief, although his rival. He resolved, then, to make a manœuvre; and it was the true one. This was, to direct his march on Augsburg; that is to say, to refuse the course of the Danube, to cross its tributaries, and render all the Austrian lines of defence useless, by a direct march on the heart of the empire. This movement, seriously executed, would have infallibly detached M. de Kray from the Danube and from his camp at Ulm, by drawing him on in pursuit of the French army. It was a very bold step, though without laying the Alps open, since it kept Moreau continually at their base. But it was no time for half measures. It was necessary either to remain motionless before Ulm, or to advance resolutely on Augsburg and Munich. For a simple demonstration would not deceive M. de Kray; and could only expose the corps left in observation near Ulm. Here Moreau committed an error, which narrowly missed bringing on the most disastrous consequences. On the 13th, 14th, and 15th of May, he passed the course of the Iller. Leaving Sainte-Suzanne alone on the left of the Danube, and Saint-Cyr at the confluence of the Iller with that river, he directed the corps of reserve on the Gunz, at Babenhausen; Lecourbe, beyond the Gunz, on Erkheim; and a body of light troops on Kempten, on the road to the Tyrol. In this singular position, his line extending twenty leagues, touching Ulm on one side, and menacing Augsburg on the other, he could not deceive M. de Kray as to the danger of the march on Munich; and could have tempted him only to throw himself with all his force upon Sainte-Suzanne, who now remained alone on the left of the Danube. Had M. de Kray yielded to this temptation, and employed all his force, Sainte-Suzanne was lost.

The orders given on the 15th—25th of Floreal—to Saint-Cyr were executed on the morning of the 16th, when Sainte-Suzanne was assailed at Erbach by an enormous mass of cavalry. His right division, commanded by General Legrand, was at Erbach and Papelau, along the Danube; his left division, commanded by Souham, was at Blaubeuren, astride the Blau; the reserve, under General Colaud, a little way behind the two divisions. The battle began by a cloud of horsemen, who enveloped our columns on all sides. While our soldiers were charged by numerous squadrons, masses of infantry pouring out of Ulm, and marching up the Danube, prepared a more serious attack. Two columns, one of infantry, the other of cavalry, were directed, the one upon Erbach, to assail and surround the two brigades of which the division of Legrand was composed; the other upon Papelau, to cut off Legrand's from Souham's division. General Legrand then ordered his troops to retreat. They retired slowly through the woods, and issued thence on the highlands between Donaurieden and Ringingen. The troops executed this retrograde movement with remarkable steadiness. They were several hours in retreating over a very limited space; stopping every instant, forming squares, and mowing

down the pursuing cavalry with their tremendous volleys. Souham's division, assailed on both flanks, was obliged to execute a similar movement, and to concentrate itself on Blaubeuren behind the Blau, pushing the Austrians, who followed it too closely, into the deep ravine formed by this river.

Legrand's division was in the most danger, because it was placed near to the Danube, and because, on this account, the enemy wished to crush it, so as to intercept all reinforcements that might arrive from the other bank of the river. The two brigades of which it was composed, were still defending themselves hardily; when at a moment, in which the infantry were retiring, and the light artillery were limbering up their pieces for the purpose of retiring also, the enemy's cavalry, returning to their charge, thundered down suddenly upon this unfortunate division. The brave Adjutant-general Levasseur, who had been dismounted in a previous charge, seized a horse, galloped to the 10th regiment of cavalry, which was at some distance from the field of battle, brought it back on the enemy, charged the Austrian squadrons, ten times superior in number, and checked its onset. The artillery had time to bring off their guns, to take up a position in the rear, and to protect in its turn the cavalry which had rescued it. During this interval, General Sainte-Suzanne had arrived with a part of Colaud's to reinforce Legrand's division. General Decaen, with the rest, had gone to succour Souham's division at Blaubeuren. The affair was re-established; but it might have yet ended disastrously in spite of this reinforcement. For there was reason to fear that the whole Austrian army would throw itself in mass on the corps of Sainte-Suzanne. Fortunately Saint-Cyr, posted on the other side of the Danube, not allowing his comrades to be crushed this time, as he had often been accused of doing, came to their assistance in all haste. Hearing the cannonade while on the left bank, he had despatched aides-de-camp after aides-de-camp to bring the divisions from the banks of the Iller to the banks of the Danube. He had given orders to lose no time, to call in the advanced posts, and to push forward with the main body of the army instantly, without waiting for those posts. A corps left in the rear was instructed to collect them. As for himself, posted on the bridge of Unterkirchberg, on the Iller, as fast as any corps came in, whether of cavalry, artillery, or infantry, he hurried it directly on the course of the Danube, preferring momentary disorder to loss of time. Afterward he proceeded in person to the banks of the Danube. The enemy, suspecting that Sainte-Suzanne would be succoured, had broken all the bridges, as far up the river as Dischingen. Seeing that Saint-Cyr was making efforts to find a ford or to establish a bridge, he had arranged his troops along the left bank, so as to face those of Saint-Cyr arriving by the right bank. He had moreover opened a brisk cannonade, to which Saint-Cyr was beginning to reply in haste. This artillery combat, raging from one side of the river to the other, inspired the Austrians who had quitted Ulm with fears for their retreat. It

brought them back to the rear, disengaged Sainte-Suzanne a little, and sent lively joy and renewed animation through the ranks of our unhappy soldiers, who for twelve hours had been maintaining a battle of despair. They asked Sainte-Suzanne to lead them to the front; a request which was granted. Then all our divisions were put in motion at once, and the Austrians were driven back again under the cannon of Ulm; but in traversing the field of battle, which all were so joyous at reconquering, it was found strewn with our wounded and our dead. As for the result, the loss of the Austrians was not less than our own. Fifteen thousand French had sustained a combat during the whole day against 36,000 men, of which 12,000 were cavalry. M. de Kray was present all day on the field of battle.

But for the bravery of the troops, the energy and the talents of the generals, the error which Moreau had committed would have been punished by the loss of our whole left wing. Moreau repaired immediately to this wing, and, as if his thoughts had been suddenly drawn to this side, by pure accident, resolved on passing his whole army to the left bank of the river, on the 17th—27th of Floreal. Leaving Sainte-Suzanne to repose himself in his position of the previous day, he led back the corps of Saint-Cyr to its post between the Iller and the Danube. He sent the reserve which was under his orders, to Unterkirchberg, upon the Iller itself, and ordered Lecourbe to sit down between Guntz and Weissenhorn. On the 18th, the army made a second movement towards its left. Sainte-Suzanne was advanced beyond the Blau, Saint-Cyr beyond the Danube, and the reserve to Gocklingen, on the Danube itself, in readiness to cross the river. On the 19th, the movement was more decided. Sainte-Suzanne had completely turned Ulm; he had his head-quarters at Urspring; Saint-Cyr was on both the banks of the Blau, his head-quarters at Blaubeuren; the reserve had passed the Danube between Erbach and the Blau; Lecourbe was ready to cross the river.

Every thing appeared to announce an open assault on the intrenched camp at Ulm. In this new position, M. de Kray had his left on Ulm, his centre on the Blau, and his right at Elchingen. He had thus his back on the Danube, and defended the reverse of the position of Ulm. Moreau, after having attentively reconnoitred the position, disappointed the expectations of his generals, who thought they saw some serious intention in this movement to the left; and who moreover desired a bold attack on the Austrian camp, because they looked upon its success as infallible. Saint-Cyr again urged it, but was not listened to. Moreau resolved to move off, not choosing to hazard an open attack along the Blau; nor choosing, again, to turn the position by his left, for fear of uncovering Switzerland. He once more ordered the army to pass again to the right bank. On the 20th of May, and the following days, the army decamped, much to the displeasure of the soldiers, who reckoned upon an assault, and to the great astonishment of the Austrians who apprehended one.

These false movements had the bad effect of

restoring the moral feeling of the Austrian army, without, however, damping in any degree that of the French, which it was difficult to shake, so convinced was it of its own superiority. Moreau might have at this time attempted a movement which I have pointed out above, and which, executed at a later period, procured him a glorious triumph. This was to descend the Danube, to threaten M. de Kray with a passage below Ulm, and to oblige him to decamp by making him uneasy as to the line of his communications. But Moreau again feared to uncover the road over the Alps. He conceived the idea, then, of making a second demonstration on Augsburg, of endeavouring once more to deceive the Austrians, and to persuade them, that in leaving Ulm in his rear, he was marching definitively on Bavaria, perhaps even on Austria. On the 22d of May—2d of Prairial—the whole French army had repassed the Danube. Lecourbe with the right wing menaced Augsburg by Landsberg; and Sainte-Suzanne, with the left wing, kept himself at some distance from the Danube, between Dellmensingen and Achstetten. On this same day, the 22d, Prince Ferdinand, at the head of 12,000 men, half of which at least were cavalry, made an attack upon Sainte-Suzanne, either for the purpose of detaining us near Ulm or of discovering our intentions. He was, however, vigorously repulsed. The troops conducted themselves with their accustomed stoutness, and General Decaen distinguished himself. The following days Moreau continued his movement. On the 27th of May—7th of Prairial—Lecourbe seized the bridge of Landsberg on the Lech, with as much hardihood as intelligence, and on the 28th entered Augsburg. M. de Kray did not allow his determination to be shaken, but remained resolutely in Ulm. It was, it must be said, the best of all his demonstrations; and that which does most honour to his firmness and judgment.

From that moment Moreau determined to remain inactive. He improved his position and rendered it stronger. Instead of extending his line, the extremity of which touched the Danube—a position which exposed our left corps to unequal combats with the entire Austrian army—he changed his front, and thenceforth, facing the Danube, ranged himself in a line parallel to that river, but at a sufficient distance, his left resting on the Iller, his right on Guntz, his rear-guard occupying Augsburg, and a corps of flankers observing the Tyrol. The French army thus presented a mass sufficiently concentrated, that it need fear nought, as to any isolated combat on one of its wings; and ran no other risk than that of a pitched battle, which was the very thing every individual in our ranks most ardently desired; since it would have been the final destruction of the Austrian army.

In this position, now above criticism, Moreau intended to await the results of the campaign which the First Consul was carrying on beyond the Alps. His generals pressing him eagerly to quit his inaction, he persisted in answering continually that it would be rash to do more until they received news from Italy.

That if General Bonaparte should succeed on that part of the theatre of war, he would then attempt a decisive manœuvre against M. de Kray; but that, if the French army should be unfortunate beyond the Alps, this army would be quite sufficiently embarrassed by the progress it had already made into Bavaria. The enterprise of General Bonaparte, the secret of which was known to Moreau, had something in it very extraordinary to a mind of his order. It is not astonishing, then, that he should have felt some uneasiness, and that he should have refused to advance, without knowing the fate of the army of reserve.

Moreau, in consequence of these resolutions, had many lively altercations with his generals, and particularly with Saint-Cyr. This officer complained of the inactivity to which they were restricted, and above all of the partiality which prevailed in the issue of provisions to the different corps of the army. His own, he said, often wanted bread, while that of the general-in-chief, next to which he was placed, was living in abundance. It was not resources that were wanting, since the capture of the enemy's magazines, but means of transportation. Saint-Cyr had more than one altercation on this subject; he was evidently on the worst terms with Moreau's staff, and this was the principal cause of this unfortunate misunderstanding. General Grenier had just arrived. Saint-Cyr was anxious that Moreau should give this general the command of the reserve, that he might so deliver himself from the prejudices and partialities which are inevitable consequences of a special command. Moreau unfortunately would do nothing of the kind. Saint-Cyr then retired, under the pretext of bad health, and deprived the army of the most skilful of its general officers. In point of fact, Saint-Cyr was made for command, not obedience. General Sainte-Suzanne also retired, in consequence of the same misunderstanding. He was sent down upon the Rhine, to form a corps destined to cover the rear of the army of Germany, and to hold the forces of Baron Albin in check. General Grenier took the place of Saint-Cyr, and Richepanse that of Sainte-Suzanne. Moreau, whose soldiers were well furnished with provisions, and who was strongly posted in his new position, resolved to wait, and wrote to the First Consul the following letter, which perfectly describes his situation and intentions.

“Babenhausen,
“7th of Prairial, year VIII—27th of May, 1800.

“We are waiting, citizen consul, with impatience for the announcement of your success. M. de Kray and I are groping about here; he to maintain his post at Ulm, and I to force him to quit it.

“It would have been dangerous, to you in particular, had I carried the war to the left bank of the Danube. Our present position has forced the Prince of Reuss to retire to the outlets of the Tyrol, to the sources of the Lech and the Iller; thus, he cannot be dangerous to you.

“Give me, I pray, some news of yourself, and let me know what I can do for you.

“If M. de Kray advances on me, I shall re-

treat even to Memmingen, cause General Lecourbe to join me there, and we will fight. If he marches on Augsburg, I shall do so likewise. To do so he will quit his stronghold at Ulm, and then we shall see what can be done to cover you.

"We certainly should have more advantage in carrying the war to the left bank of the Danube, and in making Wirtemberg and Franconia pay contributions; but that would not suit you, because the enemy could then pour down detachments on Italy, leaving us to ravage at our will the states of the imperial princes.

"Receive the assurance of my friendship.

"Signed, MOREAU."

One month and two days had elapsed; and if Moreau had not obtained those prompt and decisive results, which at a blow finish a campaign—as he could have done by passing the Rhine upon a single point near Schaffhausen, or by throwing himself in mass on the left of M. de Kray, and fighting the battles of Engen and Mæsskirch with his forces united; as he could have done again, by driving the Austrian army headlong into the Danube at Sigmaringen; by storming it by main force in its camp at Ulm; or by obliging it to decamp through a decided movement on Augsburg—he had yet fulfilled the essential object of the plan of the campaign. He had passed the Rhine without accident, in presence of the Austrian army. He had fought two great battles, and although the concentration of his force was insufficient, he had gained these battles by his firmness and good judgment on the field. To conclude, in spite of his dilatory and darkling movements before Ulm, he had, nevertheless, shut up the Austrians round that place, and held them there blockaded, cutting them off Bavaria and the Tyrol; while he was able himself to await, in his strong position, the result of events in Italy. If in him we find not that superior and decided genius which constitutes great captains, we find a mind wise, calm, and capable of repairing by its firmness the errors caused by its deficiency of

intellect and vacillating disposition. We find in him, in short, an excellent general, such as nations often have cause to desire—such an one as Europe had not at that epoch.

For it had been given to France at this period—to France which already had General Bonaparte, to possess, in addition to him, Moreau, Kleber, Desaix, Massena, and Saint-Cyr; that is to say, the best generals of the second order! And, to this it must be added, that she had already produced Dumouriez and Pichegru! Period of wondrous memories, which should inspire us with some self-confidence, should prove to Europe that all our glory, in that age, was not due to a single man, and that it is not chance which generates such genius as that of Hannibal, Cæsar, or Napoleon.

That, with which Moreau could be especially reproached, was, his want of vigour in command—was, that he allowed himself to be surrounded and governed by a particular military clique—was, that he permitted misunderstandings to grow up on all sides of him, and thus deprived himself of his best officers; not knowing how to correct, by the force of his own will, that vicious organization of his army, which induced his generals to isolate themselves, and to commit acts unworthy of military brotherhood. The great failing of Moreau, as I have often said, and as I shall frequently have occasion to say again, was his peculiar cast of mind. Why have we not a veil before our eyes, hiding from ourselves, and capable of hiding from others, the sad consequence of the times; and permitting us to enjoy, unalloyed, the wise and noble exploits of this warrior, whose heart, neither jealousy nor banishment had as yet alienated.

We must now transport ourselves to a far different theatre, thereon to witness a spectacle far different also. Providence, rich in contrasts, will now display to us another intellect, another character, another fortune; and, for the honour of our country be it said, the soldiers, still the same, that is to say, still intelligent, devoted, and undaunted.

BOOK IV.

MARENGO.

The First Consul impatiently awaits news from Germany.—That news arrived, and announcing success, he determines to set forth for Italy.—Distress of the garrison of Genoa carried to the utmost.—Resolution of Massena.—The First Consul hastens to his succour, by the execution of his project of crossing the great Alps.—Departure of the First Consul.—His deceptive appearance at Dijon.—His arrival at Martigny in the Valais.—Choice of the Saint Bernard, whereto to cross the grand chain.—Means devised for the transportation of the artillery, ammunition, provisions, and material.—Commencement of the passage.—Unheard of difficulties surmounted by the devotion of the troops.—Unexpected obstacle in the Fort du Bard.—Surprise and grief of the army at the discovery of that fort, at first believed to be impregnable.—The artillery carried by hard passes, under the fire of the fort.—Taking of Ivrea and descent of the army into the plains of Lombardy, before the Austrians have learned its existence or its march.—Simultaneous passage of the Saint Gothard by the detachment formed from the troops in Germany.—Plan of Bonaparte, when once arrived in Lombardy.—He determines on going to Milan, to rally the troops just come up from Austria, and then to surround M. de Melas.—Long illusions of M. de Melas all suddenly destroyed.—Grief of that aged general.—His orders, at first vacillating, then positive, to evacuate the banks of the Var, and the vicinity of Genoa.—Last extremities of Massena.—Absolute impossibility of feeding the soldiers and people of Genoa compels him to surrender.—Noble capitulation.—Genoa taken, the Austrians concentrate themselves in Piedmont.—Importance of the route from Alexandria to Piacenza.—Eagerness of the two armies to occupy Piacenza.—The French reach it the first.—Position of the Stradella chosen by the First Consul, in order to surround M. de Melas.—Halt of some days in that position.—Believing that the Austrians have escaped him, the First Consul goes in pursuit of them, and meets them unexpectedly in the plain of Marengo.—Battle of Marengo.—Happy inspiration of Desaix, and his death.—Regrets of the First Consul.—Despair of the Austrians, and Convention of Alexandria, by which they surrender Italy and all its garrisons to the French army.—A few days spent in Milan by the First Consul in regulating the affairs of Italy.—Conclave at Venice, and elevation of Pius VII. to the papal chair.—Return of the First Consul to Paris.—Enthusiasm excited by his presence.—Continuation of the operations on the Danube.—Victory of Hochstedt.—Moreau conquers Bavaria to the Inn.—Armistice of Germany similar to that of Italy.—commencement of negotiations for peace.—Arrival in Paris of M. de Saint Julien, the envoy of the Emperor of Germany.—Festival of the 14th of July, in the Hospital of Invalids.

THE First Consul awaited only the success of the Rhenish army, to make his descent on the plains of Italy; for, until such time, he could not demand of Moreau a detachment of his troops, and M. de Kray was not sufficiently detached from M. de Melas to warrant any undertaking in the rear of the latter.

The First Consul therefore awaited it, with lively impatience; having determined to leave Paris, and take the command of the army of reserve, as soon as he should have certain and sufficient intelligence of Moreau's successful operations. Indeed, time pressed, for Massena was reduced to the most cruel extremities at Genoa. We left him there, fighting against the whole Austrian force, with an army worn out by fatigue; and, in spite of his immense inferiority, inflicting daily severe injury on the enemy. On the 10th of May, General Ott having allowed himself to make an improper boast, by announcing to Massena that he was firing guns for a victory obtained over General Suchet—a tale which was moreover false—the illustrious defender of Genoa prepared a signal answer to this bravado. He made a sortie from Genoa with two columns. That of the left, commanded by General Soult, ascended the Bisagno, and turned Monte Ratti; that of the right, commanded by Miollis, attacked Monte Ratti in front. The Austrians, vigorously assaulted, were driven into the ravines, losing that important position and 1500 prisoners. In the evening, Massena returned triumphantly into the city of Genoa, and on the following morning wrote word to General Ott, that he was firing guns for his victory of the previous day: heroic vengeance, and worthy of that gallant heart!

But this was the last of his good fortune, for his exhausted soldiers were hardly able to carry the weight of their arms. On the 13th of May—23d Floreal—this energetic man, yielding to the counsel of his generals, consented, almost in spite of himself, to a movement, the result of which was most unfortunate.

This operation was no other than to storm Monte Creto, an important position, which it would have been, without doubt, highly desirable to wrest from the Austrians; for they would then have been driven back to a great distance from Genoa; but unfortunately, there was small chance of its success. Massena, who was certainly not distrustful of his army, for he exacted and obtained from it daily prodigious efforts, considered it no longer capable of carrying a position, which the enemy would defend with all his forces. He preferred making an expedition along the sea-shore, toward Porto Fino, for the purpose of seizing a large convoy of provisions, which he knew to have been collected in that direction. Contrary, however, to his custom, he yielded to the opinions of his lieutenants, and on the morning of the 13th, marched upon Monte Creto. The battle was at first very brilliant; but unfortunately an awful tempest, which continued several hours, broke down the energy of our troops. The enemy had concentrated numerous bodies on this point; and he bore back our soldiers, who were half dead with hunger and fatigue, into the valleys. General Soult holding it a point of honour, to bring an expedition which he had recommended to a successful termination, rallied, around himself, the 3d half-brigade, led it bravely upon the enemy and would perhaps have succeeded, had not a shot, which shattered his leg, laid him on the field of battle. His soldiers would fain have brought him off, but they had not time to do so; and this general, who during the whole siege had worthily seconded Massena, remained in the hands of the enemy.

The army returned to Genoa greatly dispirited; but, nevertheless, it brought back prisoners. While they were fighting, a disturbance had broken out amongst the females, in the interior of the city. These wretched creatures, pressed by the extremity of want, ran through the streets with bells, crying for bread. They were dispersed, and, from that

time, the French general was compelled to occupy himself nearly exclusively with the care of nourishing the population of Genoa, which, it must be added, showed him the noblest devotion. He had successively procured, as we have seen, first, grain for a fortnight, then for another fortnight; and lastly, a vessel entering Genoa unexpectedly, had brought corn for five days' consumption, so that he obtained in all enough to subsist the city for more than a month. Having been now blockaded since the 6th day of April, these resources had held out to the 10th of May, when seeing his provisions fast diminishing, he reduced the daily rations of bread given out to the army and the people, substituting for it a soup made of herbs, and the little meat remaining in the city. The wealthier inhabitants, it is true, found something to eat, by buying, almost at their weight in gold, hidden provisions which the investigations of the police had not been able to discover, for the purpose of devoting them to the common stock of nourishment. Massena therefore had only to concern himself about the poor, on whom the want of food was pressing very sensibly. He had levied, for their benefit, a contribution from the wealthy classes, thus gaining them over to the interests of the French. Moreover, the majority of the population, fearing the Austrians, and the form of government of which they were the defenders, were determined to second Massena by their resignation! Struck by the energy of his character, they had ever felt toward him as much deference as admiration. Meanwhile, the oligarchical party, using, as their tools, some famished wretches, created for him every imaginable embarrassment. Massena, to restrain these, made a part of his battalions bivouac in the principal public squares of the city, with the matches of their cannon lighted. But the bread upon which they were yet living, and which was made of oats, beans, and any other kind of grain they had been able to procure, was on the point of failing them. In a few days the meat would be exhausted likewise. On the 20th of May there would remain no other materials, than such as were almost entirely unfit for food. It was therefore necessary that the siege should be raised before the 20th of May, if it were not desired that Massena should be made a prisoner with his whole army; and that the Baron de Melas, who would then have at his disposal 30,000 more men, should return to Piedmont, to block the débouches of the Alps. The aid-de-camp, Franceschi, employed in carrying news to the government, having succeeded, by his boldness and address, in passing the Austrian and English lines, had made the deplorable state of the fortress of Genoa known to the First Consul, who neglected nothing that would put the army of reserve in a condition to traverse the Alps. To this end he had sent Carnot into Germany, with a formal order from the consuls to Moreau, that he would despatch the detachment destined to cross the Saint Gothard. Himself toiling day and night, corresponding with Berthier, who was organizing the divisions of infantry and cavalry; with Gassendi and Marmont, who were organizing the artill-

lery; with Marescot, who was reconnoitering the whole line of the Alps; he urged every one to exertion, with that headlong energy and ardour which sufficed him to carry the French from the banks of the Po to the banks of the Jordan, from the banks of the Jordan to those of the Danube and Borysthenes. He would not leave Paris in person until the last moment, not wishing to abandon the political government of France, and leave the field clear to intriguers and conspirators, for a longer time than was absolutely necessary. Meanwhile, the divisions ordered from La Vendée, from Brittany, from Paris, and from the banks of the Rhone, traversed the wide-spread territory of the republic, and the heads of their columns already were appearing in Switzerland. The dépôt of some corps were still at Dijon, besides some conscripts and volunteers, sent thither to give credence in Europe to the opinion that the army of Dijon was a pure fable, destined solely to alarm M. de Melas. Up to this moment every thing had gone well; the illusion of the Austrians was complete. The movement of troops advancing towards Switzerland was little noticed, because the corps were so much dispersed, that they passed for reinforcements sent to the army in Germany.

At length, all being ready, the First Consul made his final arrangements. He received a message from the Senate, the Tribunal, and the Legislative Body, conveying to him the prayers of the nation, that he might soon return as a victor and pacificator. He replied with well-judged solemnity. His answer was intended to agree with the articles of the *Moniteur*, in order to prove that his journey, announced with so much preparation, was like the reserve-army, a feint and no more. He charged the Consul Cambacérés to preside in his place at the state-council, which at this period was in some sort the government itself. The Consul Lebrun was directed to superintend the administration of the finances. To each of them he said: Stand firm; whatever event may occur, be not dismayed; I will return like a thunder-bolt and crush the audacious hands that would dare touch the government. He particularly urged it upon his brothers, who were attached to him by the strongest personal interest, to keep him informed of every thing, and to give him the signal of return whenever his presence should become necessary. While he thus ostentatiously announced his departure, the consuls and ministers were, on the contrary, to tell the propagators of news, in strict confidence, that the First Consul was leaving Paris for a few days only, and that simply to review the troops which were about to make the campaign.

To sum up all, he departed full of hope and satisfaction. His army contained a good number of conscripts, but also, and in much greater numbers, soldiers inured to war and accustomed to conquest, commanded by officers formed in his own school. He had, moreover, an absolute confidence in the profound conception of his plan. According to the latest information, M. de Melas was obstinately advancing into Liguria, half of his forces against Genoa, and half against the Var. At this news, the First

Consul, no longer doubtful of the success of his enterprise, already saw in his ardent imagination, the very spot whereon he should meet and overwhelm the Austrian army. One day, before leaving Paris, while leaning over his maps, upon which he had been making marks of different colours, to indicate the position of the French and Austrian armies, he said, before his secretary, who listened to him with surprise and curiosity: "This poor M. de Melas will pass through Turin, fall back toward Alexandria, I shall cross the Po, attack him on the road to Placentia, in the plains of the Scrivia, and I shall beat him there, there." and, with these words, he set one of his marks on San Giuliano. We shall soon be able to appreciate how extraordinary was this species of foresight.

He left Paris on the 6th of May, in the morning before day-break, taking with him his aid-de-camp, Duroc, and his secretary, M. de Bourrienne. On his arrival at Dijon, he reviewed the dépôts and the conscripts who had been assembled there, but who had no ammunition, no baggage, nor any of the material necessary to an army ready to set out on a campaign. After this review, which, of course, confirmed the spies still farther in the idea that the army of Dijon was nothing but a pure fiction, he proceeded to Geneva, and from Geneva to Lausanne; here all was serious; here all that was in process must soon undeceive the incredulous, but undeceive them too late to allow them to send any information, that could be useful, to Vienna.

On the 13th of May, General Bonaparte reviewed some portion of his troops, and held a conference with the officers who had been appointed to meet him, for the purpose of giving him an account of what they had done, and of receiving his last orders. General Marescot, who had been employed in reconnoitering the Alps, was he, to whom he was most eager to give ear. After having compared all the passes, this engineer-officer pronounced himself in favour of the Saint Bernard, but he considered the operation as very difficult. Difficult it may be, replied the First Consul, but is it possible?—I believe so, answered General Marescot, but with the most extraordinary efforts. Well! let us advance, was the sole reply of the First Consul.

It is now time to make known the motives which decided him to choose the Saint Bernard. The Saint Gothard was reserved for the troops coming from Germany, of which General Moncey had assumed the command. This pass lay directly on their route, and could, at the very utmost, feed fifteen thousand men, for the valleys of Upper Switzerland were entirely ruined by the presence of the belligerent armies. There remained the passes of the Simplon, of the Great Saint Bernard, and of the Mount Cenis. These were not, as at the present day, crossed by great roads. It was necessary to unharness all vehicles at the foot of the defiles, to carry them on sledges over the mountains, and replace them on their carriages, at the farther side. These three passes all offered nearly the same difficulties, except that the road of the Mount Cenis, having been more frequently travelled,

was perhaps better beaten than the others, and presented, on that account, fewer serious obstacles. But then it led down upon Turin, that is to say, on the very centre of the Austrians, and too close to them to be well adapted to the plan of surrounding them. The Simplon, on the contrary, the most remote of the three, in reference to the entrance, presented objections exactly the reverse of these. It opened, it is true, upon the environs of Milan, on a fine country, far enough distant from the Austrians, and entirely on their rear, but it presented one great difficulty. That difficulty was its distance. It would, in fact, be necessary, in order to reach it, to ascend with the whole artillery and baggage of the army, through the entire length of the Valais, which would have required means of transportation which were not at our disposal. Among these sterile and ice-bound valleys, which armies now were about to traverse, every article of consumption must needs be carried with them. It was not, therefore, a matter of indifference whether there were twenty leagues, more or less, to traverse. On the other hand, if the passage over the Saint Bernard were chosen, there was only the distance from Villeneuve to Martigny; that is to say, from the extremity of the Lake of Geneva, or the point where navigation ceases, to the foot of the defile. This was but a short distance. The pass of the Mount Saint Bernard opened at length into the valley of Aosta, toward Ivrea, between the two roads of Turin and Milan, in a direction most favourable for surrounding the Austrians. Although more difficult, and perhaps more dangerous, it deserved the preference on account of its comparative shortness. The First Consul, therefore, decided to carry the principal mass of his forces across the Saint Bernard itself. He took with him all the best troops of the army of the reserve, about forty thousand men; thirty-five thousand infantry and artillery, and five thousand cavalry. Nevertheless, desiring to distract the attention of the Austrians, he conceived the idea of sending some detachments, which it had been impossible to unite with the mass of the army, by some of the other passes. Not far from the Great Saint Bernard lies the pass of the Little Saint Bernard, which, from the heights of Savoy, opens also into the valley of Aosta. The First Consul directed General Chabran on this pass, with the 70th half brigade, and some battalions from Orient, composed of conscripts. This was a division between five and six thousand strong, which was intended to join the principal column toward Ivrea. To conclude, General Thurreau, who, with four thousand men of the Ligurian troops defended the Mount Cenis, received orders to present himself at this pass, and endeavour to penetrate it upon Turin. Thus the French army would descend the Alps by four different passes at the same time: the Saint Gothard, the Great and the Little Saint Bernard, and the Mount Cenis.

The principal mass, forty thousand strong, acting in the centre of this half circle, was certain to unite with the fifteen thousand men coming from Germany, as well as with the troops of General Chabran, and perhaps with those of General Thurreau, so that the whole would

form a total force of about sixty-five thousand soldiers; and the enemy's mind would be distracted; since at sight of all these divers bodies of troops, he would be unable to determine on what point to direct his resistance. The question of the point of passage thus decided, the next was the mode of operating; how, in short, to transport sixty thousand men, with their material of war, to the farther side of the Alps, without beaten roads, over rocks, over glaciers; and this too at the most dangerous season of the year, that in which the snows are melting. The transportation of a park of artillery is never a very easy thing, for every piece of cannon must be followed by several vehicles, and for sixty guns about three hundred of these would be requisite. But in these high valleys, some of which are stricken with the sterility of eternal winter, the others hardly large enough to support their sparse and few inhabitants, there were no means of subsistence to be found. The bread for the men, and even the forage for the horses, must be conveyed with the army. The difficulty was, therefore, prodigious. From Geneva to Villeneuve all was easy, thanks to Lake Lemman, and to a navigation of eighteen leagues, as convenient as it was rapid. But from Villeneuve, the extreme point of the lake, to Ivrea, the outlet by which you enter the rich plains of Piedmont, there were forty-five leagues to be passed, ten of which were over the rocks and glaciers of the great chain. The route from Villeneuve to Martigny, and from Martigny to Saint Pierre, was good for carriages. Thence they must begin to scale paths, covered with snow, scarping on the brink of precipices, scarce two or three feet wide, and exposed, during the noonday heat, to the shock of frightful avalanches. About ten leagues were to be traversed by these paths, in order to gain, on the farther side of the Saint Bernard, the village of Saint Rémy, in the valley of Aosta. At this point there again began a carriage-road through Aosta, Chatillon, Bard, and Ivrea, into the plains of Piedmont. Of all these points, there was one only which might present some difficulty. This was Bard, where, it was said, there was a fort, of which some Italian officers had heard tell; but which did not appear likely to present any serious obstacle. There were then, as I have said, forty-five leagues to be marched by the men, carrying every thing along with them, from the Lake of Geneva to the plains of Piedmont, and of these forty-five leagues ten had no practicable road for vehicles.

Here follow, then, the dispositions which were conceived by the First Consul for the transportation of the material of the army, and ably executed under the direction of Generals Marescot, Marmont, and Gassendi. Immense provision of wheat, biscuit, and oats, had been sent by the Lake of Geneva to Villeneuve. Well assured, that, by means of money, he could easily secure the co-operation of the hardy mountaineers of the Alps, General Bonaparte had sent forward very considerable funds, in the form of specie. By these means, then, but within the last days only, all the cars of the country, all the mules, and all the pea-

sants had been drawn to this point by promise of high payment. By these means bread, biscuit, forage, wine, and brandy, had been conveyed from Villeneuve to Martigny and thence to Saint Pierre at the foot of the defile. A sufficient number of live-cattle had also been driven thither. Thither had all the artillery and tumbrils been conveyed; and now a company of mechanics, established at the foot of the defile, at Saint Pierre, were employed in dismounting the pieces, dividing the gun-carriages into numbered fragments, ready for transportation on the back of mules. The cannons themselves would be mounted on sleds with rollers, which had been made at Auxonne. As for the ammunition of the infantry and artillery, a great number of small boxes had been prepared, which could easily be placed upon mules, and thus, like all the rest, be carried by the beasts of burden of the country. A second company of mechanics, provided with camp-forges, was intended to cross the mountain with the first division, establish themselves at the village of Saint Rémy, where the beaten road began again, prepared to reconstruct the artillery carriages, and remount the pieces. Such was the enormous task which must needs be performed. A company attached to the pontoon train was joined to the army, not carrying the material for bridging rivers, but destined to use such as they would not fail to seize in Italy. The First Consul had, moreover, reckoned on obtaining aid, from the monks established at the hospital of the Great Saint Bernard. All the world knows that these pious cenobites, established there for centuries, live in those awful solitudes, far above all inhabited regions, for the purpose of aiding travellers surprised by perilous weather, and sometimes buried in the snow. To these the First Consul had sent, at the last moment, a sum of money, in order that they should collect a large quantity of bread, cheese, and wine. A hospital was prepared at Saint Pierre, at the foot of the defile; another on the other side of the mountain at Saint Rémy. These two hospitals were to send their sick and wounded, if any there should be, to the larger hospitals established at Martigny and Villeneuve.

All these preparations were completed. The troops were beginning to appear. General Bonaparte, established at Lausanne, inspected them all, addressed them, animated them with that fire which burned so gloriously within himself, and prepared them for that immortal undertaking which should take rank in history thereafter, side by side with the grand exploit of Hannibal. He had been careful to direct two inspections, the first at Lausanne, and the second at Villeneuve. At the latter place, every foot-soldier, every horseman, was passed in review; and by means of hastily established magazines in both these places, every man was provided with the shoes, articles of dress, or arms, of which he was in want. This precaution proved to be most useful; for in spite of all the care that might be taken, the First Consul often saw veteran soldiers coming up, whose garments were worn, whose arms were unfit for service. He complained of this very

angrily, and ceased those omissions to be repaired, which were produced by the undue haste or negligence of the agents, as always happens to a certain extent, and that unavoidably. To such a point had he carried his foresight, as to establish sadlers' workshops at the foot of the defile, for the repair of the artillery harness. On this apparently trivial subject, he had already written several letters; and I mention this circumstance, for the instruction of those generals and governments to whom the lives of men are intrusted; and who too often, through indolence or vanity, neglect such particulars. Nothing, in fact, that can contribute to the success of operations, or to the safety of soldiers, is below the genius or rank of commanding officers.

The divisions were advanced in échelon, from the Jura to the foot of Saint Bernard, to avoid confusion on the road. The First Consul was at Martigny, in a convent of Bernardines. Thence he gave out all his orders, and ceased not to correspond with Paris, and with the other armies of the republic. He had intelligence from Liguria, informing him that M. de Melas, always under illusion, was making every effort to take Genoa, and force the bridge over the Var. Satisfied on these important points, he at length gave orders to pass the mountain. He, himself, remained on this side the Saint Bernard, in order to correspond as long as possible with the government, and to expedite the movement of every thing across the mountain in person. Berthier, on the contrary, was ordered to betake himself to the other side the mountain, in order to receive the divisions and the material which the First Consul should send to him.

Lannes passed the first at the head of the vanguard, in the night of the 14th and 15th of May—24, 25 of Floreal. He commanded six regiments of choice troops, perfectly well armed, which, under their daring ardent chief,—sometimes insubordinate indeed, but always able, always very valiant—went gaily forth on their adventurous march. They set forth between midnight and two o'clock; in order to outspeed the moment at which the fierce glare of the sun, melting the snow, oft hurls down icy masses on the head of the bold traveller, who ventures to intrude into those frightful gorges. It would require eight hours to reach the summit of the pass, even unto the hospital of the Saint Bernard, and but two hours to descend thence to Saint Rémy. There was time therefore to pass over, before the period of the greatest danger. The soldiers confronted the difficulties of the road with the greatest alacrity; they were most ponderously laden; for they were obliged to carry biscuit, each man for several days, beside a quantity of cartridge. They scaled these craggy paths, singing among the precipices, and pondering the conquest of that Italy wherein they had so often heretofore tasted the joys of victory; and bearing within them a noble foresight of the deathless glory which they were rushing to achieve. The task was far less difficult for the foot soldiers than for the horsemen; the latter marched on foot, leading their horses by the bridle; in this there was no danger, while ascending; but when

they came to the descent, the straitness of the paths obliged each cavalier to walk before his horse, so that each was exposed, at the least stumble of his animal, to be dragged with him headlong into the abysses; some accidents indeed of this kind happened, and yet not many. Some horses perished, but few only of the riders. Toward morning they arrived at the hospital, and there a surprise, arranged by the First Consul, renewed the energy and the good spirits of these gallant troops. The monks, provided before-hand with the necessary provisions, had prepared tables, and served out to every soldier a ration of bread, cheese, and wine. After a moment's rest, onward again they went, and reached Saint Rémy, without serious accident. Lannes established himself immediately on the opposite side of the mountain, and made all the preparations necessary for the reception of the other divisions, especially of the artillery and baggage.

Every day, one division of the army was destined to cross over. The operation therefore would last several days; the rather, for this reason that the material must needs be passed over with each separate division. To this work they applied themselves, while yet the troops were passing in succession. First the provisions and the ammunition were sent forward. For as regards this part of the baggage, which could be readily divided and loaded on the backs of mules in small boxes, the difficulty was not so great. As to the rest, what difficulty there was, lay chiefly in the insufficiency of means of transportation. For in spite of the liberal distribution of money, there could not be procured so many mules as were required for the vast weight which had to be transported to the other side of the Saint Bernard. Meanwhile the provisions and the ammunition having been forwarded in the rear of each division, and that by the aid of the soldiers, the transportation of the artillery was last undertaken. The gun-carriages and caissons had been dismounted, as I have said, and loaded on the backs of mules. The cannon themselves yet remained, the weight of which could not be reduced by division. For the twelve pounders and howitzers, the difficulty was much greater than was at first supposed. The sledges with rollers, which had been constructed in the arsenals, were wholly useless. Another mode was suggested, and immediately adopted; and it proved successful. This was to split pine trunks into two parts, hollow them out, secure a gun between them, and drag the pieces thus protected along the slippery ravines. Thanks to their wise precautions, no shock could occur to injure them. Mules were attached to these strange loads, and succeeded in bringing a few pieces to the top of the defile. But the descent was more difficult: it was only to be achieved by manual exertion, and by incurring imminent risk; as the piece had to be restrained and checked from rolling down the precipices. Unfortunately, at this juncture the mules began to fail; the muleteers too, who were now required in great numbers, became exhausted, and in consequence fresh means must be resorted to. A price as high

as a thousand francs was offered to the neighboring peasants, for dragging a gun from Saint Pierre to Saint Rémy. One hundred men were required for one cannon, one day to bring it up, and another to let it down. Several hundred peasants presented themselves, and, in fact, under the direction of artilleryists, transported a few pieces.

But not even the allurements of such gain could induce them to maintain this effort. All disappeared ere long, and although officers were sent out to seek them, lavishing money, so to bring them back, it was in vain; and it became necessary to call on the soldiers of the several divisions to drag their own artillery themselves. It seemed that nothing could be asked, too arduous, of these devoted soldiers. The money which the exhausted peasants would no longer earn, was offered as a stimulus; but they refused it to a man, exclaiming that it was a point of honour for all troops to save their cannon; and they took charge of the abandoned pieces. Parties, each of a hundred men, leaving the ranks successively, dragged them, each in their turn. Their bands struck up lively tunes in the more difficult defiles, and animated them to surmount these novel obstacles. Arrived at the mountain top, they found refreshments prepared for them by the monks, and took some brief repose, as a preparation for greater and more perilous efforts to be exerted in descending. Thus the divisions of Chambarlhac and Monnier were seen toiling at their own artillery; and as the advanced hour of the day did not permit them to descend, they preferred bivouacking in the snow, to abandoning their cannon. Fortunately the sky was clear; nor had they to endure bad weather, in addition to the hard toils of the way.

During the days of the 16th, 17th, 18th, 19th, and 20th of May, divisions still continued to pass over with their provision, ammunition, and artillery, the First Consul still remaining at Martigny, pressing the expedition of his material. Berthier received it beyond the Saint Bernard, and saw it ordered and repaired by the mechanics. The First Consul, whose foresight never failed him, now thought immediately of pushing forward Lannes to take possession of the outlets of the mountains; for he had his division all united, and some four-pounders mounted, and in readiness. Him, then, he ordered to advance, as far as Ivrea and to take that town, securing thus the entrance to the plains of Piedmont. On the 16th and 17th of May, he marched upon Aosta, where he found some Croatians, whom he drove down the valley; he then proceeded to the borough of Châtillon, in which he arrived on the 18th. There a battalion of the enemy, which they met, was completely routed, and lost many prisoners. And now Lannes hurried down the valley, which widened sensibly as they descended, and displayed to the eyes of the delighted soldiers, houses, trees, cultivated fields, in one word, all the forerunners of Italian fertility. These brave men marched on joyously, until the valley, once again contracting, presented to them a very narrow gorge, blocked by a fort, bristling with cannon.

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This was the fort of Bard; heretofore mentioned as an obstacle, by the Italian officers, but as one that could easily be overcome. The officers of engineers attached to the vanguard advanced, and, after a prompt reconnaissance, declared that the fort completely barred the road, and that it was impossible to proceed farther, without forcing this barrier, which at first sight appeared almost impregnable. This information, running through the division, caused the most terrible surprise. This was the nature of that unexpected obstacle.

The valley of Aosta is traversed by a river which receives all the waters of the Saint Bernard, and carries them into the Po, under the name of the Dora-Baltea. As it approaches Bard, the valley narrows; the road lying between the base of the mountains and the bed of the river becomes gradually more contracted, until at length, a rock, which seems to have fallen from the neighbouring crags into the middle of the valley, almost entirely blocks it. The river then runs on one side of the rock, and the road proceeds on the other. This road lined with houses composes all the town of Bard. On the top of the rock stands a fort, impregnable by its position, though ill-constructed, which sweeps with its fire, on the right, the whole course of the Dora-Baltea, and on the left, the long street forming the little town of Bard. Drawbridges close the entrance and the outlet of this single street. A garrison, small in number, but well commanded, occupied this fort.

Lannes, who was not a man to be stopped easily, sent forward, on the instant, a few companies of grenadiers, who broke down the drawbridges, and, in spite of a heavily sustained fire, entered Bard. The commandant of the fort poured down a storm of shot and shell on this devoted town; but ceased at length, in compassion for the inhabitants.

Lannes stationed his division out of the town, under cover, but it was evidently impossible to pass the material of the army, under the fire of the fort, which swept the road in all directions. Lannes instantly made his report to Berthier, who, coming to the spot in haste, saw, with dismay, the difficulty of overcoming the obstacle which was thus suddenly revealed to him. General Marescot was sent for. He examined the fort, and declared it nearly impregnable, not on account of its construction, which was indifferent, but from its position, which was entirely isolated. The escarpment of the rock did not admit of escalading, and the walls, though not covered by an embankment, could not be battered in breach, as there was no possibility of establishing a battery in a position suitable for breaching them. Nevertheless, it was possible, by strength of arm, to hoist a few guns of small calibre to the top of the neighbouring heights. Berthier gave orders to this end. The soldiers, who were used to the most difficult undertakings, went to work eagerly to hoist up two four-pounders, and even two eight-pounders. These they in fact succeeded in elevating to the mountain of Albaredo, which overlooks the rock and fort of Bard; and a plunging fire, suddenly opened.

greatly surprised the garrison, which, nevertheless, did not lose courage, but replied, and soon dismounted one of our guns, which were of too feeble a calibre to be useful.

Marescot declared that there was no hope of taking the fort, and that some other means must be devised for overcoming this obstruction. Reconnoissances were now made to the left, along the sinuous flanks of the Albaredo mountain; and at length a path was found, which, through vast dangers, more perilous than those which the Saint Bernard had presented, rejoined the great road of the valley, below the fort, at Saint-Donaz. This path, though traversing a mountain of the second order, was, at the least, as difficult to cross as that of the Saint Bernard, since it was never trodden, except by shepherds and their flocks. If a second operation, like that which had been just accomplished, was here again to be performed—if this new defile must be passed by dismounting and remounting the artillery once more, and dragging it once more with similar efforts, the manual strength of the army would, it was likely, prove insufficient, and the guns and their carriages, so frequently separated and reunited, might finally be found unfit for service. Berthier, in great alarm, instantly counter-ordered all the columns as they successively came up; suspended the march of the men and the artillery all along the line, in order to prevent them from involving themselves further, should it be necessary, after all, to retreat. An instant panic circulated to the rear, and all men thought themselves arrested in this glorious enterprise. Berthier sent courier after courier to the First Consul, to inform him of this unexpected disappointment.

The latter tarried still at Martigny, not meaning to pass over the Saint Bernard, until he had seen, with his own eyes, the last of the artillery sent forward. But this announcement of an obstacle, considered insurmountable at first, made a terrible impression on him; but he recovered quickly, and refused positively to admit the possibility of a retreat. Nothing in the world should reduce him to such an extremity. He thought that, if one of the loftiest mountains on the globe had failed to arrest his progress, a secondary rock could not be capable of vanquishing his courage and his genius. The fort, said he to himself, might be taken by bold courage; if it could not be taken, it still could be turned. Besides, if the infantry and the cavalry could pass by it, with but a few four-pounders, they could then proceed to Ivrea at the mouth of the gorge, and wait until their heavy guns could follow them. And if the heavy guns could not pass by the obstacle which had arisen; and if, in order to get any, that of the enemy must be taken, the French infantry were brave and numerous enough to assail the Austrians and take their cannon.

Moreover, he studied his maps again and again, questioned a number of Italian officers; and learning from these that many other roads led from Aosta to the neighbouring valleys, he wrote letter after letter to Berthier, forbidding him to stop the progress of the army, and pointing out to him, with wonderful precision, what reconnoissances should be made around the fort of Bard.

He would not allow himself to see any serious danger, except from the arrival of a hostile corps, shutting up the debouché of Ivrea; he instructed Berthier to send Lannes as far as to Ivrea, by the path of Albaredo, and make him take a strong position there, which should be safe from the Austrian artillery and cavalry. When Lannes guards the entrance of the valley, added the First Consul, whatever may happen, it is of little consequence, the only result may be a loss of time. We have enough provisions to subsist ourselves awhile, and one way or other we shall succeed in avoiding or overcoming the obstacles which now delay us.

These instructions having been sent to Berthier, he addressed his last orders to General Moncey, who should debouch by the Saint Gothard; to General Chabran, who should come down by the Little Saint Bernard, directly in front of the fort of Bard; and then, at last, resolved to cross the Alps in person. Before he set forth, he received news from the Var, informing him that on the 14th of May—the 24th of Floreal—the Baron de Melas was still at Nice. As it was now the 20th of May, it could not reasonably be supposed, that the Austrian general, in the space of six days, could have marched from Nice to Ivrea. It was then on the 20th, before daylight, that he set out to pass the defile. His aid-de-camp Duroc, and his secretary Bourrienne, accompanied him. The arts have represented him bounding across the snowy Alps on a fiery charger; but here is the truth unvarnished.

He ascended Mount Saint Bernard, mounted on a mule, dressed in the gray great coat which he always wore, conducted by a guide of the country; displaying, in the most difficult paths, the abstraction of a mind occupied elsewhere; discoursing with the officers whom he met here and there on the road; and then at intervals conversing with the guide who accompanied him, making him talk of his life, his pleasures, and his troubles, like to some idle traveller who has no better occupation. This guide, who was quite young, laid before him, with ingenuous simplicity, the particulars of his obscure life, and above all the grief he endured for want of a little money, which rendered him unable to marry one of the maidens of the valley. The First Consul, now listening to him, now questioning the passengers, with whom the mountains were alive, arrived at the hospital, where the good monks received him with great eagerness. Hardly had he alighted, before he wrote a note, which he handed to his guide, desiring him to give it without delay to the administrator of the army, who had remained on the other side of the Saint Bernard.

In the evening, when the young man returned to Saint Pierre, he learned with surprise how mighty was the traveller he had conducted in the morning; and also that General Bonaparte had given him a field and house; in fact, the means of marrying, and realizing all the dreams of his modest and moderate ambition. This mountaineer died recently in his own country proprietor of the field which had been given to him by the ruler of the world.

This singular act of benevolence, at a moment of so much preoccupation, is worthy of

attention. If it had been the mere caprice of a conqueror, distributing at random good and evil, alternately crushing an empire and building up a cottage; even such a caprice were worth the recording, if it should merely be to tempt the masters of the earth to do likewise. But such an act reveals something farther. The human soul, in the moment when it burns with ardent wishes, is inclined to benevolence, and does good, as it were, to merit that good which, itself, it seeks at the hands of Providence.

The First Consul halted a few minutes with the monks; thanked them for their cares toward his army; and made them a splendid gift, to be applied to the consolation of travellers and the poor.

He made the descent rapidly, after the custom of the country, by letting himself slide down the snow, and arrived the same evening at Etroubles.

The following morning, after having expended some time in examining the park of artillery and the provisions, he started for Aosta and for Bard. There, finding all that had been reported to him true, he resolved to make his infantry, cavalry, and the four-pounders, proceed by the path of Albaredo, which would be possible, after repairs. All the troops should be sent to take possession of the outlets of the mountains before Ivrea; and the First Consul, meanwhile, would attempt an attack on the fort, or find some means of avoiding its obstruction, by sending his artillery through one of the neighbouring defiles. He ordered General Lecchi, commanding the Italians, to proceed on the left, advancing by the road to Grassoney in the valley of the Sesia, which extended to the Simplon and the Lago Maggiore. This movement was intended to clear the road of the Simplon, to form a junction with the detachment, which was coming down it, and lastly to examine all the paths practicable to wheeled carriages. Meantime, the First Consul occupied himself with the fort of Bard. The single street, which composed this town, was in our possession, but only passable, if passable at all, under such storm of fire as would make it impossible to move artillery that way, even if the distance had been only five or six hundred yards. The commandant was summoned; but replied, with the firmness of a man who appreciated fully the importance of the post intrusted to his courage. Force, therefore, alone, could make us masters of the passage. The artillery, which had been placed in battery on the heights of Albaredo, produced no great effect; an escalade was attempted on the outer ramparts of the fort; but some brave grenadiers and an excellent officer, Dufour, were killed or wounded to no purpose. At this time the troops were defiling by the path of Albaredo; for fifteen hundred workmen had wrought the necessary repairs on it. Places that were too narrow they had enlarged by mounds of the earth; declivities too sudden they had eased, by cutting steps for the feet; trunks of trees they had thrown across other places, to form bridges over ravines, which were too broad to be leaped.

The army defiled man by man in succession, the cavaliers leading their horses by the bridles. The Austrian officer commanding in the fort of Bard, seeing our columns thus march past, was in despair that he could not stop their progress; he, therefore, sent a message to M. de Melas, informing him that he had seen the passage of a whole army of infantry and cavalry, without having any means to prevent it; but pledged his head that they should arrive without a single piece of cannon. During this time, our artillery-men made one of the boldest of attempts. This was, under the cloud of night, to carry a piece of cannon under the very fire of the fort. Unfortunately, the enemy, aroused by the noise, threw down fire-pots, which made the whole road light as day, enabling him by that means to sweep it with a hail-storm of deadly missiles. Out of thirteen gunners who had run the risk of taking this piece forward, seven were killed or wounded. There was in that enough to discourage hardy spirits; yet it was not long ere another way, ingenious, but still very perilous, was devised. The street was strewn with straw and litter; tow was fastened around all the cannon, to prevent the slightest resonance of those huge metallic masses on their carriages; the horses were taken out, and the bold artillerymen, dragging them with their own hands, were so daring as to carry them under the batteries of the fort, along the street of Bard. These means succeeded to perfection. The enemy, who occasionally fired as a precaution, wounded a few of our gunners; but soon, in spite of this fire, all the heavy artillery was transported through the defile; and this formidable obstruction, which had given the First Consul more anxiety than the Saint Bernard itself, was now entirely overcome. The artillery-horses had been sent by the path of Albaredo.

While this bold operation was in execution, Lannes, marching on at the head of his infantry, took, on the 20th of May, the town of Ivrea, which had not been repaired since the wars of Louis XIV., and which, by a singular presentiment, although it was too late, the Austrian staff were about arming at this very time. The fortifications of Ivrea consisted of a citadel detached from the body of the place, and a rampart protected by bastions. The valiant General Watrin, at the head of his division, assailed the citadel. Lannes rushed in person against the body of the place, and both were taken, one after the other, by escalade. There were in this place from five to six thousand Austrians, half of them cavalry, all of whom retreated with great precipitation. Lannes made some of them prisoners, drove the rest out of the valley, and took up a position at the entrance of the plain of Piedmont, at the point designated by the First Consul. A few days later, and the town of Ivrea, defended by the Austrians, would have been, though not an insurmountable, yet a serious obstruction. The French found here provisions and cannon; they finished the fortification of the town and completed the provision of it, so as to make it, in case of defeat, a cover for our line of retreat.

Meanwhile, General Chabran, with his division, descended from the Little Saint Bernard; and as this division contained many conscripts, recently incorporated, it was charged with the blockade of the fort of Bard, which could not hold out long, as it would find itself without resources, and as, now that the artillery had passed, it could be of no further service. General Thurreau, at the head of a body of 4000 men, carried the pass of Suza, made 1500 prisoners, and took some cannon, but was obliged to halt at the entrance of the valley, between Suza and Bussolino. General Lecchi, with the Italians, turned the valley of the Sesia, drove back the division of Rohan, took several hundred prisoners, and came up to clear the outlets of the Simplon, and unite his own force with a detachment of the division left in Switzerland at the beginning of the campaign. Lastly, the corps of General Moncey was scaling the heights of the valley of the Saint Gothard, by a succession of échelon movements.

Thus was the general movement of the whole army successful at all points; but it was now time to advance beyond the valley of Aosta. Lannes, always with the vanguard, left the valley on the 25th of May—the 6th of Prairial—and no longer hesitated to show himself on the plain. The Austrian General Haddick, with a few thousand infantry and a numerous cavalry, had been ordered to block up this outlet of the Alps. He was covered by a small river, the Chiusella, which empties itself into the Dora-Baltea. A bridge crossed this river. Lannes marched rapidly upon it with his infantry. Here our battalions were received with a sudden and well-directed fire of artillery: but that did not prevent them in their resolute advance. The brave Colonel Macon, with his half-brigade, entered the bed of the river, crossed it above and below the bridge, and appeared on the farther side. The Austrian cavalry, commanded by General Palfy, came rushing down to charge this demi-brigade, but the general himself fell dead, and his horsemen were routed. The French, rejoined by the remainder of Lannes division, advanced, pursuing the enemy with their usual order. General Haddick, taking advantage of some disorder in this movement, launched out his squadrons on them to great purpose. The 6th light infantry were checked, but the 22d, formed in close column, repulsed this fresh attack of the Austrian cavalry, by the weight of its fire only. Several thousand horse were then put at once into motion, to make a last effort on that valiant infantry. The 40th and 22d half-brigades, forming in square, sustained that formidable shock with rare resolution. Three times were they charged home, and three times did the squadrons of the enemy recoil from their bayonets. General Haddick, seeing himself thus unable to resist the van of the French army, gave orders to retreat, having lost many men, wounded, slain, and prisoners, surrendering all the plain of Piedmont to Lannes, and retiring behind the Orco. Lannes pursued his march, and on the 28th of May—the 8th of Prairial—advanced toward Chivasso on the banks of the Po. The Austrians, struck with surprise at this sudden invasion, hastened to

evacuate Turin. Boats, loaded with wheat, rice, munitions of war, and wounded men, were sent down the Po. But Lannes took all of them. The abundance prepared by the Austrians for their own army was destined thus to minister to the enjoyment of the French.

Thirteen days only had elapsed, and the prodigious enterprise of the First Consul had fully succeeded. An army of 40,000 men, infantry, cavalry, artillery, had passed, without a beaten road, over the loftiest mountain range of Europe, dragging up their artillery by hand over the snow, or pushing it before them under the murderous fire of a fort, pouring its volleys in at point blank range. A second division of 5000 men had descended from the Little Saint Bernard; another of 4000 had debouched from the Mount Cenis; a detachment occupied the Simplon; and, to conclude, a corps of 15,000 French, under General Moncey, were on the heights of the Saint Gothard. Here were sixty and some odd thousand soldiers, who were about to enter Italy, separated as yet from each other, it is true, by considerable distances; but sure to be combined ere long, upon a main body of 40,000 men, which poured down by the way of Ivrea, in the centre of the half-circle of the Alps. And this extraordinary march was no rash madness of a general, who, intent on turning his adversary, exposes himself to a like danger. Master at once of the valleys of the Aosta, of the Simplon, and of the Saint Gothard, General Bonaparte had the certainty of being able, in case he lost a battle, to return to the point whence he had come; he would at the utmost lose some artillery, if he should be pressed in his march. Now, having nothing henceforth to conceal, he came in person to Chivasso, harangued the troops, and raised their firmness in presence of the Austrian cavalry; disclosed to them the great results which he foresaw, and showed himself not only to his own soldiers, but to the Italians and the Austrians, in order now to daunt, by his formidable presence, the enemy whom nevertheless he rather would have left to sleep in profound security.

What was the Baron de Melas about all this while? Always reassured by the cabinet of Vienna, and also by his own agents, on the subject of the fabulous army of reserve, this general maintained the siege of Genoa and the attack on the bridge of the Var. He had suffered considerable losses on these two points, but in other respects, he persisted in believing that the assemblage of troops at Dijon was nothing more than a swarm of conscripts, destined to fill up vacancies in the armies of the Rhine and Liguria. Information, which reached him about the middle of May, had inspired him with some uneasiness touching his rear; however, he soon became composed, and arrived at the conclusion that all the forces then assembled at Dijon must proceed ere long by the Saone and Rhone to join the corps of General Suchet on the Var. Instead of sending troops by the defile of Tende back to Piedmont, he kept all his forces under General Elsnitz before the bridge of the Var. Meanwhile the French columns, which debouched simultaneously from all the valleys of the Alps,

seen and reconnoitred with the most complete certainty by General Wukassowich, at length dissipated his illusion, yet still without entirely undeceiving him. He left General Ott with 30,000 men before Genoa, General Elsnitz with 30,000 before the bridge of the Var, the latter to be reinforced by the troops of General Saint-Julien, which had become disposable since the taking of Savona, and he himself turned back with a detachment of 10,000 men through the Col de Tende, on his way to Coni, where he arrived on the 22d of May. Thus far, the Austrian general thought that the French troops, who had shown themselves, were nothing more than an assemblage of conscripts employed to make some demonstration in his rear, and so to deter him from the siege of Genoa; he did not yet think that it could be General Bonaparte himself at the head of a grand army. But now this last illusion vanished. One of his officers, who knew General Bonaparte well by sight, was sent to Chivasso on the banks of the Po. This officer saw with his own eyes the victor of Castiglione and Rivoli, and gave information of it to his commander-in-chief, who only then began to estimate the whole extent of the perils by which he was surrounded. For it was no assemblage of conscripts that the First Consul would deign to command. This was not all; it had been doubted whether the French had cannon, but at Chiusella the noise of their artillery had been heard. This venerable old man, who, in the preceding campaigns had displayed incontestable qualities, was now a prey to bitter anguish. Every day brought forth trouble; for he soon learned that the heads of General Moncey's columns were descending from the Saint Gothard.

He was indeed in a position of more than ordinary peril. Of 120,000 men, 25,000 at least he had lost before Genoa and the Var. Those left to him were scattered far and wide. General Ott, with 30,000 men, was before Genoa; General Elsnitz, with 25,000, before the bridge of the Var; General Kaim, under orders to guard the debouches of Suza and Pignerol with 12,000 men, had lost Suza and retreated upon Turin. General Haddick, who, with about 9000 men, was left to guard the valleys of Aosta and the Sesia, had just retreated before Lannes. And General Wukassowich, who, with 10,000 men, observed the valleys of the Simplon and the Saint Gothard, what would become of him before Moncey! The Baron de Melas himself was at Turin, with a body of but 10,000 men, brought back from Nice. Might not General Bonaparte fall down amidst all these dispersed troops, beat them in detail, one by one, and annihilate them? Perhaps there was yet time to take salutary determinations, but then they must be conceived and executed on the instant. The Austrian general lost a few days in recovering himself; in coming to a conclusion on the plans of his adversary; in forming his own; and last, in resigning himself to the sacrifices which must naturally be the consequence of concentrating all his forces. For he must needs abandon the Var instantly; perhaps Genoa, too; and certainly a great part of Piedmont.

While he deliberated thus, General Bonaparte, with his wonted promptitude and resolution, decided his own plans. The determinations, at which he must arrive, were not less grave than those of his adversary. For if the Austrians were dispersed, the French were dispersed likewise. For had they not descended the Mount Cenis, from the Great and from the Little Saint Bernard, and from the Saint Gothard? They must be reunited, they must cut off the retreat of the Baron de Melas, and lastly, they must raise the blockade of Massena, who, at this time, was reduced almost to the last extremity.

Having descended from the Saint Bernard, General Bonaparte had, on his right, the Mount Cenis and Pavia; on his left, the Saint Gothard and Milan, and fifty leagues in front of him Genoa and Massena. What then was to be done? To lean upon the right toward Mount Cenis, to combine the four thousand men of General Thurreau, would have been but a weak result. It would, moreover, have exposed him to an immediate encounter with M. de Melas, which, however, in the present state of his scattered forces, would not be very dangerous. Again, leaning to the right would be to open for him the roads to Milan and Placentia on his left, for his retreat. It would not indeed have been worth while to have made so great efforts to break down from the Alps upon the enemy's communications, if, after having gained the control of them, he had left them free. To press straight forward, passing the Po, rushing upon Genoa among the dispersed corps of the Austrian army, neglecting General Thurreau on the right, and General Moncey on the left, endangering all his lines of communication, would be nor wise, nor worthy of the profound prudence, which had combined all portions of his plan with as much reflection as boldness. No one could know what number of troops might be encountered on this route; the line of retreat towards the Alps would have to be sacrificed; Generals Thurreau and Moncey, abandoned to themselves, would probably be compelled to retreat toward the Mount Cenis and the Saint Gothard, after heaven only knows what adventures. A better plan would be to assist Massena directly by the way of Toulon, Nice, and Genoa. After all these considerations, there evidently remained but one part to take, that of bearing to the left toward the Saint Gothard and Milan, and so effecting a junction with the 15,000 men under General Moncey. Thus the principal detachment of the army would be united, amounting to 60,000 fighting men; the capital of Upper Italy would be occupied; the people would be raised, on the rear of the Austrians; all their magazines would be captured; the line of the Po, and all the bridges on that large river, occupied; and, to conclude, a position being gained to act at once on either bank, M. de Melas would be intercepted, by whichever line of retreat he might choose to attempt his escape. It is true that by this plan the succour to Massena would be delayed for eight or ten days, which would be vexatious. But General Bonaparte hoped that his presence would suffice to liberate the army of Liguria,

for he supposed that M. de Melas would hasten to recall the troops besieging Genoa, and the bridge of the Var. At all events, Generals Massena and Suchet had accomplished the object assigned to them by detaining M. de Melas on the Apennines, fatiguing and exhausting him, and, above all, preventing him from blocking the debouches of the Alps. Thus the defender of Genoa, even should he be forced to yield, would only be consummating the long series of sacrifices imposed upon the noble and hapless army of Liguria, for the sake of the success of a vast combination.

When his plan was determined, General Bonaparte made his arrangements with the greatest promptitude, and directed his whole army to the left bank of the Po. He assembled his park of artillery, which had been put into good order, instructed Lannes to collect all the boats taken at Chivasso, and arrange them, as if for a bridge, to be thrown, in order to pass into Piedmont. His intention was to mislead M. de Melas again, in regard to his plans, and he was now no less successful than he had been before. At the sight of the movement, ordered by General Bonaparte, M. de Melas, still striving to flatter himself till the last moment, entertained the hope that the French could not have descended the Alps, but in small numbers. He thought that if General Bonaparte, as every thing led him to suppose, only desired to cross the Po, to proceed to Turin, and unite his force with General Moreau toward the Mount Cenis—he thought, I say, that it was possible to oppose him by breaking the bridges, and disputing the passage of the Po, with some thirty thousand men. He thus conceived the hope of being able to defend himself on this line, without making the double sacrifice of the position occupied on the Var, and the progress made before Genoa. Consequently M. de Melas united General Haddick, who had returned from the valley of Aosta, General Kaim, stationed at the outlet of Suza, and the 10,000 men, which he had himself brought back from Nice, beside a fresh detachment drawn from the Var; thus forming an assemblage of 30,000 men. And not supposing us to have a greater number, he hoped, with these forces, to dispute the river separating the two armies.

The First Consul made no efforts to remove this new illusion of his enemy, and leaving him occupied with this half concentration of his forces, in the direction of Turin, betook himself at once to Milan. Lannes, who had made a feint of ascending the Po for the purpose of marching from Chivasso upon Turin, suddenly turned down the river, advancing by Crescentino and Trino, upon Pavia, where were immense magazines of the Imperialists, consisting of provisions, ammunition, and artillery, and a most important position, from its commanding the passage of both the Po and Tessino. Murat was marching, by Vercello, on the point of Buffalora. The whole army followed this general movement toward Milan. On the 31st of May, they arrived before the Tessino; this river is wide and deep. They had no boats to cross it, and on the other side a numerous cavalry displayed itself, be-

longing to the corps of General Wukassowich, who guarded the Simplon and this part of the debouches of the Alps. Behind the Tessino runs the Naviglio-Grande, a wide canal, which crosses the country as far as Milan. For a certain distance it runs parallel to the course of the river, from which it is drawn, and is very near to it. The cavalry of the enemy, being crowded upon a very narrow neck of land between the Tessino and the canal, was much embarrassed in its movements, and could make little use of its strength.

The Adjutant-general Girard took some small boats, which the peasants of the environs had concealed near Galiate, and which they readily gave up to the army. He crossed over, followed by a handful of soldiers, and threw himself upon the Austrian van-guard! Successively reinforced by the going and coming of these boats, and covered by the fire of the artillery, he repulsed the cavalry, who did not dare to undertake too much on this unsuitable ground, and obliged it to re-cross the Naviglio-Grande at a point, called the bridge of Turbigio. Thus, at one dash, he crossed at once the Naviglio and the Tessino. But General Wukassowich arrived unexpectedly with Laudon's brigade of infantry, and attempted to penetrate the village of Turbigio. The Adjutant-general Girard had then 4000 or 5000 infantry against him, with only a few hundred soldiers to oppose them. He defended himself, however, for several hours, with much presence of mind and courage, and succeeded in saving the bridge of Turbigio, the loss of which would have thrown back the French beyond the Naviglio-Grande, and perhaps beyond the Tessino. While he was defending himself so bravely, General Monnier, who had succeeded in crossing a little way below, came to his aid, fell upon Laudon's troops and drove them from Turbigio. This line, which was calculated to stop the French army, was thus forced by a mere combat of the van-guard. On the following day, the 1st of June—12th Prairial—the division of Boudet passed towards Buffalora, and the whole army advanced upon Milan. Wukassowich, fearful of being hemmed in between the grand army, which was advancing upon Lombardy, and Moncey's division, which was descending from the Saint Gothard, retired hastily, ordering the brigade of Dedovich, which was at the foot of the mountains, to fall back upon the Adda, by the way of Cassano. He himself sought refuge behind the Adda, by Milan and Lodi, after having left a garrison of 2800 men in the Castle of Milan.

No obstacle henceforth arrested the course of the French army. Free entrance was afforded to the capital of Lombardy, which, for more than a year, had been groaning under the Austrian yoke. Up to this time these unhappy Italians had heard of nothing but the success of M. de Melas, and the distress of the French. Caricatures of the army of reserve had been circulated in Milan, as well as in Vienna and London. It had been represented as a medley of old men and children, armed with sticks and staves, mounted upon asses, and having for its whole artillery but a couple of blunder-

busses. The censure thus heaped upon the French republic was not difficult to be endured; but not so the oppression, which the unfortunate Italians were condemned to undergo. Every man in Lombardy distinguished for fortune or education was either in prison or in exile, especially if he had taken any part in the affairs of the Cisalpine republic. And what was very remarkable, this persecution fell less heavily upon the ultra-patriots of the day,—men corresponding to the French jacobins,—than upon moderate men, whose example was more dangerous to the lower orders. With the exception of a few creatures of the Austrian government, and some nobles attached to the oligarchical party, all were sending up prayers for the return of the French. But they scarce durst cherish the hope, especially when they saw the Baron de Melas making such rapid advances in Liguria, on the point of taking Genoa, and passing the Var; and the First Consul so much occupied, in appearance at least, by the dangers of invasion which threatened France on the side of the Rhine. It was even circulated among the people, that the General Bonaparte, so well known in Italy, had died in Egypt; that, like another Pharaoh, he had been drowned in the Red Sea; and that the person whose name was then figuring in Paris was one of his brothers.

The surprise of the Italians may be readily conceived, when it was suddenly announced to them that a French army had made its appearance at Ivrea, that it had even passed that place, and was marching upon the Tessino; and later yet, that it had crossed that river. We may figure to ourselves the excitement that prevailed in Milan; the statements and counter-statements that met each other during forty-eight hours; and, finally, the joy that broke forth when the news was realized, by the appearance of General Bonaparte in person, marching with his staff at the head of the van-guard. On the 2d of June—13th of Prairial—the whole population poured forth to meet the French army, saluting the illustrious chief, whom they had so often seen within their walls, welcoming him with transports of enthusiasm, and hailing him as a saviour come down to them from heaven. Italian feeling, naturally so lively and so prompt to manifest itself, had never been displayed in so striking a manner, no similar combination of circumstances having ever arisen to call forth the emotions of a whole people. As soon as the French general entered Milan, his first act was to open the prisons, and render the government of the country friendly to France. He gave a provisional administration to the Cisalpine republic, composing it of the most respectable men of the city; and, faithful in Italy to the system which he had carried out in France, he permitted neither violence nor reaction; and while he restored power to the Italians of his party, he took care that they should not exercise it against the Italians of the opposite party.

After thus devoting his first cares to the affairs of Milan, he hastened to push his columns in every direction, as far as the lakes, the Adda, and the Po, so as to turn the

insurrection to the profit of the French, to seize on the enemy's magazines, to make himself master of his communications, and to cut him off from every line of retreat. So far, things were proceeding favourably. For Lannes, whose direction was upon Pavia, had entered that city on the 1st of June, and made himself master of its immense magazines. That general found in Pavia, in the Austrian magazines, a considerable amount of corn, forage, ammunition, arms, and, above all, three hundred pieces of artillery, half of which were field-pieces. He also procured there several pontoons, which the French pontoon train, who had marched into Italy, without their material, were intended to employ upon the Po.

The division of Chabran, which had been left before Fort Bard, took possession of it on the 1st of June, and found there eighteen pieces of cannon. General Chabran, having left a garrison in it, as well as in Ivrea, occupied the course of the Po, from the Dora-Baltea, as far as the Sesia. Hence to Pavia the ground was occupied by Lannes. General Bethencourt, who had come from the Simplon, was stationed before Arona, toward the termination of Lago Maggiore. The Italian legion was directed through Brescia in pursuit of the Austrians, who were retiring in all haste. At the same time, the divisions of Duhesme and Loison passed the Adda, and rested upon Lodi, Cremona, and Pizzighittone. General Wukassowich, unable any longer even to make a feint of guarding the Adda, retired beyond the Mincio, under the cannon of Mantua.

Nothing now arrested the march of General Monecy, save the difficulty of subsisting in the barren valleys of Upper Switzerland. His first columns had begun to make their appearance; but it was necessary that they should wait some days for the others, and this proved to be one of the great inconveniences of his position, for it was necessary to press forward, if Genoa was to be prevented from falling into the hands of the Austrians. General Bonaparte was now sure of establishing a junction of all his columns, one only excepted, that of General Thurreau, who was cut off at the pass of Mount Cenis, without being able to extricate himself. In other respects, our army was strongly posted in the midst of the Milanese; having its retreat secured by the Mount Cenis, the Saint Bernard, the Simplon, and the Saint Gothard; holding the Adda, the Tessino, and the Po; living upon the magazines of the Austrians; intercepting all their routes, and in position to give them decisive battle; after which they would have no other resource, in case of discomfiture, than that of laying down their arms. The surrender of Genoa, if such must be, would be a painful circumstance, painful as regarded the brave army by which it was defended; and painful, inasmuch as the besiegers, by reinforcing General Melas, would render more difficult the great battle which was to terminate the campaign. But when General Bonaparte should carry the day it was by one and the same blow that Genoa and Italy would be reconquered. Nevertheless, he would have made every sacrifice to save Genoa; but the junction of Monecy's

corps could not be looked for earlier than the 5th or 6th of June, and it was in vain to hope that Genoa could hold out till that period.

Baron Melas had, by the late news, been rendered fully sensible of the real state of things. After seeing his adversary enter Milan, where he was joined by all the columns which descended the Alps, in succession, he comprehended the vast plan laid out against him. To add to his misfortune, news was brought him of the reverses experienced by M. de Kray, and of his retreat upon Ulm. Upon this, he at length broke through his system of half-measures, and issued an imperative order to General Elsnitz to abandon the bridges of the Var, and to General Ott to break up the siege of Genoa, and to both of them to form a junction at Alessandria. It was this that led General Bonaparte to form hopes for the safety of Genoa. But it was decided that the noble but ill-fated army of Liguria should pay, even to the last, by its blood, by its suffering, and at length by a painful surrender, for the triumphs of the army of reserve.

Massena sustained to the last the greatness of his character. "He yield!" cried his soldiers; "No, he would sooner make us eat our very boots!" The meat had all been consumed, and they were subsisting upon horse-flesh; and, the latter having also failed them, the most unclean of animals were obliged to serve them for sustenance. The miserable bread, composed of oats and beans, had also been devoured. From the 23d of May—3d of Prairial—Massena, collecting the starch, linseed, and cacao, found in the magazines of Genoa, had it made into bread which the soldiers could with difficulty swallow, and which few among them succeeded in digesting. The hospitals were encumbered with the sufferers. The people being reduced to a vegetable soup, as their only support, experienced all the torments of famine. The streets were covered with wretched beings, expiring of inanition; women, extenuated with hunger, were seen exposing to the public charity their infants, whom they could no longer nourish. Another spectacle filled both the city and the army with dismay. This was the number of prisoners, whom Massena had taken, and for whom he had no food. He was unwilling to set them free upon their parole, having seen numbers of those, to whom this privilege had been granted, reappear in the ranks of the enemy. He had, therefore, proposed to General Ott, and afterwards to Admiral Keith, that they should furnish the provisions necessary for their daily subsistence, passing his word of honour that no part of the same should be abstracted for the garrison. The word of such a man might surely have been relied upon. But so deep was the spirit of animosity, that it was decided to impose on Massena the charge of feeding the prisoners, however cruel the privations to which such a resolution might lead. The general on the enemy's side had, therefore, the barbarity to condemn his soldiers to the horrible sufferings of hunger, in order to augment the famine in Genoa, by having some thousands of mouths more to feed. Massena supplied these prisoners with the same vegeta-

ble soup which he gave to the inhabitants. It was inadequate to the want of men of robust constitution, and habituated to the abundance of the rich plains of Italy. They were always upon the eve of revolt, to drive them from the thought of which, Massena caused them to be shut up in the hulks of some old vessels, which were placed in the middle of the port, and upon which a park of artillery, constantly pointed, stood ready to bellow forth destruction. The frightful howlings of these miserable beings deeply affected the whole population, already so immersed in their own sufferings.

Day by day the number of our soldiers diminished. They were seen expiring in the streets, and so great was the weakness of the men, that they were permitted to mount guard seated. Discouraged and disheartened, the Genoese no longer performed the service of the national guard, fearful of compromising themselves should the Austrians bring back the oligarchical party. From time to time, obscure rumours were afloat, that the despair of the inhabitants was about to break forth; and to prevent such an explosion, battalions, with loaded cannon, occupied the principal streets and squares of the city.

The imperturbable attitude of Massena had its effect upon the people and the army. The respect which this heroic officer inspired, eating, as he did, with the soldiers, their disgusting bread, living with them under the fire of the enemy, and sustaining, with unshaken firmness, the weight of duty and the cares of responsibility, added to all their physical calamities—the respect which he inspired, I say, acted as a powerful restraint upon all. In the midst of desolated Genoa, he exerted the ascendancy of a grand and lofty mind.

Meanwhile, a feeling of hope still supported the besieged. Several of the general's aides-de-camp had, by courageous and persevering efforts, crossed the lines, and brought in news. Colonels Reille, Franceschi, and Ortigoni, had adventured successfully, and had learned, at one time, that the First Consul had set forth, and was on his way; and at another, that he was crossing the Alps. One of the three, Franceschi, had left him descending the Saint Bernard. But since the 20th of May, no farther accounts of him had been received. Passed in this state of doubt and uncertainty, ten or twelve days seemed as so many ages, and it was asked, in a desponding tone, how it could happen that, in ten days, General Bonaparte should not have crossed the space which separates the Alps from the Apennines. Knowing him to be the man he is, said they, he is, by this time, either conqueror or conquered; if he come not, it is that he has fallen in this daring enterprise. Had he entered Italy, he would already have had the Austrian general in his grasp, and would have dragged him from the walls of Genoa. Others pretended that General Bonaparte regarded the army of Liguria in the light of a corps to be sacrificed to a grand operation; that he had one thing only in view, and that was to keep the Baron de Melas upon the Apennines; but this object attained, that he thought no more of dislodging him, but would march forward to an end of

vaster purpose. Well, well! cried the Genoese, and our soldiers joined them in the sentiment, they have sacrificed us to the glory of France; be it so; but now that this object is attained, is it desired that the last man of us shall expire? Were it facing the enemy's fire, and with arms in our hands, well and good; but of hunger, of disease—no, that cannot be! The moment has come; we must at last surrender. Pushed to desperation, several of the soldiers went so far as to destroy their arms. Meanwhile, a plot was talked of, contrived by some men, whom suffering had driven to desperation. Massena addressed to them a beautiful proclamation, in which he reminded them of the duties of a soldier; duties which consist not less in supporting privations and suffering, than in facing dangers. He pointed to the example of their officers, eating of the same food with themselves, and exposing themselves, day by day, to be killed or wounded at their head. He told them that the First Consul was advancing at the head of an army for their deliverance; that to capitulate at this time of day, were to lose, in a moment, the result of two months of deeds of devotion. Yet a few days, said he, nay, a few hours, and you will be delivered, and that after having rendered the noblest service to your country.

And thus, in every sound, in every echo, toward the horizon, they thought they heard the cannon of General Bonaparte, and were seen to run eagerly together. One day, it was currently believed, that the firing of cannon was heard in the direction of Bocchetta; extravagant joy broke forth on every side; Massena, himself, hurried to the ramparts. Vain illusion! it was but the distant muttering of a storm in the gorges of the Apennines. Feelings of angry melancholy and depression grew upon every heart.

At length, on the 4th of June, there remained but two ounces, to each man, of that loathsome bread, composed of starch and cacao. To yield the place was now absolutely necessary; for reduced to extremity, as our soldiers were, the wretched men could not be called upon to devour each other; and their resistance had its inevitable term, in the physical impossibility of existing any longer without food. The army had, moreover, the sense, that it had done all that could be expected from its courage. The conviction was strong upon them, that they were not defending the Thermopylæ of France, but were serving to favour a manœuvre which, at the moment, must have succeeded, or failed utterly. Above all, a belief began to gain ground, that the First Consul was thinking more of extending his combinations than of relieving them. Massena shared this feeling, though he avowed it not; but he did not consider his duties as entirely accomplished, until he had held out unto the last possible term of resistance. These two miserable ounces of bread, which remained for each man, being consumed, nothing would remain but the necessity to surrender. To this, he resigned himself at last, but in grief and in bitterness of heart.

General Ott had sent him a flag of truce, for the Austrians were not less eager to come to

terms than the French. In fact, this general had received the most positive orders to raise the sign of Genoa and to fall back upon Alessandria. Some historians have said, that these offers on the part of the enemy should have taught Massena what was the real state of things. Doubtless, he well knew that, could he wait a day or two longer, succours might possibly arrive; but those two days were not his to dispose of. "Give me," said he, to the Genoese, "only two days' provisions, or even one, and I will save you from the Austrian yoke, at the same time that I spare my army the pain of a surrender." At length, on the 3d of June, Massena was compelled to treat. A surrender at discretion was named, but he rejected the idea in a manner so decided, that it was not again proposed. He insisted that the army should retire whither it would, with its arms and baggage, with colours flying, and with the liberty to serve and fight, when beyond the besieger's lines. "If not," said he, to the Austrian flag of truce, "I will sally forth from Genoa, sword in hand. With 8,000 famished men, I will attack your camp, and I will fight, till I cut my way through you." The garrison was permitted to depart, but it was insisted that its commander should remain a prisoner in person, for they feared that with a leader such as he, this garrison might cut its way from Genoa to Savona, join with the troops of Suchet, and attempt some formidable enterprise upon the rear of Baron de Melas. To calm the indignation of Massena, the end of this condition, so honourable to himself, was avowed. He would not hear one word of it. It was then asked, that the garrison should leave by sea, that it might not have time to join Suchet's corps. To all these propositions he opposed his usual answer, that "He would cut his way through them." It was at length agreed, that 8,000 men should pass by land, that is to say, those who were still able to support the weight of their arms. The convalescents were to be successively embarked, and transported to Suchet's general quarters. There remained 4000 invalids, whom the Austrians contracted to feed and take care of, and to restore them afterwards to the French army. General Miollis was left to command them. In the stipulations of Massena, provision was made for the interests of the Genoese. He required, as an express condition, that no man among them should be prosecuted for opinions put forth during the period of our occupation, and that persons and property should be faithfully respected. M. de Corvetto, a Genoese of high standing, and since minister in France, was admitted to these conferences, and can bear witness to the efforts made in favour of the Genoese. It was also Massena's wish that the existing government—that for which they were indebted to the French Revolution, should be left untouched. Upon this point the Austrian general refused to make any engagement. "Very well!" said Massena, "do what you please; but, I give you notice that, ere fifteen days are passed, I shall be once more in Genoa."—Prophetic words, to which M. de Saint-Julien, an Austrian officer, made the following noble and delicate reply: "Monsieur le Géo-

ral, you will find in this place the men whom you have so well taught how to defend it."

The definitive conference took place on the morning of the 4th of June, in a chapel, at the Ponte Cornigliano. The article relative to the conducting a portion of the army by land, gave rise to a last difficulty. But when Massena gave them the alternative, either of acceding to what he wished, or of coming to the issue of a desperate conflict on the morrow, the Austrian generals yielded the point. It was stipulated that this convention, in which evacuation was agreed upon, and from which the term capitulation was carefully excluded, should be concluded that very evening. It may be observed, that the Austrian officers were filled with admiration at the French general's conduct, and paid him every tribute of respect and regard.

When evening came, he still delayed signing, in the hope, which never abandoned him, that deliverance might come. At last, when it could no longer be deferred without breaking the word that had been passed, he affixed his signature to it. The following morning, our troops marched forth with General Gazan at their head, and found the rations prepared for them at the outposts. Massena went by sea, in order that he might more promptly reach Suchet's head-quarters. He left the port in a boat bearing the tri-colour flag, and under the guns of the English squadron.

Thus finished this memorable siege, during which a French army found occasion to display great virtues and to perform great services. It had made more prisoners and killed more enemies than it numbered soldiers. With fifteen thousand men, it had taken or put *hors de combat* more than eighteen thousand Austrians. It had moreover ruined the moral sense of the imperial army, by compelling it to be continually on the alert, and to make constant and prodigious efforts. But should it be asked, at what cost the brave garrison of Genoa accomplished all this?—The reply is here—of fifteen thousand effective soldiers, it had lost more than three thousand killed in action; four thousand had been wounded more or less grievously; only eight thousand were on their way to join the army in the field. Soult, the second in command, remained with a broken leg in the hands of the enemy. Of three generals of division, one, Marbot, had died of an epidemic: a second, Gazan, was severely wounded. Of six generals of brigade, four were disabled; Gardanne, Petitot, Fressinet, and d'Arnaud. Of twelve adjutant-generals, six were disabled, one taken prisoner, and an eighth killed. Two officers of the staff had been killed, seven taken prisoners, fourteen wounded. Eleven colonels, out of seventeen, had been put *hors de combat*, or made prisoners. Three-fourths of the officers had shared the same fate. It is self-evident, that nothing could have sustained this brave army through so many trials and reverses, but the example of endurance and devotedness set them by all their officers. But in return, they showed themselves worthy of such leaders; for never did French soldiers display more constancy or more heroic virtue.

Honour, then, to that luckless valour, which, by its all-unlimited devotion, contributed to the triumphs of that more lucky valour, the feats of which I have now to record!

While General Ott, himself under orders to raise the siege of Genoa, was granting to Massena the favourable terms we have just recounted, General Elsnitz, being recalled by the orders of the Baron de Melas, had abandoned the bridge of the Var. The attacks of the Austrians upon this point had been tardy, because their heavy artillery, transported by sea, had been long reaching them. Different attempts had been made in succession from the 22d until the 27th of May; the last, in particular, was a mere desperate effort of despair, on the part of General Elsnitz, who was desirous, before retiring, to leave no means untried that might lead to ultimate success. These attacks were all valiantly repelled, and General Elsnitz, perceiving that there was no chance of success, thought of repassing the mountains. Suchet, scanning with a prompt and experienced eye the intentions of the Austrian general, made dispositions to prevent him effecting his retreat in safety. He saw at a glance that, by manœuvring to his left, along the mountains, he should place the Austrians in a perilous situation, and might probably succeed in cutting off some of their detachments. In fact, without the line of the Var, where the inroads of the enemy had been stayed, lies the parallel line of the Roya, whose source is in the Col di Tende. Should the French, by moving across the Var, out-march the Austrians upon the sources of the Roya, they would make themselves masters of the Col di Tende, and force their adversaries to skirt the ridge of the Apennines in search of a passage.

This happy idea, executed with vigour, obtained for General Suchet the happiest results. He began by dislodging General Gorupp from Ronciglione; marched briskly on his left to the right of the Austrians, which was somewhat shaken; carried successively the defiles of the Rauss, which open from the valley of the Var into that of the Roya; took the famous camp Des Mille Fourches; and making himself master of the Col di Tende, found himself, on the first of June, placed in command of General Elsnitz's line of retreat. General Gorupp, being thrown into disorder on the heights of Roya, had still time to gain the Col di Tende, leaving, however, upon his route, a number of dead and prisoners. General Elsnitz, with the rest of his army, had no other resource than that of following the seaward declivity of the Apennines to Oneglia, and of returning by Pievia and San Giacomo into the valley of the Tanaro. He had to cross frightful mountains, with soldiers already disordered by this species of flight, having at his heels an enemy who was in high spirits at passing from defensive to offensive warfare. During five whole days the Austrians were pursued without intermission, and checked continually; and, at length, on the 6th of June, General Elsnitz, on reaching Ormea, had only ten thousand men left. On the 7th he was at Ceva. General Gorupp had retired upon Coni, with a

feeble division. The loss sustained by the Austrian corps upon the Var is estimated at ten thousand men.

General Suchet, who had been so long separated from Massena, joined him again upon the seaboard, near Savona. The twelve thousand French, who came from the Var, joined the eight thousand who had left Genoa, thus forming a body of twenty thousand men, well situated for falling upon the rear of M. de Melas. But Massena having received rather a serious contusion in disembarking, could not mount his horse, while the eight thousand men whom he led were worn out with fatigue. And, add to this—for the truth must be told—that in the breast of all the defenders of Genoa, there lingered a secret irritation against the First Consul, who was now known to have triumphed at Milan, while the army of Liguria was reduced to capitulation. Massena was unwilling that General Suchet should run the risk of a descent upon Italy, without being apprized of the movements which the two generals opposed to each other were about to make on the other side of the Alps. Baron de Melas, being joined by all his lieutenants, Haddick, Kaim, Elsnitz, and Ott, might find himself at the head of a formidable force, fall upon General Suchet, and worst his forces, before proceeding to meet General Bonaparte. Massena did, however, permit his lieutenant, Suchet, to pass the Apennines; and to take up a position before Acqui; instructing him to hold this position, observing the Austrian army, and availing himself of every opportunity to annoy it; hanging suspended, as it were, over its head like the sword of Damocles. We shall shortly have an opportunity of seeing what service was again rendered by the army of Liguria, simply by its presence upon the summit of the Apennines.

It was thought by Massena, that this brave army, in terminating by a menacing movement the memorable defence of Genoa, had done its part toward the triumph of the First Consul, and that it could not do more without imprudence. This distinguished officer had reason for what he did. He was about to deliver over the Austrians, worn down by the efforts he had compelled them to exert, and reduced to a third of their number, into the hands of General Bonaparte. Of the 70,000 men who had passed the Apennines, not more than 40,000 had returned, including the detachment brought back by M. de Melas to Turin. The 50,000 in Lombardy had also been diminished greatly, and, above all, were dispersed over the country. Generals Haddick and Kaim, the former of whom guarded the valley of Aosta, and the other the valley of Suza, had suffered considerable losses. General Wukassowich, driven beyond the Mincio, and separated from his general-in-chief by the French army, which had descended from the Saint Bernard, remained paralyzed for the rest of the campaign. A corps of some thousand men had ventured into Tuscany. By at once forming a junction between Generals Elsnitz and Ott, who came from the borders of the Var, and from Genoa; and Generals Haddick and Kaim, who had returned from the valleys of

Aosta and Suza, M. de Melas might have formed a mass of about 75,000 men. But he was compelled to leave garrisons in the strong holds of Piedmont and Liguria, such as Genoa, Savona, Gavi, Acqui, Coni, Turin, Alessandria, and Tortona. As matters therefore stood, he would not have more than 50,000 soldiers. or thereabout, to bring into the field, presuming that too many men were not sacrificed in the garrison of the strongholds in question, and that the junction of his generals were effected without accident.

The situation of the Austrian generalissimo was, therefore, very critical, even after the taking of Genoa. It was so, not only in respect to the dispersion and diminution of his forces, but also in regard to the line of march he must needs take, in order to emerge from the narrow precincts of Piedmont, in which General Bonaparte had shut him up. In fact, it was necessary to repass the Po, in the face of the French, and to regain, through Lombardy, which was occupied by them, the grand route of Friuli and the Tyrol. The difficulty was immense, in presence of an adversary whose distinguishing tact in the art of war was that of great and rapid movements.

M. de Melas had kept the upper course of the Po, from its source as far as Valencia. It was easy to pass this river at Turin, Chivasso, Casale, or Valencia; granted, but in passing it at any one of these points, he must necessarily fall upon the Tessino, which was occupied by General Bonaparte, and upon Milan, the centre of all the French forces. There was, therefore, but little chance of his escape in that direction. The choice was left him, of leaning to his right, and of taking the direction of the lower course of the Po, that is, of making for Placentia or Cremona, in order to gain the grand route to Mantua. Placentia thus became to both the adversaries the capital point of occupation. In respect to M. de Melas, it presented almost the only hope of escaping a second "Caudine Forks." In regard to General Bonaparte, it was the means of gaining the prize due to his daring march across the Alps. In fact, had the latter succeeded in delivering Piedmont, only at the sacrifice of allowing the Austrians to escape, such a result, balanced against the risks he had run, might have incurred some ridicule in the eyes of Europe, which was gazing intently at this campaign; for his manœuvre, the object of which is now manifest, would in this manner have been foiled. Consequently, Placentia was the key of Piedmont: it was a point equally essential to the party anxious to escape the adversary, and to the party anxious to prevent that escape.

For the above reasons, M. de Melas fixed upon two points of concentration for his troops; Alessandria, for those who were in Upper Piedmont, and Placentia for those around Genoa. He ordered Generals Kaim and Haddick to march from Turin upon Alessandria, by the way of Asti; and General Elsnitz, returned from the borders of the Var, on the same place, by way of Ceva and Cherasco. These three corps, once united, were instructed to transport themselves from Alessandria to Placentia. He ordered General Ott, who was

on his way from Genoa, to descend directly upon Placentia, by the way of Bocchetta and Tortona. A corps of infantry, disencumbered of all the impediments of an army, had orders to march direct on the same place, by the route of Bobbio, along the valley of the Trebbia. Lastly, General Oreilly, who was already in the environs of Alessandria, with a strong detachment of cavalry, received instructions not to await the concentration of the troops of Upper Piedmont, but to make his way, at the top of his horses' speed, to Placentia. The small corps, which had adventured into Tuscany, also received orders to repair thither by the Duchy of Parma, and by the route of Fiorenzuola. Thus, while the principal part of the Austrian army was concentrating upon Alessandria, in order to march thence upon Placentia, the corps lying nearest to the latter place had the same orders to march thither direct, and without loss of time.

But it was doubtful whether General Bonaparte could be outstripped in so important an object. He had lost five or six days in Milan in collecting the corps which had come by the Saint Gothard; an interval of great importance, since during that time Genoa had fallen. But now that General Moncey, with the troops drawn from Germany, had scaled the Saint Gothard, he lost not a moment farther. Placed upon the route of the couriers coming to and fro from Vienna to M. de Melas, at Turin, he was perfectly initiated in all the projects of the imperial government. For instance, he had read the singular despatch, in which M. de Thugut, reassuring the Austrian general, advised him to be at his ease, and not to allow himself to be diverted from his purpose by the fable of an army of reserve; to lose no time in carrying Genoa and the line of the Var, in order to form a detachment to aid the army of Marshal de Kray, who was shut up on the Ulm. He had also read the despatches of M. de Melas, which opened, in a tone of confidence, but closed in a troubled and plaintive strain. All this was amusing enough, but the amusement was interrupted on the 2d of June, when he learned, through the same correspondence, that Massena had been compelled to surrender Genoa on the 4th. As for the rest, this news in no respect changed the plan marked out for his campaign; for having sought to throw himself upon the rear of the enemy, in order to surround him and force him to lay down his arms, had he succeeded, Italy, and the city of Genoa, would both be reconquered by the same blow. The real and serious inconvenience, resulting from the taking of Genoa, was that of having upon his hands the disposable troops of General Ott. But the intercepted despatch carried its consolation with it, for this despatch declared that the army of Massena were not prisoners of war. Hence, if on the one hand a larger body of Austrian troops was descending from the Apennines; on the other, a body of French troops, which had not at first been taken into account, was descending from the Apennines on the track of those Austrians.

Now that Genoa had opened its gates, the First Consul felt less eager to encounter M. de

Melas. But he was very eager indeed to occupy the line of the Po, from Pavia to Placentia and Cremona; and to possess himself of these important points, that of Placentia in particular, he made dispositions quite as active as those of M. de Melas himself. While occupied in Milan, collecting the troops which had come from different points of the Alps, he stationed along the Po the troops which had come with him by the Saint Bernard. Lannes had already taken possession of Pavia with the division of Watrin. This general had instructions to pass the Po, a little way above its junction with the Tessino, that is, at Belgiojoso. Murat, with the divisions of Boudet and Monnier, had orders to cross at Placentia; Duhesme, with the division of Loison, was to pass at Cremona.

On the 6th of June, Lannes having collected at Pavia, in the Tessino, all the boats that could be disposed of, sent them to the Po, and having reached a point between Belgiojoso and San-Cipriano, began his passage there. General Watrin, who was placed under his orders, crossed the river with a detachment. Scarcely had this detachment reached the right bank, when it had an affair with the troops which had come from Valencia and Alessandria, and were hurrying to Placentia. It ran much risk of being driven into the river; but General Watrin held his ground firmly till the boats going and returning had brought him a reinforcement, when he remained, in the end master of the ground. The remainder of Watrin's division, led on by Lannes, afterward passed the Po, and took a position somewhat higher up, menacing the great road from Alessandria to Placentia.

On the same day, Murat reached Placentia. All the members of the Austrian administration were in this city, with some hundreds of men to guard them. On the approach of danger, the Austrian officer mounted cannon on the bridge-head of Placentia, situated on the left bank of the Po, and hoped to defend himself until the corps, which were advancing on every side, should come to his succour. The vanguard of Monnier's division, deeming the place, before which it presented itself, undefended, was met by a terrible fire of grape-shot, and as the position could not be carried by assailing it in front, a regular attack was deferred till the morrow.

On the day following, the 7th, General Oreilly, who had received orders from M. de Melas, to hasten from Alessandria to Placentia, arrived there with his cavalry. The other Austrian corps, that which had come up from Parma by Fiorenzuola, that which had gone down with General Gottesheim by Bobbio, and that which had come with General Ott by Tortona, had not arrived; nor was General Oreilly in condition, with his squadrons, to defend Placentia. The few hundred men who attempted a resistance at the bridge-head, had lost a fourth of their number. In this position of things, the Austrian commander drew off his artillery, and destroyed the bridge of Placentia, which was formed by boats; so that when General Boudet hastened to repair the check of the evening previous, he found the bridge

head evacuated, and the bridge itself gone. But there remained a portion of the boats that had served for its construction; of these Murat took possession, and somewhat lower down, at Noceto, by successive embarkations, carried Monnier's brigade across the Po. This brigade threw itself upon Placentia, and effected an entrance, after a lively action. General O'Reilly lost not a moment in falling back, that he might be in time to save the park of artillery which was on its way from Alessandria, and which was in danger of falling into the hands of the French. In fact he arrived in time to prevent its falling into the hands of either of Murat or Lannes. He had to charge the troops of Lannes, which had passed the Po at Belgiojoso, more than once with his cavalry. He disengaged himself, however, and succeeded in counter-ordering the park of artillery, which shut itself up in Tortona. While General O'Reilly was clearing the road backward to Alessandria, having had the good fortune to get through our out-posts, the vanguard of General Gottesheim's infantry, having descended along the Trebbia, by Bobbio, presented itself before Placentia. One regiment came full-face upon the whole of Boudet's division, and was cut to pieces. It was that of Klebeck. This unfortunate regiment, which was assailed by superior numbers, lost many prisoners, and fell back in disorder upon Gottesheim's principal corps, in advance of which it was marching. General Gottesheim, alarmed at this rash skirmishing, returned with all speed up the acclivity of the Apennines, in order to regain Tortona and Alessandria, across the mountains, about which he had the ill luck to wander several days in succession. Again, the regiment returning from Tuscany, by the way of Parma and Fiorenzuola, arrived on the same day upon the suburbs of Placentia. This was a new disaster for this detached corps, which, falling suddenly into the midst of the enemy's army, was thrown back in disorder upon the road to Parma. Thus, out of four corps marching upon Placentia, three, the least important it is true, had been beaten, and had left prisoners in their flight. The fourth and most considerable, was that of General Ott, which, having to make a longer circuit, was still in the rear; and was on the point of coming up with Lannes, before reaching Belgiojoso. From this moment the French were masters of the Po, and in possession of the two principal passes, that of Belgiojoso, near Pavia, and that of Placentia. They were soon to be in possession of a third, for on the following day, General Duhême, at the head of Loison's division, took Cremona from a detachment which General Wukassowich had left there on quitting the place. Here he collected much materiel, and made 2000 prisoners.

General Bonaparte now directed all his operations from Milan. He had sent forward Berthier to the borders of the Po; and, day by day, sometimes hour by hour, conveyed to him, in an interesting correspondence, the movements he was to execute.

Though by taking possession of the Po, of Pavia, and Placentia, he was master of the line of retreat which M. de Melas would be

tempted to follow, still all was not done; for, what rendered this route of Placentia the true line of retreat for the Austrians, was the presence of the French beyond the Tessino, and around Milan. In fact, in this position the French blocked the passage, which the Austrians might have opened to themselves by crossing the Po between Turin and Valencia. Nevertheless, if now, in order to encounter M. de Melas, the French should pass the Po between Pavia and Placentia, abandoning Milan, and weakening the Tessino, they would again tempt M. de Melas to pass either by Turin, Casale, or Valencia; and falling on the rear which we had left open, and on the city of Milan itself, to pay us back with nearly the same blow we had dealt him in the descent from the Alps. Nor was it impossible, that M. de Melas, deciding upon the sacrifice of a part or his baggage and heavy artillery, which he might have left in Piedmont, would retrace his steps to Genoa, and ascend by Tortona and Novi, as far as Bocchetta. Thence he might throw himself into the valley of the Trebbia, fall upon the Po below Placentia, in the environs of Cremona or Parma, and by this circuit succeed in gaining Mantua and the Austrian states. This march, however, across Liguria and the spurs of the Apennines, the same which had been marked out for General Gottesheim, was the least probable, as presenting great difficulties, and leading to the sacrifice of a part of his material; but it was strictly within the reach of possibility, and like other possibilities was to be provided against. It was to guard against these different chances, that General Bonaparte used every precaution; nor is there, perhaps, an example in history of dispositions so masterly and so profoundly conceived, as those which he devised on this decisive occasion.

A threefold problem was to be solved.—to close by a barrier of steel the principal route, leading directly from Alessandria to Placentia; to occupy, in such a way as to render it available in case of need, the route falling by the upper Po down on the Tessino; and lastly, to retain the power of descending in time upon the lower Po, should the Austrians, seeking to fly by the reverse of the mountain, endeavour to pass the river above Placentia, toward Cremona or Parma. General Bonaparte never ceased poring over the map of Italy, in search of a post, that would answer to these three conditions, and he made a choice worthy of everlasting admiration.

On examining the movement upon the chain of the Apennines, it will be seen that, owing to the turn which that chain takes in embracing the gulf of Genoa, it sweeps off in a northerly direction, and throws off spurs which descend to the very brink of the Po, from the position of the Stradella to the environs of Placentia. In this part of Piedmont and of the Duchy of Parma, these spurs press so closely upon the river as to leave but a very narrow space for the high road to Placentia. An army, stationed before the Stradella, at the entrance of a sort of defile several leagues in length, with its left upon the heights, its centre on the road, its right along the Po, and the marshes that border it, would be difficult to dislodge. It

should be added, that this road is sprinkled with halets and villages, built of rough masonry, and very capable of resisting cannon. Against the imperial army, therefore, with its numerous cavalry and artillery, apart from its other advantages, this position was excellent, as rendering null those two important arms.

It had other advantages also, nor these less peculiar. It is close to this position, that the tributary streams of the other bank of the Po, the most important for occupation, such as the Tessino and the Adda, form their junction. The Tessino joins the Po a little way above Pavia, and below Belgiojoso, nearly opposite to the Stradella, at two leagues, for the farthest. The Adda, taking a longer course before joining the Po, falls into it between Placentia and Cremona. It will be readily understood, that, stationed at the Stradella, and master of the bridges of Belgiojoso, Placentia, and Cremona, General Bonaparte was in possession of the most decisive points, for he would bar the principal route, that from Alessandria to Placentia; and could, at the same time, by a vigorous march, either advance upon the Tessino, or fall down the Po as far as to Cremona, and make for the Adda, which covered his rear against the forces of Wukassow ch.

It was in this kind of net, formed by the Apennines, the Po, the Tessino, and the Adda, that he distributed his forces. He resolved in the first instance to throw himself upon the Stradella itself, with the 30,000 best soldiers of his army, the divisions of Watrin, Chambarlhac, Gardanne, Boudet, and Monnier, posted under the orders of Murat, Victor, and Lannes, in the position we have described, the left upon the mountains, the centre on the high road, and the right along the Po. The division of Chabran, which had come by the Little Saint Bernard, which had been charged in the first instance with the occupation of Ivrea, was afterwards sent to Vercelli, with orders to fall back upon the Tessino, in case of the approach of the enemy. The division of Lapoype, which had descended the Saint Gothard, was posted upon the Tessino, in the environs of Pavia. In all these amounted to 9000 or 10,000 men, who were instructed to fall back one upon the other, dispute the passage of the Tessino at the outset, and give time to General Bonaparte to fly in a single day to their succour. The detachment of the Simplon, under General Bethencourt, guarded, in the direction of Arona the route of the Saint Gothard, which was destined to serve as the retreat of the French army in case of disaster. The division of Gilly was appointed to guard Milan; which would render the presence of an Austrian garrison necessary in the castle of that city. Between 3000 and 4000 men were employed in this twofold object. Lastly, the division of Lorges, which had come from Germany, had orders to take up its station at Lodi, on the Adda. The division of Loison, which formed part of the army of reserve, was commissioned, under the orders of General Duhesme, to defend Placentia, and Cremona. This comprised another force of between 10,000 and 11,000 men, employed on these latter points.

Such was the disposition of the fifty and odd thousand soldiers, of whom General Bonaparte could dispose at this moment. 32,000 were at the central point of Stradella, from 9000 to 10,000 upon the Tessino, from 3000 to 4000 at Milan and Arona; and lastly, between 10,000 and 11,000 on the lower Po and the Adda; all so placed, as to be able mutually to support each other with the greatest celerity. In fact, in case of advice from the Tessino, General Bonaparte could in a single day succour the 10,000 French who guarded it. On notice from the lower Po, he could, in the same space of time, descend upon Placentia and Cremona, while General Loison, defending the passage of the river, would afford him time to hasten thither. The one and the other of them would, on their side, fall back upon the Stradella and reinforce General Bonaparte in as short a space of time as it would occupy him to reach them.

In the present instance, General Bonaparte seemed to abandon his usual principle of concentrating his forces on the eve of a general engagement. If such a concentration be regarded as a chef-d'œuvre of art, when operated seasonably, in the moment of a decisive action, and in the case of two opponents marching against each other, the very reverse is the case, when one of the two is seeking to escape; and when the secret of art consists in grasping him firmly before fighting him. Such was the case in the present instance. In fact, General Bonaparte had to draw a net round the Austrian army, and this net must be strong enough to hold him. Had he had nothing but outposts on the Tessino and the lower Po, fitted at the most to supply him with information, not to bar the enemy's route, he would have wholly failed of his purpose. Upon every point there were needed posts capable at the same time of conveying intelligence, and of arresting the course of the Austrians, always maintaining in the centre a principal mass, ready to speed in any direction, with decisive means; and never was the employment of such forces, and the application of his own principles, happily modified, combined with such profound skill, as by General Bonaparte on the occasion before us. It is in the application to peculiar circumstances of a true, but general principle, that men of action are the most distinguished.

This plan once decided, General Bonaparte gave his orders accordingly. Lannes, with the division of Watrin, had been sent to the Stradella, by the way of Pavia and Belgiojoso. It was necessary that the divisions of Chambarlhac, Gardanne, Monnier, and Boudet, which had gone to Placentia, should bring him the succour of their forces, before the Austrian corps, which, driven out of Placentia, had marched to effect a junction with General Ott near Tortona, should have time to fall upon him. This is what General Bonaparte, with his amazing sagacity, had foreseen. Unable to quit Milan until the 8th, in order to reach the Stradella on the 9th, he despatched to Berthier, Lannes, and Murat, the following instructions—"Concentrate yourselves," said he, "at the Stradella. On the 8th, or 9th at the latest, you

will have upon your hands fifteen or eighteen thousand Austrians, coming from Genoa. Meet them, and cut them to pieces. It will be so many enemies the less upon our hands on the day of the decisive battle which we are to expect with the entire army of M. de Melas." These orders given, he set forth, on the 8th, from Milan, intending to pass the Po in person, and to be at the Stradella the day following.

It was impossible to divine, with more exactness, the movements of the enemy. I stated above, that three Austrian detachments had presented themselves before Placentia without effect; that the detachment which had reached Tuscany by the way of Fiorenzuola, had been driven from thence; that the detachment of General Gottesheim, which had descended with the infantry by the valley of Trebbia, had been pushed back upon that valley; and, lastly, that General Oreilly, who had come with the cavalry from Alessandria, had been compelled to return in the direction of Tortona. But, on his side, General Ott, marching with the main body by the route of Genoa to Tortona, reached the Stradella on the morning of the 9th of June, as General Bonaparte had foreseen. He brought forward with him Generals Gottesheim and Oreilly, whom he had met on their retreat, and intended to make a vigorous effort upon Placentia, not dreaming that the French army could be in échelon almost in its full strength in the defile of the Stradella. Including the troops which had joined him, he had between seventeen and eighteen thousand men. On the morning of the 9th, Lannes could not collect more than seven or eight thousand; but, thanks to the reiterated orders of the general-in-chief, five or six thousand would join him in the course of the day. The field of battle was that which I have already described. Lannes offered himself, with his left resting on the heights of the Apennine, his centre on the high road, near the small village of Casteggio, and his right in the plain of the Po. He had erred in posting himself somewhat too far in advance of the Stradella, in the direction of Casteggio and Montebello, where the road ceases to form a defile, owing to the opening of the plain. But the French, full of confidence, though inferior in numbers, were capable of the grandest devotion; above all, under a leader like Lannes, who possessed eminently the art of gaining their affections.

Lannes, by pushing the division of Watrin vigorously on Casteggio, drove in Oreilly's outposts. His plan consisted in gaining possession of the small village of Casteggio, situated upon his route, either by attacking it in front, or by turning it on the plain of the Po on one side, or on the declivities of the Apennine on the other. Stationed upon the road, the numerous artillery of the Austrians swept it in every direction. Two light battalions of the 6th attempted to take this murderous artillery by turning it to the right, while the whole of the third battalion of the 6th and 40th, made an effort to carry the neighbouring heights to the left, while the remainder of Watrin's division marched upon Casteggio itself, wherein the centre of the enemy rested. A furious engagement began upon all points. The French

were on the point of carrying the positions attacked, but General Gottesheim, hastening with his infantry to the aid of Oreilly, drove back the battalion which had gained the heights. Lannes, under a most fearful fire, supported his troops, and prevented them from yielding to numbers. They were, however, on the point of giving way, when the division of Chambarlhac, forming a part of General Victor's corps, came up. General Rivaud, at the head of the 43d, regained the heights, rallied the French battalions, which had been driven thence, and, after unheard-of efforts, succeeded in establishing himself on that position. In the centre, that is upon the high road, the 96th came to the aid of General Watrin, in his attack upon Casteggio; and the 24th, extending themselves to the right upon the plain, essayed to turn the enemy's left, in order to put down the fire of his artillery. During this combined effort upon the wings, the brave Watrin maintained a stout and fierce attack upon Casteggio; he lost and retook this hamlet several times. But Lannes, present everywhere, gave the decisive stroke. By his orders, General Rivaud, on the left, being now master of the heights, and having cleared them of the enemy, rushed down upon the rear of Casteggio; the troops, pushed forward on the plain to the right, succeeded in turning the severely disputed hamlet, and, on both sides, marched upon Montebello; while General Watrin, making a last effort on the enemy's centre, cut his way through it, and thus, at length, passed out beyond Casteggio. The Austrians, at this moment finding themselves repulsed in every direction, fled to Montebello, leaving in our hands a considerable number of prisoners.

The action had lasted from eleven in the morning until eight in the evening. The Austrians, who were here in the plains of Piedmont, struggling with such desperate efforts to cut their way out, were the same soldiers who had blockaded Massena in Genoa, and who had been formed by him to encounter the rudest shocks. They were seconded by a numerous artillery, and had displayed more than their usual bravery. The First Consul arrived just at the termination of the battle, the time and place of which he had so well foreseen. He found Lannes covered with blood, but exulting in the happy result of the day, and the troops in transport at their success. They had, to use his own phrase, "the consciousness of having acted worthily." The conscripts had shown themselves worthy to vie with the veterans of the army; we had taken four thousand prisoners, and nearly three thousand had been killed or wounded. The victory had been a hard one for us to gain—twelve thousand combatants, at most, having encountered eighteen thousand.

Such was the battle of Montebello, which conferred upon Lannes and his family the title by which they are to this day distinguished: a glorious title, of which his sons have just reason to be proud!

This first encounter was a fine opening of the campaign, and one well calculated to impress M. de Melas with the conviction that the

road would not be readily opened to his march. General Ott, weakened by the loss of 7000 men, retired in consternation upon Alessandria. The moral sense of the French army were raised to the highest degree of enthusiasm.

The First Consul hastened to unite his divisions, and to occupy strongly the route from Alessandria to Placentia, which, in all probability, would be attempted by M. de Melas. Lannes having advanced something too far forward, the First Consul made a slight retrograde movement, as far as to the point known by the name of the Stradella, as this defile, being contracted in this place between the heights and the river, presents a more secure position.

The 10th and 11th of June were passed in observing the movements of the Austrians; in concentrating the army; in allowing it time to rest from the fatigue of its rapid marches; and in organizing the artillery in the best manner possible; for until this moment he had not been able to collect on this point more than forty field-pieces.

On the 11th, Desaix, one of the most distinguished generals of the period, arrived at headquarters; who, in point of military talent, was, perhaps, equal to Moreau, Massena, Kleber, and Lannes; but who surpassed them all in certain rare qualities peculiar to himself. He had recently left Egypt, where Kleber had committed certain political blunders, which I shall shortly have the pain of relating. Desaix had attempted in vain to prevent the evil consequence of these false views of his brother in arms, in order to avoid the painful spectacle of which he had returned to Europe. These errors, be it observed, were afterward gloriously repaired. Desaix, having been made prisoner near the shores of France, had been treated in a very unworthy manner by the English. He arrived full of indignation, and demanded an opportunity of avenging himself sword in hand. He loved the First Consul with a warmth that had almost the air of passion; and the First Consul, touched with the affection of a heart so noble, repaid it with the liveliest friendship he ever manifested during his whole life. They passed a whole night together in talking over the events of Egypt and France, and the First Consul gave him, upon the spot, the command of the united divisions of Monnier and Boudet.

On the following day, June 12th, General Bonaparte, surprised at not seeing the Austrians appear, could not help feeling some apprehension. Astonished that, in such a situation, M. de Melas should hesitate, lose time, and allow all the outlets to be closed around him, and measuring his antagonist too closely by himself, he observed, that M. de Melas could not have sacrificed hours so precious, and that he must have escaped him, either by ascending toward Genoa, or by passing the upper Po, in order to force the Tessino. Fatigued with waiting, on the 12th, after mid-day, he quitted his position at the Stradella, and advanced, followed by all his army, as far as the heights of Tortona. He ordered the blockade of that place, and established his head-quarters at Voghera. On the morning of the 13th, he passed the

Scrvia, and debouched into the immense plain extending between the Scrivia and the Bormida, which has since been known by no other name than the plain of Marengo. It was on that very spot that, not many months before, his active imagination had pictured to itself the great battle with M. de Melas.

In this place, the Po retreats from the Apennine, and leaves a vast space, across which the Bormida and the Tanaro roll their waters, now become less rapid, till meeting near Alessandria, they flow on together into the bed of the Po. The road, leading along the foot of the Apennine to Tortona, departs from it, abreast of this place, turns to the right, passes the Scrivia, and opens into a vast plain. The stream it crosses at a first village, called San Giuliano, runs forward to a second named Marengo, and at length crosses the Bormida, and terminates at the celebrated fortress of Alessandria. Did the enemy intend to follow the high road from Placentia to Mantua, said General Bonaparte to himself, it is here that he would await me; for here his numerous artillery and his fine cavalry could act to the best advantage, and exert their combined means with the best effect. To strengthen himself still more in his conjectures, General Bonaparte caused the plain to be scoured by his light cavalry, who were unable to discover a single Austrian. Toward the close of the day, he advanced with the corps of General Victor, composed of the divisions of Gardanne and Chambarlhac, as far as to Marengo. At this point they found a detachment, that of Oreilly, who for a moment defended the village of Marengo, but abandoned it immediately, and fell back over the Bormida. An ill-conducted reconnoissance induced the belief that the enemy was not in possession of the bridge of the Bormida.

From all these indications, General Bonaparte doubted no longer. He came to the conclusion that M. de Melas had escaped. He would never have given up the plain, and, above all, the village of Marengo, which formed the entrance to it, had he wished to deliver a battle, and force his way over it from Alessandria to Placentia. Deceived by a conclusion so natural to arrive at, General Bonaparte left General Victor with two divisions at Marengo; placed Lannes in échelon in the plain with Watrin's division, and hastened to his headquarters at Voghera, hoping for news of General Moncey, established on the Tessino, and of General Duhesne, established on the lower Po, and thus to hear what had become of M. de Melas. Staff-officers, from all these points, were appointed to meet him at his headquarters. But the Scrivia had overflowed its banks, and, very fortunately, he was obliged to stop at Torre-di-Garofolo. The news from Tessino and the Po, the news of that very day, announced the most absolute repose. M. de Melas had made no attempt whatever on that side. What could have become of him? . . . General Bonaparte conjectured that he must have ascended by Novi to Genoa, in order to pass by the valley of the Trebbia, and return to Cremona. It would seem, in fact, that not being at Alessandria, and not having proceeded up the Tessino, he could have done no other.

Another supposition was, that, following the example of Wurmser at Mantua, he might have shut himself up in Genoa, where, victualled by the English, his garrison of 50,000 men might have the means of protracting the war. These ideas having taken possession strongly of the First Consul's mind, he ordered Desaix to march upon Rivolta and Novi, with a single division, that of Boudet. For it was by the way of Novi that M. de Melas would necessarily pass, on his way from Alessandria to Genoa.

By a happy presentiment, however, he kept the division of Monnier, which was Desaix's second, in reserve at head-quarters; and, as far as possible, provided against every exigency, by leaving Victor at Marengo with two divisions, Lannes with one in the plain, and Murat at his side with all his cavalry. If the general disposition of the French forces at this moment be taken into account, part of which was spread upon the Tessino, part on the lower Po and the Adda, and part on the route to Genoa, we shall be struck by their wide dispersion. It was a necessary consequence of the situation of affairs, and of the circumstances of the moment, which no foresight could control.

On the evening of the 13th, the eve of one of the most memorable days in history, General Bonaparte slept at the village of Torredì-Garofolo, where he expected to receive news on the morrow.

During this time, Alessandria was a scene of confusion. The Austrian army was reduced to a state of despair. A council of war had been called, and not one of the resolutions, of which the French general was apprehensive, had been adopted. One point of their deliberation was, whether they should retire by the upper Po and the Tessino, or shut themselves up in Genoa; but the Austrian generals, like brave men as they were, preferred obedience to the voice of honour. After all, said they, for eighteen months we have been fighting like good soldiers; we have re-conquered Italy; we are marching upon the frontiers of France, whither our government directs us; yesterday, only, was that order again repeated. It is for that government to give us notice of the danger which threatens our rear. If there be any thing false in our situation, it is upon them that the error must rest; all the means proposed to avoid an encounter with the French army are complicated, difficult, doubtful; there is but one simple and honorable course to pursue, and that is to cut our way through it. To-morrow, we must open ourselves a path, though our blood pay the attempt. If we succeed, victory will regain for us the road to Placentia and Mantua; if not, we shall have done our duty, and the responsibility of any disaster that may befall will rest upon other heads than ours.

The First Consul had not conceived it possible, that, under such circumstances, so much time would be lost in deliberation. But to equal him in the promptitude of his decisions, was the lot of but few men; and M. de Melas was in too painful a position not to claim sympathy and pardon for the cruel perplexities that retarded his definitive resolution. In thus determining to deliver a battle, the Austrian

general acted the part of an honourable soldier; but he might be reproached for having left twenty-five thousand men in the strongholds of Coni, Turin, Tortona, Genoa, Acqui, Gavi, and Alessandria, especially after the losses lately experienced by General Ott, at Montebello. With twenty-five thousand men in these places, three thousand in Tuscany, and twelve thousand between Mantua and Venice, there remained with him but forty thousand men at the farthest, to be present on the field of battle, whereby the fortune of the war must be decided. To such a fraction had the fine army of one hundred and twenty thousand men been reduced, which was to close its campaign, by forcing the southern frontiers of France! Forty thousand had fallen, forty thousand more were dispersed, and the last forty thousand men were about to engage in battle in order to escape a catastrophe like that of the Caudine forks; but, with these last there was a powerful cavalry, there were two hundred pieces of artillery.

It was decided that, on the morrow, the whole army should debouche by the bridges of the Bormida, for there were two covered by the same tête-de-pont, contrary to the false accounts returned to General Bonaparte; that General Ott, at the head of ten thousand men, half infantry and half cavalry, should debouche from the Bormida, and bearing to the left, should direct himself upon a village called Castel-Ceriolo; that Generals Haddick and Kaim, at the head of the main body of the army about twenty thousand in number, should carry the village of Marengo, which is at the entrance of the plain, and that General Oreilly with five or six thousand soldiers should take the right, ascending the Bormida. A powerful artillery was destined to support this movement. A considerable detachment, consisting principally of cavalry, was left behind at Alessandria, upon the road to Acqui, to observe the troops of Suchet, of whose arrival they had some vague information.

I have described the large plain of Marengo, traversed in all its extent by the high road from Alessandria to Placentia, and enclosed between the Scrivia and the Bormida. The French, marching from Placentia and the Scrivia, would first come upon San Giuliano, and afterward, at three quarters of a league farther, upon Marengo, which almost touches the Bormida, and forms the principal outlet which the Austrian army had to conquer, in order to issue from Alessandria. Between San Giuliano and Marengo extends, in a right line, the road which was to be disputed; and on each side wide spreads the plain covered with fields of wheat and vineyards. Below Marengo, to the right of the French, and left of the Austrians, lay Castel-Ceriolo, a large borough through which general Ott was intended to pass, in order to turn the corps of General Victor, stationed in Marengo. It was, therefore, upon Marengo that the principal attack of the Austrians would be directed, as this village commanded the entrance of the plain.

At day-break, the Austrian army passed the two bridges of the Bormida. But its movement was slow, because it had but one bridge

head, from which to debouche. Oreilly passed first, and encountered the division of Gardanne, which General Victor, after having occupied Marengo, had led forward. This division was formed only of the 101st and 44th demi-brigades. Oreilly, supported by a numerous artillery, and with double the force of his opponent, compelled him to fall back, and shut himself up in Marengo. Fortunately, he did not throw himself into the place after him, but waited till the centre under General Haddick should come to his support. The slowness of their march across the defile formed by the bridges, cost the Austrians two or three hours. At length Generals Haddick and Kaim deployed their forces in the rear of Oreilly, and General Ott passed the same bridges on his way to Castel-Ceriolo.

General Victor immediately combined his two divisions for the defence of Marengo, and sent to acquaint the First Consul that the whole Austrian army was advancing, evidently with the intention to give battle.

An obstacle presented by the ground, favoured the bravery of our soldiers very greatly. In front of Marengo, between the Austrians and the French, lay a deep and muddy stream, called La Fontanone. It flowed between Marengo and the Bormida, and fell a little way below that place into the latter river. Upon his right, that is in the village of Marengo, Victor stationed the 101st and 44th demi-brigades, under General Gardanne; upon the left of the village, the 24th, 43d, and 96th, under General Chambarlhac; and somewhat in the rear of these, General Kellermann with the 20th, 2d, and 8th regiments of cavalry, and a squadron of the 12th. The rest of the 12th regiment was despatched to the upper Bormida, in order to observe the more remote movements of the enemy.

General Haddick advanced upon the stream, under cover of twenty-five pieces of artillery, which thundered on the French. He threw himself bravely into the bed of the Fontanone, at the head of the division of Bellegarde. General Rivaud immediately sallying from the cover of the village, with the 44th and 101st, began to fire on the Austrians as they were attempting to debouche, almost muzzle to muzzle. A terribly fierce struggle followed along the margin of the Fontanone. Haddick returned several times to the charge; but Rivaud, holding his ground sturdily under the Austrian batteries, checked Haddick's corps by the close fire of his musketry, and cast it back in disorder on the other bank. The unfortunate General Haddick received a mortal wound, and his soldiers retired. M. de Melas then caused the troops of General Kaim to advance, and gave orders to Oreilly to follow the Bormida, ascending it to a place named Stortigliona, in order to execute a charge on our left with the cavalry of Pilati. But, at this moment, General Kellermann was on horseback at the head of his division of cavalry, observing the movement of the enemy's squadrons, and Lannes, who had taken ground to the right of Victor, in the plain, had wheeled into line between Marengo and Castel-Ceriolo. The Austrians then made a second effort. The divisions of

Gardanne and Chambarlhac, arranged in a half circle around the semi-circular head of the Fontanone, were so placed as to pour a converging fire into the point of attack, and thus ravaged the troops of General Kaim with their musketry. In the meanwhile, General Pilati, making his way up the stream, succeeded in crossing the Fontanone at the head of 2000 horse. The brave Kellermann, who, on this day, added so greatly to the glory he had won at Valmy, dashed upon the squadrons of Pilati, as they were attempting to deploy, sabred many, and drove the rest down headlong into the muddy bed of this inconsiderable water-course, which art itself could not have better traced for the cover of the French position.

At this moment, though our army, which had been taken by surprise, had only the two corps of Victor and Lannes, in line, that is to say, 15,000 or 16,000 men, to oppose to nearly 36,000; still, thanks to the error committed on the previous evening by the Austrians in not occupying Marengo,—an error which was not, however, without its advantages in this respect, that it had been the means of deceiving General Bonaparte—our army, I say, had gained time to let its leader rejoin them, and the reserves, either remaining in the rear, or sent on the route to Novi, to come into position.

Such was the state of things, when M. de Melas, determined to exert every effort to save the honour and liberty of his army, and being perfectly seconded by his soldiery, all veterans, whose hearts the victories of the preceding campaign had tended to elevate, made another advance upon the French line. General Ott, who had taken considerable time to defile, was by this time in a condition to act upon the left of the Austrians. He manœuvred with intent to turn us, passed Castel-Ceriolo, and outflanked Lannes, who, placed at the side of Victor, between Marengo and Castel-Ceriolo, formed the right of our line. While the column of General Ott engaged the attention of Lannes, the corps of Oreilly, Haddick, and Kaim, having rallied, were directed anew upon the Fontanone, in front of Marengo. All their movements were supported by a formidable artillery. The grenadiers of Latterman dashed into the stream, crossed it, and scaled the opposite bank; the division of Chambarlhac, stationed to the left of Marengo, and on the flanks of the Austrian grenadiers, pouring upon them a destructive fire. In spite of this, a battalion of these grenadiers succeeded in establishing themselves beyond the Fontanone. M. de Melas redoubled his cannonade upon the division of Chambarlhac, which was not covered by the houses of the village, as that was which defended Marengo. In the mean time the Austrian pioneers had constructed, in haste, a trestle bridge. The brave Rivaud, at the head of the 44th, then sallied from the village of Marengo, and marching upon his assailants, would, in spite of their grape-shot, have driven them into the Fontanone; but the 44th, already exhausted by the obstinate strife, was arrested by the frightful discharges of artillery, and Rivaud himself was wounded. Seizing this moment, Latterman's grenadiers advanced *à masse*, and penetrated Marengo. Though co

vered with blood, Rivaud again placed himself at the head of the 44th, made a vigorous charge upon the grenadiers, and drove them out of Marengo; but being received on advancing beyond the cover of the houses, by a smashing fire of artillery, he could not bear them back across the stream, which had till now afforded so important a protection to our army. Weakened at length by the blood which he had lost, and supporting himself with difficulty, this valiant officer was obliged to allow himself to be carried off the field of battle. The Austrian grenadiers therefore established themselves in the position which they had conquered. At the same instant, the division of Chambarlhac, which, as we have said, was protected by no cover, but stood exposed to the enemy's grape-shot, was almost annihilated. General Oreilly repulsed the 96th, placed on our extreme left, and thence began to out-flank us. On the right, Lannes, who having at first to do only with the corps of General Kaim, was on the point of driving him into the bed of the Fontanone, found himself suddenly turned by General Ott, who was debouching from Castel-Ceriolo, with all his numerous cavalry. Champeaux's brigade of cavalry, stationed in the rear of Lannes's corps, as Kellermann's was in the rear of Victor's, made several brilliant charges, but to no purpose; and the unfortunate Champeaux himself received a mortal wound. Our army, out-flanked on the two wings, and driven from the point of Marengo, to which it had clung so stubbornly at first, had now no farther means of sustaining itself. It was in danger of being forced back into the plain behind it, where there was nothing to cover it against 200 pieces of artillery, and a stupendous cavalry.

It was ten o'clock in the morning. The carnage had been horrible. An immense mass of wounded encumbered the road between Marengo and San-Giuliano. Already a part of Victor's troops, overwhelmed by numbers, were retreating in disorder, crying that all was lost. In effect, all would have been lost, had not a reinforcement of fresh troops come to the rescue; and above all, a great leader, capable of grasping still the victory which was escaping from our hands.

General Bonaparte, informed that the Austrian army, the escape of which from his hands he had been deploring, had, on the contrary, surprised him on that very plain of Marengo, which the evening before had appeared so deserted, made all speed from Torre-di-Garofolo, thanking his happy stars for the overflow of the Scrivia, which had prevented him from going to pass the night at Voghera. He brought with him the Consular Guard, a troop small in number, but of matchless valour, which afterwards was known as the Imperial Guard; he brought with him Monnier's division, composed of three excellent demi-brigades, and ordered a reserve of two regiments of cavalry to follow him at a short distance; to conclude, he sent Desaix orders to march with all speed upon San-Giuliano.

The First Consul, at the head of his reserves, came at full gallop to the field of battle. He found Lannes out-flanked by the infantry and

cavalry of General Ott, yet struggling, on the left, to hold to Marengo; Gardanne still defending himself amid the hedges of that village, the object of so desperate a struggle, and, on the other side, the division of Chambarlhac, mowed down by the Austrian artillery, and scattering itself before its fire.

At this aspect of things, a single glance of his experienced eye was sufficient to show him what was necessary to be done, to set things right again. The mutilated left was really routed; but the right was merely menaced, and still maintained itself; it was to the latter that his succours must be carried. By fixing it solidly at Castel-Ceriolo, he would have a point-d'appui in the midst of this vast plain; he might execute a pivot movement upon this wing, thus reinforced, and withdraw his battered left into the rear, and so save it from the enemy. Even if he were to lose by this movement the high road from Marengo to San-Giuliano, the evil would be reparable; for in the rear of his new position ran another road, leading to Salé, and from Salé to the banks of the Po. This line of retreat toward Pavia would, therefore, remain sure. Moreover, when in a position to the right of the plain, he would be on the flank of the Austrians, who must engage upon the high road from Marengo to San-Giuliano, if they would turn their victory to account.

These reflections, made with the rapidity of lightning, General Bonaparte at once proceeded to the execution of the plan he had conceived. He thrust forward into the plain the eight hundred grenadiers of the Consular Guard, ordering them to hold the Austrian cavalry in check until the arrival of the three demi-brigades of Monnier. These brave men, forming themselves into a square, received with admirable coolness the charges of the dragoons of Lobkowitz, and remained unshaken under the repeated assaults of a host of cavalry. Somewhat to their right, General Bonaparte ordered two demi-brigades of Monnier's, which came up at the moment, to direct themselves upon Castel-Ceriolo. These two demi-brigades, the 70th and 19th, led on by General Carra-Saint-Cyr, marched forward, sometimes throwing themselves into squares to arrest the cavalry, sometimes rushing in columns of attack to break the infantry, and succeeded in reconquering the lost ground, and effecting a lodgment among the hedges and gardens of Castel-Ceriolo. At the same instant General Bonaparte, at the head of the 72d, came to succour the left of Lannes, while Dupont, chief of the staff, rallied far in the rear the scattered remains of Victor's corps, pursued by the horse of Oreilly, but protected by Murat by the cavalry of reserve. The presence of the First Consul, and the sight of the bears in caps of the mounted guard, sufficed to reanimate the troops. The battle was renewed with fresh fury. The brave Watrin, of Lannes's corps, with the 6th of the line and the 22d, drove back Kaim's soldiers at the bayonet's point into the Fontanone. Lannes, inspiring the 40th and 28th with the fire of his own heroic spirit, launched them one after the other upon the Austrians.

In every part of this immense plain the battle raged with desperate fierceness. Gardanne essayed to regain Marengo; Lannes struggled to recover the stream which had before served as so important a cover to our troops, while the grenadiers of the Consular Guard, always in square, like a living citadel in the midst of this battle-field, filled the void between Lannes and the columns of Carra-Saint-Cyr, which were already entering the first houses of Castel-Ceriolo. But the Baron de Melas, with all the courage of despair, leading his combined masses against Marengo, at length issued from the village, driving before him the exhausted troops of Gardanne, who still clung in vain to every obstacle of the ground. Oreilly completed the destruction of Chambarlhac's division, which still remained uncovered under the fire of grape from his terrible artillery.

It was no longer possible to hold the ground; it was imperatively necessary to fall back. General Bonaparte ordered a slow retreat, still keeping a firm face to the enemy. But while his left, deprived of Marengo, and now without cover or defence, was rapidly recoiling upon San-Giuliano, where it hoped to find shelter, he still continued to cling to the right of the plain, and to defend himself slowly, thanks to the position of Castel-Ceriolo, thanks to the energy of the Consular Guard, and, above all, thanks to Lannes, whose efforts were prodigious. So long as he should maintain the right, the First Consul preserved a sure line of retreat by Salé toward the banks of the Po; and still, if Desaix, who, on the previous evening, had been directed upon Novi, should come up in time, he might reconquer the field, and bring the victory to his side.

It was at this moment that Lannes and his four demi-brigades made efforts which deserve the admiration of posterity. The enemy, who had debouched en masse from Marengo on the plain, pouring on him from eighty pieces of artillery a storm of round and grape; Lannes, at the head of his four demi-brigades, protracted his retreating combat, over three-quarters of a league, for two whole hours. For when the enemy came on in force, and pressed him too hard, he stopped, and charged with the bayonet. Though his artillery was dismounted, some light pieces, drawn by the best horses, and manœuvred with no less ability than daring, came to assist the demi-brigades, which were pressed too closely, and even ventured to place themselves in battery before the Austrians. The Consular Guard, on which no impression could be made by charges of cavalry, was now attacked with cannon. They strove to break it, as if it were a wall, and then launched upon it the cavalry of Frimont. It suffered fearful loss, it recoiled, but they could not break it. Carra-Saint-Cyr also gave way, and lost Castel-Ceriolo, maintaining still, however, a last hold among the vines in the rear of the village. We still kept possession of the road from Castel-Ceriolo to Salé. In every direction the plain displayed one vast field of carnage, whereon, to the blaze of artillery furious explosions were now added, for Lannes blew up the caissons which he could not bring off.

Half the day passed away, and at length M. de Melas imagined that he held in his hands the victory which he had bought so dear. This veteran, who, by his courage at least, had shown himself worthy of his opponent on this memorable day, returned to Alessandria exhausted with fatigue. He left the command in the hands of M. de Zach, the chief officer of his staff, and sent off couriers to all Europe, announcing his victory, and the defeat of General Bonaparte at Marengo. The chief of his staff, being thus charged with the command, formed the main body of the Austrian army into columns of march, on the high road from Marengo to San-Giuliano. He placed at the head two regiments of infantry, Latterman's column of grenadiers came next, and after these the baggage. To the left, he disposed General Oreilly; to the right, Generals Kaim and Haddick; and, in this order, he resolved on forcing the high road to Placentia, the great object of so many efforts, and the salvation of the Austrian army.

It was now three o'clock. Had no new circumstance arisen, the battle must be regarded as lost by the French; although, indeed, on the morrow, the evil of to-day might be perhaps repaired by the troops on the return from the Tessino, and the Adda, to the Po. Desaix, however, still remained with Boudet's division, as yet whole and uninjured; will he arrive in time! Such is the circumstance on which depends the fate of the battle. The aides-de-camp of the First Consul had galloped off in search of him, right early in the morning. But, long before they reached him, Desaix, at the first cannon-shot that was fired on the plain of Marengo, halted to listen. On hearing that remote cannon-shot, he judged that the enemy, whom he was on his way to seek at Novi, on the route to Genoa, was even at Marengo. He instantly despatched Savary with a few hundred horses to Novi, to see what was passing there, and put himself with his division in observation, still listening to the cannon of the Austrians and French, which boomed incessantly from the direction of the Bormida. Savary having found no one about Novi, Desaix was confirmed in his happy judgment, and, without farther hesitation, marched on Marengo, sending several aides-de-camp before him, to announce his approach to the First Consul. The whole day long he marched, and, at three o'clock, the head of his column began to appear on the verge of the plain, in the neighbourhood of San-Giuliano. Outstripping them all, at full gallop, he came into the presence of the First Consul. Oh! happy inspiration in a lieutenant, no less intelligent than he was devoted! Oh! happy fortune which belongs to youth! If, after fifteen years had flown, the First Consul, so well seconded on that day by his generals, had found a Desaix on the field of Waterloo, he would have saved his empire, and France her dominant position among the powers of Europe!

The presence of Desaix was destined to change the whole face of affairs. He was surrounded by his friends—informed of all of the events of the day. The generals drew in

circle about him and the First Consul, and eagerly discussed their serious situation. Most were in favour of a retreat. The First Consul demurred; eagerly asked Desaix's opinion. Desaix cast his eye over the devastation of the battle-field, and then, taking out his watch and looking at the hour, answered General Bonaparte, in these simple, yet lofty words: "Yes, the battle is lost; but it is only three o'clock. There is yet time to gain another." Delighted with the answer of Desaix, General Bonaparte at once prepared to avail himself of the resources brought by this officer, and of the advantages assured him by the position which he had taken up since the morning. In fact, he was now on the right of the plain, while his enemy was on the left, in column of march upon the high road leading to San-Giuliano. Desaix coming up by the way of San-Giuliano with 6000 fresh troops, and confronting the Austrians, might hold them in check, while the main body of the army should rally and throw itself on their flank. On the spot, and without a moment's loss of time, dispositions were made accordingly.

Desaix's three demi-brigades were formed in front of San-Giuliano, a little way to the right of the main road. The 30th deployed in line, the 9th and 59th in close column, on the wings of the former. A slight undulation of ground concealed them from the enemy. On the right, rallying and somewhat recovered, were the shattered relics of Chambarlhac's and Gardanne's divisions under General Victor. To their right, in the plain, Lannes, whose retreat had been stopped; next to him the Consular Guard, and next again to that Carra-Saint-Cyr, who had maintained himself as near as possible to Castel-Ceriolio. In this position the army formed a long oblique line, from San-Giuliano to Castel-Ceriolio. In an interval between Desaix and Lannes, but somewhat more in the rear, was stationed Kellermann, with his cavalry. A battery of twelve pieces, the sole remains of the whole artillery of the army, was spread out in front of Desaix's line.

These dispositions made, the First Consul passed on horseback along the lines of his soldiers, speaking to several corps. "My friends," said he to them, "you have retreated far enough: recollect that I am in the habit of sleeping on the field of battle." After having re-animated his troops, who were reassured by the arrival of their reserves, and burning to avenge the events of the morning, he gave the signal. The charge was beaten along the whole length of the lines.

The Austrians, who were rather in order of march than of battle, kept the high road. The column directed by M. de Zach came first; a little behind it came the centre, half deployed on the plain and facing Lannes. General Marmont suddenly unmasked his twelve pieces of cannon. A heavy discharge of grape-shot fell upon the head of the column, which was completely taken by surprise, and suspecting nothing less than farther resistance, for they thought the French decidedly on their retreat. They had not yet recovered from their surprise,

ben Desaix put the 9th light infantry in

movement. "Go and inform the First Consul," said he to his aid-de-camp, Savary, "that I am charging, and that I must be supported by the cavalry." Desaix, on horseback, charged in person, at the head of this demi-brigade. He led it over the slight inequality of ground which concealed him from the view of the Austrians, and made them aware of his presence by a discharge of musketry at point blank distance. The Austrians poured in an answering volley; and Desaix fell on the instant, pierced by a bullet in the breast. "Conceal my death," said he to General Boudet, who was his chief of division, for it might, he thought, produce a panic among his men. Useless precaution of the young hero. He was seen to fall, and his soldiers, like those of Turenne, clamorously demanded to be led forward to avenge the death of their leader. The 9th light infantry, which on that day gained for itself the title of "*The Incomparable*," a distinction which it bore to the conclusion of the war; the 9th light infantry, after pouring its fire upon the enemy, formed in column, and fell upon the deep mass of the Austrians. At the sight, the two first regiments that led the march, surprised and confounded, fell back in disorder upon the second line, and disappeared amidst its ranks. Lattermann's column of grenadiers were now at the head, and received the shock as chosen troops might be expected to receive it. They were firm. The struggle extended to the two sides of the main road. The 9th light infantry was supported to the right by Victor's troops, which had rallied; to the left, by the 30th and 59th demi-brigades of Boudet's division, which followed the movement. Lattermann's grenadiers were defending themselves stoutly, though hard pressed, when suddenly a storm burst on their heads. General Kellermann, who, at the instance of Desaix, had received orders to charge, set off at full gallop, and passing between Lannes and Desaix, placed part of his squadron *en poënce* to make head against the Austrian cavalry, whom he saw before him, and then, with the remainder, threw himself on the flank of the column of grenadiers, already assailed in front by Boudet's infantry. By this charge, which was executed with extraordinary vigour, the column was cut in two. Kellermann's dragons sabred it to the right and left, till, pressed on every side, the unfortunate grenadiers threw down their arms. Two thousand of them surrendered themselves prisoners. At their head, General Zach himself was compelled to give up his sword, and in this manner the Austrians were deprived of any leader until the battle ended. For, as we have seen, M. de Melas, thinking himself secure of the victory, had returned to Alessandria. But Kellermann did not stop here, he dashed on the dragoons of Lichtenstein and broke them! These recoiled in disorder on the centre of the Austrians, as it was forming in the plain, in front of Lannes, and there caused some confusion. At this moment Lannes advanced, pressed vigorously on the Austrians' centre, which was shaken, while the grenadiers of the Consular Guard and of Carra Saint-Cyr again bore down upon Castel-Ceriolio, from which they were not far distant. Along

the whole line from San-Giuliano to Castel-Ceriolo, the French had now resumed the offensive; they marched forward, drunk with joy and enthusiasm, at seeing the victory again returning to their hands. Surprise and discouragement had passed to the side of the Austrians.

Admirable power of the human will, obstinate to the last, and resolute to win back fortune by endurance! From San-Giuliano to Castel-Ceriolo, that oblique line of the French advanced at charging pace, pushing the Austrians back before them, who were now all amazed at being forced to fight a second battle. Carra-Saint-Cyr soon regained the village of Castel-Ceriolo, and General Ott, who had at first advanced beyond this village, fearful of being out-flanked, bethought him of retrograding ere he should lose his communication. The panic communicated itself to his cavalry; they set off at full gallop, crying, "to the bridges, to the bridges!" The struggle became, then, who should first reach the bridges of the Bormida. General Ott, re-passing Castel-Ceriolo, with the troops of Vogelsang, was obliged to cut his way through the French. He succeeded, and hastily regained the banks of the Bormida, into which his soldiers plunged headlong.

Generals Kaim and Haddick strove in vain to keep the centre together; Jannes gave them no opportunity to do so; he drove them back into Marengo, thence into the Fontanone, and from the Fontanone into the Bormida. But the grenadiers of Weidenfeld made head for a moment, to give Oreilly, who had advanced as far as Cassina-Grossa, the time to retrace his steps. The Austrian cavalry too, on its side, attempted a charge or two, to arrest the march of the French. But it was checked by the mounted grenadiers of the Consular Guard, led on by Bessières and young Beauharnais. At last, Lannes and Victor, with their united corps, threw themselves upon Marengo, and drove before them Oreilly and the grenadiers of Weidenfeld. The confusion on the bridges of Bormida thickened at every moment. Horse, foot, artillery, crowded to that point, and all was confusion and disorder. The bridges were insufficient to receive the press, and numbers precipitated themselves into the stream. A driver of artillery tried to cross with the piece of artillery which he had in charge, and succeeded in the attempt. The whole artillery hastened to follow his example, but a part of the wagons stuck fast in the river's bed. The French, ardent in pursuit, captured men, horses, cannon and baggage. The unfortunate Baron de Melas, who, scarce two hours before, had left his army victorious, hastened back at the noise of this disaster, and scarcely could believe his eyes. He was in despair.

Such was the bloody battle of Marengo, which, as we shall shortly have opportunity to see, produced a vast influence on the destinies of France and of the world at large. In fact, for the moment, it gave a peace to the republic, and, somewhat later, an empire to the First Consul. It was contested savagely, and was well worth the price it cost; for never was

there a more serious issue to two combatants. M. de Melas fought to avoid a shameful capitulation; and General Bonaparte staked his whole fortune on the day. The loss, considering the number of combatants, was immense, and out of all proportion. The Austrians lost about 8000 men, in killed and wounded, and upwards of 4000 prisoners. Their staff was almost decimated, General Haddick being killed, and Generals Vogelsang, Lattermann, Bellegarde, Lamarsaille and Golllesheim, wounded; together with a great many of their officers. Altogether, with men *hors de combat* or taken, they lost one-third of their whole army, estimating it, as it has usually been, at 36 or 40,000 men. As for the French, they had 6000 killed or wounded, which, with 1000 prisoners left in the hands of the enemy, makes their loss one-fourth, from 28,000 soldiers, present on that day under arms. Their staff also was not less severely treated than that of the Austrians. Generals Mainony, Rivaud, Malher, and Champeaux, were wounded, the last mortally. But the heaviest loss was the death of Desaix; during ten years of war, France had endured none greater. So sensibly was it felt by the First Consul, as to annul in his breast all joy for the victory. His secretary, M. de Bourrienne, hastening to congratulate him upon this triumph, little less than miraculous, exclaimed, "What a glorious day!"—"Yes," replied the First Consul, "very glorious—could I, this evening, have embraced Desaix on the field of battle." "I was going," said he, "to make him minister of war; I would have made him a prince, had I been able." The conqueror of Marengo little dreamed that the day would come, when crowns would be his to bestow upon those who served him. The unfortunate Desaix was lying near San-Giuliano, in the midst of this vast field of carnage. His aid-de-camp, Savary, who had long been attached to him, sought for his body through the piles of dead, and recognised him by his long and flowing hair; he gathered his remains with pious care, covered them with a hussar's mantle, and, placing them on his horse, bore them to the head-quarters of Torre-di-Garofolo.

Though the plain of Marengo ran deep with French blood, joy reigned throughout the army. Soldiers and generals, privates and officers, all felt conscious of their meritorious conduct, and appreciated the immense importance of a victory gained over the last of the enemy. The Austrians, on the contrary, were filled with dismay. They knew themselves surrounded, and reduced to the law of the conqueror's will. The Baron de Melas, who, on this eventful day, had two horses killed under him, and, in spite of his great age, had shown all the spirit and vigour of youth, vieing with the most daring under his command, was plunged into the deepest sorrow. He had returned to Alessandria to take some slight repose, in the persuasion that the field was won. He now beheld his army half destroyed, flying in all directions, abandoning their artillery to the French, or plunging it into the marshes of the Bormida. To crown his misfortune, Zach. the head of his staff, and who enjoyed all his con-

fidence, was at this moment a prisoner in the hands of the French. In vain did he turn his eyes upon his generals; not one would speak a word of counsel to him; all cursed the cabinet of Vienna, which had deceived them with such fatal illusions, and led them on to the brink of the abyss into which they had fallen. And still, some measure must be taken: What! . . . Fight to win a passage through the foe? They had done so, and failed. Retreat upon Genoa, or make for the upper Po, to force the Tessino!—But these plans, difficult before the battle, were impossible now, that it had been fought and lost. General Suchet was but a league in the rear, with the army of Liguria, in the neighbourhood of Acqui; General Bonaparte was before Alessandria, with the victorious army of reserve; these would now form a junction, and cut off the retreat to Genoa. General Mancey, who, with the detachment from Germany, was guarding the Tessino, might be reinforced by General Bonaparte in as short a space as it would take to march toward him. No chance, therefore, appeared on any side, and it was necessary to come to the cruel conclusion of capitulation. Happy if, by abandoning Italy, the liberty of the Austrian army could be saved, and if from the generosity of the conqueror, the boon could be obtained, that it should not be made prisoners of war! It was determined, therefore, to send a flag of truce to General Bonaparte, with a view to open negotiations. The Prince of Lichtenstein was chosen for the purpose, and on the following morning, the 15th of June—26th of Prairial—he was instructed to proceed to the head-quarters of the French general.

The First Consul, on his side, had many reasons for treating. His principal object had been obtained, for Italy had been delivered in a single day. After the victory he had gained, whereby the Austrians were completely surrounded, he was certain of obtaining the evacuation of Italy; he could have done more; he could have exacted that the vanquished should lay down their arms, and acknowledge themselves prisoners. But by galling the honour of these brave men too closely, they might, perhaps, be impelled to an act of desperation. It would have been to spill useless blood; it would have been to lose so much time. Having been absent from Paris for more than a month, it was important that he should return thither as speedily as possible. We had a prisoner, who might prove a very important intermediary, and that was M. de Zach. The First Consul opened his mind to him, expressed, in his presence, his sincere desire for peace, his disposition to respect the feelings of the imperial army, and to grant it the most honourable conditions. The Austrian flag of truce having, in the meanwhile, arrived, he manifested, in the presence of this envoy, the same disposition as to M. de Zach, and requested both of them to repair, with Berthier, to M. de Melas, to settle the base of a capitulation. According to his custom on all occasions of this kind, he stated, irrevocably, the conditions on which he had already determined, declaring that no future parley should lead him to

modify them. He then consented not to require that the Austrian army should be declared prisoners; he was perfectly willing to let them march past with the honours of war; but he absolutely required that all the strongholds of Liguria, Piedmont, and Lombardy, should be immediately restored to France, and that the Austrians should evacuate the whole of Italy, as far as the Mincio. The negotiators set forth immediately for the Austrian head-quarters.

The conditions which they brought, though rigorous, were not harder than naturally might have been expected; nay, more, they might be termed generous. One only was painful, almost humiliating; and that was the surrender of Genoa, after so much blood had been shed, and after but a few days' occupation. But it was clear that they were terms from which the conqueror would not depart. M. de Melas, however, sent his principal negotiator to the First Consul, in order to raise some questions in relation to the proposed armistice. "Monsieur," said the First Consul, addressing him with some warmth, "my conditions are irrevocable. I did not begin to make war yesterday; your position is as perfectly comprehended by me, as by yourselves. You are in Alessandria, encumbered with dead, sick, and wounded, destitute of provisions, deprived of the élite of your army, surrounded on every side. I might exact every thing; but I respect the white hairs of your general, and the valour of your soldiers, and I ask nothing but what is rigorously justified by the present position of affairs. Return to Alessandria; take what steps you may, you will have no other conditions."

The convention was signed at Alessandria, on the 15th of June, according to the base laid down by General Bonaparte. It was agreed, in the first place, that there should be a suspension of arms in Italy, until such time as an answer should be received from Vienna. Should the convention be accepted, the Austrians were free to retire, with the honours of war, beyond the line of the Mincio. They bound themselves, in withdrawing, to restore to the French all the strongholds which they occupied. The castles of Tortona, Alessandria, Milan, Arona, and Placentia, were to be surrendered between the 16th and 20th of June—27th Prairial, and 1st of Messidor—the castles of Ceva and Savona, the strongholds of Coni and Genoa, between the 16th and the 24th, and the fort of Urbia, on the 26th of June. The Austrian army was to be divided into three columns, which were to withdraw one after the other, and proportionally to the delivery of the strongholds. The immense military stores accumulated by M. de Melas, in Italy, were to be divided into two parts; the artillery of the Italian foundries was granted to the French army; the artillery of the Austrian foundries to the imperial army. The Imperialists, after having evacuated Lombardy as far as the Mincio, were to fall back behind the following line:—the Mincio, La Fossa, Maestra, the left bank of the Po, from Borgo-Forte to the mouth of that river, on the Adriatic. Peschiera and Mantua were to remain in possession of the Austrian army. It was stated, without explanation that the detach-

ment of this army, then actually in Tuscany, should continue to occupy that province. There could be no allusion made, in this capitulation, to the States of the Pope, or those of the King of Naples, because these potentates were strangers to the affairs of upper Italy. Should this convention not receive the emperor's ratification, ten days' notice was to be given of the resumption of hostilities. In the mean time, no detachment on the one side or the other should be sent into Germany.

Such was the substance of the celebrated convention of Alessandria, which in a single day procured for France the restitution of all upper Italy, and which led in the end to the restitution of all Italy. M. de Melas has since been much reproached, and much too severely, in regard to this campaign and convention. Men should be just toward misfortune, especially when that misfortune has been brought upon a man by his adherence to the laws of honour and integrity. M. de Melas was deceived in respect to the existence of any army of reserve, by the cabinet of Vienna, which never ceased to keep him labouring under the most unfortunate illusions. Once undeceived, he may be reproached fairly that he did not concentrate his forces quickly, or completely, as he might have done, and that he left too many men in his garrisons. It was not, in fact, behind the walls of these, but on the battle-field of Marengo, that he should have guarded the strongholds. This error once admitted, it must be acknowledged that M. de Melas, when surrounded, acted as brave men act,—that is to say, he strove to make his way with his sword. He did all that a brave man could, and he was conquered. After this there was but one thing to do, by which to save the liberty of his army, for Italy was irrecoverably lost to him. He could obtain no more than he obtained; he might, indeed, had the conqueror so wished, have undergone still greater humiliations. And the conqueror himself acted wisely in exacting no more. For by endeavouring to humiliate these gallant men, he would have run the risk of driving them to extremities, and of losing moments very precious to him. For at that time his presence was indispensable in Paris. While, therefore, we pity M. de Melas, let us admire, as we ought, the conduct of the conqueror, who was indebted for the vast results of this campaign, not to chance, but to combinations, deep in themselves, and marvellously executed.

Some detractors have sought to attribute to General Kellermann the gaining of the battle of Marengo, and consequently all the results which this memorable day brought in its train. But, if General Bonaparte is to be despoiled of the glory of that day, why not attribute it to that noble victim of the happiest inspiration, to that Desaix, who, divining the orders of his chief before he had received them, brought him the twofold offering of the victory and of his life? Why not attribute it again to that intrepid defender of Genoa, who, by detaining

the Austrians on the Apennines gave General Bonaparte time to descend from the Alps, and handed them over to him already half-defeated? So speaking, Generals Kellermann, Desaix, Massena, could all be the true conquerors of Marengo! all except General Bonaparte! But in this world, it is by the voice of the people that glory is decreed; and it was by the voice of the people that he was proclaimed conqueror of Marengo, who, discovering by the glance of genius, what advantage might be taken of the upper Alps to burst down upon the Austrian rear, had, during three whole months, deceived their vigilance; who had brought into existence an army, which had before no being who had astounded Europe by the miracle of that creation; who had crossed the Saint Bernard without any beaten road; who had swooped suddenly upon the midst of startled Italy; who had surrounded his unfortunate adversary with unequalled art; who had, to sum the whole, delivered a decisive battle, which, if lost in the morning, was gloriously recovered in the evening. And certainly, had it not been won that night, it would have been won on the ensuing morning; for, independent of the 6000 men of Desaix's division, the 10,000 men from the Tessino, and the 10,000 posted on the lower Po, presented infallible means for the destruction of the enemy's army. Let us suppose a case. Let us suppose that the Austrians, conquerors on the 14th of June, had entangled themselves in the gorge of the Stradella, that they had found at Piacentia Generals Duhesme and Loison, with 10,000 men, to dispute the pass of the Po, with General Bonaparte in their rear, reinforced by Generals Desaix and Moncey—what would these Austrians have done in this narrow gorge, blocked by a well-defended river, pursued by a superior army? They would but have experienced a disaster, more serious than that on the plains of the Bormida. The true conqueror of Marengo, therefore, is he who mastered fortune by a series of combinations, admirable for their depth and power, unequalled in the history of mightiest captains.

What shall we say, then, more? He was well served by his lieutenants. Nor is it needful to detract from any glory to make his shine the brighter. Massena, by his heroic defence of Genoa; Desaix, by his most fortunate determination; Lannes, by his matchless firmness on the plain of Marengo; Kellermann, by his admirable charge of cavalry—all contributed to secure his triumph. He recompensed them all in the most striking manner; as for Desaix, he embalmed his fate with the most honourable regrets. The First Consul ordered the most magnificent honours to be done to the man who had performed for France services so important; he took every care of his military family, placing his two aides-de-camp near his own person, who were left without employment by the death of their master: these were the Colonels Rapp and Savary.

Before quitting the battle-field of Marengo,

¹ He did not recompense Kellermann. No other officer of his distinction but was made *Maréchal of France*; which he never was. It has been always stated, heretofore, that after Desaix's fall, Zach's men were rallied, and

assumed the offensive, and that the French foot were again in disorder, when Kellermann charged, *without orders* and retrieved the fight.

the First Consul determined to write a second letter to the Emperor of Germany. Although the former had received no other than an indirect answer, addressed through M. de Thugut to M. de Talleyrand, he thought that victory permitted him to renew demands already repulsed. At this moment, he most ardently desired peace; he thought that his true part was now to bring about a pacification with the foreign foes, as he had already done with the domestic enemies of France, and that this task, well accomplished, would render his growing authority far more legitimate than new victories. Being susceptible, moreover, of the strongest emotions, he had been singularly affected by the sight of this plain of Marengo, on which was lying a fourth part of the two armies. Under the influence of these feelings, he wrote rather a singular letter to the emperor. "It is on the field of battle," said he to him, "amid the sufferings of a multitude of wounded, and surrounded by 15,000 corpses, that I beseech your majesty to listen to the voice of humanity, and not to suffer two brave nations to cut each other's throats for interests not their own. It is my part to press this on your majesty, being upon the very theatre of war. Your majesty's heart cannot feel it so keenly as does mine."

The letter was long. In it the First Consul discussed, with his peculiar eloquence, and in language far different from that of diplomacy, the motives which France and Austria might still have to remain armed against each other. Is it for religion that you fight? said he to him. Then make war on the Russians and the English, who are the enemies of your faith, and be not their ally! Do you wish to guard against revolutionary principles? It is war, that has extended them over one half the continent, by extending the conquests of France; nor can it fail to diffuse them farther. Is it for the balance of Europe? The English menace this balance far more than we do; for they have become the masters and the tyrants of commerce, and are beyond the reach of resistance; while Europe will always be able to restrain France, should she seriously endanger the independence of other nations—reasoning unfortunately very true, and which fifteen years of war have but too clearly justified. Is it, added the diplomatic warrior, is it for the integrity of the German empire? But your majesty has yourself ceded to us Mayence and the German states, on the left bank of the Rhine. Moreover, the empire anxiously implores you to grant her peace. Lastly, is it for the interests of the house of Austria? Nothing can be more natural, if it be so. Let us then execute the treaty of Campo Formio, which secures to your majesty large indemnities in compensation for the provinces lost in the Netherlands, and secures them to you where you most wish to obtain them; that is, in Italy. Your majesty may send the negotiators whither you will, and we will add to the treaty of Campo Formio stipulations, calculated to assure you of the continued existence of the secondary states, all of which the French republic is accused of having shaken. The First Consul here alluded to Holland, Switzerland, Piedmont, the Roman States, Tuscany, and Naples, which the Directory had excited into re-

volution. Upon these conditions, he continued, peace is made, if you will. Let us make the armistice general for all the armies, and enter into negotiations instantly.

M. de Saint-Julien, one of the generals who had the confidence of the emperor, was directed to carry this letter to Vienna, together with the treaty of Alessandria.

A few days after this, when he had recovered a little from his first impressions, the First Consul felt some regret, such as he had often experienced before, when he happened to write an important document, upon the first impulse, without consulting minds colder than his own. Giving an account of this step to the Consuls, he told them; I have despatched a courier with a letter to the emperor, which the minister of foreign affairs will communicate to you. *You will think it somewhat original*, but it was written on the field of battle, 22d of June.

After having bid adieu to his army, he set out for Milan, on the morning of the 17th of June—28 of Prairial—three days after the battle of Marengo. He was expected there with the most lively impatience, and arrived in the evening after it was dark. The population, informed of his arrival, came out into the streets to see him pass. They uttered cries of joy, and threw flowers into his carriage. The town was illuminated with that brilliant display, which the Italians alone know how to give their festivals. The Lombards, who for ten or twelve months had borne the Austrian yoke, rendered still more galling by the war, and the violence of circumstances, trembled at the idea of being replaced under their insupportable authority. During the many hazards of this short campaign, they had received reports the most contradictory, endured anxieties the most cruel, and were now delighted to see their deliverance finally insured. General Bonaparte immediately proclaimed the re-establishment of the Cisalpine republic, and hastened to put the affairs of Italy, the face of which his last victory had completely changed, into something like order.

I have already said, that the war undertaken by the formidable coalition of the Russians, English, and Austrians, for the purpose of restoring the princes dethroned by the pretended invasions of the Directory, had not yet restored one to their former situation. The King of Piedmont was at Rome, the Grand-duke of Tuscany in Austria: the pope had died at Valencia, and his provinces were invaded by the Neapolitans. The royal family of Naples only were in their own dominions, which were given up entirely to the English, and undergoing the most sanguinary struggles. The Queen of Naples, the Chevalier Acton, and Lord Nelson, permitted, if they did not order, the most abominable cruelties. The victory of the French republic was to change all this: humanity had as much interest in it as ponies.

The First Consul instituted a provisional government at Milan, until there should be time to reorganize the Cisalpine republic, and define her frontiers, which would only be possible after the peace. He did not consider that

he, any more than Austria, was under obligations to the King of Piedmont, and consequently did not hurry himself to re-establish him in his dominions. There also he substituted a provisional government, and appointed General Jourdan commissioner, with orders how to direct it. The First Consul had long since desired to employ, and separate from his enemies, this upright and wise man, who was not calculated for a ruler of the anarchists in France. Piedmont was thus kept in reserve, with a view of disposing of it for the benefit of the French republic, at the conclusion of a peace; or as a gage of reconciliation with Europe, in the re-establishment of the secondary states, which had been destroyed under the Directory. Tuscany would remain occupied by an Austrian corps. The First Consul was on the watch, ready to interfere at a moment's notice, if the English should enter it, or if men should be raised there any farther to act against France. He neither spoke, nor did, any thing as regarded Naples; waiting for the consequences of his victory on the mind of this court. The Queen of Naples, now much alarmed, was already preparing to go to Vienna, to demand the support of Austria, and yet more that of Russia.

The court of Rome remained; here the temporal interests became entangled with spiritual interests of the gravest nature. Pius VI., as we have seen, had lately died in France, a prisoner to the Directory. The First Consul, faithful to his policy, had given orders for funereal honours to be paid him. A conclave had assembled at Venice, and with much difficulty obtained permission from the Austrian cabinet to name a successor to the deceased pope. This conclave was composed of thirty-five cardinals; its secretary was a prelate, Monsignor Consalvi, a Roman priest, young, ambitious, remarkable for the pliability, penetration, and agreeable qualities of his mind, and lately mingled with all the great affairs of the age. The conclave, following the custom of all elections, political or religious, was divided. Twenty-two of its members took the side of Cardinal Braschi, a nephew of the late pope, and voted for the Cardinal Bellisomi, Bishop of Cesena, for the pontificate. Those who did not wish to perpetuate the dominion of the Braschi family at Rome, headed by Cardinal Antonelli, voted for Cardinal Mattei, a signer of the treaty of Tolentino. But they gave him only thirteen votes. Several months had elapsed, in the maintenance, on both sides, of this silent but obstinate contest. So far neither of the competitors had obtained any advantage over the other. The learned Cardinal Gerdil, who had figured in the controversies of the last century, was then suggested; this new candidate was a native of Savoy, and, since the victories of the republic, had become a subject of France. Austria exercised her right of exclusion against him. To finish the matter, Cardinal Mattei lost two votes, which promised to go for Cardinal Bellisomi, thus giving him twenty-four votes, that is, two-thirds of the whole, which was the number rigorously required by the laws of the church, to make an election valid. But as they were in the dominions of Austria, previous to this nomination, they thought pro-

per to submit it to her government, in order to obtain her tacit consent. The court of Vienna was so imprudent as to suffer more than a month to elapse before giving an answer. This wounded the susceptibility of the princes of the church; the parties were all disunited, and the election of Cardinal Bellisomi became impossible. This was the moment of disorder and fatigue for which the cunning secretary of the conclave, the prelate Consalvi, had been waiting, for the purpose of producing a new candidate, the object of his long and secret meditations. Addressing all the parties in the language most calculated to impress them, he proved to these the inconveniences of the Braschi domination, and to those, the little reliance to be placed upon Austria and the different Christian courts. Addressing himself thereafter to the ancient Roman interest, so sagacious and profound as it was, he displayed before their astonished eyes a perspective altogether new to them. "It is from France," said he to them, "that persecutions have come upon us, for the last ten years. Well, it is from France, perhaps, that we shall derive aid and consolation in the future. France has always been, since the days of Charlemagne, the most useful and least troublesome protector of the Church. A very extraordinary young man, one very difficult as yet to judge, holds dominion there at the present day. He will before long, do not doubt it, reconquer Italy." The battle of Marengo was not fought at this time. "Remember that he protected the priests in 1797, and that he has recently given funeral honours to Pius VI. Singular words, which he has been heard to utter, upon the religion and the Court of Rome, have been repeated to us by witnesses worthy of belief. Let us not neglect the opportunities which may present themselves from him. Let us make a choice which cannot possibly be construed into an intention of hostility with France, but which may even, to some extent, be agreeable to her, and we shall perhaps effect something more beneficial to the church, than by soliciting candidates from all the Catholic courts of Europe."

This was certainly a flash of that genius of the Roman court, which, in the beginning of this century, still threw out some bright gleams. Monsignor Consalvi then brought forward the name of Cardinal Chiaramonti, bishop of Imola. No better choice could be made for the object he had in view. Cardinal Chiaramonti, a native of Cesena, fifty-eight years of age, a relation of Pius VI., educated by him for the Roman purple, enjoyed universal esteem for the qualities of his mind, his learning, and his gentle virtues. To his attractive character was united great firmness; he had been known at a former period, to contend nobly, and with a constancy that insured success, against the trickeries of his order, that of Saint Benedict, and against the persecutions of the Inquisition. His last and most celebrated action of public life, was a sermon, delivered in his own character as bishop of Imola, on the occasion of the union of his diocese with the Cisalpine republic. He had then spoken of the French Revolution with moderation, which charmed the conqueror of Italy, and disgusted the

fanatics of the ancient regime. Nevertheless, being universally respected, he pleased the Braschi party, was not disagreeable to the opposite faction, was well enough esteemed by these cardinals who were fatigued with the length of the conclave, and seemed a happy choice to those who expected much from the good will of France in the future. The unexpected adherence of an illustrious person decided his election, which met with no farther real difficulty than his own personal resistance to such an honour. The adhesion in question was that of Cardinal Maury. This celebrated champion of the old French monarchy had retired to the Roman court, where he lived, recompensed for his contests with Barnave and Mirabeau, by the cardinal's hat. He was an emigrant; but an emigrant who possessed a remarkable mind, and great sense, and who welcomed, with secret satisfaction, the idea of connecting himself again with the government of France, since glory in some sort compensated for the novelty of this government. He had the disposal of six votes, and gave them all to Cardinal Chiaramonti, who was elected Pope just about the time of the arrival of General Bonaparte at Milan by the way of the Saint Bernard.

The new pontiff was at Venice, not having been able to obtain permission from the court of Vienna to be crowned at Saint Mark's, or from the court of Naples, that Rome should be restored to him. Departing suddenly, however, for Ancona, he negotiated in that city the evacuation of the States of the Church, and his own restoration to the capitol of the Christian world. In this precarious situation, France, having become friendly to the Holy See, could render him very valuable assistance, and the peculiar foresight of Monsignor Consalvi was about to be very suddenly accomplished. This meeting of the Cardinal Chiaramonti and the First Consul, the one elevated to the pontifical throne, the other to the dictatorship of the republic, nearly at the same time, was not to be one of the least astonishing accidents of this century, or least prolific of future events.

Bonaparte, while yet a youth, in 1796, a general under the orders of the Directory, not yet daring, or having any pretension to direct the French Revolution, had upheld the Pope by the treaty of Tolentino, and had only taken the Legations from him in order to bestow them upon the Cisalpine republic. Having become First Consul, now at liberty to do what he thought proper, and determined to undo a great part of the things done by the French Revolution, he could not hesitate in his conduct towards the newly elected Pope. Scarcely had he returned to Milan, when he saw Cardinal Martiniana, bishop of Vercelli, a friend of Pius VII., and declared to him that he was resolved to maintain good terms with the Holy See, to reconcile the French Revolution with the Church, and even to sustain the latter against its enemies; if the new Pope should show himself reasonable, and comprehend clearly the present situation of France and the world. These words were not lost on the ears of the old cardinal, but were destined soon to pro-

duce abundant fruit. The Bishop of Vercelli sent his own nephew, the Count Alciati, to Rome to conclude a negotiation.

To this communication General Bonaparte added an act, still bolder, which he would not have ventured to attempt in Paris, though he was well enough pleased that the fame of it should reach France from a distance, as a sign of his future intentions. The Italians had prepared a solemn *Te Deum*, in the old Cathedral of Milan, at which he determined to be present, and on the 18th of June—29th Prairial—he wrote these words to the consuls:—

“To-day, whatever our atheists of Paris may say to it, I go in great state to the *Te Deum*, which is to be chanted in the metropolis of Milan.

“*Office of the Secretary of State.*”

After having given his attention to the general affairs of Italy, he effected some indispensable dispositions for the distribution of the army in the conquered countries, for its subsistence and reorganization. Massena had of late rejoined him. The ill humour of the defender of Genoa speedily disappeared before the flattering reception of the First Consul. He received the command of the army of Italy, which surely he well merited. This army was composed of the corps which had defended Genoa; of that which had defended the Var; of the troops which had crossed St. Bernard; and of those which, under General Moncey, had arrived from Germany. All these formed an imposing mass of 80,000 hardy veterans. The First Consul established them in the rich plains of the Po, so as to allow them to repose from their fatigues, and to compensate for their privations by the abundance they were about to enjoy.

With his accustomed foresight, the First Consul gave the order to blow up all the forts and citadels which blocked the approaches to France and Italy. In consequence of this, the demolition of the forts of Arona, of Bard, of Seravalle, and of the citadels of Ivrea and Ceva, was ordered and executed. He prescribed the mode and the extent of the contributions which were destined to subsist the army; he superintended the departure of the Consular Guard in person, and calculated its halts, so that it should arrive in Paris in time for the celebration of the 14th of July, which, as he meant, should be conducted with extraordinary pomp. He applied himself, even at Milan, to regulate the details of this festival. “It is necessary,” he wrote, “to render the solemnity of the 14th of July imposing and brilliant, and to take care that no ridiculous fooleries are introduced into the ceremonies, which has been too much the case of late. Chariot races might do very well in Greece, where they fought in chariots, but they will not do for us in Paris.”—Milan, 22d of June. Office of the secretary of state.—He forbid them raising triumphal arches to him, saying he wished no better triumphal arch than public satisfaction. If in spite of all that recalled him to Paris, the First Consul yet remained ten days at Milan, it was for the purpose of securing the faithful execution of the convention of Alessandria. He placed no con-

fidence in Austrian faith, and thought even that he perceived some delays in the surrender of certain strong places. He immediately reprimanded Berthier for his weakness, and ordered him to detain the second and third columns of M. de Melas's army. The first had already departed. Apprehensions might well have been entertained; above all for Genoa, which the Austrians must have been tempted to deliver up to the English before the French entered it. The Prince of Hohenzollern, in fact, whether of his own accord, or excited by the English, refused to deliver up, at this moment, to Massena's troops, a place conquered with so much trouble. M. de Melas, hearing of these difficulties, insisted, with the frankness of an honest man, on the immediate execution, by his general, of the convention of Alessandria; threatening him, at the same time, if he resisted, with the consequences which his disobedience would provoke. The words of M. de Melas were respected, and Genoa was delivered up to the French on the 24th of June, in the midst of the joy of the Ligurian patriots; thus released in a few days from the presence of the Austrians, and the power of the oligarchs. Thus the words of Massena were verified: "I swear to you that I shall be in Genoa before fifteen days!" All this being done, the First Consul set off from Milan, on the 24th of June, with Duroc, his favourite aide-de-camp; Bessières, commander of the Consular Guard; M. de Bourrienne, his secretary; and Savary, one of the officers whom he had attached to his person, in memory of Desaix. He stopped some hours at Turin, to order the construction of works at the citadel, crossed the Mount Cenis, and entered Lyons under triumphal arches, and through a population astonished by the prodigies he had just accomplished. The men of Lyons, who were delighted in the same degree by his glory and policy, absolutely invaded the hotel of the Céléstines, at which he had alighted, and insisted on seeing him. He was obliged to present himself to them. The moment he appeared, there were unanimous bursts of acclamations. They now requested him so urgently to lay the first stone in the Place Bellecour, the reconstruction of which was about to be commenced, that he was obliged to consent. He passed a day at Lyons, in the midst of a concourse of all the people of the neighbourhood. After having addressed to the people of Lyons words that charmed them, relating to the restoration of peace, of order, and of commerce, he set out for Paris. The inhabitants of the provinces through which his road passed, collected from all sides to see him. This man, at that time favoured so much by fortune, enjoyed his glory keenly, yet in conversing with his companions of the road, he addressed to them these extraordinary words, which paint well his insatiate love of renown: "Yes," he said to them, "in less than two months I have conquered Cairo, Milan, Paris; what then? were I to die to-morrow, I should not have half a page in a universal history." He arrived, in the night of 2d and 3d of July, in Paris.

His return was necessary, for having been at a distance from the capital nearly two months, his absence, above all at the moment

of the false news of Marengo, had given birth to new intrigues. For a time it was believed that he was either dead or vanquished, and the ambitious set themselves to work. Some turned their thoughts to Carnot, others to M. de la Fayette, lately dismissed from Olmutz, and re-admitted to France, by the kindness of the First Consul. They wished to make of Carnot, or M. de la Fayette, the president of a republic. M. de la Fayette had no concern with these intrigues, neither had Carnot; but Joseph and Lucien Bonaparte conceived unjust suspicions of the latter; and induced their brother to partake them. From that circumstance arose the unhappy resolution which the First Consul executed some time afterward, of taking the portfolio of the minister of war from Carnot. It was even supposed that Messrs. Talleyrand and Fouché, who mutually hated each other, were drawing together, without doubt to concert measures and profit by events. Nothing could be perceived to excite suspicion against the man most called upon to act in case of General Bonaparte's disappearance from the scene; I mean M. de Sieyès; but he was the only one who showed so much reserve. However, all this had scarcely time to ripen; so thoroughly was the ill news effaced by the good which followed. But what had passed, was very much exaggerated in the report; and the First Consul conceived feelings of resentment against certain individuals, which he had the good sense to conceal, and even entirely to forget, after a while, as regards all those who had been pointed out to him, one alone excepted, the illustrious Carnot. The First Consul, however, now completely occupied with the joy of his successes, did not wish that any passing cloud should obscure the public felicity. He welcomed every one, and was welcomed by every one, with transport; above all, by those who felt that he had cause to complain of them. The people of Paris, when they heard of his return, crowded under the windows of the Tuileries, and during the whole day filled the courts and gardens of the palace. The First Consul was obliged to show himself to the multitude several times. In the evening the city of Paris was spontaneously illuminated. Men celebrated with rapture the miraculous victory, which they considered a certain prelude to the ardently desired peace. This day had so powerful an effect upon the feelings of him who was the object of all this homage, that twenty years afterward, alone, exiled, a prisoner in the midst of the Atlantic solitudes, he spoke of it—in collecting and relating the events of his past life—as the happiest of his existence. The next day the officers of state waited on him, and set the first example of those congratulations, the pompous spectacle of which we have seen often renewed under all the reigns. This spectacle was at that time new, and had a motive. Next came to the Tuileries, the Senate, the Legislative Corps, the Tribunal, the officers of the great tribunals, the Préfecture of the Seine, the civil and military authorities, the Directors of the Bank of France, and, last of all, the Institute, and the learned societies. These distinguished bodies were collected together to compliment the conqueror of Marengo, and

spoke to him as they had formerly, and have since, spoken to kings. But it must be said, that the language, although uniformly adulatory, was dictated by deep enthusiasm. In fact, the aspect of affairs having so changed in the last few months; security having succeeded trouble; a prodigious victory having placed France at the head of the European powers; the certainty of peace having caused all anxieties of a general war to cease; and last of all, prosperity announcing itself everywhere, how could they be otherwise than transported with enthusiasm at such results, and so soon to be realized? The president of the Senate concluded his address with the following words, which may give some idea of the others. "We are happy to acknowledge that the country owes its safety to you, that the republic will owe its strength to you, and the people that prosperity, which in one day you have made to succeed to ten years of tempestuous revolution."

While these things were passing in Italy, and in France, Moreau, on the banks of the Danube, was yet carrying on his glorious campaign against M. de Kray. We left him manœuvring about Ulm to oblige the Austrians to leave that strong position. He had posted himself between the Iller and the Lech, resting his left and right on these two rivers, facing the Danube, his back to Augsburg, ready to receive M. de Kray if he wished to fight, and in the mean time blocking up his road to the Alps, which last was the essential end of the campaign. If Moreau's success had been neither prompt nor decisive, it had been constant, and sufficient to admit of the First Consul accomplishing all, in Italy, which he had proposed. But the moment had now arrived when the general of the army of the Rhine, emboldened by the state of the times and by the successes of the army of reserve, was going to try a serious manœuvre to force M. de Kray from his position of Ulm. Now, at this moment, though he had heard nothing of the battle of Marengo, he had learned the success of the passage of the Alps. No longer caring about covering the road across the mountains, he was at perfect liberty to move as he thought best. Of all the possible manœuvres to force the position at Ulm, he preferred that which consisted in passing the Danube below that position, and so compelling M. de Kray to decamp, by threatening to cut off his line of retreat. This manœuvre was, in fact, the best; for that which consisted in dashing on straight to Vienna, by way of Munich, was too bold for a mind like Moreau's, and, perhaps, premature in the general state of affairs. That which would have consisted in passing the river higher up, and quite close to Ulm, in order to carry the Austrian camp by storm, was hazardous as all such attacks must be. But to pass below Ulm, and, by threatening M. de Kray's line of retreat, to oblige him to secure it, was the wisest and the surest manœuvre. From the 15th to the 18th of June, Moreau put himself in motion to execute this new resolution. The organization of his army, as has been said, had received some change, in consequence of the departure of the Generals Sainte-Suzanne and Saint-Cyr. Lecourbe always

formed the right, and Moreau the centre, commanding the corps of reserve. The corps of Saint-Cyr, now under the command of General Grenier, formed the left. Sainte-Suzanne's corps, now reduced to a strong division, and given to the bold Richepanse, was destined to perform the duty of light troops, observing Ulm, while the rest were manœuvring below. Some affairs had taken place before Ulm, one particularly, on the 5th of June, in which two French divisions had maintained themselves against forty thousand Austrians. It was a part of M. de Kray's plan to fix us before Ulm, by constantly occupying our attention. On the 18th of June, Richepanse was in sight of Ulm; Grenier, with the left, at Guntzbourg; the centre, formed of the corps of reserve, at Burgau; while Lecourbe, with his right, extended as far as to Dillingen. The enemy had broken down all the bridges from Ulm to Donauwerth. But a reconnaissance made by Lecourbe had decided Moreau to choose the points of Blindheim and Gremheim whereat to pass the Danube, because on those two points the bridges, imperfectly broken down, were easier to be repaired. Lecourbe was intrusted with this dangerous operation. To render it less difficult for him, he was reinforced by General Boyer with five battalions and the whole reserve of cavalry under the orders of General Hautpoul. The centre, under the general-in-chief, advanced from Burgau to Aisligen, so as to have it in his power to second the passage. Grenier, with the left, received orders to make a false attempt on his side, in order to draw the attention of the enemy to himself. On the 19th of June, early in the morning, Lecourbe placed his troops between the village of Blindheim and Gremheim, the bridges of which had been but imperfectly destroyed. He took care to cover himself behind some clusters of trees. He had no pontoon train, and only a limited quantity of timber and planks; but he made up, by audacity, for all his wants. General Gudin superintended this projected passage under Lecourbe; some pieces of artillery were placed on the banks of the Danube to keep the enemy at a distance, and, at the same time, his assistant, Quenot, boldly threw himself into the stream, to seize upon two large boats, which were in sight on the other bank. This brave officer brought them off under a shower of balls, and returned with only a slight wound in the foot. The best swimmers of the division were now chosen; they laid their arms and clothes in two boats and threw themselves into the waters of the Danube, under the fire of the enemy. Arrived on the other bank, and without even taking the time to dress themselves, they seized their arms and rushed furiously on some companies of Austrians who were guarding that part of the river, dispersed them, and took two pieces of cannon with their tumbrils. That being done, they rushed to the bridges, the piers of which still remained entire. They worked hard on both banks, placing thereon ladders, beams, and planks, and establishing the first portions of a communication. Some French artillery-men took advantage of this to pass from the other

side of the Danube, and began to work the two guns, which we had taken, against the enemy. We were soon masters of both banks, and the bridges, ere long, were sufficiently repaired, to afford a passage for most of the troops. The infantry and cavalry began to pass over. It was to be expected that numerous Austrian reinforcements should come up promptly from Donauwerth, and rush down ~~and~~ from all their positions above, at Gundelfingen, Guntzbourg, and Ulm. Lecourbe, who had repaired in person to the spot, posted all the infantry of which he could dispose, with some troops of cavalry, in the village of Schwenningen, which was situated on the road to Donauwerth. This point was important, for it was that by which the Austrians ascending the Danube must needs present themselves. Four thousand infantry, five hundred cavalry, and six pieces of cannon, soon showed themselves and attacked the village, which was, within two hours, taken and retaken several times.

Nevertheless the numerical superiority of the Austrians, and their determination to retake a position so decisive, would have given them the victory over our troops, and forced them to abandon the village, had not Lecourbe received a timely reinforcement of two squadrons of carabineers. He combined with these a few troops of the 8th hussars, which he had in hand, and launched them on the enemy's infantry, which was extending itself on the vast plain by the side of the Danube. This charge was executed with so much vigour and rapidity, that the Austrians were thrown back in disorder, leaving us their artillery, 2000 prisoners, and 300 horses. Two battalions of Wurtembergers who endeavoured to resist and formed square, were broke like the rest. After this brilliant combat, fought by Puthrod's brigade, Lecourbe had no longer any thing to fear from the lower Danube.

But it was not from that side that the principal dangers were like to arise. The main force of the Austrians was above him, that is to say, at Dillingen, Gundelfingen, and Ulm; and it was necessary to wheel round so as to front the enemy coming thence. Fortunately the divisions of Montrichard, and Gudin, and Hautpoul's reserve, had passed the reconstructed bridges of Gremheim and Blindheim, and were lining the celebrated plain of Hockstedt, which had gained a celebrity sadly famous for us in the time of Louis XIV.—13th of August, 1704. The enemy who had assembled hastily at Dillingen, from the nearest points, at some distance from Hockstedt, was drawn up near the Danube; the infantry to our left, along the marshes by the river, and behind some tufts of wood; the cavalry to our right, in very great numbers. They presented themselves thus in admirable order, awaiting the reinforcements which were continually coming up, and falling slowly back in order to be nearer their support. The 87th demi-brigade and a squadron of the 8th hussars, followed step by step this retrograde movement of the Austrians. Lecourbe, disembarassed of the enemy from the lower Danube by the combat of Schwenningen, came up at full gallop, at

the head of the 2d regiment of carabineers, of the cuirassiers, of the 6th and 9th cavalry, and of the 9th hussars. This was nearly the whole of Hautpoul's cavalry reserve. Our troops were in the plain, divided from the enemy by a little watercourse, the Egge, on which stands a village, that of Schrezeim. Lecourbe passed the village at a gallop with his cuirassiers; formed them as fast as they filed through it; and threw them upon the Austrian horse, who, surprised by this rough and sudden charge, recoiled in disorder, and left 9000 infantry, whom it was their duty to protect, entirely uncovered. The foot, thus abandoned, endeavoured to cast themselves across the ditches which cut up the whole plain of the Danube about Dillingen; but the cuirassiers, well led on, cut their column, and separated from it 1800 men, who became our prisoners. Already had two successful combats been fought in one day, due, in good part, to the cavalry, and there was yet to be another. Lecourbe took post on the Egge, awaiting the rest of his reserves which were arriving by the bridge of Dillingen, which we had now won. But M. de Kray's cavalry was coming up in haste, outstripping the infantry, and formed in two great lines behind Lauingen. Here was the opportunity to profit by the high spirits it had gained from its success this morning, and to measure its prowess in the plain with the numerous and brilliant squadrons of the Austrian army. Lecourbe, having occupied Lauingen with his infantry, combined all the cavalry of all his divisions with Hautpoul's reserves, deployed them in the plain, and offered the enemy that sort of cavalry combat which was sure to tempt him, as the number and quality of his cavalry were superb. The first Austrian line was put in movement with that coolness and precision natural to well-trained cavalry. In fact, it drove back the 2d regiment of carabineers, which had behaved so gallantly in the morning, and a few squadrons of hussars who had charged with it. Then our cuirassiers went at it, rallied the carabineers and hussars, who faced about, as soon as they felt themselves supported, and altogether dashed vigorously at the Austrian squadrons, whom they beat back in turn. On seeing this, the second line of the enemy's horse charged, and having the advantage of speed over our cavalry, which had not re-formed after their shock, drove them in, with great haste. But the 9th was still in reserve. Manœuvring both skilfully and boldly, it was wheeled upon the flank of the Austrian cavalry, surprised it, and, maltreating it severely, secured the possession of the plain of Hockstedt to our victorious squadrons.

The results in killed, wounded, and prisoners were not very considerable, for encounters of cavalry with one another, unless infantry is in the case, are never very serious. But the plain was ours. And our horse had proved their manifest superiority to that of the Austrians, which had not happened before. From this moment all our arms of service had a decided superiority to the similar arms of the enemy. It was now eight o'clock in the evening; and

in the long days of June, there still was time enough in which the Imperialists could dispute with us the left bank of the Danube, so gloriously won in the morning. Eight thousand infantry now came up to the succour of the corps which had been beaten, and was followed by a numerous artillery. Moreau also arrived at the head of all his reserves. A new battle now began more fiercely than any of those that preceded it. The French infantry first attacked the Austrians, under a tempest of round and grape. M. de Kray's troops, fighting for a great interest, the maintenance of the position of Ulm, displayed extraordinary vigour. Moreau was several times personally engaged in this *melée*, but his infantry, supported by the cavalry, who had come back from their charge, remained victorious at about eleven o'clock at night. At the same moment, the 37th demi-brigade entered Gundelfingen, and from that time all the positions in the plain were ours. We had crossed the Danube, made 5000 prisoners, taken twenty pieces of cannon, 1200 horses, 300 carriages, and considerable magazines at Donauwerth. We had been fighting for eighteen successive hours. This operation, which effaced the sad memories of Hochstedt by recent glory, was, after Marengo, the finest operation of the campaign, and was equally creditable to Lecourbe and Moreau. The latter had become gradually bold; and at length stimulated by the grand examples set him in Italy, had taken wider views, and had now gathered a laurel fresh from the same tree which had yielded its noblest to the First Consul. Happy and noble rivalry, had it never proceeded farther!

After so bold and decisive a manœuvre of his adversary, M. de Kray could no longer hold Ulm, without suffering his communications with Vienna to be cut off. To rush straight upon the French and give them battle, was too hazardous, with soldiers whose moral sense had been severely shaken by the last events. He determined then to decamp in haste that very evening. He caused a park of nearly a thousand carriages to pass out before him, and followed on the next day with the bulk of his army on the road to Nordlingen. He marched in dreadful weather, over roads completely broken up. Notwithstanding this, the rapidity of his retreat was such that he reached Nersheim in twenty-four hours. To support his troops, who were beginning to fail, he spread a report that an armistice had been signed in Italy, which would soon extend to Germany, and that peace would surely follow. This rumour spread joy among his soldiers, and gave them new strength. They reached Nordlingen.

Moreau had learned too late the departure of the enemy. Richepanse had not been able to discover the evacuation of Ulm, until the last detachments were retiring from it, and he had immediately informed his general-in-chief. But, in that interval, the Austrian had gained two days on us, and it would not be possible for us to overtake him but by a forced march. Nevertheless, Moreau reached Nordlingen on the 23d of June, in the evening, pressing M. de Kray's rear-guard, as he continued to retreat,

very hard. Seeing, however, that owing to the wretched state of the roads he could not gain sufficiently on them to strike a blow at the Austrian army, and that he was likely to be drawn into a fruitless pursuit, and one of unknown distance, Moreau determined to halt and select a position suited to the present position of affairs. M. de Kray, without choosing to give him the good news of the victory of Marengo, which was not yet known in the French army, caused him to be informed of the suspension of arms in Italy, and proposed one for Germany likewise. Moreau, suspecting thereupon that great events had occurred beyond the Alps, never doubting but that they were fortunate, and expecting to receive a courier who should inform him of them, resolved to make no terms until he should know more, and until he should have won better cantonnements for his soldiers. He resolved, therefore, to repossess the Danube; to trust Richepanse with the investment of the two principal places situate on the river—Ulm and Ingolstadt; and to move, himself, with the bulk of his army, beyond the Lech, in order to occupy Augsburg and Munich; so as to insure to himself a part of Bavaria for his subsistence; and to conquer the bridges of Isar, and all the roads which open upon the Inn.

Moreau then repossessed the Danube and the Lech, by Donauwerth and Rhain, directed his different corps by Pottmoss and Pfaffenhausen, even to the banks of the Isar. He occupied on that river the points of Landshut, Moosburg, Freisingen, and detached Decaen on Munich, which places he entered in triumph on the 28th of June. While he was executing this movement, the two armies encountered for the last time, and, on this occasion, unexpectedly, and in a battle without end or object. It was at Newbourg, on the right bank of the Danube, while both parties were marching on the Isar. A French division, engaged at too great a distance from the army, was forced to sustain an unequal combat, but triumphed at last, after enduring a serious loss in the death of the brave Latour d'Auvergne. That noble soldier, honoured by General Bonaparte with the title of First Grenadier of France, fell by a lance thrust in his heart. The army shed tears over his tomb; nor did it leave the field until it had raised a monument on the spot.

On the 13th of July—14th Messidor—Moreau was in the heart of Bavaria, blockading Ulm and Ingolstadt, and occupying on the Isar Landshut, Moosburg, Freisingen, and Munich. This was the moment to think of striking a blow at the Tyrol, and of taking from the Prince de Reuss the strong positions which he held along the mountains, to the sources of the Iller, the Lech, and the Isar—positions, by means of which he always had the power of disturbing the French. He was not, it is true, very dangerous, but his presence compelled us to make considerable detachments, and he became a subject of constant anxiety to our left wing. To this intent, General Moreau was reinforced, and received means of attacking the Grisons and the Tyrol. The positions of Fussen, Reitti, Immenstadt, and Feldkirch were carried in succession promptly and bril-

iantly, and our establishment on the Isar was thus perfectly consolidated.

M. de Kray had crossed the Isar, and thrown himself behind the Inn, occupying the camp of Ampfing in advance of that river, and the bridge-heads of Wasserbourg and of Muhl-dorf. It was now the middle of July—end of Messidor. The French government had left it to General Moreau to act at his own pleasure, and to dispose of his armies as he judged best. He thought justly that he ought not to be the only person who was fighting. The repose enjoyed by the soldiers of Italy caused some envy among those of Germany. Although a stipulation of the convention of Alessandria forbade either the French or the Austrians to detach men to Germany, it yet fell out naturally enough, that a convention of this nature was not very strictly observed, and the army of the Rhine soon found that it had on its hands an enemy unexpectedly augmented.

Moreau, who had received several propositions from M. de Kray, determined at length to listen to him, and on the 16th of July—26th Messidor—consented to sign an armistice at Parsdorf, a place a little way in advance of Munich, on terms nearly similar to that of Italy. The two armies should retire each behind a line of demarkation, which, setting out from Balzers in the Grisons, ran along the Tyrol, between the Isar and the Inn, equidistant from the two rivers, struck the Danube at Wilshofen, ascended that river to the mouth of the Alt-Muhl, followed the Alt-Muhl, the Reanitz, the Main, to Mayence. The garrisons of Ulm and Ingolstadt remained blockaded. But it was agreed that every fifteen days they should receive provisions in proportion to the amount of their garrisons. The two armies should have twelve days' notice of the resumption of hostilities. The French army should have for its subsistence, Franconia, Suabia, and a great part of Bavaria. Our soldiers, placed on the Mincio, on one side of the Alps, and the Isar on the other, were now about to reap, in the rich fields of Italy and Germany, the recompense of their privations and their labours. They had deserved it well, by the noble exploits which had distinguished the French arms. The army of the Rhine, although the splendour of its deeds had not been so glaring as the glory of its Italian rival, had borne itself in the field with equal vigour and wisdom. The last great event of this campaign, the passage of the Danube at Hochstedt, will bear comparison with any feat of arms recorded in our military history. The opinion which, in 1799, was unfavourable to Moreau, had now become almost partial to him. After the name of General Bonaparte, far distant, it is true, but at such a distance as did not preclude much honour, men ranked

that of Moreau. And as opinion is unstable, he now excelled the conqueror of Zurich, as much as in the previous year he had been excelled by him.

The news of the successes of the army of the Rhine completed the joy produced by the extraordinary victory of the army of Italy; and changed the hopes of peace which filled the public mind, into the certainty of it. The joy was universal. The public funds, nominally at five per cent., which had been sold on the 18th of Brumaire, for thirteen francs, had risen to forty. A decree of the consuls announced to the stockholders that the interest of the first six months, which would end on the 22d of September, 1800, would be paid to them entirely in silver. Happy news; such as had not been given for many a day to the unfortunate creditors of the state. All this was attributed to the armies, to the generals who had led them, and chiefly to the young Bonaparte, who governed and fought in a style equally superior and uncommon. The festival of the 14th of July, moreover, one of the two republican festivals preserved by the constitution, was celebrated with great splendour. A magnificent ceremony was prepared at the Invalids. The musician Mehul had composed some fine songs, and the first singers of Italy, from which we were then beginning to take both arts and artists, were brought to perform them. After hearing these strains under the dome of the Invalids, the First Consul, accompanied by a numerous staff, repaired to the Field of Mars, to receive the Consular Guard. It had marched in, that very morning, covered with dust, its uniforms in tatters, for it had never ceased marching since the day following the battle of Marengo, in order exactly to keep the appointment, which the First Consul had made with it, for the 14th of July. It carried to the Invalids the conquered standards of the last campaign, in order to add them to that common depository of our trophies. The crowd which lined the sides of the Champ de Mars, rushed eagerly in to see the hero of Marengo. This boundless enthusiasm necessarily produced accidents. The First Consul was for a long time closely pressed in that popular *melée*. He entered the Tuileries, surrounded by the multitude, closely following his steps. The day was consecrated wholly to public rejoicings.

A few days afterward, on the 21st of July—2d Thermidor—the arrival of the Count of St. Julien was announced, the confidential officer of the Emperor of Germany, intrusted with the ratification of the convention of Alessandria, and empowered to confer with the First Consul, on the conditions of that long desired peace, which was destined to terminate the second coalition. France, it must be admitted had never witnessed days so glorious.

BOOK V.

HELIOPOLIS.

State of Egypt after the Departure of General Bonaparte—Deep Grief of the Army: its Desire to return to France—Kléber excites, instead of repressing, that Feeling—His Report on the State of the Colony.—This Report, destined for the Directory, is received by the First Consul—its falsehood—Great Resources of the Colony, and Facility of securing it to France—Kléber, influenced by the Feeling which he had encouraged, is induced to treat with the Turks and the English—Shameful Convention of El Arisch, stipulating the Evacuation of Egypt—Refusal of the English to execute that Convention: they calculate upon obliging the French Army to lay down its Arms—Noble Indignation of Kléber—Breach of the Armistice and Battle of Heliopolis—Dispersion of the Turks—Kléber pursues them to the Frontiers of Syria—The Vizier's Camp taken—New Distribution of the Army in Lower Egypt—Return of Kléber to Cairo, to reduce that City, which had risen in his Rear—His skilful Temporizing—Having collected his Means, he attacks and retakes Cairo—General Subinisation—Alliance with Murad Bey—Kléber, who thought it impossible to keep Egypt when subdued, re-conquers it in thirty-five Days from the Turkish Forces and the revolted Egyptians—His Errors gloriously repaired—Emotion of the Mussulman Populations on learning that Egypt is in the hands of the Infidels—A Fanatic travels from Palestine to Cairo to assassinate Kléber—Lamentable Death of the latter, and its Consequences to the Colony—Present Tranquillity—Kléber and Desaix both killed on the same Day—Characters and Lives of those two Warriors.

IN August, 1799, General Bonaparte, being determined by news from Europe to leave Egypt suddenly, ordered Admiral Ganteaume to send out of the harbour of Alexandria the frigates *La Muiron* and *La Carrère*, the only ships left after the destruction of the fleet, and to cast anchor in the little roadstead of the Marabout. At that place, about two leagues westward of Alexandria, he purposed to embark. He took with him Generals Berthier, Lannes, Murat, Andréossy,¹ Marmont, and the two men of science to whom he was more attached than to any of the others belonging to the expedition, Monge and Berthollet. On the 22d of August—5th Fructidor, year VII.—he proceeded to the Marabout, and embarked hastily, in constant apprehension that the English squadron would make its appearance. The horses on which the party rode thither, being left upon the beach, galloped back to Alexandria. The sight of these horses, saddled, but riderless, created a sort of panic; it was supposed that some accident had befallen some of the officers of the garrison, and a detachment of cavalry was despatched from the entrenched camp. Presently, a Turkish groom, who was present at the embarkation, explained what had happened, and Menou, who alone had been initiated into the secret, made known in Alexandria the departure of General Bonaparte, and the appointment of General Kléber to succeed him. The latter had been directed to meet him at Rosetta, on the 22d of August, but General Bonaparte was in such haste to embark, that he went the day before. Besides, when he imposed on Kléber the heavy burden of command, he was not sorry to leave him absolute orders, which admit of neither objection nor refusal.

This intelligence caused a painful surprise throughout the army. At first, it was discredited; General Dugua, commandant of Rosetta, caused it to be contradicted, not believing it himself, and fearful of the bad effect it was likely to produce. It was not, however, possible to doubt it long, and Kléber was officially proclaimed the successor of General Bonaparte. Officers and soldiers were in consternation.

All the ascendancy exercised over them by the conqueror of Italy had been required to draw them after him into distant and unknown countries, and it was all required to retain them there. Regret for home is a passion, which becomes violent, in proportion as distance, strangeness of scene, and fears founded on the uncertainty of return, conspire to increase it. Oftentimes, in Egypt, this passion showed itself in murmurs, sometimes in suicide. But the presence of the commander-in-chief, his language, his incessant activity, dispelled these gloomy vapours. Well knowing how to employ himself, and how to employ others, he captivated their minds to the highest point, and either banished from his presence, or prevented the generation of those irksome feelings to which he was altogether a stranger. The men often said to themselves that they should never see France again, that they should never recross the Mediterranean, especially since the fleet had been destroyed at Aboukir, but General Bonaparte was on the spot; with him they could go anywhere, find their way back to their country, or make a new country for themselves. With his departure the aspect of things was totally changed. The intelligence of it came, therefore, like a thunderbolt. The most opprobrious epithets were applied to this departure. They did not consider that irresistible impulse of patriotism and ambition, which, on the news of the disasters of the Republic, had urged him to return to France. They perceived only the forlorn state in which he left the unfortunate army, which had felt sufficient confidence in his genius to follow him. They said to themselves that he must surely have convinced himself of the imprudence of that enterprise. of the impossibility of its success, since he had run away, and left to others what seemed to him henceforth impracticable. But to sneak off alone, leaving beyond sea those whom he had thus imperilled, was cruelty, nay, cowardice, said some traducers; for he had ever some traducers, and those very near to his person, even in the most brilliant epochs of his career.

¹ ANDROSSY. Served with distinction in Italy, in 1797. Accompanied Bonaparte to Egypt, and was one of those who returned with him, and supported him on

the 18th Brumaire. After the peace of Amiens, he was minister at St. James. He wrote several memoirs relative to Egypt.—*Biographie Méricenne*.

Kléber did not love General Bonaparte, and endured his ascendancy with a sort of impatience. If he restrained himself in his presence, he indulged elsewhere in unbecoming expressions. A grumbler and whimsical, Kléber had ardently desired to accompany the expedition to Egypt, that he might extricate himself from that state of disgrace to which he had been consigned under the Directory; and he was now sorry that he had quitted the banks of the Rhine for the banks of the Nile. With weakness unworthy of his character, he allowed that feeling to betray itself. This man, great as he was in danger, yielded to it as much as the meanest of his soldiers. The chief command did not console him for the necessity of remaining in Egypt, for he did not love command. Encouraging the discontent against General Bonaparte, he committed the error, which would deserve to be called criminal, had it not been repaired by heroic actions, of contributing himself to produce in the army a feeling which soon became general. Following his example, everybody began to say that they could not stay any longer in Egypt, and must absolutely return to France at all hazards. Other feelings combined with this passion for return, to destroy the moral feeling of the army, and to produce in it the most mischievous dispositions.

An old rivalry divided at that time, and long continued to divide, the officers who had belonged to the armies of the Rhine and of Italy. They were jealous, these of those, each party pretending to carry on war in a different and a superior manner; and although this rivalry was repressed by the presence of General Bonaparte, it was the principal cause of the diversity of their opinions. All who had come from the armies of the Rhine, showed but little inclination to the Egyptian expedition; on the other hand, the officers originally attached to the army of Italy, though sorry to be so far distant from France, were well-inclined to the expedition, because it was the work of the general-in-chief. After his departure, all restraint was thrown off. Kléber's partisans rallied tumultuously around him; they loudly repeated with him what, it is true, began to be the conviction of every one, that the conquest of Egypt was a mad undertaking, which ought to be abandoned as soon as possible. This opinion, however, found dissentients; some generals, such as Janusse, Menou,¹ Davout,² Desaix, in particular, dared to express other sentiments. The army was henceforth split into two parties; the one was called the colonist, the other the anti-colonist party. Unluckily Desaix was absent. He was completing the conquest of Upper Egypt, where he was delivering brilliant battles, and ruling with admi-

nable wisdom. His influence could not, therefore, be opposed at that moment to Kléber's. To crown the misfortune, he was not destined to remain in Egypt. General Bonaparte, wishing to have him about his person, had committed the error of not appointing him commander-in-chief, and had left orders for him to return as speedily as possible to Europe. Desaix, whose name was universally cherished and respected in the army, whose administrative talents equalled his military capacity, would have governed the colony most ably, and would have avoided all those weaknesses to which Kléber gave way, at least for a moment.

Kléber, however, was the most popular of the generals among the soldiery. His name was hailed by them with entire confidence, and somewhat cheered them for the loss of the illustrious commander who had just left them. The first impression once over, their minds, though they had not recovered their wonted tone, acquired more calmness and justice. Other language was held; men said among themselves that, after all, it behoved General Bonaparte to fly to the succour of France, now in danger; and that, the army once established in Egypt, the best thing he could do for it was to go to Paris, to represent strongly its situation and its wants, and to claim that assistance which he alone could extort from the supine government at home.

Kléber returned to Cairo, assumed the command with some ostentation, and took up his abode in the fine Arabian mansion which his predecessor had occupied in the Ezbekyeh Place. He displayed a certain pomp, not so much to gratify his own taste as to make an impression on the Orientals, and resolved to make his authority felt, by exercising it with vigour. But it was not long before the solitudes of chief command, which were insupportable to him, the new dangers with which the Turks and the English threatened Egypt, and the grief of exile, which was general, filled his soul with the most gloomy discouragement. A report of the state of the colony having been made to him, by his order, he addressed to the Directory a despatch full of errors, and accompanied it with a report by Poussielgue, the administrator of finances—a report in which things were represented in the most false, and moreover in the most injurious light, as regarded General Bonaparte.

In this despatch and report, dated the 26th of September—4th Vendémiaire, year VIII.—General Kléber, and Poussielgue, the administrator, stated that the army, diminished by one half, was at this moment reduced to about 15,000 men; that these men were nearly naked, which in that climate was extremely dangerous on account of the difference of temper-

¹ MENOU, J. BARON DE. Deputy from the nobility of Touraine to the States General. He was one of the first who joined the chamber of the Tiers Etat. He distinguished himself as a speaker and statesman, during the years 1789, '90, and '91. In the latter year he was employed as major-general, and in 1792 was second in command of the regular army. In 1793 he was employed against La Vendée, and was defeated by young La Roche Jacquelin, at the bridge of Le and at Vihiers. In 1795 he defended the National Convention against the Jacobins, and was rewarded by a suit of gilt armour. In 1798 he followed Bonaparte to Egypt, where he displayed both

courage and conduct. He there embraced Mahometanism, and married a rich young Egyptian girl, daughter to the keeper of the baths at Alexandria.—*Biographie Moderne.*

² DAVOUT, LOUIS NICHOLAS. Born of a noble family, in 1770. Studied with Napoleon at Brienne. He distinguished himself under Dumouriez. In the Italian campaigns he sedulously attached himself to Napoleon. He followed Napoleon to Egypt, and after the battle of Marengo was made chief of the grenadiers of the Con-sular Guard.—*Encyclopædia Americana.*

ture between day and night; that they were in want of cannon, muskets, projectiles, powder, all which things it was difficult to replace, because cast-iron, lead, timber for building, and materials for making gunpowder, were not to be found in Egypt; that there was a considerable deficit in the finances, since the sum of 4,000,000 of francs was due to the soldiers for pay, and 7,000,000 or 8,000,000 to the contractors for various supplies; that the resource to be derived from the levying contributions was already exhausted, the country being ripe for immediate insurrection should new ones be imposed; that, the inundation having failed this year, and the crops therefore likely to prove deficient, the Egyptians would be alike destitute of means and will to pay the tax; that dangers of all kinds threatened the colony; that the two old chiefs of the Mamelukes, Murad Bey and Ibrahim Bey, still maintained their ground, the one in Upper, the other in Lower Egypt; that Djeddar, the celebrated pasha of Acre, was about to send to the Turkish army a reinforcement of 20,000 excellent soldiers, the former defenders of St. Jean d'Acre, against the French; that the grand vizier himself having set out from Constantinople, was already in the neighbourhood of Damascus, with a powerful army; that the Russians and the English were preparing to add a regular force to the irregular forces of the Turks; that, in this extremity, but one resource was left, namely, to treat with the Porte; and that, General Bonaparte having set the example thereof, and given express authority therefor, in his instructions to his successor, an attempt was about to be made to negotiate with the grand vizier a mixed domination, by means of which the Porte should occupy the open country of Egypt, and levy the miri or land-tax, while France should occupy the towns and the forts, and levy the revenue of the customs. Kléber added, that the commander-in-chief had seen the crisis approaching, and that this was the real motive for his precipitate departure. M. Poussielgue concluded his report with a calumny. General Bonaparte, when he left Egypt, had, he said, carried away two millions. To complete this picture, it should be known that General Bonaparte had loaded M. Poussielgue with favours.

Such were the despatches sent to the Directory by Kléber and M. Poussielgue. General Bonaparte was therein treated as a man who is held to be ruined, and to whom there is no need of showing indulgence. It was believed, in fact, that he was exposed to the two-fold danger of being taken by the English, and severely condemned by the Directory for deserting his army. What would have been the embarrassment of the writers of those despatches, had they known that they would be opened and read by the man who was the object of their calumnies, and who had ere this time become the absolute head of the government!

Kléber, too careless to ascertain himself the real state of things, not even taking the pains to examine whether the statistics he was sending agreed with his own assertions,—Kléber, I

say, knew not that he was advancing falsehoods; he transmitted, through negligence and ill-humour, the hearsays which passion had multiplied around him to such a degree as to give them a kind of public credibility. These despatches were intrusted to a cousin of Barras, the Director, and accompanied by a multitude of letters, in which the officers of the army gave vent to a despair as unfounded as it was imprudent. This cousin of Barras was taken by the English; he hastily threw overboard the packet of despatches of which he was the bearer; but it floated, was perceived, picked up, and sent to the British cabinet. We shall soon see what was the result of these mischievous communications, which thus fell into the hands of the English, and were published throughout all Europe.

Kléber and M. Poussielgue, however, had sent duplicates of their despatches to Paris. These duplicates, transmitted by a different channel, reached France, and were delivered to the First Consul.

What truth was there in this picture, drawn by diseased imaginations? Of this we shall soon be enabled to judge with certainty by actual events; meanwhile, we must rectify the false assertions just laid before the reader.

The army, according to Kléber, was reduced to 15,000 men; yet the returns sent to the Directory made it amount to 28,500. When, two years later, it was brought back to France, it still numbered in its ranks 22,000 soldiers, and, in these two years, it fought several pitched battles, and innumerable combats. In 1798 there had left France, in various convoys, 34,000 men. Of these 4000 were landed at Malta; 30,000, therefore, arrived at Alexandria. Subsequently, 3000 sailors, the remnant of the crews of the fleet destroyed at Aboukir, reinforced the army, and again raised it to 33,000 men. In 1798 and 1799, it had lost from 4000 to 5000 soldiers; it was, therefore, reduced to about 28,000, of whom at least 22,000 were fit for duty.

Egypt is a salubrious country, where wounds heal with extreme rapidity: there were, this year, few sick, and no plague-patients. Egypt was full of Christians, Greeks, Syrians, or Copts, urgent to be enlisted into our ranks, and capable of furnishing excellent recruits, to the number of 15,000 or 20,000. The blacks of Darfur, bought and made free, added so many as 500 good soldiers to one of our demi-brigades alone. Egypt, moreover, was subdued. The peasants who cultivate it, accustomed to obey under all masters, never thought of lifting a musket. With the exception of a few insurrections in the towns, there was nothing to be feared but from undisciplined Turks, coming from a distance, or English mercenaries, transported with great trouble by sea. Against such enemies the French army was more than a match, if it were commanded, I do not say with genius, but with ordinary judgment.

Kléber alleged in his despatches that the soldiers were naked; but General Bonaparte had left cloth for clothing them, and, a month after the transmission of this despatch, they were entirely new clothed. At any rate, Egypt abounded in cotton stuffs; it furnished all

Africa with them. It could not be difficult to procure these stuffs by purchase, or by requiring them in part payment of the taxes. As regards provision, Egypt is the granary of those countries which are destitute of corn. Wheat, rice, beef, mutton, poultry, sugar, coffee, were then cheaper by tenfold there than in Europe. So low was the price of necessities, that the army, though its finances were not in the most flourishing condition, was able to pay for all that it consumed. Kléber asserted that it was in want of arms. Yet there remained 11,000 swords, 15,000 muskets, and 1400 or 1500 cannon, 180 of which were field-pieces. Alexandria, which, according to him, had been destitute of artillery ever since the siege of St. Jean d'Acre, contained more than 300 pieces in battery. For ammunition, there remained 3,000,000 musket-cartridges, 27,000 gun-cartridges made up, and material for making more; for there were still in the magazines 200,000 projectiles, and 1,100,000 pounds of powder. Subsequent events demonstrated the truth of these allegations, since the army continued to fight two years longer, and surrendered considerable stores to the English. What, in fact, could have become, in so short a time, of the immense *matériel* carefully accumulated by General Bonaparte on board the fleet which conveyed the army to Egypt?

In regard to the finances, Kléber's report was equally false. The soldiers were paid up. It is true that nothing had yet been decided respecting the financial system best adapted for provisioning the army, without exhausting the country; but the resources existed, and by merely levying the taxes already imposed, the troops might live in abundance. There was due upon the imposts of the year sufficient to provide for all current expenses; that is to say, above 16,000,000*f.* There was, consequently, no danger of driving the population to insurrection by the imposition of new taxes. The financial documents subsequently made public proved that Egypt was capable of furnishing 25,000,000*f.* per year, and that with ease. At this rate it would be paying but half the amount wrung from it, with a thousand vexatious circumstances by the numerous tyrants who oppressed it under the name of Mamelukes. At the price of things in Egypt, the army could be subsisted for 18,000,000*f.* or 20,000,000*f.* As for the chests, so far was General Bonaparte from having exhausted them that, at his departure, he had not even taken the whole of his pay.

As for the dangers with which the colony was threatened, the truth was this: Murad Bey, utterly disheartened, was flying to and fro through Upper Egypt with a handful of Mamelukes. Ibrahim Bey, who, under the government of the Mamelukes, shared the sovereignty with him, was at that time in Lower Egypt, toward the frontiers of Syria. He had not 400 horse with him, much less several thousands. Djeddar Pasha was shut up in St. Jean l'Acre. So far from preparing a reinforcement of 80,000 men for the army of the grand-vizier, he viewed, on the contrary, with high displeasure, the approach of a fresh Turkish

army, especially since his pashalic had been delivered from the French. As for the grand-vizier, he was not yet across the Taurus. The English had their troops at Mahon, and were thinking at this moment of employing them in Tuscany, at Naples, or on the coast of France. As for a Russian expedition, that was a mere fable. The Russians never had any idea of taking so long a voyage, for the purpose of furthering the policy of England in the east.

The inhabitants were not so much disposed to insurrection as was represented. By humouring the sheiks, who are the priests and the lawyers of the Arabs, as General Bonaparte had recommended, their attachment would very easily have been gained. We had already begun to make ourselves a party among them. We had, moreover, on our side the Copts, the Greeks, and the Syrians, who, being all Christians, behaved toward us as friends, and were useful auxiliaries. Thus nothing imminent from that quarter was to be apprehended. No doubt, if the French experienced disasters, the Egyptians, with the fickleness of conquered nations, would do as the Italians themselves had recently done, they would join the conqueror of one day against the conqueror of the preceding day. Still they appreciated the difference between the sway of the Mamelukes, who fleeced them, and never were seen but sword in hand, and that of the French, who respected property, and rarely struck off heads.

Kléber, then, had indulged in dangerous exaggerations, the melancholy results of hatred, weariness, and exile. By his side, General Menou, viewing every thing under the most favourable colours, believed the French to be invincible in Egypt, and regarded the expedition as the commencement of a near and momentous revolution in the commerce of the world. Men never can sufficiently divest themselves of personal prejudice in forming opinions of this kind. Kléber and Menou were both honest, upright men; but the one wanted to leave Egypt, the other to stay in it: the clearest, and the most authentic returns, bore to them totally contrary significations—misery and ruin to one, abundance and success to the other.

At any rate, be the situation what it might, Kléber and his party were themselves seriously culpable when they took thought of evacuation, for they had no right to do so. It is true that General Bonaparte, in instructions replete with wisdom, envisaging all possible circumstances, had foreseen the very case in which the army might be obliged to evacuate Egypt. "I am going to France," said he, "either as a private man or as a public man; I will procure succours to be sent to you. But if, next spring,—he was writing in August, 1799—you shall have received no succours, no instructions; if the plague should have carried off more than 1500 men, independently of losses by war; if a considerable force, which you are incapable of resisting, should press you hard, negotiate with the vizier; consent even, if it must be so, to an evacuation, subject to one condition, that of communicating with the French government; and, until that can be effected, continuing to occupy. You will thus

nave gained time, and it is impossible that, during the interval, you will not receive succour." These instructions were very sound; but the case foreseen was far from being realized. For this, in the first place, it would have been requisite to wait till the spring of 1800; it would have been requisite that, at this period, no succours, and no orders, should have arrived in Egypt; it would have been requisite that the army should have lost part of its effective force by the plague; and, lastly, that it should be pressed by superior forces: now, nothing of this sort had happened, or did happen. A negotiation opened without these conditions was a real transgression.

In September, 1799—Vendémiaire, year VIII. —Desaix, having completed the conquest and subjugation of Upper Egypt, had left two movable columns for the pursuit of Murad Bey, to whom he had offered peace on condition of his becoming a vassal of France. He had then returned to Cairo by order of Kléber, who wished to make use of his name in those luckless negotiations into which he was about to enter. During these proceedings, the army of the grand-vizier, so long announced, was slowly advancing. Sir Sidney Smith, who conveyed with his squadron the Turkish troops destined to be transported by sea, had just arrived off Damietta with 8000 Janissaries. On the 1st of November, 1799—10th Brumaire, year VIII. —the landing of the first division, of 4000 Janissaries, was effected, towards the Boğaz of Damietta, that is, at the entrance of that branch of the Nile which runs past this town. General Verdier, who had only 1000 men at Damietta, marched out with this small force, and proceeded beyond the fort of Lesbeh, to a narrow tongue of land, on the shore of which the Turks had disembarked, and, without giving time for the other 4000 Janissaries to arrive, attacked the 4000 who had already landed. In spite of the fire of the English artillery, advantageously placed upon an old tower, he beat them, drowned or put to the sword 3000, and took the rest prisoners. The gun-boats, at this sight, returned to their ships, and did not land the remainder of the Turkish troops. The French had only twenty-two men killed and 100 wounded.

On the first tidings of this disembarkation, Kléber had despatched Desaix with a column of 3000 men; but the latter, uselessly sent to Damietta, had found the victory won, and the French filled with unbounded confidence. This brilliant achievement ought to have sufficed to encourage Kléber: unfortunately he was swayed at once by his own chagrin and by that of the army. He had before influenced the troops, who in their turn influenced him to the fatal resolution of an immediate evacuation. General Bonaparte became the theme of renewed invective. That rash young man, it was said, who had exposed the French army to chance, and exposed himself to another chance in braving the seas and the English cruisers in order to return to France, that rash young man could not have escaped the dangers of the passage. The prudent generals trained in the school of the Rhine ought to relinquish the mad delusion, and to carry back to Europe the

brave soldiers, indispensable to the Republic now threatened in all quarters.

In this disposition of mind, Kléber had sent to the vizier, who had entered Syria, one of his officers to make new overtures of peace. At a previous period General Bonaparte, with a view to embroiling the vizier with the English, had adopted the idea of setting on foot negotiations, which, on his part, were but a feint. His overtures had been received with great distrust and pride. Kléber's met a more favourable reception, through the influence of Sir Sidney Smith, who was preparing to play a prominent part in the affairs of Egypt.

This officer of the English navy had contributed largely to prevent the success of the siege of St. Jean d'Acre; he was proud of it, and had devised a *ruse de guerre*, according to the expression of the English agents, which consisted in taking advantage of their momentary weakness to wrest from the French their valuable conquest. Accordingly, as all the intercepted letters of our officers clearly showed their impatient desire to return to France, Sir Sidney Smith wished to induce the army to negotiate and to sign a capitulation; and before the French government should have time to give or to refuse its ratification, to ship it off immediately and to throw it upon the coast of Europe. With this view, he had disposed the grand-vizier to listen to the overtures of Kléber. As for himself, affecting to load the French officers with civilities, he permitted them to receive news from Europe, taking care however that only such intelligence should reach them as was anterior to the 18th of Brumaire. Kléber, on his part, despatched a negotiator to Sir Sidney Smith, for as the English were masters of the sea, he wished to induce them to take part in the negotiation, so that the return to France might be rendered possible. Sir Sidney lent a willing ear to this message, and manifested a disposition to enter into arrangements, adding, moreover, that, by virtue of a treaty of the 5th of January, 1799, negotiated by himself, there existed a triple alliance between Russia, England, and the Porte; that those powers had bound themselves to do every thing jointly; that, in consequence, no arrangement with the Porte could be valid and carried into execution, if it should not be concurred in by the agents of all the three courts. In his communications, Sir Sidney Smith assumed the title of "Minister plenipotentiary of his Britannic Majesty to the Ottoman Porte, commanding his squadron in the waters of the Levant."

Sir Sidney Smith here attributed to himself a title which he had held, but which he had ceased to hold since the arrival of Lord Elgin as ambassador at Constantinople; and, in reality, he had at this moment no other power than what a military commander always has—that of signing conventions of war, suspensions of arms, &c.

Kléber, without closer examination, without knowing whether he was treating with agents sufficiently accredited, blindly entered upon that perilous course into which he was hurried by a feeling common to the whole army, and which would have ended in ignominy if

fortunately for him, Heaven had not endowed him with an heroic soul, which could not fail to retrieve itself with glory, as soon as he should discover the extent of his error. He entered, then, into negotiation, and offered to Sir Sidney Smith, as well as to the vizier, who had advanced as far as Gaza in Syria, to appoint officers furnished with full powers to treat. Disliking to receive the Turks in his camp, and unwilling, on the other hand, to risk his officers amidst the undisciplined army of the grand-vizier, he resolved to propose Sir Sidney Smith's ship *The Tigre*! for the place of the conferences.

Sir Sidney, who was cruising with two ships only—which, be it observed by the way, sufficiently proved the possibility for France to communicate with Egypt—Sir Sidney had at this moment but one; the other, the *Theseus*, was under repair at Cyprus. Boisterous weather frequently obliging him to stand off shore, his communications with the land were neither regular nor prompt. It took some time to obtain his assent. At length, his answer arrived: it was to this effect, that he would appear successively off Alexandria and Damietta, to take on board the officers whom Kléber should send to him.

Kléber appointed Desaix and Poussielgue, the administrator, the same who had so clumsily slandered General Bonaparte, and whom the Egyptians, in their Arabic narratives, have designated *Sultan Kléber's vizier*. Poussielgue was an advocate for evacuation, Desaix was opposed to it. The latter had made the utmost exertions to withstand the torrent, to raise the spirits of his companions in arms, and he had undertaken the negotiation commenced by Kléber, solely with the hope of protracting it, and gaining time for the arrival of succour and instructions from France. Kléber, in order to excuse himself to Desaix, told him that it was General Bonaparte who first began to parley with the Turks; that, moreover, he had himself provided, and authorized beforehand, a treaty of evacuation, in case of imminent danger. Desaix, misinformed, still hoped that the first ship which should arrive from France would clear up these obscurities and perhaps change the deplorable dispositions of the staff of the army. He set forth with M. Poussielgue, and unable to join Sir Sidney Smith off Alexandria, found him before Damietta, and went on board the *Tigre*, on the 22d of December, 1799—1st Nivose, year VIII. It was just at this moment that General Bonaparte was invested with the supreme power in France.

Sir Sidney Smith, delighted to have on board such a plenipotentiary as Desaix, gave him a most flattering reception, and strove by every means of persuasion to bring him to the idea of evacuating Egypt.

Desaix was perfectly competent to defend himself, and held out for the conditions which his principal had instructed him to demand. These conditions being held inadmissible by

the English commodore, admirably suited the plans of Desaix, who wished to gain time; on the part of Kléber they were extremely ill-advised, for their extravagance rendered any agreement impossible. But Kléber sought in that very extravagance an excuse for his fault. He demanded, for instance, that the army, retiring with the honours of war, with arms and baggage, should be allowed to land at any point of the continent that he might be pleased to select, in order to afford the Republic the aid of its presence, wherever it might be deemed most serviceable. He demanded that the Porte should restore to us immediately the Venetian islands, which had become French property by the treaty of Campo-Formio, that is to say, Corfu, Zante, Cephalonia, &c., and which were occupied at the moment by Turco-Russian garrisons; that these islands, and above all, Malta, one of much greater importance, should be given up to France; that the possession of them should be guaranteed to her by the persons signing the treaty of evacuation; that the French army, on retiring, should have a right to reinforce and revictual the garrisons; and lastly, that the treaty which united the Porte, Russia, and England, should be instantly annulled, and the triple alliance of the East dissolved.

These conditions were unreasonable, it must be confessed: not that they were an exorbitant equivalent for what was given up by the cession of Egypt, but because they were not feasible. Sir Sidney made Kléber sensible of this. Officers treating for a mere suspension of arms cannot include topics of such vast extent in their negotiation. Zante, Cephalonia, Corfu, were occupied by Turkish and Russian troops; it was requisite, therefore, to refer not only to Constantinople but also to Petersburg. Malta was held under the king of Naples as lord paramount: it could not, therefore, be disposed of without the consent of that prince, who had always refused to cede it to France. To land French troops in the island at that moment, would be in a manner deciding the question. There would be found therein cruisers or garrisons of all the combined powers, who would not retire upon an order from Sir Sidney Smith or the grand vizier. Besides this, England would never consent to a condition insuring the possession of Malta to France. To land a French army on a point of the continent, where it might derange the combinations of the war by its unexpected appearance, would be a step too bold for a mere commodore to think of taking. Lastly, to demand the abolition of the triple alliance was to require of Sir Sidney Smith the abrogation by himself alone, on board his ship, of a treaty ratified by three great powers, which had acquired great importance for the East. Supposing that all these stipulations should be accepted by all the courts whose consent was requisite, it would still be necessary to send to Naples, to London, to St. Petersburg, to Constantinople. Of course this would no longer be a military convention of evacuation, like that which was signed at Marengo, capable of execution on the very instant. If it were referred to London, it must

When captured ships are taken into the British navy, even when the French name is retained, the English article is used—*The Temeraire*, *The Tigre*, &c. H.

necessarily be referred to Paris also, which Kléber had no wish to do. All this evidently far exceeded the limits of a military capitulation.

Sir Sidney Smith had no difficulty in making the French negotiators feel the force of these reasons. But it was urgently necessary to gain two objects immediately—the departure of the wounded, and of the scientific men attached to the expedition, for whom Desaix solicited safe-conduct, and secondly, a suspension of arms; for the army of the grand-vizier, though marching slowly would soon be in presence of the French. It had actually arrived before the fort of El Arisch, the first French post on the frontiers of Syria, and had summoned it to surrender. Kléber, apprized of this circumstance, had written to Desaix and ordered him to require, as an indispensable condition of these conferences, that the Turkish army should halt on the frontier.

The first point, that relating to the departure of the wounded, and the men of science, rested with Sir Sidney Smith. He assented to it with great cheerfulness and courtesy. As for the armistice, Sir Sidney declared that he would willingly propose it, but he could not answer for obtaining it; for the Turkish army was composed of fanatic and barbarous hordes, and it was a difficult thing to make regular conventions with it, and still more so to insure their execution. To remove this difficulty, he adopted the idea of going to the camp of the grand-vizier, which was in the environs of Gaza. The negotiations, in fact, had been going on for a fortnight, on board the Tigre, while floating at the pleasure of the winds off the coast of Syria and Egypt: the parties had said all that they had to say, and the negotiation could not be continued to any useful purpose but in conjunction with the grand-vizier. Sir Sidney Smith, therefore, proposed to repair thither, in order to arrange there a suspension of arms, and to prepare for the arrival of the French negotiators, if he thought he could insure them safety and respect. This proposal was accepted. Sir Sidney, availing himself of a favourable moment, pushed off in a boat which landed him on the coast, after incurring some danger, and ordered the captain of the Tigre to meet him in the port of Jaffa, where Poussielgue and Desaix were to be put ashore, if the place of conference should be transferred to the camp of the grand-vizier.

At the moment when the English commodore reached the camp, a horrible event had occurred at El Arisch. The Turkish army, composed of a minority of Janissaries, and a majority of Asiatic militia, whom the Mussulman laws place at the disposal of the sultan, presented a confused and undisciplined mass, extremely dangerous to all who wore the European dress. It had been raised in the name of the Prophet; for the Turks were told that this was the last effort that would be required to drive the Infidels out of Egypt; that the redoubtable Sultan of Fire, Bonaparte, had left them: that they were weakened and disheartened; that for the Turks to show themselves would be to conquer; that all Egypt was ready to rise against their domination. These and

other things, repeated everywhere, had collected around the grand-vizier a host of 70,000 or 80,000 fanatic Mussulmans. The Turks had been joined by the Mamelukes. Ibrahim Bey, who had sometime before retired to Syria, and Murad Bey, who had descended by a long circuit from the cataracts to the environs of Suez, had become the auxiliaries of their former adversaries. The English had created for this army a sort of field artillery, drawn by mules. The Bedouin Arabs, in the hope of plundering the vanquished, to whichever party they might belong, had placed 15,000 camels at the disposal of the grand-vizier, to assist him to cross the desert which separates Egypt and Palestine. The Turkish generalissimo had in his semi-barbarous staff some English officers, and some of those guilty emigrants, who had taught Djeddar Pasha how to defend St. Jean d'Acre. We shall now see of what horrors those miserable refugees became the cause.

The fort of El Arisch, before which the Turks were at this moment sitting down, was, according to the declaration of General Bonaparte, one of the two keys of Egypt: Alexandria was the other. According to him, an army arriving by sea could not land in great force anywhere but on the beach of Alexandria. An army advancing by land, and compelled to cross the desert of Syria, would be obliged to pass El Arisch, in order to get water at the wells situated at that place. He had therefore ordered important works to be constructed about Alexandria, and the fort of El Arisch to be put in a state of defence. A body of 300 men, supplied with provision and ammunition, were in garrison there, commanded by a valiant officer named Cazals. The Turkish advanced guard having reached El Arisch, colonel Douglass, an English officer in the service of Turkey, summoned Cazals, the commandant, to surrender. A French emigrant in disguise was the bearer of the summons. A parley ensued, and the soldiers were told that the evacuation of Egypt was imminent; that it was already announced as resolved upon; that it would soon be inevitable; and that the desire to oblige them to defend themselves was a piece of useless cruelty. The guilty feelings which the officers had but too much encouraged in the army, then burst forth. The soldiers in garrison at El Arisch, vehemently longing, like their comrades, to leave Egypt, declared to the commandant that they would not fight, and that he must make up his mind to surrender the fort. The gallant Cazals, indignant at this, called them together, addressed them in the noblest language, told them that if there were cowards among them, they might leave the garrison and go to the camp of the Turks, that he gave them full liberty to do so, but that he would resist unto death with those Frenchmen who continued faithful to their duty. These words revived for a moment the feeling of honour in the hearts of the soldiers. The summons was rejected, and the attack commenced. The Turks were not capable of carrying a position that was defended, were it never so little. The batteries of the fort silenced all their artillery. Under the direction, however, of English and emigrant officers, they pushed their

treaches to the salient angle of a bastion. The commandant ordered a few grenadiers to make a sortie, for the purpose of driving the Turks from the first branch of the trench. Captain Ferray, who was appointed to head the party, was followed by three grenadiers only. Finding himself deserted, he returned to the fort. Meanwhile the mutineers had struck the colours, but a sergeant of grenadiers had hoisted them again. A struggle ensued. During this contest, the recreants, who insisted on surrendering, threw ropes to the Turks; these ferocious enemies, once hoisted up into the fort, fell sword in hand upon the dastardly beings who had given them admission into the fort, and slaughtered many of them. The rest, returning to their senses, joined the remainder of the garrison, defended themselves with desperate courage, and were most of them cut in pieces. Some few obtained quarter, thanks to Colonel Douglass, and owed their lives to the interference of that humane, gallant, and distinguished officer.

Thus fell the fort of El Arisch. This was a first effect of the deplorable disposition prevailing in the army, the first fruit reaped by the leaders from their own errors.

It was now the 30th of December—9th Nivôse:—the letter written by Sir Sidney Smith to the grand-vizier, to propose to him a suspension of arms, had not reached him in time to prevent the melancholy catastrophe at El Arisch. Sir Sidney Smith was a man of generous feelings. This barbarous massacre of a French garrison disgusted him; and, above all, it made him fear a rupture of the negotiations. He lost no time in sending explanations to Kléber, both in his own name and in that of the grand-vizier, and he added formal assurances that all hostilities should cease pending the negotiations.

At the sight of these hordes, which rather resembled a migration of savage tribes than an army going to battle, fighting among themselves at night over their provisions or for the possession of a well, Sir Sidney Smith felt alarmed for the safety of the French plenipotentiaries. He insisted that the tents destined for their reception should be pitched in the very quarter of the grand-vizier and the reis-effendi, who were both present with the army; and that a guard of picked men should be stationed about these tents; he caused his own tents to be pitched beside them; and, lastly, he provided a detachment of English seamen, to secure both himself, and the French officers intrusted to his honour, from all violence. Having taken these precautions, he sent to Jaffa, to fetch Messrs. Poussielgue and Desaix to the place where the conferences were to be held.

Kléber, when informed of the massacre of El Arisch, did not manifest so much indignation as he ought to have done; he was aware that, if he should be too warm upon that subject, all the negotiations would be broken off.

He was more urgent than ever for a suspension of arms; and, at the same time, as a measure of precaution, and in order to be nearer to the theatre of the conferences, he left Cairo, and transferred his head-quarters to Salahieh, on the very border of the desert, two days' march from El Arisch.

In the mean time, Desaix and Poussielgue, detained by contrary winds, had not been able to land at Gaza till the 11th of January—21st Nivôse,—or to reach El Arisch before the 13th. The conferences commenced as soon as they arrived, and the indignation of Desaix had wellnigh broken off the negotiations. The Turks, ignorant and barbarous, interpreting in their way the conduct of the French, attributed their disposition to treat, not to an immoderate desire to return to France, but to fear of fighting. They required, therefore, that the army should surrender themselves prisoners of war. Desaix was for putting an end at once to all kind of communication, but Sir Sidney interposed, prevailed on both parties to moderate their terms, and proposed honourable conditions, if honourable they could be as pertaining to a resolution of this nature. It was no longer possible to advance Kléber's original conditions. Of this he was himself convinced, by the letters which had been written to him from on board the Tigre, and he said no more about the Venetian Islands, Malta, or the revictualing of those islands. To give a colour, nevertheless, to his capitulation, he still adhered to one point—that the Porte should withdraw from the triple alliance. This point, strictly considered, was susceptible of being negotiated at El Arisch, since the grand-vizier and the reis-effendi were at hand; but it could scarcely be demanded of the English negotiator, whose intervention, however, was indispensable. This condition, therefore, was set aside, like the others. It was a vain artifice, which Kléber and his advisers employed toward themselves, in the desire of concealing from their own eyes the unworthiness of their own conduct.

The pure and simple evacuation, and its conditions, ere long became the sole subject of negotiation. After long discussion, it was agreed that all hostility should cease for three months; that those three months should be employed by the vizier in collecting, in the ports of Rosetta, Aboukir, and Alexandria, the vessels requisite for the conveyance of our army; by General Kléber in evacuating the Upper Nile, Cairo, and the contiguous provinces, and in concentrating his troops upon the points of embarkation; that the French should depart with arms and baggage, that is to say, with the honours of war; that they should take with them such military stores as they had need of, and leave the rest; that, from the day of the signature, they should cease to impose contributions, and should abandon to the Porte such as were still due; but that, in

• DESAIX, L. C. A. Born 1768 at the Chateau de Vengon near Riom, of a noble family, went through his studies at the college of Emat. In 1784 entered the foot regiment of Brittany as sub-lieutenant. In the campaign of Alsace, 1793, he displayed considerable talent. In 1794 joined the army of the North under Pichegru, in 1796 was recalled to the army of the Rhine

under Moreau, whose successes he shared, and frequently insured. After the peace of Campo Formio he was appointed second in command to the army of England, and subsequently accompanied Bonaparte to Egypt. On his return to Europe he chiefly contributed, as related in vol. I of the text, to the victory of Marengo.—*Biographie Moderne.*

return, the French army should receive 3000 purses, equivalent at that time to 3,000,000 francs, and representing the sum necessary for its subsistence. During the evacuation and the passage. The forts of Katieh, Salahieh, and Belbeis, forming the frontier of Egypt towards the desert of Syria, should be given up ten days after the ratification; Cairo forty days after. It was agreed that the ratification should be given within eight days by General Kléber alone, and without any reference to the French government. Lastly, Sir Sidney engaged, in his own name, and in the name of the Russian commissioner, to furnish the army with passports, which should prevent molestation from English cruisers.

The French commissioners here committed an error in form, which was of serious consequence. The signature of Sir Sidney Smith was indispensable, for, without that signature, the sea continued closed to them. They ought to have required Sir Sidney Smith, since he was the negotiator of that convention, to sign it. The mystery of his powers would then have been cleared up. It would then have transpired that the English commodore, though he formerly held powers to treat with the Porte, had none at this moment, Lord Elgin having arrived as minister at Constantinople; that he had no special instructions for the present case; that he had merely very strong presumptions that his conduct would be approved in London. The French plenipotentiaries, not conversant with diplomatic usages, supposed that Sir Sidney Smith, offering passports, was qualified to give them, and that these passports would be valid.

The terms of the convention being arranged, there was nothing more to be done but to sign it. But the noble heart of Desaix revolted from what he was obliged to do. Before placing his name at the foot of such a paper, he sent for Savary,¹ his aide-de-camp, directed him to proceed to head-quarters at Salahieh, where Kléber then was, to communicate to him the draft of the convention, and to declare that he would not sign it, till he should receive from him a formal order to that effect. Savary went, repaired to Salahieh, and delivered to Kléber the message with which he was charged. Kléber, who had a vague sense of his error, determined, in order to cover it, to assemble a council of war, to which all the generals of the army were summoned.

The council met on the 21st of January, 1800—1st Pluviôse, year VIII. The minutes of it still exist. It is painful to see brave men, who had shed their blood, who were going to shed it again for their country, accumulate wretched falsehoods to colour a criminal weakness. This example ought to serve as a lesson to military officers; it ought to teach them that it is not enough to be firm under fire, and that the courage which braves balls and bullets is the least of the virtues imposed by their noble profession. In this council of war, great stress was laid on the intelligence which had then

reached Egypt, that the great combined French and Spanish fleet had sailed out of the Mediterranean into the ocean; whence it was concluded that all hope of succour from France was at an end. In proof of this, it was argued that five months had elapsed since the departure of General Bonaparte—five months, during which no despatch had arrived. An argument was made of the discouragement of the army, which the very persons who used it had themselves contributed to produce. They adverted to what had recently happened at Rosetta and Alexandria, where the garrisons had behaved like that of El Arisch, threatening to revolt, if they were not immediately taken back to Europe. They alleged that the active army was reduced to 8000 men; they exaggerated, beyond measure, the force of the Turkish army; they talked of a pretended Russian expedition that was about to join the grand-vizier—an expedition which had no existence but in the heated imaginations of those who were desirous to forsake Egypt at any rate. They asserted, as a positive fact, the impossibility of resistance—an assertion which was so soon to be contradicted, in an heroic manner, by the very persons who so stoutly maintained it. Lastly, to keep as closely as possible within the instructions of General Bonaparte, they brought forward some cases of plague, extremely doubtful and, for the rest, absolutely unknown in the army.

Notwithstanding all that was said, however, the partisans of the evacuation were far from adhering to the instructions left by General Bonaparte. He had laid down as conditions:—1. That no succours, no orders, should have arrived by the spring of 1800. 2. That the plague should have carried off 1500 men, besides the losses from war. 3. That the danger should be so great as to render all resistance impossible: and, these circumstances being realized, he had recommended to his successor to gain time in negotiating, and not to consent to the evacuation, but on condition of its ratification by France. Now, it was still only January, 1800; there was no plague, no pressing danger; and yet an immediate evacuation was the point to be decided, and without any reference to France.

A man who has exhibited in war something superior to courage, that is to say character, General Davout, since marshal and prince of Eckmühl, was the only one who durst withstand this culpable impulsion. He was not afraid to oppose Kléber, to whose ascendancy all the rest bowed, and combated with energy the proposed capitulation. But he was not listened to; and, from a mischievous complaisance, he consented to sign the resolution of the council of war, by suffering an entry to be made in the minutes that it had been adopted unanimously.

Davout, nevertheless, took Savary aside, and charged him to assure Desaix that if he choose to break off the negotiation he would find support in the army. Savary returned to the

¹ SAVARY, RENE. Son to the major of the Castle of Sedan. The revolution quickly made him an officer, and he was successively aide-de-camp to Generals Férino and Desaix. He distinguished himself under the latter in

the passage of the Rhine, accompanied him to Egypt, was beside him when he received his mortal wound at Marengo, and was thenceforth attached to the person of Napoleon.

camp at El Arisch, and communicated to Desaix what had passed, and the message which Davout had desired him to deliver. Desaix, finding Davout's name subscribed to the deliberations, replied with warmth to Savary, "Whom then would you have me trust, when the very man who disapproves the convention dares not make his signature agree with his opinion? He would have me disobey, and yet dares not maintain to the end the sentiments which he has expressed!" Desaix, though deeply grieved, yet, on seeing the torrent, gave way to it himself, and affixed his signature on the 28th of January, to that unlucky convention, afterwards celebrated by the title of the convention of El Arisch (8th Pluviôse.)

When the thing was done, people began to be sensible of its importance. Desaix, on his return to the camp, spoke of it with grief, and did not conceal his deep mortification at having been selected for such a mission, and forced to fulfil it by an order from the general-in-chief. Davout, Menou, and some others, launched out into bitter invectives: dissensions broke forth on all sides in the camp of Salahieh.

Meanwhile, preparations were making for departure: the great majority of the army were overjoyed at the prospect of leaving their distant lands, and soon beholding France again. Sir Sidney Smith had returned to his ship. The vizier advanced and took possession, consecutively, of the intrenched positions of Katiéh, Salahieh, and Kelbeis, which Kléber, in haste to execute the convention, faithfully delivered up to him. Kléber returned to Cairo, to make his preparations for departure, to call in the troops that were guarding Upper Egypt, to concentrate his army, and then to direct it upon Alexandria and Rosetta, at the time stipulated for embarkation.

While these events were occurring in Egypt—baneful consequences of a sentiment which the chiefs of the army had fanned instead of stifling—other events, natural consequences of the same causes, were taking place in Europe. In fact, the letters and despatches, sent in duplicate, had, as we have seen, arrived at the same time in London and Paris. The accusatory despatch directed against General Bonaparte, and addressed to the Directory, had been delivered to General Bonaparte himself, who had become the head of the government. He was shocked at so many weaknesses and falsehoods; but he was sensible how much the army needed Kléber; he appreciated the great qualities of that general, and, not conceiving that his discouragement could proceed to such a length as to induce him to give up Egypt, he took no notice of his own grievances. He hastened, therefore, to despatch from France instructions and an intimation of the great success which he was preparing to send.

The British government, on its part, having received a duplicate of Kléber's despatches, and a great number of letters written by our

officers to their families, caused them all to be published, with a view to exhibit to Europe the situation of the French in Egypt, and to embroil Generals Kléber and Bonaparte. It was a perfectly natural calculation on the part of an hostile power. At the same time, the English cabinet had received advice of the overtures made by General Kléber to the grand-vizier and to Sir Sidney Smith. Believing that the French army was reduced to the last extremity, it lost no time in sending off an express order not to grant any capitulation, unless they surrendered themselves prisoners of war. Mr. Dundas even made use, in his place in parliament, of odious expressions. "An example," he said, "must be made of that army, which, in a time of profound peace, has dared to invade the dominions of one of our allies; the interests of mankind require that it should be destroyed."

This language was barbarous; it displays the violence of the passions which then filled the hearts of the two nations. The English cabinet had taken literally the exaggerations of Kléber and of our officers; it considered the French as reduced to submit to any conditions that might be imposed upon them; and, not foreseeing what was passing, it had the imprudence to give positive orders to Lord Keith, the admiral commanding in the Mediterranean, not to sign any capitulation but on the express condition that the French troops should become prisoners of war.

These orders, despatched from London on the 17th of December, reached Admiral Keith in the island of Minorca in the first days of January, 1800; and, on the 8th of the same month, that admiral hastened to forward to Sir Sidney Smith the instructions which he had just received from his government. It took time, especially at that season, to cross the Mediterranean. The communications of Lord Keith did not reach Sir Sidney Smith before the 20th of February. The latter was deeply chagrined. He had acted without precise instructions from his government, reckoning upon it that his acts would be approved. He thus found himself in a false position with the French, for they might, with apparent reason, accuse him of breach of faith. Better acquainted, besides, with the real state of things, he was well aware that Kléber would never consent to surrender himself prisoner of war; and he saw the convention of El Arisch, so adroitly wrung from the weakness of a moment, wholly set aside. He lost no time in writing to Kléber, to express his mortification, to apprise him honestly of what was passing, to advise him to suspend immediately the delivery of the Egyptian fortresses to the grand-vizier, and to conjure him to wait for fresh orders from England before he took any definite resolutions.

Unfortunately, when these advices from Sir Sidney arrived at Cairo, the French army had already executed in part the treaty of El Arisch. It had delivered up to the Turks all the posi-

* LORD KEITH. A very gallant man and able officer. On the 4th of May, 1798, he offered battle off Cadiz with sixteen sail to twenty-six French sail of the line, which they declined. On the 19th of June he captured the *La Junon*, *L'Alceste*, *La Courageuse*, *La Salamine*, and *L'Alerte*, bound from Egypt to Toulon. He rejected the

treaty of El Arisch, signed the capitulation of Menou, afterward commanded in the North Sea; and finally was the admiral who gave the sailing orders for St. Helena to the *Bellerophon* with Napoleon on board.—*Brown's Naval History*.

sons on the right bank of the Nile, Katieh, Salahieh, Belbeis, and some of the positions of the Delta, particularly the town of Damietta and the fort of Lesbeh. The troops were already on march for Alexandria, with their baggage and stores. The division of Upper Egypt had put the Turks in possession of the Upper Nile, and was falling back upon Cairo, for the purpose of rejoining the rest of the army towards the sea. Desaix, availing himself of the order which he had received to return to France, and disliking to have any hand in the details of that ignominious retreat, had set out with Davout, who, for his part, could not stay any longer with Kléber. Kléber, forgetting his bickerings with Davout, was anxious to retain him, and had offered him the rank of general of division, which he had authority to confer as governor of Egypt. Davout refused it, saying that he should not like his promotion to bear the date of such a deplorable event. But, when Desaix and Davout were embarking, M. de Latour Maubourg, arriving from France, with the despatches of the First Consul, met them on the beach, informed them of the revolution of the 18th of Brumaire, and of the elevation of General Bonaparte to the supreme power. Thus Kléber, at the moment when he had just given up the fortified positions, learned that the convention of El Arisch would not be executed, and received the intelligence, not less momentous to him, of the establishment of the consular government.

But there had been sufficient weakness for a great character: an ignominious offer was now about to recall Kléber to himself, and to make him what he really was—a hero. He was obliged either to surrender himself prisoner, or to defend himself in a much worse situation than that which he had declared to be untenable in the council of war at Salahieh; he was obliged either to submit to dishonour, or to engage in a desperate struggle. Kléber did not hesitate, and we shall see that, notwithstanding his much worse situation, he contrived to do what a few days before he judged to be impossible, and thus gave the noblest of contradictions to himself.

Kléber instantly countermanded all the orders previously given to the army. He brought back from Lower Egypt to Cairo part of the troops that had already descended the Nile; he ordered his stores to be sent up again: he urged the division of Upper Egypt to make haste to rejoin him, and gave notice to the grand-vizier to suspend his march towards Cairo, otherwise he should immediately commence hostilities. The grand-vizier replied that the convention of El Arisch was signed; that it must be executed; that, in consequence, he should advance towards the capital. At the same instant, an officer sent from Minorca with a letter from

Lord Keith to Kléber, arrived at the headquarters. Among other expressions, that letter contained the following: "I have received positive orders from his Britannic Majesty, not to consent to any capitulation with the army under your command, unless the troops lay down their arms, surrender themselves prisoners of war, and give up all the ships in the harbour of Alexandria."

Kléber, fired with indignation, caused Lord Keith's letter to be inserted in the order of the day, adding to it these few words: "Soldiers, to such insults, there is no other answer than victory. Prepare for action."

This noble language found an echo in every breast. The situation was greatly changed since the 28th of January, the day on which the convention of El Arisch was signed. The French then held all the fortified positions in Egypt; they ruled the Egyptians, who were quiet and submissive; the grand-vizier was on the other side of the desert. Now, on the contrary, the most important posts were given up; they had possession of the plain only; the population was everywhere awake; the inhabitants of Cairo, excited by the presence of the grand-vizier, who was at the distance of five hours' march, was waiting only for the first signal to rise. The dismal picture drawn in the council of war, in which the convention of El Arisch was discussed,—that picture, then false, was now strictly true. The French army was about to fight in the plain which borders the Nile, having in front the vizier, with 80,000 men, and on its rear the 300,000 inhabitants of Cairo ready to revolt; and it was without fear! Glorious reparation of a great fault!

Agents of Sir Sidney Smith's had hastened up, to interpose between the French and the Turks, and to make fresh proposals of accommodation. Letters, they said, had just been written to London; when the convention of El Arisch was known there, it would be ratified to a certainty; in this situation, it would be right to suspend hostilities, and wait. To this the grand-vizier and Kléber consented, but on conditions that were irreconcilable. The grand-vizier insisted that Cairo should be given up to him; Kléber, on the contrary, that the vizier should fall back to the frontier. In this state of things, fighting was the only resource.

On the 20th of March, 1800,—29th Ventôse, year VIII.—before daybreak, the French army marched from Cairo, and deployed in the rich plains which border the Nile, having the river on the left, the desert on the right and in front, but at a distance, the ruins of ancient Heliopolis. Night, almost luminous in this climate, facilitated the manœuvres, but without rendering them distinct to the enemy. The army formed itself into four squares; two on the left, under General Reynier,² two on the

¹ LATOUR MAUBOURG, VICTOR FAY, Marquis de. Born at Vivarais of an ancient family, in 1756. Was in the king's body-guard, and defended the royal family on the night of October 5. Emigrated August 10, 1792. He returned on the amnesty of the 18th Brumaire. Entered the service of the republic, and distinguished himself in Egypt and elsewhere.—*Encyclopædia Americana*. H.

² REYNIER, E. Born at Lausanne in 1771. In 1792 served on the staff in Holland. Was promoted to the rank of adjutant-general, and contributed to the successes of the French army at Lille, Menin, and Courtrai.

Distinguished himself at the passage of the Waal in Holland: and yet farther in the first campaign of the Rhine, under Moreau, in which he displayed singular nobleness and incorruptibility of character. In Egypt, no general gained more honour. At the Pyramids he did much for the victory. At El Arisch he defeated 20,000 Turks with four French battalions. He conducted the siege of Acre, while Bonaparte was fighting at Mount Tabor, and did much toward the victory of Heliopolis.—*Biographie Moderne*. ■

sight, under General Friant. They were each composed of two demi-brigades of infantry, drawn up in several lines. At the angles and outside were companies of grenadiers, with their backs to the squares, serving to reinforce them during the march and in charges of cavalry, and separating from them to attack defended positions when the enemy attempted to make a stand. At the centre of the line of battle, that is to say, between the two squares on the left, and the two squares on the right, the cavalry was disposed in a deep mass, having light artillery on its wings. At some distance in the rear, and on the left, a fifth square, smaller than the others, was destined to act as a reserve. The number of the troops that Kléber had collected in this plain of Heliopolis might be estimated at somewhat less than 10,000 men. They were firm and tranquil.

Day began to dawn. Kléber, who, since he had been commander-in-chief, had displayed a sort of magnificence, in order to make an impression on the Egyptians, was dressed in a rich uniform. Mounted on a horse of great height, he exhibited to the soldiers that noble countenance which they so much loved to behold, and the manly beauty of which filled them with confidence. "My friends," said he, as he rode through their ranks, "you possess in Egypt no more than the ground under your feet. If you recoil but a single step, you are undone!" His presence and his words were everywhere hailed with the greatest enthusiasm; and, as soon as it was quite light, he gave orders for marching forward.

As yet, only part of the army of the grand-vizier was in sight. In that plain of the Nile which extended before us, appeared the village of El Matarieh, which the Turks had entrenched. Here was an advanced-guard of from 5000 to 6000 Janissaries, very good soldiers, escorted by some thousand horse. A little beyond, another body appeared to harbour a design to glide between the river and our left wing, for the purpose of raising Cairo in our rear. In front, and at a much greater distance, the ruins of ancient Heliopolis, a wood of palm-trees, and considerable undulations of the ground, hid the bulk of the Turkish army from the view of our soldiers. The total number of all these forces, including the principal body, the corps placed at El Matarieh, and the detachment on march to penetrate into the city of Cairo, might be computed at 70,000 or 80,000 men.

Kléber first ordered a squadron of mounted guides to charge the detachment manœuvring on our left, for the purpose of introducing itself into Cairo. The guides dashed off at a gallop upon this confused mass. The Turks, who never feared cavalry, received and returned the shock. They completely enveloped our horse, which was in danger of being cut to pieces, when Kléber sent to their relief the 22d regiment of chasseurs and the 14th of dragoons, who, charging the dense mass by which the guides were, in a manner, surrounded, used their swords so well as to disperse and put them to flight. The Turks then retired out of sight.

This day Kléber hastened to attack the en-

trenched village of El Matarieh, before the main body of the enemy's army had time to come up. This duty he assigned to General Reynier, with the two squares on the left; and he himself, with the two squares on the right, wheeling about, posted himself between El Matarieh and Heliopolis, to prevent the Turkish army from coming to the assistance of the attacked position.

Reynier, having reached the village of El Matarieh, detached the companies of grenadiers which lined the angles of the squares, and ordered them to charge the village. These companies advanced, forming two small columns. The brave Janissaries would not wait for them to come up, but went to meet them. Our grenadiers, receiving them firmly, poured upon them, when close to those muzzles of their pieces, a discharge of musketry, which struck down a great number, and then charged with fixed bayonets. While the first column was attacking the Janissaries in front, the second took them in flank, and completed their dispersion. The two columns united then fell upon El Matarieh, amidst a shower of balls. They rushed with the bayonet on the Turks, who resisted, and, after a great carnage, made themselves masters of the position. The Turks fled into the plain; and, joining those whom the guides, chasseurs, and dragoons, had just before dispersed, ran in disorder towards Cairo, with Nassif-Pasha, the lieutenant of the grand-vizier, at their head.

The village of El Matarieh, full of spoils in the Oriental fashion, presented an ample booty to our soldiers. But they did not stop there; both generals and soldiers were aware how important it was not to be surprised, in the midst of a village, by the mass of the Turkish troops. The army, resuming by degrees the same order as in the morning, advanced into the plain, still formed into several squares, with the cavalry in the middle. It passed the ruins of Heliopolis, and perceived beyond them a cloud of dust rising on the horizon, and rapidly advancing towards us. On the left appeared the village of Seriaquous; on the right, amidst a wood of palms, the village of El Merg, situated on the margin of a small lake, called the Lake of the Pilgrims. A slight elevation of ground ran from one to the other of these villages. All at once, this moving cloud of dust stood still, and was presently dispersed by a breeze, leaving the Turkish army exposed to view; it formed a long, floating line from Seriaquous to El Merg. Placed on the elevation just mentioned, it somewhat overlooked the ground upon which our troops were deployed. Kléber then gave orders to advance. Reynier, with the two squares on the left, marched towards Seriaquous; Friant, with the two squares on the right, moved upon El Merg. The enemy had sprinkled a considerable number of tirailleurs in advance of the palm-trees which surround El Merg. But a fight of tirailleurs could scarcely be successful against such soldiers as ours. Friant

¹ BELLARD, FRIANT, and VERDIER. Three generals of some ability, but not sufficient merit to entitle them to any very high distinction in that era of great men and great events. BELLARD was subsequently severely defeated near Cairo.

sent a few companies of light infantry, which soon obliged these detached Turks to rejoin the confused mass of their army. The grand-vizier was there, in the midst of a group of horsemen, whose bright armour glistened in the sun. Our howitzer fire soon dispersed this group. The enemy brought forward his artillery, with the intention of replying; but his shot, ill-directed, passed over the heads of our soldiers. His pieces were soon dismounted by ours, and put *hors de combat*. The thousand colours of the Turkish army were then seen waving, and part of its squadrons rushed out of the village of El Merg upon the squares of Friant's division. The deep fissures in the ground, the ordinary effect of a hot sun upon a soil long inundated, fortunately checked the impetuosity of the horses. General Friant, suffering these Turkish horse to advance nearly to the muzzles of the guns, gave orders for a sudden discharge of grape-shot, which swept them down by hundreds. They retired in confusion.

This was but the prelude to a general attack. The Turkish army was visibly preparing for it. Our squares waited with firmness, two on the right, two on the left, the cavalry in the centre, facing both before and behind, and covered by two lines of artillery. At a signal given by the grand vizier, the entire mass of the Turkish cavalry set itself in motion, rushed upon our squares, spread itself upon their wings, turned them, and soon surrounded the four fronts of our order of battle. The French infantry, unmoved by the shouts, the bustle, the tumult of the Turkish cavalry, remained calm, with bayonet presented, keeping up a continued and well directed fire. In vain these thousand groups of horse whirled round it: they fell under the grape-shot and the balls, rarely coming up to its bayonets, expired at its feet, or turned about and fled, never to show themselves again.

After a long and frightful confusion, the sky, darkened by smoke and dust, suddenly became clear; the sun burst forth, and our victorious troops beheld before them a mass of men and horses, dead or dying; and, at a distance, as far as the eye could reach, bands of fugitives running away in all directions.

The main body of the Turks was retiring, in fact, towards El Kangah, where they had encamped the preceding night, on the road to Lower Egypt. A few groups only went to rejoin those parties which, under Nassif-Pasha, lieutenant of the grand-vizier, had in the morning directed their steps towards Cairo.

Kléber resolved not to allow the enemy any rest. Our squares, preserving their order of battle, crossed the plain at a rapid pace, and, passing Seriaquous and El Merg, advanced to El Kangah. We arrived there at night. The enemy, finding himself closely pressed, again fled in disorder, leaving to our army the provisions and baggage, of which we stood in great need.

Thus, in that plain of Heliopolis, 10,000 soldiers, by superiority in discipline and quiet courage, dispersed 70,000 or 80,000 foes. But, to obtain a more beneficial result than that of a few thousand killed, wounded, and stretched

in the dust, it would be necessary to pursue the Turks, to drive them into the desert, and to cause them to perish there by hunger, thirst, and the sword of the Arabs. The French army was exhausted with fatigue. Kléber allowed it a little rest, and gave orders for the pursuit on the following day.

We had scarcely 200 or 300 wounded or dead, for in this species of combat, troops in a square, which preserve themselves unbroken, sustain but little loss. Kléber, at this moment, hearing cannon towards Cairo, had no doubt that the corps which had turned his left had gone to second the revolt of that city. Nassif-Pasha, the vizier's lieutenant, and Ibrahim Bey, one of the two Mameluke chiefs, had actually entered it with 2000 Mamelukes, 8000 or 10,000 Turkish horse, and some revolted villagers of the environs, in all about 20,000 men. Kléber had left scarcely 2000 in that great capital, distributed in the citadel and the forts. He ordered General Lagrange to set out in the middle of that same night, with four battalions, and go to their relief. He enjoined all the commandants of troops left at Cairo to take strong positions, to keep in communication with one another, but not to attempt any decisive attack before his return. He was apprehensive of some false manœuvre on their part, which might uselessly endanger the lives of the soldiers, every day more and more precious, now that they were absolutely doomed to remain in Egypt.

During the whole time that the battle had lasted, the second Mameluke chief, Murad Bey, who had formerly shared with Ibrahim Bey the rule over Egypt, who was distinguished from his colleague by brilliant valour, chivalrous generosity, and great intelligence, had remained on the wings of the Turkish army, motionless, at the head of 600 superb horse. When the battle was over, he had plunged into the desert and disappeared. It was in consequence of a promise given to Kléber, that he had thus acted. Murad Bey, who had recently arrived at the vizier's head-quarters, had felt the old jealousy which so long divided the Turks and the Mamelukes spring up again within him. He was aware that the Turks were anxious to recover Egypt, not to restore it to the Mamelukes, but to possess it themselves. He, therefore, thought to conciliate the French, under the idea of allying himself with them if they were victorious, or of succeeding them if they were vanquished. Acting, however, with circumspection, he refrained from the manifestation of his sentiments till hostilities were definitively resumed, and had promised Kléber to declare for him after the first battle. That battle was fought; it was glorious for the French, and his sympathy for them could not fail to be greatly augmented by it. There was reason to hope that, in a few days, we should have him for our professed ally.

In the middle of the very night which followed the battle, after allowing the troops a few hours rest, Kléber ordered the drums to beat to arms, and marched for Belbeis, determined not to give any respite to the Turks. He arrived there very early in the day. This was the 21st of March—30th Ventôse. The vizier, in his

rapid flight, was already beyond Belbeis. He had left in the fort and town a corps of infantry, and in the plain a thousand horse. On the approach of our troops these horse fled. The Turks were driven out of the town; they were shut up in the fort, where, after exchanging a few cannon-shot, want of water and fear induced them to surrender. So great was the fanaticism of these Turkish troops, that some men chose rather to be slaughtered than to give up their arms. Meanwhile, the cavalry of General Leclerc, scouring the plain, seized a long caravan of camels proceeding towards Cairo, and laden with the baggage of Nassif-Pasha and Ibrahim Bey. This capture revealed more completely to Kléber the real design of the Turks, which consisted in exciting not only the capital but all the large towns in Egypt to rise against the French. Apprized of this design, and finding that the Turkish army made no stand anywhere, he detached General Friant with five battalions for Cairo, to support the four battalions sent in the night from El Kangah, under the orders of General Lagrange.

Next day, March 22d—1st Germinal—he set out for Salahieh. General Reynier preceded him at the head of the left division: he himself followed with the *guides* and the 7th hussars. Lastly came General Belliard, with his brigade, the rest of Friant's division. During the march, a message was received from the grand-vizier, who desired to negotiate. The only answer returned was a refusal. Not far from Karaim, half-way to Salahieh, a violent cannonade was heard; soon afterwards Reynier's division was seen formed in square and engaged with a multitude of horse. Kléber sent word to Belliard to hasten his march, and he himself, with the cavalry, proceeded with the utmost expedition towards Reynier's square. But at this sight the Turks, who were attacking Reynier's division, liking better to have to do with the French cavalry than with the infantry, fell upon the *guides* and the 7th hussars, whom Kléber was bringing with him. Their charge was so sudden that the light artillery had not time to place itself in battery. The drivers were slaughtered on their guns. Kléber, with the *guides* and the hussars, was for a moment in the greatest danger, especially as the inhabitants of Karaim, thinking that it was all over with such a handful of French, had hastened to the spot with pitch-forks and scythes to finish them. But Reynier immediately sent the 14th dragoons, which extricated Kléber in time. Belliard, who had pushed on at a great rate, came up soon afterwards with his infantry, and cut in pieces some hundred men.

Kléber, anxious to reach Salahieh, hastened his march, deferring till his return the punishment of Karaim. The heat of the day was oppressive; the wind blew from the desert, and along with a scorching air was inhaled a fine, penetrating dust. Men and horses were exhausted with fatigue. At length, about nightfall, they arrived at Salahieh. They were now on the very frontier of Egypt, at the entrance of the desert of Syria, and Kléber expected to have on the morrow a final engage-

ment with the grand-vizier. But, on the morning of the next day, March 23d—2d Germinal—the inhabitants of Salahieh came to meet him, and informed him that the vizier was continuing his flight in the greatest disorder. Kléber hastened forward, and with his own eyes beheld this sight, which proved how much he had exaggerated to himself the danger of Turkish armies.

The grand-vizier, taking with him 500 of his best horse, had penetrated with some baggage into the desert. The rest of his army was fleeing in all directions; one part was running towards the Delta; a second begged upon its knees for quarter; a third, seeking an asylum in the desert, was slaughtered by the Arabs. These last, after convoying the Turkish army, had remained on the frontier, knowing that one party or the other must be vanquished, and that, of course, there would be booty to pick up. Their conclusion was correct; for, finding the Turkish army completely demoralized and incapable of defending itself even against them, they murdered the fugitives for the purpose of plundering them. Just at the moment when Kléber arrived, they had borne down upon the deserted camp of the vizier, and pounced upon it like a flock of birds of prey. At the sight of our army, they fled away on their swift horses, leaving abundant spoils to our soldiers. Here, in the intrenched space of a square league, they found an infinite multitude of tents, horses, cannon, and a great quantity of saddles and harness of all sorts, 40,000 horse-shoes, a profusion of provisions and of rich apparel, boxes already broken open by the Arabs, but still full of perfumes of aloes, silk stuffs, in short of all those articles that compose the dazzling and barbarous luxury of oriental armies. Along with twelve litters of wood, carved and gilt, there was a carriage hung on springs after the European fashion, of English manufacture; and pieces of cannon were found with the motto *Honi soit qui mal y pense*: a certain evidence of the very active intervention of the English in this war.

Our soldiers, who had brought nothing with them, found, in the Turkish camp, provisions, ammunition, a rich booty, and objects the singularity of which made them laugh, as they were always disposed to do after a brief moment of dejection. Strange power of the mind over man! Now, victorious, they had no wish to leave Egypt, and no longer considered themselves doomed to perish in distant exile!

When Kléber had ascertained with his own eyes that the Turkish army had disappeared, he resolved to return and reduce the towns of Lower Egypt, and Cairo in particular, to their duty. He made the following dispositions:—Generals Rampon and Lanusse were ordered to scour the Delta; Rampon was to march to the important town of Damietta, which was in the hands of the Turks, and to retake it. Lanusse was to keep in communication with Rampon, to sweep the Delta from Damietta to Alexandria, and to reduce successively the revolted villages. Belliard had the general commission to support these different operations, and the special commission to second Rampon in his attack on Damietta, and to retake him-

self the fort of Lesbeh, which commands one of the mouths of the Nile. Kléber, moreover, left Reynier at Salahieh, to prevent the remnants of the Turkish army, which had fled into the deserts of Syria, from coming back. The latter was to remain in observation on the frontier till the Arabs had completed the dispersion of the Turks, and then return to Cairo. Lastly, Kléber himself set out on the next day, March 24th—3d Germinal—with the 88th demi-brigade, two companies of grenadiers, the 7th hussars, and the 3d and 14th dragoons.

He arrived at Cairo on the 27th of March. Important events had occurred there since his departure. The population of that great city, which numbered nearly 300,000 inhabitants, fickle, inflammable, inclined to change, like all multitudes, had followed the suggestions of Turkish emissaries, and fallen upon the French the moment they heard the cannon at Heliopolis. Pouring forth outside the walls during the battle, and seeing Nassif-Pasha and Ibrahim Bey with some thousand horse and Janissaries, they supposed them to be conquerors. Taking good care not to deceive the inhabitants, the Turks affirmed, on the contrary, that the grand-vizier had gained a complete victory, and that the French were exterminated. At these tidings, 50,000 men had risen in Cairo, at Boulaq, and at Gyzeh. Armed with swords, pikes, and old muskets, they purposed to slaughter the French left among them. But 2000 men, entrenched in the citadel and in the forts which commanded the city, supplied with provisions and ammunition, opposed a resistance difficult to overcome. Having almost all of them fallen back in time, they had managed to shut themselves up in the fortified places. Some, however, had been in great danger; it was those who, to the number of 200 only, mounted guard at the head-quarters. This noble edifice, formerly occupied by General Bonaparte, and since by Kléber and the principal administrations, stood at one of the extremities of the city, overlooking on one side the square of Ezbekyeh, the finest in Cairo; on the other, gardens stretching to the Nile. The Turks and the insurgent populace intended to storm this house, and to slaughter the 200 French by whom it was occupied. This would have been the more easy for them, since General Verdier, who guarded the citadel, placed at the other extremity of Cairo, could not come to their assistance. But the brave soldiers who were in the head-quarters managed, sometimes by a well-supported fire, sometimes by daring sorties, to keep the ferocious multitude at bay, and to give General Lagrange time to arrive. He had been detached, as we have seen, the very night after the battle, with four battalions. He arrived at noon the next day, entered by the gardens, and rendered the head-quarters thenceforth impregnable.

The Turks, seeing no means of overcoming the resistance of the French, reeked their revenge on such unfortunate Christians as were in their power. They began by slaughtering part of the inhabitants of the European quarter; they killed several merchants, plundered their houses, and carried off their wives and daughters. They then went in search of those

Arabs who were accused of living on good terms with the French, and of drinking wine with them. They put them to death; and murder and plunder went hand in hand, as usual. They impaled an Arab, who had been chief of the Janissaries under the French, and who was charged with the police of Cairo; and they treated in the same manner one who had been secretary to the Divan instituted by General Bonaparte. Thence they proceeded to the quarter of the Copts. These, as every one knows, are descended from the ancient inhabitants of Egypt, and have adhered to Christianity in spite of all the Mussulman dominations that have succeeded one another in their country. They possessed great wealth, arising from the collection of the taxes, which the Mamelukes had delegated to them. The intention was, to punish, in them, friends of the French, and more especially to plunder their houses. Very fortunately for these Copts, their quarters formed the left side of Ezbekyeh square, contiguous to our head-quarters. Their chief was, moreover, rich and brave; he defended himself well, and succeeded in saving them.

Amid these horrors, Nassif-Pasha and Ibrahim Bey were ashamed of themselves for what they did or suffered to be done. They saw that wealth wasted which would belong to them, if they remained in possession of Egypt. But they winked at all that was done by a populace of which they were no longer masters, and thought, besides, by these massacres, to keep up their animosity against the French.

During these transactions arrived General Friant, detached from Belbeis, and lastly Kléber himself. Both entered through the gardens behind our head-quarters. Though conqueror of the grand-vizier's army, Kléber had a serious difficulty to surmount, nothing less than to subdue an immense city, peopled by 300,000 inhabitants, partly in a state of revolt, occupied by 20,000 Turks, and built in the Oriental style, that is to say, having narrow streets, divided into piles of masonry, which were real fortresses. These edifices receiving light from within, and, exhibiting without nothing but lofty walls, had terraces instead of roofs, from which the insurgents poured a downward and destructive fire. Add to this, that the Turks were masters of the whole city, excepting the citadel and the square of Ezbekyeh. As for the latter, they had blockaded it, in a manner, by closing the streets that ran into it with embattled walls.

The French had but two modes of attack; either to keep up a destructive fire of bombs and howitzers from the citadel, till the city was reduced, or to debouch by the square of Ezbekyeh, overthrowing all the barriers erected at the head of the streets, and taking all the quarters by assault, one by one. The first method was liable to cause the destruction of a great city, the capital of the country, which the French needed for the supply of necessities; the second exposed them to the risk of losing ten times as many men as ten battles like that of Heliopolis would have cost them.

In this case, Kléber showed as much prudence as he had just shown energy in the field. He resolved to gain time and to let the insur-

section wear itself out. He had sent almost the whole of his *matériel* to Lower Egypt, under the idea that he should very soon embark. He enjoined Reynier, as soon as the army of the vizier had entirely crossed the desert, and as soon as Damietta and Lezbeh were retaken, to ascend the Nile with his whole division, and the stores necessary for Cairo. Meanwhile, he caused all the outlets by which the city could communicate with the surrounding country, to be blockaded. Though the insurgents had procured provisions by plundering the houses of the Egyptians, in general amply supplied with them; though they had cast balls, and even founded cannon, they could not possibly help suffering very soon from dearth. Nor could they fail at length to be undeceived respecting the general state of things in Egypt, and to learn that the French were everywhere victorious, and the vizier's army dispersed; moreover, they were likely to fall out ere long, for their interests were totally opposite. Nassif-Pasha's Turks, Ibrahim Bey's Mamelukes, and the Arab population of Cairo could not agree together long. For all these reasons, Kléber thought it advisable to temporize and to negotiate.

While he was gaining time, he completed his treaty of alliance with Murad Bey, through the agency of the wife of that Mameluke prince, a person universally respected, endowed with beauty, and even with a superior understanding. He granted to him the province of Sald, under the supremacy of France, on condition of paying a tribute equivalent to a considerable part of the imposts of that province. Murad Bey engaged, moreover, to fight for the French; and the French engaged, if they should ever quit the country, to facilitate for him the occupation of Egypt. Murad Bey, as we shall see by and by, faithfully adhered to the treaty which he had just signed, and began by driving from Upper Egypt a Turkish corps which had occupied it.

By means of Murad Bey and the sheiks who were secret friends of France, Kléber then opened negotiations with the Turks who had entered Cairo. Nassif-Pasha and Ibrahim Bey began, in fact, to be afraid of being shut up in the city by the French, and treated after the Turkish fashion. They knew, besides, that the grand-vizier's army was completely dispersed. In consequence, they cheerfully assented to conferences, and agreed to a capitulation, by the terms of which they were to be allowed to retire safe and sound. But, at the moment when this capitulation was about to be concluded, the insurgents of Cairo, finding themselves abandoned to the vengeance of the French, were seized with consternation and rage, caused the conferences to be broken off, threatened to despatch all those who showed any determination to desert them, and even gave money to the Turks to induce them to fight. An attack by main force was, therefore, indispensable for completing the reduction of the city.

Lower Egypt having returned to its duty, Reynier had ascended with his corps and a convoy of military stores. He assisted in investing that part of the outworks of Cairo,

which stretch from north to east, that is to say from fort Camin to the citadel: General Friant encamped towards the west, in the gardens behind our head-quarters, between the city and the Nile; Leclerc's cavalry was posted between Reynier's and Friant's divisions, scouring the country; General Verdier occupied the south.

On the 3d and 4th of April—13th and 14th Germinal—a detachment of General Friant's commenced the first attack. Its chief object was to clear Ezbekyeh square, which was our principal débouché. A beginning was made with the Copt quarter, which formed the left of it. The troops penetrated with the greatest intrepidity into the streets which crossed this quarter in all directions; while several detachments blew up the houses all round Ezbekyeh square, for the purpose of opening avenues to the interior of the city. Meanwhile, the citadel threw a few bombs to intimidate the population. These attacks were successful, and made us masters of the heads of the streets terminating in Ezbekyeh square. In the following days, an eminence situated near fort Sulkouskoï, which the Turks had entrenched, and which commanded the Copt quarter, was taken. Every preparation was thus made for a general and simultaneous attack. Before he made this attack, Kléber summoned the insurgents for the last time; they refused to listen to the summons. Still making a particular point of sparing the city, which, it is true, was not implicated in the horrors committed by a few fanatics, he resolved to speak to the eye by means of a terrible example. He gave orders for attacking Boulaq, a detached suburb of Cairo, on the banks of the Nile.

On the 15th of April—25th Germinal—Friant's division surrounded Boulaq, and poured upon that devoted suburb a shower of bombs and howitzers. Favoured by this fire, the soldiers rushed to the assault, but met with an obstinate resistance from the inhabitants and the Turks. Every street, every house, became the theatre of a desperate conflict. Kléber ordered this horrible carnage to be suspended for a moment, to offer pardon to the revoltors: that pardon was rejected. The attack was then resumed: the fire spread from house to house, and Boulaq, in flames, experienced the two-fold horror of a conflagration and an assault. Meanwhile, the chiefs of the population having thrown themselves at the feet of the conqueror, Kléber put a stop to the effusion of blood, and saved the remnant of the hapless suburb. It was the quarter which contained the warehouses of the merchants; in these were found an immense quantity of goods, which were preserved from the flames for the use of the army.

This horrible sight was witnessed by the whole population of Cairo. Taking advantage of the effect which it was likely to produce, Kléber ordered the capital itself to be attacked. A house adjoining to the head-quarters had been undermined; fire was applied to the mine, and Turks and insurgents were blown up together. This was the signal for the attack. Friant's and Belliard's troops debouched by all the outlets from Ezbekyeh square, while General

ral Reynier entered at the north and east gates, while Verdier, from the elevated citadel, showed bombs upon the city. The fight was obstinate. Reynier's troops penetrated through the Bab-el-Charyeh gate, situated at the extremity of the great canal, and, driving before them Ibrahim Bey and Nassif-Pasha, who defended it, at length cooped up both of them between the 9th demi-brigade, which, having entered at the opposite point, had driven back all they encountered in their victorious course. The two French corps joined after making a frightful carnage. Night separated the combatants. Several thousand Turks, Mamelukes, and insurgents, had fallen; four hundred houses were in flames.

This was the last effort at resistance. The inhabitants, who had long detained the Turks, now began to conjure them most earnestly to quit Cairo, and thus leave them at liberty to negotiate with the French. Kléber, who was averse to these sanguinary scenes, and who was anxious to spare his soldiers, wished for nothing better than to treat. The envoys of Murad Bey served him for agents. The treaty was soon concluded. Nassif-Pasha and Ibrahim Bey were to retire to Syria, escorted by a detachment of the French army. The only terms granted them were, that their lives should be spared. They set out from Cairo on the 25th of April—5th Floréal—leaving to the mercy of the French the wretches whom they had urged into revolt.

Thus terminated that sanguinary struggle, which had commenced with the battle of Heliopolis on the 20th of March, and which ended on the 25th of April with the departure of the last lieutenants of the vizier, after thirty-five days' fighting, between 20,000 French, on one side, and, on the other, the whole force of the Ottoman empire, seconded by the revolt of the Egyptian towns. Great faults had occasioned this insurrection, and provoked this horrible effusion of blood. If, in fact, the French had not made preparations for departing, the Egyptians would never have dared to rise. The contest would have been limited to a brilliant but by no means dangerous battle between our squares of infantry and the Turkish cavalry. But, a commencement of evacuation, having produced a popular explosion in several towns, it was necessary to retake them by assault, which was more destructive than a battle. Let us forget Kléber's faults in admiration of his glorious and energetic conduct! He had imagined that he could not defend Egypt, when subjugated and peaceful, against the Turks; and he had now conquered it in thirty-five days, in spite of Turks and of the insurgent Egyptians, with equal energy, prudence, and humanity.

In the Delta, all the towns had returned to a state of complete submission. Murad Bey had driven from Upper Egypt the Turkish detachment of Dervish Pasha. The vanquished everywhere trembled before the conqueror, and expected a terrible chastisement. The inhabitants of Cairo, in particular, who had committed revolting cruelties upon the Arabs attached to the French, and upon the Christians of all nations, were filled with consternation.

Kléber, who was humane and wise, took good care not to repay cruelties with cruelties. He knew that conquest, odious to all nations, never becomes tolerable in the estimation of those on whom it falls, but at the price of a good government, and cannot render itself legitimate in the eyes of enlightened nations unless by the accomplishment of great designs. He hastened, therefore, to use his victory with moderation. The Egyptians were persuaded that they should be treated harshly: they conceived that the loss of life and property would atone for the crime of those who had risen in revolt. Kléber called them together, assumed at first a stern look, but afterwards pardoned them, merely imposing a contribution on the insurgent villages.

Cairo paid 10,000,000 francs, a burden far from onerous for so large a city. The inhabitants considered themselves as most lucky to get off so easily. Eight millions more were imposed upon the rebel towns of Lower Egypt.

This sum sufficed for the immediate discharge of the arrears of pay, and furnished funds for procuring the provisions needed by the army, for supplying all the wants of the wounded, and for completing the fortifications that were begun. It was a precious resource, till the system of the impositions should be improved and carried into execution. Another resource, equally unexpected, presented itself at this moment. Seventy Turkish vessels had just entered the Egyptian ports, to carry away the French army. The late hostilities justified our detaining them. They were laden with goods, which were sold for the benefit of the chest of the army. Owing to these various resources, an abundant provision was made for all the services, without any requisition in kind. The army found itself in plenty, and the Egyptians, who had not hoped to be let off so easily, submitted with perfect resignation. The army, proud of its victories, confident in its strength, knowing that General Bonaparte was at the head of the government, ceased to doubt that it would soon receive reinforcements. Kléber had in the plain of Heliopolis made the noblest amends for his momentary faults.

He assembled the administrators of the army, the persons best acquainted with the country, and turned his attention to the organization of the finances of the colony. He restored the collection of the direct contributions to the Copts, to whom it had formerly been intrusted; he imposed some new customs' duties and taxes on articles of consumption. The total of the revenues was to amount to 25,000,000 fcs., and this was sufficient for all the wants of the army, which did not exceed eighteen or twenty millions. He admitted into the ranks of our demi-brigades, Copts, Syrians, and even blacks, bought in Darfur, and whom some of the subalterns, beginning to speak the language of the country, undertook to drill. These new soldiers, placed in the regiments, fought there as stoutly as the French with whom they had the honour to serve. Kléber gave orders for the completion of the forts constructing around Cairo, and set men to

work at those of Lesbeh, Damietta, Burlos, and Rosetta, situated on the sea-coast. He pressed forward the works of Alexandria, and imparted fresh activity to the scientific researches of the Institute of Egypt. From the cataracts to the mouths of the Nile, every thing assumed the aspect of a solid and durable establishment. Two months afterwards, the caravans of Lyria, Arabia, and Darfur, began to appear again at Cairo. The hospitable welcome which they received insured their return.

If Kléber had lived, Egypt would have remained in our possession, at least till the time of our great disasters. But a deplorable event snatched away that general, in the midst of his exploits and of his judicious government.

It is always more or less dangerous to give a deep shock to the ruling principles of human nature. All Islamism had been moved by the presence of the French in Egypt. The children of Mahomet had felt somewhat of that enthusiasm which of old inflamed them against the crusaders. Cries of a holy war were raised, as in the twelfth century; and there were fanatic Mussulmans who vowed to achieve the *sacred fight*, which consists in slaying an infidel. In Egypt, where people saw the French closely, where they appreciated their humanity, where they could compare them with the soldiers of the Porte, especially with the Mamelukes—in Egypt, where they witnessed their respect for the Prophet,—a respect enjoined by General Bonaparte,—less aversion for them was entertained; and, when they afterwards left the country, the fanaticism had considerably abated. Indeed, during the late insurrection, there had even been perceived, in some places, real signs of attachment to our soldiers, to such a degree, that the English agents were surprised at it. But, throughout the rest of the East, the attention of all was engrossed by one subject, and that was the invasion by Infidels of an extensive Mussulman country.

A young man, a native of Aleppo, named Suleiman, who was a prey to extravagant fanaticism, who had performed the pilgrimage to Mecca and Medina, who had studied at the mosque El Azhar, the most celebrated and the wealthiest in Cairo, that where the Koran and the Turkish law are taught, who, finally, purposed to obtain admission into the body of the doctors of the faith, chanced to be wandering in Palestine, when the wrecks of the vizier's army passed through the country. He witnessed the sufferings, the despair, of his co-religionists, which violently affected his morbid imagination. The aga of the Janissaries, who had chanced to see him, inflamed his fanaticism still more by his own suggestions. This young man offered to assassinate "the Sultan of the French," General Kléber. Furnished with a dromedary and a sum of money, he repaired to Gaza, crossed the desert, proceeded to Cairo, and shut himself up for several

weeks in the great mosque, into which students and poor travellers were admitted, at the cost of that pious foundation. The rich mosques are in the East what convents formerly were in Europe; there are found prayer, religious instruction, and hospitality. The young fanatic intimated his design to the four principal sheiks of the mosque, who were at the head of the department of instruction. They were alarmed at his resolution, and at the consequences to which it was likely to lead; they told him that it would not succeed, and that it would bring great disasters upon Egypt; but still they refrained from apprizing the French authorities.

When this wretched man was sufficiently confirmed in his resolution, he armed himself with a dagger, followed Kléber for several days, but, finding no opportunity to approach him, he resolved to penetrate into the garden of the head-quarters, and to hide himself there in an abandoned cistern. On the 14th of June he appeared before Kléber, who was walking with Protain, the architect of the army, and showing him what repairs would require to be done in the house, to obliterate the traces of the bombs and balls. Suleiman approached him, as if to beg alms, and, while Kléber was preparing to listen to him, he rushed upon him, and plunged his dagger several times into his breast. Kléber fell, under the violence of this attack. Protain, having a stick in his hand, fell upon the assassin, struck him violently on the head, but was thrown down in his turn by a stab with the dagger. At the cries of the two victims, the soldiers ran to the spot, raised their expiring general, sought and seized the murderer, whom they found skulking behind a heap of rubbish.

A few minutes after this tragic scene Kléber expired. The army shed bitter tears over him. The Arabs themselves, who had admired his clemency after their revolt, united their regrets to those of our soldiers. A military commission assembled immediately to try the assassin, who confessed every thing. He was condemned, according to the laws of the country, and impaled.¹ The four sheiks to whom he had communicated his intention were beheaded. These bloody sacrifices were deemed necessary for the safety of the chiefs of the army. Vain precaution! With Kléber, the army had lost a general, and the colony a founder, for whom none of the officers left in Egypt was qualified to make amends. With Kléber Egypt was lost for France. Menou, who succeeded him by right of seniority, was a warm partisan of the expedition; but, notwithstanding his zeal, he was very far beneath such a task. One man alone could have equalled Kléber, nay, surpassed him, in the government of Egypt; this was he, who, three months before, embarked in the harbour of Alexandria for Italy, and who fell at Marengo, on the same day, nearly at the same moment that Kléber was murdered at Cairo; this was

¹ This seems to have been an act of barbarous atrocity, disgraceful to a civilized European nation. The military commission, who tried this unhappy wretch, was composed of French officers; and that they should have passed a sentence of *impalement* however sanctioned by the barbarous laws of the east, is equally disgraceful

and astonishing. It must be remembered, however, that at this time France had rejected Christianity, and that the French commander in Egypt, after the death of Kléber, had adopted Mahometanism, and styled himself Abdallah Menou; and this may in some sort account for things, else unaccountable. H. W. H.

Desaix. Both died on the 14th of June, 1800, for the accomplishment of the vast designs of General Bonaparte. How singular the destiny of these two men, constantly placed side by side during life, undivided in death, yet withal so different in every quality whether of mind or body!

Kléber was the handsomest man in the army. His lofty stature, his noble countenance, expressing all the pride of his soul, his valour at once intrepid and cool, his quick and solid intelligence, rendered him a most formidable commander on the field of battle. His mind was brilliant, original, but uncultivated. He read incessantly and exclusively Plutarch and Quintus Curtius; there he sought the food of great souls, the history of the heroes of antiquity. He was capricious, indocile, and a grumbler. It was said of him, that he liked not either to command or to obey; and this was true. He obeyed under General Bonaparte, but not without murmuring; he sometimes commanded, but in the name of another, under General Jourdan, for example, assuming the command by a sort of inspiration amidst the battle, exercising it like a superior captain, and, after the victory, resuming his character of lieutenant, which he preferred to any other. Kléber was licentious in his manners and language, but upright, disinterested, as men were in those days, for the conquest of the world had not yet corrupted their dispositions.

Desaix was the reverse in almost every respect. Simple, bashful, nay, somewhat awkward, his face hid by a profusion of hair, he had not the look of a soldier. But, heroic in action, kind to the soldiers, modest with his comrades, generous to the vanquished, he was adored by the army and by the people conquered by our arms. His solid and eminently cultivated mind, his intelligence in war, his

application to his duties, and his disinterestedness, made him an accomplished model of all the military virtues; and, while Kléber, indocile, refractory, could not endure any superior authority, Desaix was obedient, as though he had not known how to command. Under a rough exterior, he concealed a soul ardent and susceptible of enthusiasm. Though trained in the severe school of the army of the Rhine, he was a warm admirer of the campaigns in Italy, and was desirous of inspecting with his own eyes the fields of battle of Castiglione, Arcole, and Rivoli. While visiting those places, the theatres of immortal glory, he accidentally fell in with the commander-in-chief of the army of Italy, who conceived a strong attachment for him. What an honourable homage was the friendship of such a man! General Bonaparte was deeply touched by it. He esteemed Kléber for high military qualities, but considered none as equal to Desaix either in talents or character. Besides, he had an affection for him; surrounded by companions in arms, who had not yet forgiven his elevation, though feigning an obsequious submission to him, he appreciated the more Desaix's pure disinterested devotedness, founded on deep admiration. At the same time, keeping to himself the secret of his preferences, affecting ignorance of Kléber's faults, he treated him and Desaix both alike, and was desirous, as we shall see, to unite in the same honours two men whom Fortune had united in one and the same fate.

For the rest, all continued quiet in Egypt after Kléber's death. General Menou, on assuming the command, lost no time in despatching the ship *Osiris* from Alexandria, to carry to France tidings of the then flourishing state of the colony, and of the deplorable end of its second founder.

BOOK VI.

ARMISTICE.

Vast Preparations for succouring the Army in Egypt—Arrival of M. de St. Julien at Paris—Impatience of the French Cabinet to treat with him—Notwithstanding the insufficiency of M. de St. Julien's Powers, Talleyrand induces him to sign preliminary Articles of Peace—M. de St. Julien signs and sets out with Duroc for Vienna—State of Prussia and Russia—Clever Expedient of the First Consul in regard to the Emperor Paul—He sends back to him six thousand Prisoners without Ransom, and offers him the Island of Malta—Enthusiasm of Paul I. for General Bonaparte, and Mission of M. de Sprengporten to Paris—New League of the Neutral Powers—The four great Questions of Maritime Law—Reconciliation with the Holy See—The Court of Spain, and its Intimacy with the First Consul—Sketch of the internal State of that Court—General Berthier sent to Madrid—This Representative of the First Consul negotiates a Treaty with Charles IV. by which Tuscany would fall to the House of Parma, and Louisiana to France—Erection of the Kingdom of Etruria—France reinstates herself in the Favour of the European Powers—Arrival of M. de St. Julien at Vienna—Astonishment of his Court when apprized of the Preliminary Articles signed without Powers—Embarrassment of the Cabinet of Vienna, which had engaged not to treat without England—Disavowal of M. de St. Julien—Attempt at a joint Negotiation, comprehending England and Austria—For the Admission of England into the Negotiation, the First Consul requires a Naval Armistice, which would enable him to succour Egypt—England refuses, not to treat, but to grant the proposed Armistice—The First Consul then insists on a direct and immediate Negotiation with Austria, or the Resumption of Hostilities—Manner in which he has profited by the Suspension of Arms to put the French Armies on a formidable Footing—Alarm of the Austrians, and cession of the Fortresses of Philipshurg, Ulm, and Ingolstadt, to obtain a Prolongation of the Continental Armistice—Convention of Hohenlinden, granting a fresh Suspension of Arms for forty-five Days—Appointment of M. de Cobentzel as Envoy to the Congress of Lunéville—Festival of the lot of Vendémiaire—Removal of Turenne's remains to the Invalides—The First Consul devotes the Leisure left him by the Interruption of Hostilities in attending to the internal Administration—Success of his Financial Measures—Prosperity of the Bank of France—Payment of the Stockholders in Cash—Repair of the Roads—Return of the Priests—Difficulties respecting the Celebration of Sunday and Decadi—New Measures in regard to the Emigrants—Posture of Parties—Their Dispositions towards the First Consul—The Revolutionists and the Royalists—Policy of the Government towards them—Conflicting Influences about the First Consul—Parts acted by Messrs. Fouché, de Talleyrand, and Cambacérès—The Bonaparte Family—Letters of Louis XVIII. to the First Consul, and Answer to that Prince—Plot of Ceracchi and Arena—Public Sensation created by the Discovery of this Plot—Imprudent Friends of the First Consul wish to make a Handle of it to raise him too soon to the supreme Power—Pamphlet written in that Spirit by M. de Fontanes—Necessity for disavowing that Pamphlet—Lucien Bonaparte removed from the Ministry of the Interior and sent to Spain.

WHILE the Osiris was conveying to Europe the tidings of what had happened on the banks of the Nile, orders totally contrary to those before given were despatched from the ports of England. The observations of Sir Sidney Smith had been well received in London. The government had been fearful of disavowing an English officer, who had come forward as invested with its powers; it had above all discovered the falsehood of the intercepted despatches, and formed a more correct estimate of the difficulty of wresting Egypt from the French army. It had, therefore, ratified the convention of El Arisch, and instructed Lord Keith to cause it to be executed. But it was too late, as we have seen: the convention was at that moment torn, sword in hand; and the French, having recovered possession of Egypt, were no longer disposed to abandon the country. The English ministers were destined to experience bitter regret for the levity of their conduct, and violent attacks in parliament.

The First Consul, on his part, was rejoiced by the intelligence of the consolidation of his conquest. Unfortunately, the news of Kléber's death reached him almost at the same moment as the news of his exploits. His grief was intense and sincere. He rarely dissembled, and only when obliged to do so by a duty or by an important interest, but always with effort, because the vivacity of his temper rendered dissimulation difficult. But in the narrow circle of his family and his counsellors, he used no disguise; he manifested his affections, his antipathies, with extreme vehemence. It was among these intimates that he betrayed the profound sorrow which he felt for the death of Kléber. In him, he regretted not a friend, as in Desaix; he regretted a great general, an able chief, more capable than any other to

insure the establishment of the French in Egypt—an establishment which he regarded as his most glorious work, but which definitive success alone could convert from a brilliant attempt into a great and solid enterprise.

Time, that like a river sweeps along with it all that falls into its rapid current, Time has engulfed the odious falsehoods then invented by the hatred of parties. There is one of them, however, which it may be instructive to mention here, though long since consigned to profound oblivion. The royalist agents reported, and English newspapers repeated, that Desaix and Kléber, having given umbrage to the First Consul, were assassinated by his orders, the one at Marengo, the other at Cairo. There were miserable and silly fools enough to believe it, and now people are almost ashamed to recollect such imputations. Those who fabricate these infamous calumnies ought sometimes to place themselves in presence of posterity. They would blush at the refutation which time has in store for them.

The First Consul had already given pressing orders to the fleets at Brest and Rochefort, to prepare to set sail for the Mediterranean. Though our finances were in a much better state, still, being obliged to make great efforts on land, the First Consul could not accomplish all that our navy required. He neglected nothing, however, to put the great Brest fleet in a condition to put to sea. He solicited the court of Spain to send the necessary orders to Admirals Gravina¹ and Mazzaredo, commanding the Spanish division, to concur in the

¹ GRAVINA commanded the Spanish squadron in the disastrous battle of Trafalgar, in which he had his flag in the Prince of Asturias 100 guns. After the victory was decided, he escaped with a few sail of the line and frigates into Cadiz.—*Brenton's Naval History.*

movements of the French division. The squadrons of the two nations, blocked up in Brest for a year past, when united, would form a force of forty ships of the line. The First Consul proposed that, taking advantage of the sailing of this immense naval force, the French ships disposable at L'Orient, Rochefort, and Toulon, and the Spanish ships disposable at Ferrol, Cadiz, and Carthage, should join the combined fleet, to increase its strength. These different movements were to be directed in such a manner as to deceive the English, to throw them into great perplexity, and meanwhile, Admiral Ganteaume, taking with him the quickest sailers, was to slip away and to carry to Egypt 6000 picked troops, numerous workmen, and an immense *matériel*.

Spain willingly assented to this combination, which would at least have the advantage of bringing back into the Mediterranean, and consequently into her ports, the squadron of Admiral Gravina, uselessly shut up in the harbour of Brest. She saw no other objection to this plan but the bad condition of her fleets and their wretched equipment. The First Consul did his best to remove this objection, and the ships of the two nations were soon provided with the more necessary stores. In the mean time, he was anxious that the army in Egypt should receive intelligence from him every five or six days. He gave orders that, from all the ports of the Mediterranean, Spain and Italy included, there should sail brigs, avisoes, mere merchantmen, carrying balls, bombs, lead, powder, muskets, swords, wood for cartwrights' work, medicines, Jesuits' bark, corn, wine, in short all that the army in Egypt was likely to need. He ordered, moreover, that each of these small vessels should take out a number of workmen, masons or smiths, some gunners, and some picked cavalry-soldiers. He directed them to charter vessels at Carthage, Barcelona, Port Vendre, Marseilles, Toulon, Antibes, Savona, Genoa, Bastia, St. Florent, &c. He even bargained with merchants of Algiers to send to Egypt cargoes of wine, of which the army was destitute. By his command, a company of actors was formed, the requisites for a theatre were provided, and the whole was to be sent to Alexandria. The best Paris newspapers were subscribed for, in order to be forwarded to the principal officers of the army, that they might be made acquainted with what was passing in Europe. In short, nothing was neglected that could serve to keep up the courage of the exiled soldiers, and to place them in constant communication with the mother country.¹

Of course several of these vessels were liable to be taken, but the greater number had a chance of arriving, and did actually arrive, for the extensive coast of the Delta could not be strictly guarded. The same success did not attend the attempts made to reinvade Malta, which the English kept closely blockaded. They made an especial point of reducing this second Gibraltar; they knew that the blockade

must in the long run produce here a certain effect; for Malta is a rock, which cannot be supplied but by sea, whereas Egypt is a vast kingdom, which feeds both itself and its neighbours. They steadfastly persevered, therefore, in investing the place and in inflicting upon it the horrors of famine. The brave General Vaubois, having at his disposal a garrison of 4000 men, was not afraid of their attacks; but he saw the provisions destined for the subsistence of his soldiers hourly diminishing, and unfortunately did not receive from the ports of Corsica sufficient resources to supply the place of those that were every day consumed.

The First Consul also turned his earnest attention to the selection of a chief capable of commanding the army in Egypt. The loss of Kléber was distressing, especially in consideration of those who might be called to succeed him. Had Desaix remained in Egypt, the misfortune would have been easily repaired. But Desaix had returned; Desaix was dead. Those who were left were not competent for such a command. Reynier was a good officer, brought up in the school of the army of the Rhine, skilful, experienced, but cold, irresolute, without ascendancy over the troops. Menou was well informed, personally brave, an enthusiast in favour of the expedition, but incapable of directing an army, and covered with ridicule because he had married a Turkish woman and turned Mahometan himself. He took the name of Abdallah Menou, which was a subject of mirth for the soldiers, and greatly abated the respect with which a commander-in-chief needs to be surrounded. General Lanusse, brave, intelligent, full of an ardour, which he understood the art of communicating to others, appeared to the First Consul to deserve the preference, though he was deficient in prudence. But General Menou had assumed the command by right of seniority. It was difficult to insure the arrival of an order in Egypt; the English might intercept that order; and, without communicating it literally, they might excite a suspicion of its purport, in such a manner as to render the command uncertain, to produce dissension among the generals, and to distract the colony. He therefore left things in the same state, and confirmed Menou in the charge, not conceiving him to be so utterly incapable as he really was.

We must now return to Europe, to see what was passing on this theatre of the great events of the world. The letter addressed from Marengo itself to the Emperor of Germany reached him along with the news of the lost battle. The court of Vienna was then aware of the faults which it had committed, in rejecting the offers of the First Consul at the beginning of winter, in persisting to consider France as exhausted and incapable of continuing the war, in refusing to believe the existence of the army of reserve, and in blindly pushing M. de Melas into the gorges of the Apennines. The credit of M. de Thugut was considerably diminished, for to him alone were imputed all the errors of want of conduct and foresight. However, to these faults, already so serious, was added another not less important, that of forming a closer alliance than ever with the English, under the

¹ All these particulars are extracted from the voluminous correspondence of the First Consul with the department of war and of the marine.

impression of the disaster of Marengo. Till now, the cabinet of Vienna had declined their subsidies, but it thought it right to procure immediately the means of repairing the losses of this campaign, either to place itself in a condition to treat more advantageously with France, or to be able to engage in a fresh struggle with her, if her pretensions were too exorbitant. It accepted, therefore, two millions and a half sterling (62,000,000 francs). In return for this subsidy, it engaged not to make peace with France before the month of February following, unless the peace were common to England and Austria. This treaty was signed on the 20th of June, the very day on which the news of the events in Italy reached Vienna. Austria, therefore, bound herself to the fortunes of England for seven months longer; but she hoped to pass the summer in negotiations, and to get on till winter before hostilities could be recommenced. For the rest, the Imperial cabinet had made up its mind to peace; it merely wished to negotiate jointly with England, and especially not to make too great sacrifices in Italy. On this condition, it desired nothing better than to conclude peace.

The emperor sent as bearer of his answer to the letter of the First Consul, the same officer who had brought that letter, namely, M. de St. Julien, in whom he reposed great confidence. The answer on this occasion was direct and personally addressed to General Bonaparte. It contained the ratification of the double armistice, signed in Germany and in Italy, and an invitation to explain himself confidentially and with perfect frankness respecting the bases of the future negotiation. M. de St. Julien was specially charged to sound the First Consul on the conditions of peace, and on his part to say sufficient concerning the intentions of the emperor to induce the French cabinet to disclose its own. The letter of which M. de St. Julien was the bearer, full of flattering and pacific protestations, contained a passage in which the object of his mission was clearly specified. "I am writing to my generals," said his imperial majesty, "to confirm the two armistices, and to settle the details of them. I have, moreover, sent to you the Count de St. Julien, major-general in my army: he is charged with my instructions, and to point out to you how essential it is not to enter into public negotiations, likely to excite prematurely in so many nations hopes perhaps illusory, till it is ascertained, at least in a general manner, if the bases that you mean to propose for peace are such as to afford a prospect of obtaining that desirable end.

Vienna, July 5th, 1800."

The emperor hinted, towards the conclusion of this letter, at the engagements which bound him to England, and which made him desirous of a peace common to all the belligerent powers.

M. de St. Julien arrived in Paris on the 21st or July—2d Thermidor, year VIII.—and was cordially received. He was the first envoy from the emperor who had been seen for a long time in France. He was welcomed as the representative of a great sovereign and a messenger of peace. We have already shown how

earnestly the First Consul desired to put an end to the war. Nobody contested with him the glory of battles; he now aspired to one of a different kind, less brilliant but more novel, and at this time more profitable to his authority, that of giving peace to France and Europe. In his ardent soul desires were passions. He then sought peace as we have since seen him seek war. M. de Talleyrand desired it as much; for he was already fond of assuming the part of moderator about the First Consul. It was an excellent part to play, especially at a later period; but to urge the First Consul to peace at this time was adding one impatience to another, and endangering the result by too great precipitation.

On the very day after his arrival, the 22d of July—3d Thermidor—M. de St. Julien was invited to a conference with the minister for foreign affairs. They conversed on the subject of their reciprocal desire to terminate the war, and the best way of accomplishing it. M. de St. Julien listened to all that was said to him concerning the conditions on which peace might be concluded, and hinted on his part at all that the emperor wished. M. de Talleyrand concluded too hastily that M. de St. Julien had secret and sufficient instruction for treating, and proposed that they should not confine themselves to a mere conversation, but draw up jointly preliminary articles of peace. M. de St. Julien, who was not authorized to take such an important step, for the engagements of Austria towards England were in absolute opposition to it—M. de St. Julien objected that he had no power to conclude a treaty. M. de Talleyrand replied, that the emperor's letter completely authorized him, and that, if he would agree to some preliminary articles and sign them with a proviso of their ulterior ratification, the French cabinet, on the mere letter of the emperor, would consider him as sufficiently accredited. M. de St. Julien, a soldier by profession, and devoid of experience in diplomatic usages, had the simplicity to avow to M. de Talleyrand his embarrassment and his ignorance of forms, and to ask him what he would do in his place. "I would sign," answered M. de Talleyrand. "Well then, be it so," rejoined M. de St. Julien, "I will sign the preliminary articles, which shall not be held valid till they have received the ratification of my sovereign." "Most assuredly," replied M. de Talleyrand, "no engagements between nations are valid but such as have been ratified."

This singular manner of communicating their powers to each other is specified at length in the minutes still existing of that negotiation. They are dated the 23d, 24th, 27th, and 28th of July,—4th, 5th, 8th, and 9th Thermidor, year VIII. All the important points to be arranged between the two nations were discussed. The treaty of Campo Formio was adopted as the basis, with the exception of some modifications. Thus the emperor abandoned to the Republic the boundary of the Rhine, from the point where that river leaves the Swiss territory to that where it enters the Bavarian territory. In regard to that article, M. de St. Julien demanded and obtained a

change in the wording. He wished the expression, "The Emperor assents to the line of the Rhine," to be altered as follows: "The Emperor does not oppose the retaining of the boundary of the Rhine by the French Republic." This mode of expression was adopted in answer to the reproaches of the Germanic body, which had accused the emperor of giving up to France the territory of the confederation. It was agreed that France should not retain any of the fortified positions which operated upon the right bank, (Kehl, Cassel, Ehrenbreitstein,) that their works should be razed, but that, in return, Germany should not throw up any entrenchment, either of earth or masonry, within three leagues of the river.

So much for the boundary between France and Germany. The limits between Austria and Italy yet remained to be settled. The fifth secret article of Campo Formio had stipulated that Austria should receive in Germany an indemnity for certain lordships which she had given up on the left bank of the Rhine, independently of the Netherlands, which she had long before sacrificed to France. The bishopric of Salzburg was to compose that indemnity. The emperor would have liked better to be indemnified in Italy; for the acquisitions which he made in Germany, especially in the ecclesiastical principalities, were scarcely new acquisitions, the court of Vienna already possessing in those principalities an influence and privileges nearly equivalent to a direct sovereignty. On the contrary, the acquisitions which he obtained in Italy had the advantage of giving him territory, which he did not yet possess in any degree, and especially of extending his frontier and his influence in a country which had been the constant object of the ambition of his family. From these same motives it was natural that France should be better pleased to see Austria aggrandize herself in Germany than in Italy. This latter point, however, was conceded. The treaty of Campo Formio threw Austria back upon the Adige, and ascribed to the Cisalpine Republic the Mincio and the celebrated fortress of Mantua. The ambition of Austria this time was to obtain the Mincio, Mantua, and the Legations into the bargain, which was exorbitant. The First Consul went so far as to grant her the Mincio and Mantua, but he would not cede the Legations at any rate. The utmost he would consent to was to give them to the Grand-duke of Tuscany, on condition that, in return, Tuscany should be transferred to the Grand-duke of Parma, and the duchy of Parma to the Cisalpine. The Grand-duke of Parma would have gained considerably by this exchange, which was a satisfaction granted to Spain, with what views we shall show by-and-by.

M. de St. Julien replied that, on this latter point, his sovereign was not prepared to adopt a definitive resolution; that these removals of sovereign houses from one country to another were by no means conformable with his policy; that of course this was a point which must be afterwards adjusted. To evade the difficulty, the negotiators merely said, in the preliminary articles, that Austria should re-

ceive in Italy the territorial indemnities previously granted to her in Germany.

The Austrian officer, thus metamorphosed into plenipotentiary, expressed, in the name of his sovereign, a warm interest for the independence of Switzerland, but scarcely any for that of Piedmont, and appeared to insinuate that France might pay herself in Piedmont for what she ceded to the house of Austria in Lombardy.

The parties, therefore, stopped short at very general conditions; the boundary of the Rhine for France, with the demolition of Kehl, Cassel, and Ehrenbreitstein; particular indemnities for Austria, taken from Italy instead of Germany; which signified that Austria would not be confined within the limit of the Adige. But, it must be confessed, not only was it in vain to treat with a plenipotentiary without powers, but something still more vain was it to consider as articles of peace, articles, the only contestable point in which, the only one for which the emperor went to war, the boundary of Austria and Italy, was not even resolved in a general manner: for, as to the boundary of the Rhine, no one had seriously thought of disputing that with us, for a long time past.

To the preceding articles were added some accessory arrangements: it was agreed, for example, that a congress should be held immediately; that, during this congress, hostilities should be suspended, the levies *en masse* making in Tuscany disbanded, and the English landings, with which Italy was threatened, deferred.

M. de St. Julien, urged beyond all reasonable bounds by the desire to play an important part, had from time to time scruples respecting the strange and bold step which he had ventured to take. To make him easy upon the matter, M. de Talleyrand promised, on his word of honour, that these preliminary articles should remain secret, and that they should not be considered as having any value whatever till after their ratification by the emperor. On the 28th of July, 1800—9th Thermidor, year VIII.—these famous preliminaries were signed at the hôtel of foreign affairs, to the great joy of M. de Talleyrand, who, finding M. de St. Julien so prepared upon every question, seriously believed that he had secret instructions to treat. This, however, was not the case, and, if M. de St. Julien was so well informed, it was only because they wished at Vienna to enable him to provoke and to receive the confidential communications of the First Consul relative to the conditions of the future peace. The French minister had not been able to penetrate that circumstance; and from the desire to sign an act resembling a treaty he had committed a serious error.

The First Consul, paying no attention to the forms observed by the two negotiators, and trusting on that point entirely to M. de Talleyrand, thought for his part of nothing but making Austria explain her views, in order to ascertain whether she wished for peace, and to force it from her by a new campaign, if she appeared not to desire it. But, for this purpose, it would have been better to have sum-

moned her to explain herself within a given time than to enter into an illusory and puerile negotiation, in consequence of which the dignity of the two nations was likely to be compromised, and their reconciliation to be rendered more difficult.

M. de St. Julien thought it best not to wait in Paris for the emperor's answer, as he was solicited to do; he wished himself to carry the preliminaries to Vienna, no doubt with a view to explain to his master the motives of his extraordinary conduct. He left Paris on the 30th of July—11th Thermidor—accompanied by Duroc, whom the First Consul sent to Austria, as he had previously sent him to Prussia, to observe the court there closely, and to give it an advantageous opinion of the moderation and policy of the new government. Duroc, as we have elsewhere remarked, was well suited for missions of this kind, from his sound sense and elegant manners. The First Consul had, moreover, given him written instructions, in which he had provided with minute attention for every contingency. In the first place, when any circumstance led to a presumption of the intentions of Austria in regard to the preliminaries, Duroc was instantly to send off a courier to Paris. It was recommended to him until the ratification to keep an absolute silence, and to appear totally ignorant of the intentions of the First Consul. If the ratification was granted, he was authorized to declare, in a positive manner, that peace might be signed in twenty-four hours, if there was a sincere desire for it. He was to let it be understood, in one way or another, that, provided Austria would be content with the Mincio, the Fossa Maestra, and the Po, which was the line marked out by the convention of Alexandria; and provided, moreover, that she agreed to the removal of the Duke of Parma to Tuscany, and of the Duke of Tuscany to the Legations, there was no obstacle to an immediate conclusion. These instructions even contained rules respecting the language to be held on all the subjects that might arise in conversation. Duroc was forbidden to join in any sneers against Russia and Prussia, which were then disliked at Vienna, because they had withdrawn from the coalition. He was enjoined to maintain a great reserve respecting the Emperor Paul, whose character was a theme for raillery in every court: he was to speak highly of the King of Prussia, to visit the Grand-duke of Tuscany, to show none of those passions which the revolution had excited, either in one way or in another. Royalists and Jacobins were all to be spoken of as though they were not less ancient in France than the Guelfs and the Ghibellines in Italy. He was particularly enjoined not to manifest any antipathy towards emigrants, excepting those, indeed, who had borne arms against the Republic. He was ordered to assert on all occasions that, of all the countries of Europe, France was most attached to its government, because of all countries it was that which had afforded the government occasion to do the most good. Lastly, he was to represent the First Consul as having no prejudices, neither those of other times nor those of the present day, and as being indif-

ferent to the attacks of the English press, for he did not understand English.

Duroc set out with M. de St. Julien, and though the secret of the preliminaries was kept, still the numerous conferences of the emperor's envoy with M. de Talleyrand had been remarked by everybody, and people said aloud that he was the bearer of conditions of peace.

Our prodigious successes in Italy and Germany had naturally exercised a considerable influence, not upon Austria alone, but upon all the courts of Europe, whether friendly or hostile.

On the news of the battle of Marengo, Prussia, still neutral upon system, but kindly disposed toward us according to events, Prussia had expressed warm admiration to the First Consul, and from that moment had not said a single word which could give rise to a doubt respecting the transfer to France of the entire line of the Rhine. The only point now to be studied, according to her, was to be just in the partition of the indemnities due to all those who lost territories on the left bank of the Rhine, and discreet in settling the general limits of the great States. She even added that it was right to be firm towards Austria, and to curb her insatiable ambition. Such was the language which she held every day to our ambassador in Berlin.

M. d'Haugwitz, and King Frederick William in particular, whose kindness was sincere, informed General Beurnonville from day to day of the rapid progress which the First Consul was making in the esteem of Paul I. As we have already seen, that fickle and enthusiastic prince had for some months been passing from a chivalrous animosity against the French Revolution to an unbounded admiration of the man who was now the representative of that Revolution. He had conceived an absolute hatred for Austria and England. Though from this change a first result of great importance had been obtained, namely, the motionless attitude of the Russians on the Vistula, still the First Consul aspired to something more. He wished to enter into direct communication with the emperor Paul, and suspected Prussia of prolonging that equivocal state, that she might be the sole agent in our relations with the most powerful of the courts of the North.

He devised a method, which was crowned with complete success. There were still in France six or seven thousand Russians taken last year, and who could not be exchanged, because Russia had no prisoners to release in return. The First Consul had proposed to England and to Austria, which held in their hands a certain number of our soldiers and seamen, to exchange these Russians for a like number of French. Both of them assuredly owed Russia such a courtesy, for these Russians had incurred captivity solely by serving the purposes of English and Austrian policy. The proposal was nevertheless rejected. The First Consul immediately conceived the happy idea of restoring unconditionally to Paul I. the prisoners in our hands. This was an act of dexterous generosity, and not very burden

some to France, which could do nothing with these prisoners, since they could not procure her Frenchmen in exchange. The First Consul accompanied this act with the attentions most likely to touch the susceptible heart of the Emperor Paul. He caused these Russians to be armed and clothed in the uniform of their sovereign: he even gave up their officers, their colours, and their arms. He then wrote a letter to Count de Panin, minister of foreign affairs at St. Petersburg, informing him that, Austria and England having refused to procure their liberty for the soldiers of the Czar, who had become prisoners while serving the cause of those powers, the First Consul would not detain those brave men indefinitely, and that he sent them back to the emperor unconditionally; that this was on his part a testimony of consideration for the Russian army, an army which the French had learned to know and to esteem on fields of battle.

This letter was sent by way of Hamburg. It was transmitted by M. de Bourgoing, our minister in Denmark, to M. de Muraviev, minister of Russia at Hamburg. But such was the fear excited by Paul I. in his agents, that M. de Muraviev refused to receive this letter, not daring to disobey the anterior orders of his cabinet, which forbade him all communication with the representatives of France. M. de Muraviev merely reported to his court what had passed, and made it acquainted with the existence and contents of the latter, of which he had refused to take charge. Upon this, the First Consul made another, and still more efficacious advance towards the Russian monarch. Seeing that Malta could not hold out long, and that this island, strictly blockaded, would be obliged, by want of provisions, to surrender to the English, he conceived the idea of giving it to Paul. It is well known that this prince, an enthusiast on the subject of the ancient orders of chivalry, and that of Malta in particular, had caused himself to be elected grand-master of St. John of Jerusalem, and he was resolved to re-establish that religious and chivalric institution, and that he frequently held at St. Petersburg chapters of the Order, for the purpose of conferring its decoration on the princes and great personages of Europe. It was impossible to take a more direct course to his heart than by offering him the island that was the seat of the Order, of which he had made himself the head. The thing was ably conceived in all its bearings. Either the English, who were on the point of taking it, would consent to restore it, and then it would be out of their hands; or they would refuse, and Paul I. was capable of declaring war against them on that account. This time, M. de Sergijeff, a Russian officer, and one of the prisoners detained in France, was directed to proceed to Petersburg, as the bearer of the two letters relative to the prisoners and the island of Malta.

When these different communications reached St. Petersburg, they produced their inevitable effect. Paul was deeply touched, and thenceforth indulged, without reserve, in the highest admiration of the First Consul. He immediately selected an old Finland officer, M. de

Sprengporten, formerly a Swedish subject, a most respectable man, very well disposed towards France, and in high favour at the court of Russia. He appointed him governor of the island of Malta, ordered him to put himself at the head of the 6000 Russian prisoners in France, and to go with this force perfectly organized, and to take possession of the island of Malta, which would be delivered up to him by the French. He ordered him to proceed to Paris, and to thank the First Consul publicly. To this demonstration Paul added a much more effective step; he enjoined M. de Krudener, his minister in Berlin, who had been charged, some months before, to renew the connection between Russia and Prussia, to enter into direct communication with General Beurnonville, our ambassador, and furnished him with the necessary powers for negotiating a treaty of peace with France.

M. d'Haugwitz, who thought, perhaps, that the reconciliation was proceeding too rapidly, for Prussia would lose her character of mediating agent, the moment the cabinets of Paris and St. Petersburg were in direct communication—M. d'Haugwitz contrived to be the ostensible agent of this reconciliation. Hitherto M. de Krudener and M. de Beurnonville had met in Berlin, in the houses of the ministers of the different courts, without speaking. One day, M. d'Haugwitz invited them both to dinner; after dinner, he brought them face to face, then left them *tête-à-tête* in his own garden, to give them opportunity for complete explanation. M. de Krudener expressed his regret to M. de Beurnonville, that it had not been in his power before to seek the society of the French legation; he excused the refusal given at Hamburg to receive the First Consul's letter, by the existence of anterior orders; and, lastly, he entered into a very long explanation respecting the new dispositions of his sovereign. He informed him of the mission of M. de Sprengporten to Paris, and avowed the especial satisfaction which Paul I. had felt at the restitution of the prisoners, and the offer to restore Malta to the Order of St. John of Jerusalem. At length, from all these subjects he passed to the most serious, namely, the conditions of peace. Russia and France had nothing to quarrel about. They had not gone to war for any interest of territory or commerce, but for a dissimilarity in the form of their government. As far as concerned themselves directly, they had, therefore, but to write one article, to the effect that peace was re-established between the two powers. This circumstance alone showed how unreasonable the war had been. But the war had brought with it alliances, and Paul, who prided himself on strict fidelity to his engagements, desired only one thing, that his allies should be treated indulgently. They were four in number:—Bavaria, Wurtemberg, Piedmont, and Naples. He demanded, on behalf of the four, the integrity of their dominions. Nothing could be more easy, if an explanatory clause were merely introduced to the effect, that this condition should be considered as fulfilled, if those princes obtained an indemnity for the provinces which the French Republic should take from them. The point was thus understood and admitted.

M. de Krudener. In fact, the secularization of the ecclesiastical States of Germany, and their proportionate partition among the lay princes who had lost the whole or part of their dominions, in consequence of the cession of the left bank of the Rhine to France, was a thing long agreed upon by everybody. It had even been admitted at the congress of Rastadt, under the Directory. An arrangement was equally easy for the Italian princes, allies of Paul I. Piedmont was to lose Nice and Savoy; it might be indemnified in Italy, if Austrian ambition were curbed in that country, and not suffered to extend itself too far there. On this point, Paul I., greatly irritated against the cabinet of Vienna, said, like Prussia, that Austria must be kept down, and nothing granted her but what could not be refused. As for the kingdom of Naples, France had nothing to take from it, but she had odious proceedings to punish, outrages to avenge. Still the First Consul was willing to pardon, on one condition, of a nature to be particularly pleasing to Paul I., who was not less hostile to the English than to the Austrians, namely, that the cabinet of Naples should atone for its faults by a formal rupture with Great Britain. On all these points the parties were nearly agreed. They could not fail to become still more so every day, from the natural course of events, and from the impetuous character of Paul I., who, from a state of dissatisfaction with his former allies, was about to pass, without transition, to a state of open war.

The reconciliation of France with Russia was, therefore, nearly accomplished, and even public; for the departure of M. de Sprengporten for Paris had just been officially announced. Paul I., the furious enemy of France, thus became her friend, her ally, against all the powers of the old coalition. The glory and the profound address of the First Consul had wrought this extraordinary change. A fortuitous and important circumstance was about to render it still more complete; this was the quarrel of the neutral powers, exasperated by the violences of England upon the seas. It seems as if every thing concurred to favour the designs of the First Consul, and one is tempted to admire, at this moment, his good fortune as much as his genius.

On viewing the course of events in this lower world, one would almost say, that fortune loves to smile on youth, for she seconds, in a wonderful manner, the early years of great men. Let us not, however, like the ancient poets, make her blind and capricious; if she so often favours the youth of great men, as she did that of Hannibal, of Cæsar, or Napoleon, it is because they have not yet abused her favours. General Bonaparte was fortunate, then, because he had deserved to be so; because he was in the right against all the world; at home, against party strife; abroad, against the powers of Europe. At home, he aimed only at order and justice; abroad, at peace, but an advantageous and glorious peace, such as

he has a right to desire who has not been the aggressor, but who has been victorious through his superior ability. Thus Europe sought anxiously to be reconciled to France, represented by a great man, so just and so powerful. And if this great man had met with auspicious circumstances, there was not one which he has not brought about himself, or by which he had not skilfully profited. It was but yesterday that one of his lieutenants, anticipating his orders, had hastened, at the report of the cannon, to gain for him the victory of Marengo; but what had he not done to pave the way to that victory! Now, a prince, struck with insanity on one of the first thrones in the world, afforded an easy prey to his diplomatic ability; but with what masterly condescension had he not contrived to flatter that monarch! England, by her conduct on the seas, was soon going to reconcile all the maritime powers with France; but we shall see what art he had employed to soothe them, and to leave to England the part of violence. Fortune, that capricious mistress of great men, is not, then, so capricious as people are pleased to represent her. All is not caprice when she smiles upon them, caprice when she abandons them, and, in her alleged infidelities, the fault is, in general, not on her side. But let us speak a language more true, more worthy of so grave a subject: fortune, that pagan name given to the power which governs all things here below, is Providence, befriending genius when walking in the path of rectitude, that is, in the ways marked out by infinite wisdom.

The fortunate circumstance which was destined definitively to rally the powers of the north around the politics of the First Consul, and to procure for him auxiliaries upon the element on which he had most need of them, that is, on the seas, was this:—The English had just committed new violences against neutrals. They could not suffer the Russians, the Danes, the Swedes, the Americans, to frequent quietly all the ports of the world, and to lend their flags to the commerce of France and Spain. They had already violated the independence of the neutral flags, especially in regard to America, and it was because the Americans had not sufficiently defended it that the Directory showed its anger, by subjecting them to treatment almost as rigorous as that which they experienced from the English. General Bonaparte had repaired this fault by annulling the harshest of the regulations enforced by the Directory; by instituting the tribunal of prizes, charged to administer better justice to captured vessels; by paying homage, in the person of Washington, to all America; lastly, by inviting negotiators to Paris, for the purpose of renewing relations of amity and commerce with her. It was precisely at this moment that England, as if irritated by the ill success of her policy, seemed to become more oppressive towards neutrals. Odious acts had already been committed by her upon the seas;

* The whole of this defence of the French system is singular, false, partial, and unjust toward the United States, which latter country, it is now universally conceded, leaned entirely to France at that time. It is of course natural that France, when she could not keep a ship either of commerce or war on the ocean, should

wish to be furnished by foreign flags with all the articles of which she stood in need. To expose the fallacy of this reasoning, it is enough to call the attention to the fact, that were the pretensions here contended for admitted, naval warfare would be utterly useless, and blockades of no avail.

but the last exceeded all the bounds, not only of justice, but of the most ordinary prudence.

This is not the place for entering into all the details of that important dispute; suffice it to specify its principal points. The neutrals alleged that the war, which certain great nations thought fit to wage with one another, ought not, in any way, to cramp their own trade, nay, that they had a right to pick up that commerce of which the belligerent powers voluntarily deprived themselves. In consequence, they claimed the right of frequenting freely all the ports of the world, of navigating even between the ports of the belligerent nations; of going, for instance, from France and Spain to England, from England to Spain and France, and, what was more disputable, of going from the colonies to the mother-countries, of going from Mexico to Spain, for the purpose of carrying thither the precious metals, which, but for their intervention, could never have reached Europe. They maintained that "the flag covers the merchandise," which means, that the flag of a power, not implicated in the war, covered from every kind of search the merchandise transported in their vessels; that, on board them, French merchandise could not be seized by the English, nor English merchandise by the French; as a Frenchman, for instance, would have been inviolable on the quays of Copenhagen and St. Petersburg for the British power: in short, that the vessel of a neutral nation was as sacred as the very quays of its capital.

The neutrals consented to only one exception. They admitted that they ought not to carry goods specially used in war, for it was contrary to the very idea of neutrality that they should supply one of the belligerent nations with arms against the other. But they sought to limit this interdiction solely to articles fabricated for war, such as muskets, cannon, powder, projectiles, materials for accoutrements of every kind, &c.; and as for provisions, they would not consider any provisions interdicted but such as were prepared for the use of armies, such as biscuit, for example.

If they admitted one exception as to the nature of transportable merchandise, they admitted another as to the places to be entered, but on condition that it should be accurately defined. This second exception was relative to the ports *bonâ fide* blockaded, and guarded by a naval force capable of laying siege to them, or of reducing them by famine, by means of blockade. In such a case they admitted that to run into a blockaded port was thwarting one of the two nations in the use of its right, by preventing it from taking the places of its enemy by attack or by famine; that it was consequently affording succour to one of the two against the other. But they insisted that the blockade should be preceded by formal declarations, that the blockade should be *bonâ fide*, executed by such a force that there would be imminent danger in violating it; and they did not admit that, by a mere declaration of blockade, either party could interdict at pleasure, by means of a pure fiction, the entry into such or such a port, nay, frequently the entire extent of certain coasts.

Lastly, as it was necessary to ascertain whether a vessel really belonged to the nation whose flag she hoisted, whether or not she carried merchandise called contraband of war, the neutrals consented to be searched, but required that this search should be made with certain courtesies to be agreed upon and punctually observed. Above all, they considered it as an essential rule that search should not take place if merchant-vessels were convoyed by a ship of war. The military or royal flag, according to them, ought to enjoy the privilege of being believed on its word, when it affirmed, upon the honour of its nation, that the vessels under convoy were, in the first place, of its nation, and, in the next, that they had on board no interdicted articles. If it were otherwise, said they, a mere brig, when cruising, might stop a convoy, and with that convoy a fleet of war, perhaps an admiral. Who knows even? a privateer might stop either M. de Suffren or Lord Nelson.

Thus the doctrines maintained by the neutrals may be reduced to four principal points.

The flag covers the merchandise, that is to say, no search shall be made after an enemy's goods on board a neutral vessel, foreign to the belligerent nations.

No merchandise is interdicted but contraband of war. This contraband is confined solely to articles made for the use of the armies. Corn, for instance, and naval stores, are not included.

Access cannot be interdicted to any port, unless it is *bonâ fide* blockaded.

Lastly, no vessel under convoy can be searched.

Such were the principles maintained by France, Prussia, Denmark, Sweden, Russia, and America, that is to say, by an immense majority of nations: principles, founded on respect for the rights of others, but pertinaciously contested by England.

She insisted, in fact, that, on these conditions, the commerce of her enemies would be carried on without obstacle by means of the neutrals, (which, be it observed by the way, was not correct, for that commerce could not be continued by means of neutrals, without relinquishing to them the greater part of the profits, and causing the nation obliged to have recourse to them to sustain an enormous loss;) she insisted then on seizing French and Spanish merchandise on board whatever vessel it might be. She maintained that certain commodities, without being fabricated, such as corn and naval stores, were real succours carried to a nation in time of war. She alleged that a declaration of blockade was sufficient, without the presence of a naval force, to interdict the entry of certain ports or coasts; and lastly, that neutrals, upon pretext of being under convoy, could not escape the search of the belligerent powers.

If the reader wishes to know what was at the bottom of the important interest concealed under these sophistries of the public writers of England, here it is. England was bent on preventing the precious metals of Mexico, the principal source of the opulence of Spain, from being brought to the Spaniards; and the French

sugar and coffee, which they cannot dispense with; to both the timber, hemp, and iron of the North, necessary for their navy. She would fain have it in her power to starve them, in case of a deficient harvest, as she had done in 1793, for instance; she sought a pretext for closing the ports of entire countries, without having recourse to a *bonâ fide* blockade; lastly, she purposed, by dint of searches, annoyances, and obstacles of every kind, to ruin the commerce of all nations, so that war, which, for commercial nations is a state of distress, should become for her merchants, what it actually was, a time of monopoly and of extraordinary prosperity. With regard to the Americans, she had an intention still more unjust, namely, to rob them of their seamen upon pretext that they were English, a confusion easy to make, owing to the similarity of the languages.

In 1780, during the American war, Catherine the Great had formed the league of the neutrals to resist these pretensions. The First Consul, taking advantage of the nascent friendship of Paul, of the increasing irritation of the neutrals, and of the unparalleled violences of the English, made the utmost efforts to form a similar one in 1800.

At this moment, the dispute presented itself under one form only, that of the right of search. The Danes and the Swedes, to escape the vexations of the English cruisers, had devised the expedient of sailing in numerous convoys, escorted by frigates bearing the royal flag. It must be added that they never tarnished the honour of their flag, and took good care not to escort false Danes or false Swedes, or to cover contraband of war, as it was called. They studied only how to escape vexations which had become intolerable. But the English, viewing this as a mere subterfuge to elude a difficulty and continue the commerce of neutrals, persisted in exercising the right of search, even in regard to vessels under convoy.

In the preceding year, two Swedish frigates, the *Troya* and the *Halla Persen*, escorting Swedish merchantmen, had been stopped by the English squadrons and obliged to submit to the search of the convoy under their care. The king of Sweden had sent the captains of the two frigates before a court-martial for not defending them. This example had for a moment checked the English, who were apprehensive lest they should provoke a rupture with the northern powers. They had in consequence shown a little more lenience to Swedish vessels. But two recent instances had revived the difficulty, and driven Sweden and Denmark to the last degree of exasperation.

In the winter of 1799—1800, the Danish frigate the *Haufersen*, Captain Vandockum, who was conveying a fleet of merchantmen in the Mediterranean, was stopped by the squadron of Admiral Keith; she attempted to resist, was fired upon, and carried into Gibraltar. A most violent dispute ensued on this subject between the English cabinet and the Danish cabinet, and it was still going on, when, in the month of July, the Danish frigate, the *Freya*, escorting a convoy of her nation, was met in the

Channel by an English squadron. The latter insisted on exercising the right of search; Captain Krabe, commander of the *Freya*, nobly resisted the summons of the English admiral, and refused to suffer the convoy to be searched. Force was employed with uncalled for violence; Captain Krabe defended himself; his ship was riddled, and he was obliged to surrender to the superior force of the enemy, for he had but a single frigate to oppose to six men-of-war. The *Freya* was carried into the Downs.

This occurrence was soon followed by another, of a different nature, but more odious and more serious. Two Spanish frigates were lying at anchor at the entrance of the road of Barcelona. The English formed a plan for taking them. Here was no question about the right of neutrals, but the perpetration of a piece of downright knavery, for the purpose of entering an enemy's port with impunity, without being recognised. They perceived in these roads a Swedish galliot, the *Hoffnung*, and resolved to make use of her for accomplishing the piratical act which they meditated. They manned their boats, boarded the galliot, clapped a pistol to the breast of the Swedish captain, and obliged him to sail quietly towards the Spanish frigates, which, having no mistrust of the Swedish flag, since it was neutral, suffered her to come alongside. The English immediately rushed on board, surprised the two frigates, which had few hands on board, took possession of them and left the harbour of Barcelona with their unworthily acquired prey.

This event produced an extraordinary sensation in Europe, and incensed all the maritime nations, whose rights the English were no longer satisfied with violating, but whose flag they outraged, by making it, unknown to itself, subservient to acts of the most infamous piracy. Spain was already at war with Great Britain; she could do nothing more; but she had recourse to Sweden, whose flag had been usurped, to denounce this odious fact, more offensive to Sweden than even to Spain. Nothing more was requisite to embitter the quarrel between England and the neutrals. At this moment especially, the moderation which the First Consul had manifested towards them was of such a nature as to render British violence more glaring. Sweden demanded reparations: Denmark had already demanded them. Behind these two courts was Russia, which, ever since the league of 1780, regarded herself as a copartner with the powers of the Baltic in all questions that interested their maritime rights.

On the part of Denmark, M. de Bernstorff kept up a brisk controversy with the cabinet of London, by means of notes which France published, and which do equal honour to the minister who wrote them, and to the nation which gave them its signature, and which had soon to support them with its arms. "A mere gun-boat," said the English, "carrying the flag of a neutral, is to have a right then to convoy the trade of the world, and to withdraw from our vigilance the commerce of our enemies, which may be carried on as easily in time of

war as in time of peace!" "A whole squadron," replied M. de Bernstorff, "would be obliged then to obey the summons of the most paltry cruiser, to stop at her requisition, to suffer the convoy which it is escorting to be examined before its face! The word of an admiral, making a declaration upon the honour of his nation, is not to weigh against the doubt of the captain of a privateer, who is to have a right to verify the declaration by a search! One of these hypotheses is more inadmissible than the other."

To support its doctrines by means of terror, the English cabinet, which had just sent Lord Whitworth to Copenhagen, despatched after him a squadron of sixteen sail, which was cruising at this moment at the entrance of the Sound. The presence of this squadron produced a strong sensation among all the powers of the Baltic: it alarmed not only Denmark, against which it was directed, but also Sweden, Russia, and Prussia herself, whose commerce was likewise interested in the free navigation of the seas. The four powers which signed the old armed neutrality of 1780 commenced a negotiation with the avowed purpose of forming a new league against the maritime tyranny of the English. The cabinet of London, which was, nevertheless, afraid of such an event, insisted warmly at Copenhagen on settling the dispute; but, so far from offering indemnities, it had the singular presumption to demand them. It purposed, by frightening Denmark, to withdraw her from the league before it was formed. Unfortunately, Denmark had been taken by surprise; the Sound was not in a state of defence; Copenhagen was not secured from a bombardment. In this state of things, she was obliged to give way for the moment, with a view to gain the winter season, during which ice would defend the Baltic, and give all the neutrals time to make their preparations for resistance. On the 29th of August—11th Fructidor, year VIII.—Denmark was obliged to sign a convention, in which the question of the law of nations was adjourned, and the last misunderstanding only, which had arisen on the subject of the Freya, was adjusted. The Freya was to be repaired in the English dockyards and restored; but, for the moment at least, the Danish government ceased to furnish convoys for merchantmen.

This convention had settled nothing. The storm, so far from being dispersed, soon gathered again, for the four northern courts were extremely incensed. The king of Sweden, whose honour was not yet satisfied, prepared for a journey to St. Petersburg, to renew the ancient league of neutrality; and Paul I., who was not fond of middle terms, took at the outset a most energetic step. Being informed of the dispute with Denmark, and of the presence of a British fleet at the entrance of the Sound, he sequestered all property belonging to the English, as a security for the injury that might be done to Russian commerce. This measure was to be continued till the intentions of the British government were completely elucidated.

In the northern courts, therefore, every thing tended to favour the designs of the First Con-

sul. Events served him according to his wish. Things went on equally well in the south of Europe, that is, in Spain. Here one of the first monarchies of the globe was seen sinking into dissolution, to the great detriment of the balance of Europe, and to the great grief of a generous nation, indignant at the part which it was made to act in the world. The First Consul, whose indefatigable mind embraced all objects at once, had already directed the efforts of his policy towards Spain, and sought to derive as much advantage for the common cause as he could from that degenerate court.

We should not draw the melancholy picture that follows, if it were not true, in the first place, and if it were not necessary, in the next, for understanding the great events of the period.

The king, the queen of Spain, and the Prince of Peace, had engaged for many years the attention of Europe, and exhibited a spectacle extremely dangerous for royalty, at that time already so much lowered in the estimation of nations. One would have said that the illustrious house of Bourbon was destined at the close of this century to lose their crowns in France, in Naples, and in Spain: for, in these three kingdoms, three sovereigns of imbecile weakness exposed their sceptres to the derision and the contempt of the world, by leaving them in the hands of three queens, either giddy, violent, or dissolute.

The Bourbons of France, whether by their own fault, whether through misfortune, were swallowed up by the French Revolution; by dint of foolishly provoking it, those of Naples had been driven a first time from their capital; those of Spain, before they let their sceptre drop into the hands of the crowned soldier whom that Revolution had produced, deemed it expedient to pay their court to him. They had already allied themselves with France in the time of the Convention; they could not but connect themselves with her much more cheerfully now that the Revolution, instead of a sanguinary anarchy, exhibited to them a great man, disposed to protect them if they followed his advice. Happy had it been for these princes, if they had followed at that time the good advice of this great man! Happy for himself had he done no more than give it them!

The king of Spain was an honest man, not harsh and blunt like Louis XVI., more agreeable in person, but less informed, and surpassing him in weakness. He rose very early, not to attend to his royal duties, but to hear masses, and then go down to his workshops, where, surrounded by turners, smiths, and armourers, and stript of his clothes like them, he wrought in their company at all sorts of work. Though very fond of the chase, he liked still better to manufacture arms. From his shops he went to his stables, to assist in dressing his horses, and indulged in the most incredible familiarities with his grooms. After spending the first half of the day in this manner, he took a solitary repast, to which neither the queen nor even his children were admitted, and devoted the rest of the day to the chase. Several hundred horses and servants were not

in motion for this daily pleasure, which was his predominant passion. After riding like a young man, he would return to his palace, give a quarter of an hour to his children, half an hour to the signature of the papers submitted to him by the queen and his ministers, sit down to play with some of the nobles of his court, sometimes take a nap with them, till the hour for his last meal, which was followed immediately by his retirement to bed, always at one and the same fixed time. Such was his life, without a single variation throughout the year, unless during Passion Week, which was devoted entirely to religious exercises. In other respects, an honest man, faithful to his word, mild, humane, religious, of exemplary chastity though not cohabiting with his wife, ever since his physicians had, by her direction, ordered him to abstain from it; he had no other share in the scandals of his court, in the faults of his government, than in suffering them to be committed, without perceiving them, without believing them, during the course of a long reign.

By his side, the queen, sister of the duke of Parma, a pupil of Condillac's,¹ who wrote for her and her brother some excellent works of instruction, led a totally different life, and would do very little honour to the celebrated philosophic tutor of her youth, if philosophers could in general answer for their disciples. She was nearly fifty years old, and had still certain vestiges of beauty, which she strove to perpetuate with infinite pains. Going to mass every day, like the king, she employed in corresponding with a great number of persons, and particularly with the Prince of Peace,² those hours which Charles IV. spent in his workshops and his stables. In this correspondence she communicated to the Prince of Peace the affairs of court and State, and received from him a report of all the puerilities and scandal of Madrid. She finished her morning by giving one hour to her children, and one to the duties of government. Not a paper, not an appointment, not a pardon, went for the royal signature, before it was submitted to her. The minister who should have ventured upon such an infraction of the conditions of her favour would have been instantly dismissed. She dined alone, like the king, in the middle of the day; the rest of the afternoon was devoted to receptions, in which she acquitted herself very gracefully, and to the Prince of Peace, on whom she bestowed several hours of her time every day.

The reader is aware that the Prince of Peace was no longer minister at the period of which we are treating. M. d'Urquijo, whom we shall presently introduce, had succeeded him; but that prince was nevertheless the first authority in the kingdom. This singular personage, ignorant, fickle, of no capacity, but of handsome exterior, as it is necessary to be in order to succeed in a corrupt court, the arrogant ruler of queen Louisa, had reigned for twenty years

over her vacant and frivolous soul. Weary of his high favour, he shared it cheerfully with obscure favourites, indulged in a thousand debaucheries, which he recounted to his crowned slave, whom he delighted to mortify by his stories, nay, even maltreated her, it is said, in the grossest manner: and yet he retained an absolute empire over that princess, who was incapable of resisting him, who could not be happy unless she saw him every day. She had long since committed the government to him, with the official title of first minister, and although he no longer retained the title, he did the power; for nothing was done in Spain but according to his pleasure. He disposed of all the resources of the state; and he had at home enormous sums in cash, while the treasury, reduced to the greatest straits, made shift with a discredited paper-money, depressed to half its nominal value. The nation was almost habituated to this spectacle: it manifested indignation only when some new and extraordinary scandal made the blood mount into the faces of the brave Spaniards, whose heroic resistance soon afterwards proved that they were worthy of a different government. At the moment when Europe rang with the great events occurring on the Po and the Danube, the court of Spain was the theatre of an unheard-of scandal, which had well-nigh exhausted the patience of the nation. The Prince of Peace, proceeding from one excess to another, had finished by marrying a relation of the royal family. A child was born from this union. The king and queen, resolving themselves to stand sponsors for the new-born infant, had the ceremony performed with all the etiquette customary at the baptism of Infants of Spain. The highest nobles of the court were obliged to perform the same duty that would have been required of them if the child had been the offspring of royalty. On this infant in long-clothes had been conferred the great orders of the crown and magnificent presents. The grand-inquisitor had officiated at the religious ceremony. This time, it is true, indignation had risen to the highest pitch, and every Spaniard had considered himself as personally insulted by this odious proceeding. Things had come to such a pass that the Spanish ministers opened their minds upon the subject to the foreign ambassadors, and particularly to the ambassador of France, to whom they usually had recourse in most of their embarrassments, and who received from their own lips the shocking particulars which we are here relating.

Amidst these scandalous proceedings, the king alone, kept under continual espionage by his wife, neither knew nor suspected what was passing. Neither the outcry of his subjects, nor the occasional revolt of some of the grantees of Spain, indignant at the degradation that was required of them, nor the inexplicable assiduities of the Prince of Peace,

¹ CONDILLAC, STEPHEN BONNET DE. Among the French, the founder of the sensual system. Born in 1715, at Grenoble, lived like his brother, the Abbé Mably, from his youth devoted to study.

His complete works amounted to 35 volumes.—*Encyclopædia Americana*.

² URQUIJO, DON MANUEL DE. Duke of Alcudia, Prince

of Peace, favourite of Charles IV. of Spain. Born 1764, at Badajoz. He was a poor noble, who sang and played well on the guitar, by means of which accomplishments he gained the favour of the queen; and between 1780 and 1797 he passed through all grades from the lowest to the highest, by means of the affection of the infamous queen.—*Encyclopædia Americana*.

could open his eyes. This poor good-natured king even used sometimes to make this singular remark, which embarrassed all present who were doomed to hear it: "My brother of Naples is a blockhead, who suffers himself to be ruled by his wife." It should be added that the Prince of the Austrias, since Ferdinand VII., brought up at a distance from the court and with incredible harshness, detested the favourite, whose criminal influence he was aware of, and that his just hatred for the favourite was at last converted into an involuntary hatred for his father and mother.

What a spectacle, at the conclusion of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth century, when the throne of France had recently sunk with a crash, and when a young warrior, simple, austere, indefatigable, full of genius, had just raised himself upon its ruins! How long could the Spanish monarchy withstand the dangerous effect of this contrast!

Amidst these disorders, the house of Spain was at times overtaken by confused presentiments, and began to feel some apprehensions of a revolution. The ancient attachment of the Spaniards to royalty and to religion served, it is true, to cheer it; but it was afraid that revolution would come by the way of the Pyrenees, and therefore sought to dispel the danger by implicit deference towards the French Republic. The incredible violence of the English cabinet, the passionate outbursts of Paul I. against that house, on the formation of the second coalition, had thrown it completely into our arms. It regarded this as advantageous, nay, honourable, since General Bonaparte had ennobled, by his presence in the seat of power, all the relations of the cabinets with the government of the Republic.

The good King Charles IV. had conceived, though at a distance, a sort of friendship for the First Consul. This feeling became stronger every day, and it is painful to think how this singular attachment was destined to terminate, without treachery on the part of France, but by an inconceivable concatenation of circumstances. "What a great man is General Bonaparte!" Charles IV. was incessantly saying. The queen said so too, but more coldly, because the Prince of Peace, disposed sometimes to censure what the court of Spain did since he was no longer minister, seemed to blame the partiality that was shown to the government of France. Meanwhile the First Consul, informed by M. Alquier, our ambassador, a man of superior understanding and sagacity, that he must absolutely secure at Madrid the good-will of the Prince of Peace, the First Consul had sent to that favourite some magnificent arms, made at the manufactory of Versailles. This attention on the part of the greatest personage in Europe had touched the vanity of the Prince of Peace. Some attentions of our ambassador had completely won him, and thenceforward the whole court of Spain seemed to give itself up to us without reserve.

From d'Urquijo, the minister, alone was a slight resistance experienced. He was a man of eccentric character, naturally an enemy to

the Prince of Peace, whom he had succeeded, and liking General Bonaparte not much better. M. d'Urquijo, of plebeian extraction, and endowed with some energy, having drawn upon himself the enmity of the clergy and of the court through some insignificant reforms which he had attempted, inclined, in an astonishing manner for a Spaniard of that time, towards revolutionary ideas. He was connected with many French demagogues, and participated to a certain point in their aversion for the First Consul. He had the merit of desiring to reform the most crying abuses, of striving, for instance, to diminish the revenues of the clergy and the jurisdiction of the agents of the court of Rome. To these measures he was striving to obtain his Holiness's assent; and in making this attempt he had exposed himself to serious dangers. Having, in fact, the Prince of Peace against him, he must be undone, if the Romish influence were to unite with the domestic influence in the palace to overthrow him. Touched with some attentions paid him by M. Alquier, witnessing, moreover, the partiality of the king and queen, M. d'Urquijo at length began, in his turn, to admire General Bonaparte, whom it was not only natural, but at that time quite the fashion, to admire.

The partiality of the king soon became unbounded. Having seen the arms sent to the Prince of Peace, he conceived and expressed a wish to have some of the same sort. Some magnificent specimens were manufactured forthwith, and he received them with real joy. The queen also wished for dresses, and Madame Bonaparte, who was celebrated for her taste, sent all the most exquisite and elegant productions of that kind in Paris. Charles IV., generous as a Castilian, unwilling to be behindhand, took care to make a right royal return. Knowing that horses would be acceptable to the First Consul, he stripped the studs of Aranjuez, Medina Coeli, and Altamira, of their handsomest inmates, to find first six, then twelve, then sixteen horses, the finest in the Peninsula. One cannot tell where he would have stopped, had he not been checked in his ardour. He took two months to select them himself, and nobody could have performed the task better, for he was a consummate judge. He appointed, moreover, a numerous train to accompany them to France, chose his best grooms for this mission, clothed them in magnificent liveries, and imposed but one condition on all this parade, namely, that, while travelling in France, his grooms should attend mass every Sunday. A promise was given that his desire should be complied with, and his joy at making a handsome present to the First Consul was then unalloyed. Though fond of France, this excellent prince had a notion that it was impossible for a man to live in that country many days without wholly forsaking the religion of his forefathers.

The *défilé* of these demonstrations suited well the views of the First Consul. It gratified him, he thought it useful to show to Europe, and even to France, the successors of Charles V., the descendants of Louis XIV., taking honour to themselves from their personal relations

with him. But he sought more solid advantages in his diplomatic relations, and aimed at a more important object.

The king and queen of Spain were passionately fond of one of their children, the Infanta Maria Louisa, wife of the hereditary Prince of Parma. The queen, sister, as we have said, of the reigning Duke of Parma, had united her daughter to her nephew, and concentrated upon this couple her fondest affections; for she was most ardently attached to the house from which she sprang. She meditated an aggrandizement for that house in Italy, and, as Italy was at the disposal of the conqueror of Marengo, it was on him that she rested all her hopes of obtaining the accomplishment of her wishes. The First Consul, apprized of those wishes, took care not to neglect this way of arriving at his ends; and he despatched to Madrid his faithful Berthier, in order to profit by the circumstance that presented itself. This was the first subject of his attention on his return from Marengo. If he had sent one of his aides-camp to Berlin and to Vienna, he resolved to do more for the court of Spain; he resolved to send thither the man who had the largest share in his glory; for Berthier was then the Parmenio of the modern Alexander.

It was at the very moment when the First Consul was negotiating the preliminaries of peace with M. de St. Julien, when he was seducing the inflammable heart of Paul I., and fomenting in the north the quarrel of the neutral powers; it was at this moment that he despatched General Berthier in all haste to Madrid. He set out towards the end of August—beginning of Fructidor—without official title, but with the certainty of producing a great effect by his mere presence, and with secret powers for treating on the most important subjects.

His journey embraced several objects; the first was, to visit the principal sea-ports of the Peninsula, to ascertain their state and their resources, and, money in hand, to urge expeditions for Malta and for Egypt. Berthier quickly performed this task, and then hastened to Madrid to fulfil the more important mission with which he was charged. The First Consul was quite willing to grant an increase of territory to the house of Parma; he was even disposed to add to this aggrandizement a new title, that of king, which would have crowned the wishes of the queen; but he required to be paid for these concessions in two ways: first, by the restitution of Louisiana to France; secondly, by a threatening injunction to the court of Portugal, for the purpose of forcing it to make peace with the Republic and to break with England.

The motives of the First Consul for requiring such conditions were these:—Since Kléber's death, he began to be uneasy about the preservation of Egypt, and he shared with all his contemporaries the ambition of distant possessions. The rivalry between France and England, which, for a century past, had fought solely for the East and West Indies, had inflamed to the highest degree the passion for possessing colonies. In the event of Egypt being wrested from us the First Consul wished to

achieve something for the colonial greatness of France. He cast his eye over the map of the world, and beheld a magnificent province, situated between Mexico and the United States, formerly belonging to France, ceded, in a time of abasement, by Louis XV. to Charles III., seriously threatened by the English and the Americans, so long as it should be in the impotent hands of the Spaniards, of little value to the latter, who possessed half the American continent, but of great value to the French, who had no possession in that part of America, and capable of being made productive, when the activity of the latter should be specially concentrated on its territory; this province was Louisiana. If Egypt, lost to us, could no longer furnish us with a compensation for St. Domingo, the First Consul hoped to find it in Louisiana.

He demanded it formally, therefore, of Spain, as the price of an acquisition in Italy. He required, in addition, that part of the Spanish fleet blocked up in the roads of Brest should be given to him. As for Portugal, he wished to take advantage of the geographical position of Spain in regard to that country, and of the ties of consanguinity which united the two reigning houses of the Peninsula, to detach it from the alliance with England. The Prince of Brazil, regent of Portugal, was, in fact, son-in-law of the king and queen of Spain. The Court of Madrid, therefore, possessed not only the power of neighbourhood, but also family influence. And it was a fit occasion for employing this two-fold medium for driving the English from this part of the Continent. The English, once excluded from Portugal, when the coasts of Prussia, Denmark, Russia, and Sweden were about to be closed against them, when Naples, doomed to submit to the will of France, was going to receive orders to forbid them her ports—the English would soon be excluded from the whole of the Continent.

Such were the proposals which Berthier was ordered to carry to Madrid. He was cordially received by the king, the queen, the Prince of Peace, and by all the grandees of Spain, curious to see the man, whose name always figured beside that of General Bonaparte in the military bulletins of these times. The conditions of France appeared hard, yet no serious resistance could be made to them. D'Urquijo, the minister, alone, fearing the effect which this cession might produce upon the Spaniards, showed rather more opposition than the court. Reasons incontestably good were adduced to make him easy. He was told that it would take a large extent of territory on the yet uninhabited banks of the Mississippi to form an equivalent for the smallest possessions in Italy; that the Spaniards needed, in the Gulf of Mexico, allies such as the French against the English and the Americans; that, if Louisiana was of great value to France, stripped of all her colonial possessions, it was of scarcely any to Spain, already so rich in the New World; that an increase of influence in Italy would be worth more to Spain than a distant territory, situated in a region where she had more land than she could work and defend; that it was an ancient French possession, wrung from the

weakness of Louis XV., and which Charles III. himself, with that upright spirit which was known to all the world, had for a moment refused, so convinced was he that it was not his due. These reasons were excellent, and assuredly, under these circumstances, Spain was not asked to give more than she received. But what decided M. d'Urquijo more than all the best arguments, was the fear of offending France, and thwarting a combination to which his court was attached with a sort of passion.

An eventual treaty was agreed upon. By this treaty, the First Consul promised to obtain for the Duke of Parma an increase of dominions in Italy of about 1,200,000 souls; to ensure to him, moreover, the title of king, and the acknowledgment of this new rank by all the sovereigns of Europe, at the general peace. As soon as part of these conditions were fulfilled, Spain, in return, was to cede back to France Louisiana, with the same extent of territory which that province had when it was ceded by Louis XV. to Charles III., and to give, moreover, six ships of the line, rigged, armed, ready to receive their crews. This treaty, signed by Berthier at Madrid, filled the queen with joy, and raised the infatuation of the court of Spain for the First Consul to the highest pitch.

The last condition, which had for its object to force Portugal to break with England, was easy, for it was as accordant with the interests of Spain as with those of France. Spain, in fact, was equally interested with France in weakening the power of England, and above all in excluding her from the Continent. In this the First Consul did no more than rouse her from her unpardonable apathy, and urge her to make use of an influence which she ought long since to have employed. He went still further in his plans relative to this point: he proposed to Charles IV., if the court of Lisbon should not comply immediately with the injunction given it, to pass the frontiers of Portugal with an army, to seize one or two provinces, and to keep them as pledges, for the purpose of afterwards obliging England to restore the Spanish colonies which she had

taken, in order to save the dominions of her ally. For his part, if Charles IV. did not conceive himself strong enough to undertake this enterprise, he offered him the assistance of a French army. That kind-hearted king did not ask for so much. The Prince of Brazil was his son-in-law; he had no wish, therefore, to take provinces from him, even though they were only to serve as pledges for the restitution of Spanish provinces. But he addressed to him the most pressing exhortations, and even added threats of war, if his advice was not attended to. The court of Lisbon promised to send a negotiator immediately to Madrid, to confer with the ambassador of France.

Berthier returned to Paris loaded with the favours of the court of Spain, and could assure the First Consul that he had friends entirely devoted to him in Madrid. The magnificent horses sent by Charles VI. arrived nearly about the same time, and were presented to the First Consul in the Place du Carrousel, at one of those great reviews, in which he delighted to show to the Parisians and to foreigners the soldiers who had conquered Europe. An immense concourse of curious persons came to see those beautiful animals and those grooms in splendid liveries, which reminded the spectator of the pageantries of ancient monarchy, and bore evidence to the respect, the extraordinary attentions, of the 'dest courts of Europe for the new head of the French Republic.

At this moment, three American negotiators, Messrs. Oliver Ellsworth,¹ Richardson Davis,² and Van-Murray,³ sent to reconcile France and the United States, arrived in Paris. That republic, swayed by interest much more than gratitude, above all, governed at that time by the policy of the federalist party, had drawn closer to Great Britain during the late war, and had been wanting not only to France but likewise to herself in deserting the principles of the maritime neutrality.⁴ Forgetful of the treaty of alliance of 1778, to which she owed her existence, a treaty which bound her not to grant to others commercial advantages which were not at the same time extended to the French, she had conceded extraordinary and

¹ OLIVER ELLSWORTH, an American Judge and statesman, born at Windsor, Connecticut, in 1745. His father was a farmer. At 17 he entered Yale College, which he subsequently left for Nassau Hall, at Princeton. He was admitted to the bar in 1771, at Hartford, Connecticut. In the revolutionary war he served on the patriot side, and also was a member of the general council of his own state. In 1777 he was chosen a delegate to Congress. In 1780 he was member of the council of his own state, and in 1781 Judge of the Superior Court. In 1789 he was sent from Connecticut as a delegate for the formation of the federal constitution, and it is said that the organization of the Senate of the United States is attributable to him. In 1789 he was Senator of the United States; and in 1796 was appointed Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, on the resignation of Mr. Jay. In 1799 he was sent as an envoy to France. In 1802 he died, in his 63d year, and has left behind him a character as one of the most distinguished patriots, statesmen, and lawyers, to whom the American revolution gave birth.—*Encyclopedia Americana*. H.

² WILLIAM RICHARDSON DAVIS, was born in England, in 1756. At six years old he was brought to America, and received the rudiments of his education in North Carolina. In 1776 he graduated at Nassau Hall, in Princeton, New Jersey. He commenced the study of the law, until the outbreak of the war, when he obtained a company in Pulaski's legion, and served with distinction until the close of hostilities. In 1787 he was sent from South Carolina as a deputy for the formation of the federal constitution. In 1799 he was governor of

North Carolina, and in the same year was sent envoy to France. He died at Camden, South Carolina, in 1830.—*Encyclopedia Americana*. H.

³ WILLIAM VAN-MURRAY, was born in Maryland, about the year 1762. He went to London after the peace of 1763, and resided there three years as a student in the Temple. In 1785 he returned to Maryland, and adopted the practice of law. From 1790 to 1793, he sat as a distinguished and eloquent member in the House of Representatives. In 1797 he declined re-election, and was shortly afterward sent by General Washington as envoy to the Batavian republic; in the course of which appointment the duties alluded to in the text became a part of those of his office. He died in 1803. He was one of the most accomplished and gifted of American gentlemen.—*Encyclopedia Americana*. H.

⁴ This is an untrue as it is unjust and ill-told. America never did give up one tittle of her pretensions as to the rights of neutrality. The aggressions of the Secretary and the Empire were both prior, in point of time, and greater and more vexatious in effect than those of Great Britain; and it was only a sense of gratitude, which most persons now consider overstrained—inasmuch as the aid extended to her by France, in the revolutionary struggle, was not in the least degree disinterested—that hindered her from declaring war on France, as she subsequently did for less cause on England.

The truth is, that it is very rare that national gratitude exists at all, and there is perhaps no instance of its lasting as long, or being as clearly shown, as in the case of the United States to France. H. F. H.

exclusive advantages to Great Britain. Giving up the principle that "the flag covers the goods," she had admitted that an enemy's property may be searched for on board a neutral bottom, and seized if its origin were ascertainable. This conduct was alike impolitic and dishonourable. The Directory naturally much irritated, had had recourse to the system of reprisals, declaring that France would treat neutrals as they suffered England to treat them. Proceeding from one harsh step to another, it had come to a state of almost declared war with America, but without actual hostilities.

Such was the state of things which the First Consul had it much at heart to put an end to. We have seen what honours he paid to Washington, with the two-fold intention of producing an effect both at home and abroad: he appointed three plenipotentiaries, his brother Joseph Bonaparte, and the two councillors of state, Fleurieu and Rœderer, to arrange matters with the American plenipotentiaries, and earnestly pressed the conclusion of the negotiation, in order to give England very soon a new adversary, by placing another power on the list of those who would engage to cause the true principles of maritime neutrality to be observed. The first obstacle to a reconciliation was the article by which the United States promised to France a share in the commercial advantages granted by her to all nations. This obligation not to concede anything to others without conceding as much to us, occasioned the Americans great embarrassment. Their negotiators manifested no disposition to yield on this point, but appeared ready to acknowledge and to defend the rights of neutrals, and to re-establish, in their stipulations with France, the principles which they had abandoned in treating with England. The First Consul, who was much more tenacious of the principles of the maritime neutrality than of the commercial advantages of the treaty of 1778, which had become illusory in practice—the First Consul directed his brother to waive the point, and to conclude an arrangement with the American envoys, provided there could be obtained from them a complete and formal recognition of the principles of the law of nations which it was important to enforce. This difficulty removed, the parties soon agreed about all the rest, and at this moment a treaty of reconciliation was preparing to be signed with the United States.

Another reconciliation, of much greater importance still, that of the Republic with the Holy See, began to produce its fruit. The new Pope, elected in the vague hope of an accommodation with France, had beheld this hope, to which he owed his elevation, realized. General Bonaparte, as we have related, returning from Marengo, had transmitted some overtures to Pius VII. through Cardinal Martiniana, bishop of Vercelli, assuring him that

he had no intention to re-establish the Roman and Parthenopean Republics, instituted by the Directory. He had certainly enough to do in Italy, with the Cisalpine Republic to constitute, to direct, and to defend against the policy and the interests of all Europe. General Bonaparte required in return that the new pontiff should lend the aid of his spiritual authority in re-establishing peace and concord in France. The Pope joyfully received Count Alciati, nephew of Cardinal Martiniana, who was charged to carry the overtures of the First Consul; he sent him back immediately to Vercelli, to declare, in his name, that, though disposed to co-operate with the First Consul in effecting an object so important and so dear to the church, still he wished first to be made acquainted in a somewhat more precise manner with the views of the French cabinet. The cardinal, in consequence, wrote from Vercelli to Paris, to communicate the dispositions and the wishes of the new Pope. The First Consul, in reply, asked for a negotiator, with whom he could enter into direct explanation, and the Pope immediately appointed Monsignor Spina, Bishop of Corinth, Nuncio of the Holy See at Florence. This envoy, having first repaired to Vercelli, resolved to set out for France, at the urgent solicitation of the First Consul, who, by bringing this negotiation under his own eye, thought to make the more sure of its success. On the part of the First Consul, it was a ticklish step to bring to Paris a representative of the Holy See, especially in the state of the public mind, which was not yet prepared for a sight of this kind. It was agreed that Monsignor Spina should not have any official title, and that he should profess himself to be Bishop of Corinth, charged to treat with the French government on the affairs of the Roman government.

During these negotiations, so actively and so ably conducted with all the powers, M. de St. Julien, who had signed and was the bearer of the preliminaries of peace, had proceeded for Vienna, accompanied by Duroc.¹ Aware of the imprudence of his conduct, he had not concealed from M. de Talleyrand that he was not sure he should be able to take Duroc on to Vienna. The illusion of the minister would not allow him to give heed to this difficulty; and it was agreed that M. de St. Julien and Duroc should take the head-quarters of M. de Kray, established at Alt-œttingen, near the Inn, in their way, to obtain from that general passports permitting Duroc to enter Austria. They reached the head-quarters on the 4th of August, 1800—16th Thermidor, year VIII.—but Duroc was detained, and not suffered to pass the limit fixed by the armistice. This was a first and by no means favourable sign of the reception which the preliminaries were likely to meet with. M. de St. Julien then set off alone for Vienna, telling Duroc that he would apply for passports for him and send

¹ DUROC, MICHAEL, Duke of Friuli. Born of an ancient family at Pont à Mousson. He entered the army as lieutenant of artillery in 1793. He served in the republican armies, and distinguished himself at the siege of Mantua and the battle of Sismone in 1796. He was *ad-de-camp*, in the first Italian campaign, to Leoben and afterward to Bonaparte. He distinguished

himself at Grimolano, and at the passage of the Isongo, in Friuli, whence afterward his title. He followed Bonaparte to Egypt, and was made chief of battalion in the year VI. At Jaffa, St. Jean d'Acre, and Aboukir, he gained fresh honours. Returned to France with Bonaparte, and shared the struggle of the 18th Brumaire.—*Encyclopædia Americana.*

them to the head-quarters if he obtained them. M. de St. Julien then sought audience of the emperor, and delivered to him the articles which he had signed in Paris, on condition of ratification and secrecy. The emperor was greatly surprised and dissatisfied at the extraordinary latitude which M. de St. Julien had given to his instructions. It was not precisely the conditions contained in the preliminary articles which displeased him: it was the fear of being compromised with England, which had just assisted him with her money, and was extremely suspicious. He was prepared, it is true, to go so far as to communicate part of his intentions, for the purpose of discovering those of the First Consul; but he would not at any price have signed any document whatever, for that would infer a negotiation opened without the participation of the British cabinet. Therefore, in spite of the danger of provoking a storm on the part of France, the imperial cabinet resolved to disavow M. de St. Julien. That officer was publicly very ill treated, and sent into a sort of exile in one of the remote provinces of the empire. The preliminaries were considered as null, having been signed, though provisionally, by an agent without character and without powers. Duroc received no passports, and, after waiting till the 13th of August—25th Thermidor—he was obliged to return to Paris.

All this, independently of the delay in the conclusion of peace which it created, was very disagreeable to say to the First Consul; and Austria had reason to fear the effect of such a communication on his irritable character. It was very possible that he might leave Paris immediately, put himself at the head of the armies of the Republic, and march upon Vienna. The court of Austria resolved therefore, while disavowing the preliminaries, not to make a rupture of that disavowal, and to propose to the French government the immediate opening of a congress. Lord Minto, representative of the British cabinet at Vienna, consented to suffer Austria to negotiate, but on condition that England should be a party to the negotiation. It was agreed with him to propose diplomatic conferences in which England and Austria should alike take part. In consequence, M. de Thugut wrote to M. de Talleyrand, under date of the 11th of August—23d Thermidor—that, though disavowing the imprudent conduct of M. de St. Julien, the emperor was nevertheless earnestly desirous of peace; that he, therefore, proposed the immediate opening of a congress, in France itself, at Schelestadt, or Luneville, which ever the French government pleased; that Great Britain was ready to send a plenipotentiary; and that, if the First Consul assented to this, a general peace might soon be restored to the world. The whole was clothed in the language most likely to soothe the impetuous disposition of him who then governed France.

When the First Consul received these tidings, he was highly irritated. He was offended, in the first place, at the disavowal of the officer who had treated with him, and in the next, he saw with mortification that peace was deferred. He perceived, above all, in the presence of

England at the negotiation, a cause of interminable delays; for there was much more difficulty in concluding a maritime than a continental peace. On the spur of the moment, and under the influence of a first impression, he was for raising an outcry, denouncing Austria as having violated her faith, and commencing hostilities forthwith. M. de Talleyrand, sensible that he had himself done wrong in treating with a plenipotentiary without powers, endeavoured to pacify the First Consul. The matter was submitted to the Council of State. This great body, which is now nothing more than an administrative tribunal, was then a real council of government. The minister laid before it a detailed report. "The First Consul," said he in his report, "has thought fit to convocate an extraordinary meeting of the Council of State, and, trusting to its discretion as well as to its wisdom, he has charged me to communicate to it the most minute details of the negotiation which has taken place with the court of Vienna." Having unfolded that negotiation, as one might have done before a council of ministers, M. de Talleyrand acknowledged that the Austrian plenipotentiary had no powers; that, in negotiating with him, the possibility of a disavowal ought to have been foreseen; that, in consequence, there was no establishing a *polemique d'apparat* on this subject; and that a violent outbreak ought to be avoided. But, referring to the example of the negotiations for the peace of Westphalia, which had long preceded the signature of the treaty of Munster, and during which the parties continued to negotiate and fight, he proposed that the opening of a congress should be agreed to, and at the same time that hostilities should be recommenced.

This was, in fact, the wisest course that could be pursued. It was expedient to treat, since the hostile powers had made France an offer to do so, but also to profit by the state of our armies, quite ready to take the field afresh, and that of the Austrian armies not yet recovered from their defeats, to force Austria to negotiate in earnest, and to separate herself from Great Britain.

There was, however, one thing which might be tried that had also its advantages; and the First Consul discovered it with his usual sagacity. England proposed a joint negotiation. In admitting her to a congress, there was the danger of introducing a contracting party in no hurry to conclude, and the danger, more especially, of clogging the continental peace with all the difficulties of the maritime peace: time would, therefore, elapse in negotiations either insincere or rendered more difficult; the season for fighting would be suffered to pass away, and thus the Austrian armies would gain a respite which they greatly needed. These were serious inconveniences. But a compensation might be found for them all; it was this: since England desired to be admitted to the negotiation, to admit her, but on one condition, that of concluding a naval armistice also. If England assented to this, the benefits of the naval armistice would far surpass the inconveniences of the continental armistice; for our fleets navigating wherever

they pleased, would be enabled to provision Malta and to carry soldiers and *matériel* to Egypt. For such an advantage, the First Consul would gladly have run the risk of an extra campaign on the Continent. A naval armistice was no doubt something quite new, quite unusual, in the law of nations; but it was fair that the Anglo-Austrian alliance should pay in some manner for the sacrifice which we made on our part in suspending the march of our legions for Vienna.

We had residing in London a discreet and skilful negotiator, M. Otto, who was there for the purpose of treating of matters relative to the prisoners of war. He had even been chosen by our cabinet, with a view to make use of him on the first occasion, either to make or to listen to overtures. He was instructed specially to address himself to the British cabinet, and plumply propose the question of a naval armistice. In this mode of proceeding the First Consul found the advantage of getting on faster, and of negotiating his business directly, which he always liked to do better than to employ agents. On the 21st of August—6th Fructidor, year VIII.—instructions conformable with this new plan of negotiation were sent to M. Otto. On the same day, the communications from Vienna were answered in a very harsh tone. In this answer, the refusal to admit the preliminaries was attributed to the subsidiary treaty signed on the 20th of June last; the French government disdainfully deplored the dependence in which the emperor was placed in regard to England; it assented to a congress at Luneville, but added, that they must nevertheless fight while negotiating, because, in proposing a joint negotiation, Austria had not taken the precaution to provide, as a natural condition, for a suspension of arms by land and sea. This was one way of inducing Austrian diplomacy itself to make an effort in London for obtaining a naval armistice.

Negotiations were opened in London between M. Otto and Captain George, the head of the Transport Office. They lasted during the whole month of September. M. Otto, proposed, on the part of France, that hostilities should be suspended by land and sea; that all the vessels both of commerce and war of the belligerent nations should be allowed to sail freely; that the ports belonging to France, or occupied by her armies, such as Malta and Alexandria, should be assimilated to the fortresses of Philippsburg, Ulm, and Ingolstadt, in Germany, which, though blockaded by our armies, were nevertheless to receive provisions and supplies. M. Otto, treating frankly, admitted that France would derive great advantages from this arrangement; but he added, that she ought to have very great advantages, to compensate her for the concession which she made, in suffering the summer to pass away without completing the destruction of the Austrian forces.

The sacrifice required of England in this demand was one which nothing was capable of wringing from her. It would, in fact, be permitting the revictualling of Malta and Egypt, and thus perhaps ensuring for ever those two possessions to France; it would also be per-

mitting the grand combined French and Spanish fleet to leave Brest, to sail into the Mediterranean, and to take a position there, which would render it afresh master of that sea for a longer or a shorter time. England, therefore, could not assent to such a proposal. Still the danger of Austria touched her deeply; she had an important interest in not suffering her to be crushed; for, if Austria were crushed, General Bonaparte, having the full command of his means, would be able to attempt some formidable enterprise against the British islands. In consequence, she deemed it expedient to make sacrifices to an interest of this kind; and, while crying out against the strangeness of a naval armistice, she presented a counter-project, dated the 7th of September, 1800—20th Fructidor, year VIII. To begin with, she assented to Luneville as the place of the congress, and appointed Mr. Thomas Grenville, brother of the minister for foreign affairs, to treat for the general peace. She next proposed the following system respecting the naval armistice. All hostilities were to be suspended by land and sea; the suspension of arms was to extend not only to the three belligerent parties, Austria, England, and France, but to their allies. This arrangement was designed to deliver Portugal from the threatening remonstrances of Spain. The maritime places which were blockaded, such as Malta and Alexandria, were to be assimilated to the places in Germany, and to be provisioned every fortnight in proportion to the consumption which had taken place during the interval of time elapsed. The ships of the line lying at Brest and other ports were not to be at liberty to change their station during the armistice.

This counter-project was, on the part of England, rather a testimony of good-will towards Austria than an actual concession on the important point of the negotiation. Malta might, no doubt, gain something by being provisioned for a few months; but Egypt needed no provisions. It was soldiers, muskets, cannon, that it wanted, and not corn, which it had to spare to all the world.

France, however, by yielding on some points, might still find in the naval armistice advantages sufficiently great to induce its acceptance, even with modifications.

On the 21st of September—the fourth complementary day of the year VIII.—the First Consul made a proposal, which was the last. He consented that ships of the line should not be allowed to change their station, which condemned the combined squadron of Spain and France to remain blocked up in Brest; he required that Malta should be revictualled every fifteen days, at the rate of 10,000 rations per day; he consented that Egypt should continue blockaded; but he required that six frigates should have liberty to leave Toulon, to sail to Alexandria, and to return without being searched by the British cruisers.

His intention here was clear enough, and he was right not to disguise an interest, which every one would have guessed at first sight. He meant to arm these six frigates *en sûr*, to load them with men and munitions of war, and to send them to Egypt. He hoped that

they might be made to carry 4000 soldiers, a great quantity of muskets, swords, bombs, balls, &c. He had, therefore, sacrificed every thing, to confine himself to his main object, the re-activating of Malta and the recruiting of the army in Egypt.

But the difficulty, what effort soever might be made on both sides to diminish it, remained at bottom the same. The object was to preserve Malta and Egypt for France, two points upon which England would not give way. Thus there were no means of coming to an understanding. The negotiation was relinquished, on the refusal in London to admit the last plan for a naval armistice.

Before these parleys were definitively broken off, the First Consul, by way of courtesy, made a final proposal to England. He offered to renounce all armistice, and, nevertheless, to treat with her, but in a separate negotiation from that which was about to commence with Austria.

It was now September, 1800. Several months had been spent in sterile negotiations since the victories of Marengo and Hochstett, and the First Consul would not waste any more time without acting.

Austria, when threatened, had replied that she could not force England to sign a naval armistice; that she offered, for her own part, to negotiate immediately; that she had appointed M. de Lherbach to repair to Luneville; that he was about to proceed thither forthwith; that Mr. Thomas Grenville was waiting, on his part, for passports; that they could, therefore, negotiate without delay; but that it was not necessary to resume hostilities during the negotiations, and to spill more torrents of human blood. The First Consul, who perceived the secret intention of protracting till winter should arrive, determined, at length, on resuming hostilities, and had issued his orders accordingly. He had employed to good purpose the two months which had elapsed, and put a finishing hand to the organization of the armies. His new arrangements in respect to them were as follows:—

Moreau, as we have said, had been obliged to send General St. Suzanne upon the Rhine with some detachments, for the purpose of uniting the garrisons of Mayence and Strasburg, and making head against the partisans raised by Baron d'Albini in the heart of Germany. The army of Moreau was in consequence weakened, and, at the same time, the force so collected was insufficient to cover his rear. The First Consul, to ward off all danger in that quarter, had hastened to complete the Batavian army, placed under the command of Angereau. He had formed it of 8000 Dutch and 12,000 French, drawn from the troops which guarded Holland and the departments of the North. These troops, the most worn down by the preceding campaigns, reinvigorated since by rest, reinforced by recruits, now

constituted excellent corps. Angereau had marched to Frankfort, where he was by his presence the Mayence levies of Baron d'Albini and the Austrian detachments left in the environs. This precaution taken, the corps of St. Suzanne reorganized, nearly 18,000 strong, had returned to the Danube, and again formed the left wing of Moreau. His return raised the active army of the Rhine to more than 100,000 men.

When the army of reserve had thrown itself into Italy, it had been obliged to leave behind part of the corps destined to compose it, and for the complete formation of which there had not been time to wait. Instead of an effective force of 60,000 men, as was intended, it had numbered only forty and some odd thousand. The First Consul had formed with these corps left behind a second army of reserve, 15,000 strong, given the command of it to Macdonald,¹ and posted it in the Grisons, facing the Tyrol, which had permitted Moreau to draw him to his right wing, commanded, as the reader is aware, by Lecourbe, and to unite, in case of need, under his hand, the entire mass of his army, if he should have to force the barrier of the Inn.

The army of Italy, on its part, established on the banks of the Mincio by the convention of Alexandria, relieved also by the presence of Macdonald from all concern about Switzerland and the Tyrol, had been enabled to draw its wings closer to its main body, and to concentrate itself in such a manner that it could enter into action at any moment. Composed of the troops which had crossed the St. Bernard, of those which had been drawn from Germany by the St. Gothard, lastly, of the troops of Liguria, which had defended Genoa and the Var, rested and recruited, it presented a total mass of about 120,000 men, 80,000 of whom were assembled on the Mincio. Masséna had at first been appointed commander-in-chief, and he was, in fact, the only one capable of commanding it well. Unfortunately, mischievous dissensions had arisen between the commissariat of the army and the Italian governments. The army, though stationed amidst fertile Italy, and in possession of the rich magazines left by the Austrians, had nevertheless not enjoyed all the plenty to which it was entitled by its long privations. It was alleged that the commissariat officers had sold part of these magazines. The governments of Piedmont and the Cisalpine, moreover, complained that they were drained by war contributions, and refused to pay them. Amidst this confusion, heavy charges were preferred against the French administration; and in these complaints General Masséna himself was included. The clamour soon became so vehement, that the First Consul thought himself obliged to recall Masséna, and to appoint General Brune² in his stead. Brune, with abundance of intelligence and courage, was

¹ MACDONALD, ETIENNE JACQUES JOSEPH ALEXANDER. Born at Sancerre in 1765. Son of a Highlander who fought at Culloden for Charles Edward. He entered the service of France in 1781. He embraced the principles of the Revolution. Was a brigadier-general in 1793. In 1794 distinguished himself under Pichegru in Holland. In 1795 commanded at Cologne, there joined the army of the Rhine, and afterward that of Italy under Napoleon.

He was left in command at Rome after the peace of Campo Formio, but was obliged to retreat before Mack; but after several battles again recovered it. He distinguished himself against Suwaroff, though defeated. Returned to Paris, and contributed to Bonaparte's success on the 18th Brumaire. In 1800 conducted the corps of reserve across the Splügen.—*Encyclopædia Am.* n

² BRUNE, WILLIAM MARIA ANNE. Son of a lawyer.

but an indifferent general, and a still more indifferent politician. He was one of the most zealous leaders of the demagogue party, which, however, did not prevent him from being devotedly attached to the First Consul, who was thereby much gratified. Not having had it in his power to assign him an active command during the spring campaign, the First Consul determined to give him one during the autumn campaign. His victory in Holland caused him to rank high in public estimation; but the recall of Masséna was a misfortune for the army, and for the First Consul himself. Masséna, soured, was about to become, in spite of himself, a subject of hope for a multitude of intriguers, who at this moment were again stirring. The First Consul was aware of this, but he would not suffer irregularities anywhere, and one cannot blame him for it.

To these four armies the First Consul had added a fifth assemblage of troops around Amiens. He had detached from the demi-brigades left in the interior the skeletons of the companies of grenadiers, recruited them with fine men, and formed out of them a superb corps of nine thousand or ten thousand picked soldiers, whom he intended to despatch in haste to the coast, if the English should effect a landing on any part of it, or into Italy, to perform the duty which Augereau was performing in Germany, that of covering the wings and the rear of the principal army. Murat was appointed its commander-in-chief.

All this had been accomplished, as far as related to the recruiting, by means of the levy ordered by the legislative body, and with reference to the expense, by means of the financial resources recently created. These different corps were now in want of nothing; they were well fed, well armed; they had horses, and a complete *matériel*.

The First Consul was naturally impatient to avail himself of such means to wring peace from Austria before winter. He, therefore, ordered Moreau and Brune to repair to their head-quarters, and to make preparations for recommencing hostilities. He directed Moreau to give the Austrian general the notice stipulated by the armistice, and not to allow any prolongation of the suspension of arms, unless on one condition, that the emperor should relinquish to the French the three fortresses actually blockaded, Philipsburg, Ulm, and Ingolstadt. On this condition he consented to grant a further respite of five or six weeks. These fortresses, in fact, were worth the sacrifice. Once in possession of them, the French would obtain an excellent base of operation on the Danube; they would be reinforced by the corps which were blockading them; they would, moreover, have time left to push one wing of the army of Italy upon Tuscany and the kingdom of Naples, countries in which levies *en masse* were being raised at the instigation of Austria, and with the money of

England. Such were the orders despatched to the head-quarters of Moreau.

The Emperor of Germany, on his part, making good use of the time, had employed with the greatest activity the subsidies furnished by England. He hastened the new levies ordered in Bohemia, Moravia, Hungary, Styria, and Carinthia. Wickham, the English minister, had established a sort of offices in several towns of Germany, for bribing soldiers to fight for the coalition. By means of a fresh subsidy, the Bavarian and Wurtemberg corps had been considerably augmented. Independently of the sums paid to Austria, English recruiting officers had taken into the direct pay of their government two regiments, composed of boatmen plying on the rivers of Germany, and destined to facilitate the passage of them. Ten thousand peasants, hired for the purpose, threw up, under the direction of Austrian engineers, formidable entrenchments along the whole line of the Inn, from the Tyrol to the junction of that river with the Danube. All was bustle from Vienna to Munich. The staff of the Austrian army had been totally changed. M. de Kray, notwithstanding his experience and his vigour on the field of battle, had shared the disgrace of M. de Melas. The Archduke Ferdinand himself, who served under him, had been removed. The Archduke John, a young prince of highly cultivated mind and very brave, but without experience in war, his head full of theories, his imagination struck by the manoeuvres of General Bonaparte, and anxious to imitate him at any rate, had been called to the supreme command of the Imperial armies. This was one of those novelties, which people are fond of trying in desperate circumstances. The emperor had repaired in person to the army, to review it, and to excite the spirit of the soldiers by his presence.

He passed several days with the army, accompanied by M. de Lherbach, the negotiator appointed to proceed to Lunéville, and by the young Archduke John. Having seen every thing, examined every thing, in company with his advisers, he ascertained that nothing was ready, that the army was not yet sufficiently recruited, either in point of *matériel* or courage, for the immediate recommencement of hostilities. M. de Lherbach was, therefore, commissioned to repair to Moreau's head-quarters, to learn whether a prolongation of the armistice for a few days could not be obtained from the French government. M. de Lherbach was informed by Moreau of the conditions fixed by the First Consul for a new suspension of arms. He consented reluctantly to these conditions, and on the 20th of September—the 3d complementary day of the year VIII.—he concluded a new prolongation of the armistice with General Lahorie, in the village of Hohenlinden, which was destined so soon to become celebrated. The fortresses of Philipsburg, Ulm, and Ingolstadt were to be delivered up to the

Bievie—born in 1763. He was a printer in Paris at the outbreak of the Revolution, and an active member of the club of the *Cordeliers*. Till 1792 he edited a newspaper; in that year he went as a commissary to Belgium. In 1793 he entered the Revolutionary army. In 1796 he distinguished himself in Italy, at Verona, and Arcola

In 1798 commanded an army in Switzerland, and in 1799 defeated the English at Bergen in Holland and compelled the Duke of York to the convention of Alcmær. He was murdered at Avignon, by a mob, in consequence of a suspicion that he was the murderer of the Princess Lamballe.—*Encyclopædia Americana*. M.

French army, to be disposed of as he should think fit. In return, the armistice was prolonged for forty-five days, reckoning from the 21st of September, including fifteen days' notice of the resumption of hostilities, if they were once more to recommence.

The emperor returned to Vienna, dissatisfied with the visit which he had been induced to pay to the army, for that visit had been productive of no other result than the surrender to the French of the three strongest fortresses in the empire. That prince was overwhelmed with chagrin. His subjects shared his sentiments, and accused M. de Thugut of being a complete tool of England. Queen Caroline of Naples had just arrived with Admiral Nelson and Lady Hamilton,¹ to support the war party in Vienna; but the public clamour was vehement. M. Thugut was reproached for egregious faults, such as the refusal, at the commencement of winter, to listen to the pacific proposals of the First Consul, the vicious direction of the military operations, his obstinacy in not admitting the existence of the army of reserve, even when it was crossing the St. Bernard, the concentration of the principal forces of the empire in Liguria, with a view to please the English, who flattered themselves that they should gain possession of Toulon; lastly, the engagement entered into with the British government not to treat without it; an engagement signed on the 20th of June, at a moment when he ought, on the contrary, to have preserved his freedom of action. These reproaches were, in great part, well founded; but, whether founded or not, they had the sanction of events; for nothing had succeeded with M. de Thugut, and nations judge only from results. M. de Thugut was, therefore, obliged to yield to circumstances, and retired, still retaining, however, considerable influence over the Austrian cabinet. M. de Lherbach was appointed to succeed him, and, as envoy to the congress of Lunéville, instead of M. de Lherbach was selected a well-known diplomatist, M. Louis Cobentzel, who was personally acceptable to General Bonaparte, and who had negotiated with him the treaty of Campo Formio. Hopes were entertained that M. de Cobentzel² would prove a fitter person than any other for establishing amicable relations with the French government, and that, placed at Lunéville, at some distance from Paris, he would occasion-

ally visit that capital, to have direct communication with the First Consul.

The delivery to the French army of the three fortresses of Ulm, Ingolstadt, and Philippsburg, took place most seasonably for the celebration of the fête of the 1st Vendémiaire. It could not fail to revive the hopes of peace, by furnishing evidence of the extremity to which Austria was reduced. This fête, one of the two which the Constitution had retained, was destined to celebrate the anniversary of the foundation of the Republic. The First Consul determined that it should not be less pompous than that of the 4th of July, so opportunely heightened by the presentation to the Invalides of the colours taken in the last campaign; he resolved that it should be distinguished by a character as patriotic, but more serious than those which had been given during the course of the Revolution, and, above all, that it should be exempt from the ridicule attached to the imitation of ancient customs in modern times.

Religion, it must be confessed, leaves a great void in the solemnities of nations, when it is excluded from them. Public games, theatrical representations, and fires, illuminating the night with their brightness, may occupy, during several hours, the multitude assembled to rejoice at any joyful occurrence, but cannot fill up an entire day. In all ages, nations have been disposed to celebrate their victories at the foot of their altars, and they have converted their public ceremonies into an act of thanksgiving to the Deity. But altars France then had none. Those which had been erected to the Goddess of Reason, during the reign of Terror, those which the Theophilanthropists innocently strewed with flowers, during the licentious system of the Directory, were covered with a ridicule never to be effaced; for, in regard to altars, none are respectable but those which are ancient. Now, the old Catholic altar of France had not yet been restored. Nothing, consequently, was left but academic ceremonies, beneath the dome of the Invalides; elegant discourses, such as M. de Fontanes³ could deliver; or patriotic airs, such as a Mehl⁴ or a Leseur⁵ could compose. The First Consul, sensible of all this, sought, therefore, to supply the place of the religious feature by a profoundly moral feature.

The homage to Washington, the presenta-

¹ LADY HAMILTON. A woman of obscure birth and tainted character, but of rare beauty and extreme fascination. Wife of Sir William Hamilton, the English minister at Naples, a man of some literary and antiquarian celebrity, but of no force of character. The fatal influence of this vicious woman on Nelson is too well known, and has been too generally deplored, to make any more particular allusion to it necessary. H. W. H.

² COBENZEL, LOUIS, Count of. Born at Brussels, in 1753. He first entered the military service of Austria, but was sent minister to Copenhagen in 1771, and to the court of Frederick the Great in 1775 to 1778. In 1779, he was sent to Russia, on an embassy to Catherine II. He was one of the signers of the treaty of Campo Formio in 1797, and in the following year was sent to the congress of Rastadt. In 1801 he was sent, as above, to treat with France at Lunéville.—*Encyclopædia Americana*.

³ FONTANES, LOUIS MARQUIS DE. Born at Nîort, in 1757. Early in the Revolution he edited a paper called

the *Moderateur*. Escaped to England, being proscribed by the Convention in 1797. Returned after the 18th of Brumaire, and with Ronald and La Harpe, assumed the conduct of the *Mercur*. He soon after became president of the *Corps Législatif*.—*Encyclopædia Americana*.

⁴ MEHL, STEPHEN HENRY. A celebrated musical composer, member of the French Institute. Born at Givre, in 1763. Received his first lessons from a blind organist. At the age of twelve was appointed joint organist of the abbey of Valledieu. He afterwards studied under Edelmann and Gluck.—*Encyclopædia Americana*.

⁵ LESEUR, JEAN BAPTISTE, a musical composer, descended from the great painter, Leseur. Born in 1763 and placed in the musical schools at Amlens. In 1780, he received the office of director of music in the cathedrals of Paris, where he gave general satisfaction. His finest work was "The Harps," which gained him the highest honours from Napoleon.—*Encyclopædia Americana*.

tion of the colours taken at Marengo, had already supplied materials for the two fêtes celebrated during his consulship; he contrived to find, in a great reparative act, the subject-matter of the fête of the 1st of Vendémaire, y-ar IX.—23d September, 1800.

At the time of the violation of the tombs at St. Denis, the body of Turenne had been found in perfect preservation. Amidst the excesses of the populace, an involuntary feeling of respect had saved these remains from the general profanation. Deposited at first in the Jardin des Plantes, they had afterwards been consigned to the care of M. Alexandre Lenoir, a man, whose pious zeal, worthy of being recorded in history, had preserved for us a multitude of ancient monuments, which he had collected in the museum of the Petits Augustins. There lay these remains of Turenne, exposed to the curiosity, rather than to the respect, of visitors. The First Consul conceived the idea of depositing the relics of this great man beneath the dome of the Invalides, and under the guard of our country's veterans. To glorify an illustrious general and a servant of the ancient monarchy, was reconciling the glories of Louis XIV. with those of the Republic; it was re-establishing respect for the past, without offending the present; it was, in short, the whole policy of the First Consul, under the noblest and the most touching form. This removal was to take place on the last complimentary day of the year VIII.—22d of September—and on the following day, the first stone of the monument to Kléber and Desaix was to be laid. Thus, at the moment, when our earth, in obedience to the laws which govern its motions, was completing one great century, and giving birth to another, (no less famous in its turn, if it prove one day worthy of its commencement,) at this moment, the First Consul resolved to pay a joint homage to the hero of past times and to the twin heroes of the present time. To render these two ceremonies the more striking, he imitated in some points what had been practised at the Federation of 1790, and desired all the departments to send to him representatives, who by their presence, should give to these fêtes not merely a Parisian, but a national character. The departments cordially responded to this appeal, and chose distinguished citizens, whom curiosity, a desire to see, with their own eyes, disorder succeeded by tranquillity, the miseries of anarchy by prosperity, and the desire especially to approach and to converse with a great man, drew in great numbers to Paris.

On the fifth complementary day, in the year VIII.—September 22d—the public authorities repaired to the Museum of the Petits Augustins, to fetch the car on which was laid the body of Turenne. On this car, drawn by four white horses, was placed the sword of the hero of the monarchy, preserved in the family of Bouillon,¹ and lent to the government for that

noble ceremony. Four old generals, mutilated in the service of the Republic, held the slips of the car; it was preceded by a pie-balled horse, like one which Turenne frequently rode, harnessed as horses were in his time, led by a Black, and offering an accurate representation of some scenes from the age to which this homage was paid. Around the car marched the invalids, followed by some of those fine troops which had just returned from the banks of the Po and of the Danube. This extraordinary and noble procession passed through Paris, amidst an immense concourse, and proceeded to the Invalides, where the First Consul awaited it, surrounded by the envoys of the departments, both those of the old France of Louis XIV., and those of new France; these latter representing Belgium and Luxemburg, the Rhenish provinces, Savoy, and the county of Nice. The precious relique borne by this train was placed under the dome. Carnot, minister of war, delivered a simple and suitable address, and, while music of a solemn kind, pealed through the vaulted edifice, the body of Turenne was deposited beneath the monument where it now reposes, and where it was soon to be rejoined by his companion in glory, the illustrious and virtuous Vauban where he was destined to be joined one day by the author of the great things which we are here relating; where he will certainly remain, surrounded by this august company, throughout the ages which Heaven may reserve for France.

If, in times like ours, when faith is quenched, anything can supply its place, and equal, perhaps, the pomp of religion, it is such spectacles.

On the evening of that day, a gratuitous representation of the *Tartuffe*² and the *Cid*³ was given to the people of the capital, with a view to afford them an amusement less coarse than usual. The First Consul attended the performance. His presence, his intention, instinctively guessed by that impressible and intelligent populace, all concurred to maintain, in that tumultuous assemblage, perfect decorum, a very unusual thing at gratuitous representations. The silence was interrupted only by cries, a thousand times repeated, of "*Vive la République! Vive le Général Bonaparte!*"

On the following day, the First Consul, accompanied, as on the preceding, by the public authorities and the envoys of the departments, repaired to the Place des Victoires. There was to be raised a monument in the Egyptian style, destined to receive the mortal remains of Kléber and Desaix, who, according to the intention of the First Consul, were to rest side by side. He laid the first stone, and then proceeded on horseback to the Invalides. There the minister of the interior, who was his brother Lucien, delivered a speech on the state of the Republic, which made a strong impression. Certain passages were highly applauded

¹ BOUILLON. This noble family is too familiarly known to require much mention. It was at its height of glory and greatness in the reign of Louis XIV.

H. W. H.

² TARTUFFE. An excellent comedy by Molière.

H. W. H.

³ THE CID. A tragedy, generally esteemed the master-piece of Corneille.

H. W. H.

ed; among others, the following, relative to the present age and the age of Louis XIV.: "One might say, that at this moment those two great ages have met to express mutual admiration over that august tomb." The speaker, while pronouncing these words, pointed to the tomb of Turenne. He was answered by unanimous applause, proving that all hearts, without derogating from the present, were willing to take again from the past what deserved reviving. And, that the spectacle might be complete, that the ordinary illusions of human nature might have their share in these scenes, otherwise so noble, the orator further exclaimed: "Happy the generation which sees a revolution begun under monarchy terminate in a republic!"

During this ceremony, the First Consul had received a telegraphic despatch, announcing the armistice of Hohenlinden and the cession of the three fortresses of Philipsburg, Ulm, and Ingolstadt. He sent his brother Lucien a note, which was read to those present, and greeted with greater applause than the academic harangue of the minister of the interior. Notwithstanding the respect due to the place, shouts of "*Vive Bonaparte! Vive la République!*" shook the vaults of the noble edifice. An immediate publication of the news in Paris produced a more profound satisfaction than all the rejoicings destined for the amusement of the multitude. People were not afraid of war; they were full of confidence in the genius of the First Consul and in the courage of the French armies, if it must be continued: but, after so many battles, after so many troubles, they wished to enjoy in peace the glory acquired and the prosperity that was beginning to dawn.

That prosperity was, indeed, making rapid advances. If the mere presence of General Bonaparte had sufficed, on the 18th of Brumaire, to soothe, to cheer men's minds, to revive their hopes, the case must be very different now, when the successes of our armies, the eager advances made by Europe towards us, the prospect of a speedy and a glorious peace, and lastly, tranquillity everywhere restored, had realized the hopes conceived in a first moment of confidence.

These hopes had, in fact, become realities, and it may be said that, in the ten months past, from November, 1799, to September, 1800, the face of France was changed. The public funds, the vulgar but true index to the state of public opinion, had risen from twelve francs (the real price at which five per cent. stock was sold the day before the 18th of Brumaire) to forty francs. They promised to reach fifty.

The stockholders had just received a half-year's dividend in cash, a thing which had not occurred since the commencement of our Revolution. This financial phenomenon had produced a great effect, and it appeared to be not one of the least of the victories of the First Consul. How had he been able to accomplish this prodigy? This was an enigma which the mass of the public explained by that extraordinary power, which he was already said to possess, of doing whatever he pleased.

But there is no miracle in this world: there

is no other cause for real successes but sound sense seconded by a strong will. Such too was the sole cause of the happy results obtained by the administration of the First Consul. He had, in the first place, applied a remedy to the real evil, which consisted in the delays in the collection of the taxes: he had, with this view, instituted a special agency for the preparation of the assessments, formerly left too complaisantly to the communes. This special agency, stimulated by the prefects, another creation of the consular government, had made out the assessments in arrear of the year VII. and the year VIII., and finished those for the year IX., the year just entered upon—September, 1800, to September, 1801. Thus, for the first time since the Revolution, the assessments of the current year were about to be put into a train of collection, from the very first day of that year. The receivers-general, having the revenue paid to them punctually, were thus enabled to discharge punctually the monthly bills which they had accepted, and had, in fact, always paid them at the end of every month. We have already said that, to guaranty the solidity of these bills, the Treasury had required of the receivers a security in cash, which security, deposited in the Sinking Fund, was to serve to retire such bills as might be protested. Out of the 20,000,000 composing the total amount of the securities, not more than 1,000,000 had been required for the payment of dishonoured bills. Hence they had obtained immediately a character equal to that of the best commercial paper. At first, they could not be discounted below three-fourths per cent. per month, that is, nine per cent. per annum; now, persons were willing to discount them at eight, and even at seven. This was a very moderate rate, especially in comparison with that which the government had hitherto been obliged to pay. Now, as the direct contributions in a total budget of 500,000,000 amounted to about 300,000,000, the Treasury had, from the first day of that year's account, had in its hands the 300,000,000 in assets easy to be realized. Instead of receiving nothing, or nearly nothing, as formerly, and receiving but tardily the little that was paid in, it had, from the very 1st of Vendémiaire, the greater part of the public revenue at its disposal. Such had been the result of the preparation of the assessments in proper time, and of that system of bills of exchange drawn, by the name of obligations, on the chests of the receivers-general: by depriving the latter of the pretext of delay in their receipts, the government had been enabled to impose upon them the condition of paying on a fixed day.

The year VIII., which had just closed,—September, 1799, to September, 1800,—had not been so easily provided for as the year IX. promised to be. It had been necessary to withdraw all the papers previously issued, *bons d'arrérage*, *bons de réquisition*, *délégations*, &c. These papers had been withdrawn either by the discharge of anterior contributions, or by means of certain arrangements entered into with the holders. The revenue of the year VIII. had consequently been diminished by so much, and there had resulted a deficit on the

year's account. But, the victories of our armies having carried them into the enemy's country, the Treasury was immediately relieved from the burden of their subsistence; and, with some national domains, which began to fetch advantageous prices, the deficit of that year might afterwards be covered. No more *bons d'arrérage* had been issued, for the stockholders were in future to be paid in cash; no more *bons de réquisition*, for the armies were supported either by the French treasury, or by some foreign treasury: lastly, no more *délégations*, for, as we have elsewhere related, the First Consul had adopted an invariable system in regard to persons having claims upon the state: he either gave them nothing or cash; and in cash he already gave them more than the preceding governments. Every week he held a council of finances: at this council he required a statement of the resources, and another of the wants, of each ministerial department, to be laid before him, selecting the most urgent of those wants, and dividing among them the resources which were sure to come in, but nothing more. With this regularity, this firmness of conduct, there was no further necessity for issuing paper; and, throwing no fictitious stock into circulation, the government had ceased to have any to redeem. The receipts of the Treasury, during the year IX., were therefore sure to be in specie.

The public dividends had been paid by the Bank of France. This Bank had existed for only six months, and it was already able to issue notes to a considerable amount, which were taken by the public as readily as cash. The wants of trade and the conduct of the government towards the new establishment, had occasioned this rapid success. The way in which the thing was done was this. Out of the securities in cash, a million, at most, had been sufficient to support the credit of the obligations. The rest had been left unemployed; and, strong as was the temptation to employ the 18,000,000 or 19,000,000 remaining to satisfy wants, all of which were urgent, the government had not hesitated to impose upon itself the severest privations, in order to devote 5,000,000 to the purchase of Bank shares, the amount of which it had paid immediately. It had not stopped there, but had deposited with it in account current the surplus of the disposable funds. An account current is composed of sums which are paid in on condition that they can be drawn out at pleasure, according to the wants of each day. Having all at once such resources at its disposal, the Bank had lost no time in discounting, in issuing notes, which, always paid in money, if the holders so desired, had acquired in a few months the value of cash. All this may now appear ordinary enough; for we see this phenomenon in every small town operating in the easiest manner, and a great number of banks prospering from the very day of their foundation. But, at that time, after so many bankruptcies, after the aversion which the assignats had excited for paper, it was a sort of commercial prodigy, wrought by a government which, of all sentiments, particularly inspired that of confidence.

The Treasury then resolved to intrust the bank with various services advantageous for itself and for the state, especially that of paying the *rentes*. It did this by means of a perfectly simple process. The acceptances of the receivers-general were as good as bills of exchange. The Treasury, therefore, offered the bank these bills to the amount of about 20,000,000 for discount; an operation highly advantageous to it, for discount was at six or seven per cent., and an operation perfectly safe, as these acceptances had acquired an unexceptionable character. The bank then undertook the payment of six months dividend to the stockholders, who received from it either cash or notes, at their option.

Thus, in a few months, the government had, by submitting to privations, already raised itself a powerful instrument, which, for an aid of 10,000,000 or 12,000,000 that it had received for the moment, could now render it services to the amount of hundreds of millions.

Financial prosperity, therefore, revived on all sides. The only sensible depression amidst the general well-being was the depression of landed property. In the height of our troubles, the proprietors of land or of houses had enjoyed the advantage of paying no taxes, owing to the delay in making out the assessments, or in paying next to nothing, thanks to the assignats. It was now otherwise. They were now obliged to pay, first the arrears, next the current assessments, and the whole in cash. For small proprietors, the burden was heavy. Allowance had at first been made for 5,000,000 of non-available assets in the budget, with the intention of exempting the tax-payers who were too hardly pressed; it was found necessary to devote to the same object a much larger sum. It was a kind of profit and loss account opened with the tax-payers, by the operation of which the past was forgiven them, in order that punctual payment of the present might be obtained. Landed property alone cannot support in a state all the public burdens. These must partly be met by excise, and other duties on articles of consumption. The Revolution, by abolishing the taxes on liquors, on salt, and on other articles, had closed one of the two necessary sources of the public wealth. Time had not yet opened it again. This was one of the glories destined at a later period for the restorer of order and of society in France. But he had first a great many prejudices to overcome. By establishing *octrois* at the gates of towns to provide for the wants of the hospitals, he had made a first useful experiment, and which accustomed people to the resumption of a measure, sooner or later indispensable.

Though landed property was for a moment heavily burdened, a general feeling of ease was, nevertheless, diffused among all classes. In all parts people felt themselves regenerated, and they found within them courage for speculation and exertion.

But there was much more to be done in that convulsed society, to restore every thing, not to a perfect state, such as one might aspire to in time, but merely to a state that was endurable. We have just seen what required to be

done for the finances: there was another service quite as important and quite as much disorganized as that of the finances, namely, that of the roads. They had become almost impassable. As everybody knows, not a few years' but a few months' neglect is sufficient to change into a quagmire the artificial strata which men make upon the earth, for the transport of heavy loads. Now, it was nearly ten years since the roads in France were left almost without repairs. Under the old government, their repair was provided for by *corvées*, and since the Revolution by means of a sum which figured in the general budget, but had not been paid more punctually than the sums destined for other services. The Directory, seeing how things stood, had been led to the idea of a special resource, which could not be misapplied, and which could never run short: and, to attain this end, it had established a toll for keeping up the roads and erected gates for collecting it. This toll had been farmed to the contractors for the roads themselves, who, negligently superintended, defrauded both in the collection of the toll and in the application of the produce of it. Besides, it was insufficient. It yielded at most 13,000,000 or 14,000,000 per annum, and 30,000,000 would have been required. In the three years VI., VII., and VIII., no more than 32,000,000 had been expended on the roads, and it would have required at least 100,000,000 to remedy the ravages which time had made, and to provide for their annual repair.

The First Consul, adjourning the adoption of a complete system, had recourse to the simplest expedient, that of applying the general funds of the state to the succour of this important service. He continued the toll, the mode of levying it, and its application, confining himself to a stricter superintendence, and gave immediately 12,000,000 upon the year IX., a considerable sum for that time. This sum was to serve for the repair of the principal high roads running from the centre to the extremities of the republic; from Paris to Lille, from Paris to Strasburg, from Paris to Marseilles, from Paris to Bordeaux, and from Paris to Brest. He proposed to lay out afterwards on other roads a similar amount to what he had thus devoted to them, to augment this grant in proportion to the improved circumstances of the treasury, at the same time continuing the toll, till the roads of France were restored to the state in which those of every civilized country ought to be.

The canals of St. Quentin and the Oureq, commenced towards the end of the old government, exhibited everywhere the appearance of ditches half filled up, of hills half cut through, of ruins, in short, rather than works of art. He immediately sent engineers to survey them, went thither himself, and ordered definitive plans, with the intention of signaling by works of great public utility the first moments of the speedily expected peace.

It was not merely the wretched state of the roads which rendered them unfit for travelling, but also the robbers by whom they were infested in a great number of provinces. The Chouans and the Vendéens, unemployed ever

since the termination of the civil war, and having contracted habits of life incompatible with peace, pursued the trade of plunder on the high roads of Bretagne, Normandy, and the environs of Paris. Refractory persons running away from the conscription, and some soldiers of the army of Liguria, impelled by privations to desert, were committing the like depredations on the roads of the centre and of the south. Georges Cadoudal,¹ who had returned from England with plenty of money, and was now concealed in the Morbihan, secretly directed this new *chouannerie*. Numerous movable columns, accompanied by military commissions, were requisite to suppress this disorder. The First Consul had already formed some of these columns, but he had not sufficient troops. While the Directory had kept too many troops at home, he had kept too few. But he said to himself, most justly, that, when he had beaten the enemies abroad, he should soon put down those at home. "Have patience," he replied to those who spoke to him in alarm about this kind of disorder; "give me a month or two; by that time I shall have conquered peace, and then I will do speedy and complete justice upon those highwaymen." Thus, in every point of view, peace was then the indispensable condition of well-being. Meanwhile, however, he applied himself to remedy the most urgent disorders.

We have already related that he had consented to substitute, for the oath formerly required of priests, a mere promise of obedience to the laws, which could not offend their consciences in any way. They had immediately availed themselves of this, in great numbers, and the clerical functions were at once disputed by the constitutional priests, who had taken the oath to the civil constitution of the clergy, the nonjuring priests, who had given only a promise of obedience to the laws, and, lastly, those who had neither taken the oath nor given the promise. The priests belonging to the first two classes, were competitors with one another for obtaining the churches, which were granted to them with more or less facility, according to the extremely variable humour of the local authorities. Those who had refused any sort of declaration performed the ceremonies of religion clandestinely in private houses, and were held by many stanch Catholics to be its only true ministers. Lastly, to add to the confusion, there were the Theophilanthropists, who also made use of the Catholic churches, and on certain days deposited flowers on those altars at which the priests had been saying mass. These ridiculous sectaries held festivals in honour of all the virtues, of courage, temperance, charity, &c. On All Saints' day, for example, they celebrated a festival in honour of ancestors. In the eye of strict Catholics this was a profanation of the religious edifices; and sound sense and the respect due to the dominant creeds commanded that it should be done away with.

For putting an end to this chaos, an agreement with the Holy See was requisite; an agreement by means of which those who had

¹ GEORGES CADOUHAL. The great Chouan leader. See note to p. 20.

taken the oath, those who had given the promise, and those who had refused both, might be reconciled together. But Monsignor Spina, envoy of the Holy See, had but just arrived at Paris, and, surprised to find himself there, kept out of everybody's sight. The subject to be discussed was as delicate for him as for the government. The First Consul, discerning with extraordinary tact the characters of men and the employment for which they were fitted, had opposed to this wily Italian the person most capable of coping with him, namely, the Abbé Bernier, who, after having long directed La Vendée, had at length reconciled it with the government. He had brought him to Paris, attached him to himself by the most honourable of all ties, the desire to contribute to the public welfare, and to share the honour of doing so. To the Abbé Bernier to re-establish a good understanding between France and the Romish Church, was like continuing and completing the pacification of La Vendée. The interviews with Monsignor Spina had but just begun, and the government could not promise itself an immediate result.

It was of importance to come to as speedy an arrangement of religious affairs as possible; for peace with the Holy See was not less desirable for the quiet of people's minds than peace with the great powers of Europe. But, meanwhile, there was a multitude of irregularities, either mischievous or singular, against which the First Consul strove to provide in the best possible manner by consular ordinances. He had already, by his ordinance of the 7th Nivose, year VIII.—28th of December, 1799— forbidden the local authorities, frequently favourable to the priests, to thwart them in the exercise of their religion. Having charge of the religious edifices, as we have elsewhere observed, they would frequently not allow the priests the use of them on Sundays, but only on Decadis, alleging that the Decadi was the only holiday recognised by the laws of the republic. The ordinance referred to above had provided for this difficulty, by enjoining the local authorities to give up the edifices for public worship to the priests on the days indicated by each persuasion. But this ordinance had not smoothed all the difficulties relative to Sundays and Decadis. On this point the laws and manners were at variance, a variance which it is necessary to explain, in order to convey an idea of the state of French society at that period.

The Revolution, in its passionate fondness for uniformity and symmetry, had not confined itself to the introduction of uniformity into all measures of length, superficies, and weight, and to the reduction of them to natural and immutable unities, such as a fraction of the meridian, or the specific gravity of distilled water; it had aimed at introducing the same regularity into the measure of time. It had therefore divided the year into twelve equal months, of thirty days each, completing it by the ingenious invention of five complementary days. It had divided the months into three *decades*, or weeks of ten days each, reduced in this manner the days of rest to three per month, and substituted for the four Sundays of the Gregorian calendar

the three *decadis* of the republican calendar. Most assuredly, in all mathematical points of view, this latter calendar was far better than the old one; but it offended religious ideas: it was not that of the generality of mankind, that of history; it could not overcome inveterate habits. The metrical system, after forty years' efforts and legislative restrictions, and notwithstanding its incontestible commercial advantages, has scarcely yet been definitively adopted: how then could there be any hope of supporting the republican calendar against a custom of twenty centuries, against universal usage, against the power of religion? When we reform, we must be content to reform for the purpose of applying a remedy to real sufferings, of re-establishing justice where it is wanting; but to reform for the pleasure of the eye or of the mind, for the purpose of putting a straight line where there is none, is requiring too much of human nature. You may form at pleasure the habits of a child; you cannot remould those of a grown man. It is the same with nations: you cannot alter the habits of a people after an existence of fifteen centuries.

Accordingly, Sunday was again observed in all quarters. In certain towns, the shops were closed on Sundays, in others on Decadis; frequently in the same town, in the same street, the contrast existed, and exhibited the spectacle of a mischievous conflict of ideas and manners. For the rest, Sunday would have prevailed everywhere, but for the intervention of certain authorities. The First Consul, by a new ordinance of the 7th Thermidor, year VIII.—July 26th, 1800—decided that every one should be at liberty to keep holiday when he pleased, to adopt for a day of rest the day most conformable with his tastes or his religious opinions; and that the public officers, bound to adhere to the legal calendar, should alone be obliged to choose the Decadi for the suspension of their labours. This was insuring the triumph of Sunday.

The First Consul acted judiciously in encouraging the return to an ancient and general habit—most judiciously, if he designed re-establishing the Catholic religion, as he really did design, and with good reason, to do.

The emigrants again engaged his attention. We have already adverted to their eagerness to return ever since the very first days of the Consulate: this eagerness had kept increasing, on observing what repose France enjoyed, in what security all the inhabitants of its territory lived. But, desirous as the government was to put an end to the proscription launched against them, it was yet necessary, while putting down one disorder, and proscription is one, to avoid falling into another, for a precipitate reaction is a disorder too, and of the most serious nature. These returned emigrants found on their estates either old denouncers, who had contributed to persecute them, or purchasers who had obtained possession of their property with paper: to both these classes they were disquieting enemies, or at least troublesome neighbours; and they were not discreet enough not to abuse the clemency shown to them by the government.

They availed themselves with tacitry of

the law passed a few months before, which declared that the list of the emigrants was closed. Those who had been omitted in this list lost no time in profiting by the clause respecting them. As they could no longer be inscribed but by the authority of the ordinary tribunals, which constituted but an inconsiderable danger for them, they lived in quiet, and had almost all returned. Those who had been entered in the list, and whom the law referred to the administrative authorities to claim their erasure, took advantage of the spirit of the times to get their names erased. They applied, in the first instance, for *surveillances*, that is, as we have already explained, the faculty of returning for a time under the superintendence of the political police; they then obtained, from friends, or from complaisant persons, false certificates, attesting that they had not quitted France during the reign of Terror; that they had only kept concealed to save themselves from the scaffold; and in this manner they obtained their erasure with incredible facility. The list drawn up formerly by the local authorities, with the recklessness of persecution, comprehended 145,000 persons, and formed nine volumes. Now, names were erased with as much recklessness as they had before been inscribed, and the emigrants were reinstated by thousands in all their rights. Some, whose properties had not yet been sold, applied to the members of the government to get the sequestration taken off; they solicited, according to custom, the men whom they abused the day before, whom they would again abuse on the morrow, and frequently Madame Bonaparte herself, who had formerly been connected with the French noblesse, in consequence of the rank which she held in society. If the emigrants, whose estates were not sold, recovered them at the price of abject solicitations followed by ingratitude, there was no great mischief in that; but those whose property had been alienated went into the provinces, addressed themselves to the new proprietors, and often, by dint of threats, importunities, or religious suggestions at the pillow of the dying, recovered their family possessions at a low price, by means not much more creditable than those by which they had been despoiled of them.

The tumult was at this moment so general as to attract the attention of the First Consul. He wished to redress the wrongs done by the Revolution, but above all he wished to avoid alarming any of the interests which it had created, and which had become legitimate with time. In consequence, he thought it right to adopt a measure, which was only part of what he did at a later period, but which introduced some order into that chaos of claims, of precipitate returns, and of dangerous attempts. After mature deliberation in the Council of State, the following ordinance was issued on the 20th of October, 1800—28th Vendémiaire, year IX.

In the first place, all those previously erased, no matter by what authority, or with what negligence the proceedings in regard to them had been conducted, were validly withdrawn from the list of emigrants. Certain collective inscriptions, under the designation of children

or heirs of emigrants, were considered as not having taken place. Women, under the authority of husbands when they quitted France, minors under the age of sixteen years, priests who left the country in obedience to the laws of banishment, persons comprehended under the head of day-labourers, workmen, artisans, or domestic servants; the absent, whose absence was anterior to the Revolution, the Knights of Malta, residing in Malta during our troubles, were all definitively erased. The names of the victims who had perished on the scaffold were also withdrawn from the list: this was a reparation due to their families as to humanity. These modifications made, those were kept upon the list without exception who had borne arms against France, those who held offices in the civil or military household of the exiled princes, those who had received rank or title from foreign governments, without the authorization of the French government. The minister of justice was to appoint nine commissioners, the minister of police a like number; to these eighteen commissioners the First Consul was to add nine councillors of State; these twenty-seven persons collectively were charged to make out the new list of emigrants upon the bases indicated. The emigrants definitively erased were obliged to make a promise of fidelity to the Constitution, if they wished to remain in the country, or to obtain the removal of the sequestration from their unsold property. They were condemned to remain under the *surveillance* of the political police till a year after the conclusion of a general peace. This precaution was designed for the protection of the purchasers of national domains. As for the emigrants definitively kept upon the list, nothing could for the present be enacted relative to them: what concerned them was deferred to a later period.

Under existing circumstances, this ordinance comprehended all that could most reasonably be done; it retrenched from the proscription list the great mass of the inscribed; it reduced that list to a small number of the declared enemies of the Revolution, and postponed the decision of the fate of all such to a future period. Thus, when the Republic should be definitively victorious over Europe, universally recognised, solidly established, when the firm determination of the First Consul to protect the purchasers of national domains should have sufficiently dispelled their fears, the government would probably be able to complete that act of clemency, and at length recall all the proscribed, even those who had been traitors to France. For the moment it went no further than to cut several embarrassing questions, and to put an end to many intrigues.

We see what difficulties of all kinds that government had to surmount, to restore order in a subverted society, to be clement and just towards the one, without alarming or being unjust towards others. But toilsome as were its labours, they found their reward in the plaudits, it may be said, of the entire country. In the first days which succeeded the 18th Brumaire, people had thrown themselves into the arms of General Bonaparte, because they sought force, whatever it might be; and he

cause, from the acts of the young general in Italy, they hoped that this force would be enlisted into the service of sound sense and justice. A single doubt was then felt, and somewhat diminished the eagerness to give themselves up to him. Will he keep his place longer than the governments which preceded him? Will he understand how to govern so well as he did how to fight? Will he put an end to the troubles, the persecutions? Will he be of such or such a party? The eleven or twelve past months had effectually dispelled these doubts. His power was gaining strength from hour to hour; since Marengo, especially, France and Europe bowed under his ascendancy. As for his political talents, there was but one voice on that subject among those who approached him; he was, at least, as great a statesman as he was a commander. As for the tendency of his government, that was as evident as his genius. He was of that moderate party which deprecated persecution of every kind, which, disposed to annul some of the things which the Revolution had done, was not for annulling all, but, on the contrary, was determined to uphold its principal results. These doubts removed, people rallied around him with the eagerness of joy and gratitude.

In all parties there are two sets of persons; the one numerous and honest, whom a man may bring over to himself by realizing the wishes of the country; the other, small in number, stubborn and factious, which, far from contenting, you deeply mortify by realizing those wishes, because you deprive it of its grievances. With the exception of this latter class, all the parties were satisfied, and lent freely their support to the First Consul, or resigned themselves, at least, to his government, if their cause was irreconcilable with his, as the royalists, for example. The patriots of '89,—and ten years before these comprised nearly all France,—the patriots of '89, at first hurried on by enthusiasm towards the Revolution, soon borne back at the sight of the bloody scaffold, now disposed to think that they had been mistaken on almost every thing, conceived that they had at length found, under the consular government, all that was possible to be realized in their wishes. The abolition of the feudal system, civil equality, a certain intervention of the country in its affairs, no great deal of liberty, but much order, the triumphant position of France in Europe—all this, very different, it is true, from what they had at first wished for, but now sufficient in their estimation, all this seemed insured to them. M. de la Fayette, who, in many respects, resembled those men, excepting that he was less convinced—M. de la Fayette, released from the dungeons of Olmütz, through an act of the First Consul's, proved, by his perfectly disinterested assiduities towards him, the esteem which he felt for his government and the adhesion of those who entertained sentiments like his own. As for the more ardent revolutionists, who, without being attached to the Revolution from participation in its condemnable excesses, adhered to it from conviction from sentiment—these were pleased

with the First Consul for being the reverse of the Bourbons and insuring their definitive exclusion. The purchasers of national domains, though looking black at times, on account of his indulgence towards the emigrants, had no doubt of his resolution to uphold the inviolability of the new properties, and clung to him as to an invincible sword, that secured them from the only real danger with which they were threatened, the triumph of the Bourbons and the emigrants by means of the arms of Europe.

As for that timid and well-disposed portion of the royalist party, which sought, above all, to be relieved from all further dread of the scaffold, exile, or confiscation, which, for the first time for ten years past, began not to have them before its eyes, it was almost happy, for, with it, to have nothing to fear was almost happiness. All that the First Consul did not yet grant, it finally anticipated from him, if I may so express myself. To see the people in their workshops, the tradesmen at their counters, the nobility in the government, the priests at the altar, the Bourbons in the Tuileries, and General Bonaparte at their side, in the highest station imaginable for a subject, would have been to these royalists perfection. Of these things there were three or four, which already they clearly discerned in the acts and plans of the First Consul. As for the last, that of seeing the Bourbons again in the Tuileries, they were disposed, in their good-natured credulity, to expect it of him, as one of the miracles of his astounding genius; and, if the difficulty of believing that a man would thus give up to others a crown which he held in his hand staggered those possessed of some perspicacity, their resolution was soon taken. "Let him make himself king," said they, "but, let him save us, for monarchy alone can save us!" A great man in default of a legitimate prince, seemed acceptable to them; but a king they must have at any rate.

Thus by insuring to the patriots of '89 civil equality; to the purchasers of the national domains, to the staunchest patriots, the exclusion of the Bourbons; to the moderate royalists personal safety, the re-establishment of religion; to all, order, justice, national greatness, he had won the honest and disinterested mass of all the parties.

There was still, what there always is, the implacable portion of these parties, that which Time never changes but by consigning it to the grave. Those who compose it are, in general, the most conscientious, or the most guilty of men, and these are always last upon the breach.

The men who, in the course of the Revolution, had imbrued their hands in blood, or signalized themselves by excesses which it was impossible to forget; others who, though they had nothing wherewith to reproach themselves, had been hurried into demagogue turbulence by the violence of their character or the turn of their mind; the furious Mountainers, the few survivors of the famous Commune, the old Jacobins and Cordeliers, were irritated in proportion to the success of the new government. They called the First

Consul a tyrant, who meant to effect a complete counter-revolution in France, to abolish liberty, to bring back the emigrants, the priests, and even the Bourbons, to make himself their base servant. Others, less blinded by anger, said that he designed to make himself tyrant for his own aggrandizement, to stifle liberty for his own advantage. He was a Cæsar who ought to fall under the dagger of a Brutus. They talked of daggers, but did nothing but talk of them; for the energy of these men, greatly exhausted by ten years' excesses, began to turn into violence of language. We shall soon see, in fact, that it was not in their ranks that resolute assassins were likely to be found. The police was incessantly at their heels, penetrating into their clandestine meetings, watching them with incessant attention. There were some who wanted nothing but bread; the First Consul, by the advice of Fouché, the minister, cheerfully supplied them with it, or, if they were fit for any thing, he did better, he gave them employment. They then became, according to the account of the others, nothing but wretches sold to the tyrant. If even there were any, who, from sheer fatigue, became a little more calm, as was at this time the case with some notorious personages, such as Santerre, and several others, they were immediately branded with the appellation of hirelings. According to the custom of parties, these incorrigible demagogues sought, among the real or supposed discontented men of the day, the imaginary hero who was to realize their dreams. It is not known from what indications Moreau had appeared to them to be jealous of the First Consul; it was, probably, because he had acquired sufficient glory to be the second personage in the State. They had instantly extolled him to the skies. But Moreau had just arrived in Paris; the First Consul had given him a most flattering reception, made him a present of a pair of pistols, enriched with precious stones, and inscribed with the names of his victories: he was now nothing but a lackey. Brune, the demagogue, at first dear to their hearts, had, by his intelligence, attracted the attention of the First Consul, obtained his confidence, and been appointed to the command of the army of Italy; he, too, was a lackey. Masséna, on the contrary, deprived rather abruptly of the command of that army, was dissatisfied, and could scarcely contain himself; he was immediately declared the future saviour of the Republic, and ought to put himself at the head of the real patriots.

1 CARNOT, LANNES, SIEYÈS. Notes ante.

2 MADAME BONAPARTE. Marie Joséphine Rose, daughter of Joseph Gaspard Tascher de la Pagerie, by Rose Claire des Vergers de Saintis, was born in the island of Martinique on the 23d of June, 1763. She went to Paris in her fifteenth year, was married in 1779 to Alexander Viçcount Beauharnais, and presented at the court of Marie Antoinette, where she gained a certain character for levity and a habit of imprudence, from neither of which she ever recovered fully. Her marriage was not a happy one. The Revolution ensued. The Viçcount de Beauharnais was imprisoned and put to death, she displaying the greatest courage and devotion to him to the last. She was imprisoned for a long time, and expected hourly to share her husband's fate, but in six days the death of the fiend Robespierre produced her liberation. While in prison she became intimate with Theresa Cabanis, afterward Madame Tallien, with whom she soon became conspicuous by their adoption of

Such was the case with Carnot, whom they called a royalist of the 18th of Fructidor, whose proscription they then demanded and obtained, and who, being now deprived of the portfolio of war, again became, in their estimation, a great citizen; such was the case with Lannes, who, it is true, was attached to the First Consul, but was a decided republican, and at times used extremely violent language relative to the return of the priests and of the emigrants; such was the case with M. Sieyès himself—with M. Sieyès, odious at first to the republicans for having been the principal accomplice of the 18th of Brumaire, then the butt of their railery, on account of the disappointment with which the First Consul had repaid his services, and by this time almost a favourite with them, because, dissatisfied with being a cipher, he showed what he had shown to all the governments—a cold and disapproving mien. Carnot, Lannes, Sieyès,¹ were to join Masséna to set up the Republic again on the first occasion. Lastly, what will strikingly illustrate the silly credulity of the expiring parties, the minister Fouché, one of the two principal advisers of the First Consul, and who had no object to gain—the minister Fouché, because he was well acquainted with these patriots, not afraid of them, and occasionally afforded them relief, knowing that it was rather tongues which need silencing, than hands disarming—the minister Fouché was to join Masséna, Carnot, Lannes, and Sieyès, to overthrow the tyrant, and save the liberties which were menaced.

The royalist faction had, like the revolutionary faction, its implacable sectaries, equally credulous reasoners, but more formidable conspirators. These were the great nobles of Versailles, who had returned, or were about to return, intriguers charged with the sorry affairs of the Bourbons, going to and fro between France and foreign countries, to frame childish plots, or to earn a little money; lastly desperadoes, devoted soldiers of Georges, ready for any crimes.

The first, great nobles, accustomed to talk much, attacked by words only the First Consul, his family, and his government. They lived in Paris nearly like foreigners to the country, scarcely designing to notice what was passing there, sometimes soliciting their erasure from the list of emigrants, or the removal of the sequestration from their unsold property. For this purpose they frequented Madame Bonaparte's,² at least such of them as had been acquainted with her when she was

the Grecian costume, and their influence with the Directory now exercised on the side of mercy. About this time Barras became strongly interested in her, and procured the restitution of her husband's property. In 1795, she became acquainted with Napoleon Bonaparte, and on the 6th of March, 1796, they were married.

She followed him through the first campaign of Italy, was present at the siege of Verona, and afterward held a species of court in Genoa. In December, 1797, in order to counteract her influence over him, several of his brothers, and afterward Junot, endeavoured and perhaps partially succeeded in making him doubt her fidelity—most unjustly! It is curious to observe, as regards Junot's agency in this matter, that every line of the book written by his wife, the Duchesse d'Abrantes, teems with spiteful and bitter remarks concerning Josephine. On his return from Egypt, in 1799, there was a considerable misunderstanding between them, but it was speedily accommodated, and none such ever arose again.

the wife of M. de Beauharnais. They went in the morning, never in the evening, were received in the entresol of the Tuileries, which she had fitted up for her private apartments, warm solicitors while there, excusing themselves as soon as they had left for having gone thither, and attributing that step to a strong desire to oblige unfortunate friends. Madame Bonaparte foolishly found pleasure in the society of these equivocal visitors; and her husband, though frequently annoyed by them, nevertheless endured them out of complaisance to his wife, perhaps, too, from a desire to know every thing, and to have communications with all parties. There were few of these solicitors who were not under obligations to the government, either on their own account, or on account of relations; but the freedom of their language was not for this reason at all diminished. All that was done for them was, in their estimation, no more than their due: they had been robbed of their possessions, and, if they were restored to them, this was but a duty, an act of repentance, for which they owed no gratitude to any one. They jeered at every thing and at everybody, even at the embarrassment of Madame Bonaparte, who, if she was proud to be the wife of the first man of the age, seemed almost ashamed of being the wife of the chief of the government, and who was at once too kind and too weak to crush them with the legitimate pride which she ought to have felt. They jeered, we said, at everybody, excepting, however, the First Consul, whom they thought a great general, but a middling politician, without consistency in his ideas, favouring the Jacobins one day, the royalists the next, having no will but in war, because war was his profession, and there, too, inferior to Moreau, in more than one respect. It is true, he had obtained splendid success; that those gentlemen admitted; thus far every thing had prospered with him, but how long would that last? Europe, indeed, was now incapable of resisting him; but, though conqueror abroad, would he overcome all the difficulties with which he was surrounded at home? The finances seemed to improve, but paper, which had been the ephemeral expedient of all the revolutionary governments, was also the expedient of his. Nothing was to be seen but bills of the receivers-general, notes of the Bank of France, &c. Would not this new paper end as paper had always ended? The government at this time did make some sort of shift, because the armies were maintained by the conquered countries; but at the peace, when they should return to their own territory, how were they to be provided for? Landed property was grievously burdened, and before long those subject to the

taxes neither could nor would pay them. People talked, it was true, of the satisfaction of certain classes, of priests and emigrants, who were well treated by the present government; but that government recalled the emigrants without restoring their property to them. They were enemies whom it brought from abroad into the country, and who were in consequence the more dangerous. It recalled the priests, but without giving them back their altars. To concede every thing by halves in this way, was to confer an obligation one day on people who would not thank you for it the next. Bonaparte, as these royalists called him, for they never deigned to give him his proper title, Bonaparte knew not how to do any thing but in an incomplete manner. He had permitted Sunday to be kept, but he had not dared to abolish the Decadi, and France, left to herself, had returned universally to Sunday. This was not the only ancient custom to which she would return, as soon as an example was set or liberty given. Bonaparte, by re-establishing, now this, then that, was himself commencing a counter-revolution, which would soon hurry him further than he meant to go. Since he was about reviving so much of the past, would he go the length of restoring the monarchy, and even of restoring it for himself, by making himself king or emperor?—if so, he would only render the counter-revolution more certain, by undertaking to effect it with his own hands. On this restored throne there would very soon be wanted those princes who alone were worthy to fill it; and, in re-establishing the institution, he would have re-established it for the Bourbons.¹

It frequently happens that hatred guesses right, because it takes delight in imputing faults, than which nothing is more predicable of human conduct. Only, in its restless impatience, it outstrips time. These shallow tattlers knew not how near they came to the truth; neither did they know that, before their predictions were accomplished, it was decreed that the world should be convulsed for fifteen years; it was decreed that the man of whom they thus spoke should have achieved sublime things, committed prodigious faults; and that, ere the catastrophe arrived, they should have time to belie themselves, to abjure their cause, to forsake the only legitimate princes in their estimation, to serve this ephemeral master, to serve and to adore him; they knew not that, if France should one day return to the feet of the Bourbons, she would approach them as if thrown by the tempest to the foot of a time-honoured tree, but thrown thither only for a moment.

In a lower sphere conspired otherwise than by words the intriguers in the service of the

It is a singular thing that from the moment of his repudiating this sweet, amiable, and interesting woman, the fortunes of Napoleon changed, and his fates verged as rapidly and continually downward, as previously they had mounted gloriously. Perhaps the very measures he took to consolidate and perpetuate his power, in his wedding the cold and selfish Arch-duchess, who calmly abandoned him to St. Helena, in the evil day, was the predominating cause which led to the downfall of all his greatness.

H. W. H.

¹ This picture of the emigrants of those days is not drawn from imagination. The language which I attribute to them is literally extracted from the voluminous correspondence addressed to Louis XVIII., and brought by that prince to France. Left, during the Hundred Days, at the Tuileries, and subsequently deposited in the archives of the Foreign Office, it furnishes singular evidence of the illusions and of the passions of that time. Some of these letters are very witty, and all very curious.

Bourbons, and lower still, but more dangerously, the agents of Georges, with their hands full of money supplied by England. Georges, ever since his return from London, was in the Morbihan, concealing himself from observation, acting the part of a man who retires in resignation to some rural retreat, but implacable in reality, having sworn in his heart, having sworn to the Bourbons, to perish or to destroy the First Consul. To attack in open fight the grenadiers of the consular guard would be hopeless; still there were among the Chouans arms quite ready to have recourse to the last expedient of vanquished parties, that is, to assassination. Among them might be found a band ready for any thing, for the blackest crimes as well as the rashest attempts. Georges, still undecided as to the moment and the place which ought to be chosen, kept them to their purpose, communicating with them through trusty persons, giving up to them the high roads for their subsistence, or part of the money received in profusion from the British cabinet.

The First Consul, satisfied with the homage of France, with the unanimous adhesion of the sincere and disinterested men of every party, gave himself little concern about the language of the one class, or the plots of the other. Wholly engrossed by business, he thought little of the empty talk of the idle, though he was far from being insensible to it; but, for the time being, he was too much absorbed by his task to pay much attention to such language. He thought very little more of the plots directed against his person; he considered them as one of those dangers, which he braved every day on the field of battle with the indifference of fatalism. For the rest, he deceived himself respecting the nature of his danger. Having, on the 18th of Brumaire, wrested the supreme power from the revolutionary party, and having it at the moment for his principal enemy, he threw the blame of all that happened on this party, and seemed to be irritated against it alone. The royalists, at least at that time, were in his eyes but a persecuted party, which it was right to screen from oppression. He was well aware that there were villains among them; but he had contracted the habit, from living with moderate men, of anticipating violence from the revolutionists alone. One of his advisers, however, strove to correct this error of his judgment: it was M. Fouché, the minister of the police.

In this government, conducted almost by one man, all the ministers had been cast into the shade, with the exception of two, Messrs. Fouché and de Talleyrand. They alone were, at times, faintly discernible through the halo of glory which encircled General Bonaparte, and the dazzling effulgence of which threw all around him into comparative obscurity. General Berthier had just succeeded Carnot in the department of war, because he was more supple, more resigned to the modest part of comprehending and rendering the ideas of his chief, which he did with a clearness and a precision truly admirable. It was no slight merit to be the worthy chief of the staff to the greatest captain of the age, and perhaps of all

ages. But Berthier, beside the First Consul, could not have any importance as director of the military operations. The navy, at the moment, attracted very little attention. The finances required only the firm and persevering, but unobtrusive application of certain principles of order, laid down once for all. The police, on the contrary, was of great importance, on account of the vast authority with which the government was armed; and, as well as the police, the foreign affairs, on account of the relations to be re-established with the whole world. As for the police, the First Consul needed a man who was acquainted with the parties and with the individuals of whom the parties were composed: this was the cause of the influence acquired by Fouché, the minister. In regard to the foreign affairs, though no person better qualified than the First Consul could be presented to Europe, there needed every moment an agent more mild, more patient than he: and this was the cause of the influence acquired by M. de Talleyrand. Messrs. Fouché and de Talleyrand shared, therefore, the only portion of political credit which the ministers then enjoyed.

The police was not at that period what fortunately it has since become, a mere surveillance, without power, charged solely with warning and giving information to justice. It was an immense arbitrary authority deposited in the hands of a single man. The minister of the police could exile these as revolutionists, could recall those as emigrants, fix for all the place of their residence, continue or remove the sequestration from the property of returned emigrants, restore or take away his church from a priest, suppress or reprimand a journal which had displeased him; lastly, point out any person to the mistrust or the favour of a government, which then had an extraordinary number of places to give away, and which soon had the wealth of Europe to distribute among its creatures. The minister of the police, on whom the institutions of the time conferred such attributions, though placed under the supreme and vigilant authority of the First Consul, yet possessed a formidable power over the whole nation.

M. Fouché, charged to exercise this power, formerly an Oratorian and a Conventionalist, was an intelligent and a crafty personage, neither good nor wicked, well acquainted with men, especially the bad, and despising them; employing the funds of the police in supporting the agents of troubles as much as in watching them; always ready to procure bread or a place for every person weary of political agitations; thus making friends for the government, and more especially for himself; creating for himself obliged dependents, far superior to credulous and deceitful spies, who never failed to inform him of every thing that it was his interest to know; having persons under obligations to him in all the parties, even among the royalists, whom he knew how to manage, and to repress at the right time always forewarned, never overrating danger nor exaggerating it to his master; clearly distinguishing an imprudent man from one really to be feared, knowing when to caution

the case, to proceed against the other; in short, managing the police better than it ever was managed, for it consists in disarming animosities as much as in repressing them; a superior minister, if he had had elevated intentions, if his indulgence had sprung from any other principle than an indifference to good and evil, if his activity had proceeded from any other motive than a passion for interfering in every thing, which rendered him irksome and suspicious to the First Consul, and frequently gave him the appearance of a vulgar intriguer. For the rest, his intelligent but ignoble countenance, was a faithful mirror of the qualities and vices of his soul.

The First Consul, chary of his confidence, never granted it freely, especially to men for whom he had no esteem. He made use of M. Fouché, and at the same time distrusted him. Hence he sometimes sought to dispense with or to control him, by giving money to De Bourrienne,¹ his secretary, to Murat, the commandant of Paris, but especially to Savary, his aid-de-camp, in order to compose in this way several contradictory policies. But M. Fouché always contrived to convict these bastard policies of awkwardness and puerility, proved himself alone to be well informed, and, while frequently crossing the First Consul, nevertheless made his peace with him by that manner of treating men in which was mingled neither love nor hate, but an incessant application to wean them, one by one, from an agitated and factious existence.

M. Fouché, half faithful to the revolutionary party, took pleasure in showing indulgence to his old friends, and dared, in reference to them, to contradict the First Consul. Well knowing their moral situation, appreciating, more especially, the villains of royalism, he was incessantly repeating that the danger, if there were any, was from the royalists much more than from the revolutionists, and that they should soon have occasion to perceive this. He had even the merit, but not for a long time, of insisting that it would be well not to forsake the Revolution and its ideas quite so much. Hearing already the flatterers of the day assert, that it was necessary to proceed more rapidly in reaction, to disregard the prejudices of the Revolution, and to return to something that should resemble monarchy, minus the Bourbons, he dared to censure, if not the aim, at least the imprudence with which certain persons pursued that track. While admitting the justice of his opinions, given with good sense, but without frankness and without dignity, the First Consul was struck, but not pleased, with them. He acknowledged the services of this personage, but had no esteem for him.

M. de Talleyrand performed a totally contrary part; he had neither affection for M. Fouché nor resemblance to him. They had both been formerly priests, the one having belonged to the superior, the other to the inferior

clergy, and yet they had nothing in common, but their having both taken advantage of the Revolution to cast aside, the former the prelate's robes, the latter the humble gown of the Oratorian professor. How strange, it must be confessed, and how characteristic of that deeply convulsed society, was the spectacle presented by this government, composed of a soldier and two priests, who had abjured their profession, and, though thus composed, having none the less splendour, grandeur, and influence in the world.

M. de Talleyrand, descended from a family of the noblest lineage, destined by his birth for the army, doomed to the priesthood by an accident, which deprived him of the use of one foot, having no liking for this imposed profession, successively bishop, courtier, revolutionist, and emigrant, then afterwards minister for foreign affairs under the Directory—M. de Talleyrand had retained something of all these different states; there was to be found in him a touch of the bishop, of the man of quality, and of the revolutionist. Having no firmly fixed opinion, but only a natural moderation, which was opposed to every species of exaggeration; capable of entering at once into the feelings of those whom he wished to please, either from liking or from interest; speaking a unique language peculiar to that society which had Voltaire for instructor; full of smart, poignant repartees, which rendered him as formidable as he was attractive; by turns caressing or disdainful, demonstrative or impenetrable; careless, dignified, lame without loss of gracefulness, in short, one of the most extraordinary personages, and such a one as a revolution alone can produce, he was the most seducing of negotiators, but at the same time incapable of directing, as head, the affairs of a great state; for every leader should possess a resolute will, settled views, and application, and he had none of these. His will was confined to pleasing, his views consisted in the opinions of the moment, his application was next to nothing. In a word, he was an accomplished ambassador, but not a directing minister: be it understood, however, that this expression is to be taken in its most elevated acceptation. For the rest, he held no other post under the consular government. The First Consul, who allowed no person the right to give an opinion on the affairs of war and of diplomacy, merely employed him to negotiate with the foreign ministers, on bases previously prescribed, and this M. de Talleyrand did with an art that will never be surpassed. He possessed, however, a moral merit, that of being fond of peace under a master who was fond of war, and of showing that he was so. Endowed with exquisite taste, uniting with it unerring tact, and even a useful indolence, he was able to render real services, by simply opposing to the First Consul's exuberance of language, pen, and action, his sobriety, his perfect moderation, and his very propensity to do nothing. But he made little impression on that imperious master, from whom he extorted no respect either by genius or by conviction. Thus he had no more empire than M. Fouché, nay,

¹ DE BOURRIENNE. This man has written a book about Napoleon, in which, whatsoever else he may show, he very clearly shows himself a miserable, weak, vindictive, and ungrateful scoundrel. See his *Memoirs of Napoleon* H. W. H.

even less, though quite as much employed, and more agreeable.

Then again, M. de Talleyrand said just the contrary to what M. Fouché said. Attached to the ancient *régime*, minus the persons and the ridiculous prejudices of other times, he recommended the re-establishment of the monarchy as soon as possible, or an equivalent for it, by availing of the glory of the First Consul in lieu of blood-royal, adding that, if we wished to have a speedy and a durable peace with Europe, we ought to make haste to resemble other states. And, while his colleague, Fouché, in the name of the Revolution, advised that we should not go too fast, M. de Talleyrand, in the name of Europe, advised that we should not go so slow.

The First Consul prized the plain good sense of M. Fouché, relished the graces of M. de Talleyrand, but absolutely believed neither the one nor the other on any subject, and, as for his confidence, had given that, given it wholly and entirely, but not to either of those two men—to his colleague Cambacérés. The latter, with an understanding far from brilliant, had extraordinary good sense, and an unbounded attachment to the First Consul. Having trembled for ten years of his life under proscribers of all sorts, he loved, with a kind of affection, the powerful master, who at length procured him the faculty of breathing at his ease. He loved his power, his genius, his person, from which he had not received, and hoped never to receive, any thing but favours. Acquainted with the weaknesses of men, even of the greatest, he counselled the First Consul, as one ought to counsel when one wishes to be attended to, with perfect sincerity, with extreme discretion, never for the purpose of showing off his own wisdom, but always to be serviceable to a government which he loved as dearly as himself, always approving of all its acts in public, whatever they might be, and never disapproving of them but in private, in an absolute *tête-à-tête* with the First Consul; keeping silence when there was no good to be done, and when censure could be but a vain pleasure of finding fault; sure to speak his mind, and with a courage highly meritorious in a man so extremely timid, when he was in time to prevent a blunder, or influence the general conduct of affairs. And, as if a character which is incessantly under self-restraint must needs be betrayed into some weakness, the consul Cambacérés exhibited a puerile vanity with his inferiors, lived with some subaltern courtiers, who paid him fulsome homage, walked every day in the Palais Royal, in a ridiculously magnificent dress, and sought, in the gratification of a *gourmandise* that has become proverbial, pleasures which were suited to his vulgar but prudent soul. Of what consequence, however, are a few foibles, redeemed by superior reason!

The First Consul cheerfully forgave these foibles in his colleague, and made much of him. He appreciated that superior good sense, which never wished to shine but to be useful, and which threw a tempered and true light upon every thing. He appreciated, above all, the sincerity of his attachment, laughed at his

weaknesses, but always with delicacy, and paid him the very high compliment of confiding every thing to him alone, of never being concerned but about his judgment. Hence, he was susceptible of no influence but his—an influence scarcely suspected, and on that account very great.

The consul Cambacérés was qualified more especially to temper his vehemence in regard to persons, and his precipitancy in regard to things. Amidst this conflict of two opposite tendencies, one urging to a precipitate reaction, the other, on the contrary, combating that reaction, M. Cambacérés, inflexible when the maintenance of order was in question, was, in every thing else, always a decided advocate for not going too fast. He did not oppose the end to which things were visibly tending, for he kept incessantly repeating, "Let them in due time decree as much power as they please to the First Consul, well and good, but not too soon." He wished especially that reality should always be preferred to appearance, real power to that which was but ostentation. A First Consul, possessing the power to do all that he pleased for the welfare of the state, seemed to him far superior to a crowned prince, cramped in his action. To act, and to keep out of sight, above all, never to act too quickly, constituted the whole of his wisdom. This most certainly is not genius, but it is prudence; and, for founding a great state, both are requisite.

M. Cambacérés was useful to the First Consul in another way, besides advising him with superior judgment—that of governing the Senate. That body, as we have said, was of immense importance, owing to the patronage vested in it. In the first moments, it had been relinquished, in some measure, to M. Sieyès, as a compensation for the executive power, vested wholly in General Bonaparte. M. Sieyès was at first content to abdicate, but, living on his estate of Crosne, began to feel somewhat vexed at his nullity; for there never was abdication without regret. Had he possessed firmness and consistency, he might have wrested the Senate from the First Consul, who would then have had no resource left but a *coup d'état*. But M. Cambacérés, without noise, without ostentation, insinuating himself by degrees with that body, occupied the ground which the peevish negligence of M. Sieyès abandoned to him. People knew that it was through him they could come at the First Consul, the source of all favour, and to him they accordingly addressed themselves. Of this he availed himself with infinite and always concealed art, to repress or to regain opponents. But this was done with such discretion, that nobody thought to complain of it. At a time when repose had become true wisdom, when repose was even necessary for reviving one day a taste for liberty, we dare not censure, we dare not give the name of corrupter to the man who, on the one hand, tempered the master imposed by events, and, on the other, checked the imprudences of an opposition without aim, unseasonable, and politically unwise.

As for the consul Lebrun, General Bonaparte treated him with respect, even with affection, but as a person meddling but little with

public affairs, the administration excepted. To him he consigned the superintendence over the details of the finances, and charged him to keep him acquainted with the proceedings and the sentiments of the royalists, by whom this third consul was frequently surrounded. He had thus an ear and an eye among them, but only from the mere interest of curiosity as to what might be hatching in that quarter.

To convey an accurate idea of the circle surrounding the First Consul, we must say a word concerning his family. He had four brothers, Joseph, Lucien, Louis, and Jérôme. The two latter we shall notice in due time. Joseph and Lucien only were then of any importance. Joseph, the eldest of all, had married the daughter of a wealthy and respectable merchant of Marseilles. He was mild, tolerably acute, agreeable in person, and caused his brother less vexation than any of the others. It was for him that the First Consul reserved the honour of negotiating the peace of the Republic with the states of the old and the new world. He had charged him to conclude the treaty which had been signed with America, and had just appointed him plenipotentiary to Lunéville, thus seeking to assign to him a part which should be popular in France. Lucien, at present minister of the interior, was a clever man, but of an unequal mind, restless, ungovernable, and, though possessing talent, not having sufficient to make amends for what he wanted in point of good sense. Both flattered the propensity of the First Consul to raise himself to the supreme power; and this was but natural. The genius of the First Consul, like his glory, were things personal to himself; one quality only could be transmissible to his family, that was the princely quality, if he should one day assume it, in preference to that of first magistrate of the Republic. His brothers were among those who asserted, with least reserve, that the present form of government was but one of transition, devised to lull revolutionary prejudices; but that he ought to make up his mind, and that, if he wished to found something truly stable, it was indispensably necessary to introduce greater concentration, unity, and durability. The drift of all this was very evident. The First Consul, as every one knows, had no children, which greatly embarrassed those who already dreamed of the transformation of the Republic into a monarchy. It was, in fact, an inconsistency to pretend to be desirous of insuring the regular and natural transmission of the supreme power in the family of a man who had no heirs. Thus though, hereafter, this default of heirs might be a personal advantage for the brothers of the First Consul, it was now an argument against their projects, and they frequently reproached Madame Bonaparte for a misfortune, of which, they said, she was the cause. Having quarrelled with her, from sheer jealousy of her influence, they had not spared her in conversation with her husband, and persecuted her with their remarks, incessantly and loudly repeating that it was absolutely necessary for the First Consul to have a wife who should bring him children, that this was not a private but a consideration, and that a resolution on

this point was indispensable, in order to insure the future welfare of France. They caused these cruel sentiments, pregnant with the most sinister consequences for her, to be repeated by all lips. The wife of the First Consul, apparently so fortunate, was, therefore, at this moment very far from happy.

Joséphine Bonaparte, who had been married first to the Count de Beauharnais, then to the young general who had saved the Convention on the 13th Vendémiaire, and now shared with him a place which began to resemble a throne, was a Creole by birth, and had all the graces, all the defects, usual in women who are so born. Kind-hearted, profuse, and frivolous, not a beauty, but perfectly elegant, and endowed with infinite fascination, she could please much more than women who were superior to her in understanding and personal charms. The levity of her conduct, depicted to her husband in the most unfavourable colours when he returned from Egypt, filled him with anger. He had thoughts of separating himself from a wife whom, right or wrong, he believed to be culpable. She wept a long time at his feet; her two children, Hortense and Eugène Beauharnais, both very dear to General Bonaparte, wept too; he was overcome, and yielded to a conjugal tenderness, which, for many years, was with him paramount to policy. He forgot the real or alleged faults of Joséphine; he loved her still, but not as in the early period of their union. The unbounded extravagance, the vexatious imprudences, in which she daily indulged, frequently excited in her husband gusts of impatience which he could not repress; but he forgave her with the kindness which prosperity inspires, and could not long be angry with a woman, who had shared the first moments of his nascent greatness, and who, from the day of their union, seemed to have brought Fortune along with her.

Madame Bonaparte was altogether a woman of the *ancien régime*, devout, superstitious, nay, a royalist, detesting what she called the Jacobins, who hated her in return; seeking only the society of the ancient nobility, who returning in throngs, as we have said, used to visit her in the morning. They had known her the wife of an honourable man, pretty high in rank and in military standing, the unfortunate Beauharnais, who died on the revolutionary scaffold; they found her the wife of a *parvenu*, but of a *parvenu* more powerful than any prince in Europe; they did not hesitate to go and solicit favours, while affecting to look down upon her. She was eager to make them partakers of her power, and to render them services. She even took pains to excite in them a sort of illusion which they were fond of indulging, that, in reality, General Bonaparte was only waiting for a favourable occasion to recall the Bourbons, and to restore the inheritance which belonged to them. And, singularly enough, this illusion which she delighted to instil into them, she would almost fain have shared herself; for she would rather have seen her husband a subject of the Bourbons, but a subject the protector of his kings, surrounded by the homage of the ancient French aristocracy, than crowned monarch by the hand of the nation. She

was a very faint-hearted woman. Though giddy, she loved that man who covered her with glory, and loved him the more since she was less beloved by him. Not conceiving it possible that he could set his daring foot on the steps of the throne, without falling immediately beneath the dagger of republicans or royalists, she foresaw her children, her husband, and herself, overwhelmed in one general ruin. But, supposing that he ascended safe and sound to that usurped throne, another fear narrowed her heart—it would not be her lot to share his elevation. If General Bonaparte should some day be made king or emperor, it would evidently be under the pretext of giving a stable government to France, by rendering it hereditary; and unfortunately her physicians left her no hope of ever having more children. She recollected on this subject the extraordinary prediction of a woman, a sort of Pythoness then in vogue,¹ who had told her: "You will occupy the first place in the world, but only for a short time." She had already heard the brothers of the First Consul pronounce the fatal word, divorce. The victim of grandeur, whom, to judge of her lot from the external splendour by which she was surrounded, the queens of Europe might have envied, was a prey to corroding care. Each advance of fortune added apparently to her happiness, but really augmented her distress; and if she did escape from her keen anxieties, it was by a levity of character which saved her long and intense thought. The attachment of General Bonaparte for her, his gusts of passion, when he gave way to them, repaired the next moment by demonstrations of the greatest kindness, served also to cheer her. Hurried away, moreover, like all the people of that time, by a stupefying whirlwind, she reckoned upon the god of revolutions, upon chance; and, after painful agitations, she returned to the enjoyment of her fortune.

She strove, meanwhile, to divert her husband from his ideas of an exaggerated greatness, ventured even to talk to him of the Bourbons, at the risk of raising storms; and, in spite of her partialities, which ought to have led her to prefer M. de Talleyrand to M. Fouché, she had taken a liking to the latter, because, thorough Jacobin as he was, she said, he dared tell the truth to the First Consul; and to tell the truth to the First Consul was, in her estimation, to advise him to uphold the Republic, but to increase at the same time his consular power. Messrs. de Talleyrand and Fouché, thinking to strengthen themselves by penetrating into the family of the First Consul, introduced themselves into it by flattering each as each liked to be flattered. M. de Talleyrand strove to please the brothers, by saying that it was necessary to devise for the First Consul a different position from that which the Constitution conferred on him. M. Fouché endeavoured to please Madame Bonaparte by saying, that to hurry things would be the height of imprudence, and endanger the

loss of all. This method of insinuating themselves into his family, and exciting disharmony by their interference, was excessively displeasing to the First Consul. This feeling he often manifested; and when he had any communication to make to his relations, he employed his colleague Cambacérès, who, with his accustomed prudence, listened to every thing, but said no more than he was directed to say, and acquitted himself of this kind of commission with equal delicacy and precision.

A very strange circumstance occurred to impart a present and positive feature to all these internal agitations. The prince, who was afterwards Louis XVIII., then an exile, ventured upon a singular and indiscreet step. Many royalists, to account for and excuse their return towards the new government, affected to believe, or really did believe, that General Bonaparte meant to recall the Bourbons. These men, who had not read or knew not how to read, the history of the English revolution, and to appreciate the terrible lessons with which it abounds, all at once discovered in it an analogy which flattered their hopes; it was the recall of the Stuarts by General Monk. They said nothing about Cromwell, who, however, acted a part great enough not to be forgotten. The unfounded rumour had at length gained currency, and reached Louis XVIII. This prince, endowed with tact and a good understanding, had committed the blunder of writing to General Bonaparte himself, and had transmitted to him several letters which he thought seasonable, but which were not, and which proved only one thing—the ordinary illusions of the emigrants. The first of the letters was as follows:—

"February 20th, 1800.

"Men such as you, sir, whatever their apparent conduct may be, never excite uneasiness. You have accepted an eminent post, and I am glad you have done so. You know better than any one else how much strength and power are required to secure the happiness of a great nation. Save France from its own frenzy, and you will have fulfilled the first wish of my heart; restore her king to her, and future generations will bless your memory. Your services will always be found too valuable to the state, to admit of my discharging in full, and as I could wish, the debt of my ancestors and my own, by the bestowal of important posts.

"Louis."

The First Consul was extremely surprised on receiving this letter, and was for some time undecided whether he ought to reply. It had been transmitted to him by the consul Lebrun, who had received it himself from the Abbé Montesquieu. The First Consul, engrossed by a multiplicity of business, on entering upon the government, had suffered some time to elapse without answering it. The prince, impatient as an emigrant, wrote a second letter, stamped still more with the credulity of his party, still more derogatory to his dignity. It was in these terms:—

¹ Mademoiselle Le Normand, the celebrated fortune-teller, whom some readers may have visited at her residence, No. 5, Rue de Tournon, Paris. She published, in 1830 *Mémoires Historiques et Secrètes de l'Imperatrice*

Josephine, in two volumes, containing very interesting particulars of her distinguished patroness, and died in 1844.—Translator.

"You must long have been aware, general, of the esteem in which I hold you. If you doubt whether I am susceptible of gratitude, mark your own place; fix that of your friends. As for my principles, they are those of the French character. I am clement by disposition. I shall be so from reason also.

"No, the victor of Lodi, of Castiglione, and of Arcola, the conqueror of Italy and of Egypt, can never prefer a vain celebrity to true glory. You are, nevertheless, losing valuable time: we can insure the repose of France; I say *we*, because I need Bonaparte for this purpose, and he could not accomplish it without me.

"General, Europe observes you, glory awaits you, and I am impatient to restore peace to my people."

"Louis."

This time the First Consul thought that he could not help answering. At bottom he had never had any doubt as to the course which he ought to pursue towards the deposed princes. Ambition apart, he considered the recall of the Bourbons as impracticable and fatal. It was from conviction that he repelled them, earnestly as he might otherwise desire to be master of France. His wife had been made acquainted with the incident, so had his secretary; and, though he did them not the honour to admit them to such deliberations, he gave them his motives. His wife had thrown herself at his feet to implore him to leave at least some hope for the Bourbons; he repulsed her angrily, and addressing his secretary, "You do not know those people," said he; "if I were to give them back their throne, they would fancy that they had recovered it by the grace of God. They would soon be surrounded and hurried away by the emigrants; they would overturn, in pretending to remodel, every thing, even what cannot be remodelled. What would become of the numerous interests created since '89? What would become of the purchasers of national domains, and of the leaders of the army, and of all those who have embarked their lives and fortunes in the Revolution? After men, what would become of things? What would become of the principles for which we have fought so hard? All this would perish, but not perish without a struggle; the conflict would be tremendous; thousands of men would perish. No, never will I take so fatal a resolution." He was right. Setting aside all personal interest, he acted judiciously. His dictatorship, which retarded the establishment of public liberty in France, a liberty, however, extremely difficult to establish at that time,—his dictatorship completed the triumph of the French Revolution, which Waterloo itself, after a lapse of fifteen years, could no longer destroy.

As might be expected, his answer was in unison with his sentiments, and did not hold out more hopes than he meant to give. It is only from the very words of the letter that one can judge of the grandeur of expression with

which he replied to the imprudent overture of the exiled prince:—

"Paris, the 30th Fructidor, year VIII.—7 Sept. 1800.

"I have received your letter, sir, and thank you for the obliging expressions which it contains regarding myself.

"You should renounce all hope of returning to France; you could not do so but over the corpses of half a million Frenchmen.

"Sacrifice your individual interest to the repose and happiness of France; history will give you credit for it.

"I am not insensible to the misfortunes of your family; I will contribute with pleasure to the ease and the tranquillity of your retirement.

"BONAPARTE."

Some portions of this got abroad, and the personal designs of the First Consul became, in consequence, the more evident.

It is full-often the attempts of parties to stifle an infant power, that accelerate its growth, and encourage it to dare all that it meditates. An attempt more ridiculous than criminal of the republicans against the First Consul, hastened a demonstration quite as ridiculous, on the part of the men who purposed to hurry forward his elevation: both came to nothing.

The patriot declaimers, more noisy and far less formidable than the agents of the Bourbons, met frequently at the house of a man formerly employed by the Committee of Public Welfare, now out of office. His name was Demerville; he talked a great deal, hawked about the pamphlets against the government, and was scarcely capable of doing more. His house was the resort of Aréna,¹ the Corsican, one of the members of the Five Hundred, who had escaped by a window on the 18th Brumaire; of Topino Lebrun, a painter of some talent, pupil of David, participating in the revolutionary extravagance of the artists of that time; and of many Italian refugees, who were exasperated against General Bonaparte, because he protected the pope and did not re-establish the Roman republic. The principal and the most violent of these latter was a sculptor named Ceracchi.² These hot-brained men used to meet at Demerville's, and made use of language the most absurd. It was requisite, they said, to put a finishing hand to the business; they had plenty of people on their side; Masséna, Carnot, Lannes, Sieyès, nay, Fouché himself. There was nothing to do but to strike the tyrant, and all the genuine republicans would speak out; all would unite to raise up the expiring Republic again. But it was necessary to find a Brutus to strike the new Cæsar. Nobody came forward. A soldier out of employ, named Harrel, leading a life of idleness and penury with these declaimers, indigent and discontented like them, appeared to them the man of action whom they needed. They made proposals to him which alarmed him ex-

¹ARENA.—CERACCHI. Aréna appears to have been a thorough scoundrel, actuated only by personal hatred to Napoleon. Ceracchi was an Italian, half crazy with that excited and inefficient love of liberty which is continually stirring his countrymen up to momentary ebullitions of patriotism and freedom, generally resulting only in individual murder, but never by any chance moving them to any sustained or useful resistance to oppression. There are some curious gossiping details

about this conspiracy in the book of the Duchesse d'Angantes, with whose mother, Madame de Permon, the conspirators were all on terms of intimacy. In addition to the men named above, a person called Diana was also engaged in the plot, and was arrested. There is no doubt that the plot was real in intention, and not a police affair, but the men were fools, drivellers, and cowards, and unequal to perpetration of the crime, which they did not lack the wickedness to conceive. M. W. M.

ceedingly. In his agitation, he communicated the matter to a commissary of war, with whom he was somewhat intimate, and who advised him to report all he knew to the government. This Harrel went to M. de Bourrienne, secretary to the First Consul, and General Lannes, commandant of the consular guard. The First Consul, apprized by them, directed the police to give Harrel money and orders to consent to all that his accomplices should propose to him. These miserable conspirators conceived that they had found in him the very man for executing their purpose; but they thought that one was not sufficient. Harrel offered to bring some others. They agreed to it, and Harrel brought to them some spies of M. Fouché's. After they had fallen into this snare, they thought of procuring daggers to arm Harrel and his companions. This task they took upon themselves, and brought daggers purchased by Topino Lebrun. At length, they chose the place for despatching the First Consul, and this was the Opera, then called the Theatre of the Arts. They fixed the moment, and that was the 10th of October—18th Vendémiaire, year IX.—on which day the First Consul was to attend the first representation of a new opera. The police, being forewarned, had taken its precautions. The First Consul went to the Opera House followed by Lannes, who, watching over him with the most anxious attention, had doubled the guard, and placed the bravest of his grenadiers around his box. The would-be assassins actually came at the time agreed upon, but not all, and not armed. Topino Lebrun was not there, neither was Demerville; Aréna and Ceracchi alone appeared. Ceracchi approached nearer to the First Consul's box than the others, but he had no dagger. The only bold fellows on the spot, and armed, were the conspirators sent by the police to the theatre of crime. Ceracchi and Aréna were apprehended, as were successively all the others, but most of them either at home or in the houses where they had sought refuge.

This affair produced a great sensation; it was not deserving of it. Assuredly the police, which ignorant men, not conversant with such matters, in general charge with fabricating itself such plots as it discovers—the police had not invented this, but it must be admitted, that it had taken too great a part in it. The conspirators wished, without the least doubt, the death of the First Consul, but they were incapable of striking him with their own hands; and, by furnishing them with what was most difficult to be found, pretended perpetrators, they had been led further into the crime than they would have ventured had they been left to themselves. If all this were to have terminated in a severe but only temporary punishment, such as ought to be inflicted on madmen, well and good! but to put them to death on such grounds is more than it is right to do, even when the object is to protect a precious life. But at that time of day people were not so nice; proceedings were immediately instituted, and these were destined to lead the unhappy wretches to the scaffold.

This attempt excited a general alarm. Hitherto there had been seen during the Revolu-

tion only what were then called *journées*, or attacks by armed bands; but people now felt secured from such assaults by the military power of the government. They had not yet thought of assassination, or of the possibility of the First Consul being struck unawares, in spite of the guard of grenadiers which surrounded him. The attempt of Ceracchi, the ridiculous part of which was not known, was a kind of forewarning which terrified all classes. A dread of finding themselves plunged back into chaos seized everybody, and generated a sort of enthusiasm in favour of the First Consul. The populace crowded round the Tuileries. The Tribunate, the only one of the assemblies of the state assembled at that moment, since it met every fortnight in the interval between the sessions, repaired thither in a body. All the public authorities followed this example. Great numbers of addresses were sent to the First Consul. They may all be summed up in these words of the municipal body of Paris:

"General," it said, "we beg in the name of our fellow-citizens, to express the deep indignation which they have felt at the news of the attempt meditated against your person. So many interests are involved with your existence, that the plots which have threatened it must necessarily be a subject of public grief, as the vigilance which has preserved it will be a subject of national gratitude and joy.

"That Providence, which in the year VIII. brought you back from Egypt, which at Marengo seemed to protect you from all dangers, which, lastly, on the 18th Vendémiaire, year IX., has just saved you from the fury of assassins, is, permit us to say so, the Providence of France much more than yours. It has not willed that a year so brilliant, so full of glorious events, destined to occupy so large a space in the recollection of men, should terminate all at once in a detestable crime. May the enemies of France cease to seek your destruction and ours! May they submit to that destiny, which, more mighty than all plots, will ensure your preservation and that of the Republic! We say nothing to you about the guilty; justice lays claim to them."

These addresses, all cast in the same mould, repeated to the First Consul that he had no right to exercise clemency, that his life belonged to the Republic, and ought to be defended like the public welfare, of which it was the pledge. It must be added that these manifestations were sincere. Every one thought himself in danger along with the First Consul. Every one but the factious wished for his preservation. The royalists believed that, if he were to die, they should be sent back to the scaffold or into exile; the revolutionists imagined that they beheld counter-revolution triumphant through the arms of foreigners.

The First Consul took particular and remarkable pains to diminish the estimate that was formed of the danger to which he had been exposed. He would not have it believed that his life depended on the first corner; and he conceived this to be equally necessary for his safety and for his dignity. In conversing with the authorities deputed to congratulate him, he

told them all that the danger, about which they were so much alarmed, had not been serious: he explained to them how, surrounded by the officers of the consular guard and a piquet of his grenadiers, he was completely secure against the seven or eight wretches who purposed to attack him. He was convinced, much more than his words could lead people to suppose, of the danger with which his life was threatened; but he thought it useful to exhibit himself to all imaginations surrounded by the grenadiers of Marengo, and inaccessible amidst them to the weapons of assassins.

More serious plots than this, about which so much fuss was made, and framed by other hands, were preparing in the dark. Under the influence of a vague presentiment, people said to one another, that these attempts would be repeated. Hence the partisans of the First Consul took occasion to insist that something more stable was requisite than an ephemeral power resting on the head of a single man, to which the stab of an assassin's dagger might at any time put an end. The brothers of the First Consul, Messrs. Roederer, Regnault de St. Jean d'Angely, de Talleyrand, de Fontanes, and many others held these ideas, some from conviction, others to please the master, all, as is usually the case, from a mixture of sincere and interested motives. This led to the appearance of a very singular, and very remarkable anonymous pamphlet, said to have been written by Lucien Bonaparte, but which, from the extraordinary elegance of the language, from the classic knowledge of history, ought to have been attributed to its real author, who was M. de Fontanes. This pamphlet excited so strong a sensation as to deserve mention here. It marks one of the steps taken by General Bonaparte in the career of supreme power. Its title was, "*Parallèle entre César, Cromwell, Monk, et Bonaparte.*" The author first compared General Bonaparte with Cromwell, and found in him no resemblance to that leading personage of the English Revolution. Cromwell, as he said, was a fanatic, a sanguinary leader of a faction, the murderer of his king, victor only in the civil war, conqueror of a few cities or counties of England, in short, a barbarian who had ravaged the universities of Oxford and Cambridge, a clever villain but no hero. The counterpart to Cromwell in the French Revolution would be Robespierre, if Robespierre had possessed courage, and if, France having nothing to subdue but La Vendée, he had been the conqueror of it. General Bonaparte, on the contrary, having no hand in the evils of the Revolution, had compensated by immense glory for crimes which were not his. He had abolished the barbarous festival instituted in honour of regicide; he was putting an end to the horrors of the revolutionary fanaticism; he honoured the arts and sciences, established schools, opened the temple of the arts. He had not carried on civil war; he had conquered not cities but kingdoms. As for Monk, what had that unsteady mind, that deserter from all parties, who did not know whither he was steering, who wrecked the vessel of the Revolution upon monarchy, as he might have wrecked it on the Republic, what had this sorry

personage in common with General Bonaparte, who possessed a mind so firm, and knew so clearly what he purposed! The title of Duke of Albemarle might be enough to satisfy the vulgar vanity of General Monk, "but is it to be supposed that the truncheon of marshal, or the sword of constable, would suffice for the man before whom the universe stands aghast? . . . Does not every one know that there are certain destinies which call to the loftiest station? . . . And besides, were Bonaparte ever to imitate Monk, is it not evident that France would be again plunged into the horrors of a new revolution? The tempests, instead of being allayed, would spring up again on all sides."

After rejecting these comparisons, the author found in the whole range of history no counterpart to General Bonaparte but Cæsar. He discovers in him the same military greatness, the same political greatness, but he discovers also one point of dissimilarity. Cæsar, at the head of the Roman demagogues, had oppressed the party of the honest citizens, and destroyed the Republic; General Bonaparte, on the contrary, had raised in France the party of the honest citizens and put down that of the wicked.

All this was true: the task undertaken thus far by General Bonaparte was much more moral than that of Cæsar.

After all these comparisons, it was necessary to draw a conclusion. Happy the Republic, exclaimed the author, if Bonaparte was immortal! "But where," he added, "where are his heirs? where are the institutions capable of upholding his benefits and perpetuating his genius! The destiny of 30,000,000 of human beings hangs on the life of a single man! Fellow countrymen, what would become of you, if at this moment a funeral wail were to announce that this man had ceased to live!"

The author next examined the different chances that might turn up at the death of General Bonaparte. Would the nation return under the yoke of an assembly? but the remembrance of the Convention was there to exclude such a supposition from every mind. Would it throw itself into the arms of a military government? but where was the equal of General Bonaparte? The Republic, no doubt, possessed great generals, but which of them so far eclipsed all the rest as to extinguish all rivalry, and to prevent the armies from slaughtering one another, in behalf of their particular chief? . . . In default of the government of assemblies, in default of the government of Prætorians, would the country have recourse to the legitimate dynasty, which was on the frontiers, stretching out its arms to France? . . . But this would be counter-revolution, and the return of Charles II. and James II. to England, and the blood which flowed at their appearance, were examples sufficient to enlighten nations; and, were more recent examples needed, the late return of the Queen of Naples, and her imbecile husband to their unfortunate kingdom was a lesson written in characters of blood. *Frenchmen, you are sleeping on the brink of an abyss!* Such were the conclusions of this singular composition.

All that it contained, except the language, was true; but

very premature, to judge from the impression which they produced. Lucien, minister of the interior, employed the means at his disposal for circulating this pamphlet over all France. He filled Paris and the provinces with it, taking care to conceal its origin. The publication produced a great effect. In reality it said only what everybody thought, but it required of France an avowal which a very legitimate pride did not yet permit her to make. Eight years before, the French had abolished a royalty of fourteen centuries, and were they to come so soon and confess, at the feet of a general of thirty, that they were wrong, and beseech him to revive that royalty in his person! They were willing enough to invest him with a power equal to that of kings, but it was necessary at least to save appearances, were it merely for the sake of the national dignity. True, this young warrior had already gained admirable victories, and already restored, to some extent, security throughout the country, but he had scarcely commenced the reconciliation of parties, the reorganization of France, the compilation of its laws, and above all, he had not yet given peace to the world. There were then many titles yet left for him to acquire, but which he was sure of soon concentrating on his glorious head.

The impression was general and painful. The prefects reported from all quarters that the pamphlet produced a mischievous effect; that it supplied the demagogue faction with some justification; that Cæsars called forth Brutuses; that the publication was imprudent and to be regretted. In Paris the impression was the same. In the Council of State the disapprobation was not concealed. The First Consul, whether he had been concerned in the pamphlet, or whether he had been compromised without his knowledge by impatient and unskillful friends, deemed it incumbent on him

to disavow it, especially in the eyes of the revolutionary party. He sent for M. Fouché, and asked him publicly how he could suffer such publications to be circulated. "I know the author," replied the minister. "If you know him you ought to have sent him to Vincennes." "I could not send him to Vincennes," rejoined M. Fouché, "for it is your own brother." At these words General Bonaparte complained bitterly of that brother, who had already compromised him oftener than once. A feeling of displeasure with Lucien Bonaparte was the consequence. One day, the latter not being punctual at the council of the ministers, which was frequently the case, and many complaints being preferred against his administration, the First Consul expressed strong dissatisfaction, and seemed disposed to dismiss him immediately. But Cambacérès advised him not to proceed so harshly, and not to take the portfolio of the interior from Lucien, without giving him a suitable compensation. The First Consul complied. M. Cambacérès contrived the embassy to Spain, and was directed to offer it to Lucien. He had no difficulty in persuading him to accept it. Lucien set off, and before long the imprudent pamphlet ceased to be thought of.

Thus a first attempt at assassination against the First Consul had provoked in his favour a first attempt at elevation: but the one was as mad as the other was awkward. It was requisite that General Bonaparte should purchase by fresh services an augmentation of authority, which nobody yet defined with precision, but which all foresaw confusedly in the future, and to which he or his friends already aspired in an open manner. At all events his fortune was soon to furnish him, in services rendered, in dangers encountered, with immense claims, which France would no longer resist.

BOOK VII.

HOHENLINDEN.

Peace with the United States and with the Barbary Regencies—Meeting of the Congress of Lunéville—M. de Cobenzel declines a Separate Negotiation, and insists at least on the Presence of an English Plenipotentiary, to mask the real Negotiation between Austria and France—The First Consul, with a view to hasten the Conclusion, orders the Renewal of Hostilities—Plan of the Winter Campaign—Moreau is directed to cross the Inn, and to march for Vienna—Macdonald, with a second Army of Reserve, has Orders to pass from the Grisons into the Tyrol—Brune, with eighty thousand Men, is destined to force the Adige and the Mincio—Plan of the young Archduke John, appointed Generalissimo of the Austrian Armies—His Plan for turning Moreau miscarries through defective Execution—He halts by the way, and proposes to attack Moreau in the Forest of Hohenlinden—Admirable Manœuvre of Moreau's executed in a superior Manner by Richepanse—Memorable battle of Hohenlinden—Important Results of that Battle—Passage of the Inn, the Salza, the Traun, and the Enns—Armistice of Steyer—Austria promises to sign the Peace immediately—Operations in the Alps and in Italy—Macdonald crosses the Splügen, despite the Perils and Hardships of Winter—His Arrival in the Italian Tyrol—Dispositions of Brune for crossing the Mincio at two Points—Defect in those Dispositions—General Dupont attempts a first Passage at Pozzolo, and draws upon himself alone the Main Body of the Austrian Army—The Mincio is forced after a useless Effusion of Blood—Passage of the Mincio and the Adige—Fortunate Escape of General Laudon in consequence of a Falsehood—The Austrians, being beaten, propose an Armistice in Italy—Signature of that Armistice at Treviso—Renewal of the Negotiations at Lunéville—The Principle of a separate Peace admitted by M. de Cobenzel—The First Consul requires Austria to pay the Expenses of this second Campaign, and imposes harder Conditions than in M. de St. Julien's Preliminaries—He fixes, as his Ultimatum, the Boundary of the Rhine in Germany, the Boundary of the Adige in Italy—Courageous Resistance of M. de Cobenzel—This Resistance, though honourable, causes Austria to lose valuable Time—While the Negotiations are pending at Lunéville, the Emperor Paul, to whom the First Consul has ceded the Island of Malta, claims it from the English, who refuse it—Rage of Paul I.—He invites the King of Sweden to St. Petersburg, and renews the League of 1780—Declaration of the Neutrals—Rupture of all the Northern Powers with Great Britain—The First Consul avails himself of it to force harder Terms upon Austria—He insists, not only upon the Boundary of the Adige, but also on the Expulsion of all the Princes of the House of Austria from Italy—The Grand-duke of Tuscany and the Duke of Modena are to be removed to Germany—M. de Cobenzel at length gives way, and, with Joseph Bonaparte, signs the celebrated Peace of Lunéville, on the 9th of February, 1801—France obtains for the second Time the Boundary of the Rhine, throughout its whole Length, and is left almost Mistress of Italy—Austria is thrust back beyond the Adige—The Cisalpine Republic is to include the Milanese, Mantua, the Duchy of Modena, and the Legations—Tuscany destined for the House of Parma, with the Title of Kingdom of Etruria—The Principle of the Secularizations laid down for Germany—Important Results obtained by the First Consul in the course of fifteen Months.

JOSEPH BONAPARTE had just signed at Morfontaine, with Messrs. Ellsworth, Davie, and Van-Murray, the treaty which re-established peace between France and the United States. It was the first treaty concluded by the consular government. It was natural that the reconciliation of France with the different powers of the globe should begin with that Republic, to which she had, in a measure, given birth. The First Consul had allowed the difficulties relative to the treaty of alliance of the 6th of February, 1778, to be adjourned; but, on the other hand, he had required the adjournment of the claims of the Americans relative to captured vessels. He judged, and very justly, that, at the moment, he ought to be satisfied with the acknowledgment of the rights of neutrals. This was giving to France one ally more, and to England one enemy more upon the seas; it was a new heaven added to the maritime quarrel, which was arising in the North, and which became from day to day more serious. In consequence, the principal articles of the law of neutrals, such, at least, as they are laid down by France and all the maritime States, were inserted integrally in the new treaty.

These articles were the same to which we have already adverted.

1. *The flag covers the merchandise*—consequently, the neutral can carry the goods of any enemy, without being searched.

2. There is no exception from this rule, unless for contraband of war, and that contraband does not extend to alimentary substances, or to naval stores, timber, pitch, hemp, but solely to manufactured arms and munitions of war, such as powder, saltpetre, petards, matches, balls, bullets, bombs, grenades, car-

casses, pikes, halberds, swords, sword-belts, or accoutrements, pistols, scabbards, cavalry-saddles, harness, cannon, mortars with their carriages, and generally all arms, munitions of war, and implements for the use of troops."

3. Neutral bottoms can sail from any port to any port; there is no exception to their freedom of navigating, unless in regard to ports *bonâ fide* blockaded; and only those ports are *bonâ fide* blockaded which are guarded by such a force that there is serious danger in attempting to break the blockade.

4. The neutral is bound to submit to search, for the purpose of ascertaining her real character; but the visiting vessel must keep at the distance of cannon-shot, and send only a boat and three men to board her; and, if the neutral is convoyed by a vessel of war, no search can take place, the presence of the admiralty flag being a sufficient guarantee against every species of fraud.

The treaty contained other stipulations of detail, but these four principal clauses, which truly constitute the law of neutrals, were an important victory; for the Americans, in adopting them, were obliged to insist on the application of them to their vessels on the part of the English, or forced to go to war with them.

The signature of this treaty was celebrated with *éclat* at Morfontaine, a beautiful seat, which Joseph, who was richer than his brothers, in consequence of his marriage, had some time before purchased. The First Consul went thither, accompanied by a numerous and brilliant party. Elegant decorations, set up in the mansion and the gardens, everywhere exhibited France and America united. Toasts suited to the occasion were drunk. The First Consul proposed the following: "To the

manes of the French and the Americans who died on the field of battle for the independence of the New World." Lebrun proposed, "The union of America with the Northern powers, to enforce respect for the liberty of the seas." Cambacérès gave for the third, "The Successor of Washington."

The French government waited with impatience for the arrival of M. de Cobenzel at Lunéville, to learn whether his court was disposed to conclude peace. The First Consul, if he was not satisfied with the progress of the negotiations, was determined to renew hostilities, let the season be ever so far advanced. Since he had crossed the St. Bernard, he reckoned obstacles as nothing, and thought that men could fight just as well in snow or on ice, as on ground covered with verdure or with crops. Austria, on the contrary, wished to gain time, because she was pledged to England not to make any separate peace before the month of February ensuing, that is, February, 1801—Pluviôse, year IX. Extremely apprehensive of the renewal of hostilities, she had just applied for a third prolongation of the armistice. The First Consul had peremptorily refused it, on the ground that M. de Cobenzel had not yet arrived at Lunéville. He was resolved not to concede this point, till the Austrian plenipotentiary should be on the very spot fixed for the negotiation. At length, on the 24th of October, 1800, M. de Cobenzel arrived at Lunéville. He was received on the frontiers and along the whole route with salutes of cannon, and with extraordinary demonstrations of respect. General Clarke had been appointed governor of Lunéville, to do the honours of the place to the members of the Congress; and, that he might be able to discharge that duty in a suitable manner, a sum of money and some crack regiments had been placed at his disposal. Joseph, on his part, had repaired thither, accompanied by M. de Laforêt, for secretary. No sooner had M. de Cobenzel arrived, than the First Consul, anxious to learn himself the dispositions of the Austrian negotiator, sent him an invitation to come and pass a few days in Paris.¹ M. de Cobenzel durst not refuse, and proceeded to Paris with great deference. He reached it on the 29th of October. A new prolongation of the armistice for twenty days was at once granted him. The First Consul then conversed with him on the peace, and the conditions upon which it might be concluded. M. de Cobenzel's replies were not very satisfactory on the question of a separate negotiation, and, as to the conditions, he put forward pretensions that were totally out of place. Austria had views in regard to Italy which it was impossible to satisfy, and she expected, if the indemnities promised in Italy by the treaty of Campo Formio were granted to her in Germany only, she expected that exorbitant concessions of territory should be made to her either in

Bavaria, or in the Palatinate, or in Swabia. The First Consul gave way to some sallies of passion. This he had done before in the negotiations of Campo Formio, with this same M. de Cobenzel; but, with increasing age and power, he controlled himself even less than he had formerly done. M. de Cobenzel complained bitterly, saying that he had never been treated in that manner, either by Catherine, or by Frederick, or by the Emperor Paul himself. In consequence, he desired to return to Lunéville, and the First Consul suffered him to depart, imagining that it would be better to negotiate foot by foot with him, through the medium of Joseph. The latter, mild, calm, and tolerably intelligent, was fitter than his brother for this operation of patience.

M. de Cobenzel and Joseph Bonaparte, having met at Lunéville, exchanged their full powers on the 9th of November—18th Brumaire. Joseph had orders to put to him the three following questions:—1. Had he authority to treat? 2. Was he authorized to treat separately from England? 3. Was he to treat for the Emperor, in the name of the house of Austria alone, or in the name of the whole Germanic empire?

The powers being exchanged, and found to be valid, for which purpose they were most minutely scrutinized, on account of the misadventure of M. de St. Julien, they entered into explanations concerning the extent of those powers. M. de Cobenzel declared, without hesitation, that he could not treat without the presence of an English plenipotentiary at the congress. As to the question, whether he was to treat for the house of Austria alone, or for the whole empire, he said that he must refer to Vienna for fresh instructions.

These answers were transmitted to Paris. The First Consul immediately directed M. de Cobenzel to be informed that hostilities should be renewed at the expiration of the armistice, that is to say, in the last days of November; that, nevertheless, the congress need not break up; that while the hostilities continued they might negotiate; but that the French armies would not stop in their march till the Austrian plenipotentiary had consented to treat without England.

During these transactions, the First Consul had taken a precaution, which had become indispensable in regard to Tuscany. The Austrian general, Sommariva, had remained there with a few hundred men, agreeably to the convention of Alessandria, but he continued to raise levies *en masse* with English money. At the same moment intelligence was received of the landing at Leghorn of those same English troops which had so long been on their way from Mahon to Ferrol, from Ferrol to Cadiz. The Neapolitans, on their part, were advancing towards Rome, and the Austrians, spreading themselves in the Legations beyond the limits marked out by the armistice, were thus endeavouring to extend a hand to the Tuscan insurrection. The First Consul, seeing that, while the Austrians were seeking to gain time, they were preparing to place the French army between two fires, directed Gene

¹ Napoleon said, at St. Helena, that M. de Cobenzel was desirous to come to Paris in order to gain time. His memory deceived him. The diplomatic correspondence shows what I advance.

ral Duprat to march upon Tuscany, and Murat, commanding the camp at Amiens, to proceed immediately to Italy. He had several times warned the Austrians what he meant to do, unless they suspended the movements of troops begun in Tuscany; and, perceiving that they paid no attention to these intimations, he had actually given orders accordingly. General Dupont, with Pino's, Malher's, and Carra St. Cyr's brigades, rapidly crossed the Apennines, and occupied Florence; while General Clement marched from Lucca to Leghorn. No resistance was anywhere experienced. Meanwhile, the insurgents assembled in the town of Arezzo, which had already distinguished itself against the French, at the time of Macdonald's retreat in 1799. They were obliged to take it by assault, and to punish it. This was done less severely, perhaps, than it had deserved for its conduct towards our soldiers. All Tuscany was thenceforward submissive. The Neapolitans were stopped in their march, and the English driven from the soil of Italy, at the very moment when they were about to enter Leghorn. Two days afterwards, they landed 12,000 men.

The armies were in motion on all sides, from the banks of the Mayn to the coast of the Adriatic, from Frankfort to Bologna. Notice of hostilities had, moreover, been given. Austria, in alarm, made a last attempt, through the medium of M. de Cobentzel—an attempt which proved her desire to bring matters to a conclusion, but also the embarrassment resulting from her unfortunate engagements with England. M. de Cobentzel, therefore, addressed himself to Joseph Bonaparte, and, assuming a tone of confidence, asked him several times if the discretion of the French government might be depended upon. Made easy on this point by Joseph, he showed him a letter, in which the emperor, expressing the same fears that he himself had just expressed, relative to the danger of an indiscretion, but, relying upon his knowledge of men and things, authorized him to make the following overture. Austria consented, at length, to detach herself from England, and to treat separately, on two conditions, on which she must insist in the most absolute manner; firstly, inviolable secrecy till the 1st of February, 1801, the period at which her engagements with England terminated, with a formal promise, if the negotiation should miscarry, to give up all the papers written on both sides; secondly, the admission of an English plenipotentiary to Lunéville, to mask the real negotiation by his presence. On these two conditions, Austria consented to treat immediately, and desired a fresh prolongation of the armistice.

The proximity of Paris admitted of an immediate answer. The First Consul would not, at any rate, admit an English negotiator to Lunéville. He consented, however, to suspend hostilities again, on condition of a peace signed secretly, if that suited Austria, but signed within forty-eight hours. The conditions of this peace were already settled, in a great measure, by the discussion on the preliminaries. They were the following:—The Rhine

as boundary of the French Republic in Germany; the Mincio for the boundary of Austria in Italy, instead of the Adige, which she had in 1797, but with the cession of Mantua to the Cisalpine; the Milanese, the Valteline, Parma, and Modena to the Cisalpine; Tuscany to the Duke of Parma; the Legations to the Duke of Tuscany; lastly, as general conditions, the independence of Piedmont, Switzerland, and Genoa. These were the groundwork of the St. Julien preliminaries, with a single difference, the relinquishment of Mantua to the Cisalpine, to punish Austria for the refusal of her ratification. But the First Consul required that the treaty should be signed within forty-eight hours, otherwise he threatened immediate war, and with redoubled vigour. In case of acceptance, he bound himself to absolute secrecy till the 1st of February, and to a new suspension of hostilities.

Austria was not disposed either to proceed so expeditiously, or to assent to such sacrifices in Italy. Deceiving herself respecting the conditions which she was able to obtain, she rejected the French proposal. Hostilities were, therefore, renewed immediately. M. de Cobentzel and Joseph remained at Lunéville, waiting, before they made new communications to one another, for the events that were about to take place at once on the Danube, on the Inn, on the High Alps, and on the Adige.

The renewal of hostilities had been announced for the 28th of November—7th Frimaire, year IX. Every thing was ready for this winter campaign, one of the most celebrated, and one of the most decisive in our annals.

The First Consul had disposed five armies on the vast theatre of this war. His intention was to direct them from Paris, without putting himself personally at their head. Still he had not renounced the idea of going to Germany or Italy, and assuming the direct command of one of them, if an unforeseen reverse, or any other cause, should render his presence necessary. His equipages were at Dijon, quite ready to start for the point to which he might be obliged to repair.

These five armies were those of Augereau on the Mayn, of Moreau on the Inn, of Macdonald in the Grisons, of Brune on the Mincio, and of Murat on march for Italy, with the grenadiers of Amiens. Augereau had under his command 8000 Dutch, 12,000 French, in all 20,000 men; Moreau 180,000, of whom 110,000 belonged to the active army. The army of this latter had been raised to this considerable force by recruiting, by the return of sick and wounded, and by the junction of St. Suzanne's corps. The delivery of Philipsburg, Ulm, and Ingolstadt, had, moreover, permitted Moreau to concentrate all his troops between the Isar and the Inn. Macdonald had at his disposal 15,000 men in the Grisons. Brune in Italy was at the head of 125,000 soldiers, 80,000 of whom were on the Mincio, 12,000 in Lombardy, Piedmont, and Liguria, 8000 in Tuscany, and 25,000 in the hospitals. Murat's corps formed a force of 10,000 grenadiers. This constituted a total of 300,000 combatants. If we add to this number 40,000 men in Egypt

and in the colonies, 60,000 in the interior and on the coasts, we shall find that, since the administration of the First Consul, the Republic numbered nearly 400,000 soldiers under arms. The 300,000 posted on the theatre of war, 250,000 of whom were effective, and capable of acting immediately, were provided with every thing, thanks to the united resources of the Treasury, and the contributions levied in the countries occupied. The cavalry was well mounted, especially that in Germany. The parks of artillery were large, and in admirable condition. Moreau possessed 200 pieces of cannon, Brune 180. We were, therefore, much better prepared than in spring, and our armies had unbounded confidence in themselves.

Enlightened but rigid judges have asked why the First Consul, instead of dividing the whole of his active forces into five corps, had not, according to his own principle, formed two great masses, one of 170,000 men under Moreau, marching for Vienna through Bavaria; the other of 130,000 under Brune, crossing the Mincio, the Adige, and the Alps, and threatening Vienna by the Friule. This was, indeed, the plan which he adopted in 1805, but the exposition of facts will enable the reader to comprehend his motives, and prove with what a profound knowledge of men and things he understood how to vary the application of the great principles of war according to circumstances.

Our two principal armies, that of Moreau and that of Brune, were posted on the two sides of the Alps, nearly on the same meridian, the first along the Inn, the second along the Mincio. Moreau was to force the line of the Inn, Brune that of the Mincio. These two armies were at least equal in numerical force, immensely superior in moral force, to those which were opposed to them. Between the two lay the chain of the Alps, forming in this part what is called the Tyrol. The Austrians had the corps of General Iller in German Tyrol, and that of General Davidovich in Italian Tyrol. General Macdonald, with the 15,000 men placed under his command, and designated the second army of reserve, was to occupy those two corps, and to attract all their attention, by leaving them uncertain respecting the point of attack which he should choose; for, placed in the Grisons, he had the option of throwing himself directly into German Tyrol, or by the Splügen into Italian Tyrol. The title borne by his army, and the doubts circulated respecting its force, could not but excite apprehensions of some other extraordinary stroke, and it was there to profit by the dread which the passage of the St. Bernard had produced. People had not given sufficient credit to the first army of reserve; they were ready to give too much to the second. Moreau and Brune, thenceforth relieved from all uneasiness about the side next to the Alps, could, without being alarmed for their flanks, push forward with the whole of their forces.

Augereau's little army was destined to watch the levies *en masse* of Franconia and Swabia, supported by the Austrian corps of Simbschen. It covered, therefore, the left and the rear of Moreau. Lastly, Murat, with 10,000 grena-

diers and a powerful artillery, was to perform precisely the same part, in regard to Brune, as Augereau was about to perform in regard to Moreau. He was to cover the right and the rear of Brune, against the insurgents of central Italy, the Neapolitans, and the English, &c.

These prudential precautions are such as it is right to take, when you are confined within the conditions of ordinary warfare. Now, the First Consul was necessarily confined within them, when he had for executors of his plans two such generals as Brune and Moreau. Moreau, the best of the two, and one of the best in Europe, was, nevertheless, not the man to do what the First Consul, after he became emperor, himself did in 1805, when, collecting a considerable force on the Danube and leaving a smaller force in Italy, he swept onwards like a torrent upon Vienna, regardless either about his flanks or his rear, and placing his safety in the overwhelming vigour of the strokes which he dealt to the principal enemy. But Moreau, but Brune, were not men to act thus. It was, therefore, necessary that, in directing them, he should keep within the conditions of methodical warfare; it was necessary to guard their flanks and their rear, to secure them against whatever might happen around them; for neither was capable of controlling accidents by the grandeur and vigour of his resolutions. For this reason it was that Macdonald was placed in the Tyrol, Augereau in Franconia, Murat in central Italy.

These dispositions did not admit of improvement, unless the state of affairs at home had allowed the First Consul to assume, in person, the command of one of the armies; but everybody agreed that at this moment he ought not to leave the centre of the government. His absence, during the short campaign of Marengo, had been attended with inconveniences serious enough to prevent him from incurring them again, without absolute necessity.

The dispositions of the Austrians were, in all respects, inferior to ours. Their armies, nearly equal in number to the French forces, were not a match for them in any other respect. They had not yet recovered from their recent defeats. The Archduke John commanded in Germany, Marshal Bellegarde in Italy. Simbschen's corps, destined to form the nucleus of the levies in Swabia and Franconia, appuied itself on General Klenau. The latter commanded an intermediate corps, placed *à cheval* on the Danube, connecting itself, on the right, with Simbschen's corps, on the left with the principal army of the archduke. Generals Simbschen and Klenau had, between them, 24,000 men, exclusively of the partisan troops raised in Germany. General Klenau was destined to follow the movements of General St. Suzanne, to approach the archduke if St. Suzanne approached Moreau, to join Simbschen's corps if St. Suzanne should join the little army of Augereau.

The Archduke John had with him 80,000 men, of whom 60,000 were Austrians, in advance of the Inn, and 20,000 Wurtembergers or Bavarians, behind the entrenchments of that river. General Iller commanded 20,000 men in the Tyrol, besides 10,000 Tyrolese. Mar

sual Belligarde in Italy, was at the head of 80,000 soldiers, well established behind the Mincio. Lastly, 10,000 Austrians, detached towards Ancona and La Romagna, were to second the Neapolitans and the English, in case these latter should make an attempt upon central or southern Italy. They formed, therefore, a principal force of 224,000 men, which, with the Mayencers, the Tyrolese, the Neapolitans, the Tuscans, and the English, might amount to about 300,000. The First Consul, in causing the Tuscans to be disarmed, in closing Leghorn against the English, in repressing the Neapolitans, had taken very useful and proper precautions for preventing the augmentation of the hostile forces.

By a sort of mutual resolution, both the belligerent parties prepared to settle the quarrel in Germany, between the Isar and the Inn. The operations commenced on the 28th of November—7th Frimaire—in severe weather, produced by a very cold rain in Swabia, and intense frost in the Alps. While Augereau, advancing by Frankfort, Aschaffenburg, Wurtzburg, and Nuremberg, fought a brilliant action at Burg-Eberach, separated the Mayence levies from Simbschen's corps, and crippled the latter for the rest of the campaign; while Macdonald, after occupying the Austrians for a considerable time towards the sources of the Inn, was preparing, in spite of the season, to cross the great chain of the Alps, with the intention of boldly throwing himself into Italian Tyrol, and facilitating for Brune the attack of the line of the Mincio; Moreau, with the principal mass of his forces, advanced, between the Isar and the Inn, to a field of battle which he had long studied, seeking a decisive engagement with the great Austrian army.

It is necessary to give an accurate idea of the ground on which the French and the Austrians were about to meet, upon one of the most important occasions of our long wars. We have elsewhere described the basin of the Danube, watered by that great river and a series of tributaries, which, descending rapidly from the Alps, come in succession to swell the mass of its waters. These tributaries, we observed, are lines which an Austrian army, intending to cover Vienna, ought to defend, and which a French army, purposing to march on that capital, must force. In the summer campaign, Moreau, as it will be recollected, after penetrating from the valley of the Rhine into that of the Danube, and crossing the Iller, the Lech, the Isar, had halted between the Isar and the Inn. He was master of the course of the Isar, all the principal points of which he occupied; first Munich, then Freising, Moosburg, Landshut, &c. He had advanced beyond that river, and was facing the Inn, occupied in force by the Austrians.

The Isar and the Inn, both issuing from the Alps, run together towards the Danube, separated by an almost invariable distance of between ten and twelve leagues. Proceeding at first in a northward direction, the Isar to Munich, the Inn to Wasserburg, they both turn off towards the east, till they fall into the Danube: the Isar at Deggendorf, the Inn at Passau. We were masters of the Isar, and it

was requisite that we should force the Inn; but the Inn, broad, deep, defended at its outlet from the mountains by the fort of Kufstein, and in the lower part of its course by the fortress of Braunau, covered between these two points by a vast number of intrenchments, the Inn was a difficult barrier to pass. If Moreau attempted to force it in the upper part of its course, between Kufstein, Rosenheim, and Wasserburg, he would meet with almost insurmountable local difficulties; he would, moreover, have the army of Tyrol on his right flank. If he determined on forcing it in the lower part of its course, between Braunau and Passau, near the point where it falls into the Danube, he would have to run the risk of a lengthened march upon the left, through a difficult, wooded, marshy country, exposing his flank to the Austrian army, which, advancing by Mühldorf and Braunau, might throw itself upon the right wing of the French army. These two inconveniences were judged extremely serious. If the Austrians, taking care to guard themselves properly, and to observe with vigilance all the passes of the Inn, confined themselves to the defensive, Moreau might encounter almost invincible obstacles. But such was not their design. The offensive was resolved upon in the Austrian staff. The young archduke, John, with his head full of new theories invented by the Germans, and emulous also to imitate something of the great movements of General Bonaparte, devised a very extensive plan, which was not badly conceived either, in the opinion of competent judges. Unluckily this plan was inapplicable, because it was not based on the accurate appreciation of present circumstances. As far as it has come to our knowledge, it was as follows:—

Moreau was established on the ground which separates the Isar from the Inn. Between Munich and Wasserburg this ground forms an elevated plain, covered with a thick forest, subsides as it approaches the Danube, and, as it sinks, is rent into numerous ravines, continues wooded in some parts, becomes swampy in others, and, in short, is very difficult of access on every side. Moreau was in possession of this plateau, of the forest which covers it, and of the roads that intersect it. From Munich, where he had his head-quarters, two roads lead to the Inn; the one running direct through Ebersburg to Wasserburg, the other in an oblique direction to the left, and passing through Hohenlinden, Haag, Ampfing, and Mühldorf. Both crossed the gloomy forest of pines, which covers that elevated tract. It was in this formidable retreat, formed by a hilly and wooded country, approachable by two roads, both of which were held by Moreau, that an assailing force must needs encounter him. The other roads consisted of only very narrow paths, destined solely for the conveyance of timber, and impassable for the heavy wagon train of an army.

The young archduke projected a great manœuvre. He purposed not to attack Moreau's position in front, but to turn it, in debouching by the bridges of Mühldorf, Neu-Oetting, and Braunau. Leaving about 20,000 men, Bavarians, Wurtembergers, and Condé's emigrants,

to dispute the Inn, he intended to assume the offensive with 60,000 Austrians, and to march on the left of Moreau, through that half woody, half swampy country, which extends between the Inn and the Isar, near the points where they fall into the Danube. If the young archduke proceeded rapidly through the difficult country by Eggenfelden, Neumarkt, and Wilsburg, and arrived in time at Landshut on the Isar, he would be able to ascend the Isar on our rear, to Freising, cross it at that place, and thence continue his march upon a chain of heights which begins at Dachau, and commands the plain of Munich. Occupying this point, he would dangerously threaten Moreau's line of retreat, and oblige him to evacuate the country between the Inn and the Isar, and to pass through Munich with the utmost haste, in order to take a retrograde position on the Lech. But, to insure the success of such a manœuvre, one must have correctly calculated all the means of execution, and, after engaging in it, great firmness was requisite for encountering its perilous chances; for there was an almost impassable country to traverse, in horrible weather, and at the same time incessantly skirting an enemy, who was not prompt and daring, it is true, but intelligent, firm, and not easily disconcerted.

The troops of both nations were in motion on the 26th and 27th of November—5th and 6th Frimaire—to commence hostilities on the 28th—7th Frimaire. The Austrian general Klenau, stationed on the Danube to support Simbschen against the little army of Augereau had attracted the attention of General St. Suzanne, commanding Moreau's fourth corps. Being thus both of them removed to a considerable distance from the principal theatre of events, they were on the Danube; General St. Suzanne towards Ingolstadt, General Klenau towards Ratisbon.

Moreau had moved his left wing, 26,000 strong, and under the command of General Grenier, along the high road from Munich to Mühldorf, by Hohenlinden, Haag, and Ampfing, thus making it occupy the slopes of that species of plateau which extends between the two rivers. His centre, which he commanded in person, and which amounted to about 34,000 men,¹ occupied the direct road from Munich to Wasserburg by Ebersberg. The right wing under Lecourbe, of about 26,000 men, was posted along the upper Inn, in the environs of Rosenheim: a division of it observed the Tyrol. Moreau had constantly at hand only his left and his centre, nearly 60,000 men. He had set his army in motion to make a strong reconnaissance from Rosenheim to Mühldorf, and to force the enemy to disclose his intentions. Moreau, unable to anticipate, like General Bonaparte, the designs of his adversary, still less to dictate them, as the latter did, by taking the initiative with a high hand,—Moreau was obliged to grope about to discover what he could neither divine nor pre-induce. But he advanced prudently, and if he was sur-

prised, he repaired expeditiously, and with great calmness, the mischief of the surprise.

The 29th and 30th of November—8th and 9th Frimaire—were spent by the French army in reconnoitring the line of the Inn; by the Austrian army in crossing that line and traversing the low tract between the Inn, the Danube, and the Isar. Moreau forced the Austrian advanced posts to fall back, moved his right under Lecourbe to Rosenheim, his centre, under his own immediate command, to Wasserburg, his left, under Grenier, to the heights of Ampfing. These heights command, but at a great distance, the banks of the Inn. The left of the French army was in some danger; for, following the course of the Inn to Mühldorf, it was fifteen leagues from Munich, while the rest of the army was only ten. Moreau had, in consequence, taken care that it should be supported by a division of the centre, that which General Grandjean commanded. But it was a fault to advance in this manner in three corps, so far separated from one another, in place of marching on the Inn *en masse*, and presenting himself before a single débouché, while he made false demonstrations at several points. This fault had well-nigh been productive of serious consequences.

The Austrian army had passed, at Braunau, Neu-Oetting Mühldorf, and crossed the low tract which has been already mentioned. Part of the archduke's troops, recently arrived, had scarcely had time to rest themselves. They were marching laboriously in that region, sometimes wooded, sometimes intersected by small rivers, the Wils, the Rott, the Isen, which descend from the plateau occupied by the French army. The narrow paths, which it was necessary to follow, were broken up; and it was with the utmost difficulty that the heavy park of wagons could move along them. The young archduke and his advisers, who had not foreseen any of these circumstances, were alarmed at the undertaking, now that it was begun. Our left wing, advanced nearly to Ampfing and Mühldorf, gave them uneasiness, and made them apprehensive lest they should be cut off from the Inn. They designed to turn Moreau, and now they were fearful that they should themselves be turned instead. This danger should have been foreseen, and a new base of operations prepared on the Danube, between Ratisbon and Passau, in case they should be separated from the Inn. But nothing of this kind was done. In every bold operation it is necessary to provide, in the first place, for difficulties of execution, and, in the next, after commencing the execution, to persevere with firmness in what one has planned, for it is very rarely the case that we do not incur ourselves the dangers in which we would involve our adversary. The Austrian staff, from the very outset, was astonished, terrified, at what it had projected, and suddenly changed its plan. Instead of persisting in gaining the Isar, for the purpose of ascending on our rear, it stopped short, and resolved to turn down upon our left, and to give battle immediately. This was meeting the difficulty in front, and undiminished; for it became necessary, in ascending the bed of the rivers, to climb the steep

¹ The centre consisted of 30,000 men; but the Polish division of Kniacewitz, which had rejoined General Decaen, and the artillery reserve, must have augmented it to about 34,000 or 35,000 men.

vated ground which we occupied, and then penetrate into the forest, in which we had been for a long time established. The enemy might at first have an advantage over our left wing, which was somewhat endangered, but, this success obtained, he would find our army concentrated in an absolute labyrinth, all the outlets of which it knew and occupied.

Accordingly, on the 1st of December—10th Frimaire, year IX.—the Archduke John moved the greater part of his army upon our left by three roads at once; the valley of the Isen, the high road from Mühldorf to Ampfing, lastly, the bridge of Kraiburg on the Inn. The valley of the Isen, commencing on the flanks of the woody plateau, already described, permitted the greatly lengthened position of our left to be turned. A corps of 15,000 men ascended it. Another corps marched direct for the high road from Mühldorf, which, after ascending the heights of Ampfing, leads through the forest to Hohenlinden and Munich. Lastly, a detachment, crossing the Inn at Kraiburg, and passing through Aschau, took in flank our left wing, which had unluckily ventured as far as Ampfing. Forty thousand men were going in a moment to fall upon 26,000.

These 26,000 men, commanded by General Grenier, had to sustain a severe and unequal contest. Ney, who defended the heights of Ampfing, displayed that incomparable energy which distinguished him in war. He performed prodigies of valour, and contrived to retire without serious loss. Threatened by the corps which had passed the Inn at Kraiburg and penetrated into the defile of Aschau, he was fortunately extricated by Grandjean's division, which Moreau, as we have said, had detached from his centre to support his left. Legrand's division, which was in the valley of the Isen, ascended that valley in retrograding upon Dorfen. Moreau, seeing the superiority of the Austrians, had the good sense not to persist, and effected his retreat in the best order.

It is obvious from these first movements that Moreau had not been able to penetrate the designs of the enemy, and that, in advancing upon all the débouchés of the Inn at once, instead of making an attack upon a single point, he had compromised his left. The extraordinary valour of his troops, and the vigour of his lieutenants, who, in execution, were accomplished generals, had made amends for all.

But this was only an insignificant beginning. Moreau had abandoned the outskirts of his position, and retired to the centre of the extensive forest of Hohenlinden. It would be requisite to force him in this formidable retreat. His coolness and vigour were here about to be pitted against the inexperience of the archduke, flushed by a first success.

We have already said that two roads ran through the forest: one on the right, descending directly to the Inn, by Ebersberg and Wasserburg; the other, on the left, which passes through Hohenlinden, Mattenboett, Haag, Ampfing, and joins the Inn at Mühldorf, is rather longer. It was along this latter road that the Austrians were proceeding *en masse*, some following the defile which it forms through the

forest, others laboriously ascending the banks of the small rivers which gave access to the flank of our position. Moreau immediately formed a judgment, and a sound one, of this situation, and conceived an idea from which he derived great results: it was to allow the Austrians, already engaged with his left, to penetrate into the forest, and then, when they should be pretty far advanced in it, to transfer his centre from the Ebersberg road to the Hohenlinden road, to surprise them in that dangerous place, and to destroy them there. He made his dispositions accordingly.

The road on the left, or the Hohenlinden road, adopted by the Austrians, after leaving the banks of the Inn and ascending the heights of Ampfing, passed over hills, alternately wooded and naked, as far as Mattenboett, then through a thick wood from Mattenboett to Hohenlinden, forming there a long defile bordered by lofty pine-trees. At Hohenlinden itself the forest suddenly ceased. A small plain, free from wood, studded with several hamlets, extended to the right and left of the road; in the middle were the village of Hohenlinden and the post-house. Not only the principal column of the Austrian army, marching in the defile of the forest, but also the detachments ascending the river Isen, for the purpose of debouching by different outlets on the left of our position, would necessarily have to pass this spot.

In this little plain of Hohenlinden, Moreau deployed his left wing under Grenier, Grandjean's division having been previously detached from the centre, with all the reserves of artillery and cavalry.

On the right of the road and village of Hohenlinden he posted Grandjean's division, commanded on this day by General Grouchy; on the left, Ney's division; still further to the left, on the skirt of the wood, and at the head of the roads by which the Austrian columns ascending the valley of the Isen would arrive, Legrand's and Bastoul's divisions, both drawn up in advance of the villages of Preisendorf and Harthofen. The reserves of cavalry and artillery were in rear of these four divisions of infantry, deployed in the middle of the plain. The centre, reduced to Richepanse's and Decaen's two divisions, was at some leagues' distance, on the right-hand road, in the environs of Ebersberg. Moreau sent to those two divisions an order, somewhat vaguely expressed, but positive, to throw themselves from the right-hand into the left-hand road, to get into the latter in the environs of Mattenboett, and there surprise the Austrian army entangled in the forest. This order was neither precise, nor clear, nor circumstantial, as well conceived and well expressed orders ought to be, and those of General Bonaparte, for instance, invariably were. He neither indicated the route to be pursued, nor provided against any accidents which might occur; he left every thing that was to be done to the intelligence of Generals Decaen and Richepanse. They, however, might well be trusted to make up for all that the commander-in-chief omitted to say. Moreau, moreover, directed Lecourbe, who formed his right towards the Tyrol, and Gene-

ral St. Suzanne, who formed his left towards the Danube, to draw near in haste to the spot on which the decisive event of the campaign was about to take place. But one was fifteen leagues off, at least, the other twenty-five, and they were consequently out of reach. It was not this that General Bonaparte acted on the eve of great battles: on these occasions he did not leave half his forces at such distances. But, to bring up all the parts of which a numerous army is composed in time to the point where the fortunes of war are decided, there is required a superior foresight, which the greatest men alone possess, and without which it is still possible to be an excellent general. Moreau was about to fight nearly 70,000 Austrians with fewer than 60,000 French; this number was more than sufficient, with the soldiers of whom our legions were then composed.

The Archduke John, ignorant of all this, was intoxicated with his success on the 1st of December—10th Frimaire. He was young, and he had seen that formidable army of the Rhine, which for many years the Austrian generals had not possessed the skill to stop, falling back before him. He rested on the 2d of December, which gave Moreau time to make the dispositions which we have just detailed; and he prepared every thing for passing through the extensive forest of Hohenlinden on the 3d of December—12th Frimaire. This general, rather raw in his profession, imagined that the French army could not make the least resistance to him in the route which he was about to pursue. He conceived at most that he should fall in with it in advance of Munich.

He divided his army into four corps. The principal, that of the centre, composed of the reserve, the Hungarian grenadiers, Bavarians, the greater part of the cavalry, the baggage, and a hundred pieces of cannon, was to follow the high road from Mühldorf to Hohenlinden, to traverse the defile which it forms through the forest, and then debouch in the little plain of Hohenlinden. General Riesch, who had crossed the Inn at Kraiburg, on the 1st of December, with about twelve thousand men, was to flank the centre, and to debouch in the open ground at Hohenlinden, on the left of the Austrians, on the right of the French. At the other extremity of this field of battle, the corps of Baille-Latour and Kienmayer, which had entered the valley of the Isen, were to continue to ascend it, and to debouch at some distance from one another, the first by Isen upon Kronacker and Preisendorf, the second by Lendorf upon Harthofen; both in the unwooded plain of Hohenlinden. They had orders not to lose time, to leave even their artillery behind, the corps of the centre taking a great quantity along with it by the principal road, and to carry with them no more baggage than was necessary for making soup for the soldiers.

Thus these four corps of the Austrian army, marching at a considerable distance from each other, in that thick forest, one only, that of the centre, on a high road, with causeway, the three others by paths exclusively destined for the carriage of timber, were to meet in the open space extending between Hohenlinden and Harthofen, exposed to the risk of not ar-

riving together, and of encountering, by the way, many unforeseen adventures. The Bavarians having rejoined the Austrians, the archduke's army amounted, at this moment, to 70,000 men.

On the morning of the 3d of December, the French were deployed between Hohenlinden and Harthofen. Moreau, on horseback before daybreak, was at the head of his staff, and, a little farther off, Richepanse and Decaen were executing the movement which they were directed to make from the Ebersberg road to that of Hohenlinden.

The four Austrian corps, on their part, advanced simultaneously, each as fast as it could, sensible of the value of time in a season when there is so little daylight either for marching or for fighting. A thick fall of snow darkened the air, and rendered the nearest objects indistinguishable. The Archduke John, at the head of the centre, had penetrated into the defile of the forest from Mattenboett to Hohenlinden, and had almost cleared it long before General Riesch, on his left, and Generals Baille-Latour and Kienmayer on his right, could reach the field of battle, embarrassed as they were in those horrible roads. The young prince at length appeared on the margin of the wood facing Grandjean's and Ney's divisions, both drawn up in order of battle, in advance of the village of Hohenlinden. The 108th demi-brigade, of Grandjean's division, was deployed, having on its wings the 46th and the 57th, formed in close column. The 4th hussars and the 6th of the line supported it in the rear. A very brisk cannonade was opened on both sides. The Austrians attacked the 108th, which made a firm resistance. Eight battalions of Hungarian grenadiers were ordered to file through the wood, in order to turn it on its right. On seeing this, Generals Grandjean and Grouchy hastened, with the 46th, to the assistance of the 108th, which was shaken, and began to lose ground. They penetrated into the wood, and commenced, among the pine-trees, a desperate struggle, almost man to man, with the Hungarian grenadiers. A battalion of the 57th, pushing still deeper into it, turned the Hungarians, and obliged them to seek refuge in the recesses of the forest. Thus Grandjean's division remained victorious, and prevented the Austrian column from deploying in the plain of Hohenlinden.

After a few moments' rest, the Archduke John made a new attack on Hohenlinden, and on Grandjean's division. This second attack was repulsed like the first. At this moment, the Austrian troops of Baille-Latour began to be perceived towards Kronacker, making their appearance on our left, at the margin of the wood, ready to debouch into the plain of Hohenlinden. The snow, having ceased falling for a few minutes, allowed them to be easily discerned. But they were not yet in a state to act, and, besides, Bastoul's and Legrand's divisions were preparing to receive them. All at once, a kind of agitation, a wavering, was perceptible in the Austrian troops of the centre, which had not yet been able to get out of the defile of the forest. Something extraordinary seemed to be taking place on their rear. Mo-

reau with a sagacity which does honour to his military intuition, remarked this circumstance, and said to Ney, "Now is the moment to charge; Richepanse and Decaen must be upon the rear of the Austrians." He immediately ordered Ney's and Grandjean's divisions, which were on the right and left of Hohenlinden, to form into columns of attack, to charge the Austrians drawn up on the margin of the forest, and to drive them back into that long defile in which they had till then been shut up. Ney charged them in front; Grouchy,¹ with Grandjean's division, took them in flank, and both drove them impetuously into that gorge, where they were crowded together pell-mell, along with their artillery and cavalry.

At this very instant, the events which Moreau had foreseen and prepared were taking place at the other extremity of the defile, at Mattenboett. Richepanse and Decaen,² in obedience to the orders which they had received from him, had struck off from the Eldersberg road into that of Hohenlinden. Richepanse, who was the nearest to Mattenboett, had started, without waiting for Decaen, and daringly penetrated into that tract of thickets and ravines which separates the two roads, marching while the fight was going on at Hohenlinden, and making incredible efforts to drag with him, over that inundated ground, six pieces of small calibre. He had already passed, without accident, the village of St. Christoph, when the corps of General Riesch, destined to flank the centre of the Austrians, arrived there; but he had proceeded onward from St. Christoph with a single brigade, leaving the second, Drouet's, engaged with the enemy. Richepanse, reckoning upon Decaen to extricate Drouet's brigade, had marched, without losing a moment, for Mattenboett; for his military instinct told him that there was the decisive point. Though he had left but two demi-brigades of infantry, the 8th and the 48th, a single regiment of cavalry, the 1st chasseurs, and six pieces of cannon, with about 6000 men, he had continued his march, dragging his artillery by hand, almost always through the quagmire. On reaching Mattenboett, at the other extremity of the defile of the forest, the head of which we have just said that Ney was attacking, he fell in with a body of Austrian cuirassiers, dismounted, with their horses' bridles over their arms; he fell upon them, and made them prisoners. Then deploying on the small open spot which surrounds Mattenboett, he placed the 8th on the right, the 48th on the left, and pushed the 1st chasseurs on eight squadrons of cavalry, which, on seeing him, had formed to charge him. The 1st chasseurs, after a vigorous charge, was repulsed, and fell back behind the 8th demi-brigade. The latter, crossing bayonets, stopped the career of the Austrian cavalry.

¹ GROUCHY, EMANUEL, Count of. Born in 1766; entered the service at fourteen; in 1785, an officer in the king's body-guard, which he left on the breaking out of the Revolution. In 1792 he commanded a regiment of dragons, and the next year all the cavalry in Savoy and the Alps. In 1794 commanded in La Vendée, and defeated the emigrants at Quiberon. In 1797 he was second in command of the army of Ireland, but effected nothing, the fleet having been dispersed by a storm in Bantry Bay. In 1798 he joined the army of Italy, and

At this moment, Richepanse's position became critical. Having left behind his second brigade to make head against Riesch's corps, surrounded himself on all sides, he thought that he ought not to give the Austrians time to perceive his weakness. Committing to General Walther, with the 8th demi-brigade and the 1st chasseurs, the duty of keeping in check the enemy's rear-guard, which was preparing to fight, he himself, with the 48th alone, fell to the left, and took the bold resolution to fall upon the Austrian rear in the defile of the forest. Hazardous as was this resolution, it was not less sensible than vigorous; for the archduke's column, entangled in this defile, must have before it the main body of the French army, and, by dashing furiously upon its rear, it was probable that he should produce great disorder in it, and obtain important results. Richepanse immediately formed the 48th into columns, and, marching sword in hand amidst his grenadiers, penetrated into the forest, sustained, without flinching, a violent discharge of grape-shot, then fell in with two Hungarian battalions, which hastened up to bar his passage. Richepanse would have inspirited his brave soldiers with words and gestures, but they had no need of them. "Those fellows are our prisoners," cried they, "let us charge!" They charged accordingly, and completely routed the Hungarian battalions. Presently, they came to masses of baggage, artillery, infantry, accumulated pell-mell at this spot. Richepanse struck inexpressible terror into this multitude, and threw it into frightful disorder. At the same moment, he heard confused shouts at the other extremity of this defile. On advancing, these shouts, becoming more distinct, revealed the presence of our troops. It was Ney, who, marching from Hohenlinden, had penetrated by the head of the defile, and pushed before him the Austrian column, which Richepanse was driving the other way, by attacking it in rear.

Ney and Richepanse met, recognised one another, and embraced, intoxicated with joy on seeing so glorious a result. Their troops rushed, on all sides, upon the Austrians, who sought shelter by flight in the woods, or begged quarter of the conqueror. They took thousands of prisoners, the whole of the artillery, and the baggage. Richepanse, leaving Ney to secure these trophies, returned to Mattenboett, where General Walther had remained with a demi-brigade and a single regiment of cavalry. He found this brave general, struck by a ball, borne away in the arms of his soldiers, but his countenance beaming with joy, and compensated for his sufferings by the satisfaction of having contributed to a decisive manœuvre. Richepanse extricated his troops, and returned to St. Christoph, where he had left Drouet's brigade alone engaged with

In the next year contributed greatly to Moreau's successes at Hohenlinden and on the Rhine. On Moreau's trial he incurred the displeasure of Napoleon.—*Encyclopædia Americana*.

² DECAEN. Born at Creully near Caen, was employed in the army of the Rhine and Moselle, distinguished himself in July, 1796, under Moreau, particularly at Ettlingen and Albe. In 1798 he was cashiered, but restored and promoted in the same year, and in 1800 made a general of division.—*Biographie Moderne*.

Riesch's corps. But all his anticipations were verified on that auspicious day. General Decaen had arrived in time, extricated Drouot's brigade, and repulsed Riesch's corps, after taking from it a great number of prisoners.

It was by this time mid-day. The centre, of the Austrian army had been enveloped and entirely routed. The left, under General Riesch, arriving too late to stop Richepanse, attacked and driven towards the Inn by Decaen, was in full retreat, after sustaining considerable losses. With such results at the centre and on the left of the Austrians, the issue of the battle could no longer be doubtful.

During these events, Bastoul's and Legrand's divisions, posted on the left of the clear ground about Hohenlinden, had had upon their hands the infantry of Generals Baillet-Latour and Kienmayer. These divisions had been hard pressed, for they were inferior by one-half to the enemy; they had, moreover, the disadvantage of ground; for the head of the wooded ravines, by which the Austrians debouched into the little plain of Hohenlinden, being rather higher than that open plain, enabled them to pour a downward fire upon it. But Generals Bastoul and Legrand, under the command of General Grenier, seconded by the courage of their brave soldiers, made a vigorous stand. Luckily, too, D'Hautpoul's cavalry was there to support them, as well as Ney's second brigade, the latter general having entered the field with one only.

The two French divisions, at first overwhelmed by numbers, had lost a little ground. Quitting the margin of the wood, they had fallen back into the plain, but with extraordinary steadiness and displaying to the enemy an heroic firmness. Two demi-brigades of Legrand's division, the 51st and the 42d, thrown back towards Harthofen, had to oppose Kienmayer's infantry, besides a division of cavalry attached to that corps. Sometimes keeping up a well-sustained fire upon the infantry, at others crossing bayonets against the cavalry, they opposed an invincible resistance to all attacks. But, at this moment, Grenier, being apprized of the success obtained at the centre, formed Legrand's division into columns, caused it to be supported by charges of D'Hautpoul's cavalry, and drove back Kienmayer's corps to the skirt of the wood. General Bonnet, on his side, with a brigade of Bastoul's division, charged the Austrians, and overthrew them in the valley from which they had endeavoured to issue. Meanwhile, the grenadiers of Iola's brigade, Ney's second, rushed upon Baillet-Latour, and repulsed him. The impulsion of victory communicated to these brave troops, redoubled their ardour and their strength. They finally drove back the two corps of Baillet-Latour and Kienmayer, the one towards the Isen, the other towards Lenddorf, in that low and difficult tract from which they had in vain attempted to debouch, in order to gain possession of the plateau of Hohenlinden.

Moreau returned at this moment from the heart of the forest with a detachment of Grandjean's division, to bring relief to his left, which

was so briskly attacked. But there, as at all the other points, he found his soldiers victorious, transported with joy, congratulating their general on such a glorious triumph. That triumph was indeed glorious. The Austrian army had greater difficulty to get out of those thickets than it had to penetrate into them. There were seen everywhere straggling corps, which, not knowing whither to flee, fell into the hands of our victorious troops, and laid down their arms. It was five o'clock, and darkness shrouded the field of battle. The French had killed or wounded 7000 or 8000 of the enemy, made 12,000 prisoners, taken 300 wagons, and eighty-seven pieces of cannon, results very uncommon in war. Thus in one day the Austrian army had lost nearly 20,000 soldiers, almost all its artillery, its baggage, and, what was of still greater importance, its whole moral courage.

This battle is the most brilliant of all that Moreau ever fought, and certainly one of the greatest in the present century, which has beheld such extraordinary conflicts. It has been wrongfully asserted that there was another conqueror of Marengo than General Bonaparte, and that this was General Kellermann. With much greater reason it might be alleged that there was another conqueror of Hohenlinden than General Moreau, namely, General Richepanse, for he executed, upon a rather vague order, a most brilliant manœuvre. But, though less unjust, this assertion would still be unjust. Let us leave to every man the merit of his deeds, and not imitate those paltry efforts of envy, which is on all occasions bent on discovering a different conqueror from the real one.

Moreau, in advancing along the Inn from Kufstein to Mühldorf, without having chosen a precise point of attack, without having concentrated all his forces upon that point, to make nothing but mere demonstrations,—Moreau had in this manner exposed his left in the battle of the 1st of December. Still this could prove but a momentary advantage to the enemy; and, in retiring into the recesses of the labyrinth of Hohenlinden, in drawing the Austrians thither, in bringing down opportunely his centre upon his left, from Ebersburg to Mattenboett, he had executed one of the most successful manœuvres known in the history of modern warfare. It has been alleged that Richepanse marched without orders; that is incorrect; an order was given to him, as we have related, but it was too general, not sufficiently detailed. None of the circumstances that might have happened had been provided against. Moreau had merely directed Richepanse and Decaen to strike off from Ebersberg, for St. Christoph, without specifying the route, without providing against either the presence of Riesch's corps, or any of the possible and even probable accidents, amidst that forest full of enemies; and, with an officer less vigorous than Richepanse, he might have reaped a disaster instead

¹ So Napoleon erroneously asserted at St. Helena. The written orders exist, and have been printed in the Memorial of the war.

of a triumph. But fortune always has some share in military successes. All that can be said is, that in this case it was very great, nay, greater than usual.

Moreau has been censured because, while fighting with six divisions out of twelve, he left three under General St. Suzanne on the Danube, three under General Lecourbe on the Upper Inn, and thus exposed his left, under General Grenier, to the hazard of fighting in the proportion of one against two. This reproach is certainly more weighty and more deserved; but let us not tarnish so glorious a triumph, and let us add, in order to be just, that there are flaws in the finest works of men, that in the most splendid victories there are faults,—faults which fortune repairs, and which must be admitted as an ordinary accompaniment of great military exploits.

After this important victory, the conqueror would have done well to pursue the Austrian army briskly, to march for Vienna, to demolish, by pushing forward, the defences of the Tyrol, to necessitate in this manner a retrograde movement in the whole line of the Austrians from Bavaria to Italy; for the retreat of the troops from the Inn would occasion that of the troops from the Tyrol, and the retreat of these latter would render the abandonment of the Mincio inevitable. But to obtain all these results it would have been necessary to have forced the Inn, then the Salza, which falls into the Inn, and forms a second line to cross after the first. At the moment, all this might have been accomplished from the impulsion given to our army by the victory of Hohenlinden.

Moreau, as soon as he had allowed some rest to his troops, moved his left and part of his centre into the Mühldorf road, threatening at once the bridges of Kraiburg, Mühldorf, and Braunau, to persuade the enemy that he intended to cross the Inn in its lower course. But, meanwhile, Lecourbe, who a few months before had so gloriously passed the Danube at the battle of Hochstett, was directed to cross the Inn, with the right, near Rosenheim. This general had discovered a spot called Neuburn, where the right bank, which we occupied, commanded the left bank, occupied by the enemy, and where the artillery might be advantageously employed to protect the passage. This point was therefore chosen. Several days were unfortunately lost in collecting the necessary *matériel*, and it was not till the morning of the 9th of December, six days after the great battle of Hohenlinden, that Lecourbe was enabled to act.

Moreau had suddenly resumed his position on the Upper Inn. The three divisions of the centre had been despatched from Wasserburg to Aibling, at a little distance from Rosenheim, ready to assist Lecourbe. The left had succeeded them in their positions, and General Collaud, with two divisions of St. Suzanne's corps, had been pushed forward from the Isar to Erding.

On the morning of the 9th of December—18th Frimaire—Lecourbe commenced the operations for the passage before Neuburn. Montrichard's division was to cross the Inn

first. General Lemaire placed on the heights of the right bank a battery of twenty-eight pieces of cannon, and swept off every thing that appeared on the left bank. On this part of the Inn there was nothing but Condé's corps, and this was too weak to oppose any serious resistance. While all the enemy's detachments were kept at a respectable distance by a continued fire of artillery, the pontonniers threw themselves into boats, accompanied by some battalions of *élite*, destined to protect their operations. In two hours and a half a bridge was completed, and Montrichard's division could begin to debouch. It advanced upon the Austrians, who retreated, and descended the right bank of the Inn till they were opposite to Rosenheim. They took a strong position at Stephans Kirchen. During this movement the divisions of the centre, stationed before Rosenheim itself, exerted themselves to prevent the Austrians from destroying completely the bridge of that town. Having been unsuccessful, they ascended the Inn and crossed at Neuburn, for the purpose of seconding Lecourbe. Condé's corps, reinforced by some succours, appraised itself, on the one hand, upon the destroyed bridge of Rosenheim, on the other upon the small lake of Chiemsee. Lecourbe sent a detachment to turn this lake, which obliged the enemy to retire, after a resistance that was not very bloody. The Inn was thus crossed, and that formidable obstacle, which it was alleged could not fail to stop the French army, was surmounted. Thus Lecourbe had gathered a fresh laurel in the winter campaign. The march was not slackened. Next day, a bridge was thrown before Rosenheim for the passage of the rest of the centre. Grenier, with the left, crossed the Inn over the bridges of Wasserburg and Mühldorf, which the enemy had abandoned without destroying them.

It was expedient to lose no time in driving the Austrians to the banks of the Salza, which runs behind the Inn and falls into that river, a little above Braunau. The Salza is like a second arm of the Inn itself. If you would cross the Inn near the mountains, you are obliged to cross it twice, as it were; whereas, in passing it in the environs of Braunau, after its junction with the Salza, there is but one passage to perform. But then the volume of its waters is doubled, and the difficulty of crossing by main force is proportionably increased. This reason, and a desire to surprise the enemy, who did not expect to see the French attempt the passage above Rosenheim, had decided the choice of Moreau.

Lecourbe, supported by the divisions of the centre, advanced rapidly, in spite of all the difficulties presented by that hilly country, interspersed with woods, rivers, and lakes,—a country difficult in any season, but still more so in the middle of December. The Austrian army, though shaken by so many reverses, still kept the field. The sentiment of honour, awakened by the danger of the capital, caused it still to make noble efforts to stop us. The Austrian cavalry covered the retreat, and vigorously charged the French corps which advanced too rashly. The enemy crossed the

Alz, which conveys the water of the Chiemsee to the Inn; they passed Fraunstein, and at length arrived near the Salza, not far from Salzburg.

There, before Salzburg itself, was still left a strong position to occupy. The Archduke John thought that he might there concentrate his troops, hoping to procure for them some success, which would raise their courage, and somewhat slacken the daring pursuit of the French. Accordingly, he did concentrate them there on the 13th of December—22d Frimaire.

The town of Salzburg is seated on the Salza. In advance of that river runs another small stream, the Saal, which descends from the neighbouring mountains, and falls into the Salza below Salzburg. The ground between the two is level, marshy, covered with clumps of trees, everywhere difficult of access. Here the Archduke John took a position, with his right to the Salza, his left to the mountains, his front covered by the Saal. His artillery swept this level tract. His cavalry, drawn up on the naked and solid parts of the ground, was ready to charge the French corps which should dare to take the offensive. His infantry was solidly appuyed upon the town of Salzburg.

On the morning of the 14th, Lecourbe, impelled by his ardour, forded the Saal, sustained several charges of cavalry on the strand bordering the river, and bore them bravely; but presently, the thick fog which covered the plain clearing off, he perceived, in advance of Salzburg, a formidable line of cavalry, artillery, and infantry. It was the whole Austrian army. In presence of this danger he behaved with great steadiness, but suffered some loss.

Fortunately, Decaen's division at this moment crossed the Salza towards Laufen, in an almost miraculous manner. On the preceding day, the advanced guard of this division, finding the bridge of Laufen destroyed, had explored the banks of the Salza, everywhere covered by the enemy's tirailleurs, in search of a passage. It had perceived a boat lying on the opposite shore. At this sight, three chasseurs of the 14th swam across to the other side, in spite of the most intense cold, and a current still more rapid than that of the Inn. After fighting hand to hand with several Austrian tirailleurs, they had taken and brought across the boat. Some hundred French availed themselves of it for crossing successively to the opposite bank, occupied a village quite close to the destroyed bridge of Laufen, and barricaded themselves there in such a manner that a small number of them sufficed to defend it. The others had rushed upon the Austrian artillery, taken it, seized all the craft on the right bank of the Salza, and thus furnished the division remaining on the left bank with the means of crossing. On the morning of the following day, the 14th, Decaen's whole division having crossed, and ascending to Salzburg, came up at the very moment when Lecourbe was engaged single-handed with the whole Austrian army. It could not have arrived more opportunely. The Archduke, apprized of the passage of the French, and of their march upon Salzburg, hastily decamped, and thus Lecourbe was extricated from the

serious danger to which chance and his ardour had exposed him.

All the defences of the Inn and the Salza were thus overcome. From that moment there was no obstacle to cover the Austrian army, or to give it courage to resist the French army. In Tyrol, it is true, there were left 25,000 men, who might have annoyed our rear, but it is not when you are victorious, and demoralization has seized your enemy, that you need fear bold attempts. Moreau, having left St. Suzanne's corps behind, to invest Braunau, and to occupy the tract of country between the Inn and the Isar.—Moreau, emboldened by the success attending every step he took, marched towards the Traun and the Ens, which were now incapable of stopping him. Richepanse formed the advanced guard, supported by Grouchy and Decaen. The retreat of the Austrians was affected in disorder. The French picked up every moment men, carriages, or cannon. Richepanse fought brilliant actions at Frankenmarkt, at Vöcklabruck, and at Schwanstadt. Incessantly engaged with the Austrian cavalry, he took so many as 1200 horse at a time. On the 20th of December—29th Frimaire—the French had crossed the Traun, and were marching for Steyer, with the intention of crossing the Ens at that place.

The young Archduke John, whom such a series of disasters had completely disheartened, had just been superseded by the Archduke Charles, who was at length recalled from disgrace, to have a task assigned to him, now impossible to be performed—that of saving the Austrian army. He beheld with grief, on his arrival, the spectacle exhibited by those soldiers of the empire, who, after they had nobly resisted the French, desired that they might no longer be sacrificed to a fatal and universally reprobated policy. He sent M. de Meerfeld to Moreau, to propose an armistice. Moreau agreed to grant forty-eight hours, on condition that within this time he would return from Vienna, furnished with the emperor's powers; but he stipulated, at the same time, that the French army should meanwhile have license to advance to the Ens.

On the 21st, he crossed the Ens at Steyer. His advanced posts appeared on the Ips and the Erlaf. He was at the gates of Vienna; he might feel tempted to enter it, and to appropriate to himself the glory which no French general had yet had, of penetrating into the capital of the empire. But the moderate spirit of Moreau was not fond of pushing fortune to extremities. The Archduke Charles gave him his word that if hostilities were suspended, Austria would treat immediately for peace, on the conditions which France had always insisted upon, especially that of a separate negotiation. Moreau, full of a just esteem for that prince, showed a disposition to believe him.

Several of his lieutenants urged him to march to Vienna.—“It will be better,” he replied, “to secure peace . . . I hear nothing of Macdonald and Brune; I know not whether the one has succeeded in penetrating into the Tyrol, whether the other has been able to cross

the Mincio. Augereau is at a great distance from me, in a critical situation. I might perhaps drive the Austrians to despair, were I to persist in humbling them. We had better halt and be content with peace, for it is for that alone that we are fighting."

These were wise and praiseworthy sentiments. On the 25th of December—4th Nivôse, year IX—he consented, therefore, to sign, at Steyer, a new suspension of arms, the conditions of which were the following:—There was to be a cessation of hostilities in Germany, between the Austrian armies and the French armies, commanded by Moreau and Augereau. General Brune and Macdonald were to be invited to sign a similar armistice for the armies of the Grisons and of Italy. The whole valley of the Danube, including the Tyrol, was given up to the French, besides the fortresses of Braunau and Wurtzburg, the forts of Scharnitz, Kufstein, &c. The Austrian magazines were placed at our disposal. No detachment of troops could be sent to Italy, in case a suspension of arms should not be agreed to by the generals commanding in that country. This stipulation was obligatory on both armies.

Moreau was satisfied with these conditions, calculating, with reason, upon peace, and preferring it to more signal but more hazardous triumphs. A brilliant glory surrounded his name, for his winter campaign surpassed that of the spring. After crossing the Rhine in that first spring campaign, and driving the Austrians to the Danube, while the First Consul was crossing the Alps; after having then dislodged them from their camp at Ulm by the battle of Hochstett, and pushed them back to the Inn, he had taken breath during the summer, and, resuming his march in winter, during the most intense cold, he had overwhelmed them at Hohenlinden, driven them from the Inn to the Salza, from the Salza to the Traun and the Ens, pushing them, in disorder, to the very gates of Vienna. At last, halting a few leagues from the capital, he granted them time for signing peace. In his conduct there had been irresolution, dilatoriness, in short, faults which severe judges have since keenly censured, as if to revenge, on the memory of Moreau, the injustices committed upon the memory of Napoleon; but there was an unbroken series of successes, obtained by prudence and firmness. We ought to respect all glories, and not destroy one to avenge another. Moreau had proved himself capable of commanding 100,000 men with prudence and vigour; no man, excepting Napoleon, has manœuvred such a force so well, in the present century; and, although the place of the conqueror of Hohenlinden be at an immense distance from that of the conqueror of Rivoli, of Marengo, and of Austerlitz, that place is, nevertheless, glorious, and would have remained glorious, if criminal misconduct, the fatal effects of jea-

lousy, had not subsequently sullied a life till then noble and pure.

The armistice in Germany happened seasonably for extricating the Gallo-Batavian army, commanded by Augereau, from its hazardous position. The Austrian general, Klenau, who had always remained at a great distance from the Archduke John, had suddenly formed a junction with Simbschen, and, by this union of forces, had brought Augereau into danger. But the latter had bravely defended the Rudnitz, and maintained his ground till the conclusion of hostilities. The retreat of the Austrians into Bohemia relieved him from embarrassment, and the armistice covered him from the dangers of a position too destitute of support, since Moreau was at the gates of Vienna.

During these events in Germany, hostilities continued in the Alps and in Italy. The First Consul, seeing, from the commencement of the campaign, that Moreau could dispense with the assistance of the army in the Grisons, had ordered Macdonald to cross the Splügen, to throw himself from the great chain of the Alps into the Valteline, and from the Valteline into Italian Tyrol, then to proceed to Trent, and thus turn the line of the Mincio, and, by this manœuvre, put an end to the resistance of the Austrians in the plains of Italy. No objection, founded on the height of the Splügen or the inclemency of the season, could shake the First Consul. He had invariably replied that, wherever two men could set their feet, an army had the means of passing, and that the Alps were easier to cross in frost than when the snow was melting, the season in which he had himself crossed the Saint Bernard. This was the argument of an absolute spirit, which is determined to attain its end at any rate whatever. The event proved that, in the mountains, winter is attended with dangers at least equal to those of spring, and that, moreover, it dooms men to the most frightful hardships.

General Macdonald prepared to obey, and he did it with all the energy of his character. After leaving Morlot's division in the Grisons, to guard the débouchés which communicate between the Grisons and the Engadine, (the upper valley of the Inn,) he approached the Splügen. For some time past the division of Baraguay d'Hilliers¹ was in the Upper Valteline, threatening the Engadine from the Italian side; while Morlot threatened it from the side next to the Grisons. With the bulk of his army, about 12,000 men, Macdonald commenced his movement, and climbed the first acclivities of the Splügen. The passage of that lofty mountain, narrow and winding during an ascent of several leagues, was attended with the greatest dangers, especially at that season, when frequent tempests covered the roads with enormous drifts of snow and ice. The artillery and ammunition had been placed

¹ BARAGUAY D'HILLIERS, LOUIS. Born of a noble family at Paris in 1764. He entered the service early, and was in the regiment of Alsau on the breaking out of the Revolution. He was aid-de-camp successively to Crillon, La Bourdonnaye Montesquieu, and Custine, with whom he was arrested in 1793. Tried and acquitted by the revolutionary tribunal in 1794, he was again

disgraced with Menou in 1795. Employed in Italy in 1796. Had a command in the army of Egypt, and was taken by the English in the frigate *Sensible* in 1798. In 1799 he was on the general staff on the Rhine. Shared the events of the 18th of Brumaire, and was made inspector-general of the 14th, 15th, and 16th divisions.—*Biographie Moderne* m.

on sledges, and the soldiers were laden with biscuit and cartridges. The first column, composed of cavalry and artillery, began the passage in fine weather, but it was all at once assailed by a tremendous tempest. An avalanche precipitated one half of a squadron of dragoons into the abyss, and struck terror into the soldiers. They, nevertheless, kept up their courage. In three days, the storm having ceased, a fresh attempt was made to cross this formidable mountain. It was encumbered with snow. Oxen were driven before the troops, to trample the snow, into which they sunk up to the belly; then labourers beat it down hard; the infantry, in passing, rendered it quite solid; lastly, sappers widened the passes, when too narrow, by cutting the ice with hatchets. These exertions were requisite to render the road passable for cavalry and artillery. The first days of December were thus spent in effecting the passage of the first three columns. The soldiers endured these horrible sufferings with admirable fortitude, living upon biscuit and a small quantity of brandy. The fourth and last column had at last nearly reached the summit of the mountain, when a fresh storm once more closed the passage, entirely dispersed the 104th demi-brigade, and buried about 100 men. General Macdonald was there. He rallied his soldiers, cheered them under dangers and hardships, caused the road, barred by blocks of frozen snow, to be again opened, and at length de-bouched with all the rest of his corps into the Valteline.

This truly extraordinary enterprise had carried the greater part of the army of the Grisons across the great chain, and to the very threshold of the Italian Tyrol. General Macdonald, as he had been ordered, sought, as soon as he had passed the Splügen, to concert with Brune before proceeding to the sources of the Mincio and the Adige, and thus demolishing the whole defensive line of the Austrians, which extended from the Alps to the Adriatic.

Brune would not deprive himself of a whole division to assist Macdonald, but he consented to detach Lecchi's Italian division, which was to ascend from the valley of the Chiesa to the Rocca d'Anfo. Macdonald, therefore, resolved to ascend the Valteline, and to attack Mont Tonal, which commands the pass into the Tyrol and the valley of the Adige. But here, though the height was inferior to that of the Splügen, the ice was as deeply drifted; and besides, General Wukassowich had covered the principal approaches to Mont Tonal with intrenchments. On the 22d and 23d of December, General Vandamme made an attack at the head of a corps of grenadiers, and renewed it several times with heroic courage. Those brave fellows made incredible but useless efforts. Several times, marching upon the ice, and exposed to a most destructive fire, they advanced to the very palisades of the intrenchment, and endeavoured to pull them up, but, the ground being frozen, they were foiled in the attempt. It was useless to persist further; it was, therefore, resolved, to pass into the valley of the Oglio, to descend it to Pisogno, and then proceed into the valley of the Chiesa. The

intention in this was to cross the mountains in a less elevated region, and by passes not so well defended. Macdonald, having descended to Pisogno, crossed the Cols which separated him from the valley of the Chiesa, formed his junction with Lecchi's brigade towards the Rocca d'Anfo, and found himself beyond the obstacles which parted him from the Italian Tyrol and the Adige. He was enabled to reach Trent, before General Wukassowich had effected his retreat from the heights of Mont Tonal, and to take a position between the Austrians who defended the sources of the rivers amidst the Alps, and the Austrians who defended the lower part of their courses in the plains of Italy.

Brune, before he attempted to force the Mincio, had waited till Macdonald had made sufficient progress for the attacks to be nearly simultaneous in the mountains and in the plain. Out of 125,000 spread over Italy, he had, as we have observed, 100,000 effective men, tried soldiers, and recruited after their privations, an artillery admirably organized by General Marmont, and an excellent cavalry. Nearly 20,000 men guarded Lombardy, Piedmont, Liguria, and Tuscany. A weak brigade, commanded by General Petitot, observed the Austrian troops, which, setting out from Ferrara, threatened Bologna. The national guard of the latter city was ready, besides, to defend itself against the Austrians. The Neapolitans were again passing through the Roman States on their march to Tuscany; but Murat, with the 10,000 men from the camp of Amiens, was gone to meet them. Brune, after providing for the guard of the different parts of Italy, had about 70,000 men to direct upon the Mincio. General Bonaparte, who was perfectly acquainted with this theatre of operations, had recommended to him carefully to concentrate his troops as much as possible in Upper Italy; to take no heed what the Austrians might attempt towards the banks of the Po, in the Legations, or even in Tuscany; to remain steadily, as he had himself formerly done, at the débouchés of the Alps; and he was incessantly repeating that, when the Austrians should be beaten between the Mincio and the Adige, that is to say, on the line by which they enter Italy, all those who had passed the Po and penetrated into central Italy would be in so much the greater danger.

The Austrians did actually seem disposed to come out of Ferrara and to threaten Bologna; but General Petitot found means to repress them, and the national guard of Bologna displayed on its part the firmest attitude.

Brune, straightways conforming to the instructions which he had received, advanced to the Mincio, between the 20th and 24th of December,—29th Frimaire to 3d Nivôse,—took the positions which the Austrians had occupied in advance of that river, and made his dispositions for passing it on the morning of the 25th. General Delmas¹ commanded his

¹ DELMAS was born at Tullies, of a poor but noble family. In 1791, he was chief of the first battalion of the Corrèze. He distinguished himself in the army of the North, and was soon made general of brigade. In 1793, he served in the army of the Rhine, and afterwards

advanced-guard, General Moncey¹ his left. General Dupont his right, and General Michaud his reserve. Besides the cavalry and artillery distributed in the divisions, he had a considerable reserve of both.

In recording the first campaigns of General Bonaparte,² we have already described this theatre as the scene of so many memorable events; we must, nevertheless, portray in a few words the configuration of the country. The mass of the waters of the Tyrol is discharged by the Adige into the Adriatic: hence the Adige forms a line of great strength. But, before you reach the line of the Adige, you come to one of minor importance, namely, that of the Mincio. The waters of several valleys lateral to that of the Tyrol, at first accumulated in the lake of Garda, afterwards pour themselves into the Mincio, tarry some time at Mantua, around which they form an inundation, and at last fall into the Po. There was, consequently, a double line to cross, first that of the Mincio, then that of the Adige, the latter being far the more considerable and the stronger of the two. It was requisite to cross both, and if this were done promptly enough to give a hand to Macdonald, who was marching by the Rocca d'Anfo and Trent to the Upper Adige, it would be possible to separate the Austrian army defending the Tyrol from the Austrian army defending the Mincio, and to take the former.

The line of the Mincio, seven or eight leagues long at most, appuying on the lake of Garda on the one hand and Mantua on the other, bristling with artillery, and defended by 70,000 Austrians, under the command of the Count de Bellegarde, was not easy to force. The enemy had at Borghetto and Valleggio a well intrenched bridge, which enabled him to act on both banks. The river was not fordable at this season; and the mass of its waters had been further increased by closing all the canals which are supplied by it.

Brune, after collecting his columns, conceived the singular idea of crossing the Mincio at two points at once, at Pozzolo and at Mozzembano. Between these two points the river formed a bend, the convexity of which was turned towards our troops; moreover, the right bank, which we occupied, commanded the left bank occupied by the Austrians, so that at Mozzembano, as well as at Pozzolo, we could open a converging fire from higher batteries upon the enemy's bank, and thus cover the operation of a passage. But at both points the Austrians were found firmly seated behind the Mincio, covered with solid intrenchments, appuyed either on Mantua or on Peschiera.

The advantages and the inconveniences of the passage were, therefore, nearly alike at Pozzolo and at Mozzembano. But what ought to have decided Brune to prefer one of the two points, no matter which, while he might have made a false demonstration on the other, was that between these two points there was a *tête de pont*, then occupied by the enemy. The Austrians, therefore, could debouch by this *tête de pont*, and throw themselves on one of the two operations with a view to interrupt it. It follows that only one should have been attempted, and that with the whole of the forces.

Brune, nevertheless, persisted in his double plan, apparently to divide the enemy's attention, and on the 25th of December made all necessary dispositions for a double passage. But difficulties which supervened in regard to carriage, difficulties extremely great at this season, prevented every thing from being ready at Mozzembano, the point at which Brune himself was with the greater part of his troops, and the operation was deferred till the next day. It would seem that, in this case, the second passage ought to have been countermanded; but Brune, having always considered the attempt near Pozzolo as a mere diversion, thought that the diversion would produce its effect with the greater certainty, if it preceded the principal operation by twenty-four hours.

Dupont, who commanded at Pozzolo, was an officer full of ardour: he advanced, on the morning of the 25th, to the bank of the Mincio, crowned with artillery the heights of Molino della Volta, which commanded the opposite bank, threw a bridge in a very short time, and, favoured by a thick fog, succeeded in passing Watrin's division to the right bank. Meanwhile, Brune continued motionless with the left and the reserves, at Mozzembano. General Suchet,³ placed between the two with the centre, masked the Austrian bridge of Borghetto. General Dupont, then, was on the left bank with a single corps, in presence of the whole Austrian army. It was easy to foresee the result. The Count de Bellegarde, without loss of time, directed the mass of his forces upon Pozzolo. General Dupont sent to apprise his neighbour, Suchet, and the commander-in-chief, of the success of the passage, and of the danger to which that success exposed him. General Suchet, like a brave and faithful comrade, hastened to the assistance of Dupont's division; but, on quitting Borghetto, he sent to beg Brune to provide for the guard of that débouché, which he left uncovered by his movement towards Pozzolo. Brune, instead of hurrying with all his forces to the point where a lucky accident had opened the

with great credit in Holland. He carried the advanced works at Bols-le-Duc, by leaping the palisades on horseback at the head of a body of hussars.

He served in the army of Italy, in 1797 and 1799, and again in 1800 with great credit on the Rhine.—*Biographie Moderne*.

1. MONCEY, BON. ADRIAN JEAN-OT. Born at Besançon in 1754. His father was an advocate, he entered the regiment of Champagne in 1773, and in 1789, at 25 years, was only a sub-lieutenant of dragons. In 1790 captain, in 1794, chief of battalion, and in 1796, general of division. He led one of the divisions of Napoleon's army, that of St. Gothard, across the Alps, and fought at Mazingo, Pozzolo, and Roveredo.—*Court and Camp of Napoleon*.

2. In the *History of the French Revolution*.

3. SUCHET, LOUIS GABRIEL. Born at Lyons in 1770, the son of a silk manufacturer. Entered a regiment raised in Lyons, as volunteer, at twenty years. In 1793 commanded a battalion at the siege of Toulon, and captured General O'Hara. In 1794, joined the army of Italy, distinguished himself at Vado and Laona, where he took three Austrian standards. In 1796, commanded the eighteenth battalion under Massena, fought at Dego, Lodi, Rivoli, Arcola, &c., &c.

In 1798, distinguished himself against the Swiss, and was sent to Paris, with twenty-three standards. He served in Italy and on the Danube, with Joubert, &c., &c.—*Court and Camp of Napoleon*.

passage of the Mincio to his army—Brune, still engrossed by his operation of the following day upon Mozzembano, never quitted his position. He approved the movement of General Suchet, at the same time recommending to him not to compromise himself on the other side of the river, and merely sent Boudet's division to mask the bridge of Borghetto.

But General Dupont, eager to follow up his success, was absolutely engaged. He had crossed the Mincio, taken Pozzolo, which is situated on the left bank, and carried successively Watrin's and Monnier's divisions across the river. One of his wings was appuyed on Pozzolo, the other on the Mincio, under the protection of the elevated batteries of the right bank.

The Austrians marched with all their reinforcements upon that position. They were preceded by a great number of pieces of cannon. Fortunately, our artillery, placed at Molino della Volta, and firing from one bank to the other, protected our soldiers by the superiority of its fire. The Austrians fell furiously upon Watrin's and Monnier's divisions. The 6th light, the 28th, and the 40th of the line, were wellnigh overwhelmed, but they resisted, with admirable intrepidity, all the joint assaults of the Austrian infantry and cavalry. Monnier's division, however, surprised in Pozzolo by a column of grenadiers, was dislodged. At this moment, Dupont's corps, separated from its principal *point d'appui*, was on the point of being thrown into the Mincio. But General Suchet, arriving on the other bank, with Gazan's division, and perceiving from the heights of Molino della Volta the serious danger of his brother commander, engaged with 10,000 men against 30,000, hastened to send him reinforcements. Restrained, at the same time, by the orders of Brune, he durst not send him the whole of Gazan's division, and threw Clauzel's brigade only to the other side of the river. This brigade was insufficient; and Dupont must have succumbed notwithstanding these succours, when the rest of Gazan's division, crowning the opposite bank, from which the Austrians could be reached with grape-shot and even by musketry, poured on them a murderous fire, and thus stopped them short. Dupont's troops, being supported, resumed the offensive, and made the Austrians fall back. General Suchet, seeing that the danger increased every moment, resolved to send Gazan's whole division to the other bank. The important point of Pozzolo was thenceforward most fiercely disputed. That village was six times taken and retaken. At nine o'clock at night, the combatants were still fighting by moonlight and in a severe frost. The French finally remained masters of the left bank, but they had lost the *élite* of four divisions. The Austrians had left 6000 dead or wounded on the field of battle, the French nearly as many. But for the arrival of General Suchet, our left wing would have been destroyed; and, as it was, he durst not engage completely, his hands being tied by the orders of the commander-in-chief. If M. de Bellegarde had directed his whole forces upon that point, or if he had debouched from the bridge of Borghetto, while

Brune was immovable at Mozzembano, he might have inflicted a disaster on the centre and on the right of the French army.

Fortunately, he did nothing of the kind. The Mincio was thus crossed at one point. Brune persisted in his plan of passing the next day, the 25th of December, towards Mozzembano, thus exposing himself anew to the risks of an operation by main force. He covered the heights of Mozzembano with forty pieces of cannon, and favoured by the fogs of the season, succeeded in throwing a bridge. The Austrians, fatigued with the preceding day, doubting the intention of a second passage, made less resistance than the day before, and suffered the neighbouring positions of Sallionzo and Valleggio to be taken from them.

The whole army debouched in this manner beyond the Mincio, and was enabled to march, with all its divisions united, for the second line, that of the Adige. The *tête de pont* of Borghetto must have fallen as a matter of course, from the offensive movement of our columns. A fresh blunder was committed in sacrificing several hundred of our brave soldiers for the conquest of a point which was not tenable. Twelve hundred Austrians were made prisoners there.

The French were victorious, but at the cost of valuable blood, which Generals Bonaparte and Moreau would not have failed to spare the army. Lecourbe passed the rivers of Germany in a different manner. Brune, having forced the Mincio, advanced towards the Adige, which he ought to have crossed immediately. He was not ready to effect the passage till the 31st of December—10th Nivôse. On the 1st of January, General Delmas, with the advanced guard, crossed the river without accident at Bus-solengo, above Verona. General Moncey, with the left, was to ascend to Trent, while the rest of the army descended again to envelope Verona.

Count de Bellegarde was at this moment in imminent danger. Part of the troops of the Tyrol, under General Laudon, had retired before Macdonald, and fallen back upon Trent. General Moncey, with his corps was marching thither also, in reascending the Adige. General Laudon, hemmed in between Macdonald's corps and Moncey's, must succumb, unless he had time to escape into the valley of the Brenta, which, running beyond the Adige, terminates, after numerous windings at Bassano. Brune, if he suddenly crossed the Adige, and vigorously pushed Count de Bellegarde beyond Verona, to Bassano itself, might anticipate at this latter point the corps of the Tyrol, and take it entire by closing the débouché of the Brenta.

An act not the most honourable of General Laudon's, and the tardiness of General Brune, extenuated, it is true, by the season, extricated the Tyrol corps from all these perils.

Macdonald had actually reached Trent, while Moncey's corps was proceeding thither, on its side. General Laudon, hemmed in between these two corps, had recourse to a falsehood. He assured General Moncey that an armistice had just been signed in Germany, and that this armistice extended to both armies, which was false; for the convention signed at Steyer by Moreau applied only to the armies operating upon the Danube. General Moncey, from a

nice sense of honour, credited the statement of General Laudon, and opened to him the passes leading to the Brenta; so that he was enabled to rejoin the Count de Bellegarde in the environs of Bassano.

But the disasters in Germany were known. The Austrian army, beaten in Italy, pressed by an army of 90,000 men, since the junction of Macdonald's and Brune's troops, could hold out no longer. An armistice was proposed to Brune, who hastened to accept it, and signed it on the 16th of January at Treviso. Brune, impatient to settle matters, demanded no more than the line of the Adige, with the fortresses of Ferrara, Peschiera, and Portolegnago. He never thought of requiring the cession of Mantua. Yet he had received specific orders not to halt till he had entered Isonzo, and made himself master of Mantua. That place was the only one which was worth the trouble; for all the others must have fallen as a matter of course. It was of especial importance to occupy it, that there might be a ground for demanding, at the Congress of Lunéville, its cession to the Cisalpine Republic.

While these events were occurring in Upper Italy, the Neapolitans penetrated into Tuscany. The Count de Damas, who commanded a corps of 16,000 men, 8000 of whom were Neapolitans, had advanced to Sienna. General Miollis, obliged to guard all the posts of Tuscany, had not more than 3500 disposable men, mostly Italians. He marched, nevertheless, to meet the Neapolitans. The brave soldiers of Pino's division rushed upon the advanced-guard of the Count de Damas, overthrew it, forced an entrance into Sienna, and put to the sword a considerable number of the insurgents. The Count de Damas was obliged to fall back. Besides, Murat was advancing with his grenadiers, to wring from him the signature of a third armistice.

Thus the campaign was finished everywhere, and peace insured. In every quarter our operations had been successful. Moreau's army, flanked by that of Augereau, had penetrated to the very gates of Vienna; Brune's, seconded by that of Macdonald, had passed the Mincio and the Adige, and advanced to Treviso. Though it had not entirely thrown the Austrians to the other side of the Alps, it had dispossessed them of sufficient territory to furnish the French negotiator at Lunéville with powerful arguments against the pretensions of Austria in Italy. Murat was about to complete the submission of the court of Naples.

On receiving intelligence of the battle of Hohenlinden, the First Consul, who was said to be jealous of Moreau, was filled with sincere joy.¹ This victory lost none of its value in his estimation, because it was achieved by a rival. He deemed himself so superior to all his companions in arms, in military glory, and in political influence, that he felt no jealousy of any of them. Wholly devoted to the task of pacifying and reorganizing France, he derived warm satisfaction from every event which

contributed to facilitate his task, even when such events added to the fame of those men who were destined afterwards to be set up for rivals to him.

What displeased him in this campaign was the useless effusion of French blood at Pozzolo, and especially the grievous fault of not demanding Mantua. He refused to ratify the convention at Treviso, and declared that he would give orders for the renewal of hostilities, if the fortress of Mantua were not immediately delivered to the French army.

All the while, Joseph Bonaparte and M. de Cobentzel were at Lunéville, awaiting the events occurring on the Danube and the Adige. It is a singular situation, that of two negotiators, treating while hostilities are going on, witnesses, as it were, of the duel between two great nations, expecting every instant the news not of the death, but of the exhaustion of the one or the other. On this occasion, M. de Cobentzel displayed an energy of character, which may be held up as an example to men who are called to serve their country in disastrous circumstances. He did not suffer himself to be disconcerted by the defeat of the Austrians at Hohenlinden, or by the passage of the Inn, the Salza, the Traun, &c. To all these events he replied, with imperturbable composure, that all this was certainly unfortunate, but that the Archduke Charles had recovered from his mortifications; that he had arrived at the head of the extraordinary levies of Bohemia and Hungary; that he had brought to the assistance of the capital 25,000 Bohemians and 75,000 Hungarians; that, in advancing farther, the French would meet with a resistance which they did not expect. At the same time, he persisted in all the pretensions of Austria, particularly in that of not treating without an English plenipotentiary, who would at least mask by his presence the real negotiations which might take place between the two legations. Sometimes he went so far as to say, that he would retire to Frankfort, and thus put an end to the hopes of peace, which the First Consul needed for lulling people's minds. At this threat the First Consul, who never shuffled when any one tried to intimidate him, sent word to M. de Cobentzel, that if he left Lunéville, all chance of an accommodation would be totally lost, and that the war should be pushed to the utmost extremity, even to the entire destruction of the Austrian monarchy.

Amidst this diplomatic struggle, M. de Cobentzel received intelligence of the armistice of Steyer, the emperor's order to treat on any terms, and, in particular, urgent injunctions to obtain an extension to Italy of the armistice already agreed on for Germany; for there would be nothing gained, if, after stopping one of the two French armies which were marching for Vienna, the other should be suffered to reach that capital by the Friule and Carinthia. In consequence, M. de Cobentzel declared, on the 31st of December, that he was ready to treat without the concurrence of England; that he consented to sign preliminaries of peace, or a definitive treaty, whichever the French government pleased; but that, before he definitively committed himself by separating from

¹ M. de Bourrienne says that "he leaped for joy;" and this biographer is not to be suspected, for though he owed every thing to Napoleon, he seems not to have recollected this in his Memoirs.

England, he desired that an armistice common to Italy and Germany should be signed, and that some explanation respecting the conditions of peace should be entered into, at least in a general manner. For his part, he proposed these conditions: the Oglio, for the boundary of Austria in Italy, together with the Legations; and at the same time, the reinstatement of the Dukes of Modena and Tuscany in their former dominions.

These conditions were unreasonable. The First Consul would not have admitted them even before the successes of the winter campaign, and still less after them.

The reader has not forgotten the preliminaries signed by the Count de St. Julien. The treaty of Campo Formio was there adopted for basis, with this difference, that certain indemnities promised to Austria for various petty territories should be granted in Italy, instead of Germany. We have already mentioned the drift of this negotiation; the treaty of Campo Formio assigned the Adige for the boundary between the Cisalpine Republic and Austria; by promising Austria indemnities in Italy, she was led to hope for the Mincio, for example, instead of the Adige, as a boundary, but the Mincio at most, and never the territory of the Legations, which the First Consul intended to dispose of otherwise.

The ideas of the First Consul were thenceforth fixed. He determined that Austria should pay the expenses of the winter campaign; he determined that she should have the Adige, and nothing more, and that she should receive no indemnity, either in Germany or Italy, for the small territories ceded on the left bank of the Rhine. As for the Legations, he meant to reserve them, and to make them subservient to various combinations. Hitherto they had belonged to the Cisalpine Republic. His design was either to leave them to it, or to devote them to the aggrandizement of the house of Parma, promised, by treaty, to the court of Spain. In this latter case, he should give Parma to the Cisalpine, Tuscany to the house of Parma, which would be a considerable aggrandizement, and the Legations to the Grand-duke of Tuscany. As for the Duke of Modena, Austria had promised, by the treaty of Campo Formio, to indemnify him for the loss of his duchy by means of the Brisgau. It was, therefore, for her to fulfil her engagements towards that prince.

The First Consul wished for something else, that was thoroughly understood but very difficult to make Austria agree to. He wished not to be obliged, as after the peace of Campo Formio, to hold a congress with the princes of the empire, to obtain from each individually the formal cession of the right bank of the Rhine to France. He recollected the congress of Rastadt, which terminated in the murder of our plenipotentiaries; he recollected the trouble it had been to treat with each prince separately, and to agree with all those who had lost territories upon a system of indemnities that would satisfy them. In consequence, he required that the emperor should sign, as head of the house of Austria, for what related to his house, and, as emperor, for what related

to the empire. In short, he wanted to have, in a single stroke, an acknowledgment of our conquests, both on the part of Austria and on the part of the Germanic confederation.

He, therefore, ordered his brother Joseph to notify to M. de Cobentzel the following conditions, as definitely fixed:—The left bank of the Rhine to France; the boundary of the Adige for Austria and the Cisalpine, without relinquishing the Legations; the Legations to the Duke of Tuscany; Tuscany to the Duke of Parma; Parma to the Cisalpine; the Brisgau to the Duke of Modena; lastly, peace to be signed by the emperor, both for himself and for the empire. As for the armistice in Italy, he was willing to grant it, on condition of the immediate delivery of the fortress of Mantua to the French army.

As the First Consul was acquainted with the Austrian manner of negotiating, and particularly that of M. de Cobentzel, he wished to cut short a great many difficulties, a great many oppositions, a great many threats of a feigned desperation; and he devised a new way of signifying his *ultimatum*. The Legislative Body had just assembled; it was proposed to it on the 2d of January—12th Nivose,—to declare that the four armies commanded by Generals Moreau, Brune, Macdonald, and Angereau, were entitled to their country's thanks. A message, added to this proposal, announced that M. de Cobentzel had at length engaged to treat without the concurrence of England, and that the definitive condition of peace was the Rhine for France, and the Adige for the Cisalpine Republic. The message added that, in case these conditions were not accepted, the French would march on Prague, on Vienna, and on Venice, and there enforce them.

This communication was hailed with transport in Paris, but excited a strong emotion at Lunéville. M. de Cobentzel raised great outcries against the hardness of these conditions, and particularly against their form. He complained bitterly that France seemed to be making the treaty by herself, without having to negotiate with anybody. He, nevertheless, continued firm, and declared that Austria could not give way on all the points, that she would rather fall with arms in her hand than accede to such conditions. M. de Cobentzel consented, however, to fall back from the Oglio to the Ciesà, which runs between the Oglio and the Mincio, on condition of having Peschiera, Mantua, and Ferrara, without obligation to demolish those fortresses. He consented to indemnify the Duke of Modena with the Brisgau, but he insisted on the restitution of the dominions of the Duke of Tuscany. He spoke of formal guarantees to be given for the independence of Piedmont, the Holy See, Naples, &c. As for peace with the empire, he declared that the emperor was about to demand powers of the Germanic Diet, but that his sovereign would never take it upon him so treat for it without being authorized. He insisted further on the signature of an armistice in Italy, declaring that, as for Mantua, if Austria were to deliver that fortress to the French army, she would put all Italy at once into the hands of the French, and deprive herself of all means

of resistance, if hostilities should be renewed. Adding caresses to firmness, M. de Cobentzel endeavoured to touch Joseph, by talking to him of the favourable dispositions of the emperor towards France, and particularly towards the First Consul, insinuating even that Austria might probably ally herself with the French Republic, and that such an alliance would be very serviceable against the secret but real ill-will of the northern courts.

Joseph, who was extremely mild, could not help being affected, to a certain degree, by the complaints, the threats, and the caresses of M. de Cobentzel. The First Consul roused his energy by numerous despatches. "You are forbidden," he wrote to him, "to admit of any discussion on the principle laid down in the ultimatum: *the Rhine and the Adige*. Stick to those two conditions as irrevocable. Hostilities shall not cease in Italy till Mantua is given up. If they begin again, the *thalweg* of the Adige shall be carried back to the Julian Alps, and Austria shall be excluded from Italy. If Austria," added the First Consul, "should talk of her friendship and her alliance, reply that those who have just shown themselves so attached to the English alliance cannot care about ours. Assume, in negotiating, the attitude of General Moreau, and force M. de Cobentzel to play the part of the Archduke John."

At length, after a further resistance of several days, intelligence more and more alarming every moment arriving from the banks of the Mincio—it must not be forgotten that hostilities continued in Lombardy longer than in Germany—M. de Cobentzel consented, on the 15th of January, 1801—25th Nivôse—that the Adige should be adopted for the boundary of the possessions of Austria in Italy. He ceased to mention the Duke of Modena, but renewed the formal demand of the reinstatement of the Duke of Tuscany in his dominions. He consented further to declare that the peace of the empire should be signed at Lunéville, but after the emperor should have obtained powers from the Germanic Diet. In the same protocol, this plenipotentiary again claimed an armistice for Italy, but without assenting to the condition which France attached to it—the immediate delivery of Mantua to our troops. His fear was, that after giving up this *point d'appui*, France would impose harder conditions; and alarming as the resumption of hostilities appeared to him, he would not yet part with this pledge.

This persevering firmness in defending his country in so difficult a situation was natural and honourable, but at last it became imprudent, and led to consequences which M. de Cobentzel had not foreseen.

The occurrences in the north contributed as much as the victories of our armies to augment the pretensions of the First Consul. He had hitherto sought anxiously for peace with Austria; in the first place, to have peace, and, in the next, to secure himself against one of those changes of humour so frequent in the Emperor Paul. For some months past, it is true, that prince had shown a keen resentment against Austria and England; but a manœuvre of the Austrian or English cabinet might bring back the Czar to the coalition, and then France

would again have all Europe upon her hands. It was this apprehension which had induced the First Consul to brave the inconveniences of a winter campaign, in order to crush Austria while she was deprived of the support of the forces of the continent. The turn which events had recently taken in the north having relieved him from all fear on this head, he had become at once more patient and more exacting. Paul, in fact, had formally broken with his late allies, and thrown himself completely into the arms of France, with that warmth which he showed in all his actions. Strongly disposed to this line of conduct by the effect produced upon his mind by the victory of Marengo, by the restitution of the Russian prisoners, by the offer of the island of Malta, lastly, by the adroit and delicate flatteries of the First Consul, he had been definitively decided by a recent event. It will be recollected that the First Consul, despairing of saving Malta, strictly blockaded by the English, had conceived the happy idea of offering that island to Paul I.; that this prince had received that offer with transport; that he had commissioned M. de Sprengporten to go to Paris, to thank the head of the French government, to receive the Russian prisoners, and to conduct them to Malta, to form its garrison. But in the mean time, General Vaubois, reduced to the last extremity, had been compelled to surrender the island to the English. This event, which, under any other circumstances, must have mortified the First Consul, grieved him but little. "I have lost Malta," said he, "but I have put an apple of discord into the hands of my enemies." Paul hastened to claim from England the seat of the Order of St. John of Jerusalem; but the British cabinet, instead of giving it up, replied by a flat refusal. Paul was enraged beyond measure. He laid an embargo on the English shipping, caused so many as three hundred of their vessels at once to be seized in the ports of Russia, and even ordered such as endeavoured to escape to be sunk. This circumstance, added to the quarrel of the neutrals noticed above, could not fail to produce a war. The czar put himself at the head of this quarrel, calling to his aid Sweden, Denmark, and even Prussia, and proposing to them to renew the league of maritime neutrality of 1780. He invited the king of Sweden to repair to St. Petersburg, to confer with him on this important subject. Gustavus went thither, and was magnificently entertained. Paul, full of the mania with which he was possessed, held at St. Petersburg a grand chapter of Malta, admitted as knights the King of Sweden and all the personages who accompanied him, and conferred most lavishly the honours of the Order. But he did something more serious—he immediately renewed the league of 1780. On the 26th of December, a declaration was signed by the ministers of Russia, Sweden, and Denmark, by which those three maritime powers engaged to maintain even by arms, the principles of the law of neutrals. They specified all these principles in their declaration, without omitting one of those which we have mentioned, and which France had just induced America to recognise. The

be and themselves, moreover, to unite their forces, and to direct them in common against any power whatever that should violate the rights which they alleged to belong to them. Denmark, though extremely zealous for the interests of the neutrals, would have been glad not to proceed so fast; but the ice defended her for three months, and she hoped that, before her waters were navigable, England would have given way, or at least that the preparations of the neutrals of the Baltic would be sufficient to prevent the British fleet from appearing before the Sound, as it had done in the month of August last. Prussia too, which would rather have negotiated than proceeded with such promptness, was hurried along like Sweden and Denmark, and gave her adhesion two days afterwards to the declaration of St. Petersburg.

These were important events, and insured to France the alliance of the whole north of Europe against England; but these were not all the diplomatic successes of the First Consul. The Emperor Paul had proposed to Prussia to concur with France in what was passing at Lunéville, and to agree to three of the bases of the general peace. Now, the tenour of the communications¹ of these two powers to our government, entirely coincided with those principles on which France had most insisted at Lunéville.

Prussia and Russia conceded the left bank of the Rhine, without dispute, to the French Republic; but they demanded an indemnity for the princes who lost portions of territory, but solely for the hereditary princes, and by means of the secularization of the Ecclesiastical States. This was precisely the principle which Austria repudiated, and which France proposed. Russia and Prussia demanded the independence of Holland, of Switzerland, of Piedmont and of Naples, which, at the moment, was in no way contrary to the designs of the First Consul. The Emperor Paul interfered in behalf of Naples and Piedmont, solely on account of the treaty of alliance concluded with those states in 1798, when it had been necessary to involve them in the second coalition war; but he meant to protect Naples only on condition that this court should break with England. As for Piedmont, he claimed but a slight indemnity for the cession of Savoy to France. He thought it right, and Prussia with him, that France should curb the ambition of

Austria in Italy, and confine her within the boundary of the Adige. Paul became at last so ardent, that he proposed to the First Consul to form a close alliance with him against England, and to engage not to make peace with her until the restitution of Malta to the Order of St. John of Jerusalem. This was more than was desired by the First Consul, who was shy of such absolute engagements. Paul, wishing appearances to correspond with the real state of things, opened, instead of the clandestine communications between M. de Krudener and General Beurnonville in Berlin, a public negotiation in Paris itself. He accordingly appointed M. de Kalitscheff as plenipotentiary to treat ostensibly with the French cabinet. M. de Kalitscheff received orders to repair immediately to France. This negotiator was the bearer of a letter addressed to the First Consul, and, moreover, written by the Emperor Paul with his own hand. We already had M. de Sprengporten in Paris; we were now about to have M. de Kalitscheff: it was not possible to desire a more signal reconciliation of Russia with France.

Thus the face of things was changed in Europe, in the North as well as in the South. In the North, the maritime powers, at open war with England, sought to join with us against her, by absolute engagements. In the South, Spain was bound to us by the closest ties: she threatened Portugal, to compel her to break with Great Britain. Lastly, Austria, worsted in Germany and Italy, left by all the powers at our mercy, had nothing but the daring obstinacy of her negotiator at Lunéville to defend her.

These events, the fruits of the ability of the First Consul, followed each other in rapid succession in the first days of January. Prussia and Russia, in fact, manifested their desire for the peace of the Continent; and Paul,² with his own hand, apprized the First Consul of the mission of M. de Kalitscheff, at the very moment when M. de Cobentzel, giving way as to the boundary of the Adige, but obstinately standing out in regard to all the rest, refused the delivery of Mantua, as the price of an armistice in Italy.

The First Consul immediately wished to retard the progress of the negotiation at Lunéville. He directed instructions to be given to Joseph,³ and wrote to him, prescribing a new

¹ Letter of the King of Prussia of the 14th of January, communicated by M. de Lucchesini.

² PAUL I., Emperor of Russia, son of Peter III. and Catharine II., was born in 1754. His father would not acknowledge his legitimacy, but on the death of Ivan, in 1763, he became sole heir to the crown, and was placed under the care of the Counts Panin and Olinus. He married first a princess of Darmstadt, who soon died without issue, and after that a princess of Wirtemberg, by whom he had the Emperors Alexander and Nicholas, grand-dukes Constantine and Michael, and several daughters. In 1796, on the death of his mother, he ascended the throne. He joined the first coalition against Bonaparte, but the defeat of Zurich, and the artful management of Bonaparte, soon brought him round, and he shortly afterwards declared against England. His mind was soon found to be deranged, and he was murdered, as related above, on the 11th of March, 1801.—*Encyclopedia Americana*.

³ JOSEPH NAPOLEON BONAPARTE, the eldest of Napoleon's brothers, and the one in whom he placed most confidence, was born at Corte, in Corsica, on the 7th of January, 1768. On completing his studies at Autun, he was desirous of entering the army, but in compliance

with the wishes of his father, he became a member of the departmental administration, under the presidency of Paoli. When Corsica fell into the possession of the English, he retired to the continent. At Marseilles he married Mademoiselle Clary, whose sister was the wife of Bernadotte. After the victory of Mondovi, Napoleon sent Joseph to Paris, to convince the Directory of the necessity of making peace with Sardinia. He succeeded, and was soon after made minister to Parma, and then ambassador at Rome. Returning from Rome, he entered the Council of Five Hundred, of which he was chosen secretary. Under the Consulate he was a member of the Council of State, and as such was one of the commission to terminate the differences then existing between France and the United States. It was while he was engaged in diplomatic pursuits, that he suggested the plan of union between several Christian powers, for the extinction of the corsairs of Barbary. In 1803 he was created a senator and grand officer of the Legion of Honour. In 1804 he was intrusted by his brother with command of the fourth regiment of Boulogne. When Napoleon ascended the throne, Joseph and his children were declared heirs to the crown, in case of the death of the emperor without issue. In the same year he was

line of conduct to our legation.¹ In a state of crisis, such as Europe was in at that time, he thought it inexpedient to be in a hurry. It was possible, in fact, that too much might have been ceded, or something stipulated, which might have run counter to the views of the northern courts. Anticipating, besides, that M. de Kalitscheff would arrive in a few days, he wished to see him, before he concluded definitively. Instructions were therefore transmitted to Joseph, to temporize for at least ten days, before he signed, and to require conditions still more stringent than the preceding.

Austria had consented to confine herself within the Adige. The construction which the First Consul now sought to put upon this was, that the Duke of Tuscany was not to remain in Italy, but should receive, like the Duke of Modena, an indemnity in Germany. His ultimate object was not to leave a single Austrian prince in Italy. To leave the Duke of Tuscany in Tuscany, was, in his views, equivalent to giving Leghorn to the English; to remove him to the Legations, was granting Austria a footing beyond the Po. In consequence, he adopted the idea, of transferring Tuscany to the house of Parma, as he had stipulated at Madrid; thereby converting Leghorn into a Spanish arsenal; and of thenceforth including the whole valley of the Po in the Cisalpine Republic; for, according to this plan, it would comprehend the Milanese, the Mantuan, Plaisance, Parma, Modena, and the Legations. Piedmont, at the entrance of that valley, would in future be but a vassal of France. Austria, limited by the Adige, would be thrown to one extremity of Italy; Rome and Naples confined to the other extremity; France, with Tuscany and the Cisalpine for her advanced posts, would control and sway that superb country. Joseph Bonaparte was therefore directed by his new instructions to require that the Duke of Tuscany should, like the Duke of Modena, be removed into Germany; that the scheme for the secularization of the Ecclesiastical States, should be realized to indemnify the hereditary German princes, as well as the Italian princes, dispossessed by France; that the peace with the empire should be signed at the same time as the peace with Austria, without even waiting for the sanction of the Diet; that nothing should be stipulated respecting Naples, Rome, and Piedmont, because France, though willing to preserve those states, desired first to arrange with them the conditions of their preservation; lastly, that Mantua should be delivered up to the French army, under threat of immediate renewal of hostilities.

offered the throne of Lombardy, which he declined. In 1802 he presided in the Senate, and administered the government. After the battle of Austerlitz, he was appointed to the command of the army destined to invade the kingdom of Naples, the capital of which he entered on the 15th of February, 1806. While making a tour, to inform himself of the condition and wants of the country, he was informed that the emperor had recognized him king. His reign in Naples is regarded by his biographers with unmingled satisfaction. He gathered about him the best and wisest men, and introduced important reforms into every department. He regenerated the nation, which was prosperous beyond all precedent, when he was called, against his will, to the throne of Spain. The events of his reign in Madrid will be narrated in the succeeding pages of this history. It was in

Nothing is more usual, when a negotiation is still pending, when a treaty is not signed, nothing is more common than to modify the proposed conditions. The French cabinet, therefore, was quite justified in departing from its first conditions; but it must be confessed that, in this case, the alterations were abrupt and extensive.

M. de Cobentzel, by waiting too long, by demanding too much, by being wilfully blind to his real position, had lost the favourable moment. According to his custom, he complained bitterly, and threatened France with the desperation of Austria. He was, nevertheless, pressed to obtain the armistice for Italy, and made up his mind to concede Mantua; but he feared lest, after he had given up this bulwark, he should be at the mercy of France, and that fresh demands should be brought forward. In this frame of mind, he showed himself mistrustful and captious, and would not relinquish Mantua till at the last extremity. At length, on the 26th of January—6th Pluviôse,—he signed the surrender of that fortress to the French army, to obtain an armistice in Italy and a prolongation of the armistice in Germany. The negotiators immediately despatched couriers from Lunéville to the Adige, to prevent an effusion of blood, which was imminent.

Warm discussions ensued at the conferences, which were held at Lunéville, on the following days. M. de Cobentzel said that he had been promised the re-establishment of the grand-duke, on the very day that he had consented to the boundary of the Adige. Joseph replied, that this was true, but that the re-establishment of this prince was to be granted in Germany; that every state availed itself of its present situation to treat more advantageously: that France, in acting thus, adopted the very principles expressed by M. de Thugut, in his letters of the preceding winter; that, moreover, the grand-duke, whose case was under discussion, would be in Tuscany, cut off from Austria and unsupported; that, in the Legations, on the contrary, he would be too well placed, as he would serve for a link between Austria, Rome, and Naples, that is to say, between the enemies of France—an arrangement to which France would never consent. The idea of placing him either in Tuscany or in the Legations should, therefore, be relinquished.

After vehement controversies, M. de Cobentzel seemed at last to consent that the indemnities for the grand-duke should be taken in Germany; but he would not admit the absolute principle of the secularization of the Ec-

all respects most honourable to him. After the battle of Vittoria he returned to Paris, where the emperor left him with the title of his lieutenant. On the final overthrow of Napoleon at Waterloo, Joseph followed him to Rochefort, where it was their intention to embark for the United States. When he learned from Bertrand, afterward, the resolution of the emperor, he quitted France in an American vessel, and arrived in safety at New York. He purchased an estate near Bordentown, in New Jersey, where he lived many years, under the name of Count Surville, devoting his time to study and acts of benevolence. He returned to Europe after the last revolution in Paris, and died at Florence in 1844.

¹Letter dated 1st Pluviôse—21st January—(State Paper Office.)

eclesiastical States. The Ecclesiastical States were devoted to Austria, especially the three archbishop-electors of Treves, Cologne, and Mayence, whereas the hereditary princes, on the contrary, were often opposed to her interest in the Germanic Diet. Austria assented to the secularizations, understood in this way, that the small Ecclesiastical States should serve to indemnify not only the hereditary princes of Bavaria, Wurtemberg, and Orange, but the great ecclesiastical princes, such as the Archbishops of Treves, Cologne, and Mayence; for then her influence in Germany would have been in part maintained. Joseph Bonaparte had orders to make an obstinate opposition to this proposal. He was to admit the principle of secularizations solely for the benefit of the hereditary princes. Lastly, M. de Cobenzel would not sign the peace for the empire, without powers from the Diet. This refusal proceeded, according to him, from a reluctance to violate forms; but in reality from an unwillingness to render too evident the part usually played by Austria in regard to the members of the Germanic body, a part which consisted in compromising them with France, whenever it was to the interest of Austria to do so, and afterwards deserting them, when the war had been disastrous. In 1797, she had delivered Mayence to the French, a proceeding most severely censured by all Germany; and now, to sign for the empire, without powers from the Diet, seemed to M. de Cobenzel a new and very grievous act, to add to all the anterior acts with which the German princes reproached their sovereign. To these reasons Joseph Bonaparte replied, that it was easy to perceive the real motive of Austria; that she was afraid of committing herself with the Germanic body, but that it was not for France to heed such considerations; that, as to form, there was a precedent in the peace of Baden, signed by the emperor in 1714, without powers from the Diet; that, besides, the emperor was now only asked to sanction what the representatives of the empire had already assented to at Rastadt, that is to say, the cession of the left bank of the Rhine to France; and that his refusal would be a sorry service rendered to Germany, for the French armies would continue in the territories occupied by them, till peace was concluded with the empire; whereas, if the peace were common to all the German princes, the evacuation would immediately follow the ratifications.

These discussions lasted several days. M. de Cobenzel was, nevertheless, anxious to conclude. The French negotiator, on his side, though at first desirous to defer the signature of the treaty for a few days, being now apprized that M. de Kalitscheff would not arrive in Paris so soon as he was at first expected, saw no further advantage in temporizing: he too was desirous to bring matters to a close. Orders had, in fact, been given to the two plenipotentiaries to come to an agreement; and, to decide M. de Cobenzel, Joseph Bonaparte had been authorized to make one of those concessions, which, at the last moment, serve for a pretext to an exhausted negotiator for yielding with

honour. The *thalweg*¹ of the Rhine was the limit assigned to France and Germany; consequently Düsseldorf, Ehrenbreitstein, Philipsburg, Kehl, Old Breisach, situated on the right bank, though attached to the left bank by many ties, were to be left to the Germanic Confederation. But Cassel, a suburb of Mayence, on the right bank, was a subject of dispute, for that suburb could scarcely be separated from the city itself. Joseph was authorized to cede Cassel, but on condition that it should be dismantled. Mayence would thus cease to be longer a fortified *tête de pont*, affording a passage at all times to the right bank of the Rhine.

The last conference was held on the 9th of February, 1801—20th Pluviôse, year IX. As it usually happens, the negotiators were never nearer to a rupture than when they were on the point of agreeing definitively. M. de Cobenzel warmly insisted on the maintenance of the Grand-duke of Tuscany in Italy; on the indemnity destined for the German princes, an indemnity which he wished to extend to the ecclesiastical princes of the first order; lastly, on the inconvenience of signing for the Germanic body, without having powers from the Diet. An article relative to the debts of Belgium also gave rise to great difficulties. On all these accounts he at last declared that he durst not conclude without referring to Vienna. Joseph thereupon replied that his government enjoined him to declare the negotiations at an end, unless they brought them to a termination before they broke up; he added that in the event of another campaign Austria would be thrown back beyond the Julian Alps. At length he ceded Cassel, besides all the fortified positions on the right bank, but on condition that France should demolish before she evacuated them, and that they should never be reconstructed.

Upon this concession, M. de Cobenzel yielded, and the treaty was signed on the 9th of February, 1801, at half-past five in the evening, to the great joy of Joseph, to the great grief of M. de Cobenzel, who, however, had nothing to reproach himself with; for, if he had endangered the interests of his court, it was because he had persisted in defending them too warmly.

Such was the celebrated treaty of Lunéville, which terminated the war of the second coalition, and for the second time conceded to France the left bank of the Rhine, with a commanding situation in Italy. The principal clauses were as follows.

The *thalweg* of the Rhine, from its exit out of the Helvetic territory to its entry into the Batavian territory, formed the boundary of France and Germany. Düsseldorf, Ehrenbreitstein, Cassel, Kehl, Philipsburg, Old Breisach, situated on the right bank, were left to Germany, but were first to be dismantled. The hereditary princes who suffered losses on the left bank were to be indemnified. No mention was made of the ecclesiastical princes or of the mode of fixing the indemnities; but it

¹ The middle of the stream.—Translator

was perfectly understood that the whole or part of the ecclesiastical territories were to serve for the indemnities.

The emperor, at Lunéville as at Campo-Formio, ceded the Belgic provinces to France, as well as the small territories which he possessed on the left bank, such as the county of Falkenstein, and the Frickthal, which lay wedged in between Zurzach and Basle. He gave up, moreover, the Milanese to the Cisalpine. For these he obtained no other indemnity than the Venetian States as far as the Adige, which had been previously insured to him by the treaty of Campo-Formio. He lost the archbishopric of Salzburg, which had been promised him by a secret article of the same treaty. His house was, besides, deprived of Tuscany, which was ceded to the house of Parma. An indemnity in Germany was promised to the Duke of Tuscany. The promise of the Breisgau was still held out to the Duke of Modena.

The territorial distribution of Italy was thus settled on a much more advantageous basis for France than at the time of the treaty of Campo-Formio. Austria continued to have the Adige for her boundary; but Tuscany was taken from her house and given to a house dependent on France; the English were excluded from Leghorn; the whole valley of the Po, from the Sesia and the Tanaro to the Adriatic, belonged to the Cisalpine Republic, a dependent daughter of the French Republic; lastly, Piedmont, confined to the sources of the Po, was dependent on us. Thus, masters of Tuscany and the Cisalpine, we occupied all central Italy, and prevented Austria from giving a hand to Piedmont, the Holy See, and Naples.

By the first coalition, Austria had lost Belgium and Lombardy, besides Modena for her family. By the second, she lost the bishopric of Salzburg for herself, and Tuscany for her house, which placed her in a position somewhat inferior in Germany, but very inferior in Italy. This was certainly not too much for all the bloodshed, for all the efforts imposed upon France.

The principle of the secularizations was not explicitly but implicitly laid down, since it was promised to indemnify the hereditary princes without alluding to the ecclesiastical princes. Evidently the indemnity could not be demanded of any but the ecclesiastical princes themselves.

The peace was declared common to the Batavian, Helvetic, Cisalpine, and Ligurian Republics. Their independence was guaranteed: nothing was said concerning Naples,

Piedmont, or the Holy See. These States were dependent on the pleasure of France, which, for the rest, was tied in regard to Piedmont and Naples, by the interest which the Emperor Paul took in behalf of those two courts, and in regard to the Holy See, by the religious plans of the First Consul.

The First Consul, however, as we have seen, had not thought fit to explain himself to any one relative to Piedmont. Displeased with the King of Sardinia, who gave up his ports to the English, he was desirous of keeping himself at liberty in regard to a territory situated so near to France and of such high importance to her.

The emperor signed the peace for himself as sovereign of the Austrian States, and for the whole Germanic body as Emperor of Germany. France promised secretly to use her influence with Prussia to dispose her to approve this mode of proceeding of the emperor's. The ratifications were to be exchanged in thirty days by Austria and by France. The French armies were not to evacuate Germany till the ratifications had been exchanged at Lunéville, but were to have evacuated it entirely a month after that exchange.

Here, as at Campo-Formio, the liberation of all persons confined for political offences was stipulated. It was agreed that the Italians, shut up in the prisons of Austria, particularly Moscati and Caprara, should be released. The First Consul had not ceased to insist on this act of humanity ever since the opening of the congress.

General Bonaparte had attained the supreme power on the 9th of November, 1799—18th Brumaire, year VIII.;—it was now the 9th of February, 1801—20th Pluviôse, year IX.;—consequently just fifteen months had elapsed, and France, partly reorganized at home, completely victorious abroad, was already at peace with the Continent, and in alliance with the North and the South of Europe against England. Spain was preparing to march against Portugal; the Queen of Naples had thrown herself at our feet; the court of Rome was negotiating in Paris the arrangement of religious affairs.

General Bellavène, appointed to carry the treaty, left Lunéville in the evening of the 9th of February, and arrived as an extraordinary courier in Paris. The treaty which he brought was immediately inserted entire in the *Moniteur*. Paris was suddenly illuminated; vehemence and general joy burst forth on all sides; and thanks without number were given to the First Consul for this happy result of his victories and his policy.

BOOK VIII.

INFERNAL MACHINE.

Plots against the Life of the First Consul—Carbon, St. Réjant, and Limoëlan, three Agents of Georges, form a Plan for destroying the First Consul by the Explosion of a Barrel of Gunpowder—Choice of the Rue St. Nicolas, and of the 3d Nivôse for the Execution of this Crime—The First Consul saved by the Dexterity of his Coachman—Sensation produced—The Crime attributed to the Revolutionists, and to the indulgence shown them by Fouché, the Minister—Animosity of the new Courtiers against that Minister—His Silence and Coolness—He discovers Part of the Truth and makes it known; but Measures are nevertheless taken against the Revolutionists—Irritation of the First Consul—Project of an arbitrary Measure—Deliberation on this Subject in the Council of State—After long Discussions, a Resolution is adopted for transporting a certain Number of Revolutionists without Trial—Some Resistance, but very faint, made to this arbitrary Act—Discussion whether it shall take place by a Law, or by a spontaneous Measure of the Government, referred only to the Senate, for the sake of Constitutionality—The latter Course adopted—Transportation decreed against one hundred and thirty alleged Terrorists—Fouché, who knew them to be innocent of the Attempt of the 3d Nivôse, consents, nevertheless, to the Measure which proscribes them—Discovery of the real Authors of the Infernal Machine—Execution of Carbon and St. Réjant—Unjust Condemnation of Topino Lebrun, Arena, &c.—Session of the Year IX.—French Manifestations of Opposition in the Tribunal—Institution of Special Tribunals for the Suppression of Robbery on the Highroads—Financial Statement of Ways and Means for the Years VI., VII., and VIII.—Budget of the Year IX.—Definitive Adjustment of the Public Debt—Rejection by the Tribunal, and Adoption by the Legislative Body, of this Plan of Finance—Sentiments of the First Consul—Continuation of his administrative Labours—Roads—Canal of St. Quentin—Bridges over the Seine—Works at the Simplon—The Monks of the Great St. Bernard established at the Simplon and at Mont Cenis.

WHILE the external position of France was daily becoming more brilliant, while Germany and Austria were treating for peace, while the northern powers were leaguings with us to resist the maritime pretensions of England, while Portugal and Naples were closing their ports against her, and while, in short, every thing was succeeding to the wish of a victorious and moderate government, her internal situation exhibited a spectacle, at times frightful, of the last convulsions of expiring parties. We have already seen, in spite of the prompt reorganization of the government, robbery infesting the highroads, and factions, in despair, attempting the assassination of the First Consul. These were the inevitable consequences of our past disunion. The men whom civil war had trained to crime, and who could no longer resign themselves to a peaceable and honest life, sought employment on the highways. The broken-down factions, despairing of overpowering the consular guard, attempted to destroy, by atrocious means, the invincible author of their defeat.

Robbery had increased on the approach of winter. It was impossible to travel the roads without running the risk of being plundered or murdered. The departments of Normandy, Anjou, Maine, Bretagne, and Poitou, were, as formerly, the theatres of these depredations. But the evil had spread. Several departments of the centre and the south, as those of the Tarn, la Lozère, the Aveyron, the Upper Garonne, l'Hérault, the Gard, the Ardèche, the Drôme, Vaucluse, the Bouches du Rhone, the Upper and Lower Alps, the Var, had been infested in their turn. In these departments the bands of robbers had been recruited by the assassins of the south, who, upon pretext of chastising Jacobins, murdered, for the purpose of robbing, the purchasers of national domains; by young men who would not submit to the conscription; and by some soldiers whom want had driven from the army of Liguria, during the cruel winter of 1799 and 1800. These wretched men, having once entered upon this criminal life, had taken a liking to it; and nothing but the force of arms and the severity of the laws could now divert

them from those courses. They stopped the public conveyances; they kidnapped from their homes the purchasers of national domains, and frequently opulent landed proprietors also, carried them into the woods, as they did the Senator Clement de Ris, for example, whom they detained for twenty days, inflicted horrible tortures on their victims, sometimes burning their feet, till they had paid considerable sums for their ransom. They plundered more especially the public chests, and even seized the funds of the state at the houses of the collectors, upon pretext of making war upon the government. Vagabonds who, in these times of trouble, had left their homes to follow a wandering life, served them for scouts, by assuming the character of beggars in the towns. These wretches, picking up all sorts of information while engaged in begging, intimated to the robbers, their accomplices, what carriages to stop and what houses to plunder.

Small bodies of troops had been required to repress these bands. When any of them were taken, justice could not take its course, for the witnesses durst not give evidence, and the juries were afraid to convict. Extraordinary measures are always to be regretted, not so much on account of the severities attendant on them, as the shock which they give to the constitution of a country, especially when that constitution is new. But, in this case, measures of that kind were indispensable; for ordinary justice, after it had been tried, was found to be powerless. A bill (*projet de loi*) had been prepared for instituting special tribunals for the suppression of highway robbery. This bill, presented to the legislative body, which was then sitting, was violently attacked by the opposition. The First Consul, exempt from those scruples of legality which are felt only in times of quiet, and which, even when they happen to be petty or narrow, are at least a happy sign of respect for the authority of the law, the First Consul had not hesitated to have recourse to martial law till the plan under discussion should be adopted. As it was necessary to employ bodies of troops to suppress these bands of robbers, the government not being strong enough to cope

with them, he thought that this situation might be assimilated to a state of real war, which authorized the application of the laws peculiar to the state of war. He formed several small corps, which scoured the infested departments, and were accompanied by military commissions. All the robbers taken in arms were tried within forty-eight hours and shot.

The horror excited by these villains was so great and so general, that nobody durst raise a doubt as to the regularity or the justice of these executions. Meanwhile, villains of another stamp were meditating the destruction of the consular government by different and still more atrocious means. While Demerville, Ceracchi, and Arena, were undergoing judicial examination, their adherents of the revolutionary party continued to form a thousand schemes, the one more insane than the other. They had planned the assassination of the First Consul in his box at the opera, and had scarcely dared, as we have seen, to grasp their daggers. Now, they were dreaming of something else. One day they proposed to excite a disturbance at the breaking up of one of the theatres, and to despatch the First Consul amidst the tumult; on another, to seize him on his way to Malmaison, and to murder him after they had carried him off. Like genuine declaimers at clubs, they talked of the schemes everywhere and aloud, so that the police was informed from hour to hour of each of their plans. But, while they talked incessantly, not one of them was bold enough to act. M. Fouché feared them but little, and yet watched them with continual attention. However, among their numerous devices, there was one more formidable than the rest, and which had roused the particular vigilance of the police. One Chevalier, a workman employed in the manufactories of arms established in Paris under the Convention, had been found at work upon a frightful machine. It was a barrel filled with powder and langrage, to which was adjusted a musket-barrel with a trigger. This machine was evidently destined to blow up the First Consul. The inventor was apprehended and thrown into prison. This new contrivance made some noise, and contributed greatly to keep all eyes fixed on those who were called Jacobins and Terrorists. Their reputation of 1793 caused them to be more feared than they deserved to be. The First Consul, as we have already said, participated in the error of the public respecting them; and, having continually to do with the revolutionary party, sometimes with honest men of that party dissatisfied with too rapid a reaction, sometimes with villains planning crimes which they no longer had the energy to commit, he laid the blame of every thing upon the Revolutionists, was angry with none but them, talked of punishing them alone. M. Fouché persisted, but to no purpose, in directing his attention to the Royalists. It would have required strong facts to change the opinion of the First Consul and that of the public on this subject. Unfortunately, atrocious facts were in course of preparation.

Georges, having returned from London to the Morbihan, was full of money, thanks to the

English, and secretly directed the plunderers of the diligences. He had sent some of his cut-throats to Paris, for the purpose of murdering the First Consul. Among them were two men, named Limoëlan and St. Réjant, both practised in the horrors of the civil war, and the latter formerly a naval officer, having some knowledge of gunnery. To these two he added a third, called Carbon, a subordinate person, the worthy tool of those great criminals. Arriving in Paris one after another, towards the end of November—first days of Frimaire—they sought the surest means of killing the First Consul, and made more than one trial with air-guns in the neighbourhood of Paris. Fouché, the minister apprized of their presence and of their errand, had them closely watched. But, owing to the inefficiency of two agents employed to follow these men, he had lost sight of them. While the police was making every exertion to discover traces of them, these villains had buried themselves in profound obscurity. Without declaiming, like the Jacobins, or communicating their secret to any one, they prepared for an atrocious deed, which has been equalled but once, and in our own times. Chevalier's machine had suggested to them the idea of destroying the First Consul by means of a barrel of powder charged with langrage. They resolved to put this barrel into a small cart, and to place it in one of the narrow streets which then led to the Carrousel, and through which the First Consul very frequently passed in his carriage. They bought a horse and a cart, and hired a cart-house, passing themselves off for foreign traders. St. Réjant, who, as we have just said, was a naval officer and artilleryman, made the necessary experiments, went several times to the Carrousel, to see the First Consul's carriage leave the Tuileries, to calculate how long it took to reach the neighbouring streets, and to arrange every thing in such a manner that the barrel should explode at the right time. These three men chose, for the accomplishment of their plan, a day when the First Consul was to go to the Opera to hear Haydn's oratorio of "The Creation," which was to be performed for the first time. It was the 3d Nivôse—December 24th, 1800. They selected for the theatre of the crime the Rue St. Nicaise, which ran from the Carrousel to the Rue de Richelieu, and through which the First Consul was in the habit of passing very often. Several successive windings in this street must necessarily slacken the progress of the most expert driver. The day having arrived, Carbon, St. Réjant, and Limoëlan, drove their cart to the Rue St. Nicaise, and then separated. When St. Réjant was to set fire to the barrel of powder, the two others were to place themselves within sight of the Tuileries, and to come and give notice the moment they saw the First Consul's carriage make its appearance. St. Réjant had the barbarity to get a girl of fifteen to hold the horse harnessed to this horrible machine. For his part he kept himself in readiness to set fire to it.

At this very moment, the First Consul, fatigued with business, was hesitating about going to the Opera, but he suffered himself to be persuaded by the earnest solicitations of

those about him, and set out from the Tuileries at a quarter past eight o'clock. He was accompanied by Generals Lannes, Berthier, and Lauriston, and escorted by a detachment of mounted grenadiers. Most fortunately these grenadiers followed, instead of preceding, the carriage. It arrived in the narrow part of the Rue St. Nicaise, without having been announced either by the detachment or by the accomplices. The latter never came to apprise St. Réjant. Fear had prevented their doing so, or perhaps they had not recognised the First Consul's carriage. St. Réjant himself did not perceive it till it was a little past the machine. He was violently jostled by one of the horseguards, but, not disconcerted, he set fire, and instantly took to flight. The First Consul's coachman, who was a capital whip, and usually drove his master with extreme rapidity, had had time to pass one of the turnings of the street, when the explosion was suddenly heard. The shock was tremendous: the carriage was nearly overturned: all the windows were broken, and the fronts of the neighbouring houses were shattered by the discharge. One of the horse-grenadiers was slightly wounded, and all the surrounding streets were instantly strewn with a great number of persons dead or dying. The First Consul and those who accompanied him, at first conceived that they had been fired at with grape; they stopped for a moment, soon learned the real state of the case, and pursued their way. The First Consul insisted on going to the opera. He appeared calm, unmoved, amidst the extraordinary agitation that prevailed in all parts of the house. It was reported that, in order to despatch him, banditti had blown up a whole quarter of Paris.

He stayed but a few moments at the opera, and returned immediately to the Tuileries, where, on the report of the attempt, an immense concourse had collected. His anger, which he had before repressed, then burst forth. "It is the Jacobins, the Terrorists," he exclaimed; "it is those wretches in permanent revolt, in *bataillon carré* against every government, it is the cut-throats of the 2d and 3d of September, the ringleaders of the 31st of May, the conspirators of Prairial; it is those villains who, to assassinate me, have not scrupled to sacrifice thousands of lives. I will do signal justice upon them." There was no need for an impulsion from so high a quarter to inflame the public opinion against the Revolutionists. Their exaggerated reputation, and their attempts for two or three months past, were such as to cause every possible crime to be attributed to them. In that saloon, thronged more especially by those who were anxious that their attachment should be remarked, there was soon but one cry against the Terrorists, as they were called. The numerous enemies of M. Fouché hastened to profit by the occasion, and to launch forth into invectives against him. His police, said they, sees nothing, allows any thing to be done; it shows a criminal indulgence towards the revolutionary party. This is owing to M. Fouché's fellow-feeling for his old accomplices. The life of the First Consul would no longer be safe in his hands. In a

moment the animosity against that minister was at its height; that very evening it was asserted that he had been dismissed. As for M. Fouché, retiring into a corner of the saloon of the Tuileries, with a few persons who did not share the general excitement, he listened to the accusations preferred against him with the utmost composure. His air of incredulity inflamed still more the anger of his enemies. Still he would not disclose what he knew, for fear of marring the success of the researches that were on foot. But, recollecting the agents of Georges, dogged for some time by the police, and afterwards lost sight of, he did not hesitate in his own mind to impute the crime to them. Certain members of the Council of State would have addressed some observations to the First Consul, and expressed their doubts as to the real authors of the attempt in the Rue St. Nicaise: he flew into a violent passion. "I am not to be bamboozled," he exclaimed. "This is no attempt of Chouans or emigrants, or *ci-devant* nobles and priests. I know the authors; I shall be sure to get at them, and to inflict on them an exemplary punishment." While uttering these words, his speech was vehement, his gesture threatening. His flatterers applauded and excited that anger which should have been soothed, not inflamed, after the horrible events which had just agitated all around.

On the following day, the same scenes were repeated. According to a custom recently introduced, the Senate, the Legislative Body, the Tribunal, the Council of State, the judges, the administrative authorities, the staffs, waited upon the First Consul, to express their grief and indignation, sentiments sincerely and universally felt. Never, indeed, had such a thing been seen. The Revolution had familiarized men's minds with the cruelties of dominant factions, but not yet with the dark plots of vanquished parties. People were filled with surprise and dismay: they dreaded the repetition of these atrocious attempts, and asked each other in consternation what would become of France if the man who alone curbed these wretches were to be cut off. All the bodies of the state, admitted into the Tuileries, expressed ardent attachment to the hero-pacifier, who had promised to restore, and who was actually restoring, peace to the world. The terms of these addresses were common-place, but the sentiment which pervaded them all was not less genuine than profound. The First Consul replied to the municipal council: "I have been touched by the proofs of affection which the people of Paris have shown me on this occasion. I deserve them, because the only aim of my thoughts, of my actions, is to augment the prosperity and the glory of France. While those banditti confined themselves to direct attacks upon me, I could leave to the laws the task of punishing them; but, since they have just endangered part of the population of the capital by a crime unexampled in history, the punishment shall be equally speedy and terrible. Assure the people of Paris, in my name, that that handful of villains, whose crimes have gone far to dishonour liberty, shall soon be deprived of the power to do mischief."

Every one applauded these words of ven-

geance, for there was not a person but, for his own part, made use of similar expressions. Men of reflection anticipated with pain that the enraged lion might, perhaps, overleap the barrier of the laws; but the multitude called for punishment. In Paris, the agitation was extreme. The Royalists threw the guilt on the Revolutionists, and the Revolutionists on the Royalists. Both were equally sincere, for the crime remained a profound secret to all but its authors. Every one descended on the subject, and, according to his inclination to condemn one party rather than another, found reasons equally plausible for accusing the Royalists or the Revolutionists. The enemies of the Revolution, both old and new, said that the Terrorists alone could have devised so atrocious a scheme, and adduced, as a conclusive proof of their opinion, the machine of Chevalier, the gunsmith, recently discovered. Sagacious persons, on the contrary, who had steadfastly clung to the Revolution, asked why those highway robbers, those *Chauffeurs*, who committed so many crimes, who daily displayed an unparalleled refinement in cruelty, and who, in particular, had just carried off the senator Clement De Ris, why these men might not be the authors of the horrible explosion in the Rue St. Nicaise as well as the so-called Terrorists. It should moreover be borne in mind that persons of sedate minds could scarcely obtain a hearing at that moment, so deeply was public opinion agitated, and so strong was the tendency to condemn the revolutionary party. But, will it be believed? amidst the conflict of diverse imputations, there were men of both parties inconsiderate or perverse enough to hold a totally different language. Certain factious Royalists longed for the destruction of the First Consul at any rate, and adopting the general opinion which attributed the crime to the Terrorists, admired the atrocious energy, the profound secrecy, which had been required for the commission of such a deed. The Revolutionists, on the contrary, seemed almost to claim the merit for their party; and there were among them braggarts of crime, who had the culpable folly of being almost proud of the execrable act that was imputed to them. It is only in times of civil war that we meet with such levity and such unprincipled language, among men who would themselves be incapable of perpetrating the deeds which they dare to approve.

We may further add, that all who talked of this event were totally wrong. The minister Fouché alone suspected who were the real culprits.

While he was engaged in searching after them, everybody was asking what was to be done to prevent future attempts of the same kind. People were, at that time, so accustomed to violent measures, that they thought it almost natural to seize the men known to have been formerly Terrorists, and to treat them as they had treated their victims in '93. The two sections of the Council of State, to whose province this subject more particularly

belonged, the sections of legislation and of the interior, assembled two days after the event, on the 26th of December,—5th Nivôse,—to inquire which of the various plans proposed was most admissible. As the bill (*projet de loi*) to institute special tribunals was then under discussion, it was suggested that two clauses should be added to it. The first instituting a military commission for the trial of crimes committed against the members of the government; the second investing the First Consul with authority to remove from Paris men whose presence in the capital should be deemed dangerous, and to punish them with transportation, if they should attempt to disregard such first exile.

After the preliminary investigation of this subject in the two sections of legislation and of the interior, the whole Council of State met under the presidency of the First Consul. M. Portalis¹ reported what had passed in the morning in the two sections, and submitted their propositions to the Council. The First Consul, out of temper, thought these propositions defective. A mere change of jurisdiction appeared to him totally inadequate to the circumstances. He was for apprehending the Jacobins *en masse*, shooting those who should be convicted of having had a hand in the crime, and transporting the others. But it was his wish to accomplish this by means of an extraordinary measure, in order to be more sure of the result. "The proceedings of a special tribunal," said he, "will be slow, and not reach the real criminals. Our business now is not to frame a system of judicial metaphysics. Metaphysical minds have ruined every thing in France for the last ten years. We must judge of the situation like statesmen, and apply a remedy to it like resolute men. What is the evil that annoys us? There are in France 10,000 scoundrels, spread over the whole country, who have persecuted all the honest people, and who are steeped in blood. All are not guilty in the same degree, far from it. Many are still open to repentance, and are not incorrigible criminals; but, while they see the head-quarters established in Paris, and the chiefs concocting plots with impunity, they retain hope, and keep up their spirits. Strike the chiefs boldly, and the soldiers will disperse. They will return to those occupations from which they were driven by a violent revolution; they will forget that stormy passage in their lives, and again become peaceable citizens. Honest men, who are now in constant fear, will take courage, and attach themselves to a government which has known how to protect them. There is no middle course; either we must pardon all, like Augustus, or vengeance, prompt, terrible, and proportionate to the crime must overtake them. As many of the guilty must be sacrificed as there have been victims. Fifteen or twenty of these villains must be shot, and 200 of them transported. By these means we shall rid the Republic of agitators who convulse it; we shall clear it of such sanguinary scum." At each suc-

J. E. M. PORTALIS, born at Beausset, minister of divine worship, grand officer of the Legion of Honour, &c. He was a lawyer before the Revolution, and was

deputed by the department of Seine to the Council of Ancients in March, 1795, from which period he was in active public life.—*Biographie Moderne* N

cessive sentence, the First Consul became more and more animated; and, nettled at the disapprobation even which he perceived in certain countenances, "I am," he exclaimed, "I am so convinced of the necessity and justice of a strong measure, to purify, and, at the same time, to quiet France, that I am ready to constitute myself sole judge, to have the culprits brought before me, to examine them, to try them, and to order sentence of condemnation to be executed. All France will applaud me, for it is not my own person that I here seek to avenge. My fortune, which has preserved me so often on the field of battle, will continue to preserve me. I think not of myself; I think of social order, which it is my mission to re-establish, and of the national honour, which it is my duty to purge from an abominable stain."

This scene petrified part of the Council of State with surprise and terror. Some members, sympathizing with the sincere but intemperate feelings of the First Consul, applauded his speech. A very decided majority discerned, with regret, in his words, the language which the Revolutionists had themselves held, when they proscribed thousands of victims. They, too, had said that the aristocrats endangered the Republic, that it was necessary to get rid of them by the most speedy and by the surest means, and that the public safety was worth a few sacrifices. The difference, to be sure, was great; for, instead of a bloodthirsty rabble, who, in their blind fury, at length took each other for aristocrats, and slaughtered one another, here was a man of genius, proceeding, with consistency and vigour, towards a noble aim, that of setting convulsed society to rights. Unfortunately, he endeavoured to succeed, not by the slow observance of rules, but by prompt and extraordinary means, like those which had been employed to overturn it. His good sense, his generous heart, and the horror of shedding blood, then prevalent, were guarantees against sanguinary executions; but, with the exception of actual bloodshed, he was disposed to resort to every severity towards those who were then denominated Jacobins and Terrorists.

Objections were raised in the Council of State, timidly, it is true, for the indignation universally excited by the crime of the Rue St. Nicaise, checked the courage of those who would fain have made some resistance to arbitrary proceedings. However, one individual, who was not afraid to oppose the First Consul, and who did so bluntly, and in a straightforward way, Admiral Truguet,¹ seeing that the intention was to strike the Revolutionists *en masse*, raised doubts respecting the real authors of the crime. "Government," said he, "is desirous to get rid of the villains who disturb the Republic; well and good; but there are villains of more than one kind. The returned emigrants threaten the purchasers of the national domains; the Chouans infest the high roads;

the re-instated priests inflame the passions of the people in the South; the public mind is poisoned by pamphlets" This last expression of Admiral Truguet had reference to the famous pamphlet of M. de Fontanes, to which we have before adverted. At these words, the First Consul, stung to the quick, and, advancing directly to the speaker, asked, "What pamphlets do you allude to?" "Pamphlets that are publicly circulated," replied Admiral Truguet. "Specify them," rejoined the First Consul. "You know them as well as I do," retorted this courageous man, who thus dared defy such indignation.

A scene like this had never yet been witnessed within the walls of the Council of State. The circumstances produced an outburst of the impetuous temper of the man who then held in his hands the destinies of France. He thereupon gave vent to his passion, and displayed all the eloquence of wrath. "Do people take us for children?" he exclaimed. "Do they think to hurry us away with these declamations against the emigrants, the Chouans, the priests? Because there are still some partial attempts in La Vendée, are we to be required, as formerly, to declare the country *en danger*? . . . Has France ever been in a more brilliant situation? have the finances ever been in a better state, the armies more victorious? has general peace ever been nearer at hand? If the Chouans commit crimes I will have them shot. But must I begin again by proscribing on account of the appellations of nobles, priests, or royalists? Must I send into exile ten thousand old men, who only desire to live peaceably, while paying respect to the established laws? Have you not seen poor ecclesiastics put to death in Bretagne, at the instigation of Georges himself, because he saw that they were gradually becoming reconciled to the government? Must I again proscribe on account of rank or title? Must I strike some because they are priests, others because they were formerly nobles? Do you not know, gentlemen, members of the Council, that, with the exception of two or three, you are all reputed Royalists? You, citizen Defermon, are you not taken for a partisan of the Bourbons? Must I send citizen Portalis to Sinnamary, citizen Devaisne to Madagascar, and then constitute myself a council *à la Babouf*? No, citizen Truguet, I am not to be deceived: we have none who threaten our quiet but the Septemberists. They would not spare even you, in vain you might tell them, that you had defended them to-day in the Council of State—they would sacrifice both you and me, as well as all your colleagues."

There was only one word to be said in reply to this vehement apostrophe, that it was not right to proscribe any person for a mere title, neither one party because they were styled Royalists, nor another party because they were Revolutionists. The First Consul had no

¹ Son of a captain of the port of Toulon. Was first in the naval guard; in 1792 was rear-admiral at Toulon; and subsequently commanded a squadron which sacked the city of Onelle. Having survived the Reign of Terror, he was in 1793 appointed, by the Directory, minister of the Marine. In 1797 he went as ambassador to Madrid, where he was engaged in various intrigues.

which induced a request that he should be recalled. In 1799 he returned to Paris, and entered the Council of State in the section of Marine; and in 1803 he was appointed to the Brest squadron, in which he remained till Napoleon became Emperor, after which time he was without public employment.—*Biographie Moderne*.

sooner uttered his concluding words, than he rose abruptly, and put an end to the sitting.

Cambacérés, the consul, always calm, possessed infinite skill in obtaining, by gentleness, what his imperious colleague would fain extort by the sole power of his will. He assembled the two sections on the following day at his residence; he endeavoured, in a few words, to excuse the warmth of the First Consul, affirming, what was true, that he had no dislike to contradiction, when it was free from acrimony and personality; and he endeavoured to reconcile their minds to the idea of some extraordinary measure. This was not worthy of his accustomed moderation; but, though in the habit of giving prudent advice to the First Consul, he gave way when he saw that he was absolutely resolved, and especially when the point in discussion related to the curbing of the Terrorists. M. Portalis, who had the merit of being averse to proscribe any one, though he had been proscribed himself, adhered to the plan of the two sections, proposing to add two clauses to the law instituting the special tribunals. Cambacérés, however, insisted, and obtained a majority in favour of the adoption of an extraordinary measure, upon the understanding that it should be discussed afresh before the united sections. In this sort of meeting with closed doors, words again ran very high. M. Röderer inveighed vehemently against the Jacobins, imputed their crimes to the indulgence of M. Fouché, and went so far as to move that the Council of State should join in an address, praying for the dismissal of that minister.

M. Cambacérés repressed all these ebullitions of zeal, and convoked the sections at the apartments of General Bonaparte, in whose presence was held a sort of privy council, composed of the consuls, the two sections of the Interior and Legislation, and the ministers of Foreign affairs, of the Interior, and of Justice. So strong were the prejudices against M. Fouché, that he was not even summoned to these conferences.

The proposal of an extraordinary measure was again presented and discussed at great length. Several sittings of this same privy council were held before the members could agree. At length, it was resolved that a general measure should be adopted against those who were called the Terrorists. But a serious question yet remained to be settled; that was the form of that measure. The point to be decided was, whether that measure should be carried into execution by a spontaneous act of the government, or by means of a law. The First Consul, generally so bold, was in favour of a law. He was averse to compromise the great bodies of the state on this occasion, and this he declared openly. "The Consuls are irresponsible," said he, "but the ministers are not so, and any of them who sign such a resolution may some day be called to account. Not a single individual must be compromised; the Legislative Body must share in the responsibility of the proposed measure. The Consuls themselves," he added, "know not what may happen. As for myself, while I live, I am not afraid that any one will dare to call me to

account for my actions. But I may be killed, and then I cannot answer for the safety of my two colleagues. It would be your turn to govern," said he, laughing, to the second consul Cambacérés, "and you are not very firm in the stirrups. It will be better to have a law for the present, as well as for the future."

A singular scene was passing at this moment. They who were averse to the measure, wished that it might be adopted, not by means of a law, but through a spontaneous resolution of the government. They were desirous to throw upon the government the entire responsibility, without perceiving that they were thus suffering it to acquire the mischievous habit of acting alone, and on its arbitrary authority. It was said, in support of this opinion, that the law would not pass, that opinions began to be divided respecting the real authors of the crime, that the Legislative Body would recoil from a proscription-list, and that the government would run the risk of incurring a most signal defeat. Messrs. Röderer and Regnault de St. Jean d'Angely expressed themselves to this effect. To the latter, the First Consul made this reply: "Since the Tribunate has rejected one or two laws, you are panic-struck. There are, it is true, some Jacobins in the Legislative Body, but not above ten or twelve at most. They frighten the others, who know that, but for me, but for the 18th of Brumaire, they would have been massacred. These latter will stand by me on this occasion; the law will pass."

The advocates of the other course persisted in their sentiments, and M. de Talleyrand, siding with those who were afraid of the bill being thrown out, suggested an argument most likely to make an impression on the First Consul, namely, that abroad the measure would have a more salutary effect. "Foreigners," he said, "would recognise in it the act of a government that dared, and was able to defend itself against the anarchists." The First Consul yielded to this argument, but he devised a middle course, which was adopted: this was, to refer it to the Senate, that this body might examine whether the act was, or was not, an infringement of the Constitution. The reader will, no doubt, recollect that, according to the Constitution of the year VIII., the Senate did not vote the laws, but was empowered to rescind them, if it deemed them contrary to the Constitution. It had not the same power with regard to the measures of the government. The suggestion of the First Consul was therefore approved, and M. Fouché was directed to make out a list of the principal Terrorists, with a view to their being transported to the deserts of the New World. The two sections of the Council of State were charged to draw up a declaration of the reasons for this act. The First Consul was to sign the decree, and the Senate to declare whether it was, or was not, contrary to the Constitution.

This measure against the Terrorists, illegal and arbitrary in itself, had not even the justice which an arbitrary act may sometimes carry with it, when it punishes those who are really guilty; for the Terrorists were not the authors of the crime. By this time, the truth began to

be suspected. Fouché, the minister, and Dubois, prefect of police, had been incessantly engaged in the most active search, and this search had not been fruitless. The violence of the explosion had destroyed almost all the instruments of the crime. The girl, whom St. Réjant had employed to hold the horse, had been blown to pieces; nothing was left of the unfortunate creature, but her legs and feet. The iron tires of the cart-wheels had been thrown to a great distance. Fragments of the articles employed in the commission of the crime, and which were likely to lead to the discovery of the authors, had been found, at a great distance apart, in every direction. There were also left some remains of the cart, and the horse. These remains were collected, a description of them was drawn up, and made public through the newspapers, and all the horse-dealers in Paris were invited to inspect them. By a lucky chance, the original owner of the horse at once identified him, and gave the name of the seedsman to whom he had sold him. This seedsman, being summoned, declared with the utmost frankness all that he knew about the matter. He had sold the horse to two men, who represented themselves as foreign traders. He had had two or three interviews with them, and described them very minutely. A man who kept carriages for hire, and who had let for a few days the cart-house, in which the cart was deposited, made also a very circumstantial deposition. He described the same persons, and furnished particulars perfectly corresponding with those which had been received from the seedsman. The cooper who had sold the barrel, and who had put on the iron hoops, gave information agreeing entirely with the preceding accounts. All these depositions perfectly tallied as to the stature, features, dress, and appearance of the suspected individuals.

When all these witnesses had been heard, recourse was had to a decisive proof. Upwards of two hundred Revolutionists, apprehended on this occasion, were taken from prison and brought before them. These examinations lasted during the 1st, 2d, 3d, and 4th of January—11th, 12th, 13th, and 14th Nivôse—and led to the conviction that not one of the Revolutionists was concerned in the crime, as not one was recognised. And no doubt could be entertained of the veracity of the witnesses who furnished these descriptions, for almost all of them had come forward spontaneously to give evidence, and manifested great zeal in seconding the efforts of the police. Thus, it was proved almost to a certainty that the Revolutionists were innocent. The fact, however, could not be perfectly established, unless by the discovery of the real authors. But an important circumstance pointed to the agents of

Georges, who had been sent upwards of a month before to Paris, and who had always been considered by M. Fouché as really the guilty parties. Though all trace of them had been lost, yet down to the 3d Nivôse they had been seen, sometimes in one place, sometimes in another, though the police had not been able to apprehend them. But since the 3d Nivôse, they had entirely disappeared, so that one would almost have thought that they had concealed themselves under ground. This disappearance, so sudden and so complete, ever since the day of the crime, was a striking circumstance. Add to this, that one of the descriptions given by all the witnesses, corresponded in every point to that of Carbon. M. Fouché, more convinced than ever by all these indications, that the real authors were the Chouans, lost no time in despatching an emissary to watch Georges' motions, and to obtain information relative to Carbon, St. Réjant, and Limoëlan. In the mean time he had collected sufficient evidence to shake the conviction of many, and even that of the First Consul, who, nevertheless, would not relinquish his first opinion but upon the production of actual proof.

Such was the state of the proceedings on the 4th of January—24th Nivôse—the day on which the act that condemned so many men under the designation of Terrorists was definitively decreed.¹

The Council of State had successively come to an agreement upon all the points; it had never thought seriously of a tribunal which should try in a summary manner, and sentence the Terrorists to be shot; it had always stopped short at the idea of transporting a certain number of them; and, after many discussions, it was agreed that they should be transported, by virtue of an act of the Consuls, submitted to the approbation of the Senate. The affair having been arranged with the principal members of the Council and the Senate, the rest could be nothing but an empty formality.

M. Fouché, who, without knowing the whole truth, was nevertheless acquainted with it in part, and buffeted on all sides, had the weakness to lend himself to a measure, directed, it is true, against men stained with blood, but not the authors of the crime, which it was intended to punish at the moment. Of all those who participated in this act of proscription, he was therefore the most inexcusable; but he was attacked in all quarters; he was accused of complaisance towards the Revolutionists; and he had not the courage to resist. He himself drew up the report for the Council of State, on which the decree of the consuls was founded.

In this report, presented to the Council of State on the 1st of January, 1801—11th Nivôse—a class of men was denounced, who for ten years had steeped themselves in crime of every

¹ I have compared the dates of all the documents in the case with the dates of the measures passed against the revolutionary party, and the result is, that between the 11th and the 14th Nivôse—the 1st and the 4th of January—only one thing was known, namely, that the personal examinations of the so-called Terrorists had not led to the identification of any one of them. Consequently, there were strong reasons for believing that the revolutionary party was not concerned in the crime of the Rue St. Nicolas; but this was not positively ascertained till much later, that is to say, till the 28th Nivôse—

18th of January—the day of the apprehension, and complete identification of Carbon by the sellers of the horse, cart, and barrel. The act against the Revolutionists is dated the 14th Nivôse—4th of January:—it is not true, therefore, as it has been sometimes asserted, that the proscription took place in spite of a perfect knowledge of the real authors of the crime, and that the government punished the Revolutionists, knowing them to be innocent. The procedure was at all events highly arbitrary; but it is our duty to state the facts as they occurred, without exaggeration or extenuation.

kind; who had shed the blood of the prisoners in the Abbaye, invaded and outraged the Convention, threatened the Directory, and who now, driven to despair, had recourse to the dagger, to strike the Republic in the person of the First Consul. "All these men," it was said, "have not taken up the dagger, but all are universally known to be capable of pointing and of using it." It was added that the protective forms of justice were not made for them; it was therefore proposed to seize, and to transport them from the territory of the Republic.

The examination of the report gave rise to the question, whether the Jacobins ought not to be denounced in it as the contrivers of the 3d Nivôse. The First Consul took great pains to oppose this. "We believe so," said he, "but we do not know it;"—(he began, in fact, to be shaken in his conviction)—"they are transported for the deeds of the 2d of September, of the 31st of May, of the days of Prairial, for Babœuf's conspiracy, for all that they have done, for all that they might yet do."

A list of 130 persons doomed to transportation was annexed to this report. The government did not confine itself to transporting them; but, what was perhaps more cruel, there was added to the names of several of them the appellation *Septembriser*, without any other ground for thus stigmatizing them than public notoriety.

The Council of State manifested a visible repugnance on hearing these 130 names; for it might be said that it was called upon to draw up a proscription list. Thibaudeau, the councillor, said that such a list could not be prepared by the Council. "I am not so silly," replied the First Consul, angrily, "as to make you pass sentence upon individuals; I merely submit to you the principle of the measure." The principle was approved, but not without some dissentient votes.

The question was then proposed, whether the measure should be an act of state police, on the part of the government, or a law passed in the accustomed forms. This point had been previously arranged: the resolutions already secretly adopted were confirmed, and it was decided that the measure should be a spontaneous act of the government, but referred to the Senate, which should pronounce upon the question of constitutionality.

On the 4th of January—14th Nivôse—the First Consul, having had the definitive list prepared, drew up a decree, by which he banished from the territory of the Republic the persons included in that list, and without hesitation affixed his signature.

On the 6th of January—15th Nivôse—the assembled Senate, proceeding a step further than the decision of the Council of State, declared that the resolution of the First Consul was a measure essential to the preservation of the Constitution.

These unfortunate persons were collected on the following day, and despatched to Nantes to be shipped and transported to distant countries. There were among them some deputies of the Convention, several members of the old Commune, all that remained of the murderers

of September, and the notorious Rossignol, who had been general of the revolutionary army. Assuredly these men, at least most of them, deserved no sympathy; but all the forms of justice were violated in regard to them, and that which proves the danger of the violation of those sacred forms is, that many of the denunciations made by the police were disputed, and with a strong appearance of truth. It required some moral courage at the moment, to intercede on behalf of these proscripts; still there was some who, on the recommendation of bold men, were properly erased from the list of proscription, and spared at Nantes from the fatal embarkation. That an individual should be able to obtain, or fail in obtaining, the favour of government, according as he can command, or is unable to command, an influential recommendation, is a point to which I shall not advert; but that his exclusion from a proscription list should depend upon the accidental circumstance, whether he can or cannot find a courageous influential friend to interfere on his behalf, must shock every feeling of justice, and prove that when forms are violated, society is exposed to all the horrors of arbitrary rule. And yet this period was resplendent with glory; it was distinguished by a love of order, by an antipathy to blood. But the nation was emerging from the revolutionary chaos; it had no respect for rules; it found them inconvenient and insupportable. If ever this arbitrary act were canvassed, a single word was sufficient to justify it. Those wretches, it was said, were steeped in blood; they would wallow in it again, if they were allowed free scope; they are treated much better than they had treated their victims. And, certainly, if this act had many previous precedents at anterior epochs, in regard to the violation of forms, it was marked by two peculiar distinct features from the past: punishment fell mostly upon villains, and their blood was not shed. A miserable excuse, we admit, but which we must nevertheless urge in extenuation, to show that the year 1800 had nothing in common with the year '93.

While these unfortunate persons were on the road to Nantes, it was with the greatest difficulty that they were saved from the fury of the populace in all the towns through which they passed, so strongly was public feeling expressed against them. Under the dominion of this feeling, something still more deplorable occurred; this was the condemnation of Ceracchi, Arena, Demerville, and Topino Lebrun. It will be recollected that in the preceding October—Vendémiaire—these hot-headed men had entered into a plot for the assassination of the First Consul at the opera. But none of them had had the courage, nor perhaps even any decided intention, to assist in the execution of the plot. The police agents, sent in as spies amongst them, and to whom they gave daggers, urged them on to a degree of guilt, which before, perhaps, they had not contemplated. But at any rate, they did not make their appearance at the place fixed for the execution of their plot; and Ceracchi, the only one apprehended, in the opera-house, was not even armed with one of the daggers which had been distributed amongst them. They were declaimers, who

certainly wished for the destruction of the First Consul, but would never have dared to consummate it. They were tried on the 9th of January—19th Nivôse—at the very moment when the events just related were occurring. Their counsel, aware of the fatal influence exercised upon the minds of the jury by the catastrophe of the 3d Nivôse, strove in vain to weaken it. That influence was irresistible upon the jury, which, of all tribunals, is that most swayed by public opinion, and which has the advantages and the inconveniences of that bias. Sentence of death was passed on four of these wretched men: these were Ceracchi, Arena, Demerville, and Topino Lebrun. The latter deserved some sympathy, and became a striking example of the cruel mutability of fortune during revolutions. This young Topino Lebrun was a painter of some talent, and a pupil of David. Participating in the extravagant ideas of the artists of the time, he had been a jurymen at the revolutionary tribunal, but had there shown himself far more merciful than his colleagues. He brought forward the advocate Chaveau Lagarde, the respectable defender of the victims of that time, who in vain gave evidence in favour of his humanity. Extraordinary change of fortune! the former jurymen of the revolutionary tribunal, now accused in his turn, calls to his assistance the former defender of the victims of that sanguinary tribunal! But this assistance, generously afforded, could not save him. The whole four, condemned on the 9th of January—19th Nivôse—were, after an unavailing appeal to the court of Cassation, executed on the 31st of the same month of January.

Meanwhile, the horrible mystery of the infernal machine was being gradually brought to light. M. Fouché had set agents to work about Georges, to make inquiries concerning Carbon, what had become of him, and where he lived. He had learned through this channel that Carbon had sisters residing in Paris, and he had also discovered their abode. The police searched it, and found a barrel of powder. They obtained, moreover, from Carbon's youngest sister, the address of the new lodging in which he had secreted himself. He was residing with very respectable persons, the Demoiselles de Cicé, sisters of M. de Cicé, formerly Archbishop of Bordeaux, and minister of justice. These ladies, taking him for a returned emigrant, whose passport was not in order, had procured him an asylum amongst a number of females, formerly nuns, who lived together in a remote quarter of Paris. These innocent women, who every day returned thanks to Heaven for the preservation of the First Consul, as they would have given themselves up for lost if he had fallen, had afforded a retreat, unconsciously, to one of his assassins. The police repaired thither on the 18th of January—28th Nivôse—and apprehended Carbon, together with all the persons who had admitted him into the house. He was confronted the same day with the witnesses previously examined, and fully identified. At first, he denied every thing, but at length confessed his participation in the crime, but an innocent participation, according to his ac-

count, for he asserted that he was not aware of the purpose for which the cart and the barrel were intended. He denounced Limodan and St. Réjant. Limodan had had time to make his escape to a foreign country, but St. Réjant, thrown down by the explosion, and half dead for some minutes, had only time and strength to change his lodging. An agent of Georges employed to attend on him, and who had been left at liberty, in hopes by tracking him to find St. Réjant, served to indicate his abode. On proceeding thither, the police found that he was still very ill from the effects of his wounds. He was soon confronted, identified, and convicted upon abundance of evidence, which left no room for doubt. Under his bed was found a letter to Georges, in which he related, with some ambiguity, the principal circumstances of the crime, and justified himself to his chief for his miscarriage. Carbon and St. Réjant were sent to the criminal tribunal, which soon sentenced these execrable assassins to the death they deserved.

When all these particulars were published, the obstinate accusers of the revolutionary party, and the complaisant defenders of the royalist party, were alike surprised and confounded. The enemies of M. Fouché, also, were disconcerted. The soundness of his judgment was acknowledged, and he was re-established in the favour of the First Consul. But he had furnished a weapon of which his enemies, with justice, took advantage. Since he was so sure of his point, said they, why did he suffer the Revolutionists to be proscribed? He deserved, indeed, this keen reproach. The First Consul, who was unconcerned about violated forms, and cared for nothing but the results obtained, manifested no regret. He thought that what was done, was well done in every respect; that he was rid of what he called "the staff of the Jacobins," and that the 3d Nivôse proved merely one thing—the necessity of watching the Royalists, as well as the Terrorists. "Fouché's opinion," said he, "was, after all, the only correct one; he is right: we must keep an eye on the returned emigrants, the Chonans, and all the members of that party."

This event greatly diminished the sympathy which had been felt for the Royalists, who had been complaisantly called the victims of terror; and likewise greatly diminished the animosity against the Revolutionists. M. Fouché had gained in credit, but not in esteem.

The painful feelings created by the employment of the machine, since named infernal, were soon dispelled by the joy produced by the peace of Lunéville. All days are not auspicious, even under the most prosperous governments. That of the Consulate had the unexampled advantage, that, if sad impressions took possession of the public mind one moment, they were dissipated the next, by some grand, new, unforeseen result. Occasional brief but mournful scenes, in which the First Consul was conspicuous as the saviour of France, which each faction was striving to undo, and these scenes followed by victories, treaties, and acts of reparation, which healed deep wounds, or restored public prosperity—

such was the spectacle which was incessantly exhibited. General Bonaparte always emerged from them greater, dearer to France, more clearly destined for the supreme power.

The second session of the Legislative Body had commenced. It was engaged, at this moment, in the discussion and adoption of several laws, the principal of which—that of the special tribunals—was of no real importance, after what had just been done. But the opposition in the Tribunal opposed these laws against the government; this was sufficient to induce the latter to persevere in them. The first of them related to the archives of the Republic. It had become necessary, since the abolition of the ancient provinces had given up to neglect a great number of old title-deeds and documents, still either very useful, or very curious, to decide in what place these and other ancient records, such as laws, treaties, &c., should be deposited. This was a measure of order, devoid of all political bearing. The Tribunal voted against the law, and having, as usual, sent its three orators to the Legislative Body, obtained its rejection by a great majority. The Legislative Body, although strongly attached to the government, was, like assemblies thus devoted, sometimes jealous of showing its independence in measures of detail; and it could certainly do this without danger, in the discussion of a law, the object of which was to determine in what place, or places, certain ancient records and papers should be deposited.

The two assemblies had under their consideration, at the moment, a law more important than the preceding, but equally foreign to politics. It related to justices of peace, whose number had been found too great. Six thousand having been appointed at the time of their first institution, they had not answered the purpose for which they were created. In many districts, men capable of duly performing such functions were not to be found. They had failed in another point. It had been resolved to assign to them the judicial police; they had performed this duty very indifferently, and besides, the paternal and benevolent character of their jurisdiction had been, in a certain degree, impaired by it. The new plan of the government proposed two modifications relative to the justices of peace; in the first place, their reduction from 6000 to 2600; and, in the next, the transfer of the judicial police to other magistrates. The project was a reasonable one, and presented with excellent intentions; but it met with violent opposition in the Tribunal. Several members spoke against it, especially M. Benjamin Constant. It was, nevertheless, carried in the Tribunal by 59 votes against 32; and in the Legislative Body by 218 against 41.

Another law, more calculated to produce discussion, and of an entirely political nature, was presented at this period: this was the law which had for its object the institution of special tribunals. But this had lost its chief utility since the First Consul had appointed military commissions, to accompany the movable columns employed in the suppression of robbery; and especially since he had not hesi-

tated to proscribe arbitrarily such Revolutionists as were deemed dangerous. These military commissions had already produced salutary effects. The judges in military uniform, who composed them, were not afraid of the accused: they encouraged the witnesses who were to give evidence, and frequently these witnesses were the very soldiers who had seized the banditti, and surprised them with arms in their hands. Prompt and vigorous justice, following the very active employment of force, had singularly contributed to re-establish safety on the roads. The deadly conflicts which had ensued with the escorts placed on the *impériaux* of the diligences soon intimidated the robbers. Attacks became less frequent, and security began again to prevail, thanks to the vigour of the government and of the tribunal, thanks also to the conclusion of the winter. The proposed law, therefore, was introduced when the evil was already abated; but it was beneficial, inasmuch as it imparted regularity to the military tribunals established on the high roads, and applied to highway robbery a permanent and perfectly legal measure of punishment. The projected organization was this:—

The special tribunals were to be composed of three ordinary judges, all of them members of the criminal tribunal, of three military officers, with two assessors, the latter chosen by the government, and duly qualified, by their standing at the bar, to act as judges. Thus the military members could not have a majority. The government was empowered to establish these tribunals in those departments where they might be thought useful. They were authorized to take cognisance of all crimes committed by armed bands on the high roads and in the country, of all outrages against the purchasers of national domains, and lastly, of murders attempted with premeditation against the heads of the government. This last clause comprehended such crimes as the infernal machine, the plot of Ceracchi, Arena, &c. The court of Cassation was empowered to decide in every case of disputed jurisdiction, all other business before the court being suspended. This institution was to be abolished, as a matter of right, two years after the general peace.

These tribunals were obnoxious to every objection which can attach to exceptional justice. But there was this to be urged in their favour, that never had society, convulsed to the very centre, required more prompt and more extraordinary measures for tranquillizing it. Under the pretext of an adherence to the Constitution, recourse was had to that article of it, which permitted the Legislative Body to suspend its provisions in the departments where that might be deemed necessary. The case of extraordinary jurisdictions was evidently comprehended in this clause; as the suspension of the Constitution necessarily led to the immediate establishment of martial law. Moreover, the discussion was altogether superfluous in a country, and at a time when 130 persons had just been proscribed without trial, and military commissions had been established in several departments, without eliciting the

lightest murmur from public opinion. It must even be confessed that, as compared with these acts, the proposed law was a return to constitutional government. But it was vehemently, acrimoniously attacked by the usual opponents, Messrs. Daunou, Constant, Ginguéné, and others. In the Tribunal it passed by a majority of only 49 votes to 41. In the Legislative Body, the majority was much greater, for the bill obtained 192 votes against 88. But a minority of 88 votes exceeded the usual strength of the minority in that assembly, wholly devoted to the government. This great number of dissentient votes was attributed to a speech of M. Français, of Nantes, who addressed language perhaps a little too intemperate to the Legislative Body. "M. Français, of Nantes, has done right," said the First Consul to his colleagues, Cambacérés and Lebrun, who seemed to disapprove that speech; "it is better to have fewer votes, and to show that we feel insults and are determined not to put up with them."

The First Consul made use of still stronger language to a deputation of the Senate, which presented to him a resolution of that body. He expressed himself in the boldest manner, and on several occasions he plainly declared, that, if he was too much annoyed, that if people would endeavour to prevent him from restoring peace and order to France, he would rely upon the opinion which the country had of him, and govern by consular ordinances. His ascendancy increased every moment with success, his boldness with his ascendancy, and he was no longer at the pains of dissembling the extent of his designs.

He met with still stronger opposition on the questions of finance, which were the last discussed during this session. This was, nevertheless, the most meritorious work of the government, and more particularly owing to the personal intervention of the First Consul.

We have several times explained the means employed to insure the collection, and the regular payment into the treasury, of the revenues of the state. These means had been completely successful. In the year VIII. (1799—1800), there had been received 518,000,000,¹ which equalled the amount of the taxes for a whole year; for, in the budget, the expenditure and the receipts did not at that period exceed 500,000,000. Of these 518,000,000, a sum of 172,000,000 belonged to years V., VI., and VII., and 346,000,000 to the year VIII. Some items were still owing for those four years; it was necessary that they should be completely liquidated, in order that the year IX. (1800—1801), which was the current year, might at length proceed with perfect regularity. The income of the year IX. was sure to be adequate to the expenses, as the taxes would produce from 500,000,000 to 520,000,000; and this was sufficient to cover the expenses of the peace establishment. A system of annual accounts, distinguishing the income and expenditure for each twelve months had been introduced, and thenceforth the receipts of the year IX. were

to be exclusively applied to the expenses of the year IX., and the receipts of the year X. to the expenses of the year X., and so on; provision was thus made for the future. But for the past, that is to say, for the years V., VI., VII., and VIII., there was a deficit to be made good. To this purpose, the daily receipts derived from the arrears of the contributions of those respective years were appropriated. But these arrears, which were chiefly owing by the landed proprietors, reduced them to a state of great depression. At the meeting of the councils-general of the departments, a meeting then held for the first time, eighty-seven councils-general out of one hundred and six complained of the excessive burden of the direct contributions. Government, therefore, had no alternative, as we have before observed, but to remit a part of the outstanding arrears, if it persevered in requiring, in future, the punctual payment of the whole tax. A law was proposed to authorize the local administrations to relieve the tax-payers who were too heavily assessed. This bill passed without opposition. But this would occasion a considerable deficiency appertaining to the years V., VI., VII., and VIII. This deficiency was estimated for the three years V., VI., VII., at 90,000,000, and for the year VIII., separately, at 30,000,000. The year VIII. (1799—1800) was kept distinct from the years V., VI., and VII., because the year VIII. belonged to the consulate.

It was necessary to decide how these deficits were to be met. There were national domains still undisposed of, to the extent of about 400,000,000; and it was here that the sound sense of the First Consul exercised the happiest influence on our financial system, and caused the best possible employment to be made of the public resources.

As the national domains were not always marketable, their value had repeatedly been received in anticipation, by means of a government paper, which had been issued under different denominations, and which was receivable in payment of these domains. Since the extinction of the assignats, this kind of paper was known by the name of *rescriptions*. In the course of the year VIII., some of these *rescriptions* had been negotiated at less ruinous rates than before, but still at too great a sacrifice to render it prudent to have recourse to them. These notes were negotiated at a loss from the very first day they were issued, soon fell into discredit, then passed into the hands of speculators, who, in this manner purchased the national domains for next to nothing. In this way a valuable resource had been wasted, to the great detriment of the state, and to the great advantage of stockjobbers. The remaining 400,000,000, if they could be saved from the disorder, by which so many other millions had been swallowed up, to this day, would soon acquire, with time and peace, a three or fourfold value. The First Consul was resolved not to squander them in the same way that several thousand millions had already been thrown away.

¹ These figures express francs, five of which are nearly equivalent to one dollar.

Immediate funds were nevertheless required. The First Consul endeavoured to obtain them

by the emission of *rentes* (stock), which, since his accession, had already advanced considerably in value. They had risen from the price of ten and twelve, to that of twenty-five and thirty after Marengo, and above that of fifty, since the peace of Lunéville; it was asserted that they would rise as high as sixty at the general peace. At this rate, the government could begin to negotiate them, as there was less loss in selling *rentes*, than national domains. The First Consul, unwilling to open a loan, proposed to pay with *rentes*, certain creditors of the state, and to appropriate to the Sinking Fund an equivalent sum in landed property, which that fund would sell by and by, slowly and at its full value, so as to compensate in this manner for the augmentation about to be made to the public debt. Such was the principle of the laws of finance proposed this year.

The debts yet unpaid for the last three years of the Directory, V., VI., and VII., passed for bad debts. They were the remnant of the disgraceful contracts, to the amount of 600,000,000, made under the Directory. Upon commencing a new system, the government resolved to respect these debts, notwithstanding their origin and their nature. They amounted to a sum of about 90,000,000, but almost the whole being in the hands of speculators, they were at a discount of seventy-five per cent. in the market. It was proposed to pay them off by means of a stock bearing interest at the rate of three per cent. The total of these debts amounting to 90,000,000, it would require, at three per cent., 2,700,000 francs to meet the dividends. This stock, at the current price of the public funds, (say 30 to 33½) represented a real value of 27,000,000 or 30,000,000, and could not fail to represent one of 40,000,000 at least, in the eight or ten months which must elapse before the operation was completed. The debts intended to be paid, being at a discount of seventy-five per cent., and the capital of 90,000,000, of which they were composed, being thus reduced in reality to 22,000,000 or 23,000,000, much more would be paid for them than they were worth, if government granted a *rente* of 2,700,000 francs for them, since that *rente*, sold immediately, would have produced 27,000,000 or 30,000,000, and soon was likely to produce 40,000,000.

The debts of the year VIII. to be still liquidated, were of a totally different nature. They were contracted for services performed during the first year of the consular government, when order already prevailed in the administration. These services, rendered at a time when the distress was still great, had, it is true, been paid for at a very high rate; but it would have been derogatory to the honour of the consular government not to have faithfully kept these engagements, which were recently contracted, which had not been classed, like those of the Directory, among discredited paper, nor negotiated as such, and to have treated them in the same manner as those

which belonged to the years V., VI., and VII. Government, therefore, did not hesitate to pay in full, and at its nominal value, the excess of the expenditure of the year VIII. It was now estimated at 60,000,000, but the receipt of arrears of the contributions of the year VIII. would reduce it to 30,000,000. It was resolved to pay a portion of it, 20,000,000, with a stock bearing interest at five per cent., which made 1,000,000 interest. We shall explain, presently, in what way the balance of 10,000,000 was provided for.

The income of the year IX. (1800—1801) seemed likely to meet the expenses, on the nearly certain hypothesis of a speedy termination of the war; for the continental peace concluded at Lunéville must soon lead to a maritime peace. The budget was not at that time voted a year in advance; it was voted in the same year, while the expenses were being incurred. The budget of the year IX., for instance, was presented and discussed in Ventôse, year IX., that is to say, the budget of 1801 in March, 1801. The expenditure and the receipts of this year were estimated at the moment at 415,000,000 (exclusively of the expenses of collection and various local services, which may be taken at 100,000,000 more, so that 415,000,000 must be taken at 515,000,000.) But the estimate of 415,000,000 for the expenditure and the receipts fell short of the truth, for then, as now, the real charges always exceeded the estimates. We shall even show, by and by, that the sum of 415,000,000, was increased to 500,000,000. Fortunately, the produce of the taxes exceeded the sum estimated, as well as the expenditure. This excess on both sides was certainly calculated upon; but fearing, erroneously by-the-by, that the surplus receipts would not cover the excess of the expenditure, government determined to secure a supplementary resource. Ten millions yet remained to be provided for, as we have just said, to complete the payments of the year VIII.; it was supposed that 20,000,000 would be required for the balance of the year IX.; thus 30,000,000 would have to be raised in two years. It was resolved to have recourse to a sale of national domains to that extent only. The sale of fifteen millions' worth of these domains might be effected with advantage and without confusion, in the course of each year. By placing this business in the hand of the commissioners of the Sinking Fund, who had already performed this duty with great ability, the government was sure to dispose of this portion of the domains of the state on advantageous terms. In this manner the previous accounts would be liquidated, and the present balanced. There was but one more operation requisite to render the organization of the finances of the state complete, and that was, the definitive regulation of the public debt.

The moment was come, in fact, for fixing its amount, for adjusting the resources of the Sinking Fund to the amount of the entire capital of the debt, and for applying to this object the 400,000,000 of national domains, which were still at the disposal of the state.

The public debt was just as it had been left

* "*Rentes*" signifies the annual dividend payable on stock: thus, 350 five per cent "*rentes*" (perpetual annuity of 350 francs) represents 5000 francs capital stock.—Translator.

by the bankruptcy declared by the Directory, but attributable to the Convention and the Constituent Assembly. One-third of this debt had been placed upon the Great Book: it was this portion which was called, in the language of the time, the *Consolidated Third*. Interest at five per cent. had been allowed on this third, saved from the bankruptcy. The amount of it inscribed in the Great Book was 37,000,000 (interest and not capital). A very considerable sum had still to be inscribed. Two-thirds had been *mobilized*, another expression of the time, that is to say, struck out of the Great Book, and declared receivable in payment of the national domains, so that, in point of fact, they were clearly assignats. A subsequent law had completed their depreciation, by restricting them to a single purpose, that of being received in payment exclusively for the buildings, and not for the lands or the woods, constituting part of the national possessions.

It was necessary to put an end to this state of things, and for that purpose to carry to the Great Book the remainder of the *Consolidated Third*, which the preceding government had deferred inscribing, that it might be dispensed from paying interest upon it. Justice and regularity in the finances demanded that an end should be put to this state of things. It was proposed to enter in the Great Book *Consolidated Third* to the extent of 1,500,000, but to bear interest only from the commencement of the year XII. This part of the debt, though the enjoyment of the income from it was postponed for two years, yet acquired immediately, from the mere circumstance of the inscription, a value nearly equal to the portions already inscribed; and a very high value was moreover conferred on all that remained of the *Consolidated Third* by this earnest of punctuality. There was a considerable amount left uninscribed, either in *Consolidated Thirds*, properly so called, or in debts of the emigrants, which the state had taken upon itself, in confiscating their property, or in debts of Belgium, which had been a condition of the conquest. Lastly, there were the *mobilized two-thirds*, now extremely depreciated, and which it was but just to afford the holders the means of realizing. An offer was made to convert them into *Consolidated Third*, funded at the rate of five francs stock for one hundred francs nominal capital. It was probable that the holders would eagerly accept this offer. It was proposed to create for this purpose 1,000,000 *rentes*, and if this first trial succeeded, it was anticipated that the entire value of the *mobilized two-thirds* would be soon absorbed. A fixed period was also appointed, after which the *two-third bonds* should no longer be receivable in payment of the national domains. At the expiration of this term, the domains purchased and not paid for were to revert unconditionally to the state.

It was calculated that the addition of the sum of 20,000,000 of *rentes* to the 37,000,000 of *Consolidated Third* already inscribed in the Great Book, would suffice to meet the balance of *Consolidated Third* still uninscribed, the *mobilized two-thirds*, the conversion of which was contemplated, and lastly, the debts of the emigrants and of Belgium. The national debt

would accordingly comprise 57,000,000 perpetual *rentes*. In addition to that permanent charge there existed, however, 20,000,000 of life annuities, 19,000,000 of civil and religious pensions, (the latter paid to the clergy who had been dispossessed of their property,) and lastly, 30,000,000 of military pensions; thus, in all, 69,000,000 of terminable annuities, of which about 3,000,000 would annually fall in. There was reason, therefore, to hope, that in a few years, as the annuitants, pensioners, and others, died off, the saving under the head of life annuities would compensate for the successive augmentations which the perpetual debt would receive in consequence of new inscriptions in the Great Book. Consequently, the entire annual charge for interest on both branches of the debt, supposing provision to be made for all old claims, could not possibly exceed the sum of 100,000,000, about one-half of which consisted of *perpetual rentes*, and the other of *terminable rentes*. Our financial position then was this: a debt bearing 100,000,000 annual interest, and a budget exhibiting a total expenditure (interest on the debt included) of 500,000,000, with a clear net revenue of a like amount, after deduction of 100,000,000 for the costs of collection. This position was certainly far superior to that of England, which had an annual debt of nearly 500,000,000, with a revenue of 1,000,000,000 or 1,100,000,000. Add to this, that France still had left the resource of the indirect contributions, that is to say, taxes on liquors, tobacco, salt, &c., not yet re-established, and which were destined to furnish at a future period an immense revenue.

The First Consul was desirous of augmenting the resources of the Sinking Fund in proportion to the increase of the debt. He had decided upon the creation of *rentes* to the amount of 2,700,000 francs to wipe off the deficit of the years V., VI., and VII., of 1,000,000 for the deficit of the year VIII., and of several more millions for the inscription of the balance of the *Consolidated Third*, and for the conversion of the *mobilized two-thirds*, &c. He caused a capital of 90,000,000 in national domains, saleable at discretion, and applicable to the redemption of *rentes* to be assigned to the Sinking Fund. At the suggestion of the First Consul, there was moreover transferred to the Commissioners a *rente* of 5,400,000 francs belonging to the fund for public instruction; we shall presently see how this sum was made good.

By this arrangement, the national domains were preserved from being frittered away; for the Commissioners of the Sinking Fund, disposing of them slowly, and at seasonable times, or keeping them, if it suited them, thus avoided the deplorable dilapidations which had formerly taken place. To secure the remainder with a greater degree of certainty, the First Consul resolved to apply a considerable portion of them to various other branches of service, in which he took great interest, such as public instruction and the maintenance of the invalids. Public instruction appeared to him the most important service of the state, that, in particular, for which an enlightened government like his, having a new society to found, ought to lose no time in providing. As for the

invalid, that is to say, wounded soldiers, they formed, as it were, his family; they were the props of his power, the instruments of his glory: all his attention was due to them; he owed them at least some instalment of the thousand millions formerly promised by the Republic to the defenders of the country.

The First Consul did not like to see these important services dependent on the budget, on its fluctuations and contingencies. In consequence, he caused 120,000,000 worth of national domains to be allotted to public instruction, and 40,000,000 to the support of the Hospitals for the Invalids. Here was sufficient amply to endow the noble institution which he intended one day to devote to the education of the French youth, and wherewithal to endow also several similar hospitals upon the same footing as that which owes its origin to Louis XIV. Whether these assignments were or were not afterwards respected, it was for the moment 160,000,000 rescued from the improvident sales of public lands, and an annual relief for the budget. Thus of the 400,000,000 worth of national domains left, 10,000,000 were granted towards the expenditure of the year VIII., 20,000,000 for that of the year IX., 90,000,000 to the Sinking Fund, 120,000,000 to public instruction, 40,000,000 to the invalids. These formed a total sum of 280,000,000 out of 400,000,000, for which a useful employment was immediately found, without having recourse to the system of public sales. Out of this sum of 280,000,000, 10,000,000 only for the year VIII., and 20,000,000 for the year IX., were to be disposed of in the course of two years, which should not be attended with any inconvenience; the 90,000,000 assigned to the Sinking Fund were to be sold, but very slowly, when the fund should be in absolute want of money, perhaps not at all. The 120,000,000 for public instruction, the 40,000,000 for the invalids, were never to be offered for sale. Out of the total of 400,000,000, there would remain 120,000,000 disposable and unappropriated. In reality, only 30,000,000 out of the 400,000,000 were to be sold; the rest remained in trust for different branches of the services, or as a disposable reserve, with a certainty of soon increasing at least double or treble in value for the advantage of the state.

To sum up: the government availed itself of the revival of credit to substitute the expedient of the creation of *rentes* to that of the alienation of the national domains; it discharged by a very small portion of these domains, and by a creation of *rentes*, the deficiencies left unpaid in the years V., VI., VII., and VIII.; it completed the liquidation of the floating public debt, and insured the payment of the interest in a certain and regular manner. After having thus regulated old accounts, saved the remnant of the domains of the state, and fixed the amount of the debt, there would be an annual interest of 100,000,000, an ample Sinking Fund; and finally, a budget, with an equal income and expenditure of 500,000,000, exclusive of the costs of collection, or of 600,000,000, including those costs.

Such a distribution of the public property, conceived with not less equity than sound

sense, ought to have met with general approbation. A violent opposition was nevertheless raised in the Tribunal. The 415,000,000 demanded for the current year, the year IX., were granted without difficulty; but the opposition complained that the budget was not voted a year in advance; an unfair reproach, for nothing was at that time arranged for such a mode of proceeding. It was not yet practised in England, and it was even a disputed point among financiers. The same opposition members complained of the regulation of the arrears being an act of bankruptcy towards the creditors of the years V., VI., and VII., whose debts were to be consolidated at three per cent. only, instead of five, as was the case with those of the year VIII. They found fault with the regulation of the debt for depriving the holders of the *Consolidated Third* of the interest of their stock for two years, since that interest was to commence only with the year XII. For these two complaints there was very little foundation; for, as we have seen, the creditors of the years V., VI., and VII., in obtaining a permanent *rente* of three per cent., received more than their debts were worth; and as for the portion of the *Consolidated Third*, the inscription of which was resolved upon, a great service was rendered to the holders by the mere circumstance of that inscription. If, in fact, that inscription had been deferred a year or two longer, as had been done by the preceding government, the holders would have been deprived, not only of the interest, but of the benefit of the definitive consolidation. To resume the process of that consolidation so long deferred, was of itself to place them in a much better position.

The Tribunal grew warm upon these trivial objections; paid no regard to the answers that were addressed to it; and rejected the plan of finance by a majority of fifty-six votes to thirty, in the sitting of the 19th of March—28th Ventôse. Some cries of "*Vive la République!*" were even raised in the tribunes, a circumstance which had not happened for a long time, and revived the remembrance of the tumultuous days of the Convention. On the motion of Messrs. Riouffe and Chauvelin, the president caused the tribunes to be cleared.

Two days later, on the 21st of March—30th Ventôse—the last day of the session of the year IX., the Legislative Body heard the discussion of the bill. Three tribunes were to attack, and three Councillors of State to defend it. M. Benjamin Constant was one of the three tribunes. He urged in a brilliant manner, the objections raised against the plan of the government. The Legislative Body, nevertheless, voted its adoption by a majority of 227 to 58. The First Consul ought to have been satisfied. But he knew not, neither did those about him know, that we ought to do good without being surprised, without being ruffled, by the injustice with which we are frequently repaid. And what man ever had so much glory as the First Consul, to compensate him for these attacks, so frivolous, so indiscreet! Besides, notwithstanding these attacks, the arrangements were excellent on the part of the government. The majority in the Legislative Body

was five-sixths at least; and in the Tribunate, the vote of which decided nothing, it was two-thirds. There was nothing to be astonished at, little to cause alarm in such inconsiderable minorities. But, although the object of universal admiration, the man who then governed France could not endure the petty censures passed upon his administration. The time for a real representative government had not yet arrived: the opposition had not its principles, or its manners any more than the government itself. That which will completely portray the oppositionists of the Tribunate is, that the odious procedure against the Revolutionists did not elicit from them a single observation. They took advantage of the circumstance, of the act not having been referred to the Legislature, to remain silent on the subject. They declaimed on things that were of little importance or unobjectionable, and winked at the unpardonable infringement of all the rules of justice. Such, in almost all times, is the conduct of men, and of parties.

After all, the barren agitation of a few systematic oppositionists, mistaking the general movement of minds, and the exigencies of the time, produced little sensation. The public was wholly engrossed by the spectacle of the immense efforts which had achieved victory and a continental peace for France, and which were soon to procure for her a maritime peace also.

As we have observed several times, the First Consul, amidst his military and political occupations, never ceased to give his attention to roads, canals, bridges, to manufactures, and to commerce.

We have already described the wretched state of the roads, and the means employed by the First Consul to supply the insufficiency of the produce of the tolls. He had given orders for a thorough inquiry into this subject, but, as is mostly the case, the difficulty consisted much more in the want of money, than in the choice of a good system. He proceeded direct to the point, and in the budget of the year IX. he appropriated fresh sums out of the general funds of the treasury, for prosecuting the extraordinary repairs already begun. Canals were also the subject of conversation. Men's minds, disgusted with political agitations, gladly turned towards every thing that concerned industry and commerce. The canal now known by the name of the canal of St. Quentin, connecting the navigation of the Seine, and of the Oise, with that of the Somme and the Scheld, that is to say, connecting Belgium with France, had been abandoned. It had been found impossible to agree upon the mode of executing the cutting, which was to afford a passage, from the valley of the Oise, into those of the Somme and the Scheld. The engineers were divided in opinion. The First Consul went thither himself, heard what each had to say, decided the question, and decided it well. The cutting was determined upon, and continued in the best direction, the identical one which has succeeded. The population of St. Quentin received him with transport, and no sooner had he returned to Paris, than the inhabitants of the Seine Inferieure sent a deputation, to solicit

him to grant them in their turn forty-eight hours of his time. He promised a speedy visit to Normandy. At his instigation, the erection of three new bridges in Paris over the Seine was decided upon, and intrusted to companies: these were, that fronting the Jardin des Plantes, and called the bridge of Austerlitz; that which unites the isle of the City, with the isle St. Louis; lastly, that which connects the Louvre with the palace of the Institute. He directed his attention, at the same time, to the road of the Simplon, the first project of his youth—a project ever dearest to his heart, most worthy to rank, in future, beside the exploits of Rivoli and Marengo. It will be recollected, that the First Consul, as soon as he had founded the Cisalpine Republic, was desirous to connect it with France by a road, which, running from Lyons or Dijon, passing through Geneva, traversing the Valais, descending to the Lago Maggiore and Milan, should enable an army of 50,000 men with 100 pieces of cannon to debouch at any time, in the heart of Upper Italy. For want of such a road, he had been obliged to cross the St. Bernard. Now that the Cisalpine Republic had been reconstituted at the congress of Lunéville, it was more than ever expedient to form a great military communication between Lombardy and France. The First Consul had immediately issued orders for the necessary works. General Turreau, whom we have seen descending the Little St. Bernard, with the legions of conscripts, while General Bonaparte was descending the Great St. Bernard with his seasoned troops, received orders to fix his head-quarters at Domo d'Ossola, at the very foot of the Simplon. This general was to protect the workmen, and his soldiers were to assist in the completion of the undertaking.

To this magnificent work the First Consul resolved to add another, in commemoration of the passage of the Alps. The monks of the Great St. Bernard had rendered important services to the French army. Supplied with some money, they had during ten days supported the strength of our soldiers with food and wine. The First Consul retained a deeply grateful recollection of those services. He resolved upon the establishment of two similar hospices, one on Mount Cenis, the other on the Simplon, both auxiliary to the convent of the Great St. Bernard. They were each to contain fifteen monks, and to receive from the Cisalpine Republic a considerable endowment in lands. That Republic could refuse nothing to its founder. But as that founder liked prompt execution in all things, he had the works necessary for the first establishment performed at the expense of France, that these useful undertakings might experience no delay. Thus magnificent roads and institutions, founded with a beneficence truly noble, were to attest to future ages the passage of the Alps by the modern Hannibal.

Concurrently with these grand and beneficent views, a subject of another kind engaged his attention, which was no less useful to the nation; that is the compilation of the Civil Code. The task of digesting this code, the First Consul had confided to several eminent

lawyers, Messrs. Portalis, Tronchet,¹ and Bigot de Préameneu. Their labours were concluded, and the result had been communicated to the Court of Cassation, as well as to the twenty-nine tribunals of appeal, since called Royal courts. The opinions of the whole of the magistracy were thus collected, and the work was now about to be submitted to the Council of State, and gravely discussed under the presidency of the First Consul. It was proposed, that it should then be presented to the Legislative Body in the course of the ensuing session, that of the year X.

Ever ready to undertake great works, and at the same time to reward their authors munificently, the First Consul had just used his influence to raise M. Tronchet to the Senate. By this means, he conferred a distinction upon an eminent juriconsult, one of the compilers of the Civil Code, and, what was not a matter of indifference to him in a political point of view, the courageous defender of Louis XVI.

All things, therefore, were being organized at the same time, with the harmony which a

comprehensive mind is capable of introducing into its works, with the rapidity which a resolute energy, an authority already punctually obeyed, is capable of imparting to them. The genius which accomplished these things was without doubt extraordinary; but, it must be confessed, the situation was as extraordinary as the genius. General Bonaparte had France and Europe to move, and victory for a lever; he had to digest all the codes of the French nation, but then at the same time all ranks were disposed to submit to his laws with implicit obedience; he had roads, canals, bridges to construct, and the necessary resources for these objects, at his undisputed disposal; he had even nations ready to furnish him with their treasures, the Italians, for example, who cheerfully contributed to the expense of opening the Simplon, and to the endowment of the Hospices raised on the summits of the Alps. Providence does nothing by halves. For every mighty task, she furnishes a great genius, and to every great genius, she assigns a mighty task.

BOOK IX.

NEUTRAL POWERS.

Sequel of the Negotiations with the Powers of Europe—Treaty with the Court of Naples—Exclusion of the English from the ports of the Two Sicilies, and Engagement entered into by the Neapolitan Government to receive a French Division at Otranto—Spain pledges herself to coöperate the Portuguese, to put an end to the English Trade on the Coasts of Portugal—Vast Naval Projects of the First Consul, for combining the Naval Forces of Spain, Holland, and France, to enable them to act in Concert—Means contemplated to assist Egypt—Admiral Ganteaume, at the Head of a Division, leaves Brest during a Gale of Wind, and proceeds to the Straits of Gibraltar on his Way to the Mouth of the Nile—General Coalition of all the Maritime Nations against England—Preparations of the Neutral Powers in the Baltic—Warlike Ardour of Paul I.—Distress in England—She is visited by a frightful Famine—Her Financial and Commercial Position before and since the War—Her Income and Expenditure both doubled—Unpopularity of Mr. Pitt—His Differences with George III., and Retirement from Office—The Addington Administration—England, in spite of her Embarrassments, faces the Storm, and despatches Admirals Nelson and Parker to the Baltic, to break up the Confederacy of the Neutral Powers—Plan conceived by Nelson and Parker—They determine upon forcing the Passage of the Sound—The Swedish Coast being badly defended, the English Fleet passes the Sound almost without difficulty, and appears before Copenhagen—Nelson's views are to attack the Danes, before proceeding to the Baltic—Description of the Position of Copenhagen, and Measures adopted to defend this important Maritime Position—Nelson executes a bold Manoeuvre, and succeeds in anchoring in the King's Channel, Broadside on to the Danish Fleet—Bloody Engagement—Gallantry of the Danes, and danger of Nelson—He sends a Flag of Truce to the Crown Prince of Denmark, and thereby obtains the Advantage of a Victory—Suspension of Hostilities for fourteen Weeks, during which the Death of Paul I. becomes known—Events which have taken place in Russia—Exasperation of the Russian Nobility against the Emperor Paul, and their Resolution to get rid of this Prince by any Means, even by Crime—Count Pahlen—His Character and Projects—His Conduct towards the Grand-Duke Alexander—The scheme of a forced Abdication made to conceal their Project of Assassination—Frightful Scene at the Palace (Michael) on the Night of the 23d of March—Tragic Death of Paul I.—Accession of Alexander—The Confederacy of the Neutral Powers dissolved by the Death of the Emperor Paul—Virtual Armistice in the Baltic—The First Consul endeavours, by offering Hanover to Prussia, to retain her in the League of the Neutrals—England, satisfied with having broken up this Confederacy by the Battle of Copenhagen, and with being rid of Paul I., seeks to improve the Opportunity offered, by treating with France, and redeeming the Errors of Mr. Pitt—The Addington Administration proposes Peace to the First Consul, through the Medium of Mr. Otto—This proposal accepted, and Opening of Negotiations between France and England at London—Peace becomes general both by Sea and Land—Progress of France since the 18th Brumaire.

Peace between the Emperor and the Empire having been concluded at Lunéville in February, 1801, the First Consul was impatient to secure the results of his policy. These were to conclude a peace with those continental states which had not yet been reconciled to the Republic, and to compel them to close their ports against England; to direct against the latter the combined strength of the neutral

powers, and, in conjunction with them, to strike some decisive blow against the British trade and territory; and by this combination of means attain a maritime peace, without which the peace of the continent would be incomplete. Every thing proclaimed that these happy results could not long be delayed.

The Germanic diet had ratified the signature affixed by the emperor to the treaty of Luné-

¹ FR. DENIS TRONCHET, considered before the Revolution one of the luminaries of the Paris bar. In the States-General he was distinguished for his moderation. In the trial of Louis XVI. he was one of the defenders

of the king. In 1800 he became a member of the Court of Cassation; in 1801 was called into the Conservative Senate; in 1803 was created a grand officer of the Legion of Honour; and died in 1806.

vile. There were no grounds for supposing that there would be any demur, as Austria possessed the power of influencing the Ecclesiastical States, the only dissidents opposed to the treaty. With respect to the secular princes as they were to be indemnified for their losses, from the territories proposed to be secularized, they had a strong interest in accelerating the acceptance of the condition stipulated between Austria and France. They were, moreover, under the influence of Prussia, which power France had induced to view favourably the proceedings at Lunéville. Besides all this, every one was anxious for peace, and was ready to contribute to promote it, even by sacrifices. Prussia alone, in ratifying the signature of the emperor, which he had granted without the authority of the Diet, appeared desirous to qualify her consent, in such a form as rather to assume the semblance of toleration, than that of approbation, thereby reserving for the future the rights of the empire. But this proposition of Prussia, which, at the same time that it ratified the treaty, implied an indirect censure on the emperor, was not supported by the majority. The treaty was ratified unconditionally in its original form, by a *convocation* of the 9th of March, 1801—18th Ventôse, year IX. The ratifications were exchanged at Paris on the 16th of March—25th Ventôse. There only remained to settle a plan of indemnifications, which was to be the subject of ulterior negotiations.

Peace was thus concluded with the greater part of Europe. It was, indeed, not yet signed with Russia, but we were, as will soon appear, engaged with her, and with the northern courts, in one great maritime coalition. There were, at the same moment, two Russian ministers at Paris: M. de Sprengporten, on the subject of the prisoners; M. de Kalitscheff for the adjustment of general affairs. The latter had just arrived in the early part of March—middle of Ventôse.

There still remained the courts of Naples and Portugal to coerce, in order to close the entire continent completely against England.

Murat was advancing towards Southern Italy with a chosen body of troops, which had been drawn from the camp at Amiens. Reinforced by several detachments supplied from the army of General Brune, he had proceeded as far as Foligno, with a view to compel the Court of Naples to yield to the will of France. Had it not been for the interest evinced by the Emperor of Russia in favour of this court, the First Consul would probably at once have granted to the House of Parma the kingdom of the Two Sicilies, with the view of depriving a hostile family of this fine territory. But the disposition manifested by the Emperor Paul, would not allow him to carry this idea into effect. He was desirous, moreover, to conciliate general opinion throughout Europe, and for this reason it was expedient to avoid, as much as possible, the overthrowing of the ancient kingdoms. He was then willing to grant peace to the Court of Naples, on the condition that she should come to a rupture with England. But to influence her to take this step was in the highest degree difficult of accom-

plishment. Murat advanced to the frontiers of the kingdom, taking care to avoid Rome, and lavishing upon the Pope the greatest demonstration of respect. The Court of Naples no longer resisted, but signed an armistice which contained a stipulation agreeable to the wishes of the First Consul, for the exclusion of the English from the ports of the Two Sicilies. Nevertheless, the armistice was only for the short term of thirty days; at the expiration of which, a definitive treaty of peace was to be signed.

The Marquis de Gallo, one of the negotiators at Campo-Formio, who boasted of his intimacy with the First Consul, and of having as much influence over him as M. de Cobentzel, had repaired to Paris. Confiding on these personal recommendations, he flattered himself that, under the protection of the Russian embassy, and at the instances of Austria, he should obtain the conditions desired by the Court of Naples, which were confined to a simple neutrality. These pretensions were ridiculous, inasmuch as this court, which had given the signal for the second coalition, which had waged against us an obstinate war, which had, in short, treated the French with great indignity, could not expect, now that we held her at our discretion, to escape upon the condition of a plain and simple separation from England. The least we could do, was to compel her, either willingly or by force, to act as hostilely against England as she had done against France.

M. de Gallo having betrayed considerable self-sufficiency at Paris, having even appeared to depend more than was becoming upon the Russian embassy, a prompt termination was put to his negotiation. M. de Talleyrand notified to him, that a French plenipotentiary had set out for Florence, that the negotiation was consequently transferred to that city, and that, moreover, he could not treat with a negotiator who had not the power to consent to the sole condition deemed indispensable, namely, the expulsion of the English from the ports of the Two Sicilies—a condition which the Emperor Paul had as much at heart as the First Consul himself. Consequently, M. de Gallo found it necessary to quit Paris without delay. We had, in fact, just despatched to Florence M. Alquier, who had been recalled from Madrid, at the period when Lucien Bonaparte was sent to Spain. M. Alquier was invested with full instructions and powers to negotiate.

This plenipotentiary repaired to Florence with the utmost haste, and found there Chevalier Micheroux, the same minister who signed the armistice with Murat, who had just received full powers from his court. The negotiations, transferred to that city, and carried on under the bayonets of the French army, no longer experienced the same difficulties as at Paris. A treaty of peace was signed on the 18th of March, 1801—27th Ventôse, year IX. The conditions may be pronounced moderate, if the situation of the court of Naples be compared with that of the French Republic. We permitted that branch of the house of Bourbon to retain the whole of its dominions, which were preserved to them in their full integrity

We only exacted an insignificant portion of territory which it possessed in the island of Elba. This was Porto Longone, and the surrounding district. The island of Elba, at that time, belonged partly to Tuscany, and partly to the Two Sicilies. The intention of the French Consul was to annex it entirely to France. An historian of these treaties has loudly inveighed against this alleged act of spoliation, as if it were not plainly the natural right of the victor. With the exception of this insignificant sacrifice, the court of Naples lost nothing. She bound herself to close her ports against the English, and to furnish France with three frigates, to be delivered over, ready armed, at Ancona. The First Consul destined these for Egypt; but the most important article of the treaty was secret. It stipulated that the Neapolitan government should receive a division of 12,000 to 15,000 French troops in the Gulf of Tarentum, and should victual them during the whole term of their occupying that station. The real intention of the French Consul, without any reservation, was to transport them to that spot, with a view to succour Egypt. At that station they would be half way on the route to Alexandria; a last article required the restitution of all the objects of art, which had been selected at Rome by the French, which were all packed up in cases, when the Neapolitan army penetrated into the Papal States in 1799, and which the court of Naples had seized, and appropriated to itself. An indemnity of 500,000 francs was granted to the French who had been pillaged or harassed by the marauding bands of Neapolitans.

Such were the terms of the treaty of Florence, which must be viewed as an act of clemency, when the previous conduct of the court of Naples is taken into consideration; but which was perfectly in accordance with the intentions of the First Consul, who was aiming exclusively at procuring the ports of the continent to be closed against England, and at securing advantageous positions, to enable him to keep up communications with Egypt.

Nothing was yet agreed upon with the Pope, whose plenipotentiary was still negotiating at Paris, upon the most important of all, the religious question. He was dissatisfied with the King of Piedmont, who had yielded up Sardinia to the English, and also with the Piedmontese, who had manifested dispositions but little friendly towards our troops. He was desirous, therefore, of freeing himself from any engagement respecting that important part of Italy.

Let us now turn to Spain and Portugal. Every thing proceeded favourably in that quarter. The court of Spain, delighted with the stipulations agreed upon at Lunéville, which secured Tuscany to the young Infant of Parma, with the title of king, appeared every day more and more devoted to the First Consul, and to his views. An unexpected event, the fall of M. d'Urquijo, far from injuring our relations, had only served to strengthen them. This was not at first anticipated, as M. d'Urquijo was in Spain a sort of revolutionist, from whom a greater degree of favour was expected towards France, than from any other individual. But the result proved this to be a misapprehen-

sion. M. d'Urquijo had been at the head of affairs but a short time. Desirous of correcting certain abuses, he had induced his royal master, King Charles IV., to send an autograph letter to the Pope, recommending a series of propositions for the reform of the Spanish clergy. The Pope, alarmed at perceiving a reforming spirit arising in Spain, appealed to the old Duke of Parma, brother to the queen, complaining of M. d'Urquijo, whom he stigmatized as a bad Catholic. This was sufficient to ruin M. d'Urquijo in the mind of the king. The Prince of Peace, an avowed enemy of M. d'Urquijo, availed himself of the opportunity, and struck the last blow during a royal progress. Through these combined influences, M. d'Urquijo was stripped of power, and treated with an unexampled degree of harshness and severity. He was seized in his own house, and banished from Madrid, like a criminal of state. M. de Cevallos, a relative and creature of the Prince of Peace, was appointed his successor. This prince thus again became, from that moment, the real prime minister of the court of Spain. As he had sometimes shown some sort of opposition to an intimate alliance with France, probably in order to have an opportunity of thus throwing blame upon the Spanish ministry, it was feared that this change of ministers might be prejudicial to the designs of the First Consul. But Lucien Bonaparte, recently arrived at Madrid, forming at once a correct opinion of the actual state of things, neglected M. de Cevallos, a powerless subordinate, and put himself in direct relations with the Prince of Peace. He gave this prince to understand, that it was he who was considered at Paris as in reality prime minister of Charles IV., that to him would be ascribed all the difficulties which French policy might encounter in Spain, and that upon his own conduct would depend, whether we should regard him as a friend, or as an enemy. The Prince of Peace, who had provoked numberless animosities, and, above all, that of the heir-presumptive, deeply irritated with the state of oppression in which he was condemned to live, and conscious that his ruin was inevitable if the king and queen chanced to die, regarded the friendship of the Bonapartes as most precious, and promptly preferred their alliance to their hostility.

From that moment, business was conducted between the Prince of Peace and Lucien directly. M. d'Urquijo, finding himself too weak to bring this question of Portugal to a solution, had from time to time postponed any positive explanation on the subject. He had made France a thousand promises, unattended by any substantial results. The Prince of Peace admitted, in his interviews with Lucien, that up to that time they had not been inclined to act, that M. d'Urquijo had cajoled France with fine words; but he declared that he was ready, as far as regarded himself, to concert measures with the First Consul to act effectually against Portugal, provided they could come to an understanding upon certain points. He demanded first, the co-operation of a French division of 25,000 men, as Spain had it not in her power to raise a larger force than 20,000, to such a

point of depression had that splendid monarchy been reduced. As the presence of a French force might alarm the king and queen, it would be necessary, therefore, in order to reassure them both, that this force should be placed under the command of a Spanish general. This general was to be the Prince of Peace himself. Finally, the provinces of Portugal, of which they were to take possession, were to remain as security in the hands of the king of Spain until a general peace: in the mean time, the ports of Portugal should be closed against England.

These proposals were accepted by the First Consul with the greatest eagerness, and returned in order to receive the sanction of king Charles IV. This prince, governed by his queen, who, in her turn, was under the influence of the Prince of Peace, consented to the war against his son-in-law, on condition that the latter should not be deprived of any portion of his territories; that he should be forced only to break with the English, and to enter into an alliance with France and Spain. These views did not coincide with those of the Prince of Peace, who was desirous, it was alleged at Madrid, to secure for himself a principality in Portugal. However this may be, he was obliged to submit, and he received accordingly the rank of generalissimo. A summons was sent to the court of Lisbon, to come to an explanation within a fortnight, and to make election between England and Spain, the latter supported by France. In the mean time, the preparations for war were commenced on both sides the Pyrenees. The Prince of Peace, now created generalissimo of the Spanish and French troops, carried off even the king's own guards, to enable him to complete his army. He amused the court with reviews, with warlike spectacles, and indulged in the wildest dreams of military glory. The First Consul, on his part, hastened to direct towards Spain a portion of the troops which were returning to France. He formed a division of 25,000 men, well armed and equipped. General Leclerc was appointed to the command of the advanced-guard. General Gouvion St. Cyr, whom he justly regarded as one of the most able generals of the time, was appointed to the command of the entire army, in order to compensate for the utter incapacity of the prince generalissimo.

It was arranged that these troops, set in motion in the month of March, should be ready to enter Spain in the course of the ensuing month of April.

The whole of Europe thus co-operated to aid our designs. Under the influence of the First Consul, the states of the south closed their ports against England, and the Northern States entered into an armed league against her. Under these circumstances, this power was under the necessity of having troops everywhere; in the Mediterranean, in order to blockade Egypt; in the straits of Gibraltar, to check the movements of the French fleets passing from one sea to the other; upon the coast of Portugal, to succour their threatened ally; before Rochfort and Brest, in order to blockade the great French and Spanish squadron which

was ready to set sail; in the north, to keep the Baltic under control, and prevent the rising of the neutral powers; they were also necessary in India to maintain their authority and conquests in that quarter.

The First Consul was desirous of seizing this peculiar moment, when the British forces, required in all places at the same time, had their strength necessarily widely scattered, to attempt some great expedition. The principal object he had in view, that which he the most cherished, was to succour Egypt. He owed a great duty to the army led beyond the sea, and subsequently abandoned by him, in order to return to the assistance of France. He also considered the colony founded on the banks of the Nile as the most glorious of his works. It was of importance to prove to the world, that in transporting 36,000 men to the East, he had not yielded to the inspirations of a young and ardent imagination, but had attempted a serious enterprise, susceptible of being brought to a successful conclusion. We have seen the endeavours made to negotiate a naval armistice, the object of which was to permit six frigates to enter into the port of Alexandria. This armistice, it will be recollected, had not been concluded. Not having sufficient financial resources for the equipment of armaments by sea and land, the First Consul had not yet been able to undertake the vast operation which he had in contemplation to succour Egypt. But now, relieved from the continental contest, being able to direct all his resources towards naval warfare, having almost entirely the coasts of Europe at his disposal, he meditated, in order to preserve Egypt, projects as extensive, and as bold as those which he had executed to achieve its conquest. The winter season contributed to the success of his plans, by rendering the presence of the English cruisers on the coasts quite impossible.

In the mean time, vessels of every description, trading vessels, and ships of war from the smallest despatch-boat up to frigates, sailed from the various ports of Holland, France, Spain, Italy, and even from the coast of Barbary, carrying to Egypt, with news from France, provisions, European goods, wines, and munitions of war. Some of these vessels were captured, but the greater part reached Alexandria, and not a week elapsed without news from the government at home being received at Cairo, together with signal proofs of the interest which it took in the colony.

The First Consul also prepared a fleet adapted for the inland navigation of Egypt. He had executed a model of a seventy-four gun ship, which would combine great strength with the advantage of being able to navigate the shallow channels of Alexandria without discharging her guns.¹ Orders were given to build a certain number after this model.

Whilst he bestowed all this sedulous care to sustain the spirits of the army of Egypt, transmitting to it frequently news, with partial relief, the First Consul was, at the same time, preparing a vast expedition in order to convey

¹ Letter dated 1st Nivôse, year IX.—*Actes du Papier Officié.*

thither, by one mighty effort, a powerful reinforcement of troops and materials of war. The armies returned to the soil of France were about to add a pressure on our finances; but, on the other hand, they supplied the government with great means to disquiet, perhaps to strike a blow at England. Thirty thousand men remaining in the Cisalpine; 10,000 in Piedmont; 6000 in Switzerland; 15,000 were proceeding to the gulf of Tarentum; 25,000 were directing their march towards Portugal; 25,000 were stationed in Holland: thus 111,000 men were to be supported by foreign powers. The remainder were about to be thrown on the French treasury, but nevertheless entirely at the disposal of the First Consul. A camp was forming in Holland; another in French Flanders; a third at Brest; a fourth was already collected in the Gironde, either destined for Portugal, or to furnish troops for embarkation at Rochefort. The corps returning from Italy assembled between Marseilles and Toulon. The division of 15,000 men appointed to the station in the gulf of Tarentum, was to occupy Otranto, in virtue of a secret article of the treaty of Naples, to cover the surrounding roadsteads by numerous batteries, to prepare a place of anchorage, where a fleet might approach and embark a division of 10,000 to 12,000 men in order to transport them to Egypt. Admiral Villeneuve had already set out to give the necessary orders on the spot for such embarkation.

The naval forces of Holland, France, and Spain, with some remains of the Italian navy, stationed near these several assemblages of troops, gave England reason to apprehend descents contemplated upon different points at the same time; upon Ireland, upon Portugal, upon Egypt, or upon the East Indies.

The First Consul had concerted measures with Spain and Holland, relating to the employment of their respective navies. By collecting the wrecks of the ancient Dutch navy, five ships of-the-line and a few frigates might be armed. Thirty vessels were lying at Brest, fifteen French, and as many Spanish, which had been detained two years in that harbour. The First Consul had made the following arrangements with Spain. Five Dutch ships combined with five French vessels, and five of the Spanish vessels lying at Brest, were to be despatched to Brazil, in order to protect that fine kingdom, and to prevent England from indemnifying herself for the enterprise set on foot against Portugal, by seizing on the Portuguese colonies. Twenty Spanish and French ships, according to the convention, were to remain at Brest, to be ready at any moment to throw an army into Ireland. A French division was preparing under Admiral Gauteaume, in the same port of Brest, destined, it was said, for St Domingo, there to re-establish the French and Spanish authority. Another French division was being equipped at Rochefort, and a Spanish division of five vessels at Ferrol, for the purpose of carrying troops to the West India Islands, and recovering Trinidad for instance, or Martinique. Spain, by the treaty which secured Tuscany to her in exchange for Louisiana, had engaged

to furnish France with six vessels fully equipped, placed in the harbour of Cadiz, and to employ the resources of that ancient arsenal to reorganize a portion of the forces which she formerly possessed at that station.

The First Consul, in forming these arrangements, did not communicate to the Spanish government his real intentions, as he feared the indiscretion of that cabinet. He was desirous to send a portion of the combined fleets to Brazil, and to the West India Islands, to accomplish the avowed designs, and to attract thither the English fleets; but at Brest his paramount object was the expedition under Gauteaume, ostensibly destined for St. Domingo, but intended in reality for Egypt. He gave orders for the selection of seven of the fastest sailing ships of the squadron, with two frigates and a brig; and these vessels were to transport 5000 men to effect a landing, with an ample supply of warlike stores of all kinds, timber, iron, medicines, and a selection of European commodities most wanted in Egypt. The First Consul gave orders to re-land the cargoes of those vessels which were already in a very advanced state of loading, and to re-load them in conformity with the fresh arrangements which he had determined upon. He was anxious, in short, that each vessel should contain a complete assortment of every individual article prepared for the colony, and not an entire cargo of one single description of articles; so that in the case of one of the vessels being captured, the expedition would not be totally deficient of the precise article which the captured vessel might contain. This arrangement being contrary to the usage of the navy, rendered the stowage of these vessels more difficult, but the absolute will of the First Consul overcame all these obstacles. His aide-de-camp, Lauriston, was at Brest, seconding the written instructions of which he was the bearer by the influence of his presence, and by his urgent endeavours to expedite their departure. The expedition from Rochefort, ostensibly announced for the West India Islands, was also destined for Egypt. Its equipment was proceeding as rapidly as possible. The aide-de-camp Savary urged its departure, and drew thither a body of troops detached from the army of Portugal. The division of 25,000 men, which was about to pass the Pyrenees, being assembled in the Gironde, furnished convenient means for disguising the real object of the Rochefort expedition. Without exciting the least suspicion, a few battalions had been borrowed from this force with the intention of embarking them in this squadron. The expedition was to be confided to Admiral Bruix, perhaps the most distinguished naval commander whom France at that time possessed. This admiral united to a superior understanding, seldom found amongst either civil or military men, a perfect knowledge of naval affairs, and had distinguished himself by his successful and well-known cruise of 1799 in the Mediterranean. When, at the last moment, General Bonaparte should disclose his secret to the cabinet at Madrid, Admiral Bruix was to proceed to Ferrol, and, reinforced by the squadron lying at that place, repair to Cadiz, there to be

joined by the division furnished by Spain, and then proceed onwards to Otranto, embark the troops collected at that point, and from thence set sail for Egypt. This division at Cadiz, furnished by Spain, was composed of six fine vessels which were being prepared in the greatest haste. Admiral Dumanoir had just set out post to Cadiz, in order to urge on their equipment. Companies of sailors were proceeding by, and towards this port. Small vessels, filled with seamen, were sent also at the same time, and these men, when transferred, helped to complete the crews of the vessels of war.

These numerous expeditions would inevitably attract the attention of England to all points at once, divide her forces, cause her infinite confusion, and some of them taking advantage of this confusion would be almost certain to reach Egypt. Desirous of availing himself of the bad season, which rendered the enemy's cruising off Brest both difficult and interrupted, the First Consul intended to make Admiral Ganteaume sail before spring. His orders to this effect were very precise; but it was not easy for him to inspire his naval commanders with the same spirit that animated the generals of his land forces. Admiral Ganteaume had seemed to him bold and successful, as it was he who had brought him almost miraculously from Alexandria to Fréjus. But in this opinion he was mistaken. This officer, an experienced seaman, perfectly acquainted with the navigation of the Levant, of undaunted bravery, was, nevertheless, of irresolute character, and incapable of sustaining the burden of a heavy responsibility. The expedition was ready for sea: several families of workmen were embarked, under the impression instilled into them, that they were bound to St. Domingo, but still they hesitated to put to sea. Savary, armed with the orders of the First Consul, overcame all the obstacles which presented themselves, and compelled Ganteaume to set sail. The enemy's cruisers descried them, and made signals to the blockading squadron that the French fleet was leaving the port, so that Ganteaume was under the necessity of returning to the anchorage in the outer road of Bertheaume. He then feigned to re-enter the inner roads, in order to induce the English to believe that his only object was to exercise his crews by performing these evolutions.

At last, on the 28d of January—3d Pluviôse—the enemy's cruisers being dispersed by a dreadful gale of wind, he set sail, and, in spite of the greatest dangers, happily succeeded in getting out of the port of Brest, and proceeded towards the straits of Gibraltar. The success of Ganteaume's enterprise was the more desirable, as the famous expedition consisting of 15,000 or 18,000 English, destined one day for Ferrol, and another day for Cadiz, or it might be the south of France, was at that moment on its way to Egypt. It was lying in the road of Macri, opposite the island of Rhodes, waiting the season for landing, and the completion of the preparations of the Turks.

Orders were issued to the journals of the capital to make no mention of the naval movements which might be remarked in the ports of France, unless the intelligence was derived from the *Moniteur*.*

Before we trace the operations of our squadrons in the south, we must revert to the north, and see what was passing between England and the neutral powers.

Great Britain was, at this moment, menaced by an accumulation of the greatest dangers. War had at length broken out between that government and the Baltic powers. The declaration of the neutrals, similar to that issued in 1780, being only a simple declaration of their rights, England might still have dissembled with them without construing this declaration, which was directed in a general manner to all the belligerent parties, as addressed especially to herself, and might have endeavoured, for the moment, to avoid any collision, by taking care to respect the Danish, Swedish, Prussian, and Russian flags. England had, in fact, much greater interest in maintaining peace with the northern powers of Europe, than in harassing the commerce of the smaller maritime powers trading with France. Moreover, her immediate want of foreign corn rendered even the freedom of the neutrals temporarily expedient. Strictly considered, she was only justified in making reprisals against Russia; inasmuch, as amongst all the members of the neutral league, the Emperor Paul was the only one who had added to the declaration the hostile act of an embargo on her vessels. Besides, the question of Malta was much more the motive of this measure, than were any of the contested points concerning maritime rights.

But England, in her pride, had met a simple exposition of principles by an act of violence, and had placed under embargo all the Russian, Swedish, and Danish vessels. She had only excepted from these rigorous proceedings the commerce of Prussia, towards which power she showed more moderation, in the hopes of detaching her from the confederacy, and moreover, because Hanover was at her mercy.

England, then, was actually at war at the same time with France and Spain, her ancient enemies, and with the courts of Russia, Sweden, and Prussia, her ancient allies; she had been abandoned by Austria, since the peace of Lunéville, and by the court of Naples since the treaty of Florence. Portugal, her last foothold on the continent, was about to be wrested from her. Her situation was precisely similar to that in which France was placed in 1793. She was reduced to struggle alone against all Europe, exposed, however, it is true, to fewer dangers than France, and entitled to less mercy for being able to defend herself, inasmuch as her insular position protected her from the peril of an invasion. But to render the parallel of their respective positions more remarkable and complete, England was a prey to a frightful famine. The people were in want of

the enemy the slightest clue to the different movements which are taking place in our squadrons, unless the intelligence be derived from the official journal.

* Paris, 1st Ventôse, year IX.—(State Paper Office.)

† The following is a curious letter on this subject:—
“The First Consul to the Minister of General Police.
“Have the goodness, Citizen Minister, to address a short circular to the editors of the fourteen journals, forbidding the insertion of any article calculated to afford

food of primary necessity. This state of things was entirely brought about by the obstinacy of Mr. Pitt, and by the genius of General Bonaparte. Mr. Pitt having refused to treat before Marengo, and General Bonaparte having disarmed one portion of Europe by his victories, and turned the other against England by means of his policy, were both incontestably the authors of this prodigious change of fortune.

The position of England was unquestionably most alarming, and we must acknowledge that at this critical juncture she did not give way to despondency. The harvest of the preceding year having been less by one-third than an average crop, all the preceding stock on hand had been consumed. The harvest of the year 1800 having again been deficient by one-fourth, the present scarcity had followed. This scarcity was doubly aggravated by the general war, and especially by the war with the maritime powers, since the supplies of grain were usually derived from the Baltic. If, therefore, the bad harvest was the primary cause of the famine, it is true that the war greatly tended to aggravate the calamity. Had it only raised the price of grain, by interposing impediments in the way of the Baltic trade, even then its influence upon the general distress must have been truly disastrous. The revenue presented this year the most alarming deficit. The income tax, customs, and excise gave apprehensions that there would be a deficiency in the revenue of 3,000,000*l.* to 4,000,000*l.* sterling. The expenditure of the year was enormous. To meet this it became necessary to borrow 25,000,000*l.* to 26,000,000*l.* sterling. The total expenses of the year for the three kingdoms, (Ireland having just become united by the act of union,) including the interest of the debt created by Mr. Pitt, were estimated at 69,000,000*l.* sterling, an enormous amount at any time, but the more so in 1800, as at that period the revenue had not been augmented to that considerable amount to which a subsequent interval of forty years has raised it in England and in all the countries of Europe. France, as we have stated, had only to support a burden of 600,000,000 francs (24,000,000*l.* sterling). The exact total of the English debt was, as usually, stoutly disputed; but, in taking only the statement of the government,¹ it amounted in capital to 484,365,474*l.* sterling. To meet the interest of the debt and the sinking fund, there was required annually a sum of 20,144,000*l.* sterling, without taking into account the debt of Ireland, or the loans guaranteed to the Emperor of Germany. Mr. Pitt was accused of having increased the debt, on account of the war of the Revolution, more than 300,000,000*l.* sterling. On the showing of the government the increase was 298,000,000*l.*

But we must say that England presented a most surprising improvement in every branch, and that her riches had augmented in the same proportion as her burdens. Besides the conquest of India, consummated by the destruction of Tippoo Saib; besides the conquest of a portion of the French, Spanish, and Dutch colo-

nies, to which was just added the acquisition of the island of Malta, England had monopolized the commerce of the whole world. According to the official returns, the imports which had been in 1781, towards the close of the American war, 12,724,000*l.* sterling, and which, in 1792, at the breaking out of the war of the Revolution, were 19,659,000*l.* sterling, increased, in 1799, to 29,945,000*l.* The exports of English manufactured goods, which, in 1781, were 7,633,000*l.*, in 1792 were 42,905,000*l.*, and rose, in 1799, to 33,991,000*l.* Thus her foreign trade had tripled since the termination of the American war, and had nearly doubled since the war of the Revolution. In 1788, the English trade employed 13,827 vessels, and 107,925 seamen; it now, in 1801, employed 18,877 vessels, and 143,661 seamen. The excise and customs had risen from 7,320,000*l.* to 15,587,000*l.* The Sinking Fund, which was, in 1784, 1,000,000*l.*, had also increased, in 1800, to 5,500,000*l.*

The resources of the British empire had, then, all doubled or trebled during the preceding twenty years; and, if the pressure at the moment was great, there existed enormous wealth to meet it. England, it is true, was encumbered by a debt of more than 480,000,000*l.* with an annual charge of 20,000,000*l.* to meet the accruing interest; she had to meet, this year, an expenditure of 68,000,000*l.*, and to raise, by loan, 24,000,000*l.*, to meet her exigencies. All this was enormous, no doubt, if we, moreover, consider the value of money at the time; but England possessed resources within herself, proportionate to these demands. Although not a continental power, she had an army of 193,000 regular troops, 109,000 militia and fencibles, making a total of 302,000 men. She possessed 814 vessels of war, of all sizes, either in course of building or repairing, advance ships, or in commission at sea. In this number were included 100 ships of the line, and 200 frigates, under sail, in all quarters of the world; twenty ships of the line, and forty frigates in reserve, ready for sea. Her effective force then could not be estimated at less than 120 line-of-battle ships, and 250 frigates, manned by 120,000 seamen. In addition to this stupendous force, England possessed a number of naval officers of great merit, and, at their head, a renowned seaman in the person of Nelson. He was an eccentric, violent man, not fit to be intrusted with authority, in cases where diplomatic services were combined with his duties as a naval commander; and he had but recently given a proof of this at Naples, by allowing his name to be tarnished by the intrigues of women, during the bloody executions ordered by the Neapolitan government; but in the midst of danger he was a hero; and he displayed as much genius as courage; his country was justly proud of his glory.

England and France have filled the present age with the fame of their formidable rival exploits. The period at which we have now arrived in this recital, is one of the most remarkable during the struggle which they maintained against each other. They both had waged war during eight years. France, with

¹ These amounts are taken from the budget presented to Parliament in June, 1801, by Mr. Adlington, successor to Mr. Pitt.

financial resources far less vast, but perhaps more solid, inasmuch as they were founded upon a territorial revenue, with a population nearly double, with all the enthusiasm which a good cause inspires, had successfully resisted all Europe, had extended her territory to the Rhine, and to the Alps, had acquired the dominion over Italy, and a decisive influence on the continent. England, with the profits arising from the commerce of the whole world, with a powerful navy, had acquired a preponderance on the ocean, equal to that which France had acquired on land. England, by subsidizing the European powers, had incited them against her rival, had urged them to fight, even to their destruction. But whilst she exposed them to be crushed in her service, at the same time she seized upon the colonies of all nations, oppressed the powers which remained neutral, taking revenge, for the success of France on land, by an oppressive tyranny on the ocean; and, although victorious upon this element, she could not prevent France from creating a magnificent maritime station in Egypt, threatening even the British dominions in the East Indies.

A strange revulsion of public opinion, as we have said elsewhere, resulted from this concatenation of events. France, admirably governed, appeared, in the eyes of the world, humane, wise, tranquil, evincing moderation in her victories—a combination of meritorious qualities as rare as they are admirable. Whilst the various cabinets were becoming reconciled to her, they perceived at once how they had all, till then, been the dupes of England's policy. Austria had been urged on to fight for the cause of England, as if she were struggling for her own existence. For this same England the Germanic empire had been dismembered. The powers of the north, with Russia at their head, discovered, at length, that under pretext of prosecuting a moral purpose, and contending against the French revolution, they had only contributed to procure for England the commerce of the whole universe. Thus the whole world at this moment turned against the mistress of the seas. Paul I. had given the signal with the accustomed impetuosity of his character. Sweden imitated his example without hesitation. Denmark and Prussia followed in the same steps, although with a less degree of resolution. Austria conquered, and now recovered from her delusions, digested her spleen in silence, and, for the moment, at least, gave signs of resisting, for a long period to come, the baneful influence of the British subsidies.

England reaped the fruits of the policy she had pursued; she had doubled her colonies, her commerce, her revenue, her navy; but she had also doubled her debt, her expenditure, her burdens, her enemies, and she presented a spectacle of immense wealth, with all the frightful misery attending a people dying from hunger. France, Spain, Russia, Prussia, Denmark, and Sweden, were leagued against her. France, Spain, and Holland united, possessed eighty ships, fully equipped, and were capable of arming a greater number. Sweden had twenty-eight, Russia thirty-five, Denmark twenty-three

making a total together of 166 ships of the line—a force superior to that of the British navy. But England, on her side, enjoyed one great advantage, in having to contend with a coalition; moreover, her armaments surpassed, in effectiveness, those of the coalition. The French and Danish vessels were the only ones which could cope with theirs; and these found it difficult, when fighting in large squadrons, as the manœuvres of the English navy excelled all others in the world. Nevertheless, the danger was becoming imminent, for, if the struggle were prolonged, General Bonaparte was capable of undertaking some formidable expedition, and, if he succeeded in crossing the English channel with an invading army, England was lost.

The long-continued good fortune of Mr. Pitt, like that of M. de Thugut, was now on the wane, before the rising star of young General Bonaparte. Mr. Pitt had enjoyed the most brilliant destiny of his time, after that of the Great Frederick; he was only forty-three years of age, and had already held the reins of power, during seventeen years, a power almost absolute in a free country. But his fortune was declining with years, and that of General Bonaparte, on the contrary, was rising—it was just dawning. The fortunes of men succeed each other in the history of the world; like beings in the universe, they have their youth, their decrepitude, and their death. The incomparably more brilliant fortune of General Bonaparte was also destined one day to decline, but meanwhile it was reserved for it to witness the fall of the greatest statesman England ever had, sinking beneath its bright ascendant.

Great Britain seemed menaced by a sort of internal convulsion. The people, suffering from a frightful scarcity, were rising in different parts of the kingdom, pillaging the magnificent country seats of the English aristocracy and in the cities, plundering the bakers' shops and the provision warehouses. There were in London in 1801, as in Paris in 1792, misguided friends of the people, who incited proceedings against the alleged monopolists, and, in fact, insisted upon a measure which differed only in name from a *maximum* in the price of bread. Nevertheless, neither the government, nor the parliament appeared in the least degree disposed to yield to these senseless demands. The masses reproached Mr. Pitt with being the cause of all their present distresses; they alleged it was he, who, by loading the country with taxes, by doubling the debt, had raised the prices of articles of primary necessity to an exorbitant degree; that it was he, who, in persisting in prosecuting a mad war, in refusing to treat with France, had ended by turning all the maritime nations against England, and by depriving the English people of a supply of foreign grain from the Baltic, now become indispensable. The opposition, seeing, for the first time for seventeen years, Mr. Pitt's power shaken, redoubled their energy. Mr. Fox, who had so long absented himself from parliament, again resumed his seat. Sheridan, Tierney, Lords Grey and Holland, renewed their attacks, and (that which rarely happens in excited parties of an opposition) on this occasion, when

contending with their political adversaries, they had right on their side. Mr. Pitt, in spite of his accustomed self-possession, had little in fact to urge in reply, when the question was asked, why he had not treated with France when the First Consul proposed peace before the battle of Marengo! Why, and that recently before Hohenlinden, why had he not consented, if not to a naval armistice which might have given the French a chance of maintaining themselves in Egypt, at least to the separate negotiation which they had proposed! Why had he so untowardly let slip the opportunity of securing the evacuation of Egypt, by refusing to ratify the convention of El Arisch? Why had he not temporized with the neutral powers in order to gain time with them? Why had he not imitated Lord North, who, in 1780, avoided answering a manifesto of maritime powers, by a declaration of war? Why had he thus drawn all Europe in array against England on account of doubtful questions of the law of nations upon which all countries entertained conflicting opinions, and which at the moment did not materially affect the interests of England? Why, with the view of preventing France from obtaining for her dockyards, timber, iron, and hemp, which were not sufficient to recruit its navy, why had he exposed England to be wholly deprived of foreign corn? Why, in short, had an English army been uselessly transported from Mahon to Ferrol, and from Ferrol to Cadiz, without any practical result? The opposition, contrasting the management of the affairs of England with that of the affairs of France, inquired of Mr. Pitt, with bitter irony, what he had to say of this young Bonaparte, of this rash youth, who, according to the ministerial language, was only doomed to enjoy a brief existence like his predecessors, so ephemeral that it did not entitle him to be treated with!

Mr. Pitt had great difficulty in maintaining his ground against Fox, Sheridan, and Tierney, Lords Grey and Holland, when, in the face of all England, he was pressed by these urgent questions, but became alarmed at the number of his enemies, and disconcerted at the clamour of a famished people, in vain demanding bread.

Mr. Pitt made but a feeble defence to all these reproaches. He constantly repeated his favourite argument, that if he had not made war, the English constitution would have perished; and he cited as examples, Venice, Naples, Piedmont, Switzerland, Holland, and the Ecclesiastical States of Germany, as if it could be believed that what had occurred to some third-rate Italian, or German powers, must necessarily have happened to powerful England, and to her liberal constitution. He replied, and on this occasion with more truth, that if France had greatly increased her territory by land, England had equally augmented her power by sea; that her navy was crowned with glory, that if her debts and her taxes had doubled, her riches had also doubled, and that all circumstances considered, England was more powerful at that moment than before the war. All this could not be disputed. Mr. Pitt added, moreover, that as the First Consul appeared to be more permanently established in authori-

ty, they were about to treat with him. But on the question of neutral rights he remained inflexible. "If England," said he, "subscribed to the doctrines laid down by the neutral powers, a small armed sloop would suffice to convoy the trade of the whole world. England would be precluded from taking any steps against the trade of her enemies, and she could no longer prevent Spain from receiving the precious metals of the New World, nor France from obtaining the naval munitions of war supplied by the North. We must," he exclaimed, "envelop ourselves in our own flag, and proudly find our grave in the deep, rather than admit the validity of such principles in the maritime code of nations."

Two sessions of parliament succeeded each other without any interval of repose. In November, 1800, the last meeting took place of what was called the Parliament of England and Scotland; in January, 1801, the united parliament of the three kingdoms assembled for the first time in virtue of the act which united Ireland with Great Britain. During these two sessions the most vehement discussions had been carried on without intermission. Mr. Pitt was visibly weakened, not as respected his numerical majority in the parliament, but as regarded his popular influence, and moral power out of doors. Every one felt that in persisting in making war against France, he had overshot the mark, and had missed, on the eve of Marengo as on that of Hohenlinden, the favourable opportunity of treating advantageously. To miss an opportunity is for a statesman, as well as for a military man, an irreparable misfortune. The moment for making peace once past, fortune turned against Mr. Pitt. He felt himself, and the people perceived that he was vanquished by the talents of young General Bonaparte.

We must, however, do him, and also England, the justice to acknowledge, that the measures adopted during this frightful scarcity were marked by great moderation. The proposal of a *maximum* was rejected. They went no further than to grant considerable bounties upon the importation of corn, to prohibit the use of grain in the distilleries, and to discontinue all parochial relief in money, lest it might raise the price of bread, affording, however, that relief in food, such as salted provisions, vegetables, &c. A royal proclamation was addressed to all classes in easy circumstances, and who had it in their power to vary their diet, urging them to use the utmost economy in the consumption of bread in their respective families. In addition to this they despatched numerous fleets to obtain rice in the East Indies, corn in America, and in the Mediterranean. They even endeavoured to procure it from France, by a contraband trade on the coast of Brittany and La Vendée.

Nevertheless, in the midst of this distress, which was borne with great fortitude, Mr. Pitt did not neglect the prosecution of the war, and he had made every arrangement for a bold expedition into the Baltic as soon as the season would permit. He was desirous to aim a blow first at Denmark and then at Sweden, and proceed even to the extremity of the gulf of Fin-

land, with a view of menacing Russia. But it is not known even in his own country, whether he seriously wished to continue at the head of affairs in England. Two questions were constantly agitated by him in the cabinet, one of which, most inopportune at such a moment, led to his retirement. It has been seen, that after strenuous exertions made in the preceding year, he had obtained what is called the act of union with Ireland, that is to say the union of the parliaments of England, Scotland, and Ireland into one imperial legislature. This measure had appeared like a sort of party victory, especially in the face of the reiterated attempts of the French Republic to stir up an insurrection in Ireland. But they had only succeeded in stripping Ireland of her independence, by giving the Catholics a formal pledge that emancipation should be granted to them. The Catholics were told, that they never would obtain their enfranchisement, from the prejudices of the Irish parliament, which was undoubtedly true; but it appears that promises were actually made, amounting to a positive pledge, which must be considered as a serious political error, if it be true, that Mr. Pitt was bound, by the tenor of these engagements, to grant emancipation, or to retire. It was a pledge at that time impossible of performance. Be this as it may, in the month of February, 1801, at the opening of the first united parliament, Mr. Pitt asked the consent of George III. to an emancipation bill. The king, a staunch Protestant, conceived this to be an infringement of his coronation oath, and obstinately refused it. Mr. Pitt made another request, which was a most reasonable one, viz.: not to consider the occupation of Hanover, by Prussia, as an act of hostility, but to keep on terms with that power, in order to preserve at least one friendly relation on the continent. The sacrifice was too great for a prince of the house of Hanover. The dispute between the king and the minister grew warm, and on the 8th of February, 1801, Mr. Pitt, together with the majority of his colleagues, Messrs. Dundas and Windham, Lord Grenville, and others, tendered their resignation.

This resignation, after an administration of seventeen years, under circumstances so extraordinary, caused the greatest sensation. The people could not view it as arising out of natural circumstances, but ascribed secret motives to Mr. Pitt; and an opinion at that time took possession of the public mind, which historians have zealously perpetuated ever since, that Mr. Pitt, perceiving the necessity of a temporary peace, consented to stand aloof during a few months, in order to allow this peace to be brought about by others, rather than by himself, and then afterwards to return to the helm of affairs, when the political exigency of the moment should have been provided for. Such are the motives which the multitude generally ascribe to public men, and which ill-informed writers repeat as they have heard them. Mr. Pitt neither foresaw the peace of Amiens, nor its short duration, nor

did he conceive, moreover, that peace was in compatible with his continuance in the ministry, as he had consented to the famed negotiations at Lille in 1797, and even recently he had selected Mr. Thomas Grenville to represent England at Lunéville. But Mr. Pitt had gone to great lengths with the Catholics; he had committed a blunder, of which public men are often guilty, that of sacrificing the interest of the future, to secure the advantages of the moment. Having promised too much, he felt all the embarrassment of not fulfilling those promises, and that in a critical state of parties, when a small accession of strength to his adversaries would suffice to overwhelm him. It is true that, subsequently, he denied positively, that he had ever given any distinct pledge respecting Catholic emancipation, and this denial was indeed wanting to defend him from such a charge of imprudence. Whatever opinion may be entertained on this point, there never was a period when the dangers of any country justified to the same degree, or even required, the postponement of solemn engagements; for in 1801, England was a prey to a famine within, while abroad, she was at war with the whole of Europe. Nevertheless, Mr. Pitt withdrew from office, and his retirement can only be regarded as the weakness of a superior mind. It is evident that, everywhere surrounded by fearful embarrassments, Mr. Pitt was not sorry to be relieved from his situation, under the honourable pretext of an inviolable fidelity to his own engagements. He sent in his resignation, to the great grief of the king, to the great dissatisfaction of the ministerial party, and to the great apprehension of all England, which viewed with alarming anxiety, a set of new and inexperienced men seize the helm of affairs at this critical juncture. Mr. Pitt caused himself to be succeeded by Mr. Addington, who was his creature, and had for many years past held the speakership of the House of Commons. Lord Hawkesbury, afterwards Lord Liverpool, succeeded Mr. Grenville at the Foreign office. They were moderate, prudent men, but of second-rate ability, both friends of Mr. Pitt, and for some time followed his advice. This it was which contributed, more than any other cause, to give currency to the report that the retirement of Mr. Pitt was ostensible rather than real.

The feeble intellect of George III. was unequal to bear the violence of the political crisis. He was seized with a fresh attack of insanity, and during a month was incapable of fulfilling the functions of royalty. Mr. Pitt had sent in his resignation. Mr. Addington and Lord Hawkesbury were the ministers appointed to succeed him, but had not yet received the seals of office. Mr. Pitt, although he had ceased to be minister, was still, in fact, King of England, during this crisis of nearly a month's duration, and was so by the consent of the whole nation. Explanations took place upon the subject in the House of Commons. They were of a very delicate nature; they

* I am indebted for the above details to several contemporaries of Mr. Pitt, who were on the most intimate terms with him; who were engaged in the ministerial

negotiations of that period, and who fill, even at the present day, some of the highest offices in England.

were demanded by Mr. Sheridan, and given in noble, statesmanlike language by Mr. Pitt. The various motions, usually made in the English parliament, upon the state of the country, were postponed, and it perhaps occurred to some distrustful minds that Mr. Pitt prolonged, without reluctance, the sort of royal authority which he enjoyed. He trusted it would be believed, to use his own language at the time, that in the event of ministers being no longer able to receive the commands of his majesty from his own mouth, they would propose measures to which it was unnecessary to allude more distinctly, but which they should not delay for one single day. They found themselves placed by their duty in an unprecedented situation, which they should not wish, on any account, to prolong one instant more than strict necessity required. Mr. Sheridan replied to this, by expressing the utmost confidence, that neither Mr. Pitt, nor any other minister would ever presume to take advantage of the unhappy condition of the king's health, to prolong, for one moment, a power equal to that of the sovereign himself.

The most delicate reserve was observed. The word which characterized the real condition of the king, that of madness, did not escape the lips of any one; and the nation waited with anxiety, but with perfect composure, the issue of this extraordinary crisis. During this period, Mr. Pitt induced subsidies to be voted, which no one opposed; the English fleets were got ready for sea, and Admirals Parker and Nelson left Yarmouth with forty-seven sail, and proceeded towards the Baltic.

In the middle of March, the king's health was restored. Mr. Pitt transferred the reins of government to Mr. Addington and Lord Hawkesbury. The new ministers, when giving explanations, as usual, on assuming office, did not omit to state, from their seats in parliament, that they entertained the highest sentiments of esteem for their predecessors; that they considered the course of policy they had adopted as highly salutary, and that it had, in fact, saved England; they consequently declared, that they should be guided by the same principles, and follow in the same steps. "Why, then, have you come into power?" asked Messrs. Sheridan, Grey, and Fox. "If you mean to pursue the same line of policy as your predecessors, the ministers who have retired were much more capable than yourselves of carrying on the affairs of the kingdom."

Impartial men, members of parliament, censured Mr. Pitt for having relinquished the government of the nation, at such a critical moment, and for retiring without valid and sufficient reasons. Even the opposition was so far in the wrong, as to reproach him with retiring at the expense of the king's popularity, by giving out, that the king refused to grant emancipation, which measure was generally acceptable to the country. This reproach was both unreasonable, and at variance with true constitutional principles. Mr. Pitt, in resigning, was under the necessity of publicly stating the reasons for his withdrawal from office; and if the king did really refuse his sanction to an emancipation bill, Mr. Pitt had

a perfect right to proclaim it. He made it known, however, in language eminently suitable to the occasion. But it plainly appeared, that this refusal was rather a pretext than a real motive, and that Mr. Pitt yielded to a state of things with which he was unequal to contend. The lustre of his star faded before one that was now rising, and which was destined to diffuse a far brighter splendour than his own. Although he afterwards appeared at the head of affairs, and actually died in office, the expiration of his political existence may be dated at this period. Mr. Pitt, after having continued seventeen years in power, left his country loaded at once with increased riches and increased debt, with greater burdens, and with greater resources. He was an accomplished orator, if viewed as an organ of the government; an able and powerful leader, but with little enlightened views as a statesman. He had committed grievous errors, and was ever warped by all the prejudices of his countrymen. No Englishman ever entertained a more deadly hatred towards France; but we must guard against being unjust towards him on this account, and evince our impartiality, by honouring patriotism, even when engaged in a contest with our own.

Although Mr. Addington and Lord Hawkesbury were not to be compared, in talent, to Mr. Pitt, the impulse had been given, and the vessel of the state was borne onwards, for a time, by the momentum imparted to it by the fallen minister. The subsidies had been asked and voted; the English fleets were launched towards the Baltic, in order to settle the question of the rights of neutrals; and an army, transported on board the fleet of Admiral Keith, was on its way to the East, in order to dispute the possession of Egypt with the French.

Admiral Parker, an old experienced officer, whose judgment can be relied upon in critical emergencies, commanded the Baltic fleet. Nelson was next in command, ready to act whenever battle was necessary; the latter, in fact, was only qualified to fight, but nature had endowed him with a happy instinct for warfare, and he reasoned ably upon subjects connected with his profession. He proposed, that without waiting for the second division of the English fleet, they should pass the Sound, proceed direct to Copenhagen, and there, by some act of vigour, detach Denmark from the coalition; then afterwards repair to the Baltic, throw themselves into the midst of the combined fleets, prevent their junction, and thus, from that time, dictate terms at discretion. This plan was well conceived, for it was now the month of March, the northern waters were still covered with ice, and this alone was sufficient to prevent the fleets of the neutrals from effecting their junction; which, indeed, Nelson had good reason to fear, as it must greatly have endangered the British squadron.

This squadron, consisting of seventeen ships of the line, and thirty frigates, or smaller vessels, appeared on the 30th of March, in the Cattegat. The Cattegat is the first gulf formed by the northern extremity of Denmark, when it approaches the opposite coast of Sweden.

The neutral powers were proceeding with extreme activity in their preparations. The Emperor Paul, animated by his accustomed ardour, had urged and incited on Sweden, Denmark, and Prussia, and threatened with his enmity those who did not manifest the same zeal as himself. Denmark and Prussia would have preferred negotiating in the first instance; but the menaces of Paul, and the stern, but no ways menacing admonitions of the First Consul, accompanied with a formal promise of assistance from France, had prevailed with these two cabinets. Denmark, besides, seeing the English respond to a simple declaration of principles, by a declaration of war, did not consider herself at liberty to recede, and accordingly took energetic measures to repel the enemy. Prussia, perplexed in the extreme by the intimidation of Russia on the one side, and France on the other, having ceased any longer to play the part of mediatrix, now that Paul I. and the First Consul were upon amicable terms; instead of taking the lead as before, was now reduced to the position of an obsequious follower, and from that time could rely upon their friendly dispositions alone, for a share of the Germanic indemnities advantageous to her interests, and was therefore anxious to please those powers by her consistent firmness. She accordingly declared against England, and replied to her overtures by protestations of fidelity to the cause of the neutrals. She prohibited the English from entering any of the northern ports situated between Holland and Denmark; she closed the mouths of the Ems, the Weser, and the Elbe, and stationed troops, and raised batteries at the principal points of the entrances to these rivers. To crown all, she marched a body of troops, and took possession of Hanover. This proceeding was of all the rest the most serious and decisive. The First Consul required it by the warmest proofs of his satisfaction, and by the most positive pledge to her of an advantageous participation in the Germanic indemnities.

Denmark, on her part, took possession of Hamburg and Lubeck; the small port of Cuxhaven, which belonged to Hamburg, and which was the only place to which the English could have access, had been already occupied by Prussia. Thus, then, the English were left nothing but the sea and their vessels. They had not a place where they could cast an anchor. They now had the task to procure by force a readmittance for their ships into the continental ports.

It is necessary, in order to reach the Baltic from the Cattegat, to pass through the cele-

brated straits of the Sound. These straits are formed by the contiguity of the coasts of Denmark and Sweden. Between Elsinore and Helsingborg it is about three miles in width. The guns placed on the batteries of the two opposite banks, can just reach a vessel passing in the middle of the channel, but without being able to do much damage to a fleet of ships. Nevertheless, as the channel is deeper on the Swedish side, ships of war of a large size are obliged to approach nearer to this coast, and by fortifying it with batteries the passage could have been rendered more difficult to the English. But the Swedish coast had at that time no batteries, and, indeed, had never had any at any previous period; in fact it has no port which merchant vessels could be tempted to frequent. There is no other port in the Sound, except that of Elsinore, belonging to Denmark, and on this account batteries have been erected for the defence of the Danish coast only, with scarcely any on the Swedish side. On the Danish side stands the fortress of Cronenberg, regularly fortified. For these reasons the usage has originated of paying to the Danes, and not to the Swedes, the dues levied in the Sound. In such a state of things, it would have been requisite to construct works on the coast of Sweden, of which they were deficient. King Gustavus Adolphus,¹ who, next to Paul, was the most violent of the members of the league, had consulted the czar on the subject, when he was at St. Petersburg, on his recent visit, but they were aware of the impossibility of executing the least work during the present winter season, when the soil, indurated by the frost, would resist the pickaxe and the spade, to such a degree as to render any labour upon it wholly impracticable. Gustavus Adolphus had also just had an interview with the Crown-Prince of Denmark, at that time regent of the kingdom, the same who died some years ago, in 1841, after a long and glorious reign. They conferred together upon this subject, and the Crown-Prince, from private reasons by which Denmark was influenced, did not seem to attach much importance to the fortifying of the Swedish coast.² The Sound then was but feebly defended on the Swedish side. There was only an old battery of eight pieces of cannon, constructed a long time ago upon the most salient point of the shore. Although this neglect has been greatly blamed since, it is certain that the Sound, even if it had been strongly fortified on both sides, would not have presented any serious dangers to the English, as the width of the channel being about three miles, vessels passing in the midst of the straits would be at a distance of a mile and a half

¹ GUSTAVUS IV. ADOLPHUS. Born Nov. 1, 1778, and proclaimed King of Sweden on the death of his father Gustavus III. in 1793. He remained 44 years under the guardianship of Charles Duke of Sudermannland, his uncle. In his 18th year he was betrothed to a princess of Mecklenberg. This he broke off to marry Alexandra Pavlovna, granddaughter of the Empress Catharine of Russia. This match he again broke off at the last moment and married Frederica princess of Baden. He quarrelled successively with Russia, France, Prussia, and England, without any cause but his own absurd whims, and after proving himself clearly to be a fool at least, if not a madman, was deposed in 1809.—*Encyclopedia Americana*.

² Very erroneous assertions have been made on this

subject. I have had recourse to the highest and most authentic authorities. The archives of France, Sweden, and Denmark, contain the proofs of what I here advance. Those who have written to the contrary, Napoleon amongst others, have only repeated the allegations made at the time. The second passage of the Sound, which took place in 1807, at a period when Sweden was at war with Denmark, and viewed with pleasure the triumph of the English, has contributed to confirm the idea, that the Swedes had acted perfidiously. But on the first occasion, that is, in 1801, Sweden acted with perfect good faith; she was anxious for the general success, and would have done every thing in her power to secure it.

from the variations, and would therefore, being almost out of the range of their guns, escape with only perhaps some damage to their sails and rigging.

There is also another approach to the Baltic besides that of the Sound, which is formed by the two arms of the sea which separate, the one the Island of Zealand from the Island of Funen, the other the Island of Funen from the coast of Jutland, passages well known by the names of the Great and Little Belt. The English would be but little inclined to sail by this passage, in which they would be exposed to the fire of more than one Danish fort; but still more to the shoals, which rendered the navigation extremely dangerous for ships of the line; they were, therefore, most likely to decide upon going through the passage of the Sound.

The Danes concentrated all their defences, not exactly at the Sound, but lower down, in the channel which forms the continuation of the Sound, that is to say before Copenhagen. The two coasts of Denmark and of Sweden, after having approximated to each other at the Sound, now stretch out to an extent varying in width from three to twelve leagues, forming a strait about twenty leagues in length, abounding with reefs and shoals, through which a vessel can only navigate, by steering through the narrow channels, carefully ascertaining the depth of water by incessant soundings. The city of Copenhagen is situated on the most important of these channels, about twenty leagues from the Sound, in a direction towards the south. It was at this spot that the Danes had made immense preparations, waiting for the approach of the enemy. The post which they occupied did not exactly close the entrance to the Baltic, as we shall presently explain, but it compelled the English to risk an attack on a well-defended position, strongly fortified beforehand. The Crown-Prince had taken prompt and numerous preliminary measures for defence. He had stationed before Copenhagen a number of vessels, cut down so as to form formidable floating batteries, and he had armed besides ten line-of-battle ships, which were only waiting for seamen from Norway to complete their crews. It is well known that the Danish navy is the best in the whole north.

Sweden and Russia, on their parts, had also made preparations for resistance. Sweden had placed troops on the coasts from Gottenburg to the Sound, and fortified Carlscrona, in the Baltic, as well as all the other accessible points on that coast. King Gustavus Adolphus was urging on Admiral Cronstedt to complete the equipment of the Swedish fleet. This fleet already consisted of seven ships of the line, and two frigates, ready to set sail, the moment the sea was disencumbered of the winter ice. The Russians had twelve ships of the line already at Revel, and which, like the Swedish vessels, were only detained by the ice. The coalitionists had not accomplished, doubtless, all that would have been possible, if they had had at their head an energetic government, like France at that period, but, by assembling, in time, the seven Swedish, the twelve Russian, and ten Danish ships before Copenhagen, there

would have been formed a fleet of thirty ships of the line, and of from ten to twelve frigates, stationed in a formidable position, where the English could not have come to an engagement without danger, and still less could have passed by and disregarded. To have passed it, without attacking it, in order to embark in any enterprise in the Baltic, would have been to incur the danger of leaving an imposing force in their rear, capable of closing up the sole outlet of this sea, and of preventing their egress therefrom, in case of reverses. But to collect together these naval divisions, in proper time, required a celerity of movements of which these three neutral governments were hardly capable. They used every despatch, doubtless, but relying too much upon the continuance of severe weather, they had not commenced their preparations sufficiently early, and the energetic promptitude of the English greatly surpassed theirs.

On the 21st of March, an English frigate touched at Elsinore, bringing Mr. Vansittart, who was commissioned to make a last application to the Danish government. Mr. Vansittart delivered to Mr. Drummond, the English chargé d'affaires, the *ultimatum* of the British cabinet. The terms of this *ultimatum* required the Danes to withdraw from the naval confederacy of the neutral powers; to open their ports to the English; and adhere to the provisional arrangement of the preceding August, by virtue of which, they had engaged no longer to convoy their merchant vessels. The Crown-Prince of Denmark promptly refused to entertain the idea of such a defection, and replied that Denmark, and her allies, had not made a declaration of war, and that they had confined themselves to the publication of their principles of maritime law: that the English were the aggressors, as they had retaliated to a mere assertion of a dogma in the law of nations, by an embargo; that Denmark would not commence hostilities, but she would energetically repel force by force. The gallant people of Copenhagen nobly seconded, by their steady allegiance, the prince who represented them with so much dignity. The whole population took up arms; and, at the call of their noble leader, formed themselves into corps of militia and volunteers. Eight hundred students rushed to arms; every one who could handle a pickaxe assisted the engineers in completing the defensive works: redoubts were thrown up in every direction. Mr. Drummond and Mr. Vansittart abruptly left Copenhagen, threatening this unhappy city with all the thunders of England.

On the 24th, they rejoined the admirals of the fleet, who, from that moment, began to arrange their plan for immediate hostilities.

Nelson and the commander-in-chief, Parker, held a council of war, on board the fleet. The plan of operation was discussed. Some proposed to pass by way of the Sound, and others by way of the Great Belt. Nelson maintained that it was of little consequence by which strait the fleet should pass, only that not an hour should be lost in getting into the Baltic, and bearing up to Copenhagen, in order to prevent the junction of the coalitionists. Once

in the Baltic, a part of the English fleet should be directed against Copenhagen, to strike a blow against the Danes, and a part against Sweden and Russia, to destroy the northern fleets. They had twenty sail of the line, twenty-five or thirty frigates, and vessels of all descriptions. He would undertake, with twelve ships, to destroy all the Swedish and Russian fleets; the remainder must attack and bombard Copenhagen. As to which of the passages they should navigate, Nelson preferred braving some of the cannon-shot to which they might be exposed in passing the Sound, to encountering the dangerous shoals of the Great and Little Belt.

Admiral Parker, less enterprising, made an attempt, by the Great Belt, on the 26th of March. Several light vessels of the flotilla having grounded, the commander-in-chief recalled the squadron, and determined to force the Sound. Early on the morning of the 30th of March, they commenced this arduous passage. At the time it blew a topsail breeze from the north-west, favourable for navigating this strait, which runs in a direction from north-west to south-east, as far as Elsinore, after which it continues almost due north and south. The squadron, favoured by the wind, advanced boldly, at an equal distance from the two opposite shores. Nelson led the van, Parker took the command of the centre, and admiral Graves brought up the rear. The line-of-battle ships formed a single column in the middle of the channel. On each side a flotilla of gun and bomb vessels approached nearer to the coast of Denmark and Sweden, in order to engage the enemy's batteries at a shorter range. As soon as this squadron came in sight of Elsinore, the fortress of Kronenberg immediately opened a fire upon them. One hundred pieces of heavy cannon vomited forth a volley of shells and red-hot balls. But the English admiral perceiving that the fire on the Swedish side did little or no execution, as the old battery of eight guns scarcely fired, immediately approached nearer to that side of the coast, and passed the straits amidst the jeers of the English sailors at the Danes, whose shells and balls fell 600 yards short of the enemy's ships. The flotilla of bomb and gun vessels, which had approached quite close to the Danish coast, poured forth, and received an immense quantity of shells, but little bloodshed ensued, as four men only were wounded on the side of the Danes, two of whom were severely wounded, and two died. In Elsinore, only one house suffered from the fire of the English, and that was, singularly enough, the house of the English consul.

The whole fleet anchored, towards noon, in the middle of the gulf, off the island of Huen.

The gulf, as we have just said, runs from north to south, for the distance of about twenty leagues, varying in width, as the shores advance or recede, from three to twelve leagues, and has only a few channels that are navigable. At about twenty leagues towards the south, stands Copenhagen, situated on the west side of the gulf, on the coast of Denmark, at a small elevation above the level of the sea, and forming a slightly inclined plane, from

which a cannon ball would just skim over the surface of the sea. The gulf is very wide at this spot, and divided by the low island of Saltholm, into two navigable channels: the one called the passage of Malmo, runs along the Swedish coast, and is scarcely accessible for large vessels: the other, called Drogden, skirts along the coast of Denmark, and is generally preferred by navigators. The latter is again divided by a sand bank, which is called the Middle Ground, into two passages; one called the King's Channel, forms the entrance to Copenhagen: the other, called the Dutch Channel, runs on the outer side of the Middle Ground. The Danes had taken up a position in the King's Channel, leaving the other open to the English, having in view rather the defence of Copenhagen, than to prevent the enemy entering into the Baltic. But it was very certain that Parker and Nelson would not venture into the Baltic, without first destroying the defences of Copenhagen, together with the maritime forces, that the neutrals might have assembled there.

The means of defence, on the side of the Danes, consisted of land batteries, constructed on the right and left of the harbour, and of a line of razéed vessels, or floating batteries, moored in the middle of the King's Channel, the whole length of Copenhagen, with the view of keeping the enemy's fire at a distance. Commencing at the northern position, was a battery called the Three Crowns, constructed of stone work, almost completely closed at the gorge, commanding even the entrance to the port, and connecting its fire with the citadel of Copenhagen. It was fortified with seventy pieces of cannon of the largest calibre. Four ships of the line, of which two were under sail, and two at anchor, besides a frigate under way, completely blocked up the entrance to the stream which led to the port. In proceeding from this fort, that is, the Three Crowns, towards the south, twenty hulks of large ships, armed with guns, and strongly moored, filled up the passage of the King's Channel, and was thus connected with the batteries on land, placed on the island of Amak. Thus the line of defence of the Danes was supported on the left by the Three Crowns battery, and on the right by the island of Amak; its length occupying, and completely blocking up, the middle of the passage of the King's Channel. The works of the Three Crowns could not be forced, defended as they were by seventy yawning cannon mouths; and also by five vessels, three of which were under sail. The line of defence, consisting of the rafts and stationary hulks, on the contrary, was of too great length, not sufficiently close, and incapable of manœuvring; and, owing to the object they had in view, of obstructing the middle of the passage, was placed too much in advance of the point of support on the right, that is to say, the fixed batteries on the island of Amak. This island is but a continuation of the coast on which Copenhagen is seated. The line of floating batteries could, therefore, be attacked on the right. If it had been formed of a division of vessels, under sail, capable of shifting their position, or even if it had been

more concentrated, more strongly supported on the bank the English would not have come out of this attack altogether safe and sound. But the Danes set great value upon their naval squadron, which they had not the means of replacing, if it was destroyed; and not having, besides, received all the seamen from Norway, to man it completely, they kept it protected in the inner basin of the harbour, thinking that old unserviceable vessels were sufficient to answer the purpose of floating batteries against the English fleet.

Their bravest seamen, commanded by intrepid officers, worked the guns, mounted on these old hulks, which were strongly moored and chained together.

The English having arrived off Copenhagen, long before the junction of all the neutral maritime powers at this point, might have passed to the eastward of the Middle Ground, disregarding the Danes stationed in the King's Channel, and have proceeded by the before-mentioned Dutch Channel into the Baltic. They might have accomplished this beyond the reach of the guns of Copenhagen; but they would have left in their rear an imposing force, capable of cutting off their retreat, in case any untoward event should force them back, weakened, and in want of shelter, through the passage of the Sound. It was better to take advantage of the isolated position of the Danes, and, by striking a decisive blow, detach them from the confederacy, and, after having, by this means, seized the keys of the Baltic, proceed, with all expedition, against the Swedes and the Russians. This plan was, at the same time, bold and prudent; and it received that which rarely occurred—the concurrent approbation of both Parker and Nelson.

The entire days of the 31st of March and 1st of April were occupied in examining the Danish line, in sounding the channel, and in concerting the plan of attack. Nelson and Parker, accompanied by the oldest officers of the fleet, with the chief officer of engineers, reconnoitred, in person, in the midst of the ice, the position of the enemy, being sometimes within reach of the enemy's shot. Nelson maintained that, with ten ships, he would undertake to attack, and break the right line of the Danes. His plan was to proceed down the whole length of the Middle Ground, by passing through the Dutch Channel, doubling round the farther extremity, and reascending by way of the King's Channel, and then take his station, ship against ship, about a cable's length from the enemy. He arranged, moreover, that a division of the fleet, under a brave officer, Captain Riou, should attack the land battery of the Three Crowns, and, after having silenced their guns, disembark 1000 men, and take it by storm. The commander-in-chief, Admiral Parker, with the remainder of the fleet under him, was not to engage in this bold manœuvre; it was agreed that he should remain in the rear, to cannonade the citadel, and cover the disabled vessels as they retired from the action.

This manœuvre, as daring as that of Aboukir, could only succeed through great ability and good fortune. Admiral Parker gave his assent to it, on condition that it should not be carried

too far, if the difficulties should be found insurmountable; and placed at Nelson's disposal twelve ships, instead of ten, for which he had applied. On the evening of the 1st of April, Nelson dropped through the Dutch Channel, and came to an anchor, considerably below Copenhagen, at a place on the island of Amak, called Draco. In order to get into the King's Channel, and traverse its entire length, a totally different wind was wanting to that which had brought him down the Dutch Channel. The next morning, the wind having opportunely shifted from its direction on the night before he ascended the King's Channel, steering his fleet between the Danish line and the shoals of the Middle Ground. The whole channel had been sounded, but, notwithstanding this precaution, three ships struck on the Middle Ground, and Nelson took up his position with the remaining nine only. He was not disheartened, but anchored broadside on, within half a cable's length of the Danish line, a distance which must render the effect of the cannonading most terrific. The want of the three vessels agra and was greatly felt, more particularly for the attack of the Three Crowns battery, which thus was obliged to be attempted by frigates.

At ten o'clock in the morning, the whole English squadron had taken up its position, and received and poured forth a frightful volley of artillery. A division of bomb and gunships, drawing but little water, was placed upon the shoal of the Middle Ground, and discharged their shells upon Copenhagen, over the masts of the two squadrons. The fire from the Danish batteries, consisting of 800 guns, inflicted considerable damage on the English. The officers in command of the rafts displayed great intrepidity, and their gunners exhibited the most heroic courage. The commander of the *Provesten*, in particular, who occupied the extremity of the line towards the south, conducted himself with the most distinguished gallantry. Nelson, perceiving the importance of at once depriving the Danish line of the support which it received from the batteries of the island of Amak, directed four vessels against the *Provesten* alone. M. de Lassen, captain of the *Provesten*, defended himself until he had lost 500 out of his 600 gunners; he then threw himself into the sea, with the 100 remaining, and swam on shore from his vessel, which he left in flames. He thus had the glory of not striking his flag. Nelson then directed all his efforts against the other rafts and floating batteries, and succeeded in silencing several. In the mean time, at the other end of the line, Captain Riou suffered severely. Three English vessels being fast on the Middle Ground, he had only frigates to oppose to the Three Crown batteries, and he was exposed to a frightful and destructive fire from their guns, without any hope of silencing them, or of being able to take them by storm. Parker, perceiving the resistance of the Danes, and fearing that the English ships, too much injured in their rigging, would be exposed to be run aground, gave orders to discontinue action. Nelson perceiving this signal thrown out at Admiral Parker's mast-head, gave way to a noble expression of

indignation. He had lost the use of one eye, and, taking up the glass, and placing it to his blind eye, he said, sarcastically, "I really don't see Parker's signal for leaving off action," and he kept his signal for closer battle still flying. This was a noble act of imprudence, and was followed, as it often happens to audacious boldness, by a successful result.

The floating batteries of the Danes, not being able to move, or seek shelter under the land batteries, were exposed to a most destructive fire. The *Danebrog* blew up with a terrific explosion; several others were disabled, and drifted from their moorings, after having suffered an enormous loss of men. But the English, on the other side, did not suffer less severely, and were placed in the greatest peril. Nelson, in endeavouring to take possession of the Danish vessels which had struck, received, as he neared the batteries on the island of Amak, a deadly discharge from their guns. At this moment, three or four of his vessels were so completely shattered, as to be almost unmanageable; and, on the side of the Three Crown batteries, Captain Riou, compelled to draw off his vessels to a distance, was cut in two by a chain-shot. Nelson, almost beaten, was not disconcerted, and conceived the idea of sending a flag of truce to the Prince of Denmark, who was present, on one of the batteries, at this horrible scene. He told him that, if he did not stop the firing, which prevented him taking possession of his prizes, which, by right, belonged to him, since they had struck their flags, he should be obliged to blow them up, with all their crews; that the English were the brothers of the Danes, that both had fought sufficiently to attest their valour, and ought to avoid the further effusion of blood.

The prince, moved by this appalling spectacle, fearing also for the city of Copenhagen, now deprived of the protection of the floating batteries, gave orders for the firing to cease. This was a mistake; for a few moments longer, and Nelson's fleet, almost disabled, would have been obliged to retire half destroyed. A sort of negotiation ensued, and Nelson took advantage of it to quit his place of anchorage. Whilst he was in the act of retiring, three of his vessels, considerably damaged, being no longer manageable, struck on the Middle Ground. If, at this moment, the fire had still continued, these three vessels must have been lost.

The next day, Nelson and Parker, after great efforts, got afloat the three vessels which had grounded, and opened a negotiation with the Danes for the purpose of obtaining a suspension of hostilities. They stood as much in need of this as the Danes, as they had 1200 men killed and wounded, and the havoc in six of their vessels was horrible. The loss of the Danes was not much greater, but they had relied too much upon the line of their floating batteries, and now that these batteries were destroyed, the lower part of the city, which is open to the sea, was exposed to a bombardment. They were also apprehensive for their vessels of war, which, half equipped, immovable, and locked in the basin, might have been set fire to, and totally consumed. This appre-

hension was to them most alarming. They, in fact, clung to their squadron, as to their very maritime existence: and this squadron once destroyed, they were not in a position to replace it. At this instant, under the momentary irritation of suffering and danger, they complained of their allies, without reflecting upon the difficulties which had prevented them from repairing to the walls of Copenhagen. The contrary winds, the ice, and the shortness of time, had detained the Swedes and the Russians, without any blame being fairly attributable to them. It is true, that had they arrived with their twenty ships and joined the Danish fleet in the straits, where the engagement took place, Nelson would have failed in his daring enterprise, and the cause of the maritime neutral confederacy would have triumphed on that day. But there had not been time for any of them to get ready, and the promptitude of the English changed the fortune of the war. Admiral Parker, who was greatly alarmed at the temerity of Nelson, during the battle of the second, formed now a correct opinion of the position of the Danes, and knew how to derive every advantage from the battle which had been fought. He required the Danes to withdraw from the confederacy of the neutral powers, to open their ports to the English, and to receive, moreover, an English force, under the pretence of protecting them against the resentment of their allies. Nelson had the courage to land on the third of April to carry these proposals to the Crown-Prince. He went in a boat to Copenhagen, heard the murmurs of this brave people, who were filled with indignation at seeing him, but found the Crown-Prince inflexible. This Prince, more alarmed, the evening before, than the actual danger of Copenhagen justified, would not, nevertheless, consent to the ignominious defection proposed to him. He replied, that he would sooner be buried in the ashes of his city than betray the common cause. Nelson returned on board the flag-ship without having obtained any concession.

During this interval, the Danes, seeing themselves exposed to the dangers of a second conflict, set to work, and added new defences to those which before existed. They rendered the battery of the Three Crowns more formidable, covered the island of Amak with guns, as well as the lower part of the city. They transported their vessels of war, the paramount objects of their solicitude, into the innermost basins of the harbour, the farthest from the sea, carefully covering them with dung and blindness, so as to protect them against fire; and were at length reassured, when they perceived the hesitation of the English, who did not evince much eagerness to renew this terrific struggle. The whole of the available population lent their aid; one part was placed under arms, and the other part employed in preparing the means for extinguishing the conflagration. At length, after waiting five days, Nelson returned to Copenhagen, notwithstanding the threatening aspect of the preparations of the Danes. The discussion was animated, and he took upon himself to make concessions, which Admiral Parker had not authorized.

He agreed upon an armistice which amounted virtually to a *status quo*. The Danes did not withdraw from the confederacy, but all hostilities were suspended between them and the English for fourteen weeks; at the expiration of which period, they were to return to the same position as on the day on which this suspension of hostilities was signed. The terms of the armistice embraced only the Danish islands and Jutland, but not Holstein, so that hostilities might be continued in the Elbe, and from that time the English were prohibited the navigation of that river. The English were to keep at a cannon-shot distance from all the Danish ports and vessels, with the exception of the King's Channel, which they were free to navigate, in order to reach the Baltic. They were forbidden, consequently, to establish themselves upon any points of the Danish territory, and they were only allowed to put into any port for the purpose of refreshment, or to take in a supply of provisions.

These terms were all Nelson could obtain, and they were, we must confess, all that his victory entitled him to demand. But, as he was on the point of leaving Copenhagen, a very untoward report obtained currency, and the Crown-Prince, who had been influenced thereby to enter into negotiations, succeeded in keeping the knowledge of it from him. The report was in truth, at that moment, that Paul I. had just died suddenly. Nelson left the place without being aware of this intelligence, which would doubtless have greatly increased his pretensions. The armistice was immediately ratified by Admiral Parker. The Crown-Prince also intimated to the Swedes, that it was useless to expose themselves unavailingly to the attacks of the English, which they would be unequal to resist. This advice was not uncalculated for, inasmuch as, after great efforts, Gustavus Adolphus had succeeded in getting his fleet ready to sail. He had, in the earnestness of his zeal, dismissed one rear-admiral the service, and sent another admiral before a court-martial, in order to punish them for an alleged dilatoriness, which could not justly be laid to their charge.

All these efforts were however superfluous. Paul I., in fact, had breathed his last, at St. Petersburg, on the night between the 23d and 24th of March. This event put an end much more effectually than the incomplete victory of Nelson, to the maritime confederacy of the northern powers. Paul I. had been the chief promoter of that confederacy; he had applied all the impetuous energy of his character to secure its success, and assuredly he would have exerted himself to the utmost to repair the disaster, in other respects pretty equally shared, of the battle of Copenhagen. He would have sent his land forces to Denmark, despatched the whole of the neutral fleet to the Sound, and probably have made the English rue their barbarous enterprise against the capital of the Danes. But this prince had driven the patience of his subjects to the last extremity, and he had just been put to death, a wretched victim of a tragical revolution at the palace.

Paul I. was of a lively disposition, but all

his opinions were carried to the extreme, and as usual, with persons of his temperament, capable of good or evil actions, according to the temporary impulse of his weak, excitable, ill-regulated mind. If the temper of private individuals so constituted is fatal, it becomes still more so in the case of princes, especially when they are invested with absolute power. With them it often borders on madness, assuming sometimes even symptoms of a sanguinary character. Thus, at St. Petersburg, every man trembled for his own fate; even the favourites of Paul, who were treated with the greatest kindness, were not certain but that the favour they at present enjoyed might terminate in an exile to Siberia.

This prince, both sensitive and chivalrous, felt a lively sympathy for the victims of the French Revolution, and a vehement hatred against the Revolution itself. Thus, whereas the able Catharine had wisely, during her reign, confined herself to exciting all Europe against France, without setting a single soldier in motion, Paul, on his accession to the throne, had sent Suwarrow with 100,000 Russians into Italy. In the warmth of his zeal, he had interdicted, from his dominions, every article which came from France, books, fashions, and dress. This more than sufficed to give umbrage to the Russian nobility, who, like the whole of the aristocracy of Europe, delighted in reviling France, but nevertheless with the reservation of enjoying her wit, her manners, and her highly advanced civilization. They found this anti-revolutionary zeal intolerable, when carried to such an excess.

In a short time, however, Paul was seen to change these opinions and go to the very opposite extreme, conceiving a great hatred for his allies, and receiving his enemies into favour, crowding his apartments with the portrait of General Bonaparte, drinking publicly to his health, and carrying the contrast so far as actually to declare war against Great Britain. This step rendered him not only irksome, but actually odious to the Russian nobility, for he not only interfered with their tastes, but injuriously affected their material interests.

The vast extent of his dominions, occupying almost the whole of the northern part of Europe, abounding in grain, timber, hemp, and ores, requires the aid of foreign merchants, who seek these indigenous commodities, and give in exchange either money or manufactured goods. The English, in their trade with Russia, supply her, in return for the raw produce of her soil, with the articles manufactured by their own labour, and thus the Russian farmers are enabled to pay to their landlords the rents of their land. The English then engross the most important branches of trade with St. Petersburg, and this is the tie by which, in some measure, the policy of Russia is fettered to English interests, and that rivalry, which sooner or later must inevitably break out between these two great co-partners in the possession of Asia, is modified.

The Russian aristocracy was accordingly highly exasperated with the newly adopted policy of Paul. If they had blamed, in this prince, an excess of hatred against France—

they found still greater fault with an excess of affection towards her, especially when this surprising attachment was carried to such an extent, as to adopt steps ruinous to the interests of the landed proprietors. Besides this obnoxious interference with their tastes and their interests, Paul was still further guilty of cruelties, to which, however, he was not naturally addicted, being rather of a good, than of a mischievous disposition. He had sent a multitude of unhappy wretches to Siberia; afterwards, affected by their sufferings, he recalled them, but without re-instating them in their property. These unfortunate creatures filled all St. Petersburg with their complaints, and with their lamentable misery. Annoyed by these spectacles, he exiled them a second time. Becoming every day more and more distrustful, in proportion as the hatred of his subjects became more apparent to him, he threatened the lives of every one around him. He conceived sinister designs against his ministers, sometimes against his wife and children, and this prince, who was all but mad, assumed habitually the behaviour of a tyrant. He surrounded the palace Michael, which was his usual residence, like a fortress, with bastions and ditches. One would have said, that he seemed to anticipate a sudden attack. At night, he even barricaded the door which separated his apartments from those of the empress, and thus unwittingly predisposed every thing for his tragical end.

Such a state of things could not long continue, and must inevitably terminate in some deed of violence, similar to that which, more than once, had been witnessed in this empire, where, it is true, rapid advances have been made towards civilization, but where actual barbarism was the point of starting. The idea of getting rid of the unhappy Paul, by the accustomed means, that is to say, by a revolution at the palace, there where the palace is the nation, suggested itself to every mind. Let us set a proper value upon the advantages of institutions. At another extremity of Europe, upon one of the greatest thrones of the universe, sat a prince afflicted also with insanity, a headstrong, but pious and good prince, George III. This king, occasionally deprived of his reason, during whole months, had just experienced a relapse of his malady, at one of the most critical moments for England. Nevertheless, the business of the nation proceeded in the most regular and ordinary course. The constitution providing the king with ministers, who conduct the government on his behalf, this aberration of the royal mind did not, in any way, prejudice the affairs of the nation. Mr. Pitt held the government for

George III., precisely as he had held it during seventeen years; the thought of an atrocious crime never entered into the imagination of any one! At St. Petersburg, on the contrary, the spectacle of an insane prince on the throne gave rise to the most sinister projects.

There was at that time, at the court of Russia, one of those men, dreaded by all, who never shrink from the perpetration of any audacious deed. In a regular government, such men may rise, perhaps, to the station of eminently good citizens, but in a despotic government, they become criminals, if crime is, in certain cases, one of the expedients not actually sanctioned by the government, but incidental to its administration. Crime must be condemned in every country where it prevails, but we must condemn still more the institutions by which it is engendered.

Count Pahlen had served in the Russian army with distinction. He possessed a commanding person, and concealed beneath the rough, and sometimes familiar manner, of a soldier a deep and acute mind. He was endowed, moreover, with singular audacity, and an imperturbable presence of mind. As governor of St. Petersburg, intrusted with the police of the empire, and initiated, thanks to the confidence of his master, into all the great affairs of state, he was, in point of fact, though not by office, the principal personage in the Russian government. His political opinions respecting the public policy of the country were very decided. The crusade against the French revolution seemed to him as unreasonable as the new-born zeal against England was intemperate. A prudent reserve, a neutrality skilfully maintained in the midst of the formidable contest between France and England, appeared to him the only advantageous policy which Russia could pursue. Entertaining neither English nor French views, but being wholly Russian in his opinions, he was also a Russian in his manners, and a Russian such as existed in the days of Peter the Great. Being persuaded that every thing was hastening towards ruin, unless the reign of Paul were curtailed, having even conceived some alarm for himself personally, from certain indications of dissatisfaction which had escaped the emperor, he boldly formed his resolution, and communicated it confidentially to Count Panin, vice-chancellor, who was at the head of foreign affairs. They both were of opinion, that it was necessary to terminate this state of things, which had become as alarming for the empire, as for individual safety. Count Pahlen took upon himself the execution of the terrible project upon which they had resolved. The heir to the throne was the Grand-duke Alexander,

¹ The following details are the most authentic that can be procured concerning the death of Paul I. This is the source from which they are derived. The court of Prussia, greatly shocked at the news of the death of Paul I., was still more highly indignant at the unparalleled effrontery with which some of the accomplices in the crime dared to boast of it at Berlin. The court obtained, through various channels, and principally from a well-informed person, some curious details, which were collected in a minute, and transmitted to the First Consul. These are the particulars which M. Bignon, at that time secretary of our embassy to the court of Prussia, was enabled to procure, and which he has introduced into his work. But the most private circumstances still re-

mained unknown, when a singular accident placed France in possession of the only account, worthy of credit, concerning the death of Paul I., which perhaps is in existence. A French emigrant, who had passed his life in the service of Russia, and who had acquired some military renown, became the friend of Count Pahlen and General Bennigsen. Being at the country-seat of Count Pahlen, he obtained, from their own lips, a circumstantial detail of every thing which took place in St. Petersburg, on the tragical night between the 23d and 24th of March. As the emigrant was very careful in taking notes of every thing he saw and heard, he immediately committed to paper an account of the particulars given by these principal actors, and inserted it in

of who e reign we have been contemporaries—a young prince, who gave every promise of superior qualities, and who appeared at that time, what he did not prove subsequently, easy to be led. He it was whom Count Pahlen desired to raise to the throne, by some catastrophe brought about suddenly, without disturbance or confusion. It was indispensably necessary to come to some understanding with the heir, the grand-duke, to have his concurrence, in order to avoid, after the deed was perpetrated, being treated like a vulgar assassin, who is sacrificed whilst, at the same time, advantage is taken of his crime. It was embarrassing to him, to break the matter to this prince, who, governed by amiable feelings, was incapable of lending his countenance to an attempt against the life of his father. Count Pahlen, without disclosing his whole mind, without revealing any distinct project, discussed with the grand-duke the affairs of state, and, at each successive extravagance of Paul, endangering the empire, communicated the fact to him, then remained silent, without deducing any consequences therefrom. Alexander, in receiving these communications, cast down his eyes, and also remained silent. These mute but expressive scenes were of frequent occurrence. At length, it was requisite to come to some clearer explanation. Count Pahlen, at last, gave this young prince to understand that such a state of things could not be prolonged, without bringing ruin to the empire; and, taking care to avoid the mention of a crime, to which Alexander would not have listened, he insinuated to him that it was necessary to depose Paul, to provide for him a quiet retreat, but, at all hazards, to wrest from his hands the helm of power, and prevent him from driving the vessel of state to utter destruction.

Alexander shed a flood of tears, disclaimed any wish to dispute the throne with his father, but yielded, by degrees, before fresh proofs of the danger to which Paul exposed the affairs of the country, and even the imperial family itself. Paul, in fact, dissatisfied with the supineness of Prussia, in the affairs of the neutral league, even talked of marching 80,000 men upon Berlin. Besides this, in the delirium of his arrogant pride, he wished the First Consul to take him as his adviser in all things, and that this powerful personage should not make peace with Germany, nor with the cabinets of Piedmont, Rome, Naples, or the Porte, excepting upon terms laid down by Russia; so that it was soon greatly to be feared that he would not remain long on amicable terms with France, whose policy he had so warmly espoused. To these suggestions Count Pahlen added the expression of his uneasiness concerning the safety of the royal family, of whom Paul, it was said, began to harbour suspicions.

the valuable memoirs he has left behind him. These manuscript memoirs are now the property of France. They correct numerous inaccurate or vague statements, and, moreover, do not compromise more than they were previously, the names already involved in this dark event. They furnish, however, more precise and probable details. Instead of the false and exaggerated accounts already known. After comparing this report, emanating from a quarter perfectly well-informed, with the details furnished by the court of Prussia, we have

Alexander acquiesced at length; but, at the same time, exacted from Count Pahlen the most solemn oath, that no attempt should be made against the life of his father; Count Pahlen swore to every thing desired by this inexperienced youth, who imagined that a sceptre could be wrested from the grasp of an emperor, without depriving him of life.

The requisite actors in the scene yet remained to be provided, as Count Pahlen, in conceiving this scheme, deemed it beneath him to take any personal share in its execution. He fixed upon them accordingly, but decided upon only intrusting them, sooner or later, with the part they were destined to perform, according as they, by degrees, acquired his confidence. The brothers Soubow, upstarts raised by the favour of Catherine, were chosen as the chief instruments of the plot. Count Pahlen only revealed it to them at a late period. Plato Soubow, the favourite of Catherine, supple, restless, was worthy of figuring conspicuously in the revolution of a palace. His brother Nicholas, remarkable only for great personal strength, was well qualified to play a subordinate part; Valerien Soubow, a brave and honourable soldier, a friend of the Grand-duke Alexander, deserved, from his merit, to have been excluded from the plot. They had a sister, intimately connected with all the English faction—a friend of Lord Whitworth, the English ambassador—who inflamed them with zeal for the British policy. Count Pahlen engaged many other accomplices, and brought them to St. Petersburg, under various pretences, but still without disclosing any thing to them. There was one other individual whom he had summoned to St. Petersburg, upon whose co-operation he knew he could rely, as well as upon his formidable courage; this was the famous General Benningsen,¹ a Hanoverian, in the service of Russia, the first officer in the Russian service at that time, and who, at a later period, in 1807, had the honour to check, in Poland, the victorious march of Napoleon, and whose hands, worthy, indeed, of wielding a sword, should never have been sullied by a poniard.

Benningsen had retired into the country, dreading the effects of Paul's anger, which he had incurred; Count Pahlen withdrew him from his retreat, initiated him into the plot, but proposed nothing further to him, if General Benningsen can be credited, than the project of deposing the emperor. Benningsen pledged his word, and kept it with an appalling courage.

They resolved to fix upon some day for the execution of their project, when the regiment of Semenourki, wholly devoted to the Grand-duke Alexander, should be on duty at the palace Michael. They were obliged to wait. But time pressed, for Paul's malady made rapid progress, became every day more alarming, and placed the interests of the empire, as well

drawn up the historical recital which follows, and which seems to us the only one truly worthy of credit, perhaps the only complete one which posterity will ever obtain of this tragical catastrophe.

¹ Baron Benningsen, Russian commander-in-chief, born in Hanover in 1745. Served in the war against Poland; acted a chief part in the conspiracy against Paul; afterwards fought the murderous battle of Eylau and the battle of Friedland, etc. He died in his native country in 1826.

as the safety of his attendants, in greater jeopardy. One day Paul laid hold of the imperturbable Pahlen, by the arm, and addressed him in these singular terms:—"Were you at St. Petersburg in 1762?" (It was in that year that the emperor, the father of Paul, was assassinated, to transfer the throne to the Great Catharine.) "Yes," answered Count Pahlen, quite coolly, "I was." "What part did you take in the event of that time?" "That of a subaltern cavalry officer in the ranks of his regiment. I was a witness of, but not an actor in, that catastrophe." "Well," continued Paul, casting a look of distrust, and of accusation at his minister, "they want to re-enact to-day the revolution of 1762." "I am aware of it," replied Count Pahlen, without betraying the least emotion. "I know all the plot; I am a party to it." "What!" exclaimed Paul, "are you one of the conspirators?" "Yes! but to be better apprized of it, and that I may be in a position, more effectually to watch over your safety." The calmness of this formidable conspirator quite set all Paul's conjectures at defiance, and disarmed his suspicions respecting him; but he still continued discomposed and excited.

An event of almost public interest, if such a term may be employed with reference to such a crime, concurred to hasten their proceeding. Paul ordered a despatch to be written, on the 23d of March, to M. de Krudener, his minister at Berlin, enjoining him to declare to the court of Prussia, that if she did not promptly act against England, he would order an army of 80,000 men to march upon the Prussian frontiers. Count Pahlen, desirous, without saying too much, to induce M. de Krudener to attach no importance to this declaration, added in his own handwriting the following postscript:—"His Imperial Majesty is labouring under indisposition to-day; the consequences may prove serious."¹

The 23d of March was fixed upon for the execution of the plot; Count Pahlen, under colour of giving a dinner party, assembled at his house the Soubows, Benningsen, and several general officers, upon whom he thought he could rely. Wines of all kinds were served with profusion. Pahlen and Benningsen did not drink any. When dinner was over, they unfolded to the conspirators the project for which they were assembled. The most part were now, for the first time, made acquainted with this terrible plot. They were not told, that they would be required to assassinate Paul, as almost every one would have shrunk with dismay from the perpetration of such a crime. They were told, that they must proceed to the palace, and compel him to abdicate, that thus they would deliver the empire from an imminent danger, and that they would save a multitude of innocent lives, at present threatened by the sanguinary madness of Paul. At last, in order to succeed in persuading them, it was affirmed that the Grand-duke Alexander himself, convinced of the necessity of saving the empire, was acquainted with the project, and approved it. Then these men, already excited

with wine, no longer demurred, and for the most part, with only three or four exceptions, set out under the impression, that they were going to depose a mad emperor, and not to shed the blood of an unfortunate master.

The night appearing sufficiently advanced, the conspirators, to the number of about sixty, sallied forth, divided into two bands. Count Pahlen took one under his direction, General Benningsen, the command of the other; both officers, dressed in their full uniform; and wearing their sashes and orders, marched forward, sword in hand. The palace Michael was constructed and guarded like a fortress; but the bridges were lowered, and the gates thrown open to the chiefs of the conspirators. Benningsen's party marched first, and proceeded direct towards the emperor's apartments. Count Pahlen remained behind, with his reserved body of conspirators. This man, who had organized the conspiracy, disdained to assist personally in its execution. He was only there to provide for any unexpected emergencies. Benningsen penetrated into the apartment of the sleeping monarch. Two heyduks were on duty as his body-guard. These brave and faithful attendants attempted to defend their sovereign. One was struck down by a blow from a sabre, the other took flight, crying out for help—cries utterly unavailing in a palace, the guards of which are almost all accomplices in the plot! A valet, who slept in a room adjoining that of the emperor, ran to the scene; they compelled him, by force, to open the door of his master's chamber. The unhappy Paul might have found a refuge in the apartments of the empress; but, in his distrustful suspicions, he had taken the precaution, every night, to barricade the door which led to them. All escape being cut off, he flung himself to the bottom of the bed, and concealed himself behind the folds of a screen. Plato Soubow ran to the imperial bed, and, finding it empty, cried out, in alarm, "The emperor has escaped; we are lost!" But, at the same instant, Benningsen caught sight of the prince, rushed towards him, sword in hand, and presented to him the act of abdication. "You have ceased to reign!" he exclaimed to him; "the Grand-duke Alexander is now emperor. I summon you, in his name, to resign the empire, and to sign this act of abdication. On this condition alone I answer for your life." Plato Soubow repeated the same summons. The emperor, confused and lost in dismay, demanded of them, what he had done to deserve such treatment. "For years past you have never ceased to persecute us," retorted the half-intoxicated assassins. They then pressed upon the unhappy Paul, who struggled hard, expostulated, and implored them in vain. At this moment a noise was heard; it was the footsteps of some of the conspirators who had remained behind: but the assassins, believing that some one was coming to the assistance of the emperor, fled in disorder. Benningsen alone, inflexibly resolute, remained in the presence of the monarch, and, advancing towards him, with his sword pointed at his breast, prevented him stirring from the spot. The conspirators having recognised each other, re-entered the

¹ This despatch was shown to the French Ambassador, General Beurnonville, who instantly forwarded these particulars to his government.

chamber, the theatre of their crime. They again hemmed in the unfortunate monarch, in order to force him to subscribe his abdication. The emperor for an instant tried to defend himself. In the scuffle, the lamp which gave light to the frightful scene was overturned and extinguished; Benningsen ran to procure another, and, on his return, discovered Paul expiring under the blows of two assassins; one had broken in his scull with the pommel of his sword, whilst the other was strangling him with his sash.

Whilst this scene was enacting, Count Pahlen had remained outside, with the second band of conspirators. When he was told that all was over, he ordered the body of the emperor to be laid out on the bed, and placed a guard of thirty men at the door of the apartment, with orders not to admit any one, even the members of the imperial family. He then repaired to the grand-duke, to announce to him the terrible occurrence of the night.

The grand-duke, in a state of violent agitation, demanded of him, when he approached, what had become of his father! The silence of Count Pahlen soon dissipated the fatal illusions he had cherished, in imagining that an act of abdication was only contemplated. The grief of the young prince was profound; it continued to be, we are told, the secret remorse of his life, as he was naturally of a good and generous nature. He threw himself upon a chair, and burst into tears; would listen no longer to any thing, but loaded Pahlen with bitter reproaches, which the latter received with an imperturbable composure.

Plato Sbowow went in quest of the Grand-duke Constantine, who was wholly ignorant of what was going on, but who has been unjustly accused of having been implicated in this bloody catastrophe. He came to the spot trembling, believing that all his family were to be sacrificed, found his brother overwhelmed with despair, and then learnt every thing which had taken place. Count Pahlen had desired a lady of the palace, who was very intimate with the empress, to acquaint her with the fact of her tragical widowhood. This princess rushed in haste towards her husband's apartments, and attempted to reach his death-bed; but the guards kept her back. Having for an instant recovered from her first paroxysm of grief, she felt, together with the emotions of sorrow, the rising impulses of ambition awaken in her breast. She thought of the Great Catherine, and wished to reign. She despatched several persons to Alexander, who was about to be proclaimed, telling him that the throne belonged of right to her, and that it was she, and not he, who ought to be proclaimed as successor. This was a new embarrassment; this was increased anguish for the already lacerated heart of the son, who, about to ascend the steps of the throne, had to pass between the corpse of a murdered father, and an agonized mother, in tears, frantically demanding, by turns, her husband, or the sceptre. The night was consumed while these appalling and tragical events were passing; the day approached; it was necessary to leave no time for reflection: it was of importance that the death of Paul and the ac-

cession of his successor should be proclaimed at the same time. Count Pahlen approached the young prince: "You have wept sufficiently as a child," said he; "come now and reign." He tore him from this house of mourning, and, followed by Benningsen, hastened to present him to the troops.

The first regiment they met was that of Préobrajesnky. As it was entirely devoted to Paul I., their reception was very cold. But the others, who were attached to the grand-duke, and who, besides, were under the influence of Count Pahlen, who possessed considerable ascendancy over the army, did not hesitate to cry "Long live Alexander." The example was followed, and soon the young emperor was proclaimed, and placed in possession of the throne. He returned, and took up his residence with his wife, the Empress Elizabeth, at the Winter palace.

St. Petersburg was filled with consternation at the news of this bloody catastrophe. The impression it created, proved that the manners of the empire had undergone a change, and that since 1762, Russian manners had become modified by the influence of European civilization. It may be said to the honour of Russia, that if she had already progressed since 1762, she has equally advanced since 1800. The Russians exhibited, on that occasion, feelings which did them honour. They feared Paul I. and his insanity, more than they hated him, as he was not of a sanguinary character. The horrible circumstances of his death were immediately known, and inspired the deepest commiseration. His body lay in state according to usage, but infinite precautions were used to disguise his wounds. Military gloves concealed the mutilation of his hands. A large hat completely covered his head. His face was disfigured by contusions, but it was given out, that he had died of apoplexy.

This barbarous event produced an extraordinary effect throughout Europe. The news spread like lightning to Vienna, Berlin, London, and Paris. It caused the deepest horror and consternation. Some years previously, Paris had terrified all Europe by shedding royal blood; but at present, Paris exhibited a spectacle of order, humanity, and tranquillity; it was now the ancient monarchies, which in their turn scandalized the whole civilized world. A year before, the Neapolitan sovereign had imbrued his hands in the blood of his subjects; now a revolution in the palace, bathed the imperial throne of Russia in blood.

Thus, in this agitated age, every country in succession furnished melancholy examples, and supplied deplorable subjects of animadversion to its enemies! Truly, if nations wish to revile each other, their several histories furnish ample materials for mutual recrimination; but let us avoid recurring to these sad reminiscences for such a purpose. If we relate these horrible details, it is because truth is the first duty of the historian; it is because truth is the most useful, the most powerful of lessons, the most effectual in averting the recurrence of similar scenes; and thus, without offending any nation, let us say again, that the institutions are more to be blamed than the people;

and that if, at St Petersburg, an emperor was murdered in order to bring about a change of policy; at London, on the contrary, without any sanguinary crisis, a peace policy followed a war policy, by the mere substitution of Mr. Addington in the place of Mr. Pitt.

The particulars of this catastrophe soon became public, through the indiscretion of the assassins themselves. At Berlin especially, where the court was closely connected with that of St Petersburg, the details of the crime spread with singular rapidity. The sister of the Soubows had taken refuge in that city, and had manifested, it was said, certain symptoms of uneasiness and anxiety, like one who waits some great event. It so happened that her son was the very officer appointed to announce to Prussia the accession of Alexander. This young man, with all the indiscretion of his age, partially divulged the particulars of the assassination, and thus occasioned at Potsdam a scandal which gave great offence to the young and virtuous King of Prussia. The court made this young man feel the impropriety of his conduct; but hence arose a foul calumny. This sister of the Soubows was on terms of intimate friendship with the English ambassador, Lord Whitworth,¹ who figured afterwards at Paris, and played there a very conspicuous part. The death of the Emperor Paul was so highly advantageous to the English, it occurred so opportunely to complete the doubtful victory of Copenhagen, that the vulgar throughout Europe readily ascribed the perpetration of this crime to British policy. The intimacy of the English ambassador with a family so deeply implicated in the assassination of Paul, furnished strong plausible surmises, confirmatory of the calumny, together with fresh arguments for those who can never perceive that events may originate in general and natural causes.

Nevertheless, none of these conjectures were founded in truth. Lord Whitworth was an honourable man, incapable of participating in such a plot. The cabinet by which he was accredited, had committed numerous unpardonable acts during many previous years, and, soon after, was guilty of others still more difficult to justify, but it was as much taken by surprise as the rest of Europe by the death of the Czar. And yet, the First Consul himself, notwithstanding the unquestionable impartiality of his judgment, could not help entertaining some suspicions, and he gave rise to still more, by the terms in which the death of the Emperor Paul was announced in the *Moniteur*. "It is for history," says this official journal, "to develop the mystery which surrounds this tragical death, and to declare which cabinet in the world was the most deeply interested in bringing about such a catastrophe."

This event delivered England from a relentless enemy, and deprived the First Consul of a powerful ally, but one that latterly was becoming embarrassing, and almost as dangerous as he was serviceable. It is certain that the

deceased emperor, in the fulness of his arrogance, believing that the First Consul could no longer refuse him any thing in return for his alliance, had required conditions with regard to Italy, Germany, and Egypt, which France could never have conceded, and these demands must have interposed great obstacles to the re-establishment of peace, a desire for which was now becoming general throughout Europe. The First Consul selected his favourite aide-de-camp, Duroc, who had been previously sent to Berlin and to Vienna, and despatched him to Russia. He ordered him to repair to St Petersburg, with an autograph letter, to congratulate the new emperor on his accession, and to bring to bear all the powers of flattery and persuasion of a great man, in order to instil, if possible, into his mind, sound ideas concerning the relations between France and Russia.

Duroc set out instantly with orders to proceed by way of Berlin. He was to visit Prussia for the second time, collect more correct information respecting the recent events which had occurred in the North, and thus reach St Petersburg better acquainted with the men and the facts with which he would there have to deal.

England was delighted, as well she might be, with receiving at the same time the news of the victory of Copenhagen, and the death of the formidable adversary, who had originated the league of the neutral powers against her. The valour of the British hero, the gallant Nelson, was exalted to the skies, and that with a most natural and legitimate enthusiasm, for nations do well, in the first ecstasies of their joy, to celebrate, and even exaggerate their triumphs. Nevertheless, the first transports of enthusiasm being over, when the nation became more calm, the victory of Copenhagen was more correctly appreciated. The passage of the Sound had been, it was said, not very difficult to force: the attack on Copenhagen in a narrow strait, where the English ships could not manœuvre without great peril, was an adventurous, bold act, worthy of the victor at Aboukir. But the English fleet had been seriously disabled, and if it had not been for the too great eagerness of the Crown-Prince of Denmark to listen to Nelson's flag of truce, the day would probably have been lost. The victory had been very close upon a defeat, and moreover, the results obtained were quite unimportant, since the English had only extorted from the Danes a simple armistice, at the expiration of which the struggle must be renewed. If the emperor Paul had not died, this naval enterprise which the English must have prosecuted, in the midst of an enclosed sea, in which they could not put into any port, and the outlet, from which might be shut against them, must have had many terrible dangerous chances against its success. But the blow struck so opportunely against the power which commanded the entrance to the Baltic, that is to say, the Danes, was decisive;

¹ CHARLES EARL WHITWORTH, born in 1754. In 1786 he was appointed minister to Poland, then the centre of the intrigues which terminated in the dismemberment of that kingdom. In 1788 he proceeded in the same capacity to St. Petersburg, to bring about a coalition against France. In 1800 he was created Baron Whitworth. In

1802 was accredited plenipotentiary to Paris, where his mission terminated on the renewal of hostilities in the spring of 1803. He succeeded the Duke of Richmond as viceroy of Ireland, in 1814, and died in 1823, having in the interval been advanced to an Earldom.

Paul was no longer there to take up the gauntlet, and to continue the contest. This is an additional proof, illustrating the numberless others with which history abounds, that there are in this world many propitious chances in favour of boldness, especially when its efforts are seconded by sufficiently commanding ability.

The English immediately proceeded to take advantage of this fortunate change of sovereigns, by relaxing the rigour of the principles they had laid down respecting the maritime law of nations, so as to arrive at some honourable adjustment with Russia, and, after Russia, with all the remaining powers. They were well aware of the kind and amiable character of the young prince who had ascended the throne of Russia, as at that period it was pronounced to be rather bordering on weakness; and, besides, they flattered themselves with having regained considerable influence at St. Petersburg. They sent Lord St. Helens to that capital, with the necessary powers to effect an arrangement. M. de Woronzoff, ambassador of Russia to the Court of George III., wholly wedded to the cause of British policy, having even incurred the sequestration of his property on account of his not having quitted London, his accustomed place of residence, received an invitation to appear there in his official capacity, which he forthwith accepted. The vessels belonging to the neutral powers, detained in the English ports, were released. Nelson, by order of his government, continued inactive in the Baltic, and was instructed to intimate to the courts of the north, that he should refrain from any act of hostility, unless they determined to put their fleets to sea, in which case he should engage with them; but if, on the contrary, these fleets should remain in their respective ports, and not attempt to make the long-threatened junction with the Danish squadron, he should abstain from any hostile act against the coast of Denmark, of Sweden, and of Russia; that he should allow free passage to all the merchant vessels, and the relations between the countries should be upon the same footing as before the rupture.

The blow struck against Copenhagen had unfortunately produced its effect. The minor neutral powers, such as the Danes and the Swedes, although deeply irritated on their own account against England, had only been forced into the league by the menacing influence of Paul I. Prussia, who regarded her maritime interests as quite secondary compared with her other national interests, and who strongly inclined towards peace, had only engaged in the dispute, when urged on by the twofold influence of Paul I. and the First Consul: she, accordingly, felt overjoyed on finding herself extricated from such an embarrassment. She was, like the rest, eagerly disposed to co-operate in the re-establishment of commercial relations.

In a short time the trading vessels of all nations, English, Swedish, Danish, and Russian, reappeared in the Baltic: and trade and

navigation resumed their accustomed activity. Nelson allowed them to pass unmolested, and received in return, along the northern coasts, the refreshments of which he stood in need. This virtual armistice was, therefore, generally acceded to. The Russian cabinet, directed by Count Pahlen, without yielding unbecomingly to British influence, showed a disposition to terminate the maritime dispute, by such an adjustment as would secure, up to a certain point, the rights of the neutrals. It intimated that they would receive Lord St. Helens. Already it had authorized the return of M. de Woronzoff to London, whither M. de Bernstoff also repaired, as the representative of Denmark.

The First Consul, who had ably contrived and elaborated this formidable coalition against Great Britain, a coalition founded moreover upon the interests of all the maritime nations, viewed with regret its dissolution, occasioned as it was by the weakness of the confederates. He tried to make them ashamed of the promptitude with which they receded; but each excused his conduct by the example of his neighbour. Denmark, justly proud of the bloody engagement of Copenhagen, declared that she had done her part, and that it was the duty of the others to perform theirs. Sweden expressed herself ready to fight; but, she added, that as the Danish, Prussian, and, above all, the Russian flags, were freely traversing the seas, she could not see why her subjects alone should be debarred from the benefits of trade. Prussia excused her inaction, by the change which had happened at St. Petersburg, but, at the same time, reiterated to France the warmest assurances of steadfast constancy. She declared that a just estimate would be formed of her perseverance in the cause, when the proper time arrived for concluding an arrangement, and the articles of the maritime law of nations should be definitively settled. Russia affected not to neglect the rights of the neutrals, but avowedly confined her endeavours to the accomplishment of one thing only, which was the cessation of hostilities commenced upon insufficient grounds.

The First Consul, who was desirous of retarding an accommodation between Prussia and England as long as possible, conceived a very ingenious expedient to prolong the dispute. He had offered Malta to Paul, and he now tendered Hanover to Prussia. We have seen that Prussia had occupied that province, so dear to the heart of George III., by way of reprisals for the violent acts which the English government had committed against the neutral flags. Prussia had lent herself with considerable hesitation to this act of aggression, but the secret longing which she has always felt for the possession of that province, the most desirable for her, that which would most conveniently enlarge and round off the frontiers of her territory, prompted her to seize upon it, notwithstanding her anxiety for peace and repose. Other motives also had influenced her. She had, besides, an indemnity to claim in

¹ COUNT ALEXANDER WORONZOFF, made chancellor and minister of foreign affairs, in 1802, by Alexander. His brother, S. Woronzoff, was ambassador in London

when the French Revolution broke out; and took an active part in Russian diplomacy during the reigns of Catherine, Paul I., and Alexander.

Germany, as she was amongst the number of the secular princes, who were to be indemnified for their losses on the left bank of the Rhine, by the secularization of the ecclesiastical states. These claims were very large, and in the hope that the First Consul would favour them, she was anxious to propitiate him, by taking possession of Hanover. General Bonaparte declared at once, that if she wished to keep Hanover, and indemnify herself thereby, although this indemnity was of ten times greater value than the amount to which she was entitled, he would willingly consent, without giving way to any jealousy at this great augmentation, conceded to a power whose territory was conterminous with France. This proposal at once delighted, and disturbed the young monarch. The offer was a seductive one, but the chief stumbling-block was, the resentment of England. Nevertheless, without accepting the proposal in a definitive manner, the cabinet of Berlin replied, that the King Frederick William was fully sensible of the friendly dispositions of the First Consul, that he had come to no resolution yet, that it was better to defer the consideration of this territorial question till the negotiations for a general peace throughout Europe; and he added, that grounding his conduct upon the present state of things, which was an armistice tacitly acquiesced in, rather than formally stipulated, he should continue to keep possession of Hanover.

The First Consul did not require more, being content with having thereby involved the courts of London and Berlin in a question of the most complicated solution, and placed in the hands of a power which was devoted to him a precious pledge, which could be most advantageously used in the negotiations with England.

The period of these negotiations at length approached. England had seized with avidity the opportunity of relaxing the rigour of her maritime principles, with a view of quelling the danger which threatened her in the north; she was now anxious to terminate this state of things, and to conclude peace, not only with the neutrals, but with a power still more formidable than they—with France, which during the last ten years had convulsed all Europe, and which began to threaten the British soil with serious dangers. At one period, thanks to the obstinacy of Mr. Pitt, and the talents of General Bonaparte, she found herself alone, contending against all the world; having extricated herself from this position by a successful act of temerity, by a fortuitous stroke of good fortune, she was averse to again incur similar dangers, through a repetition of similar errors. England, moreover, could now treat with honour, and it was expedient, after having lost so many good opportunities, not to miss the one which now presented itself. Why, reasoned the people of England, why prolong the war? We have taken all the colonies worth having: France, at the same time, has vanquished all the allies, to which we have been attached; she has aggrandized herself at their expense, and has become the most formidable power in the universe. Every day

added to the struggle renders it more serious, especially through her successive conquest of all the European coasts and harbours. She has reduced Holland and Naples, and at the present moment is marching against Portugal. We must not render her more powerful, by pertinaciously persisting in the prosecution of the war. If it was for the maintenance of the most salutary principles that we contended some years past; if it was for social order menaced by the French revolution; that is now no longer the case, since France affords the brightest example of order and of wisdom. Can we think to re-establish the Bourbons? There, indeed, was Mr. Pitt's grand error, his mistaken policy: and if his great influence, his great talents are lost to us, we must secure the only advantage we can from his retirement, that is to say, we must relinquish that unremitting, malignant spirit of hatred, which dictated the most imprudent and gross personalities between him and General Bonaparte.

All sensible, reflecting men in England were in favour of peace. This feeling had the powerful support of the king and the people. The pious and obstinate King of England, who refused the emancipation of the Catholics to Mr. Pitt, out of fidelity to the Protestant cause, did not the less rejoice at the restoration of Catholicism in France, a re-establishment which was expected soon to take place. He viewed in that, the triumph of religious principles, and was content. He had a great aversion to the French Revolution, and although General Bonaparte had thwarted and seriously counteracted the policy of England, he was greatly pleased with him for the reaction against that revolution, and for reinstating true social principles in public opinion. France, which possesses in such an eminent degree the power of communicating to other nations the feelings she herself experiences, being now calmed down, brought back to sound notions, King George III. regarded the blessings of social order as preserved to mankind. If with Mr. Pitt the war had been one of national ambition, as respected George III. it had been a war of principle. General Bonaparte might, therefore, consider him as a friend, but a friend of a very different stamp from Paul I. Having recovered from the attack which had obscured his reason during several months, he was now decidedly inclined to peace, and pressed his ministers to conclude it. The English people, fond of novelty, looked upon a peace with the French as the greatest of novelties; for they had slaughtered each other, during the last ten years, in every quarter of the world; ascribing also the prevailing scarcity to the sanguinary struggle which desolated both land and sea, they called loudly for a reconciliation with France. Moreover, the new prime minister, Mr. Addington, unfit to aspire to the same glory as Mr. Pitt, to whom he was greatly inferior in talents, in celebrity, and in general administrative capacity, had but one plain intelligible object in view, which was to make peace. He accordingly desired to bring it about, and Mr. Pitt, still powerful in parliament, could not but

to this step, as the most expedient. The events in the north, far from swelling the pride of England, disposed her, on the contrary, to seize a very convenient and very honourable opportunity of negotiating. The new minister had determined upon this on the day he assumed office; and he was only confirmed in his resolution, when the intelligence reached him of what had taken place at Copenhagen, and at St. Petersburg. Going still further, he decided upon making a direct overture to the First Consul, which would correspond with the initiative taken by the latter towards England upon his accession to power.

Lord Hawkesbury, who presided over the Foreign office in Mr. Addington's administration, sent for M. Otto. This gentleman transacted in London, as we have already seen, the diplomatic business relative to the prisoners, and had been six months before intrusted with the duties connected with the naval armistice. He was, therefore, the natural medium of fresh communications, which were about to take place between the two governments. Lord Hawkesbury informed M. Otto that the king had confided to him a most agreeable task, the knowledge of which would no doubt cause as much pleasure in France as in England, and this was, to propose peace. He said, that his majesty was even ready to send a plenipotentiary to Paris, if it were so desired, or to any other city more agreeable to the French Consul. Lord Hawkesbury added, that the conditions which it was his intention to propose, were perfectly honourable to both countries, and as a proof of the sincerity of this reconciliation, he declared, that from that day, every design directed against the present government of France, should be discountenanced by the British cabinet. He expected a full reciprocity on the part of the French Republic.

This was disavowing the antecedent policy of Mr. Pitt, who had always pretended to aim at the re-establishment of the Bourbons, and who had unremittingly fomented the attempts of the emigrants and the Vendéans by English gold. The negotiations could not have been opened in a more dignified manner. Lord Hawkesbury, however, required a prompt reply.

The First Consul, who at that time only aimed at keeping faithfully the pledge made to France, to procure for the country peace and tranquillity, was delighted with this solution of the question, which he had, in fact, obtained by his successes, and by the wisdom of his policy. He accepted the overtures of England with as much eagerness as she had shown in

proposing them. Nevertheless, a negotiation of formality appeared to him tedious, and not sufficiently efficacious. The remembrance of that of Lord Malmesbury, in 1797, which was but an empty demonstration on the part of Mr. Pitt, had left an unpleasant impression on his mind. He thought that, if they were really sincere at London, as indeed they appeared really to be, it was quite sufficient to confer directly with the Foreign Office, and there discuss, with frankness and candour, the conditions of peace. He considered these easy of arrangement, if a reconciliation were sincerely intended. "For," said he, "England has taken the Indies, and we have taken Egypt; if we mutually agree, each to preserve these rich conquests, the rest is but of little importance. Of what importance are, in fact, a few islands in the West Indies, or elsewhere, which England keeps from us, or our allies, compared with the vast conquests we have made! Can she refuse to restore them when Hanover is in our hands, when Portugal will soon be so, and we offer to evacuate these kingdoms in return for a few islands in America? Peace is therefore easy to be brought about," so ran his despatch to M. Otto, "if the English desire it. I empower you to treat, but directly only with Lord Hawkesbury."

Full powers were sent to M. Otto with a recommendation not to make any thing public, to write as little as possible, to negotiate verbally, and only to exchange written notes upon the most important questions. It was impossible to keep such a negotiation an absolute secret; but the First Consul enjoined M. Otto to require and, on his part, to observe the greatest discretion, relative to those questions which must necessarily on both sides be raised and discussed.

Lord Hawkesbury, in the name of the King of England, consented to this mode of proceeding, and it was agreed that the conferences should commence at once at London, between him and M. Otto. They did really open, in the early part of April, 1801—middle of Germinal, year IX.

From the 18th Brumaire, year VIII.—9th of November, 1799—to the month of Germinal, year IX.—April, 1801—eighteen months had elapsed, and France, at peace with the continent, engaged in a frank and sincere negotiation with England, was about to obtain, for the first time for ten years, a general peace on land, and at sea. The condition of this general peace, admitted by all the contracting parties, was the preservation of our brilliant conquests.

BOOK X.

EVACUATION OF EGYPT.

Public attention directed toward the Negotiation transacting at London—The question arises as to the Influence of the death of Paul I. on this Negotiation—State of the Court of Russia—Character of Alexander—He and his young friends form a Secret Government, which directs all the affairs of the Empire—Alexander consents to greatly reduce the claims brought to Paris by M. de Kalitscheff, in the name of Paul I.—He receives Duroc with Kindness—Commencement of the Negotiation begun at London—Conditions announced on both sides—Conquests of the two countries by Land and by Sea—England consents to restore a portion of her Maritime Conquests, but makes all depend on the question of France keeping possession of Egypt The two Governments tacitly agree to temporize, in order to await the issue of the Military Operations. The First Consul, aware that the Negotiation depends on these Operations, incites Spain to march against Portugal, and endeavours anew to succour Egypt—Employment of the Naval Forces—Various expeditions projected—Voyage of Gantheume after leaving Brest—This Admiral passes the Straits of Gibraltar without interruption—About to repair to Alexandria, he is alarmed at imaginary dangers and re-enters Toulon—State of Egypt after the death of Kleber—Submission of the Country and prosperous Situation of the Colony—Incapacity and anarchy in the Commanders—Deplorable differences of the Generals—Ill-conceived Measures of Menou, who wants to manage every thing at once—Notwithstanding the repeated information of the approach of an English expedition, he takes no precautionary steps—Disembarkation of the English in the Bay of Aboukir on the 8th of March—General Friant, whose force is reduced to fifteen hundred men, vainly attempts to repulse them—Two battalions added to the division of Alexandria would have saved Egypt—The forces commanded by Menou are concentrated too late—Arrival of the division Lanusse, and a second combat with an insufficient force, on the 13th of March—Menou at last arrives with the main body of the army—Melancholy consequences of the division of the Generals—Plan of a decisive battle—Battle of Canopen, fought on the 21st of March without any decisive results—The English remain Masters of the Shore of Alexandria—Tedious temporizing, during which Menou might yet have retrieved the affairs of the French, by operating against the detached bodies of the enemy—He does nothing—The English make an attempt against Rosetta, and succeed in seizing one of the Mouths of the Nile—They penetrate into the interior—The last chance of saving Egypt lost at Ramanieh through the incapacity of General Menou—The English seize Ramanieh, and separate the division of Cairo from that of Alexandria—The French army, divided into two, has no choice left but that of capitulation—Surrender of Cairo by General Belliard—Menou, shut up in Alexandria, dreams of the glory of a defence resembling that of Genoa—Egypt finally lost to the French.

THE end proposed by the First Consul in assuming supreme power, was soon to be attained, for tranquillity reigned in France, deep satisfaction filled the bosom of every one, and the peace signed at Lunéville with Austria, Germany and the Italian powers, concluded, in fact, with Russia, was being negotiated at London with England. Once formally signed by these two last powers, peace would become general, and, in twenty-two months, the youthful Bonaparte would have accomplished his noble task, and rendered his country the happiest and greatest of the powers of the universe. But this great work was to be terminated, and, above all, peace to be concluded with England; for, as long as this power had not laid down her arms, the ocean was not free, and what was still more dangerous, the continental war might again break forth by the influence of the British subsidies. True it is, that owing to her universal exhaustion, England has but a slender chance of arming anew the continent; she had even recently seen the greater part of it leagued with us against her naval power, and, except for the death of Paul I., might have cruelly expiated her attacks on neutrality. This sudden death, however, was a recent and serious occurrence, which could not fail in modifying the aspect of affairs. What influence would the catastrophe of Petersburg exert over the condition of Europe? As yet this was not known, and the First Consul, impatient for the information, sent Duroc to Petersburg, in order to procure the earliest and most authentic intelligence.

A short time before the death of Paul, the relations with Russia had been surrounded with very great difficulties, in consequence of the excessive pride of that emperor, and the not less excessive pride of his ambassador at Paris, M. de Kalitscheff. The late Czar, as we have elsewhere said, wished to dictate the con-

ditions of France with Bavaria, Wurtemberg, Piedmont, the Two Sicilies, of which states he had made himself the protector, either by his own will, or by obligation, in consequence of the treaties which had united the second coalition. He even wished to regulate our relations with the Porte, and pretended that the First Consul ought to evacuate Egypt, because this province belonged to the Sultan, and, in his opinion, it could not be justly taken from him.

This ally, excited as he was against the English, was far from not being dangerous, and misunderstandings might easily arise with him. Moreover, what could only seem an evidence of folly in the Emperor Paul, was a singular symptom of the progress of Russian ambition, for three quarters of a century. In fact, scarcely eighty years since, Peter the Great, attracting for the first time the attention of Europe, contented himself in desiring to affect the north of Europe, by struggling against Charles XII., in the creation of a king of Poland. Forty years subsequently, Russia, carrying her ambition into Germany, strove against Frederick, with Austria and France, in order to prevent the formation of the Prussian power. A few years later, in 1772, she divided Poland. In 1778, she took another step, and regulating, in conjunction with France, the affairs of Germany, she interposed her mediating influence between Prussia and Austria, about to quarrel for the succession of Bavaria, and had the distinguished honour of guaranteeing, at Leschen, the Germanic Constitution. Lastly, before the expiration of the century, in 1799, she sent one hundred thousand Russians into Italy, not concerning a question of territory, but a moral question, for the preservation, as she said, of the equilibrium of Europe, and of social order, threatened by the French Revolution.

Never, in so short a space of years, had any single power attained so high a degree of in-

fluence. Paul, by wishing to make himself the universal arbiter, as the price of his alliance with the First Consul, was merely the dupe of a policy, which, in the Russian cabinet, was the result of profound reflection. His representative at Paris demanded, with cold and well-maintained haughtiness, what his master required with the ordinary impetuosity of his will. He even affected, awkwardly enough, to create himself the protector of the lesser powers, which, after having offended France, were now completely at her mercy. The court of Naples was anxious to put herself under this protection, but it availed her but little, for M. de Gallo had been dismissed from Paris, and his court obliged to submit, at Florence, to the conditions of the First Consul. M. de Saint Massan, the representative of the House of Savoy, near the French Republic, having desired to follow in the footsteps of M. de Gallo, was likewise dismissed.

M. de Kalitscheff hastened to protest for the courts of Naples and Turin, of which his master had guaranteed the dominions; and he pretended, whilst signing a treaty with France, not to be limited to stipulating the restoration of amicable relations between two empires, which had nothing to dispute about with each other by land or by sea, but also to regulate the affairs of Germany and Italy, almost in all their minutiae, but even those of the East, for he persisted in demanding the restoration of Egypt to the Sublime Porte.

Notwithstanding the desire to maintain friendly terms with the Emperor Paul, his ambassador was answered with firmness. It had been agreed to add to the open treaty, which re-established merely peace and friendship between the two states, a secret clause, in which the French cabinet engaged to treat with Russia concerning the regulation of the Germanic indemnities, to favour particularly the Courts of Baden, Wurtemberg, and Bavaria, its allies or relations; to reserve an indemnification for the House of Savoy, if its states were not restored, but without stipulating where, how much, nor when; for the First Consul had already formed the project of reserving Piedmont for France. This was all they would grant. As regards Naples, the treaty of Florence was declared irrevocable; and they determined not to listen to a word on the subject of the restoration of Egypt.

M. de Kalitscheff insisting in rather an unusual tone and manner, they at last ceased to reply to him, and he was left in Paris singularly embarrassed with the part he was to perform, and with his promises to the lesser powers. In this state of affairs, information arrived of the tragical death of Paul. M. de Kalitscheff, without waiting for the orders of his new sovereign, wishing to extricate himself from his false position, on the 26th of April addressed a peremptory note to M. de Talleyrand, asking for an immediate answer on all the points of the negotiation, complaining that conditions agreed upon, as he said, at Berlin, by General Beurnonville and M. de Krudener, were disputed at Paris. He even seemed to insinuate, that if the weaker states were not treated more kindly by France, the

glory of the First Consul would be tarnished, and his government would be confounded with the revolutionary governments which had preceded it.

M. de Talleyrand answered instantly, that his despatch was ill-timed; that it was wanting in those courtesies due to each other by independent powers; that it would not be submitted to the inspection of the First Consul, lest his dignity be offended; that M. de Kalitscheff might consider it as not having been received and that the answer demanded in the name of his cabinet, would be granted only when the requisition was made in other terms, and in another despatch.

This severe lesson had its effect upon M. de Kalitscheff. He appeared uneasy as to the consequences of his conduct. Already the little protégés who had sheltered themselves behind him, began to be afraid of his protectorate, and to regret having confided their interests to him. M. de Kalitscheff, reduced to the necessity of remaining without an answer, or of renewing his claims in a more proper form, wrote a second despatch, in which he repeated his demand of explanation, enumerating each topic, without any remark, complaint, and without any compliments. The despatch was cold, but decorous. M. de Talleyrand then informed him, that, in their new form, his questions should be submitted to the First Consul, and an early answer to them returned. M. de Talleyrand likewise added that the latter despatch alone should be preserved in the archives of the French chancery, and that the former should be destroyed.

In a few days, M. de Talleyrand replied to M. de Kalitscheff, in polite but very positive terms. He reiterated, on every topic, the opinion of the French cabinet, and added this very natural reflection that, if France had consented, on many of the most important affairs of Europe, to agree in a friendly manner with Prussia, and had appeared disposed to do what the latter desired, it was in consideration of the intimate alliance contracted with Paul I. against the British policy: but that, since the accession of the Czar Alexander, before granting the same terms, it would be necessary to ascertain if the new emperor entertained the same views, and would prove as faithful and determined an ally as his deceased predecessor.

From that time, M. de Kalitscheff remained quiet, and awaited the instructions of his new master.

The prince who had just ascended the throne of the czars was a singular being, as were the majority of the princes who had reigned in Russia, during a century. Alexander was twenty-five years of age, of a lofty stature, a noble and gentle, though somewhat irregular countenance, his understanding was acute and penetrating, his heart most generous, and his grace unequalled. Nevertheless, there might be perceived in him some tinge of paternal infirmities. His disposition was quick, capable of easily receiving impressions, but versatile, and embracing alternately the most opposite ideas. Impulse alone did not, however, govern this remarkable potentate: in his

extensive and chameleon-like intelligence, there were depths which escaped the keenest observers. He was honest, and at the same time dissembling, capable of artifice, and already he had given some intimation of these qualities and these defects, in the tragical events which had preceded his elevation to the throne. Let it not be supposed, for a moment, that we wish to calumniate this illustrious prince: he was entirely deceived as to the projects of Count Pahlen; with the inexperience of youth, he supposed that the abdication of his father was the sole object and would be the sole result of the conspiracy of which he had been made a confidant: and he believed, that by yielding to it, he would save the empire, his mother, his brothers, and himself from singular danger. When the truth flashed upon his mind, he detected his error, and those who had made him *particeps criminis*. This young emperor, in short, of noble appearance, gracious manners, witty, enthusiastic, versatile, subtle, difficult to fathom, was endowed with unexampled personal attraction and destined to exercise the greatest sway over his contemporaries. It was even his fate to exert this sway over that extraordinary man, so difficult to deceive, who then governed France, and with whom, in after years, he had so many great and terrible contests.

The education received by the young prince had been very singular. Colonel Laharpe, his tutor, had inspired him with the sentiments and ideas of a Swiss republican. Alexander had yielded, with his usual docility, to the influence of his preceptor, and was evidently tinged by it even on his accession. Whilst he was an imperial prince, always governed by an iron rule, sometimes that of Catherine, sometimes of Paul, he had formed intimacies with some young men of his own age, such as M. Paul Strogonoff, M. de Nowosiltzoff, and especially with Prince Czartorisky. This last, descended from one of the most illustrious families of Poland, and deeply attached to his country, dwelt at Petersburg as a sort of hostage: he served in the regiment of guards, and lived at the court with the young grand-dukes. Alexander, attracted toward him by a kind of community of sentiment and ideas, revealed to him the dreams of his youth. Both secretly deplored the misfortunes of Poland, natural enough in a descendant of the Czartorisky family, but rather astonishing in a grandson of Catherine: and Alexander swore to his friend, that, at his accession to the throne, he would restore to unhappy Poland her laws and her liberty.

Paul having perceived this intimacy became offended at it, and exiled Prince Czartorisky by appointing him minister near a king without dominions, the King of Sardinia. Alexander was hardly emperor, when he sent a courier to his friend, then residing at Rome, and desired him to repair to Petersburg. He also brought near him M. Paul Strogonoff and M. de Nowosiltzoff. He thus formed a species of secret government of young men, without experience, animated by generous sentiments, which all have not preserved, filled with illusions, and but little fitted, it must be confessed, to direct a great

state in the crisis of the time. They were impatient to get rid of the old Russians who had hitherto governed, and for whom they felt not the slightest sympathy. One personage alone, Prince Kotschoubey, more advanced in years, and more grave in demeanour, added to this society of young men, served to temper, by a more mature reason, the vivacity of their youth. He had travelled over Europe, acquired valuable information, and constantly pointed out to his sovereign improvements which he deemed would be useful to the internal government of the empire. All together blamed the policy which had first consisted in waging war upon France, on account of the Revolution, and then on England under the pretext of supporting the rights of nations. They desired neither a war of principle upon France, nor a maritime war upon England. According to them, the great empire of the north was to hold the balance between these two powers, which threatened to devour the world in their quarrel, and was thus to become the arbiter of Europe, the support of weak against powerful states. But, they were generally less occupied with the external policy than with the interior regeneration of the empire; their only object was to give it new institutions, modelled partly on those found in civilized countries: they had, in a word, the generosity, the inexperience, and the vanity of youth.

The ostensible ministers of Alexander were old Russians, prejudiced against France, infatuated in favour of England, and, above all, very disagreeable to their sovereign. Count Pahlen alone, thanks to the firmness of his judgment, did not share the prejudices of his colleagues, and wished to yield to no influence, but to remain neutral between England and France. In this respect, his ideas suited the new emperor and his friends. But Count Pahlen had the indiscretion to treat Alexander like a youthful prince, whom he had placed on the throne, had directed, and wished still to direct. The highly sensitive vanity of his young master was frequently wounded by him. Count Pahlen likewise treated with harshness the dowager empress, who displayed a pompous grief, and an inextinguishable hatred against the murderers of her husband. In a religious institution under her control, the dowager empress had placed a statue of the Virgin, with the Emperor Paul at her feet, invoking vengeance on his assassins. Count Pahlen caused the image to be removed, despite the remonstrances of the empress and the displeasure of her son. A power so imperiously exerted could not be of long duration.

During the early part of the reign, Count Panin continued to preside over the foreign relations: and Count Pahlen was the chief minister, taking a part in every thing. Alexander, after concerting with his friends, assisted at the meetings of his ostensible ministers. Swayed by these different and sometimes contrary influences, he determined to treat with England, and to begin by removing the embargo on British commerce, which embargo, in his opinion, was an unjust measure. It was decided to make with Lord St. Helena a

maritime regulation which should preserve, if not the rights of neutrals, at least the interests of the Russian commerce. Alexander, including among the visionary ideas of his father, the idea of being grand-master of the Order of Jerusalem, declared that he wished to be merely its protector, whilst waiting until the different tongues composing the order were collected, and had named a new grand-master. This resolution caused many difficulties to vanish, either with England, which attached great importance to Malta, or with France, which was not anxious to embark in a desperate war, in order to reduce the island to subjection; or lastly with Rome and Spain, which had never consented to recognise the grand-master of St. John of Jerusalem in an heretical prince.

In order to end another subject of dispute, that with France, it was decided that the evacuation of Egypt should no longer be demanded: for, in fact, it was more to their interest to see it in the hands of the French than in those of the English. As to Naples and Piedmont, they were said to be bound by solemn treaties, and in the commencement of his reign, Alexander was anxious to give an exalted idea of his loyalty. It was determined to ask for the court of Naples, not the revocation of the treaty of Florence, but the guarantee of its actual dominions, and the peaceable evacuation of the gulf of Tarentum. As to Piedmont, it was concluded to ask for the house of Savoy, either Piedmont itself, or, failing that, a proportionate indemnity. Lastly, Alexander desired to regulate, in unison with France, the indemnity promised to the German princes, for the loss of their territories on the left of the Rhine. All this was free from difficulty, for the First Consul had already consented to it. M. de Kalitscheff was recalled, and replaced by M. de Markoff, an intelligent man, but, as regards diplomatic rules, no better than his predecessor.

Duroc, sent to congratulate the young emperor, found, on his arrival at Petersburg, all these points settled, and received, both from the ministers and the monarch himself, a cordial welcome. His elegant address, and intelligence, succeeded in Russia as well as in Prussia, and he inspired esteem and confidence. After the formal audiences, he obtained several private interviews, in which Alexander seemed to take a pride in displaying his inmost thoughts before the representative of the First Consul. One day, especially, in one of the public gardens of St. Petersburg, the prince perceived Duroc, went up to him, accosted him with a most condescending familiarity, sent his officers away, and, leading him to a by-place, seemed to express himself with entire frankness. "I am," said he, "and have long been the friend of France. I admire your new chief, and appreciate what he has done for the tranquillity of his country and the confirmation of social order in Europe. From me he never need fear another war between the two empires. But he must support me, and cease to furnish pretexts to all those jealous of his power. You see that I have made concessions. I do not speak of Egypt;

I prefer that it should belong to France than to England: and if, unfortunately, the English should seize it, I would join you in wresting it from them. I have renounced Malta, in order to suppress one of the difficulties which shackled the peace of Europe. I am bound to the Kings of Piedmont and Naples by treaties; I know they have done wrong towards France, but how could they avoid it, surrounded and threatened as they were by England. It would give me great pain to see the First Consul seize Piedmont, as might be supposed was his intention from the recent acts of his administration. Naples complains of the severance of a portion of her territory. All this is unworthy of the ambition of the First Consul and tarnishes his glory. He is not accused, like the governments which preceded him, with threatening social order, but he is accused of desiring to invade all countries. That injures him, and exposes me to the brawlings of all these little princes, by whom I am beset. Let him remove these difficulties between us, and in future we will live in perfect harmony with each other."

Alexander, giving reign to his enthusiasm, added: tell nothing of all this to my ministers; be discreet; employ none but trusty couriers. But tell General Bonaparte to send me men in whom I can confide. The most direct relations are the best, to maintain a good understanding between the two governments. Alexander said a few words in relation to England. He affirmed that he was unwilling to yield to her the liberty of the seas, the common property of all nations; that if he had removed the embargo from her vessels, it was from a feeling of justice. Former treaties granted to English merchants, in case of a rupture, one year to settle their affairs; it would have been an injustice to seize their property, and that, cried Alexander, I never will commit; such was my only motive. But I do not intend giving myself up to England. It depends on the First Consul alone, whether I shall remain his ally, his friend.

The young emperor, in this interview, appeared sincere, confiding, anxious to separate himself from his ministers, and to show that he had his own views and private policy.

Duroc left Petersburg, loaded with the marks of his consideration, and testimonials in his favour.

It was evident, after these communications, that no great assistance could be expected from Russia against England, but it was hoped that in future we should have much less difficulty with her, in the arrangement of general affairs. The First Consul, now certain of rightly understanding this court, was in no haste to terminate the negotiation, because every day seemed to smooth the difficulties still subsisting between them and us. England, in fact, evinced at that moment but little interest for the houses of Naples and Piedmont, and if, as there was reason to believe, she no longer made their welfare one of the conditions of peace, it would be much more easy to pursue any course in regard to those two houses, when England herself was willing to yield them to the First Consul.

The negotiation with England became therefore the essential, and nearly the sole object of the day. In order to attain this end, it was necessary not only to diplomatize skilfully with London, but also to carry on the war vigorously in Portugal, and energetically to contest the possession of Egypt by the British forces, for the issue of events in these two countries was destined to exert a deep influence on the future treaty. The First Consul, wishing to throw an additional weight into the scale, even made very evident preparations at Boulogne and Calais, in order to let it be understood that the extreme measure of an expedition against England, of which the Directory had long thought, was neither forgotten by him, nor beyond his means. Numerous bodies of troops were concentrated in this part of France, and a large quantity of strongly constructed gunboats, fitted for the transportation of soldiers, and the passage of the straits of Calais, was collected on the coast of Normandy, Picardy, and Flanders.

According to agreement, Lord Hawkesbury and M. Otto had employed the middle of April, 1801—Germinal, year IX.—in diplomatic conferences. The first claims, in obedience to custom, had been excessive. England proposed a very simple basis of arrangement, which was the *uti possidetis*, that is to say, that each power should preserve all that had fallen into its hands by the chances of war. England, in fact, taking advantage of the prolonged struggle of Europe against France, had enriched herself whilst her allies were becoming exhausted, and had seized the colonies of all nations. She had taken possession of the entire continent of India, as well as of the most important commercial positions in the four quarters of the globe. From the Dutch, she had taken Ceylon, that large and rich island, which, situated at the extremity of the Indian continent, adds so much to its beauty. She had acquired the other possessions of the Dutch in the Indian ocean, except, indeed, the great colony of Java. She had wrested from them the Cape of Good Hope, between the two oceans, and one of the best situated maritime stations in the world. Her most vigorous efforts could not obtain the Isle of France, of which we did not lose possession. In South America, she had also taken from the unhappy Dutch, the greatest sufferers in this war, the territories of Guiana, extending from the Amazon to the Orinoco, such as Surinam, Berbice, Demerara, Essequibo, valuable countries, which, however, neither presented then, nor offer at this time any very considerable agricultural or commercial advantages, but which are destined to enjoy at some period an immense prosperity, and which then had the merit of being one step made toward the great Spanish colonies of the American continent. England coveted these colonies: she intended at least to drive them to independence, in order to revenge her losses in North America, and consoled herself with the idea that when once independent, they would soon become the prey of her commerce. For this same reason, she attached great importance to a conquest in the Antilles, the

island of Trinity, taken from the Spaniards, situated near South America, like a kind of foot-hold, advantageously located either for smuggling, or for the invasion of the Spanish possessions. She had also made another acquisition of great value in the Antilles, in the island of Martinico, taken from the French. The means used were scarcely lawful, for the colonists of Martinico, fearing a servile insurrection, had voluntarily intrusted themselves to her: and this voluntary trust was construed into a formal surrender. England retained Martinico on account of the immense harbour in that island. She had also taken in the Antilles, St. Lucie and Tobago, islands much smaller than the preceding, and in the direction of the fisheries, St. Pierre and Miquelon. Lastly, in Europe she had taken from the Spaniards the most valuable of the Balearic islands, and from the French, who had won it by conquest from the Knights of St. John of Jerusalem, Malta, the queen of the Mediterranean.

After these conquests, it may be said that there was but little left to fight for, except the continental possessions of the Spaniards in the two Americas. The English did, indeed, threaten, if the invasion of Portugal was insisted in, to indemnify themselves by taking Brazil.

By way of retaliation for these vast maritime possessions, France had seized the most valuable portions of the continent of Europe, assuredly much more important than all these distant countries; but she had restored them, except the part comprised between the great lines of the Alps, Rhine, and Pyrenees. She had, moreover, conquered a colony, which alone was an ample indemnification for all the colonial greatness added to England, namely Egypt. No possession equalled it in value. Egypt was the most certain route to India, should it ever be desirable to shake the British power in that country. In peace, therefore, as well as in war, it was the most valuable colony in the globe. If, for the time, the chief of the French government had thought of France alone, and not of his allies, he might have accepted the bargain proposed by England; for Martinico itself, the only direct and important loss experienced by France in this war, was nothing in comparison with Egypt, an actual empire situated between the eastern and western oceans, at once commanding and shortening the navigation of these waters. But it was a point of honour with the First Consul to cause the greater part of the possessions of the allies of France to be restored to them. He could not save Holland from the mortification of the sacrifices which she had suffered, in consequence of the defection of her navy, which, as is well known, had followed the Stadtholder into England; but he insisted on the restoration of the Cape and Guiana: he was anxious that Spain, having gained nothing in the war, should not lose any thing, and that the Balearic and Trinity islands should be returned to her. Lastly, he was determined to yield Malta at no price, for such a measure would tend to weaken and render precarious the conquest of Egypt. His intention was to leave to the English Hindostan, even with the small factories of China.

dermagor and Pondicherry, which had no interest for us; to add to that Ceylon, a Dutch possession, but to demand the restitution of the Cape, the Guianas, Trinity, Martinico, Malta, the Balearic islands, and to retain Egypt, considering that conquest as an equivalent to France for the acquisition of the continent of India by the English. We shall hereafter see the course he pursued to attain this end during a negotiation which lasted five whole months.

Under the pretext of adopting the *uti possidetis*, as a basis of the future treaty of peace, the French negotiator was ordered to answer by peremptory arguments. You wish to lay down as a principle, said he to Lord Hawkesbury, that each nation shall retain what she has conquered. In that case, France should keep in Germany, Baden, Wurtemberg, Bavaria, and three-fourths of Austria: in Italy she should retain all Italy itself; that is, the ports of Genoa, Leghorn, Naples, Venice; they should keep possession of Switzerland, which she intends to evacuate as soon as a reasonable order of affairs is restored: she should keep Holland, occupied by her armies, and where, by her influence, the most powerful fleets might be equipped. She might take Hanover, and give it as a compensation to certain continental powers, and thus attach them to her for ever. She might, in short, complete the campaign commenced against Portugal, indemnify Spain with the spoils of that country, and secure to herself new ports. The maritime positions extending from the Texel to Lisbon and Cadiz, from Cadiz to Genoa, from Genoa to Otranto, and from Otranto to Venice, are of the greatest importance. Peace will be impossible if absolute principles are advanced in the negotiation. France has returned the greater part of her conquests to all the governments vanquished by her; to Austria she has restored a part of Italy; to the court of the Two Sicilies, the kingdom of Naples: to the Pope, all the Roman states: she has given Tuscany, which she might have easily retained, to the house of Spain; she has re-established the independence of Genoa; she wishes to make of Lombardy a friendly republic, and is preparing to evacuate Switzerland, Holland, and even Hanover. England, therefore, must restore a portion of her conquests. Those claimed by France do not affect her directly, but belong to her allies. France considers it a duty to recover, in order to restore them. Again, when India and Ceylon are yielded to England in comparison with these, those of which the restoration is demanded sink into insignificance. If no concessions are made, it must be said, and openly declared, that the negotiation is merely a decoy. The world will know which power has prevented the establishment of peace. France will then make a last effort, and this difficult, and undoubtedly dangerous effort, may perhaps strike a mortal blow at England's prosperity, for the First Consul does not despair of being able to cross the straits of Calais at the head of a hundred thousand men.

Lord Hawkesbury and Mr. Addington negotiated with the desire of obtaining a peace

advantageous for themselves, naturally enough, but an immediate peace. They appreciated the arguments of the French cabinet, and were struck with the firmness of their assertions. They immediately lowered the tone of their pretensions, and seemed about to effect a reconciliation. They replied in the first place to the argument of the First Consul, drawn from the conquests restored by France, that if France had abandoned a portion of her conquests it was, because she could not keep them, whilst no naval power on earth could take from England the colonies she had conquered: that if France restored a portion of the territories occupied by her armies, she retained Nice, Savoy, the shores of the Rhine, and above all the mouths of the Scheldt and Antwerp, all of which considerably increased her, not only by land but by sea; that it was necessary to re-establish the equilibrium of Europe which had been destroyed, that it must be re-established, if not on the continent where it was wholly lost, at least on the ocean; that if France wished to retain Egypt, India was no longer a sufficient compensation for England, and that the British cabinet would then retain a great portion of her new possessions. Nevertheless, added Lord Hawkesbury, we have merely made the first proposal, and are prepared to remove whatever may seem too exacting in it. We will restore some of our conquests. Inform us only which are those to which you attach the greatest importance.

The First Consul replied warmly to the arguments of the British ministers. In his opinion it was incorrect to say, that England could maintain all her naval conquests, while France, on the contrary, was unable to retain her continental possessions. The continental war being at an end, either in consequence of the absolute exhaustion of a portion of the allies of England or of the disgust felt by the others at her alliance, France, aided by the resources of Holland, Spain, and Italy, might have wreaked her will on the continent. She was in a condition of performing on the ocean more than was supposed by the British ministers. France, undoubtedly, could not have retained the centre of Germany, and three-fourths of Austria, without creating great disorder in Europe: but she might have concluded a peace less moderate than that of Lunéville: Austria being exhausted after Hohenlinden, she might have retained all Italy, and even Switzerland, without any one being able to gainsay. As to the continental equilibrium, it was broken on that day, when Russia, Prussia and Austria divided among themselves, without an equivalent for any other power, the vast and splendid kingdom of Poland. The shores of the Rhine, the declivities of the Alps, could hardly be considered by France as an equivalent for the acquisitions of her rivals on the continent. On the ocean, Egypt scarcely balanced the conquest of the Indies. It was even doubtful that, with this colony, whether France could preserve in regard to England, her former maritime proportions.

These arguments had the cogency of reason, and fortunately that of might, for it is not enough that this latter should be on only one

side of a negotiation. The parties were soon agreed as to the basis of the negotiation. It was conceded that England, retaining possession of India, should restore a portion of the conquests taken from France, Spain, and Holland. They then began to discuss what territories should be retained or restored.

Without formally granting to France the possession of Egypt, a point over which the English negotiator always allowed a doubt to hover, he nevertheless proposed two hypotheses, one by which France might retain Egypt, and one by which France might lose it, either by the force of arms, or voluntary abdication. In the former case, England, whilst retaining India and Ceylon, comprising also Chandernagor and Pondicherry, claimed in addition the Cape of Good Hope, a portion of Guiana, that is to say, Berbice, Demerara, Essequibo, Trinity and Martinico in the Antilles, and lastly, and above all, the island of Malta. She was willing to restore the small Dutch possessions in the Indies, Surinam, the insignificant islands of St. Lucie and Tobago, St. Pierre, Miquelon and Minorca. In the latter case she still insisted on India and Ceylon, but consented to restore the small factories of Pondicherry and Chandernagor, the Cape of Good Hope, Martinico or Trinity, whichever we might choose, she keeping the other. Lastly, she still claimed Malta, but not in a peremptory manner.

These restorations did not satisfy the First Consul. The question was again discussed, and after the lapse of a month, the following propositions, which were in reality the intentions of the two governments, were concluded upon.

England wanted, under all circumstances, India and Ceylon. If the French would evacuate Egypt she would give the small factories of Chandernagor and Pondicherry: she would restore the Cape to the Dutch, on condition of its being declared a free port; she would restore to them, in addition to Berbice, Demerara, and Essequibo, on the continent of America, the establishment of Surinam; she would restore one of the great Antilles, Martinico or Trinity, and St. Lucie, Tobago, St. Pierre, and Miquelon, and lastly the islands of Minorca and Malta. Thus, she obtained, as the result of the war, if we had not Egypt, the continent of India, Ceylon, one of the two principal Antilles, Martinico or Trinity; and if we had Egypt she obtained, in addition, Chandernagor and Pondicherry, the Cape, Martinico and Trinity, and lastly Malta: that is to say, in the second case, she would, as a precautionary measure, take from us the two footholds of Chandernagor and Pondicherry, in the Indian peninsula, and, as an indemnification, Trinity, which threatened Spanish America; Martinico, the chief port of the Antilles, and lastly Malta, the principal port of the Mediterranean.

Although the Cape, Martinico, or Trinity, and Malta, demanded as an overplus in case we should retain Egypt, were far from being equal to this important possession, and though it would have been proper to yield immediately, if this condition had been inevitable, the First Consul was anxious to retain Egypt, by paying for this concession at a less dear

price. He hoped, that if the English army, directed toward the Nile, were conquered, that if the Spaniards waged an active war against Portugal, he could, whilst retaining Egypt, cause the Cape to be restored to the Dutch, Trinity to the Spaniards, Malta to the Order of St. John of Jerusalem, and thus oblige England to be satisfied with India, Ceylon, a portion of Guiana, and one or two of the little Antilles.

Every thing, therefore, depended on the issue of the war; and the English, hoping, in their turn, that it would result advantageously for them, were not sorry to await its result, which must soon be known, for the question was whether the Spaniards would dare to march on Portugal, and if the English troops on board of Admiral Keith's vessels in the Mediterranean could land in Egypt. A month or two at farthest would make known this result. Thus, on both sides, whilst avoiding most scrupulously any rupture in the negotiation, which it was sincerely desired would end in peace, they endeavoured to gain time, and the multiplicity and complication of topics to discuss furnished a very natural reason, without recourse to much diplomatic artifice.

"All depends," wrote M. Otto, "on two things: Will the English army be beaten in Egypt? Will Spain march vigorously against Portugal? Hasten, obtain both or one of these results, and you will have the most splendid peace the world has ever seen. But I must tell you," he added, "that if the English ministers fear our soldiers of the army of Egypt, they have but little dread of the resolution of the court of Spain."

The First Consul, therefore, strove continually to awaken the old Spanish court, and bring it to unite in his great designs, which consisted on the one hand to seize Portugal, and on the other to direct toward Egypt the naval forces of the two countries. Unfortunately the resources of this ancient monarchy were exhausted. A king honest, but blinded, and absorbed by cares the most vulgar and most unworthy of a throne; a queen abandoned to the most licentious debauchery; a vain, frivolous, weak-minded favourite, lavished in thoughtlessness and licentiousness the last resources of the monarchy of Charles the Fifth. Lucien Bonaparte, sent as ambassador to Madrid, to indemnify him for the ministry of the interior—Lucien, ambitious of equalling the diplomatic success of Joseph, endeavoured to support in Spain the policy of his brother: and he had acquired some influence, thanks to his name, and thanks also to the happy boldness with which he had neglected the nominal ministers, and addressed himself immediately to the true head of the government, the Prince of Peace. By giving this prince the choice of the resentment or friendship of the First Consul, he had excited in him an unusual degree of zeal for the interests of the alliance, and induced him to adopt the project of the war against Portugal. Lucien said to the Spanish court: You desire peace, you desire an advantageous, at least not a ruinous peace, you desire to conclude it without the loss of any of your colonies: *así es*

as, therefore, in seizing pledges, of which we can make use, in order to wrest from England the majority of her maritime conquests. This reasoning was excellent, and admitted of no reply, but it was not that which had the most weight with the prince. Lucien bethought himself of a still more powerful argument. You are omnipotent here, said he to the favourite, my brother knows it, and will attribute to you the failure of the projects of the alliance. Would you prefer the Bonapartes as friends or enemies? These arguments, used at first to decide on the Portuguese war, were repeated daily in order to hasten the preparations for it. Moreover, whatever reasons may have acted upon the Prince of Peace, in waging this war, he did not betray the interests of his country. He could not, in fact, serve her more usefully, for a war with Portugal was the only means of forcing England to a restoration of the Spanish colonies.

The preparations were made with as much rapidity as possible, and the last resources of the monarchy applied thereto. Who would believe that this great and noble nation, whose glory has filled the world, and whose patriotism was soon about to shine forth with such brilliancy, unfortunately against us—who would believe that she could scarcely collect twenty-five thousand men: that with magnificent ports, a large quantity of vessels, the remains of the splendid reign of Charles the Third, she would with difficulty pay a few workmen in her arsenals, in order to make her vessels ready for sea; and that at last she was unable to victual her fleets! Who would believe that the fifteen Spanish vessels, shut up for two years at Brest, constituted her whole navy, at least all fit for service? The privation of the metals, in consequence of the interruption of her relations with Mexico, had reduced her to paper money, and the paper money had fallen to the lowest degree of discredit. An appeal was made to the clergy, who did not possess, at that time, the funds which were immediately required, but who possessed more influence than the crown, and by using this influence, the preparations were ultimately completed.

Twenty-five thousand men, not badly equipped, advanced at last toward Badajos; but this was not enough. The Prince of Peace had declared that, without a French division, he would not dare to enter Portugal. The First Consul had hastened the collection of this division at Bordeaux; it had soon crossed the Pyrenees and marched rapidly toward Ciudad-Rodrigo. The Prince of Peace wanted to enter with the Spaniards by Alentejo, whilst the French division was to penetrate through the provinces of Tras-os-Montes and Beira. General Saint-Cyr, who was to command the French, had gone to Madrid to concert a plan of operations with the Prince of Peace; and, although he was little fitted to deal with the delicacy of others, possessing a great deal himself, he succeeded in causing the prince to accept some good counsel, and in concerting with him a suitable plan of operations.

Portugal, finding herself pressed so closely, had sent M. d'Aranjo to Madrid, but he was not permitted to pass through the country. He

then repaired to France where he met with the same refusal. Portugal was willing to submit to any conditions, provided she were not required to close her ports to English vessels. Her offers were rejected. It was determined to demand the entire expulsion of English ships, both merchant and naval, to hold three provinces as a guarantee until the peace, and lastly to make her pay the expenses of the expedition.

The troops of both nations began their march, and the Prince of Peace left Madrid, with his head filled with visions of glory. The court and Lucien himself were to accompany him. The First Consul had enjoined the most strict discipline on the French troops, he had ordered them to hear mass on Sunday, and visit the bishops in passing through the capital of a diocese, in short, to conform to all the customs of the Spaniards. He wished that the sight of the French, instead of alienating the Spaniards, should attach them still more to France.

In this quarter, things were in accordance with the wishes of the First Consul, and the great interest of the negotiation commenced at London. Much was still left to do, as regards the employment of the naval forces. It has been seen in what manner the three navies of Holland, France, and Spain, were to act in concert. Five Dutch, five French, and five Spanish vessels, in all fifteen, loaded with troops, were to threaten Brazil or endeavour to reconquer Trinity. All the rest of the naval forces was destined for Egypt. Ganteaume having left Brest with seven vessels, and a considerable reinforcement, was on his way to Alexandria. The other Spanish and French ships remained at Brest, in order to keep up the constant idea of a descent upon Ireland, whilst a second expedition, sailing from Rochefort, and joining five Spanish vessels equipped at Ferrol, and six others equipped at Cadiz, was to follow Ganteaume into Egypt. Spain was not informed of this project, lest through indiscretion she should betray it. She was asked, without explanation, to send to Cadiz the naval force prepared at Ferrol. The Spanish court protested warmly against this order, alleged the danger of meeting the English cruisers, which were very numerous at the entrance of the straits and in the vicinity of Gibraltar. The ships at Ferrol were moreover scarcely ready for sea, so much had their equipment been retarded. Lucien, without confessing the project upon Egypt, spoke of the necessity of commanding the Mediterranean, of the possibility of attempting in that sea something useful to both countries, perhaps an expedition to retake Minorca. At last he wrung from them the necessary orders, and the Spanish division of Ferrol was to be conveyed to Cadiz by the French fleet of Rochefort. This was not all: Spain, as is to be remembered, had promised a gift of six vessels. There was some dispute as to when this condition should be fulfilled; but, as Tuscany was about to be given up, even before Louisiana passed into the hands of the French, it was just that the vessels should be given immediately. The Spanish minister then

determined to select six in the navy yard at Cadiz, and to give them to us, but he would not transfer them armed and victualled. Cannons and biscuit could, however, be sent thither from France. These were contemptible disputes, in the presence of a common enemy, who was to be beaten by all means, in order to make him reduce his claims. These difficulties were at last settled to the satisfaction of the First Consul. It has been already seen that the French Admiral Dumanoir had left by post for Cadiz, in order to superintend the fitting out of the Spanish vessels now become French, and to assume the command. This admiral had visited the ports of Spain, and in them found all the confusion, and all the destitution of negligent and ill-governed opulence. With the remains of a magnificent *matériel*, with numerous very fine ships, but unarmed; with superb establishments, there was at Cadiz, for want of pay, neither a seaman nor a workman to put this navy afloat. Every thing was wasted and neglected. The French minister had given Admiral Dumanoir letters of credit on the richest houses in Cadiz, and by means of ready money, this officer succeeded in overcoming the principal difficulties. After having chosen those vessels which had suffered least from time and Spanish neglect, he armed them with arms taken from the others; he obtained French sailors, some of whom had emigrated in consequence of the Revolution, and some had escaped from English prisons; he received a certain number sent from French ports in small vessels; he asked and obtained permission to ship some Spaniards, and hired, by means of good pay, some Swedes and Danes. The officers necessary to organize his staff came through the Peninsula, and detachments of French infantry were sent through Catalonia to complete his crews. This division, that of Ferrol, and that of Rochefort, constituting a force of about eighteen ships, were to repair to Egypt, after having touched at Otranto, in order to take on board 10,000 men. These projects, a sketch of which has been previously given, were now in a complete state of preparation.

In order to extort from Spain the feeble efforts she had so reluctantly made, the First Consul had fulfilled with remarkable fidelity, and even surpassed all his promises to her. The house of Parma having received, in lieu of her duchy, the beautiful land of Tuscany, for a long time ardently coveted by the Spanish court; the consent of Austria was necessary to the exchange. The First Consul applied for and obtained it. The duchy of Tuscany had, moreover, been erected into the kingdom of Etruria. The old reigning Duke of Parma, a bigoted prince, inimical to all the novelties of the age, was the brother, as we have previously said, of the King of Spain. His son, a young man very badly educated, had married an infant, and lived at the Escorial. The kingdom of Etruria was intended for this youthful pair. Nevertheless, the First Consul, having only promised this kingdom in exchange for the duchy of Parma, was bound to surrender one, only on the vacancy of the other, which would take place alone by the death or abdication of

the old reigning duke, who would neither die nor abdicate. Although it was greatly to the interest of the First Consul to be freed from such a host in Italy, he consented to tolerate him in Parma, by placing immediately the infantas on the throne of Etruria. He merely required that they should come to Paris and receive the crown from his hands, as formerly in ancient Rome, the vassal monarchs came to receive their crowns from the hands of the People-King. He wanted to exhibit one great and singular spectacle to republican France. The young princes therefore left Madrid on the route to Paris, at the same time that their parents repaired to Badajos, in order to afford the favourite the gratification of being seen at the head of an army.

Such were the courtesies by which the First Consul hoped he might excite the zeal of the Spanish court, and induce it to aid him in his designs.

At this time all eyes were turned towards Egypt. Toward her were directed the efforts, the attention, hopes and fears of the two great belligerent nations, France and England. It seemed that, as if, before laying down their arms, these two nations were anxious to use them for the last time, in order to terminate with glory, and with most advantage, the terrible war which, for six years, had deluged the world with blood.

We left Ganteaume, endeavouring to leave Brest on the 3d of Pluviôse—23d of January, 1801—during a tremendous storm. The winds had been for a long time light or contrary. At last, during a gale from the north-west, which blew on the coast, he set sail, in obedience to the aid-de-camp of the First Consul, Savary, who was at Brest, with orders to vanquish all obstacles. This might be very imprudent, but what was to be done in the presence of an enemy's fleet, which constantly blockaded the harbour of Brest, in all weathers, and retired only when it became impossible to cruise? He was reduced to the alternative of either never going out, or of sailing during a storm, which would drive off the English. The squadron composed of seven ships, two frigates, and a brig, all fast sailing vessels, carried 4000 troops, an immense cargo, and numerous artisans with their families, who supposed they were going to St. Domingo. The fires of the squadron were extinguished in order not to be perceived, and they weighed anchor in the midst of the greatest apprehensions. The north-west wind is the most dangerous of all for leaving Brest. It blew at this moment with extreme violence, but fortunately did not attain its maximum until they were out in the open ocean. There they met with horrible squalls, and a tremendous sea running. The squadron sailed in order of battle, the admiral's ship, the *Indivisible*, leading. She was followed by the *Formidable*, carrying the flag of Vice-admiral Linois. The remainder of the division followed, each ship ready for action, if the enemy appeared. They were scarcely at sea when the wind, still increasing, carried away the *Formidable's* topmasts. The *Constitution* lost her main topmast; the *Dix-Août*, and the *Jean-Bart*, who followed close in her wak-

ranged themselves on the right and left, and kept her in sight till morning, to render any assistance that might be necessary. The brig *Vantour* was nearly swamped, and was about sinking when succour was sent to her. In the confusion of the tempest and darkness, the squadron was dispersed. The next morning, at the break of day, *Ganteaume*, in the *Indivisible*, laid to for some time to reassemble his division: but fearing the return of the English, who till then had not appeared, and reckoning on the rendezvous appointed for each ship, he sailed toward the place of meeting agreed upon. This was fifty leagues west of Cape St. Vincent, one of the most projecting capes of the southern coast of Spain. The other vessels of the division, after riding out the gale, repaired their damage at sea, and re-united, with the exception of the admiral's ship, which, after having waited for them, had sailed towards the place of rendezvous. The only accident of the voyage was the meeting of the French frigate *La Bravoure*, with the English frigate the *Concord*, who was watching the direction of the division. Captain *Dordelin*, commanding *La Bravoure*, made sail for the English frigate, and offered her battle. He ranged alongside of her and discharged several broadsides, which made tremendous havoc on her decks. Captain *Dordelin* was preparing to board, when the English frigate, manoeuvring to escape this danger, took refuge in flight.

The French frigate rejoined the division, and the whole of the squadron soon found the admiral at the appointed place. They then sailed for the straits of Gibraltar, after having miraculously escaped the dangers of the sea and the enemy. The fleet was full of ardour; they began to understand where they were going, and each one was burning to fulfil the glorious mission of saving Egypt.

It was necessary to use all haste, for at that moment the fleet of Admiral *Keith*, collected in the bay of Macri, on the coast of Asia Minor, was only waiting for the final preparations of the Turks, always very slow to set sail, and transport an English army to the mouths of the Nile. Expedition, therefore, was of the utmost importance, and circumstances seemed to favour the French in the most fortunate manner. The English Admiral *St. Vincent*, commanding the blockade of Brest, aware too late of the departure of *Ganteaume*, had sent Admiral *Calder* in pursuit of him, with a force equal to the French division, that is, with seven ships, and two frigates. The English not supposing that the French division would dare to enter the Mediterranean, amidst so many cruisers, and deceived moreover by various reports, thought that the French had sailed for St. Domingo. Admiral *Calder*, therefore, bore away for the Canary islands, and from thence to the Antilles. During this time, *Ganteaume* had approached the strait, and was hugging the African coast in order to es-

cape the observation of the British cruisers from Gibraltar. The winds were not very favourable, but such was not the case with the opportunity it afforded him for executing his mission, for the English Admiral *Warren*, who cruised constantly between Gibraltar and Mahon, had only four vessels, the rest of the English forces, under Lord *Keith*, being employed in transporting the army of embarkation. Unfortunately, *Ganteaume* was ignorant of these facts, and the serious responsibility weighing upon him caused him an involuntary uneasiness which bullets would never have produced in his gallant breast. Annoyed by two of the enemy's vessels which were watching him too closely, the cutter *Sprightly* and frigate *Success*, he pursued and captured them. At last he passed the strait and entered the Mediterranean. He had now nothing left to do but to crowd all sail, and make for the east. Admiral *Warren*, in fact, was snug in the harbour of Mahon, and Admiral *Keith*, embarrassed with two hundred transports, had not yet left the shores of Asia Minor. The coast of Egypt was clear, and the assistance anxiously desired and long promised to the French army there might have been easily afforded. But *Ganteaume*, always uneasy about the fate of his squadron, and still more about that of the numerous troops he had on board, was alarmed at the sight of the smallest vessels he met. Supposing that there was between him and Egypt a fleet which never existed, he was alarmed for the state of his vessels, and feared, if it were necessary to carry all sail in presence of a superior force, that he would be unable to do with rigging crippled by the storm and hastily repaired at sea. He had lost all confidence in himself. Dissatisfied with the *Bravoure*, which did not sail to please him, he determined to get rid of her, and order her to Toulon. Instead of directing her alone to this port, and coasting himself along the African shore from west to east, he committed the error of sailing northward, and coming almost in sight of Toulon. His intention was to convoy the *Bravoure*, to protect her from the enemy's cruisers: a fallacious reason certainly, for it was better to hazard a single frigate than the success of his mission. Owing to this fault he was seen by Admiral *Warren*, who immediately left Mahon. *Ganteaume*, in order to deceive him, pretended to give him chase. The valiant Captain *Bergeret*, commanding the French ship the *Dix-Août*, advancing faster and further than the rest, examined the English closely, and could make out only four ships and two frigates. Filled with joy at the sight, he thought that, superior in force to the English, we should pursue them, either to chase or engage them. But he soon perceived the signal to give up the chase, and to join the squadron. This brave officer, deeply chagrined, immediately informed *Ganteaume* that he had been deceived by his look-out-men, that there were only four vessels before them; but in vain! *Ganteaume* thought he saw seven or eight, and resolved to sail to the north. Nevertheless it was certain (as subsequently proved by the reports of Admiral *Warren*) that the enemy had but

The English have asserted that the French frigate *Indivisible* was the field of battle. The information given by two officers of high rank, still living, and present at the time, leaves no doubt on my mind as to the truth of the above account.

four ships.¹ Ganteaume approached the gulf of Lyons to discharge the *Bravoure*, and having again seen the British fleet, distracted he entered Toulon. There new anxieties awaited him; and the fear of the anger of the First Consul, indignant at the failure, in the very moment of success, of so important an expedition. This fatal determination lost Egypt, which on that very day might have been saved.

In fact, whilst Ganteaume was beafig between the coast of Africa and Mahon, two frigates, the *Justice* and *Egyptienne*, with provisions and four hundred troops, had sailed to the east from Toulon, and arrived at Alexandria without meeting a single English vessel. Two other frigates, the *Régénérée* and *Africaine*, had sailed from Rochefort, crossed the ocean, and entered the Mediterranean, without any hindrance. They unfortunately separated. The *Régénérée* arrived at Alexandria, on the 2d of March, 1801—11th Ventôse, year IX. The *Africaine*, overhauled by a British frigate during the night, waited to fight her. She had on board three hundred troops, who, wanting to share the combat, caused a terrible disorder, and after a heroic contest, was the reason of her loss. She was taken by the English frigate. But, as has been seen, of four frigates which sailed from Toulon and Rochefort, three, arriving safely, found the coast of Egypt freed from the presence of the enemy, and so easily accessible that they entered Alexandria without striking a blow; so seldom do meetings occur in the vast expanse of the ocean, and so great boldness may favour an officer, who will risk his flag for the execution of a great duty!

Ganteaume entered Toulon on the 19th of February—30th Pluviôse—worn out with fatigue and anxiety, and a prey, as he wrote to the First Consul, to every species of mental misery. This was natural enough, for he had compromised interests of the most vital importance. The First Consul, naturally irritable, could not govern his temper when his orders were disobeyed. But he understood men; he knew that signs of dissatisfaction were not to be shown at the very moment of action, because by this means they would be alienated; instead of being excited; he knew that it was necessary to encourage and cheer Ganteaume, instead of driving him to despair by the outbursts of an anger which every one dreaded at that time as the greatest of evils. Therefore, far from overwhelming him with reproaches, he sent his aid-de-camp, Lacuée, to console and comfort him, and place at his disposal troops, provisions, and money, in order to be ready to start again immediately. He merely blamed him, gently, for having left the coast of Africa for that of the Balearic islands, and for having thus induced Admiral Warren to pursue him.

Ganteaume was a brave man, a good seaman, and an excellent soldier. But his moral condition at that moment proves that responsibility may exert a much greater influence over some men than the fear of cannon balls. This even is an honourable trait, for it shows that they are

more afraid of failing in the execution of any duties assigned, than of losing their lives. Ganteaume, encouraged by the First Consul, applied himself to his task; but he lost much time either in repairing his ships or in waiting for favourable winds. Some propitious moments were, however, still left. Admiral Warren had sailed towards Naples and Sicily. Admiral Keith, it is true, was approaching Aboukir with the English army: but it was not impossible to deceive his vigilance, and land the French troops either beyond Aboukir, that is at Damietta, or on this side, at 20 or 25 leagues to the west of Alexandria, by which means our soldiers would have reached Egypt by a short march across the desert.

At the same time that the earnestness of the First Consul incited Ganteaume to a second expedition, letters arriving from Paris urged the organization of the squadrons of Rochefort, Ferrol, and Cadiz, in order to pour succour into Egypt by every avenue possible. Lastly, Ganteaume, restored to his senses by the exhortations of the First Consul, added to numerous testimonials of kindness, set sail on the 9th of March—28th Ventôse. But on leaving the port, the *Constitution* ran aground; and two days were lost in putting her afloat. On the 22d of March—1st Germinal—the squadron again weighed anchor with seven ships, several frigates, and shaped their course for Sardinia, without being perceived by the English.

It was highly desirable that these attempts should succeed, at least in part; for our army in Egypt, thrown upon its own resources, was harassed with the collected soldiers of the east and west. Nevertheless, reduced to its own numbers, it could conquer a host of enemies, as it had done in the fields of Aboukir and Heliopolis, if it behaved with its usual good conduct. Unfortunately General Bonaparte was no longer at its head. Desaix and Kléber were no more.

It now becomes necessary to explain the situation of Egypt, after the fatal blow which had stricken down the colossal figure of Kléber, whose look alone, on the shores of the Rhine, as on those of the Nile, was wont to cheer the hearts of our soldiers, and make them forget danger, misery, and exile. We must first describe the prosperous state of the colony, and then its sudden disastrous situation; it must be done, for the reverses as well as the successes of a nation must be exhibited, in order to teach a useful lesson. Of a surety, in the midst of the unexampled prosperity of the Consulate, the fruit of skilful government, one misfortune cannot obscure the brilliancy of the picture it is our duty to present: but it is also our duty to present to our warriors and our generals still more than to our soldiers, the cruel lesson taught by the last days of the occupation of Egypt. May it cause them to reflect on their too ordinary tendency to disunion, especially when they are not governed by a powerful hand, which directs against the enemy the united activity of their minds, and the impetuosity of their passions.

When Kléber died, Egypt appeared to be in a state of subjection. After having seen the army of the grand-vizier scattered like chaff

¹ Vide a report of Admiral Warren of the 23d of April, 1801, published in the *Moniteur* of 27d Messidor, year IX. (Double number 286 and 287.)

before the wind, and the revolt of 300,000 inhabitants of Cairo repressed by a handful of soldiers, the Egyptians looked upon the French as invincible, and considered their establishment on the shores of the Nile as a decree of destiny. They began moreover to become familiarized with their European masters, and found that the new yoke was much less heavy than the old one; for they paid fewer taxes than under the Mamelukes, and did not receive the bastinado at the period of the collection of the miri, as under their dethroned co-religionists. Murad Bey, that gallant and chivalrous Mameluke prince, who at last attached himself to France, held Upper Egypt in fief. He was a faithful vassal, paid his tribute punctually, and kept the Upper Nile in good order. He was an ally on whom confidence could be placed. A single brigade of 2500 men, in the environs of Beni-Souef, which could always easily fall back on Cairo, was sufficient to keep Upper Egypt in subjection: which was a great advantage on account of the small numbers of our troops.

The French army, having partaken of the error of its general during the convention of El-Arisch, and having accompanied him to the plains of Heliopolis, began to understand its mistake, and did not feel disposed to commit a second. Confident that the Republic looked to it for the maintenance of that splendid possession, it did not dream of abandoning it. Moreover General Bonaparte was now at the head of affairs; the soldiers comprehended the reasons of his departure, and no longer regarded him as a deserter. Believing themselves to be always under the eyes of their former general, they did not concern themselves about the future. Thanks, indeed, to the foresight of the First Consul who caused merchant vessels to be freighted from every port, there scarcely elapsed a week without the arrival at Alexandria of ships bringing provisions, European goods, newspapers, letters, and despatches of government. In consequence of these frequent communications, their home was, as it were, always present. A sigh for it arose undoubtedly in their bosoms, when any circumstance occurred to excite it. For instance, when General Menou assumed the command, after the death of Kléber, all eyes were turned toward France. A brigadier-general, presenting his officers to Menou, asked him if he intended to restore them to their country. Menou reprimanded him severely, and announced in the order of the day his formal resolution to obey the intentions of his government, which were to retain possession of the colony for ever, and every one submitted anew. But above all, General Bonaparte was in power: this alone gave the old soldiers of Italy reason to trust and to hope.

Their pay was punctual, and provisions were cheap. The soldiers' rations were commuted for money. Bread alone was furnished to them in kind. They thus had the advantage of a good bargain, and lived in the greatest abundance, eating poultry much more frequently than butcher's meat. They had no cloth; but owing to the warmth of the climate, the want of this was supplied, for a portion of

their dress, by the cotton fabric so abundant in Egypt. For the other part, they took all the cloth brought into the east, without regard to colour. Some variety in the uniform was the result of this: regiments, for example, were seen dressed in blue, red, and green; but the soldier was dressed, and even presented a martial appearance. Colonel Couté was of great service to the army, on account of the fertility of his inventive mind. He had brought with him a company of artificers, the remains of the artificers of Fleurus,¹ and by their assistance erected at Cairo manufactories for weaving, fulling, and shearing cloth: and as wool was abundant, it was hoped that European stuffs could be dispensed with entirely. The same was the case with powder. The factories established at Cairo already produced enough for all the wants of war. Internal trade was evidently being restored. The caravans, well protected, began to arrive from the middle of Africa. The Arabs of the Red Sea came to the ports of Suez and Cosseir, where they exchanged coffee, perfumes, and dates, for the grain and rice of Egypt. The Greeks, taking advantage of the Turkish flag, and better sailers than the English cruisers, brought to Damietta, Rosetta, and Alexandria, wine, oil, and various commodities. In a word, nothing was wanting at that moment, and extensive preparations were making for futurity. The officers, seeing that the permanent occupation of Egypt was determined on, made their arrangements to pass their time as agreeably as possible. Those residing at Cairo or Alexandria, and they composed the larger number, found comfortable quarters. Syrian, Greek, and Egyptian women, either purchased from the slave merchants, or of their own free will, shared their lodgings with them. All gloom had disappeared. Two engineers had built a theatre at Cairo, and the officers themselves acted French plays. The soldiers lived as well as their commanders, and, thanks to that facility of the French character in assimilating with all nations, they were seen smoking and drinking coffee, in company with the Turks and Arabs.

The financial resources of Egypt, judiciously administered, satisfied all the wants of the army. Egypt had paid under the Mamelukes, according to the greater or less amount of taxation, 36 to 40,000,000. She now paid about 20 or 25,000,000, and the collection was much more easy. These 20 or 25,000,000 were sufficient for the expenses of the colony, which did not exceed 1,700,000 francs per month, that being 20,400,000 francs per annum. Time, improving the collection, rendering it at once more punctual and more easy, must necessarily lighten the burden on the population, and increase the wealth of the army. It would not be impossible to create an excess of 3 or 4,000,000 per annum, which would have served to form a small treasury, either to supply extraordinary wants, or to construct works of utility or defence. The army consisted of 25 or 26,000 individuals, reckoning the general staff, the women, the children of many

¹ This was a company of artisans, of all trades, subjected to military organization and discipline.

soldiers, and artisans. Of this number there were 23,000 soldiers, of whom 6,000 were unfit for field duty, but able to defend the fortresses, and 17 or 18,000 in prime condition, capable of the most active service. The cavalry was superb: it equalled the Mamelukes in bravery, and surpassed them in discipline. The field artillery was in good order and well drilled. The dromedary regiment had attained the highest degree of perfection. It traversed the desert with extraordinary rapidity, and had entirely cured the Arabs of the love of pillage. The current loss of men was slight, for there were but 600 sick out of 26,000 persons. Nevertheless, in case of a long war, men might be wanting: but the Greeks enlisted readily, as also the Copts. The negroes likewise, bought at a very cheap rate, and remarkable for their devotion, made excellent recruits. In time, the army might have been increased by 10 or 12,000 faithful and brave soldiers. Confident to excess in their bravery and military experience, they did not doubt for a moment their ability to drive into the ocean the Turks, or English, who might be sent from Asia or Europe. Certain it is, that well commanded, these 18,000 men, properly united, and directed in a body against newly embarked troops, ought, at all hazards, to remain masters of the coast of Egypt. But they needed a skilful head: this condition of success was indispensable to this army, as well as to any other.

Imagine Kléber, or, still better, Desaix, the wise and valiant Desaix, left in Egypt whence he was taken by the tender friendship of the First Consul; imagine Kléber, having escaped the Mussulman's poniard, governing Egypt for some years! Who can doubt but that he would have converted it into a flourishing colony, and founded a splendid empire! The climate was healthy, free from fever, the land of inexhaustible fertility, the peasants in subjection and attached to the soil, the recruits voluntary, and all the conditions of the country vastly superior to the establishment now being founded in Africa!

But instead of Kléber, instead of Desaix, Menou had become general-in-chief of the army by right of seniority. It was an irreparable misfortune for the colony, and a fault on the part of the First Consul, not to have superseded him. Not being certain that his orders would reach any given point in Egypt, he feared that, if the decree containing the appointment of a new general fell into the hands of the English, they might make use of it to disorganize the government. This motive, however, would not have excused the First Consul, if he had been able to know the profound imbecility of Menou in military affairs. Another reason influencing him in favour of this general, was his known zeal for the preservation and colonization of Egypt. Menou had, indeed, warmly opposed the project of evacuation, resisted the influence of the officers of the Rhine, and constituted himself, in short, the chief of the colonist party. He even carried his enthusiasm so far as to be converted to Islamism, and marry a Turkish woman. He took the name of Abdallah Me-

nou. These eccentricities made our soldiers naturally jesters, laugh, but, in the minds of the Egyptians, did no harm. Menou had intelligence, information, great industry, a taste for colonial establishments, all the qualities of a governor, but none of those of a general. Wanting in experience, that comprehension which seizes every thing at a glance, and determination, he was, moreover, physically incapable. He was very fat, near-sighted, and a bad horseman. He was a chief ill adapted to soldiers as active and brave as ours. In addition to all, he wanted character, and, under his feeble authority, the chiefs of the army became discontented and very soon a prey to fatal divisions of opinion.

Under General Bonaparte, there was in Egypt but one mind, one will. Under Kléber, there were for a time two parties, the colonists and anti-colonists, those who wished to remain, and those who wished to depart. But after the insult offered by the English to our soldiers, and gloriously avenged at Heliopolis, after the necessity of remaining became known, order was re-established. Under the imposing authority of Kléber there were union and harmony. But a short time elapsed between the victory of Heliopolis and the death of Kléber. Union fled when Menou assumed the command.

General Reynier, a good staff-officer, had distinguished himself in this capacity in the army of the Rhine, but reserved, inaccessible, without any influence over the soldiers, enjoyed nevertheless the esteem of all. He was looked upon as one of the officers most worthy to be at the head of the army. He was next in seniority to Menou. On the day of Kléber's death, a warm altercation took place between Reynier and Menou, not about the command, for on the contrary, each was anxious to avoid the burden of it. Neither would accept it; and, it must be confessed, that at that moment it was far from being desirable. It was supposed the blow of the poniard which had terminated Kléber's career, was the signal of a general insurrection, organized throughout Egypt by the influence of the Turks and English. They therefore feared, under such critical circumstances, the heavy responsibility of the command. Menou yielded however to the entreaties of Reynier and the other generals, and consented to become the chief of the colony. But the true state of affairs soon became apparent from the profound tranquillity which followed the death of Kléber, and the command, at first refused, was subsequently regretted. General Reynier then wanted what at first he would not accept. Under a reserved, modest, and even timid exterior, he concealed a profound vanity. The authority of Menou became insupportable to him. From being tranquil and obedient, he became censorious and meddling. He found fault with every thing. The entreaties of his companions in arms had induced Menou to accept the command, and he had assumed the title of *Commander in chief ad interim*. Reynier criticized this title. At the funeral of Kléber, Menou had assigned the four corners of the pall to generals of division, and marched behind at the head of the staff.

Reynier thought he was aspiring to vice-royalty. Menou had ordered the illustrious Fourier to pronounce the eulogium of Kléber: Reynier pretended that it was an insult to his memory, to praise him through the medium of another. A delay in a subscription opened to erect a monument to Kléber, difficulties as to the successor of this general, very pitiful, in the noble warriors of that day: these puerilities, and others, were interpreted by Reynier and his friends, in the most perverted manner. We relate these trifles which would be unworthy of a place in history, did they not show to what degree unfounded discontent can descend. Reynier thus became a disobedient, foolish, and guilty subaltern. To him was added General Damas, a friend of Kléber, and chief of the general-staff, carrying in his bosom all the jealous feelings of the army of the Rhine against that of Italy. From that time opposition found a dwelling-place in the very bureaux of the staff. Menou would not permit it so near him, and determined to remove General Damas from the post he had occupied under Kléber.

The disconcerted opponents endeavoured to ward off the blow by sending to Menou, in the capacity of a negotiator, the wise and brave General Friant, who, devoted entirely to his duties, and taking part with neither, mingled with them only to effect a reconciliation. Menou, more firm than usual, did not suffer himself to be persuaded, and superseded General Damas by appointing General Lagrange. He was thus less inconvenienced by the proximity of his enemies; but they were not the less irritated, far from it, and the most scandalous and alarming discord arose among the chiefs of the army. The wise among them lamented the shock given to the government; a shock always to be dreaded, but especially so when remote from the supreme authority, and surrounded by continual dangers.

Menou, a bad general, but an industrious governor, laboured night and day, at what he termed the organization of the colony. He did some good and some evil things, but above all he did too much. In the first place, he endeavoured to make the pay of the troops punctual, and used for this purpose the contribution of 10,000,000 levied by Kléber on the Egyptian cities, as a fine for the last revolt. This was one way of maintaining good humour and obedience in the army: for, during the convention of El-Arisch, some symptoms of insubordination were produced, partly by the pay being in arrears. Menou considered that the regular payment of the soldiers' dues was a guarantee of good order, and he was right. But he formed the rash determination to pay the wages, always in preference to every other expense, forgetting forced cases which might arise from war. He attended to the bread for the troops, which he had made excellent. He organized the hospitals, and carefully attended to introducing order in the bureau of accounts. Menou was a man of perfect integrity, but somewhat inclined to bombast. He expressed so frequently, in his orders of the day, his intention to reform the morals of the army, that he wounded the feelings of his generals. They asked with

bitterness, if honesty and propriety dated only from the assumption of the command by Menou. In fact, but few misdemeanors had been committed since the occupation of Egypt. After the violation of the convention of El-Arisch, a considerable capture had been made in the port of Alexandria; that of several vessels, sailing under the Turkish flag, in order to transport the army to France, and almost all loaded with merchandise. Menou seemed displeased with the operations of the commission and of General Lanusse, who commanded at Alexandria; he recalled him in a very insulting manner, and superseded him by General Friant. Lanusse was offended, and, on his return to Cairo, enrolled himself among the malcontents. Menou did not stop there; he was anxious to change the system of taxes, and here he committed serious faults. Undoubtedly at a later period some reformation might have been effected in the finances of Egypt. The people would have been easily contented, and the public revenue considerably increased by an equitable division of the land-tax, and some duties calculated on the consumption. But at that time, exposed to attacks from abroad, it was unwise to create intestinal difficulties, and to introduce innovations, the benefit of which were not at once evident to the people. The collection of the old duties with regularity and justice, was sufficient to establish between the Mamelukes and the French a comparison highly advantageous to the latter, and largely to swell the treasure-chest of the army. Menou conceived a general register of property, a new system of land-tax, and, above all, the exclusion of the Copts, who were, in Egypt, the farmers of the revenue, and played almost the same part as the Jews in the north of Europe. These projects of future benefit were productive of present evil. Menou fortunately had not time to put his whole plan into execution: but he had enough to create new contributions. The sheiks El-Beled, the municipal magistrates of Egypt, received at certain periods the investiture of municipal power, and obtained as presents, either cloaks or shawls, from the authority appointing them. They gave in return horses, camels, and horned-cattle. The Mamelukes renewed this ceremony as frequently as possible, on account of the benefit they received from it. Some had even converted it into a prestation in money. Menou intended to generalize this measure, and extend it over all Egypt. He imposed on the sheiks El-Beled a tax, amounting to nearly 2,500,000. They were certainly rich enough to pay it, and for many of them, this regular tax was an actual disburdening. But they possessed great influence over the 2500 villages subjected to their authority, and he ran the risk of rendering them hostile, by imposing on them an absolute, uniform, and uncompensated tax, which had in addition the effect of suppressing a custom of which the moral effect was useful. Menou, possessed with the desire of assimilating Egypt to France, or, as he said, of civilizing it, conceived moreover a system of tolls. Egypt had her duties on sales, which were collected in the *akels*, or store-houses in which, in the east, all merchandise which is to be

transported from one place to another, is deposited. This mode of collection was simple and easy. Menou wished to change it to a duty paid at the gates of the cities, which are not very numerous in Egypt. Independently of the innovation on the customs of the country, the immediate effect was to advance the price of merchandise in the garrisons, to throw a portion of this burden on the army, and thereby excite anew discontent. Lastly, Menou resolved to levy a contribution on the rich merchants, who held no public offices, such as the Copts, the Greeks, the Jews, the Damascenes, and Franks, etc. He imposed on them a capitation tax of 2,500,000*fr.* per annum. This was not too much, especially for the Copts, who had grown rich by the farming of the duties. But they had been very badly treated in the revolt of Cairo: they were, moreover, necessary, for recourse must be had to them, when it became requisite to borrow money. It was imprudent to alienate them any more than the Greek and European merchants, who, assimilated to us in manners, customs, and mind, were our natural medium of communication with the Egyptians. Lastly, Menou created a tax on successions, which he wished even to extend to the army, thus throwing an additional cause of dissatisfaction among the malcontents.

This manner of assimilating a colony to the metropolis, and of thinking that it was to be civilized by clashing with its prejudices, possessed Menou, as well as all the most enlightened colonizers, who were more anxious to do quickly than to do well. To complete the work, Menou created a privy-council, composed not of four or five chiefs of the service, but of about fifty civil and military officers of all grades. It was an actual parliament, which ridicule never permitted to assemble. Lastly, he added an Arabic gazette, intended to inform the Egyptians and the army of the acts of the French authority.

The soldiers troubled themselves but little about these matters. They lived well, laughed at Menou, but appreciated his good nature and solicitude for their welfare. The inhabitants were submissive, and found, after all, that the yoke of the French was much lighter than that of the Mamelukes. The malcontents of the army were infinitely more irritable. To avoid their censure, Menou should have done absolutely nothing, and even then they would have blamed him for his want of energy. But Menou was too much possessed with the mania of organizing, not to furnish ample material for criticism. They took advantage of it, and went so far as to project the deposition of the general in chief, a mad act which would have overturned the colony, and converted the army of Egypt into an army of prætorian guards. The officers of several divisions were sounded, but so much fidelity and disinclination to revolt were found, that the subject was dropped. Reynier and Damas had persuaded Lanusse, and they combined, corrupted Belliard and Verdier, and, with the exception of General Friant, all the generals of divisions were soon ranked in this unhappy opposition. Two old members of the National Convention, whom General Bonaparte had taken to Egypt, to occupy their leisure

time, Tallien and Isnard, were at Cairo, and, returning to their former habits, became violent agitators. Instead of the deposition of the general in chief, found to be impossible, the generals conceived the idea of waiting on him in a body, to present their remarks on his measures, some of which undoubtedly were open to severe criticism. They entered without being announced, and greatly surprised Menou, by their unexpected appearance. They laid their complaints before him, which he heard with much displeasure, but not without a certain degree of dignity. He promised to consider their remonstrances, and had the weakness not to crush on the spot the impertinence of their conduct. This step gave great offence to the army, and was universally condemned. Isnard and Tallien, however, paid for all, and were sent to Europe.

During this state of affairs the order of the First Consul arrived confirming Menou in his position, and definitively investing him with the chief command. This expression of the supreme power was very seasonable, and brought a portion of the malcontents to a sense of their duty. Unfortunately, new quarrels broke out, and soon restored things to their former state. Thus in petty altercations, these disappointed spirits, soured by exile, encouraged to discord by the weakness of their commander, spent the time between the victory of Heliopolis and the present, that is, one year; a valuable space of time which should have been employed in living harmoniously, and preparing, by union, for the overthrow of the powerful enemy about to attack Egypt.

The Nile was falling, the waters were returning to their bed, and the inundated country was beginning to dry. The time of disembarkation had arrived. The month of February, 1801—Ventôse, year IX.—was approaching. The English and Turks were preparing to make another descent on the colony. The grand-vizier, who had been beaten by Kléber at Heliopolis, was at Gaza, between Palestine and Egypt, not having dared to show himself, since his defeat, at Constantinople, not having more than 10 or 12,000 men in his army, decimated by the plague, living by pillage, and fighting daily with the mountaineers of Palestine, who had risen against him. He gave no great cause for fear. The capudan pasha, the enemy of the vizier, and the favourite of the sultan, was cruising with some vessels between Syria and Egypt. He was anxious to renew the convention of El-Arisch, having but slender hopes of reconquering Egypt by force of arms, and greatly distrusting the English, whom he suspected of wishing to wrest this beautiful country from the French, in order to take possession of it themselves. Lastly, 18,000 men, collected at Macri, in Asia Minor, composed of English, Hessians, Swiss, Maltese, and Neapolitans, officered exclusively by Englishmen, and in a high state of discipline, were about embarking on board of Lord Keith's squadron and attacking Egypt, under the command of a skilful general, Sir Ralph Abercrombie.

To these 18,000 European soldiers were to

be added 6000 Albanians, then on board of the squadron of the capudan pasha, 6000 Sepoys coming from India by way of the Red Sea, and some 20,000 men, miserable eastern soldiers, ready to join the 10,000 men of the grand-vizier in Palestine. The army of Egypt was threatened by about 60,000 men. She could oppose only about 18,000 combatants. These, however, were enough and even more than necessary, if well directed.

At first there was no danger of surprise, for information arrived from every quarter, from the Archipelago by the Greek ships, from Upper Egypt by Mourad Bey, and from Europe by the frequent couriers of the First Consul. All these advices gave notice of an impending expedition, composed of English and eastern forces. Menou, deaf to these warnings, at this critical moment, did nothing which he ought to have done, and which was clearly pointed out by the situation of affairs.

Good policy would have suggested to him, in the first place, to secure the fidelity of Mourad Bey, by proper treatment, for he had possession of Upper Egypt, and moreover preferred the French to the Turks and English. But Menou neglected this precaution, and answered the advices of Mourad Bey, in a manner to have alienated him from his allegiance, had that been possible. Good policy would also have suggested the propriety of taking advantage of the distrust of the English by the Turks, and, without renewing the convention of El-Arisch, of paralyzing them by a pretended negotiation, which, whilst occupying them, would have delayed their preparations. Menou thought no more of this than of any other measure.

He did not know how to avail himself of any of the military or civil measures required by the circumstances. In the first place, he should have made at Alexandria, Rosetta, Damietta, Ramanieh, and Cairo, or wherever the army might chance to be, ample collections of munitions of war, always easily obtained in a country like Egypt. Menou refused to do so, wishing to take nothing from the men's pay, which he had promised should be kept sacred. It became necessary to remount the cavalry and artillery, the principal resources against an army of embarkation, which is generally wanting in those arms. He refused, for the same financial reasons. He even carried his improvidence so far as to select this time for castrating the artillery horses, which were entire, and difficult to manage on that account.

Lastly, Menou was opposed to concentrating the troops, which a regard for the health of the soldiers would have rendered proper, even if no danger had threatened Egypt. In fact some symptoms of the plague had appeared. It was absolutely necessary to encamp the troops, and withdraw them from the cities, independently of rendering them more active. The army, scattered in garrisons, or uselessly collected at Cairo, or employed in the collection of the mir, was in no wise fit for action. And yet by a proper disposition of the 23,000 men remaining, of whom 17 or 18,000 were ready for active service, Menou might have every-

where defended Egypt with advantage. He might be attacked at Alexandria, by the bay of Aboukir, in the vicinity, and always preferred for landing; at Damietta, another favourable point for disembarkation, although much less so than that of Aboukir; lastly, on the Syrian frontier, where the vizier was stationed with the wreck of his army. Of these three points, but one was seriously threatened, namely, Alexandria and at the bay of Aboukir; a circumstance easy to have been foreseen, and it was the common belief among the soldiers and civilians. The coast of Damietta, on the contrary, was difficult of access, and connected by so few points with the Delta, that the enemy's army, if it had disembarked, might have been easily blockaded, and forced to regain their ships. It was therefore not probable that the English would come to Damietta. On the Syrian frontier the vizier could give but little uneasiness. He was too weak, and remembered Heliopolis too well, to commence the attack. He would assume the offensive, only when the English had succeeded in landing. In all cases it was good policy to let him advance, for the more he did so, the more he was compromised. The only subject of consideration with the general in chief, should have been the English army, of which the landing was announced to be daily expected. Under these circumstances, a strong division should have been left around Alexandria, that is 4 or 5000 active troops, exclusive of the marines and men intended to garrison the forts. Two thousand men would have been sufficient for Damietta. The dromedary regiment could have protected the Syrian frontier. A garrison of 3000 men at Cairo, reinforced by the 2000 men of Upper Egypt and about 1000 French from the depots, would more than have sufficed to keep in subjection the population of the capital, if the vizier had appeared under its walls. This arrangement would require 11 or 12,000 men, out of 17 or 18,000 active troops. There then remained a reserve of 6000 picked men, who should have been encamped at an equal distance from Alexandria and Damietta. Ramanieh presented all these favourable conditions; it was a healthy location, on the shore of the Nile, not far from the sea, easily provisioned, one day's journey from Alexandria, two from Damietta, and three or four from the Syrian frontier. Such a force, stationed at that point, would have effectually frustrated all the attempts of the enemy.

Menou thought of none of these measures, and not only did not think of them, but he rejected the advice of those who suggested them to him. Judicious counsel reached him from all sides, and particularly from the generals who had opposed him. This justice is due to them, and, among their number, Reynier, more accustomed than the others to great military manœuvres, pointed out to him the proper course to pursue; but they had lost the confidence of the commander in chief, through their untimely opposition, and, now that they were in the right, he listened to them with no more deference than when they were in the wrong.

The brave Friant, ignorant of the fatal discord reigning in the army, attended zealously to the defence of Alexandria. He had organized the sailors and men of the garrison, so as to leave them in charge of the forts: but that being done, he had left only about 2000 active troops to direct toward the point of embarkation. Some of these were necessary for the defence of the principal points of the coast, such as the fort of Aboukir, the ports of Maison-Carrée, Edko, and Roseita. After occupying these points, he had left only 1200 men. Fortunately the *Régénérée*, arriving from Rochefort, had brought a reinforcement of three hundred men, with a considerable store of provisions. Thanks to this unexpected succour, the force of General Friant reached about 1500 men. Imagine of what assistance Ganteaume's squadron would have been at this moment, if, trusting a little more to chance, this admiral had brought the 4000 picked soldiers, on board of his ships.

General Friant, even in his destitute condition, demanded only two additional battalions and a regiment of cavalry. This might have sufficed, but in such a situation it was very rash to trust to a reinforcement of about 1000 men. It must be confessed, that the confidence of the army in itself contributed greatly to its defeat. It had been accustomed to fight in Egypt, one to four, and sometimes one to eight, and did not value correctly the power of the English. It was supposed that the enemy could not land more than a few hundred men at a time, without artillery or cavalry, and that they might be easily overcome by the bayonet. Fatal delusion. Nevertheless, this reinforcement, demanded by Friant, although small, would have saved all, as will be evident from the events that followed.

On the 28th of February, 1801—9th Ventôse, year IX.—an English boat was seen not far from Alexandria, apparently reconnoitring. It was pursued and captured, with the officers in it, who had charge of the disembarkation. The papers found on them left no doubt as to their intentions. Immediately afterward, the English fleet of seventy sail appeared in sight of Alexandria; but, separated by bad weather, they put to sea again. There was still left a chance of preserving Egypt from the English, for they probably would be unable to effect a landing for several days. The despatches sent by Friant to Cairo, arrived there on the 4th of March—14th Ventôse—in the afternoon. If Menou had immediately adopted a prompt and prudent determination, all might have been retrieved. If he had marched the whole army toward Alexandria, the cavalry would have reached that place in four days, the infantry in five, that is, on the 8th and 9th of March—17th and 18th Ventôse—he might have

had 10,000 men on the shore of Aboukir. The English might possibly at that time have disembarked their troops, but it would have been impossible for them to have landed their ammunition, fortify their position, and the French might have attacked them with success. Reynier, who was at Cairo, wrote to Menou, on the same day, a most able letter. He advised him to pass by the vizier, who would not assume the offensive, as also Damietta, which did not appear to be threatened, and to concentrate his forces on Alexandria. Nothing could be more correct. At all events, no error could be committed by marching toward Ramanieh, for from this place it was easy to go toward Damietta or Syria, as either point might seem in danger. Not a single day had been lost, and they approaching Alexandria, where the true danger was. It was necessary to decide instantly, and march that very night. Menou would listen to nothing, and became absolute in his orders, whilst he was vacillating in his ideas. Unable to understand which point was really threatened, he sent a reinforcement to General Rampon, near Damietta; and ordered Reynier with his division toward Belbeis to oppose the vizier on the Syrian frontier. He sent the division Lanusse to Ramanieh, and even did not send the whole of it, for he kept the 88th demi-brigade at Cairo. He sent only the 17th chasseurs (light infantry). General Lanusse was ordered to march to Ramanieh, and thence, according to the information received, to Alexandria. Menou remained himself at Cairo, with a large portion of the forces, waiting for further news, in this position, so remote from the sea. Imbecility could go no further.

During this time, events succeeded each other with great rapidity. The English fleet was composed of seven ships of the line, a great number of frigates, brigs, and large vessels belonging to the East India Company, in all seventy sail. They had on board an immense number of boats. As has been before said, Lord Keith commanded the naval and Sir Ralph Abercromby the land forces. The point selected for landing was the point always chosen previously, that is, the bay of Aboukir. There our squadron was anchored in 1798, when it was found and destroyed by Nelson; there the Turkish squadron had landed the brave Janissaries, conquered by General Bonaparte, in the glorious combat of Aboukir. The English fleet, after having been forced to stand off for several days, creating a delay which would have been fatal to them, and most fortunate to us, had Menou known how to take advantage of it, cast anchor in the road of Aboukir, on the 6th of March—15th Ventôse—at five leagues distance from Alexandria.

ABERCROMBY, SIR RALPH. Born in 1738, at Tillibodie, in Clackmannanshire. His first commission was in the 3d Dragon Guards, in 1756, and having passed through all grades of the service, he was a major-general in 1787. He was employed in Flanders and Holland, with the local rank of lieutenant-general. In 1795 he received the order of the Bath, and was appointed commander in chief of the forces in the West Indies, in which expedition he captured Grenada, St. Lucia, St. Vincente, Trinidad, Demerara, and Essequibo. In 1799

he distinguished himself in Holland under the Duke of York. In 1801, was appointed commander in chief of the expedition to Egypt, and on the 31st of March was unhorsed and wounded in two places, though he disarmed his antagonist, whose sword he gave to Sir Sidney Smith, in his victorious battle of Alexandria. He died of his wounds within a week, and was buried under the castle of St. Elmo, in Malta.—*Encyclopedia Americana*.

Lower Egypt, like Holland and Venice, is a country of lagoons. It presents, like all countries of this kind, a character which must be well understood, in order to execute properly any military operations of which it may become the theatre. At the points where the large rivers enter the sea, banks of sand form around their mouths. The banks are composed of sand brought down by the rivers, repelled by the sea, and thus between two conflicting forces, accumulate in ridges parallel to the shore. They constitute those barriers so dreaded by navigators, and always so difficult to surmount, in passing into or out of the channel of the river. They rise successively to the edge of the water, then, in time, above it, and form long sandy beaches, lashed on the outside by the waves of the ocean, and on the inside by the waters of the river, the course of which they interrupt. Where the Nile empties into the Mediterranean by numerous mouths, it has formed a vast semi-circle of these sand-banks. This semi-circle extends for at least seventy leagues, from Alexandria to Pelusium,¹ and is scarcely broken near Rosetta, Bourloz, Damietta and Pelusium, by a few apertures through which the waters of the Nile flow into the ocean. One side is washed by the Mediterranean, by lakes Mareotis, Madieh, Edko, Bourloz and Menzaleh. No landing can be made in Egypt, except on one of these sand-banks. Induced by example and necessity, the English had chosen that which forms the harbour of Alexandria. This bank, about fifteen leagues long, extending between the Mediterranean on the one hand, and lakes Mareotis and Madieh on the other, has Alexandria located at one extremity, and Rosetta at the other, terminating in a semi-circular re-entering. This semi-circular re-entering forms the roadstead of Aboukir. One shore of this roadstead was defended by the fort of Aboukir, built by the French, and commanding the adjacent coast. Then came some sand-banks, spread around the shore, and terminating on the other side of the roadstead, in a level sandy plain. General Bonaparte had ordered works to be thrown upon these banks. Had he been obeyed, a landing could never have been effected.

The English fleet, drawn up in two lines, anchored in this roadstead. They rode at anchor until the sea became sufficiently smooth for them to launch their boats. At last on the 8th, in the morning—17th Ventôse—the weather permitting, Lord Keith distributed 5000 picked men in 320 boats. These boats ranged in two lines, and led by Captain Cochrane, advanced, their wings being protected by a division of gun boats, which received and returned a very heavy cannonade.

General Friant, repairing to the spot, formed a little in the rear of the shore, to shelter his troops from the British artillery. He had thrown between him and the fort of Aboukir, a detachment of the 25th demi-brigade, with some pieces of cannon. On his left he had placed the 75th, two battalions strong, and hid-

den by the sand-banks; in the centre, two squadrons of cavalry, one of the 18th, and one of the 20th dragoons; lastly, on his right the 61st demi-brigade, also two battalions strong, and charged with the defence of the lower part of the shore. All his troops did not exceed 1500 men. Some outposts occupied the margin of the sea; the French artillery, posted on the projecting sites of the land, swept the roadstead with their guns.

The English advanced, the soldiers lying in the bottom of the boats, the sailors pulling lustily at the oars, and supporting with great coolness the fire of the artillery. As soon as a sailor fell, another took his place. The whole mass, moved by one impulse, was approaching the shore. At last they reached it; the English soldiers rose from the bottom of the boats, and jumped ashore. They formed and ran to the sandy encampment which bordered the bay. General Friant was informed of the circumstances by his outposts, which were driven in, but arrived rather late. Nevertheless, he ordered the 75th to the left, on the sand-banks, and the 61st to the right, toward the lower part of the shore. The latter gallantly charged the English, who were unsupported at that point. They drove them back and followed them into their boats. The grenadiers of this demi-brigade seized twelve boats, and directed a deadly fire on the enemy. The 75th, who, informed too late, had given the English time to obtain possession of the encampments on the left, rapidly advanced to dislodge them. Uncovered by this movement, and exposed to the fire of the gun-boats, it received a terrible discharge of grape, which killed thirty-two men and wounded twenty. It met at the same moment the terrible fire of the English infantry. This brave demi-brigade, surprised momentarily and placed on unequal ground, attacked in some confusion. General Friant wishing to support it, ordered a charge of the cavalry against the English, who were deploying in the plain, after having surmounted the first obstacles. The commander of the 18th dragoons, sent for several times to receive the general's orders, came at last. General Friant, amid a shower of balls, pointed out the precise point of attack. This officer, unfortunately somewhat timid, did not advance directly on the enemy, lost his time in making a detour, made an injudicious charge, and lost a great many men and horses, without shaking the English, and without disengaging the 75th, who were intent upon taking the sandy heights on the left. The squadron of the 20th alone remained. A brave officer, named Boussart, who commanded it, charged at the head of his dragoons, and overthrew all before him. Then the 61st, which, on the right, had remained masters of the shore, unable alone to overcome the body of enemy, took courage, followed the 20th dragoons, attacked the centre of the English, and forced them to re-embark. The 75th, under a terrible fire, renewed its attempts. If at this decisive moment General Friant had had the two battalions of infantry and the regiment of cavalry, he had so frequently demanded, the day would have been won, and the English driven to the sea. But a company of 1200

¹ Called by the moderns Tineh.

picked men, composed of Swiss and Irish, turned the sand-banks, and outflanked the left of the 75th, which was again forced to yield. It retired, leaving on our right the 61st, intent on victory, but compromised by its own success.

General Friant, seeing that the 75th being obliged to retrograde, the 61st might be surrounded, ordered a retreat, which he effected in good order. The grenadiers of the 61st, excited by carnage and success, obeyed with regret the orders of their general, and whilst retiring, kept the English at bay by some gallant charges.

The loss of Egypt followed that of this unfortunate day of the 8th of March—17th Ventôse. The brave General Friant had perhaps chosen his first position somewhat too far from the shore: perhaps also he had had too great confidence in the superiority of his soldiers, and supposed that the English could land but a few at a time. This confidence, however, was excusable, and after all, justified by the event, for if he had had one or two battalions more, the English would have been repulsed, and Egypt been saved. But what can be said of that general in chief, who, for two months, perfectly aware of the danger, had not concentrated his forces at Ramanieh, whence he might have directed 10,000 men to Aboukir, on the day of action? who, informed even on the 4th of March, by a courier who arrived that day at Cairo, had not despatched his troops, who might have arrived on the very morning of the 8th, and consequently been in time to repulse the English? What can be said of that Admiral Ganteaume, who might have landed 4000 men in Alexandria, on the very day that the *Régénérée* brought 300, who fought on the shore of Aboukir? What can be said of so much timidity, negligence, and faults of every kind, except that there are days, when the fates seem to conspire against the issue of battles and the existence of empires?

The combat had been bloody. The English lost 1100 men, killed and wounded, of 5000 engaged. Of 1500 of ours, 400 were disabled. Both sides had fought well. General Friant retired under the walls of Alexandria, and sent for immediate assistance to Menou, and the other generals in his vicinity.

All might however have been retrieved, had advantage been taken of the time still left, the forces at their disposal, and the embarrassing situation in which the English would be, when once landed on this sandy beach.

They had first to land the bulk of their army, and then their ammunition and provisions, all of which required considerable time. They were then obliged to march along this sandy bank, in order to approach Alexandria, with the sea on the right, and lakes Madieh and Mareotis on the left, supported, indeed, by their gun-boats, but without cavalry, and having no field artillery, but such as was dragged by men. Their advance must needs be slow, and surrounded by difficulties, for when before Alexandria, they would be reduced, to extricate themselves from this cul-de-sac, either to take that place, or to travel along the narrow dikes, which maintain the communication with the interior of Egypt. In order to arrest their pro-

gress, it was necessary no longer to fight partial and unequal combats, which gave them confidence, dispirited our troops, and reduced our forces, already too small. Even without fighting, the way might have been secured by a position. There was but one course left to pursue, which was to wait until Menou, whose blindness was now removed by facts, had collected the whole army under the walls of Alexandria.

General Lanusse, however, had been ordered with his division to Ramanieh. Having there heard of the transactions at Aboukir, he immediately marched for Alexandria. He had about 3000 men. Friant had lost 400 out of 1500 on the 8th of March, but having called in all the small posts, from Rosetta to Alexandria, he had still 17 or 1800. The forts of Alexandria were defended by the sailors and soldiers of the garrison. With the division of Lanusse he had nearly 5000 men to bring into action. The English had landed 16,000 exclusive of 2000 sailors. As yet it would have been improper to risk a battle. One circumstance, however, led the two French generals into error.

The long sand-bank on which the English had landed, separated by lakes Madieh and Mareotis from the interior of Egypt, communicated with it, only by means of a long embankment, passing between the two lakes and terminating at Ramanieh. This embankment formed both the canal bringing the fresh water of the Nile to Alexandria, and the high road from Alexandria to Ramanieh. At this moment it was in the greatest danger of being occupied by the English, for they had nearly reached the point where it unites to the sand-bank on which Alexandria is situated. The English had consumed the 9th, 10th, and 11th of March—18th, 19th, 20th Ventôse—in landing and organizing. On the 12th they took up their march, travelling with difficulty through the sand, the sailors of the squadron dragging the artillery, supported on the right and left by the gun-boats. On the evening of the 12th they were near the point of junction of the embankment with the ground of Alexandria.

Generals Friant and Lanusse were afraid to allow the English to occupy this point, and thus abandon to them the road to Ramanieh, by which Menou was to arrive. However, even had this road been lost, there was left another, long indeed, and difficult for the transportation of artillery; namely, Lake Mareotis itself. This lake, more or less overflowed according to the rise of the Nile and the season of the year, left exposed swampy shoals, over which a tortuous but secure road might have been found. Hence there was no reason for risking a fight, with all the chances against them.

Nevertheless, Generals Friant and Lanusse, magnifying the danger to which their means of communication were exposed, decided on offering battle. The fatality of this mistake might have been partly retrieved by remaining on the sandy heights which commanded the sand-bank, and terminated at the very head of the embankment. By remaining in this position, and using judiciously their artillery.

which was greatly superior to the English, they would retain all the advantages of the defensive, compensate for their inferior numbers, and probably succeed in keeping possession of the point, for which a second and deplorable combat was about to be fought.

Such was the plan agreed upon between Generals Friant and Lanusse. Lanusse was full of natural intelligence, bravery and audacity. He, unfortunately, was but little disposed to listen to the voice of prudence. Moreover having taken part in the dissensions of the army, he would have been delighted to achieve a victory before the arrival of Menou.

On the morning of the 13th of March—22d Ventôse—the English appeared. They were marching in three divisions; that on the left, followed the edge of Lake Mareotis, threatening the head of the embankment, and supported by the gun-boats: that of the centre advanced in the form of a square, flanked by battalions in close column, in order to repel the French cavalry, which the English greatly feared; and that on the right marched along the margin of the sea, supported, like the first, by the gun-boats.

The division which was to attack the head of the embankment had preceded the two others. Lanusse seeing the left wing of the English venturing unprotected along the lake, could not resist the desire of rushing on it. He committed the error of leaving the heights to attack it. But, at that very moment, the fearful square in the centre, hidden at first by the sandy downs, appeared on the other side of these downs, over which they had passed. Lanusse then, obliged to abandon his first intention, marched directly to this square, which was preceded at some distance by a line of infantry. He threw out the 22d chasseurs, who rushed on this line of infantry, cut it into two, and made two battalions lay down their arms. The 4th light infantry, advancing to support the 22d, completed the success. During this time, the square which had arrived within gun-shot, opened that dreadful fire of musketry which had already so much annoyed our army at the landing of Aboukir. The 18th light infantry hurried up, but it was met by a deadly fire, which occasioned some disorder in its ranks. At this moment the English were seen to advance from the right, having left the shore of the sea, in order to support the centre. Lanusse, then having only the 69th to support the 18th, ordered a retreat, not wishing to engage in too unequal a combat. Friant, on his side, surprised at seeing Lanusse descend to the plain, had also descended to assist him, and had advanced toward the head of the embankment, against the English left. He bore for a long time a heavy fire, which he returned by one equally heavy, when he perceived the retreat of his colleague. He then also retired, in order not to engage alone the English army. Both, after this short engagement, regained the position, which they were wrong ever to have left.

It was merely a reconnoissance, but a very superfluous one, which should have been avoided, for it was attended by a loss of 5 or 600 men; a loss deeply to be regretted, as we had not, like the English, the means of

receiving reinforcements, and were obliged to fight with a force of only about 5 or 6000 soldiers. If the loss of the English could have indemnified us, it was great enough to satisfy us. They had, in fact, 13 or 1400 men disabled.

They determined to wait for Menou, who had at last decided upon marching to Alexandria. He had ordered General Rampon to leave Damietta and direct his forces to Ramanieh; he had with him the principal bulk of the soldiers. Nevertheless some troops were left in the province of Damietta, in the vicinity of Belbeis and Salabié, and even at Cairo, and Upper Egypt, which were not nearly so useful in those positions as they would have been before Alexandria. If Menou had evacuated Upper Egypt and confided it to Mourad Bey, and abandoned the city of Cairo, which was not much disposed to insurrection, to the soldiers of the garrisons there, he might have 2000 men additional to oppose to the enemy. Such an increase of force was certainly not to be despised, for the most important point of all, was to beat the English. The Egyptians, not dreaming of revolt, did not require the precautions used against them. They were only to be feared when the French were decidedly vanquished.

Menou, having reached Ramanieh, there learned the whole importance of the danger. General Friant had sent two regiments of cavalry to meet him. This general thought with reason, that shut up for several days in the walls of Alexandria, he would have no use for these regiments, and that, on the contrary, they would be very useful to Menou as a vanguard.

Menou was obliged to make long circuits, in the bed of Lake Mareotis itself, in order to reach the beach of Alexandria. He succeeded, however, with some fatigue, especially for his artillery. The troops arrived on the 19th and 20th of March—28th and 29th Ventôse. He arrived himself on the 19th, and could then see how enormous had been the mistake of allowing the English to land.

The enemy had received some reinforcements, and plenty of ammunition. He had taken possession of those same sandy heights occupied by Lanusse and Friant on the 13th of March. He had there thrown up some field works, and armed them with heavy cannon. To dislodge him would prove a very difficult task.

The English were likewise far superior to us in numbers. They had 17 or 18,000 men against less than 10,000. Menou brought at most 5000. We had not, therefore, 10,000 men to oppose 18,000, located in an entrenched position. All the chances which in the first, or even in the second affair were in our favour, had now turned against us. After having, in fact, endeavoured to drive the English to the sea, at first with 1500, then with 5000 men, it would have been extraordinary not to have attempted it, with nearly 10,000, which were almost all that could be collected at one point.

It must not be forgotten that another plan still remained, which it would have been much better to have adopted after the landing, and

before the useless battle fought by Generals Lanusse and Friant; this was to have left the English in the cul-de-sac which they occupied: to have thrown up works of defence around Alexandria; to have intrusted it to the sailors and garrison soldiers, reinforced by 2000 active troops; to have evacuated all the ports excepting Cairo, where 8000 men might have been left, having the citadel as a place of refuge; then, to keep the field with the remainder of the army, that is with 9 or 10,000 men, to attack the Turks, if they entered through Syria, or the English, if they advanced into the interior, by the narrow dikes traversing Lower Egypt. We possessed the advantage of the various kinds of arms, cavalry, artillery, and infantry, and the exclusive command of the provisions of the country. They might have been blockaded, and probably forced to re-embark. But, to effect all this, there was required a general far more skilful than Menou, well versed as he was otherwise in the science of manœuvring troops. A chief, in short, was wanting, different from him, who, with all the chances of success in his favour, at the outset of the campaign, had so conducted himself as to turn them all against him.

Nevertheless it was a natural determination, to attack the English, and consistent with all that had been done, from the opening of the campaign. But, having once resolved on a decisive effort, it should have been put into immediate execution, in order not to give the Turks coming from Syria time to press us too closely.

Before offering battle, it was necessary to agree upon a plan. Menou was incapable of conceiving one, and he no longer had with his generals those relations which permitted him to ask their advice. Nevertheless the chief of the general-staff, Lagrange, asked Lanusse and Reynier to furnish a plan, which they did conjointly, and sent to Menou for his approbation. He adopted it almost mechanically.

The two armies were in sight of each other, occupying the sand-bank, about a league in width and fifteen or eighteen leagues in length, on which the English had landed. The French army was before Alexandria, on moderately elevated ground. In front of it extended sandy plains, and here and there downs, which the enemy had carefully entrenched so as to form a continuous chain of posts from the sea to Lake Mareotis. On our left, precisely against the sea, was seen an old Roman camp, of a square form, and uninjured, and a little in front of this camp, a small sand-hill, on which the English had thrown up a work. There they had posted their right, under cover of a double fire from this work and a division of gun-boats. In the middle of the battle-field, at an equal distance from the sea and Lake Mareotis, was another sand-hill, more elevated and extensive than the preceding, and crowned with entrenchments. On it the English centre rested. Lastly, quite to the right, on the side of the lakes, the ground decreasing in elevation terminated at the head of the dike, for which a battle had been fought a few days previously. A series of redoubts united the

centre with the head of this embankment. The English had there, posted their left, protected, like their right, by a division of gun-boats, in Lake Mareotis. This front of attack presented an extent of near a league; it was provided with heavy artillery which had been dragged thither by men, and defended by a portion of the English army. But the bulk of the army was drawn up in two lines, in order of battle, behind these works.

It was agreed upon to move before day on the morning of the 21st of March—30th Ventôse—in order better to conceal our operations, and to be less exposed to the fire of the enemy's intrenchments. The intention of the French generals was to take these intrenchments at the first outset, carry them, pass through them, and attack the front of the English army drawn up in order of battle in their rear. Our left, consequently, under Lanusse, was to bear down in two columns, on the right wing of the English resting on the sea. The first of these two columns was to attack directly, and at a run, the work erected on a sand-hill in front of the Roman camp. The second, passing rapidly between this work and the sea, was to assail the Roman camp, and carry it. The centre of our army, under General Rampon, was ordered to extend far beyond this attack, to pass between the Roman camp and the great central redoubt, and assail the English army beyond the works. Our right wing, composed of the divisions of Reynier and Friant, but commanded by Reynier, was directed to deploy in the plain to the right, and feign an attack toward Lake Mareotis, in order to persuade the English that the true danger was in that quarter. In order to confirm them in this idea, the dromedaries were, by following the bed of Lake Mareotis, to make an attempt on the head of the dike. It was hoped that this diversion would facilitate the sudden attack of Lanusse toward the sea.

On the 21st—30th Ventôse—before break of day, they began to march. The dromedaries executed faithfully their orders. They crossed rapidly the dry parts of Lake Mareotis, dismounted in front of the head of the dike, carried the redoubts, and turned the artillery against the enemy. This was sufficient to deceive the attention of the English, and draw it toward Lake Mareotis. But, in order to execute successfully the plan agreed upon for the sea-side, there was needed a precision difficult to be obtained in night operations, still more difficult when there is not a sole chief, who can exactly calculate time and distances to direct the movements.

The division of Lanusse, manœuvring in the dark, advanced in disorder, and frequently jostled our troops of the centre. The first column, under command of General Sully, marched resolutely to the redoubt in front of the Roman camp. Lanusse led it in person to the very spot, but suddenly perceived that the second column was going astray, and that instead of going along the sea to attack the Roman camp, it was approaching too closely the first. He ran to it to give it the proper direction. Unfortunately he fell mortally

wounded in the thigh; a fatal event, and fraught with the most disastrous consequences! The sudden removal of this gallant officer from his men, slackened their energy. Day was beginning to break, and showed the English where to direct their fire. Our soldiers, exposed at the same time to the fire of the gun-boats, the Roman camp, and the redoubts, exhibited the most admirable firmness. But in a short time all their superior officers being killed or wounded, they became confused, and fell back behind some sand hillocks, scarcely sufficient to cover them. During this time, the first column, which Lanusse had left in order to direct the second, had carried the first redan of the redoubt placed on an eminence to the right. They then marched directly to the body of the work, but failed in their front attack, and turned to attack by the flank. The centre of the army under Rampon, seeing the situation of this column, turned also from its object to assist them. The 32d demi-brigade, detached from the centre, attacked the fatal redoubt. This union of attempts created a kind of confusion. Their most energetic efforts were directed against this obstacle, and the sudden manœuvre which was to have consisted merely in carrying at a run the line of works, was changed into a prolonged and obstinate attack, costing much valuable time. The 21st demi-brigade, which belonged to the centre, leaving the 32d before the warmly contested redoubt, executed alone the plan projected, passed the line of intrenchments, and deployed bravely in front of the English army. It received and returned a dreadful fire. It became necessary to support it, and Menou, during this time, incapable of commanding, was walking over the battle-field, giving no orders, and permitting Reynier to extend uselessly on the plain to the right with a considerable force not brought into action.

Menou was then advised to charge the English, opposed by the 21st alone, with the cavalry, about 1200 strong. He immediately issued the necessary orders. The brave General Roize placed himself instantly at the head of these 1200 horsemen, crossed rapidly the dangerous pass, formed by the redoubts of the right and left, which our infantry was vainly attacking, debouched beyond, found the 21st demi-brigade engaged with the English, on whom he fell with great impetuosity. This heroic cavalry leaped a ditch which separated them from the enemy, and rushed with ardour upon the first line of the English infantry, overthrew it, and sabred a great number of men. It was then obliged to retire. If Menou, at this moment, or even Reynier, supplying the deficiency in his chief, had directed our right wing to the support of the cavalry, the centre of the English army overturned and driven beyond the works, certain victory must have followed. The works, isolated and separated from all support, would have fallen into our hands. Nothing of this kind took place. The French cavalry having overthrown the enemy's first line, seeing others still to overcome, and supported only by the 21st demi-brigade, retreated, passing again through the deadly fire of the redoubts.

From this moment, the battle could be productive of no advantageous results. The left, dismayed by the death of their general, maintained a useless fire on the intrenchments, whence one more deadly was returned. The right, deployed in the plain near Lake Mareotis, to make a diversion which no longer had any object, for since the battle had become general each corps retained its position, was of no service. Undoubtedly an active general, who would have brought it down upon the centre, and, renewing the attack with General Roize, would have made a second upon the bulk of the English, might have changed the aspect of the battle. But General Menou did not know how to command, and Reynier, who at this moment might have assumed a responsibility, which he so often did at unreasonable times in civil affairs, contented himself with complaining at receiving no orders from the commander in chief. In this state of things the only alternative left was to retreat. Menou issued the order, and the divisions fell back, still preserving a show of resistance, and suffering additional loss from the fire of the works.

What a spectacle is war, when the lives of men and the fate of nations, are thus intrusted to chiefs who are imbecile or at variance with each other, and when blood flows, in proportion to the ignorance or dissensions of those in command!

It could not be said that the battle was lost, as the enemy had not advanced a single step—but it was lost, the moment that it was not completely gained, for an unconditional victory was necessary to drive the English back to Aboukir and force them to re-embark. Both sides had suffered great loss. The English had had about 2000 men disabled, and among them the brave General Abercromby, carried in a dying state on board his ship. The loss of the French was nearly equal. Exposed for a whole day to a raking front and flank fire, they had had a most trying position. The troops had displayed extraordinary coolness. The dashing charge of the cavalry filled the English with surprise and admiration. The number of French officers and generals wounded was greater than usual. Generals Lanusse and Roize were killed; Brigadier-general Silly, commanding one of the columns of Lanusse, had his thigh carried away; and General Baudot was wounded beyond all hope of recovery. General Destaing was dangerously hurt. Rampon's clothes were riddled with balls.

The moral effect was still more serious than the actual loss. No hope of forcing the enemy to re-embark was left. We were about to be attacked by the English landing at Alexandria, the Turks coming from Syria, the capudan pasha with the Turkish squadron, preparing to land 6000 Albanians at Aboukir; lastly 6000 Sepoys, brought from India by way of the Red Sea, and close to Cosseir, on the borders of Upper Egypt. What was to be done in the midst of so many enemies, with an army, the bravery of which was still undaunted, but which, when the affairs of the colony took a wrong direction, was always ready to exclaim, that the expedition had been a splendid folly.

and that they were uselessly sacrificed to a vain chimera?

In the three engagements of the 8th, 13th, and 21st of March, nearly 3500 men had been disabled, a third of whom were killed, a third dangerously wounded, and a third would be unable to enter the ranks for some weeks. Although the army was greatly weakened, even yet, as in the beginning of the campaign, they might have manœuvred with rapidity amongst the corps of the enemy which were endeavouring to effect a junction; have beaten the vizier if he entered by Syria; the capudan pasha, if he attempted to penetrate by Rosetta; and the English did they essay to march along the narrow tongues of land which communicated with the interior of Egypt. The 3500 men lost to the army rendered this more difficult than ever. If 8000 men were left at Cairo, 2 or 3000 at Alexandria, there would be left scarcely 7 or 8000 men to take the field, even supposing that all the disposable forces had been collected, and all the secondary posts, without exception, evacuated. With a very determined and skilful general, this might have been followed by an uncertain but possible success: but what was to be expected from Menou and his subalterns?

The resource was still left. As yet it was not despaired of, and was daily expected. This resource was Ganteaume and his fleet; and the troops he had on board, 4000 men, arriving at that time might have saved Egypt. An advice boat had been sent to the admiral, to inform him of a point in the coast of Africa twenty or thirty leagues to the west of Alexandria, at which he might land, far out of the reach of the English. Three thousand men might have been left in Alexandria, and, collecting the surplus at Cairo, there would have been 10 or 11,000 men, fit to take the field.

But Ganteaume, although very superior to Menou, did not act with any more energy in the circumstances in which he was placed. After having repaired at Toulon the damages he met with on leaving Brest, as has been seen, he sailed from Toulon on the 19th of March—28th Ventôse—returned on account of the grounding of the Constitution, and sailed again on the 22d of March—1st Germinal. At this moment he was sailing toward Sardinia. A favourable wind, a determined spirit, might have borne him to the Egyptian shore, for he had adroitly escaped from Admiral Warren, by following another course. He was already fifteen leagues from Cape Carbonara, the extreme point of Sardinia, and about entering the channel, separating Sicily from Africa. Unfortunately during the evening of the 26th of March, one of his captains commanding the *Dix-Août*, in the absence of Captain Bergeret, who was sick, was awkward enough to run foul of the *Formidable*, by which both vessels were greatly damaged. Alarmed by this accident, and the damage done, Ganteaume deemed it imprudent to remain at sea any longer, and returned to Toulon on the 5th of April—15th Germinal—fifteen days after the battle of Canopus.

All this was unknown in Egypt, and notwithstanding the length of time elapsed, a ray

of hope still remained. Every sail which appeared in sight was supposed to be Ganteaume. In this state of anxiety, no plans were adopted, all was left in a fatal state of inaction. Menou merely threw up some works around Alexandria to resist any attack from the English. He ordered Upper Egypt to be evacuated, and the brigade of Donselot to be withdrawn and sent to Cairo. He had despatched some troops from Alexandria to Ramanieh, to watch the movements of the enemy in the direction of Rosetta. To crown the disasters, Mourad Bey, whose fidelity had never been shaken, had just died of the plague, and left his Mamelukes to Osman Bey, in whom confidence could not be placed. The plague began to rage at Cairo. Affairs were getting worse, and tending fast to a fatal crisis.

The English, on the other hand, fearing the army before them, attempted nothing. They preferred to march slowly but safely. They waited especially until their allies the Turks, whom they distrusted, were able to assist them. A month had elapsed since their landing, without their having attempted any enterprise but that of taking the fort of Aboukir, which made a brave defence, but was silenced by the overwhelming fire of their ships. Lastly, about the beginning of April, they determined to throw off their supineness, and free themselves from the kind of blockade to which they were reduced. Colonel Spencer was ordered, with a body of a few thousand English, and the 6000 Albanians under the capudan pasha, to cross the bay of Aboukir, and land before Rosetta. Their intention was thus to open a communication with the interior of the Delta, to procure fresh provisions which they greatly needed, and join the vizier, who was advancing toward the other extremity of the Delta, by way of the Syrian frontier. There were at Rosetta but a few hundred French, who could oppose no resistance to this attempt, and fell back, by ascending the Nile.

At El-Ain, a short distance in front of Ramanieh, they joined a small body of troops sent from Alexandria, composed of the 21st light infantry, and a company of artillery. The English and Turks, masters of a mouth of the Nile, by which they could obtain provisions, having access to the interior of Egypt, thought of turning their success to advantage, but in no great haste, for they waited more than twenty days before marching forward. An energetic and prudent enemy had now a favourable opportunity to beat them. General Hutchinson, the successor of Abercromby, had not dared to weaken his camp before Alexandria. He had sent scarcely 6000 English and 6000 Turks toward Rosetta, although he had received reinforcements which amply covered his losses, and placed about 20,000 men at his disposal. If General Menou, making good use of his time, and employing the month spent in throwing up around Alexandria the works indispensable to its protection, had so arranged his affairs as to leave but a small garrison there: if he had sent about 6000

¹ GENERAL HUTCHINSON, afterwards created Earl of Donoughmore, for his exploits in Egypt.

men to Ramanieh, and drawn to this point all that was not necessary at Cairo, he might have opposed 8 or 9000 men to the English, who had just entered by Rosetta. These would have sufficed to have driven them back to the mouths of the Nile, to have revived the spirit of the army, secured the wavering submission of the Egyptians, retarded the march of the vizier, placed the English in a state of blockade on the shore of Alexandria, and restored our lost chances. This was the last opportunity, and he was advised to seize it, but always timid, he only half followed the counsel given to him. He sent General Valentine to Ramanieh with a reinforcement which was declared insufficient. He then sent a second, with the chief of his general-staff, General Lagrange. Both of these together did not exceed 4000 men. He did not, however, order the troops from Cairo; and General Lagrange, otherwise a brave officer, was not the man to make much head with such means, against 6000 English and 6000 Turks. Menou should have collected there at least 8000 men, under his best general. He might have done so by a strong concentration of his forces, and sacrificing everywhere the secondary to the primary objects of the day.

General Morand, who commanded the first detachment sent to Rosetta, established himself at El-Ast, on the borders of the Nile, near the town of Fouah, in a position presenting some advantages for defence, where he was joined by General Lagrange. The English and Turks, masters of Rosetta and the mouths of the Nile, soon covered the river with their gun-boats, and carried the small open town of Fouah. We were therefore obliged to fall back on Ramanieh, on the night of the 8th of May—18th Floréal. The site of Ramanieh did not present many advantages for defence, and the strength of the place could hardly counter-balance the numerical superiority of the enemy. However, should a desperate resistance become anywhere necessary, Ramanieh was the place; for, this position once lost, the detached corps of General Lagrange would be separated from Alexandria, and forced to fall back on Cairo. The French army would be thus divided into two, one half shut up in Alexandria, and the other in Cairo. If, when united, it could not successfully oppose the English, it could hardly be expected, when divided, to make a very effectual resistance. Under these circumstances, the only resource left was to capitulate. The loss of Ramanieh was therefore the loss of Egypt. Menou wrote to General Lagrange that he was hastening to his assistance with 3000 men, proving that he had this number at his disposal. There were in fact 3000 at Cairo; consequently, they might have had 9000, or at least 8000 at Ramanieh. Then, in an open country, with excellent cavalry and light artillery, and the determination to conquer or die, victory was certain. But Menou did not show himself, and Belliard, who commanded at Cairo, received no orders. General Lagrange, at the head of his 4000 men, rested his rear-guard on Ramanieh and the Nile, on which this little town is built. In this position the English gun-boats occupied

the river in his rear, and discharged a shower of balls into the French camp; in his front to the plain, without any other protection than some very insufficient field-works, was the bulk of the enemy composed of Turks and English. They were about 12,000 against 4000. The danger was great; nevertheless, it would have been better to have fought, and if conquered, yielded prisoners on the field of battle, after having struggled all day, than to have abandoned such a position, without striking a blow. Four thousand men, of such troops, determined to defend themselves, would have had some chances of success. But the chief of Menou's general-staff, though devoted to his general and the preservation of the colony, not calculating the consequences of this retreat, abandoned Ramanieh on the evening of the 10th of May—20th Floréal—in order to retire to Cairo. There he arrived on the morning of the 14th. He had lost at Ramanieh a convoy of immense value, and what was still more important, all communication with the army was cut off.

From this day, Egyptian affairs became unworthy of criticism, and lost all interest. The actors in the scene soon fell with their fortunes, even beneath themselves. Everywhere was exhibited the most shameful weakness, added to the most lamentable incapacity. When we speak of the men, we mean the chiefs alone; for the soldiers and subaltern officers, always gallant in presence of the enemy, were ready to die to the last man. Not once did they tarnish the escutcheon of their former glory.

At Cairo, as at Alexandria, but one resource was left, that of capitulation. The only merit now remaining, and which is often a very delicate matter, was to retard the capitulation. Frequently, whilst seeming only to defend one's honour, in reality, one's country is saved! Masséna, by prolonging the defence of Genoa, had rendered possible the victory of Marengo. The generals occupying Cairo and Alexandria, by continuing a hopeless resistance, might yet support very usefully the important negotiations between France and England. It is true, they were not aware of this; and for this reason, when we are ignorant of the services which may be rendered by prolonging a defence, we should listen to the voice of honour which commands us to resist to the last extremity. Of these two blockaded generals the most unfortunate, for he had committed most faults, Menou, by obstinately delaying the surrender of Alexandria, was yet useful, as will be seen, to the interests of France. This was subsequently a source of consolation to him, and palliated his conduct in the opinion of the First Consul.

When the troops returned to Cairo, a council of war was held to deliberate on the course to be pursued. General Belliard, from his rank, was commander in chief. He was a prudent man, but more prudent than determined. There remained about 7000 active troops and 5 or 6000 sick and wounded, and now employed in various departments in the army. The plague was raging; they had but little money and provisions, and a town of immense extent to defend, for which 7000 men

were scarcely sufficient. The walls were nowhere capable of resisting European engineers. The citadel, indeed, offered a place of refuge, but could not contain 12,000 Frenchmen, nor protect them against the English heavy artillery. This post was only useful as a protection against the populace of Cairo. There were evidently but two things to do: either to attempt, by a bold march, a descent into Lower Egypt, the surprise of the passage of the Nile, and a junction with Menou at Alexandria, or to fall back on Damietta, which would be more certain and easy, on account of the crowd of people that must be carried with them. Once there, in the midst of the lagoons which communicate with the Delta, only by very narrow tongues of land, which 7000 soldiers of the army of Egypt could have defended for a long time against an enemy two or three times their superior in force. They were certain of obtaining an abundant supply of provisions, for the province was well furnished with cattle, Damietta well stocked with grain, and Lake Menzaleh abounded in the best and most suitable fish for the troops. Since capitulation alone was left, Damietta afforded a chance of delaying for five or six months at least this melancholy alternative. The engineer d'Hautpoul proposed this judicious plan; but, for its adoption it was necessary to evacuate Cairo. General Belliard, who, a few days subsequently, was capable of surrendering this town to the enemy, by a disgraceful capitulation, would not consent at that time to evacuate it voluntarily, for a bold and ingenious military reason. He therefore determined to remain in this capital of Egypt, without knowing what he was to do there. On the left bank of the Nile, the English and Turks ascended from Ramanieh to Cairo; on the right bank, the grand-vizier, followed by 25 or 30,000 men, composed of miserable oriental troops, was coming from Syria, and advancing upon Cairo, by the way of Belbels. General Belliard, remembering the glories of Heliopolis, wanted to meet the vizier by the same route pursued by Kléber. At the head of 6000 men he advanced as far as the heights of Elmenafir. Surrounded frequently by a cloud of horsemen, he sent his light artillery after them, who here and there reached a few of them with their balls. This was the only result he could obtain. The Turks, prudently commanded this time, would not accept a battle off Heliopolis. There was but one way to excite them, which was to take their camp at Belbels. But General Belliard, received at all the villages by discharges of musketry, found the number of his wounded hourly increasing, as well as the distance separating him from Cairo. He was afraid at least the English and Turks should enter there during his absence. Before leaving it he should have foreseen this danger, and inquired if he had time sufficient to make the passage of Belbels. Having left Cairo without knowing what to do, he returned thither in the same condition, after a useless manœuvre, which caused the whole population to suppose that he had been beaten. Like all recently conquered people, the Egyptians wavered with fortune, and, although not discontented with

the French, they were disposed to abandon them. There was, however, no fear of an insurrection, unless they were anxious to condemn the city of Cairo to the horrors of a siege.

The French army, disgusted with the humiliations to which the incapacity of their generals exposed them, had completely returned to the ideas which brought about the convention of El-Arisch. They consoled themselves by dreaming of revisiting France. If a resolute and skilful general had given them an example, such as was given by Masséna to the garrison of Genoa, they would have followed him; but nothing of this kind was to be expected from General Belliard. Pressed on the left bank of the Nile by the Anglo-Turkish army coming from Ramanieh, on the right by the grand-vizier, who kept pace with it, he proposed to the enemy a suspension of arms, which was gladly accepted, for the English were more ambitious of utility than of glory. Their chief desire was the evacuation of Egypt, no matter at what price. General Belliard assembled a council of war, in which debates were carried on with great warmth. He was told that he had neither known when to abandon Cairo, to take post at Damietta, nor how to maintain himself in that capital of Egypt by well-concerted operations; that he committed a folly in going out to attack the vizier, without succeeding in coming to close quarters with him, and that, now, not knowing where to lay his head, he inquired of his officers whether they should negotiate or be killed, when he had already resolved the question himself, by the spontaneous commencement of negotiations. Reproaches were heaped upon him with great bitterness, especially by General Lagrange, a friend of Menou, and a warm advocate for the preservation of Egypt. Generals Valentin, Duranteau, Dupas, agreed with Lagrange, that for the honour of the flag, they ought to offer battle. This, unfortunately, could not be done without great cruelty for the army, and the numerous host of artificers and sick following in its train. Before them were more than 4000 of the enemy, without reckoning the Sepoys, who, having landed at Cosseir, were descending the Nile with the Mamelukes, who had forsworn their allegiance since the death of Mourad Bey. Behind was a population of 30,000 half-barbarians, desolated by the plague, threatened with famine, and always ready to rebel against the French. The space to be defended was too extensive to be guarded by 7000 men, and too weak to resist European engineers. They and the colony might be carried by assault, and put to the sword. In vain did some brave officers raise the cry of injured honour; to surrender was their only choice. General Belliard, anxious to prove himself fit for every thing, again agitated the question of retiring to Damietta, now rather unseasonable, and another not less ridiculous, that of retreating to Upper Egypt. This latter intention was wholly absurd. They were merely artifices of weakness, endeavouring to conceal his confusion under a false show of daring. The capitulation was therefore determined on; and there was nothing else

left to do, if they were not desirous of having their throats cut by remaining.

Delegates were sent to the Anglo-Turkish camp to negotiate a capitulation. The enemy's generals accepted the proposition with joy, so greatly did they fear, even at this moment, a vicissitude of fortune. They granted the most advantageous conditions to the army. They agreed that they should retire with the honours of war, with their arms and baggage, artillery and horses, and be transported to France, and be victualled during the voyage, at the expense of England. Those of the Egyptians who wished to follow the army (and some of them were compromised by their alliance with the French) were at liberty to do so. They were also to be allowed to sell their effects.

This capitulation was signed on the 27th of June, 1801, and ratified on the 28th—8th and 9th Messidor, year IX. The pride of the old soldiers of Egypt and Italy was cruelly wounded. They were about returning to France, not as in 1798, after the victories of Castiglione, Arcola, and Rivoli, proud of their glory, and the services they had rendered the Republic; they were about returning after having been conquered, but they were about to again behold their country, and this consoled those gallant men, so long exiled from home, for all their reverses. There was a deep-seated satisfaction visible on every countenance, though not confessed. The chiefs alone were gloomy, thinking of the judgment the First Consul would pass on their conduct. The despatches which accompanied the capitulation were marked by the most humiliating anxiety. The men, who, by their own achievements, were most exempted from blame, were selected to carry these despatches; they were the engineer d'Hautpoul, and the director of the powder factory, Champy, both of whom had been so useful to the colony.

Menou was shut up in Alexandria, and, like Belliard, was forced to surrender. But a short time must elapse between the two. The plague was making some ravage in Alexandria; provisions were becoming scarce, in consequence of the want of foresight in laying in an ample supply in case of a siege. The Arabs, lured by the hope of gain, had indeed brought milk, meat, and some grain. They had, however, no wheat, and had to substitute rice for it in making bread. The scurvy lessened daily the number of efficient men. The English, in order to completely isolate the place, had conceived the idea of turning Lake Madieh into the half-dried Lake Mareotis, so as to surround Alexandria with water, on which they might have a continuous line of gun-boats. To effect this they had made an opening in the embankment from Alexandria to Ramanieh, and separating the two lakes. But, as there was only nine feet in the difference of the level, the waters were but slowly discharged, and, moreover, the operation, judicious, had it been of importance to separate Belliard from Menou, was no longer of any use after the occurrences at Cairo. If it extended the line of gun-boats, it gave the French the advantage of contracting the front of attack, without even cutting off their communication with the caravans,

for the long sandy beach on which Alexandria is situated communicates by the west with the desert of Libya. Therefore the English were anxious to complete the investment as soon as possible; and for this purpose they embarked troops in their boats; and landed about the middle of August—end of Thermidor—not far from the tower of Marabout. They even began regularly to besiege that fort. From that time, the place, completely invested, was reduced to the necessity of surrendering.

The unfortunate Menou, left with nothing to do, and leisure to ponder over his mistakes, overwhelmed with universal censure, consoled himself with the idea of having made a heroic resistance, like that of Massena at Genoa. He wrote to the First Consul, and informed him of the desperate defence. Generals Damas and Reynier were left without troops at Alexandria. They used very improper language, and even went so far as to forget their own dignity. Menou ordered their immediate arrest and embarkation for France. This energetic act came too late, and produced but little effect. The good sense of the army blamed Reynier and Damas severely, but did not think much more of Menou. The only favour they granted him, was not to hate him. Listening coldly to his proclamations, in which he announced the determination to die rather than to yield, they were ready, if necessary, to fight to the last breath, but they did not believe in the necessity of it. They understood too well the consequences of the events at Cairo, not to foresee an approaching capitulation; and at Alexandria, as at Cairo, consoled themselves for their reverses by the hope of soon seeing France.

From this day, the presence of the French in Egypt was marked by no important occurrences, and the expedition was, as it were, terminated. Considered by some as a prodigy of skill and boldness, by others, and especially by those who affect to weigh events in the balance of sober reason, it has been regarded only as a brilliant chimera.

With all the appearance of wisdom, this latter sentence is absurd and unjust.

Napoleon, in his long and wonderful career, never conceived any thing greater, or which could be more truly useful. In truth, if it be remembered that we were unable to retain the Rhine and the Alps, it will be said, that, had we occupied Egypt for fifteen years, it would have been taken from us, like our continental frontiers, and that old and valuable possession the Isle of France, which was not the result of the wars of the Revolution. But in this view, it may even be asked, if the conquest of the Rhine was not itself a folly and a chimera. In order to form a proper opinion upon this question, it must, for an instant, be supposed that our long wars had terminated differently, and inquired, if, in that case, the possession of Egypt would have been possible, desirable, and important. The answer, in this aspect of the question, cannot be doubtful. In the first place, England was almost ready in 1801 for certain considerations to give us Egypt. These considerations explained to our ambassador were not exorbitant. During the maritime peace which ensued, the termination

of which we shall soon show, the First Consuls foreseeing the short duration of this peace, would have, undoubtedly, sent immense resources to the mouths of the Nile, both in men and provisions, and that splendid army to St. Domingo, to seek an indemnification for lost Egypt, would for a long time have guaranteed the new colony from any attack. A general like Decaen or Saint-Cyr, adding to experience in war the art of governing, having, in addition to the 22,000 men remaining in Egypt, from the first expedition, the 30,000 who perished uselessly at St. Domingo, in a perfectly healthy climate, a country of inexhaustible fertility, cultivated by peasants obedient to all masters, and not carrying a musket with their plough,—a general, we repeat, like Decaen or Saint-Cyr, with such means, would have gloriously defended Egypt, and founded a superb colony.

Success was certainly possible. We may add that, in the maritime and commercial struggle maintained by France and England against each other, the attempt was in some measure required. In fact, England had just conquered the Indian continent, and obtained the supremacy of the Eastern Ocean. Could France, until then her rival, yield without a contest, such a supremacy? Did she not owe it to her glory, to her destiny, to fight? Poli-

cians and patriots must here give the same answer. Yes! she must carry the war into those regions of the East, that vast field of ambition of maritime nations, and there endeavour to gain some possessions, to counter-balance those of the English. Admitting this truth examine the world, and say if there was a possession better calculated than Egypt for the end proposed? She, alone, was worth the finest lands; she bounded on the richest, and most fertile, and those which furnished the most ample food for foreign trade. She brought to the Mediterranean, which was then ours, the commerce of the East; she was, in a word, an equivalent for India, and, at all events, was the high-road thither. The conquest of Egypt was therefore of immense service to France, to the independence of the seas, and to the civilization of the world. Therefore, as may be elsewhere seen, our success was more than once desired in Europe in those short intervals when hatred did not disturb the harmony of cabinets. For such an end, it was worth losing an army, not only that sent at first to Egypt, but that subsequently sent to perish uselessly in St. Domingo, Calabria, and Spain. Would to Heaven, that in the flights of his lofty imagination, Napoleon had never conceived any plan more rash!

BOOK XI.

GENERAL PEACE

Last and fruitless Expedition of Ganteaume. He touches at Derne, does not dare to land 2000 men he had on board, and turns back to Toulon—Capture of the Swiftsure—Admiral Lincol, sent from Toulon to Cadiz, is obliged to anchor in the bay of Algeiras—Battle of Algeiras—A squadron, composed of French and Spaniards, sails from Cadiz, to succour the division of Lincol—Return of the combined Fleets to Cadiz—Combat of the rear-guard with the English admiral Saumarez—Terrible mishap of two Spanish ships, who, during the night, mistake each other for enemies, enrage, and both blow up—Gallant Feat of Arms of Captain Troude—Short campaign of the Prince of Peace against Portugal—The Court of Lisbon sends an Ambassador to Badajoz, submitting to the combined will of France and Spain—Progress of European affairs since the Treaty of Lunéville—Increasing Influence of France—Residence at Paris of the Infantas of Spain, intended to reign in Etruria—Renewal of the Negotiation at London, between M. Otto and Lord Hawkesbury—New aspect given to the question by the English—They demand Ceylon in the Indies, Martinico or Trinité in the Antilles, Malta in the Mediterranean—The First Consul answers these claims by threatening to conquer Portugal, and if necessary making a descent upon England—Warm Polemics between the *Moniteur* and the English Journals—The British Cabinet renounces Malta, and renews all its claims by demanding the Spanish Island of Trinité—The First Consul, in order to save the possessions of an allied power, offers the French Island of Tobago—The British Cabinet refuses—Silly conduct of the Prince of Peace, which furnishes an unexpected explanation—This Prince treats with the Court of Lisbon, without consulting France, and thus deprives the French Legation of the argument drawn from the Dangers of Portugal—Irritation of the First Consul, and Threats of War with Spain—M. de Talleyrand proposes to First Consul to terminate the Negotiation at the expense of the Spaniards, by giving to the English the Island of Trinité—M. Otto receives authority to make this concession, but only at the last extremity—During the Negotiation, Nelson bravely endeavoured to destroy the Flotilla at Bologne—Combats of Bologne, between Admirals Latouche-Treville, and Nelson—Defeat of the English—Rejoicing in France, and uneasiness in England, in consequence of these two engagements—Disposition to Reconciliation—The last Difficulties are passed over, and the preliminaries of Peace concluded by the sacrifice of the Island of Trinité—Unexampled Joy in England and France—Colonel Lauriston ordered to carry to London the Ratification of the First Consul, is carried in triumph for some hours—Assembling of a Congress at Amiens to conclude on a definitive Peace—Succession of Treaties signed one after another—Peace with Portugal, the Ottoman Porte, Bavaria, Russia, etc.—Celebration of Peace on the 18th Brumaire—Lord Cornwallis, Plenipotentiary at the Congress of Amiens, present at this festival—His reception by the Parisian people—Banquet of the City of London—Extraordinary Testimonials of Sympathy exchanged at that time between the two nations.

WHILST the army of Egypt was surrendering, owing to the unskilfulness of its chief, and the want of timely assistance, Admiral Ganteaume was attempting his third sortie from Toulon. The First Consul scarcely gave him time to repair the damage done by the *Dix-Août* and indomptable running foul of each other, and was obliged to set sail almost immediately. Admiral Ganteaume put to sea on

the 25th of April—5th Floréal. He was ordered to coast along the island of Elba, in order to make, whilst passing, a demonstration on Porto-Ferrajo, to facilitate its occupation by the French troops. The First Consul was intent on taking this island, secured to France by treaties with Naples and Etruria, and in which there was a small garrison, half Tuscan and half English. The admiral obeyed, ap-

peared before the island of Elba, threw a few balls into Porto Ferrejo, and passed on, in order not to expose himself to damages, which might have rendered impossible the fulfilment of his mission. Had he sailed in a direct line, he might have been useful to the army of Egypt, for as has been seen the position of Ramanieh was lost only on the 10th of May—20th Floréal. He would have had time, by sailing on the 25th of April, to have prevented the French army from being cut in two, and the surrender of one division after the other.

To do this, not a moment should have been lost. But a kind of fatality awaited all the operations of Ganteaume. We have seen him sailing safely from Brest, enter safely the Mediterranean, suddenly lose all confidence, mistake four vessels for eight, and enter Toulon. We have seen him leaving this port in March, escape from Admiral Warren,¹ pass the southern point of Sardinia, and stop again, on account of the injuries received by the *Dix-Août* and *Indomptable*. He had not reached the climax of his misfortune. He had scarcely left the waters of the island of Elba, than a contagious disease broke out in his squadron. Either from the circumstance of the troops having been on board for a long time, or from ill-fortune, the disease attacked, with great rapidity, a great portion of the crew and the soldiers. It was deemed imprudent and useless to convey so many sick to Egypt, and Admiral Ganteaume determined to divide his squadron. Intrusting three ships to Vice-admiral Linois,² he placed in them the sick sailors and soldiers, and ordered them to Toulon. He continued his course with four ships and two frigates, with only 2000 troops, toward Egypt. But the time had gone for ever; the middle of May had arrived, and at that moment the French army was lost, for Generals Menou and Belliard were separated, by the abandonment of Ramanieh. Admiral Ganteaume was ignorant of this. He passed Sardinia and Sicily, appeared in the Gulf of Candia, escaped several times from the enemy, running up once as far as the Archipelago for that purpose, and at last anchored on the coast of Africa, a few days' sail to the west of Alexandria. The point he had selected was Derna, indicated in his instructions as suitable for landing. By furnishing the troops with provisions and money to hire camels from the Arabs, it was supposed that they could cross the desert, and reach Alexandria in a few days. This was a very hazardous conjecture. Admiral Ganteaume had anchored but a few hours, and begun to launch some of his boats,

when the inhabitants crowded the shore, and kept up a warm firing. The youngest brother of the First Consul, Jérôme Bonaparte,³ was in the midst of the troops attempting a landing. They endeavoured in vain to conciliate the inhabitants. It would have been necessary to destroy their little town of Derne, and march to Alexandria without water, and almost without provisions, fighting all the time. It was a silly enterprise, without any good object, for 1000 or at most 2000 men might have reached the termination of the voyage. So feeble an existence was not worth the loss of so many brave troops. But an event, easily to be foreseen, put an end to all doubts. The admiral thought he saw the English fleet: he deliberated no longer, hoisted his boats aboard, did not even take time to weigh anchor, but cut his cables, in order not to be attacked at anchor. He set sail, and was never seen by the enemy.

Fortune, hitherto unpropitious—for as often is said, she only favours the brave—seemed about to make him some amends. Whilst crossing the Gulf of Candia, he met an English ship of the line, the *Swiftsure*. To chase, surround, and capture her, was the work of a few moments. This fortunate meeting occurred on the 24th of June—5th Messidor. Admiral Ganteaume entered Toulon, with this species of trophy, but a slight compensation for so many failures. The First Consul, inclined to deal kindly with men who had incurred great dangers with him, was willing to accept this compensation, and publish it in the *Moniteur*.

Nevertheless, all these squadron movements were about to finish in a manner less discreditable to our navy. Whilst Admiral Ganteaume was entering Toulon, Admiral Linois, who had come to land his sick soldiers and sailors, had again sailed under the formal orders of the First Consul. After whitewashing the inside of his ships, exchanging his sick for fresh troops, and recruiting his crew with able-bodied seamen, he set sail toward his new destination. A despatch, which was only to be opened at sea, ordered him to repair immediately to Cadiz, join the six vessels armed at that port by Admiral Dumanoir, the five Spanish ships of Ferrol, making with his own a division of fourteen vessels of the first class. The squadron of Rochefort, under Admiral Bruix, might possibly have arrived. They could then collect a squadron of more than twenty ships, which could command the Mediterranean for some months, take the troops from Otranto, and afford immense assistance to Egypt. It was unknown in France that it

¹ADMIRAL WARREN. SIR JOHN BORLASE.—A very distinguished officer. He commanded the naval portion of the expedition to Quiberon. In 1796 captured a French convoy off the Pennacks. In 1798, he took the Hoche line of battle ship with a squadron of frigates destined for Ireland. In 1801, he pursued Ganteaume's squadron, though in vain, off the coast of Egypt.—*Brenton's Naval History*.

²LINOIS. Probably the best naval officer France has ever produced. Besides the action in Algeiras bay, in which the Hannibal grounded under the enemies' batteries and was forced to surrender, though it is false that the Pompee struck her colours, he distinguished himself very greatly in the Indian seas.—*Brenton's Naval History*.

³JEROME BONAPARTE. Born at Ajaccio, in 1784. When the family was compelled to leave Corsica, he accompanied them in 1793 to France. Shortly after his brother assumed the command of the army of Italy, he was sent with his sister Caroline and the two sisters of Josephine, to Madame Campan's establishment at St. Germain. Thence he went to the college of Juilly in the department of the Seine et Marne, where he remained until the 18th of Brumaire, placed Napoleon at the head of the consular government. He then left college; and in his fifteenth year entered the navy. In 1801 he was appointed to the command of a small sloop of war, l'*Epervier*. He never realized the expectations of Napoleon, who always called him a "*petit polisson*," little scamp!—*Court and Camp of Napoleon*.

was too late, and that Alexandria was the only place left to defend. To have saved this last point, however, was not a matter of indifference.

Admiral Linois hastened to obey, and sailed for Cadiz. On his way, he chased some English frigates, which he failed in taking, met with contrary winds at the entrance of the strait, and at last succeeded in penetrating it, about the beginning of July—middle of Messidor. The English fleet of Gibraltar, on the look-out near Cadiz, being pointed out to him, he anchored in the Spanish port of Algeiras, on the evening of the 4th of July—15th Messidor.

Near the straits of Gibraltar, that is toward the southern point of the peninsula, the mountainous coasts of Spain open, and, assuming the shape of a horse-shoe, form a deep bay which opens to the south. On one side of this bay is Algeiras, on the other Gibraltar; so that Algeiras and Gibraltar are opposite to each other, at about 4000 fathoms, or nearly a league and a half distance. From Algeiras Gibraltar can be easily seen with an ordinary glass. There was not a single English vessel in the bay, but Vice-admiral Saumarez¹ was not far off. He was watching with seven vessels the port of Cadiz, in which were several naval divisions, both French and Spanish. Informed of what was taking place, he hastened to take advantage of the opportunity of destroying the division of Linois, for he could oppose seven vessels to three. However of the seven he had detached one, the *Superb*, to watch the mouth of the Guadalquivir. He made the signal of recall, but the wind being unfavourable for the return of the *Superb*, he sailed for Algeiras, with six ships and one frigate.

Admiral Linois had likewise been warned by the Spanish authorities of the danger which threatened him, and had recourse to the only precautions afforded to him by the nature of the place. The coast of Algeiras, in the bay of that name, situated, as we have just said, opposite Gibraltar, presents an anchorage rather than a port. It is a slightly projecting, perfectly straight coast, extending from the south to the north, without any indentations to shelter a vessel. At the extremities of this anchorage are two batteries; one to the north of Algeiras, on an elevated point of the coast, known by the name of the battery of St. James; the other to the south of Algeiras, on a little is. and called Green island. The battery of St. James had five eighteen pounders, that of Green island seven twenty-four pounders. They could not be of much assistance, especially on account of the Spanish negligence, which had left all the ports along the coast unprovided with artillery-men and ammunition. Admiral Linois, however, communica-

ted with the local authorities, who did all in their power to assist the French. He ranged his three ships and his frigate along the shore, resting the flanks of this short line on the two fortified posts of St. James and Green island. First came the *Formidable*, to the northward, and supported by the battery of St. James; then the *Desaix*, in the centre; lastly the *Indomptable* to the southward, near the battery of Green island. Between the *Desaix* and Green island was the frigate *La Muiron*. A few Spanish gun-boats were among the French ships.

On the 6th of July, 1801—17th Messidor, year IX.—about seven o'clock in the morning, Vice-admiral Saumarez, coming from Cadiz with a west-north-west wind, advanced toward the bay of Algeiras, doubled Cape Carneio, entered the bay, and bore up for the French line. The wind, unfavourable for the English ships, separated them from each other, and fortunately did not allow them to act with the unity they desired. The *Venerable*, which led the column, fell behind; the *Pompey* took her place. The latter passing along our line, received successively the fire of the battery of Green island, the frigates *La Muiron*, the *Indomptable*, the *Desaix*, and the *Formidable*, discharging a broadside at each of them. She took her position within gun-shot of the admiral's ship, the *Formidable*, commanded by Linois. There then began between these vessels a bloody combat, almost muzzle to muzzle. The *Venerable*, at first distant from the scene of action, endeavoured to close to assist the *Pompey*. The *Audacious*, the third English vessel, intended to engage the *Desaix*, could not get up high enough, attacked the *Indomptable*, the most to the south. The *Cæsar* and *Spencer*, the fourth and fifth English ships, were one in the rear, and the other driven to the lower part of the bay by the wind, which was blowing from west to east. Lastly, the sixth, the *Hannibal*, carried at first toward Gibraltar, but having succeeded in nearing Algeiras, endeavoured to beat to windward of the *Formidable*, and get between her and the shore. The combat between the vessels engaged was very obstinate. In order not to be driven toward Gibraltar, the English had each let go an anchor. Our admiral's ship, the *Formidable*, was engaged with two, the *Pompey* and the *Venerable*, to which a third would have been added, had the *Hannibal* succeeded in getting between her and the shore. The captain of the *Formidable*, the brave La-londe, had just been cut in two by a shot. The firing continued with great warmth amid cries of *Vive la Republique! Vive le Premier Consul!* Admiral Linois, on board of the *Formidable*, bringing his broadside to bear on the *Pompey*,

¹ SAUMAREZ, SIR JAMES, afterwards created LORD DE. A very distinguished naval officer. He was captain of the *Orion* 74, in the battle off Cape St. Vincent, on St. Valentine's day, in which the *Santissima Trinidad* struck to him, although she was not taken possession of, and got off for the present. At the Nile, was second to Nelson, still in the *Orion*, with one broadside of which he sunk *La Serieuse* frigate, and then took his station on the bow of the *Franklin* and the quarter of *Le Souverain Peuple*, engaging both with great spirit until the end of the action. He subsequently attacked a French squadron in Algeiras bay, unsuccessfully,

owing to the variableness of the wind and the grounding of the *Hannibal* 74, which was taken. A few days after this he attacked the combined French and Spanish squadrons at night, with five sail of the line, a frigate and polacre, in all 422 guns, the enemy being nine sail of the line and four frigates, mounting 933 guns. In this action, the first off Trafalgar, two 113 gun-ships were blown up, and a 74 taken. He commanded after this at Gurnsey, when he bombarded Graeville, and after that in the Baltic, with as much of discretion and prudence as he had previously shown of gallantry and daring.—*Brenton's Naval History*.

who only presented her bows, had succeeded in dismasting and nearly disabling her. Taking advantage at the same time of the breeze, which had shifted to the east, and blew toward Algeiras, he made the signal to his captains to cut their cables, and let their ships go aground, so as to prevent the English from getting between us and the shore, thus placing us between two fires, as Nelson had done at the battle of Aboukir. The safety of the French ships was not much endangered by running aground, for it was low tide, and at high water they would certainly float. This order, timely given, saved the division. The *Formidable* having disabled the *Pompey*, grounded easily, for the wind had lulled in shifting. Thus extricated from the danger threatened by the *Hannibal*, she assumed a fearful position for this latter vessel. In fact, the *Hannibal*, in executing the manœuvre, grounded herself, and remained unmoving under the double fire of the *Formidable* and the battery of St. James. In this perilous situation, the *Hannibal* endeavoured to get afloat, but as the tide was falling, she remained firmly fixed in her position. She received from all sides a raking fire of artillery, by land, from the *Formidable* and the Spanish gun-boats. She sank one or two of these, but received a heavier fire than she could return. Admiral Linois, thinking that the battery of St. James was not well served, sent General Devaux thither with a detachment of French troops he had on board. The fire of the battery was then redoubled, and the *Hannibal* was overcome. But a new adversary completed her defeat. The second French ship, the *Desaix*, obeying the order to ground, and on account of the lightness of her breeze, having performed this manœuvre but slowly, was by this means thrown somewhat out of the line, at equal distances from the *Pompey* and the *Hannibal*. Profiting by this position, she fired a broadside at the *Pompey*, which made her strike; and then turned all her energy upon the *Hannibal*. Her balls, grazing the *Formidable*, committed great havoc on the *Hannibal*. At last, incapable of longer resistance, she struck her flag. Thus, two English vessels, out of six, were obliged to surrender. The four others had succeeded in recovering their alignment, and engaged at a convenient distance the *Desaix* and *Indomptable*. The *Desaix*, before grounding, had fought them gallantly, whilst the *Indomptable* and *La Muiron*, whilst retiring slowly toward the coast, answered them with a well-directed fire. These two vessels ranged themselves under the battery of Green island, the artillery of which was served by some French soldiers.

The battle had lasted for several hours with the greatest activity. Admiral Saumarez, having lost two vessels out of six, and hoping for no good result from this action, for in order to engage the French more closely he ran the risk of grounding, made the signal for

retreat, leaving us the *Hannibal*, but endeavouring to carry off the *Pompey*, which, dismasted, remained unmoving on the field of battle. Admiral Saumarez sent to Gibraltar for small boats, which succeeded in towing away the hulk of the *Pompey*, which our ships being aground were unable to prevent. The *Hannibal* remained in our possession.

Such was the combat of Algeiras, where three French fought six English ships, destroyed two of them, one of which remained in our hands. The French were filled with joy, although they had suffered considerable loss. Captain Lalonde of the *Formidable* was killed. Monconsu, captain of the *Indomptable*, had gloriously died. We lost about two hundred killed and three hundred wounded, of two thousand men on board the squadron. The English, however, had nine hundred men disabled, and their vessels were riddled.

However great was the glory of this action, all was not over. It was absolutely necessary, in the damaged state of our vessels, to leave the anchorage of Algeiras. Admiral Saumarez, furious, and swearing to revenge himself as soon as Linois left his asylum to repair to Cadiz, was making great preparations. He employed the vast resources of the port of Gibraltar to put his division in fighting order, even got ready fire-ships, determined at least to burn the French vessels if he could not induce them to put to sea. Admiral Linois, to repair his damages, had only the resources, almost next to nothing, of Algeiras. The arsenal of Cadiz, indeed, was near there; but it was very difficult to get supplies thence by sea, on account of the English, and by land, from the difficulty of transportation: and yet the upper rigging of the French vessels was destroyed, and several of their masts either shot away or badly wounded. Admiral Linois exerted himself to the utmost to get ready for sea. He had scarcely wherewithal to dress the wounded. The French consuls of the neighbouring ports were obliged to send by post surgeons and medicines.

There were at this moment at Cadiz, the Spanish squadron, which had arrived from Ferrol, and the six vessels given to France and hastily equipped by Admiral Dumanoir. The strength of these two divisions, in point of numbers, was certainly great; but the Spanish navy, always worthy, by its bravery, of the illustrious nation to which it belonged, partook of the general neglect which paralyzed all the resources of the monarchy. The division of Admiral Dumanoir, scantily manned by sailors of all nations, was unworthy of very great confidence. Not one of the vessels composing it equalled those of the division of Linois, grown skilful by long cruises, and elated by their recent victory.

Admiral Massarède, commanding at Cadiz, and not very well disposed toward us, required the most earnest entreaties to assist Admiral Linois.

¹ DUMANOIR. This French admiral commanded a squadron of five ships of the line at Trafalgar, and died early in the day, with Gravina, leaving the gallant and unfortunate Villeneuve to his fate. He had borne no part in the action, but as he fled discharged his

broadside into the captured Spanish ships, actually backing his topsails in order to fire with more precision into his own unfortunate allies. He was taken a few days later off Rochefort by Sir Richard Strachan.—*Brenton's Naval History*.—*Soutby's Nelson*. ■

On the 9th of July—20th Messidor—he dispatched Admiral Moreno, a brave and experienced officer, to Algeiras, with the five Spanish vessels from Ferrol, one of the six vessels given to Dumanoir, the San Antonio, and three frigates. This squadron carried the ammunition intended for the division of Linois. In one day it reached the anchorage of Algeiras.

Night and day they were employed in refitting the three ships which had fought so gallantly, and which had floated at the first full tide. They were rigged as well and as fast as possible, and on the morning of the 12th were ready for sea. The same attention was paid to the Hannibal, taken from the English, and intended to be sent to Cadiz.

On the morning of the 12th the combined squadron set sail, with an east-north-east wind, which carried it out of the bay of Algeiras, into the Strait. It advanced in order of battle, the two largest Spanish vessels, the San Carlos and Santa Hermenegilda, of 112 guns each, forming the rear-guard. According to Spanish usage, the two admirals were on board of a frigate, the Sabine. Toward evening the wind began to lull. They were unwilling to return to the anchorage of Algeiras on account of the danger of its position, in the presence of an enemy's fleet, strengthened probably by reinforcements daily expected by the English. They decided, however, on leaving the Hannibal behind, which could not sail, although towed by the Indienne. She was ordered back to the anchorage. The combined squadron was brought to, in the hope that in the course of the night the wind might freshen. Admiral Saumarez, on his side, had given orders for sailing. He had lost the Hannibal, the Pompey was unfit for service; he had therefore only four vessels of the six which had fought at Algeiras. But he had been joined by the Superb, thus giving him a force of five ships of the line, besides several frigates and small craft filled with combustible materials. He had carried his fury so far as to build in his ships furnaces for heating balls. Although he had only five line-of-battle ships, and the allies had nine, he was ready to dare any thing to retrieve the humiliating check he had received at Algeiras, and avoid the anger of the British Admiralty. He followed closely the Franco-Spanish squadron, waiting for a favourable moment to attack the rear-guard.

Toward the middle of the night the wind freshened, and the combined fleet again steered for Cadiz. Its order of sailing was somewhat changed. The rear-guard was formed by three ships abreast: the San Carlos on the right, the Santa Hermenegilda in the centre, and the San Antonio on the left. The darkness was intense. Admiral Saumarez ordered the Superb, an excellent sailer, to crowd all sail, and attack our rear-guard. The Superb soon reached the Franco-Spanish fleet. She had extinguished her fires so as not to be seen. Ranging herself a little to the rear of the San Carlos, and bringing her broadside to bear, she gave her the whole of it: then, continuing incessantly, she discharged a second and a third, with red-hot shot. The San Carlos soon took fire. The

Superb, seeing this, stopped, and taking in sail, kept off at some distance. The San Carlos, wrapped in flames, manœuvred in disorder, fell off before the wind, and, instead of keeping the line, was soon astern of both of her companions. The balls from her guns were flying in all directions, and struck the Santa-Hermenegilda, who, mistaking her for the head of the English column, directed her fire against her. The Spanish crews then fell into a horrible error, each supposing the other to be an enemy. They ran foul of each other with great fury, and closing, so as to lock their yard-arms, engaged in bloody combat. The fire, gaining with rapidity on the San Carlos, soon communicated to the Santa Hermenegilda, and, in this state, the two vessels kept up a furious cannonade. The opposing squadrons were involved in darkness, and ignorant of what was going on; and, with the exception of the Superb, who understood this fatal mistake, as she had caused it, no vessel dared to approach, not knowing whether she was to assist or attack a Spanish or English ship. The French ship, San Antonio, was distant from this dangerous vicinity. The conflagration soon became terrible, and cast a gloomy light over the ocean. The fatal delusion which had arrayed these brave Spaniards against each other was then dispelled, but too late, and the San Carlos blew up with an awful explosion. In a few moments the Santa Hermenegilda shared the same fate, and spread horror throughout the squadron, ignorant as to which vessel was the victim.

The Superb, seeing the San Antonio separated from the two others, attacked her with great boldness. This vessel, recently armed, fought without the discipline and coolness, indispensable to the manœuvring of these large machines of war. She was terribly crippled, and two new antagonists, the Cæsar and Venerable, coming up at the same time, completed her defeat. She was obliged to strike after a gallant resistance.

Admiral Saumarez had taken a cruel revenge, productive of not much glory to him, but of great damage to the Spanish fleet. The two admirals, Linois and Moreno, in the Sabine, kept as close as possible to this terrible scene. Being unable, on account of the darkness, to distinguish the vessels, and give the necessary orders, they were in a state of great anxiety. At the break of day, they were at some distance from Cadiz, their squadron had collected, but was short of three of its number, the San Carlos, and Santa Hermenegilda, which had blown up, and the San Antonio, captured.

A fourth vessel of the combined fleet had remained behind, the Formidable, who had covered herself with glory in the battle of Algeiras, but was yet crippled by the wounds received on that day. Deprived of some of her canvas, sailing slowly, in close proximity to two burning ships, and fearing the fatal mistakes of the night, she had fallen astern, thinking she could be useful to neither of the combatants. She thus became separated from the rest of the squadron. Being seen in the morning by the English, she was attacked by a frigate and three vessels. Admiral Linois

having gone on board the *Sabine*, left one of his subalterns, Captain Troude, in command of the *Formidable*. This skilful and brave officer, judging with extraordinary presence of mind, that, if he attempted to run, he would be outstripped by vessels better rigged than his own, resolved to seek safety in a bold manœuvre, and a gallant combat. His crew shared his feelings, and were unwilling to tarnish the laurels of Algeiras. They were old sailors, well disciplined by long cruising, and accustomed to war, a quality even more useful at sea than on land. Captain Troude did not wait until the pursuing enemy had collected all his forces against the *Formidable*, but laid himself alongside the nearest, the frigate *Thames*. He neared her, and opened a heavy and destructive fire, which soon disgusted her with the unequal contest. After her, came at full sail the *Venerable*, an English seventy-four. Captain Troude, feeling himself still superior, (the *Formidable* was an eighty gun ship,) waited for her, whilst the two other English ships, endeavouring to outsail him, attempted to cut off his road to Cadiz. Manœuvring skilfully, he presented his terrible broadside, to the unarmed bows of the *Venerable*, and adding to the superiority of his artillery the advantage of the manœuvre, he riddled her with shot, carried away first one, then a second and a third mast, and, having reduced her to a hulk, he pierced her with several dangerous shots between wind and water, thus exposing her to the immediate risk of sinking. This unfortunate ship, horribly crippled, excited the fears of the rest of the English division. The *Thames* came to her assistance; the two vessels which had attempted to cut off the road to Cadiz, immediately returned. They were anxious to save the crew of the *Venerable*, and overcome the French ship which had made so stout a resistance. The latter trusting to her manœuvre and her good fortune, directed upon them broadside after broadside; beat them off, and sent them to the assistance of the *Venerable*, about capsizing, if active measures were not taken for her safety.

The brave Captain Troude, freed from his numerous enemies, sailed in triumph for the port of Cadiz. A portion of the population, attracted by the cannonade during the night, was awaiting his approach. They had seen the danger and victory of the French ship, and despite a very natural grief at the loss of the two Spanish vessels, they shouted with joy, at the victorious return of the *Formidable* to the roadstead.

The English could not dispute with us the glory of the battle, and as to the actual loss it was pretty equally shared. If the French had lost one ship, and the Spaniards two, the English had left one in our possession, and had no so crippled as to be rendered entirely useless. Without an accident which occurred in the night, they might have been considered as completely beaten, in the different engagements. The battle of Algeiras and the return of the *Formidable* are among the most gallant feats of arms in the annals of the navy. But the Spaniards were very gloomy, for although their Admiral Moreno had behaved well,

they were not indemnified, by a brilliant action, for the loss of the *San Carlos* and *Santa Hermenegilda*.

The affairs of Portugal, however, offered them some consolation. We left the Prince of Peace preparing to begin the war against Portugal, at the head of the combined forces of the two nations, in the hope, as was previously explained, of influencing the negotiations at London.

According to the plan agreed upon, the Spaniards were to operate on the left bank of the Tagus, and the French on the right. Thirty thousand Spaniards were collected before Badajoz, on the frontier of the Alentejo. Fifteen thousand French were marching by way of Salamanca, on the *Tras-os-Montes*. Owing to unheard of efforts, loans from the clergy, and the sacrifice of all business, 30,000 Spaniards had been equipped. The artillery, however, was far behind. Nevertheless the Prince of Peace, reckoning with justice on the moral effect of the union of the French and Spaniards, wished to commence hostilities, anxious to reap the first laurels. He wanted to gain all the honour of the campaign, and keep the French merely as a resource against reverses. The Prince of Peace was welcome to enjoy this pleasure. The French, at that time, were intent, not on glory, but on useful results; and these consisted in occupying one or two provinces of Portugal, so as to hold an additional guarantee against England. Though the war seemed easy, there was one danger to fear, that is, that it might become national on the part of the Portuguese. Their hatred for the Spaniards might have produced this unhappy result, if the approach of the French, a few days march in the rear, had not dispelled all thoughts of resistance. The Prince of Peace, therefore, hastened to pass the frontier, and attack the towns of Portugal with a field battery having no besieging artillery. He easily took possession of Olivença and Jurumenha. But the garrisons of Elvas and Campo-Mayor retired behind the walls and made a show of defence. The Prince of Peace ordered a blockade of these places, and during that time, marched to meet the Portuguese army, commanded by the Duke d'Alafoens. The Portuguese made no stand anywhere, and fled toward the Tagus. The blockaded places, likewise opened their gates, Campo-Mayor surrendered, and the siege of Elvas was regularly undertaken, with a park of artillery from Seville. The Prince of Peace pursued the enemy in triumph, and passed rapidly Azumar, Alegrete, Portalegre, Castello-de-Vide, Flor-de-Rosa, and at last arrived at the Tagus, behind which the Portuguese were endeavouring to find an asylum. He had subdued nearly the whole province of the Alentejo. The French had not yet crossed the frontier of Portugal, and it was evident, that if the Spaniards alone had been thus successful, that the Spaniards and French united would in a few days be masters of Lisbon and Oporto. The court of Portugal, which had always refused to believe that the attack against it was serious, seeing what had occurred, immediately submitted, and sent M. Pinto de Souza to the Spanish

head-quarters, with orders to accept such conditions as the combined armies might impose. The Prince of Peace, desiring to render his masters partakers of his glory, sent for the king and queen of Spain, to distribute the rewards to the army, and to hold a sort of Congress. Thus, this court, formerly so great, now so dishonoured by a dissolute queen, by an incapable and omnipotent favourite, endeavoured to delude itself with the belief of having achieved great deeds. Lucien Bonaparte had followed the king and queen to Badajos. Such was the posture of affairs at the end of June and the beginning of July.

The combats of Algesiras and Cadiz, calculated to restore confidence to our navy; the short campaign of Portugal, which proved the decided influence of the First Consul over the Peninsula, and the power he possessed to treat Portugal, like Naples, Tuscany, or Holland, compensated, to a certain degree, the occurrences in Egypt. Moreover, they were ignorant of the battle of Canopus, the capitulation already signed at Cairo, and that of Alexandria inevitable. News did not then travel so rapidly by sea as now, and a month at least, sometimes more, was required for information of an event occurring on the Nile to reach Marseilles. Nothing was known of the affairs of Egypt, but the landing of the English, their first combats on the shore of Alexandria; no idea was formed of the subsequent operations, and the greatest anxiety existed as to the ultimate result of the contest. France, therefore, had lost none of her weight in the negotiation, which, on the contrary, was increasing in proportion to the influence she was daily acquiring on the continent of Europe.

The treaty of Lunéville was, in fact, followed by its inevitable consequences. Austria, disarmed, and for the future impotent in the eyes of every one, left a free course to our projects. Russia, since the death of Paul and the accession of Alexander, was not, it is true, disposed to act very energetically against England, nor to resist the intentions of France in the west. Therefore the First Consul took no pains to conceal his views. He had just erected, by a simple decree, Piedmont into French departments, without appearing to listen to the protest of the Russian envoy. He had declared, that, as regarded Naples, the treaty of Florence should be her law. Genoa had just submitted her constitution to him, that he should make certain changes, destined to increase the authority of the executive power. The Cisalpine Republic, composed of Lombardy, the duchy of Modena, and the Legations, established the first time by the treaty of Campo-Formio, the second by the treaty of Lunéville, was again erected into an allied state, dependent on France. Holland, following the example of Liguria, submitted her constitution to the First Consul, in order to give more strength to the government; a species of reform taking place, at that moment, in all the republics which had sprung from the French Republic. Lastly, the unimportant negotiators, who formerly sought support from M. de Kalitscheff, the haughty minister of Paul I. now regretted their folly, and asked for an improvement in their condition, alone from the

graciousness of the First Consul. The representatives of the German princes, especially, showed, in this respect, the greatest anxiety. The treaty of Lunéville had laid down the principle of the secularization of the ecclesiastical states, and their division among the hereditary princes. The ambition of all was awakened by this last clause. The great as well as the little powers hoped to obtain the best share. Austria and Prussia, though they had lost but little on the left of the Rhine, wanted to share in the promised indemnities. Bavaria, Wurtemberg, Baden, and the house of Orange, beset with their entreaties the new ruler of France because, as he was one of the principal framers of the treaty of Lunéville, he necessarily must possess great influence over the execution of this treaty. Prussia herself, represented at Paris by M. de Luchesini, did not disdain playing the part of a solicitor, and increasing, by her solicitation, the power of the First Consul. Thus, the six months elapsed since the signatures made at Lunéville, though marked by reverses in Egypt, reverses which, it is true, were but imperfectly known in Europe, had seen the increase of the ascendancy of the French government; for time showed its power to be only more effective and evident. These circumstances ought to influence the negotiation at London, which had been momentarily interrupted, but which, by common consent, was about to be renewed, with increased activity, in accordance with a singular conformity of ideas in the two governments. The First Consul, seeing the first acts of Menou, deemed the campaign lost, and wanted the treaty signed at London, before the catastrophe which he foresaw. The English ministers, unable to see, like him, the result of events, were afraid of some bold stroke by that army of Egypt, so renowned for its courage, and wanted to take advantage of the first appearance of success to negotiate; so that, after having been agreed to temporize, they were now agreed to conclude.

But, before entering anew into the labyrinth of the vast negotiation, where the greatest interests of the universe were to be agitated, we must sketch an event, which at that time occupied the curiosity of Paris, and which finishes the singular picture then presented by consular France.

The Infantas of Parma, destined to reign over Tuscany, had left Madrid, when the royal family left for Badajos, and had just arrived at the frontier of the Pyrenees. The First Consul was intent upon showing them Paris, before sending them to Florence to take possession of the new throne of Etruria. All these contrasts gratified the lively and grand imagination of General Bonaparte. He loved that scene, truly Roman, of a king made by him, by his republican hands: he loved, also, to show that he was not afraid of the presence of a Bourbon, and that his glory elevated him far above all comparison with the ancient dynasty whose place he filled. He loved, also, to display to the eyes of the world, in that Paris, so recently the theatre of a bloody revolution, a pomp and splendour worthy of kings. All this only marked still more what a sudden change had been effected in France, under his government.

This attentive and minute foresight, which he knew how to apply to a great military operation, he did not disdain to use in those scenes of pomp and parade, in which he and his glory were to play a conspicuous part. He regulated the smallest details, provided for all contingencies, and assigned to every thing its place. This was necessary in an entirely new social order, founded on the ruins of a world which had been destroyed. Every thing was to be created anew, even etiquette, which is necessary in a republic as elsewhere.

The three Consuls deliberated for a long time upon the manner of the reception of the King and Queen of Etruria in France, and the honours to be paid to them. To avoid many difficulties, it was agreed that they should be received under the assumed names of Count and Countess of Leghorn; that they should be treated as illustrious guests, as had been done in the last century, with regard to the young czar, afterward Paul I. and the Emperor of Austria, Joseph II.¹ By means of the *incognito* they could avoid the embarrassment occasioned by the official rank of king and queen. Proper orders were consequently given along the route to the civil and military authorities of the departments.

Novelty is always charming to all nations. This was one of a most surprising character, that of a king and a queen, after twelve years of revolutions, which had overturned or shaken so many thrones, and one peculiarly flattering to the French people, for this king and queen were the fruits of their victories. The Infantas were received with infinite regard and respect. No unpleasant occurrence made them feel that they were travelling through a country so recently a prey to intestinal convulsions. The royalists, by no means flattered by this monarchical work of the French revolution, were the only ones who availed themselves of the opportunity of showing some ill-will. At the theatre at Bordeaux, to the enthusiastic cries of "*Long live the King*," they answered by "*Down with Kings*."

The First Consul repressed himself, by letters sent from his cabinet, the rather excessive zeal of the prefects, and did not wish this royal progress to be magnified into too great an event. The young princes arrived at Paris in June, and were to spend a whole month there. They were to reside with the Spanish ambassador. The First Consul, though only the simple temporary magistrate of a republic, represented France: before this prerogative all privileges of royal blood grew pale. It was concluded that their youthful majesties, advising the First Consul of it, should pay the first visit, and that he should return it the next day. The second and third Consuls, who could not be said, in the same degree, to represent France, were to pay the first visit to the Infantas. Thus, as regards them, was established the distance of birth and rank. On the next day after their arrival the Count and Countess of Leghorn were

conducted to Malmaison by the Spanish ambassador, the Count d'Azara. The First Consul received them at the head of that military establishment which he had collected around him. The Count of Leghorn, somewhat embarrassed by his appearance, threw himself ingenuously into the arms of the First Consul, who clasped him to his breast. He treated this young couple with a parental kindness, and the most delicate attentions, but through which, nevertheless, were perceived all the superiorities of glory, power, and age. On the next day the First Consul returned their visit, at the hotel of the ambassador. The Consuls Cambacérés and Lebrun fulfilled the duty prescribed to them, and received from the young princes the courtesies due to them.

The First Consul was to present the Count and Countess of Leghorn to the Parisian public, at the opera. On the day selected for the presentation, he was sick. Cambacérés supplied his place, and escorted the Infantas to the opera. Having entered the consular-box, they took the Count of Leghorn by the hand, and presented him to the public, who answered by unanimous applause, and without any malicious or offensive expressions. Nevertheless, the idle, accustomed to worry themselves with subtle interpretations of the most ordinary events, gave a thousand aspects to the voyage of the princes to Paris. These who were satisfied with a *bon mot*, said that the Consul Cambacérés had just presented the Bourbons to France. The royalists, who persisted in hoping from General Bonaparte what he neither would nor could do, pretended that it was, on his part, a sort of preparation for the return of the old dynasty. The republicans, on the contrary, asserted that he desired, by this regal pomp, to accustom France to a re-establishment of monarchy, in his own person.

The ministers were ordered to entertain the travelling princes. To M. de Talleyrand this order was unnecessary. A model of taste and elegance under the ancient regime, he was deservedly much more so under the new, and he gave, at the chateau of Neuilly, a magnificent festival, adorned by the best society of France, and names long since strangers to the circles of the capital. At night, in the midst of a brilliant illumination, the city of Florence suddenly appeared, represented with surprising accuracy. The Tuscans, dancing and singing on the celebrated square of the Palazzo Vecchio, presented flowers to the young sovereigns, and triumphal crowns to the First Consul. This magnificence cost an enormous sum. It was the profusion of the Directory, with the elegance of another age, and that quite new propriety, which a severe master was endeavouring to impress on the manners of revolutionary France. The minister of war, in conjunction with the minister of foreign affairs, gave a military entertainment, intended to celebrate the anniversary of the battle of Marengo. The minister of the Interior, the

¹ JOSEPH II., Emperor of Germany, son of Francis I. and Maria Theresa, born March 13, 1741, at a time when Frederic the Great had already conquered half Silesia. In 1765 he became German emperor, on the death of his father. He was a moderate, tolerant, and liberal prince,

and in the early part of his reign distinguished by his concessions to popular reform. Toward his latter days his country was disturbed, and, in 1790, he died, as much perhaps of mortification as of pulmonary disease.—*Encyclopædia Americana*.

second and third Consuls, likewise entertained the princes magnificently, and for a whole month the capital was a scene of continual rejoicing. The First Consul, however, did not wish the princes to be present at the republican solemnities of July, and he made the necessary arrangements for them to leave Paris before the anniversary of the 14th of July.

In the midst of these brilliant festivals, he endeavoured to give some advice to the royal couple, about to reign over Tuscany. But he was struck with the weakness of the young prince, who, when at Malmaison, amused himself in the hall of the aides-de-camp, with games worthy at most of a youth. The princess alone appeared intelligent, and attentive to the advice of the First Consul. The latter augured badly of these new sovereigns given to a part of Italy, and understood clearly that it would be frequently necessary for him to assist in the direction of the affairs of their kingdom. "You see," said he, openly to some members of the government, "you see that they are princes, descended from an ancient line, and especially one brought up in the courts of the south. How can the reins of government be intrusted to them! On the other hand, it was well to show to France this specimen of the Bourbons. She can judge if these ancient dynasties are equal to the difficulties of an age like ours.—In fact, all who had seen the young prince had made the same remark as the First Consul. General Clarke was sent as a Mentor to these young sovereigns, under the title of Minister of France near the King of Etruria.

Amid this vast movement of affairs, amid these festivals, which, in themselves, almost assumed a serious character, the great work of the maritime peace had not been neglected. The negotiations, commenced at London between Lord Hawkesbury¹ and Mr. Otto, had become public. They were kept less secret, as soon as they were in haste to bring them to a close. As we have elsewhere said, the wish to temporize was succeeded by the wish to terminate, for the First Consul augured badly of the events occurring on the shores of the Nile, and the British government was continually fearing some unexpected exploit on the part of the army of Egypt. The new English ministers were anxious for peace, for on it depended their existence. In fact, if the war was to be continued, it was much more important to have Mr. Pitt than Mr. Addington² at the head of affairs. All the events which had transpired either in the North, or in the East, although they might have bettered the relative condition of England, appeared to them the means of making a more advantageous peace, and one more easily defended in Parliament, but not motives for desiring it less. They considered

the opportunity as good, and were desirous of avoiding the fault, for which Mr. Pitt had been so much blamed, of not having made a treaty previous to Marengo and Hohenlinden. The King of England, as has been seen, had returned to pacific views, from regard for the First Consul, as well as from some displeasure against Mr. Pitt. The people, suffering from scarcity, and fond of change, were expecting from the termination of the war an improvement in their condition. Reasonable persons, without exception, thought that ten years of bloody war were enough, and that it was unwise, by continuing any longer, to give France a chance of still further aggrandizement. In addition to all this, some uneasiness was felt at London, at the preparations for a descent on England, seen along the coast of the British channel. One class of men alone, those embarked in great maritime speculations, and who had subscribed to the enormous loans of Mr. Pitt, seeing that peace, by opening seas to the flags of all nations, and to that of France in particular, would deprive them of the monopoly of commerce, and put an end to great financial operations, were opposed to the system of Mr. Addington. They were devoted to Mr. Pitt and his policy; they were even inclined for war, when Mr. Pitt himself began to consider peace as necessary. But the rich city speculators were silenced by the cries of the people and the agriculturists, and above all by the unanimous voice of the reasonable part of the nation.

The English minister was therefore determined not only to negotiate, but to negotiate promptly in order to present the result of their negotiations, to the next meeting of Parliament that is, in the autumn. An advantageous treaty had just been concluded with Russia, England had to settle with this court merely a question of maritime right. She had made some concessions to the new emperor, and had also required some, which the prince, young and unexperienced, anxious to please the party which had placed him on the throne, still more anxious to indulge tranquilly in his ideas of internal reform, had had the weakness to grant, of the four fundamental principles of maritime law, maintained by the league of the North and France, Russia had abandoned two, and retained two. In a convention signed on the 17th of June, between Vice-Chancellor Panin³ and Lord St. Helens, the following stipulations were agreed upon.

I. Neutrals might freely trade between all the parts of the globe, even those of nations engaged in war. They might carry every thing, according to custom, except such as were comprehended in the war contraband. This clause was inserted to protect the interests of Russia. Thus bread-stuffs, and nava-

¹ LORD HAWKESBURY, an English diplomatist of some repute.

² MR. ADDINGTON. HENRY, LORD SIDMOUTH, the son of a physician. He was born in 1756, and educated with William Pitt, the son of Lord Chatham, of whom he was constantly a personal friend as well as a political supporter. In 1789 he was Speaker in the House of Commons. In 1792 he voted, for the first and last time, against his friend, on the motion of Mr. Wilberforce. In 1801 he succeeded Mr. Pitt as Chancellor of the Exchequer. He was an advocate of peace after the peace of Amiens, until its violation by the French, after which

he became one of the strongest war councillors of the king. In 1804 he was succeeded by Pitt and created viscount Sidmouth. In 1806 he was again for a short time in office. In 1812 he was Secretary of State under Lord Liverpool's administration, until 1822, when he retired, and was succeeded by Mr., now Sir Robert, Peel.

—*Encyclopedia Americana*.

³ PANIN. A Russian minister of some distinction, but in no respect equal to his father, Nikita Ivanovitch, Count Panin, the Minister of State to Catharine II., who was a man of great parts and extraordinary firmness. —*Encyclopedia Americana*.

stores, were no longer comprised in the war contraband, an important thing for Russia, which produced hemp, pitch and tar, iron, masts and spars, and grain. On this point, one of the most important of maritime law, Russia had defended the liberties of general commerce, by defending her own private interests.

II. The flag did not cover the merchandise, unless this merchandise were owned by the neutral trader. Thus coffee, coming from the French colonies; bullion exported from the Spanish colonies, could not be seized if they were the property of a Dane, or a Russian. It is true that this reservation saved, practically, a portion of the neutral commerce: but Russia sacrificed the first principle of maritime law, that *the flag makes the nation*, and did not support the noble part she had undertaken to play, under Paul and under Catherine. This protection of the weak she so earnestly wished to exert on the continent she sullenly abandoned on the ocean.

III. Neutrals, though allowed to trade without hindrance, were to stop, according to custom, at the entrance of a port blockaded, but which was *actually blockaded*, with *imminent danger of forcing the blockade*. In this respect the great principle of actual blockade was strictly maintained.

IV. Lastly, the right of search, the subject of so much dispute, and the proximate cause of the last league of the North, was settled in a manner not very honourable for the neutral flag. Therefore, it was never admitted, that merchants ships, conveyed by a vessel of war, guaranteeing her nationality by her presence, and above all, the absence of all contraband goods on board, could be searched. The dignity of the naval flag, in fact, did not permit a captain of a ship, perhaps an admiral, to be stopped by a privateer, furnished with merely a letter of marque. The Russian cabinet endeavoured to save the dignity of the flag by a nice distinction. It was decided that the right of search, as regarded merchant vessels conveyed by ships of war, should not be put in force by all vessels indiscriminately, but by ships of war alone. A privateer furnished merely with a letter of marque had no right to stop and challenge a convoy, protected by a ship of war. The right of search, therefore, could only be exerted by equals upon equals. By this means, undoubtedly, a portion of the objections was removed, but the fundamental principle was sacrificed, and the transaction was the less honourable to the court of St. Petersburg, as it had been one of the four contested principles for which Copenhagen had been bombarded only three months previously, and for which Paul I. had endeavoured to rouse all Europe against England.

Thus Russia had maintained two of the great principles of maritime law, and sacrificed two. England, it must be observed, had made concessions, and, in the hope of obtaining peace, had abandoned some of the haughty claims of Mr. Pitt. The Danes, Swedes, and Prussians were invited to unite in this convention.

Freed from Russia, having obtained some success in Egypt, the only advantage England

wished to take of this improvement in her situation, was a speedier reconciliation with France. Lord Hawkesbury sent for M. Otto to the foreign office and desired him to present the following proposition to the First Consul. "Egypt is at this moment occupied by our troops," said he; "heavy reinforcements will be sent to them—their success is probable. The struggle, it must be confessed, however, is not over. Let us stop the effusion of blood: let us both agree to evacuate Egypt, and restore it to the Sublime Porte."

To this proposition, Lord Hawkesbury added the intention of retaining Malta: "for," said he, "Malta was to be evacuated by England, only in return for the voluntary abandonment of Egypt by France. This was, no longer, on the part of France, a voluntary concession, but an inevitable consequence of the war, and there was no reason for compensating it by the restoration of Malta."

In the East Indies the English minister was satisfied with Ceylon. He offered to restore to Holland the Cape of Good Hope, and her possessions in South America, such as Surinam, Demerara, Berbice, and Essequibo. But he required one of the Great Antilles, either Martinico or Trinity, at the choice of France.

Thus England would have obtained by this ten years' war, independently of Hindoostan, the island of Ceylon in the Indian Ocean, the island of Trinity or Martinico in the Caribbean Sea, and the island of Malta in the Mediterranean. The cabinet would have a splendid gift to offer at the shrine of British pride, in each of the three principal seas.

The First Consul sent an immediate answer to the claims of the English. They laid great stress on the events in Egypt, and he, to rebut their pretensions, laid equal stress on the events in Portugal. "Lisbon and Oporto," he answered Lord Hawkesbury, through M. Otto, "will belong to us, if we desire it. A treaty is at this moment being negotiated at Badajoz, to save the provinces of England's most faithful ally. Portugal proposes, in order to redeem her territory, to exclude the English from all her ports, and to pay, in addition, a heavy war contribution; and Spain appears inclined to accept the offer. All depends, however, on the First Consul. He can accept or reject the treaty; and he will reject it, and occupy the principal provinces of Portugal, if England does not consent to peace, on moderate and reasonable terms. They demand," added he, "that France shall evacuate Egypt; granted, provided England will abandon Malta, and not demand Martinico nor Trinity, and be satisfied with the island of Ceylon, a splendid possession, completing perfectly the superb empire of the Indies."

The English ambassador, in reply to these propositions, explained himself in a manner rather unsatisfactory, as regarded Portugal, proving, what was already known, that England cared but little for the allies whom she had compromised. "If the First Consul invades the states of Portugal in Europe," answered Lord Hawkesbury, "England will invade the states of Portugal beyond the seas. She will take the Azores and Brazil, and obtain a ledge which,

in her hands, will be worth much more than the Portuguese continent in the hands of the French." The meaning of this was, that England, instead of defending an ally, would revenge herself, even on that ally, for the new possessions acquired by her rival.

The First Consul saw that it was necessary to assume an energetic tone, and openly announced the resolution he had already formed in his own bosom, which was to struggle hand to hand with England, until he had brought her to moderate claims. He declared that he would never, on any conditions, surrender Malta: that Trinity belonged to an ally, whose interests he would defend as though they were his own: that he would not leave this colony in possession of the English: that they ought to be satisfied with Ceylon, and that, of all the disputed points, with the exception of Malta, not one was worth the misery about to be inflicted on the world, nor a single drop of the blood about to be shed.

To these diplomatic explanations, he added public statements in the *Moniteur*, and the detailed account of the armament preparing on the coast of Boulogne.

Divisions of gun-boats sailed, in fact, from the ports of Calvados, Seine-Inférieure, from the Somme and Scheldt, for Boulogne, and had already succeeded several times in escaping the English cruisers by keeping close to the coast. The First Consul had not determined then, as he had at a subsequent period,¹ on the plan of a descent upon England; he wanted to intimidate this power by the splendour of his preparations, and he had at last resolved on completing his arrangements, and passing from threats to action, if the rupture became irreparable. He explained himself to this effect fully, in a meeting of the Council, at which the consuls alone were present. Full of confidence in his colleagues, Cambacérès and Lebrun, he unbosomed himself to them. He declared to them, that with the armament then at Boulogne, he had not the means of attempting a descent, one of the most difficult operations of war; that by this preparation he merely wished to prove to England his intentions, which were, a direct attack; for the success of which, he, General Bonaparte, would not hesitate to risk his life, his glory, and his fortune; that should he not succeed in obtaining from the British cabinet reasonable sacrifices, he would take his own part, complete the flotilla of Boulogne, so that it should be enabled to carry 100,000 men, in order to try the chances of a terrible but decisive operation.

Wishing to call to his aid the opinion of England and of Europe herself, he added to the notes of his negotiator, which were addressed only to the English ministers, articles in the *Moniteur* appealing to the whole Euro-

pean public. In these articles, very models of terse and pressing polemics, which were written by himself and eagerly devoured by the readers of all nations, attentive to the singular scenes which were in progress, he caressed the actual English ministers, representing them as wise, reasonable, well-intentioned men, intimidated by the violence of the ex-ministers Mr. Pitt and Mr. Windham.² It was on the latter of these especially, that he poured out his sarcasms with an unsparing hand, because he held him to be the leader of the war party. In these articles he strove to reassure Europe with regard to the ambition of France. He laboured to show that his conquests were but an equivalent to the acquisitions which Prussia, Austria, and Russia had made in the partition of Poland; that nevertheless she had restored three or four times that she had retained; that England was therefore bound, in her turn, to restore a large part of her conquests; that retaining the continent of India, she remained in possession of a superb empire, in comparison with which the contested islands were worth nothing; that the value of those isles was not of consequence such as to justify the continued effusion of blood; that if France, in truth, seemed to cling vigorously to that point, it was from a sentiment of honour, from a desire to defend her allies, and to retain at the utmost some few roadsteads in distant seas; to conclude, that, should they choose to maintain the war, England might doubtless conquer more colonies, but that she had more already than her commerce could require; that France had on the contrary acquisitions to make all around her frontiers of widely different value, known so well to the whole world as to render it needless to designate them; since her troops occupied Holland, Switzerland, Piedmont, Naples, Portugal; and, last of all, that the struggle might still be simplified, and rendered less onerous to the nations, by reducing it to a strife, body to body, between France and England. The author-general took heed not to offend the pride of Britain; but he gave them to understand that a descent would be his last resource, and that if the English ministers desired that the war should be concluded only by the destruction of one of the two nations, there was not a Frenchman who was not disposed to make a last and most vigorous effort to terminate this long and cruel quarrel to the eternal glory and the eternal advantage of France. "But wherefore," said he, "place the question on this last resort! wherefore not put an end to the sufferings of humanity! wherefore risk in this manner the lot of two great nations!" The First Consul terminated one of those addresses in these singular and beautiful words, which one day were to have so melancholy an application to himself. "Happy," he cried, "happy are nations

¹ This first attempt, which was in 1801, must be carefully distinguished from the great naval and military organization, known under the name of Camp of Boulogne, and executed in the year 1804.

² Mr. WILLIAM WINDHAM, a statesman and orator of great weight, eloquence, and ability. He was born in London in 1750, educated at Eton and Oxford. In 1782 he entered parliament, as member for Norwich. He sided with the opposition until the celebrated secession

from the Whig party in 1793, when he adhered to Burke, and was appointed secretary of war with a seat in the cabinet, which he retained until Pitt's resignation in 1801. He was distinguished for his opposition to the ephemeral treaty of Amiens. In 1806 he came in with Lord Grenville as secretary of war and the colonies, in the short administration called that of All the Talents. He died in 1810. He was a sound scholar and highly esteemed in private life. [*Encyclopædia Americana*. 2

when, having arrived at high prosperity, they have wise governments which care not to expose advantages so vast to the caprices and vicissitudes of a single stroke of fortune!"

These articles, remarkable for their vigorous logic, and their impassioned style, attracted general attention, and produced a deep effect on all minds. Never had any government held a language so open and so comprehensive.

The language of the First Consul, accompanied by very serious demonstrations on the shores of France, naturally produced a great effect on the other side of the channel. The formal declaration that France would never concede Malta, had made a great impression, and the British government replied that it was willing to yield this point, provided that island should be restored to the order of St. John of Jerusalem, but that in that case it should require the Cape of Good Hope. It yielded Trinity, moreover, and even Martinique, on condition of receiving a portion of the Dutch American continent, that is to say, Demerara, Berbice, or Essequibo.

The concession of Malta was one step gained in the negotiation. The First Consul held out for not yielding Malta, nor yet the Cape, nor even the Dutch continental possessions in America. In his eyes, Malta should have been the compensation for Egypt yielded to the French. There could, therefore, be no longer any question concerning Malta with the English, nor of any equivalents for it.

The English cabinet ceased to insist on Malta, or on the Cape as a compensation for Malta. But it returned to its demand for one of the Great Antilles, and, as it could no longer claim the French island of Martinique, it demanded the Spanish isle of Trinity.

The First Consul would no more consent to yield Trinity than Martinique. It was a Spanish colony, which would give the English a dangerous foothold on the vast continent of South America. He carried his loyalty toward the ally of France, so far as to offer Tobago, a small French island, in lieu of Trinity. It was not very important, but it was valuable to England, because all the planters were English. With a noble pride, which is permissible only to one who has loaded his country with glory, he added, it is a French colony, the acquisition ought to touch the pride of Britain, which will be flattered at obtaining a colonial trophy from us. And the conclusion of the peace will doubtless be rendered easier thereby.¹

Such was the position of affairs, about the end of July, and beginning of August, 1801. (Great warmth was exhibited on both sides. The preparations on the coast of France were

imitated on the coast of England. The militia was disciplined; wagons were constructed for the rapid transportation of troops to any threatened point. The English war-party journals held the most violent language; some of them, under the direction, it is said, of Mr. Windham, endeavoured to excite the people against M. Otto and the French prisoners. M. Otto immediately demanded his passports, and the First Consul caused to be published in the *Moniteur* the most threatening observations.

Lord Hawkesbury hastened to M. Otto, insisted on his remaining, and succeeded, although with difficulty, by giving him hopes of a speedy adjustment. National animosity, however, seemed awakened, and a rupture was dreaded. All the reasonable men in England feared, and endeavoured to prevent it. They despaired, however, of success, for the First Consul would yield at no price the possessions of his allies, upon which the English insisted.

But whilst he was so loyally defending the Spanish colonies, the Prince of Peace, with the thoughtlessness of a vain and frivolous favourite, led his master into the most unfortunate position, and absolved the First Consul from all friendly relations with Spain.

It has not been forgotten that M. de Pinto, the Portuguese envoy, had arrived at the Spanish head-quarters, to submit to the will of France and Spain. The Prince of Peace was anxious to terminate a campaign, the commencement of which had been so brilliant and easy, but which would have been difficult to continue without the aid of France. The assistance of our soldiers would have been, for instance, necessary for the occupation of Lisbon or Oporto. The enterprise, from being a mere matter of ostentation, might become a serious affair, and require fresh French troops. Foreseeing this necessity, the First Consul had ordered the advance of 10,000 additional men, making the total number of French in Spain about 25,000. Now the Prince of Peace, who had, without reason, sent for our troops, was frightened, with reason, at their arrival. Their discipline, however, had been most severe, and they had testified for the clergy, the churches, and the ceremonies of religion, a respect to which they were unaccustomed, and that would have been elicited by no one but General Bonaparte. But now that they were near at hand, the Spaniards were terribly alarmed by their presence. They should either not have been sent for, or, being summoned, should have been used to attain the end proposed. This end was not to consist only in dispersing a few Portuguese troops, in obtaining some millions of

¹ The minister of foreign relations to M. Otto, commissioner of the French republic in London:

20 Thermidor, year IX.—8th August.

As to America. I add to these peremptory observations the following, with this note.

The British government demands the reservation in the Antilles, of one of the islands which she has recently conquered, and that on the pretext that it will be necessary to the preservation of her ancient possessions. Now, on no consideration can this argument apply to the isle of Trinity. Put an end, therefore, to all discussion on that head. Trinity will be, by its position, no means of defence to the English colonies, but a means of attack against the Spanish continent. Its acquisition would,

moreover, be an acquisition to the British government of a value beyond all justice or reason. The discussion can only bear on Curaçoa, Tobago, St. Lucia, or some other isle of similar importance. Although the last two are French, the government might be induced to abandon one, and perhaps the pride of England would be flattered by thus receiving one of our colonial possessions as a trophy. You will not fail, citizen, to attribute an increased value to those isles, the concession of which might be made on our part, and especially of Tobago. That isle, which was formerly English, is still inhabited by English planters, and all its relations are English; its soil is new, and its commerce susceptible of vast improvement.

tribute, or even in closing the ports of Portugal to English vessels, but evidently, in seizing some valuable pledge, to be used in wresting from the English the concessions they were unwilling to grant. To effect this, it was necessary to occupy certain Portuguese provinces, especially that of which Oporto was the capital. This was the surest way of influencing the British cabinet, by acting on the large merchants of the city, deeply interested in the commerce of Oporto. This had been agreed upon, by the government of Paris and Madrid. Despite, however, all that had been agreed upon, the Prince of Peace thought of accepting the conditions of Portugal, and being satisfied with the fortified place of Olivença for Spain, and fifteen or twenty millions for France, and for the two powers combined, the closure of the Portuguese ports to all British vessels, either of the naval or merchant service. Under these conditions, the campaign just achieved was puerile. It was nothing but a pastime, invented to amuse a favourite satiated with royal favours, and seeking military glory by ridiculous means, such as were suitable to his guilty and silly frivolity.

The Prince of Peace took advantage of the paternal feelings so easily excited in his masters, but excited, it must be said, either too soon or too late. He made them fear the presence of the French; a fear, it must be repeated, very unseasonable and chimerical, for it could scarcely enter the mind of any one, that 18,000 Frenchmen wanted to conquer Spain, or even extend their stay beyond a proper time. All this supposed projects which were not even dreamed of by the First Consul, and which he only conceived subsequently, after astounding events, which neither he nor any one else then foresaw. At that time, he had but one wish, to wrest from England one island more, and that island was Spanish.

Whilst accepting the conditions proposed by the court of Lisbon, which consisted merely in ceding Olivença to the Spaniards, twenty millions to the French, and the exclusion of the English flag from the ports of Portugal, care had been taken to prepare two copies of the treaty, one of which was to be signed by Spain, and the other by France. The Prince of Peace affixed his signature to the one intended for his court, and dated from Badajos, because it was transacted in that city. He then caused the king, who was present at that place, to ratify it. Lucien signed the copy intended for France, and despatched it to his brother for his ratification.

The First Consul received these communications at the very moment of the greatest excitement in the negotiation at London. His anger may well be supposed. Although he was fond of his family, sometimes even to weakness, he repressed his irritability less with his relations than with others, and, certainly on this occasion, he may be pardoned having given vent to it. This he did without reserve, and expressed the most violent indignation against his brother Lucien.

He hoped, however, that the treaty was not yet ratified. Couriers extraordinary were sent to Badajos, to announce that France refused her assent, and to prevent that of Spain. But these couriers found the treaty ratified by Charles IV.¹ and the compact irrevocable. Lucien was overwhelmed with the embarrassing and even humiliating part reserved for him in Spain, instead of the brilliant part he had there expected to play. He answered his brother's anger by a fit of ill humour, common enough to him, and sent his resignation to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. The Prince of Peace, on his part, became arrogant. He used ridiculous and silly language toward the man who then governed France. He announced, in the first place, the cessation of all hostility towards Portugal, then demanded the retreat of the French, and even added this very imprudent declaration, that if fresh troops passed the frontiers of the Pyrenees, their passage would be considered as a violation of territory. He claimed, moreover, the restoration of the fleet at Brest, and a prompt conclusion of the general peace, in order to break off as soon as possible an alliance now become burdensome to the court of Madrid.² This conduct was as improper as it was contrary to the true interests of Spain. It must be said, however, that the terrible misfortune which had just happened to two Spanish vessels had thrown a gloom over the nation, and contributed to that ill humour, which manifested itself so unseasonably and injuriously for the policy of the two cabinets.

The irritation of the First Consul having reached its maximum, he answered immediately, that the French would remain in the Peninsula, until the declaration of peace between France and Portugal: that if the army of the Prince of Peace took one single step toward the 15,000 Frenchmen then at Salamanca, he would consider it as a declaration of war, and that if, to impertinent language, one single hostile act was added, the downfall of the Spanish monarchy was at hand.³

¹ CHARLES IV., KING OF SPAIN. Born at Naples in 1740, came to Madrid in 1759, on the succession of his father, Charles III., to the Spanish throne, to which he in his turn succeeded in 1788. He was married to the Princess of Parma, Louisa Maria. Too imbecile to govern himself, he yielded his power wholly to his queen and ministers, especially to the infamous Prince of Peace, Godoy. Hunting was his only business, gluttony his only pleasure. He was deposed and abdicated in 1808, and died of the gout at Naples in 1818.—*Encyclopædia Americana*.

² Despatch of 26th of July.

³ The First Consul wrote short notes, intended as a basis for the instructions which his ministers were to transmit to the ambassadors. The following is the note sent to the cabinet of foreign affairs, to serve in the compilation of the despatch to be sent to Madrid. M. de Talley-

rand, having left for some watering place, had been replaced by M. Caillard.

To the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

21st Messidor, year IX.—10th July, 1801.

Inform citizen minister, the ambassador of the republic at Madrid, that he must repair to court, and display the energy necessary in this posture of affairs. He will state:

That I have read the letter of General, the Prince of Peace: that it is too ridiculous to deserve a serious answer; but that if this prince, bought by England, persuades the king and queen into measures contrary to the honour and interests of the Republic, the last hour of the Spanish monarchy is at hand.

That I intend the French troops to remain in Spain until the Republic shall have made peace with Portugal. That the slightest movement of the Spanish troops

He ordered Lucien to return to Madrid, there assume his character of ambassador, and await his further orders. This was enough to intimidate and awe the contemptible courtier, who compromised too lightly the greatest interests of the universe. In fact, he soon wrote the most submissive letters, in order to recover the good graces of the man whose influence and personal authority over the Court of Spain he so greatly feared.

It was, however, necessary to come to some conclusion concerning this strange and unaccountable conduct of the court of Madrid. M. de Talleyrand was on a visit to a watering-place to recruit his health. The First Consul communicated to him all the steps of the business, and received in answer a very sensible letter, containing his advice in this important affair.

A war of correspondence, according to M. de Talleyrand, could lead to nothing, whatever success, relying on engagements made, might reasonably be expected from the promises made by both parties. The war against Spain, besides leading us from the object, which was the general pacification of Europe, besides being contrary to the true policy of France, became ridiculous in the pitiable condition of the Spanish monarchy, with our troops in the heart of her provinces, with her squadrons at

to approach the French troops, will be considered as a declaration of war;

That, however, I am anxious to do all that is possible to reconcile the interests of the Republic with the conduct and inclinations of his Catholic Majesty;

That whatever may happen, I will never consent to articles three and six;

That I am not opposed to the renewal of negotiation between the ambassador of the Republic and M. de Pinto, and that a protocol of the negotiation be kept every day.

That the ambassador should endeavour to make the Prince of Peace, and even the king and queen, understand, that improper words and letters, among friends like ourselves, may be considered as family quarrels, but that the slightest action or outbreak would be irre-medi-able;

That as to the King of Etruria, a minister was offered him because he has no one near him, and that to govern men some knowledge is necessary; that, however, as he hoped to find at Parma men capable of aiding him, I insisted no longer;

That as to the French troops in Tuscany, they must remain two or three months, until the King of Etruria has organized his army;

That affairs of state may be canvassed without passion, and that, moreover, my desire of being useful to the house of Spain would be ill repaid if the king permitted the corrupting influence of British gold to disunite two great nations, when on the eve of obtaining peace after so much anxiety and fatigue; that its consequences would be terrible and fatal;

That, at this moment, less haste in making peace with Portugal would have materially assisted in accelerating the conclusion of peace with England, etc.

You know this cabinet; you will therefore mention in your despatch every thing which can serve to gain time, prevent hasty measures, renew the negotiation, and, at the same time, have weight, by presenting to their views the grave aspect of affairs, and the consequences of too great rapidity.

Inform the ambassador of the republic, that if Portugal consents to leave to Spain the province of the Alentejo until the peace, that might be a sort of *mezzo termine*, since by that Spain would find herself obliged to execute to the letter the preliminary treaty.

I would as soon have nothing as fifteen millions in fifteen months.

Despatch the courier whom I send you directly to Madrid.

WE GIVE THIS CURIOUS LETTER OF M. DE TALLEYRAND.

20th of Messidor, year IX.—24th of July, 1801.

GENERAL.—I have just read, with all the attention I possess, the letters from Spain. If an answer for the sake of our, only is required, it is easy for us to be in

Brest. There was a much more natural way of punishing her; which was to cede to the English the Spanish island of Trinity, the sole and last difficulty which retarded the peace of the world. Spain had in fact absolved us from all duty, all loyalty toward her. In this case, added M. de Talleyrand, time must be wasted at Madrid and gained at London, by hastening the negotiation with England, by the concession of Trinity.

This advice was founded on reason, and so appeared to the First Consul. However, making it a point of honour to defend even an unfaithful ally, he informed M. Otto of his new intentions in relation to Trinity, and evinced himself ready to sacrifice it, not immediately, but only at the last extremity, when nothing else could be done, without producing a rupture. He ordered him to insist on the acceptance of the French island of Tobago, in exchange for Trinity.

Unfortunately the strange conduct of the Prince of Peace had greatly weakened the influence of our envoy. It was still further affected, by the recent arrival of the news of the capitulation of General Belliard at Cairo. Nevertheless the continuance of General Menou in Alexandria kept up a lingering doubt favourable to our claims. To our flotilla of Boulogne

the right, even by referring to the letter of the three or four treaties made this year with that power: but those would be mere pleas. We must consider if this is not the moment for adopting a decisive line of conduct with this unhappy ally.

I start from the following data: Spain has waged, to use one of her own expressions, a *hypocritical*, &c., war against Portugal; she wants now to make peace. The Prince of Peace is, as we are informed and as I easily believe, parleying with England. The Directory thought he was bought by that power. The king and queen depend on the prince; he was nothing but a favourite; he is now, in their opinion, a statesman and great warrior. Lucien is in an embarrassing position from which he must be extricated.—The prince uses with some skill in his letters these words: *The king has decided upon making war on his own children.* These words will have some weight upon public opinion. A rupture with Spain is a laughable threat when we have her ships at Brest, and our troops in the heart of her kingdom. Such, methinks, is our position in regard to Spain; now, what have we to do?

I now perceive, that for two years I have been no longer accustomed to think alone. Without you my imagination and understanding are without a pilot; hence I shall probably write some foolish things, but it is not my fault, I am not myself when far from you.

It seems to me that Spain, which, in the various treaties of peace, has embarrassed the Court of Versailles by her enormous pretensions, has completely absolved us from all contracts. She has even marked out to us a course to be pursued; we can do with England what she has done with Portugal: she sacrifices the interests of her allies, and this places at our disposal the island of Trinity in our negotiation with England. Should you be of this opinion, it would then be necessary to hurry somewhat the treaty at London, and be content with exercising diplomacy or rather cavilling at Madrid, confining yourself always to friendly discussions, gentle explanations, satisfying them as to the fate of the King of Tuscany, treating only of the interests of the alliance, etc. etc. In short, to lose time at Madrid, and hurry it at London.

It would be unadvisable, under these circumstances, to change the ambassador, and it should not be done, if, as I propose, you attempt temporizing. Why could you not permit Lucien to go to Cadiz to see the fleet, and travel to the different ports? During this time, the English affairs will be advanced; you would prevent England from stipulating with Portugal, and he could return to Madrid to treat finally of this peace.

I am much afraid, general, that you will find upon my opinion the impress of the shower baths, and baths which I take very punctually. In seventeen days I shall be better. I shall be very happy to renew to you the assurance of my devotion and respect.

CH.-MAUR. TALLEYRAND.

was to belong the honour of terminating all the difficulties of this tedious negotiation.

Great uneasiness was still felt in England at the preparations made on the coast of the British Channel. In order to quiet it, the English Admiralty had recalled Nelson from the Baltic, and given him the command of the naval force in that quarter. This force was composed of frigates, brigs, corvettes, and light vessels of all dimensions. The enterprising character of this celebrated English sailor, gave rise to the hope that he would soon destroy, by some bold stroke, the French flotilla. On the 4th of August—18th of Thermidor—he appeared, about the break of day, off Boulogne, with some thirty small vessels. His flag was hoisted on the frigate *Medusa*. He took up a position about 1900 fathoms from our lines, that is out of reach of our artillery, and only within range of our heavy mortars. His intention was to bombard our flotilla. This was commanded by Admiral Latouche-Tréville,¹ a brave sailor, full of natural genius and ardour for war, and destined, had he lived, to the highest honours. He exercised the gun-boats every day, accustomed the soldiers and sailors to climb rapidly on board the ships, and descend from them in the same manner, and to manœuvre together, with celerity and precision. On the 4th, our flotilla was formed in three divisions, anchored in a line parallel to, and five hundred fathoms distant from the shore, broadside to the enemy. It was composed of large gun-boats, supported at intervals by brigs. Three battalions of infantry were on board of these boats of all descriptions, to assist the scamen.

Nelson ranged a division of bomb-ketches in front of his squadron, and opened his fire at 5 o'clock in the morning. He hoped, by overwhelming our flotilla with bombs, to destroy it, or to force it to re-enter the port. He, therefore, threw an immense quantity of shells during the whole day. The majority of these projectiles, discharged from heavy mortars, passed over our line and fell on the strand. Our soldiers and sailors immovable under this incessant fire, more alarming indeed in appearance than fatal in reality, displayed wonderful coolness and gayety. Unfortunately they had not the means of returning it. Our bomb vessels, hastily constructed, could not resist the shock of the mortars, and threw only a few ill-directed shot. The powder, taken from the old stores in the arsenal, was good for nothing, and did not send the projectiles to the necessary distance. The French crews asked to advance, either to bring their guns within range, or to board the enemy. But our gun-boats, awkwardly constructed without the experience subsequently acquired in this kind of ship building, would not work well in the north-east wind then blowing. They would have been driven by the wind and current on the

English line, and obliged, in order to return to the shore, to have exposed their broadside thus leaving them defenceless, as their guns were in the bow. They were, therefore, obliged to remain motionless under this shower of projectiles, which lasted sixteen hours. Our soldiers and sailors, supporting it bravely, laughed at the shells as they flew over their heads. Their brave commander Latouche-Tréville, was in their midst with Colonel Savary, aid-de-camp of the First Consul. An enormous quantity of bombs was thrown, but by a species of miracle, no one was seriously wounded. Two of our boats were sunk, but not a man was lost. A gun-boat, the *Méchante*, commanded by Captain Margoli, was pierced through the middle. This brave officer threw his crew into the other boats, then keeping two sailors with him, brought back his boat, making water in every direction, and grounded her on the sand before she had time to sink.

The English, notwithstanding the disadvantage of our position and the bad quality of our powder, suffered more than we. They had three or four men killed and wounded by the bursting of our shells.

Nelson retired in great mortification, promising to take revenge in a few days, and to return with certain means of destruction.

His re-appearance was, therefore, daily expected, and the French admiral prepared for his warm reception. He re-enforced his line, provided it with better ammunition, cheered the spirits of his sailors and soldiers, already full of ardour, and proud at having defied the English on their own element. Three picked battalions, taken from the 46th, 57th, and 108th demi-brigades, had been embarked on board the flotilla to act as on the day of the 4th.

Twelve days afterwards, the 16th of August—28th Thermidor—Nelson appeared with a naval force much larger than the first. Every thing betokened on his part a serious attack, and an attempt at boarding. This was what the French desired.

Nelson had thirty-five sail, a great many boats, and two thousand picked men. Toward evening he had ranged his boats around the *Medusa*, distributed his people in them, and given his instructions. These boats, manned by English mariners, were to advance during the night by means of their oars, and carry our line by boarding. They were formed in four divisions. A fifth division of bomb-ketches was to take position, not in front of our flotilla, which had been found of no advantage in the bombardment of the 4th, but on one flank, so as to rake our line.

Toward midnight these four divisions, commanded by four intrepid officers, Captains Sommersville, Parker, Cotgrave, and Jones, advanced rapidly toward the coast of Boulogne. A small French boat, manned by only eight men, had been left as an outpost. She was

¹ LATOUCHE-TRÉVILLE. L. R. M. LEVASSOR, COUNT OF. Born at Rochefort on June 3d, 1745, at thirteen he entered the marine guard, and during the American war obtained the command of a frigate. He commanded the flotilla at Boulogne, against the attacks of Nelson to cut it out with boats in 1801, which enterprise failed, owing to the squadrons of attack not arriving simultaneously and to the boats being chained to one another and to the shore. He subsequently obtained the com-

mand at Toulon, when he boasted that Nelson and the whole British fleet had fled before him. Nelson kept this letter for a long time, swearing that if he ever took him he would make him eat it in a sandwich. Of this retribution he was however deprived by the death of Latouche, which occurred, according to the French papers, in consequence of his walking so often to the signal-post on Sèpe to watch the English fleet, which was blockading him.—*Encyclopædia Americana*.

surrounded and boarded, but made a gallant resistance, and the noise of her musketry served to announce the presence of the enemy.

The four English divisions approached with the whole strength of the men at the oars. As soon as they were perceived, they were received with a discharge of musketry and grape shot. The first division, commanded by Captain Sommerville, was carried by the tide, out of its course to the eastward, far beyond our right wing, which it was ordered to attack. The two divisions of the centre, commanded by Captains Parker and Cotgrave, advancing directly toward the middle of our line, reached it the first, about one o'clock in the morning, and attacked it badly. That under Captain Parker, after having exchanged with our boats a very heavy fire, threw itself upon one of the large brigs which had been stationed among our boats to support them. It was the *Etna*, commanded by Captain Pevrieu. Six pinnaces surrounded her to carry her by boarding. The English climbed up gallantly, their officers leading; but they were received by 200 infantry soldiers, and driven back with the bayonet. The brave Pevrieu, having engaged successively two English sailors, though wounded both by a dirk and a pike, killed them both. In a few moments the pinnaces were repulsed, and the greater part of the sailors in them disabled. Our boats received as bravely the assailants who attacked them, and beat them off with hatchets and bayonets. A little further off, Captain Cotgrave attacked the French with great gallantry, but no more advantage. A large gun-boat, the *Surprise*, surrounded by four pinnaces, sunk the first, took the second, and put the other two to flight. The soldiers vied with the sailors in this sort of combat, perfectly congenial to their brave and audacious disposition.

Whilst the 2d and 3d English divisions were thus received, the first, which was to have attacked our right wing, carried eastwardly by the tide, was unable to arrive at the scene of action until at a quite late period. Endeavouring to return from the eastward to the westward, she seemed to threaten the extremity of our line, and to endeavour to pass between the land and our boats, a manœuvre of which the English are very fond. This was, however, more a consequence of its position than of calculation. But detachments of the 108th posted on the shore, kept up a murderous fire on them. The English sailors, undismayed, attacked the gun-boat, *Vulcan*, stationed on the extreme right of our line. The lieutenant commanding her, named Guérault, a gallant fellow, received them at the head of his sailors, and some infantry soldiers. He had a hard contest to maintain. Whilst he was fighting on the deck of his boat, the English surrounding him, endeavoured to cut his cables, so as to carry off the boat itself. Fortunately one of them was of chain, and resisted all their efforts to part it. The firing from the other French boats and the shore obliged the English to sheer off. The attack at this point was, therefore, as successfully repulsed as at the others.

Day was beginning to break. The 4th division of the enemy, intended for our left, and

obliged to make a long detour to the westward, against the tide, running the other way, had not arrived in time. Thanks to the darkness, Nelson's bombs had not done much harm. The English were everywhere repulsed: the sea was covered with their dead, and several of their boats were taken or sunk. The daylight, becoming momentarily more clear, rendered a retreat necessary. This they executed about four o'clock in the morning. The sun shone out to illuminate their flight. This time, it was not on their part a fruitless attempt, it was an actual defeat.

Our crews were in high spirits: they had not lost many, and the English, on the contrary, had suffered severely. What added most to the satisfaction produced by this brilliant action, was to have beaten Nelson in person, and to have nullified all the threats of destruction he had publicly hurled at our flotilla.

The contrary effect would necessarily take place on the other side of the channel: and although this combat at anchor did not prove what a similar flotilla could do at sea, with 100,000 men on board, nevertheless the confidence of the English in the enterprising genius of Nelson was somewhat shaken, and the unknown danger by which they were threatened gave them still more uneasiness than before.

The vicissitudes, however, of this great negotiation were about terminating. Influenced by the conduct of the Spanish cabinet, the First Consul had authorized M. Otto to yield Trinity. It was supposed that this concession and the two combats of Boulogne would put an end to the hesitation of the British cabinet. They consented, indeed, to the propositions named, with the exception of some few minor difficulties. The English cabinet wanted, whilst restoring Malta to the order of St. John of Jerusalem, to stipulate that the island should be placed under the protection of a guaranteeing power; for they hardly relied on the ability of the order to defend it, even should it be restored. The two cabinets could not agree upon the guaranteeing power. The Pope, the Court of Naples, and Russia, were successively discussed and rejected. Lastly, the mode of engrossing the treaty itself gave some trouble. As it was to have a great effect on public opinion in both countries, both the parties laid as much stress on appearances as on reality. England consented to enumerate, in the treaty, the numerous possessions she had restored to France and her allies, but she wished also to enumerate those taken from her. This claim was just, much more so than that of the First Consul, who wished that the possessions restored to France, Holland, and Spain should be enumerated, and that England should obtain the others only at the price of silence.

To these difficulties, of no real value, were added others, in relation to the prisoners, the debts, the sequestrations, and especially to the allies of the contracting powers, and the part which should be assigned to them in the protocol. They were, however, anxious to finish and terminate the miseries of the world. On the one hand, the English cabinet wanted to conclude before the meeting of Parliament, on

the other, the First Consul was daily fearful of hearing of the surrender of Alexandria, for the prolonged resistance of this place still maintained a doubt useful to the negotiation. Impatient to achieve great results, he anxiously desired the arrival of the day when he could say to France that magical and new word of peace, not only with Austria, Prussia, or Russia, but peace with the whole universe.

Consequently it was agreed to sanction immediately the great results obtained, and to refer to further negotiation the difficulties of forms and details. To this effect it was proposed to engross the preliminaries of peace, and, immediately after the signature of these preliminaries, to order the plenipotentiaries to draw up at their leisure a definitive treaty, to which were to be referred all difficulties not fundamental and the settling of which would require time. In order to arrive more certainly at a speedy termination, the First Consul wished to limit the negotiation to a specified time. It was now the middle of September, 1801—end of Fructidor, year IX.; he granted until the 2d of October—10th of Vendémiaire, year X. After this time, he was determined, he said, to take advantage of the thick fogs of autumn to execute his projects on the coasts of England and Ireland. All this was said with the delicacy due to a great and haughty nation, but with that peremptory tone which left no room for doubt.

The two negotiators, M. Otto and Lord Hawkesbury, were honest men, and anxious for peace. They desired it for itself, and were likewise induced by the very natural and legitimate ambition of affixing their names to one of the greatest treaties in the history of the world. Thus they lent all the facilities compatible with their instructions to the engrossing of the preliminaries.

It was agreed that England should restore to France and her allies, that is to Spain and Holland, all the maritime conquests she had made, *with the exception of the islands of Ceylon, and Trinity, which she had definitively acquired.*

Such was the form adopted to conciliate the proper self-love of the two nations. In short, England was to keep the continent of India, which she had taken from the native princes: the island of Ceylon, taken from the Dutch, and the necessary appendage to this continent: lastly the island of Trinity, in the Antilles, taken from the Spaniards. This was sufficient to satisfy the greatest national ambition. She restored the Cape of Good Hope, Demerara, Berbice, Essequibo, and Surinam to the Dutch; Martinico and Guadaloupe to the French; Minorca to the Spaniards, and Malta to the order of St. John of Jerusalem. As to this last point, the guaranteeing power was to be named in the closing treaty. England was to evacuate Porto-Ferraio, which, with the island of Elba, was to return to the French. In return, the French were to evacuate the Territory of Naples, that is to say, the Gulf of Tarentum.

Lastly, Egypt was to be evacuated by the troops of both nations, and restored to the Porte. The states of Portugal were guaranteed.

If we consider only the great results, which the long disputed restoration of a few islands neither greatly increased nor diminished, the following is the summing up of the treaty. In this struggle of ten years, England had acquired the empire of the Indies, without France being able to counter-balance it by the possession of Egypt. But, in return, France had changed the face of the continent to her own advantage; she had conquered the formidable line of the Alps and the Rhine, removed Austria for ever from her frontiers, by the conquest of the Low Countries, torn from this power the constant object of her dearest wishes, that is, Italy, which had passed nearly wholly under the French dominion. She had, by the principle laid down of secularizing, considerably weakened the imperial house of Germany, to the profit of the house of Brandenburg. She had given Russia some fatal blows, for having wished to meddle in the affairs of the East. She governed Switzerland, Holland, Spain, and Italy. No country in the world exerted a magical power like her own; and, if England had increased by sea, France had added to the extent of her shores the coasts of Holland, Flanders, Spain, and Italy, countries completely under her dominion or her influence. Here were vast means of maritime power.

Such was all that England sanctioned, in signing the preliminaries at London, for the price, indeed, of the continent of India. France might readily consent to it. Our allies, vigorously defended, recovered nearly all they had lost by the war. Spain was deprived of Trinity through her own fault, but she gained Olivença in Portugal, and Tuscany in Italy. Holland abandoned Ceylon; but she recovered her Indian colonies, the Cape of Good Hope, and the Guianas: and she was freed from the Stadtholder.

Such were the consequences of this peace, the most splendid and glorious ever concluded by France. It was natural, therefore, that the French negotiator was anxious to terminate it. The 30th of September had arrived, and some difficulties in the engrossing were not yet overcome. They were all removed, and at last, on the evening of the 1st of October, the last day allowed by the First Consul, M. Otto had the gratification of affixing his signature to the preliminaries of peace, a deep and unequalled gratification, for no negotiator had ever had the happiness of securing by his signature so much greatness to his country.

It was agreed to keep this news secret at London for twenty-four hours, in order that the courier of the French legation might announce it first to his government. This fortunate courier left on the night of the 1st of October, and arrived at 4 o'clock of the afternoon of the 3d—11th Vendémiaire—at Malmaison. At that moment the three consuls were holding a government council. The greatest excitement was produced by the opening of the despatches; they ceased from their labours, and embraced each other. The First Consul, who willingly threw aside all reserve with men in whom he had confidence, evinced plainly the feelings which filled his bosom. So many results obtained in so short a time—order, victory, and

peace restored to France by his genius and indefatigable perseverance, in two years—were blessings of which he might be justly proud. In these effusions of mutual gratification, M. Cambacérès said to him, "Now that we have made a treaty of peace with England, we must make a treaty of commerce, and remove all subjects of dispute between the two countries." "Not so fast," answered the First Consul, quickly, "the political peace is made; so much the better, let us enjoy it. As to a commercial peace, we will make one if we can. But at no price will I sacrifice French industry. I remember the misery of 1786." This extraordinary and instinctive passion for the interests of French industry must have been very strong, to burst out at such a time. But Consul Cambacérès, with his ordinary sagacity, had touched upon the difficulty which at a later period was destined to again embroil the two nations.

The news were instantly sent to Paris, in order to be published. Toward evening, cannon were heard in the streets, and every one inquired what happy event elicited these manifestations. They hastened to the public offices, where the government commissioners had orders to give information of the signing of the preliminaries. At that moment, in fact, the conclusion of peace was proclaimed in all the theatres, amid a joy for a long time unexampled. This joy was natural, for a peace with England was a true general peace; it assured the repose of the continent, suppressed the reason for European coalitions, and opened the world to our commerce and the products of our industry. Paris was suddenly illuminated during that night.

The First Consul immediately added his ratification to the preliminary treaty, and sent it to London, by his aide-de-camp Lauriston.¹ If the joy in France was great and general, in England it bordered on delirium. The news, at first kept secret by the negotiators, had at last transpired, and it was necessary to announce it to the Lord Mayor of London by a message. This message caused the more excitement, as, for several hours, a report of the rupture of the negotiation had been quite current. The people immediately abandoned themselves to those violent transports which are peculiar to the passionate character of the English nation. PEACE WITH FRANCE, was written with chalk in large letters on the public conveyances leaving London. Everywhere they were stopped, the horses unharnessed, and dragged in triumph. They imagined that all the miseries of scarcity and high prices were to finish at once. They dreamed of unknown, immense, impossible benefit. These are periods when nations, like individuals, weary with hating, experience the desire of reconciliation, even though it be transitory or delusive. At this moment, unfortunately so fleeting, the English people thought they almost loved France: they adored

the hero, the sage, who governed it; and shouted with transport. *Long live Bonaparte.*

Such is human joy: it is lively and profound only from our ignorance of the future. Let us thank the wisdom of God, for having sealed to men the book of their destiny! How many hearts would have been, that day, chilled to the core, if, by dropping suddenly the veil which concealed the future, the French and English could have seen before them fifteen years of bitter hatred, and sanguinary war, the continent and the ocean dyed with the blood of two nations! And, how astounded France would have been, if, whilst thinking herself so great, so great eternally, she had caught a glimpse, in a page of that dreadful book of destiny, of the treaties of 1815! And that hero, victorious and wise, who governed her, how surprised and affrighted would he have been, if, in the midst of his most splendid works, he could have perceived his great mistakes; if, in the midst of the most elevated prosperity, he could have foreseen his terrible downfall, and his martyrdom! Oh! indeed, Providence, in the wisdom of his designs, has been beneficent in discovering only the present to man: it is all-sufficient for his feeble understanding! And let us, who to-day know all, both what happened then and subsequently, endeavour for a moment to place ourselves in the ignorance of that time, in order to understand and to partake of its lively and profound emotions.

The joy of the English was still alloyed by a slight doubt, for the ratification of the First Consul had not arrived, and some sudden determination was feared from this energetic and haughty man, who had proved so exacting toward their nation. This doubt was distressing, but London suddenly learns that an aide-de-camp of the First Consul, one of his brother soldiers, Colonel Lauriston, had arrived at the hotel of M. Otto, and brought the ratified treaty. All distrust being now dispelled, the joy is unbounded. The populace hurried to the house of M. Otto, and found him in his carriage with Colonel Lauriston, about to go to Lord Hawkesbury, and exchange the ratifications. They unharness the horses, and drag the two Frenchmen to Lord Hawkesbury's residence.

From Lord Hawkesbury's, the two envoys were to repair to the prime minister's, Mr. Addington, then to the Admiralty, to Lord St. Vincent.² The people insisted on dragging the carriage from one minister to another. At last, at the Admiralty, the crowd and confusion had become so great, that Lord St. Vincent, fearing some accident, placed himself at the head of the escort, lest the carriage should be overturned, and some melancholy disaster ensue from this convulsive joy. Several days were spent in transports of this kind, and testimonials of extraordinary satisfaction.

¹ LAURISTON. JAMES ALEXANDER BERNARD LAW, COUNT DE. Grandson of the celebrated projector Law. Was born in 1768. He embraced the military profession at an early age, and served in the artillery, in which he was very rapidly promoted, owing partly to his own activity and yet more to the friendship of Bonaparte, whose aide-de-camp he was.—*Encyclopædia Americana*. H.

² LORD ST. VINCENT, one of the most distinguished naval officers of England, perhaps better known as SIR JOHN JARVIS. He was created Earl of St. Vincent for his glorious victory off the cape of that name, over the combined French and Spanish squadrons, in which Nelson distinguished himself so highly by the boarding of the San Josef and Salvador Mundo. H.

One fact worthy of remark is, that, a few hours after the signature of the preliminaries, a courier arrived from Egypt, bringing the news of the surrender of Alexandria, which took place on the 30th of August, 1801—12th Fructidor. "This courier," said Lord Hawkesbury to M. Otto, "reached us eight hours after the signature of the treaty; so much the better; had he arrived sooner, public opinion would have obliged us to have been more exacting, and the negotiation would probably have been broken off. Peace is worth more than an island, more or less." This minister, an honest man, was right. But it proved that the resistance of Alexandria had been useful, and that, even in a desperate cause, it is always well to listen to the voice of honour, which advises the most obstinate resistance.

It was agreed that plenipotentiaries should meet at Amiens, an intermediate point between London and Paris, to settle the treaty definitively. The British cabinet chose an old and gallant soldier, who had long borne arms for his country, but who thought the time had arrived for terminating the miseries of the world, in Lord Cornwallis,¹ one of the most estimable men in Great Britain. Lord Cornwallis had commanded the English armies in America and in India. He had been Governor-general of India, and Viceroy of Ireland during the close of the last century. It was agreed that Lord Cornwallis should repair to Paris, to congratulate the First Consul, before proceeding to the place of meeting.

The First Consul, on his part, chose his brother Joseph, of whom he was particularly fond, and who, by the suavity of his manners, and gentleness of his disposition, was peculiarly adapted to play the part of a peace-maker, which was always reserved for him. Joseph had signed the peace with America at Morfontaine, with Austria at Lunéville, he was about signing that with England at Amiens. Thus the First Consul caused the fruit cultivated by his own victorious hands to be gathered by those of his brother. M. de Talleyrand, seeing all the apparent honour of these treaties falling to the lot of a personage, a stranger to the labours of our diplomacy, could not avoid a feeling of vexation, a feeling, however, momentary, and strongly repressed, observed, nevertheless, by the malicious and scrutinizing eyes of the diplomatists residing at Paris, and which served to fill more than one despatch. But the skilful minister knew that he dared not alienate the family of the First Consul; and that, moreover, if after having given General Bonaparte his dues, some portion of the glory of these great negotiations still remained to be shared, the European public decree it to the minister of foreign affairs alone.

The negotiations commenced with various

states, and yet unconcluded, were almost immediately terminated. The First Consul understood the art of producing great effects on the minds of men, because he himself had a brilliant imagination. He quickly settled all difficulties with the various courts, and desired to heap upon France every kind of gratification in rapid succession, and to bewilder and intoxicate her by extraordinary results.

He closed with Portugal, and made his brother Lucien sign, at Madrid, the conditions at first refused at Badajos, with the exception of a few unimportant modifications. He insisted no longer on the occupation of one of the Portuguese provinces, for the basis of the peace with England being secured by the abandonment of Trinity, he had no longer any interest in retaining a guarantee, which at first seemed requisite. An indemnity for the expenses of the war was agreed upon, as well as some commercial advantages for our industry; such, for example, as the immediate introduction of our cloths, and various productions on the footing of the most favoured nations. The exclusion of English war and merchant vessels was formerly stipulated until the conclusion of peace.

The evacuation of Egypt terminated all difficulties with the Ottoman Porte. M. de Talleyrand concluded, at Paris, with the minister of the Sultan, the preliminaries of peace, which stipulated the restoration of Egypt to the Porte, and the renewal of her former relations with France, and the active enforcement of all anterior treaties of commerce and navigation.

Similar treaties were made with the regencies of Tunis and Algiers.

A treaty was signed with Bavaria which placed her, with regard to France, in the relations of alliance which had formerly existed between that court and the old French monarchy, when the latter protected all the second class German powers against the ambition of Austria. It was an actual renewal of the treaties of Westphalia and Teschen. Bavaria abandoned to France all her former possessions on the left bank of the Rhine. In return, France promised to use her influence in the Germanic affairs soon about to be negotiated, to procure for Bavaria an adequate indemnity. France, moreover, guaranteed the integrity of her states.

Lastly, to finish this work of general pacification, the treaty with Russia, which established a right of peace already existing in fact, was signed, after long discussion, by M. de Markoff and M. de Talleyrand. As has been seen, the new emperor had shown less energy in his resistance to the maritime pretensions of England, but also less ostentation and exacting in the protection granted to the little Italian states, which had taken a part in the coalition against France. Alexander had never made any diffi-

¹ LORD CORNWALLIS, CHARLES, MARQUIS OF. Born in 1739, and educated at Eton and Cambridge. He devoted himself early to the profession of arms. In 1762 he took his seat in the House of Peers on the death of his father. By his speeches he appears to have been favourable to the claims of the colonies; yet in his military capacity he accepted a command in America, and distinguished himself at the battle of Brandywine. He was then appointed governor of South Carolina, and won the battles of Camden and Guilford. He then in-

vaded Virginia, and was obliged to surrender at Yorktown with his whole army to Washington and Lafayette. In 1786 he was sent out, as commander-in-chief and governor-general, to India. During his tenure he vanquished Tippoo Saib, stormed Seringapatam, and conquered the Mysore. He was afterwards Viceroy of Ireland in 1796, during the rebellion, until 1801, in which capacity he conducted himself with great firmness and judgment, and a conciliatory temper. In 1801 he signed the treaty of Amiens, as in the text.

culties as to Egypt; but, at all events, they were all suppressed by recent events. He pretended no longer to the title of Grand-master of the Knights of Malta, thus rendering easy the restoration of the Order upon its former footing, as has been agreed upon with England. The only serious difference with Alexander was as to Naples and Piedmont. By insisting and gaining time, these also had been overcome. The evacuation of the gulf of Tarentum had just been promised to the English. Russia was satisfied, and saw in it the accomplishment of a condition essential to her honour, namely, the integrity of the Neapolitan states. She had ceased to speak of the island of Elba. As to Piedmont, each day, added to the silence of England during the negotiation at London, had emboldened the First Consul not to restore this important province to the King of Sardinia. Russia reminded him of the promises made on this subject. The First Consul answered by saying, that a defence of the true maritime law in all its extent had been promised to him, and that a part of it had been yielded to England. They agreed on an article by which they promised an amicable arrangement of the interests of his majesty, the King of Sardinia, and *to have for them all the respect compatible with the actual nature of things.* This was giving themselves great latitude with regard to this prince, and especially that of indemnifying at some time with the duchy of Parma or Plaisance, as was then the intention of the First Consul. The conduct of the King of Sardinia, his devotion to the English during the last campaign in Egypt, had deeply wounded the chief of the French government. The latter, however, had better reasons than anger; he looked upon Piedmont as one of our most valuable Italian provinces, for it always gave us an outlet into Italy, and the opportunity of constantly maintaining an army there. It was, in short, for France, what Milan had so long been for Austria.

Russia and France had always been of one opinion on the affairs of Germany: there was consequently no difficulty on that head.

The treaty was therefore engrossed upon this basis, in conjunction with the new envoy, M. de Markoff, recently arrived from Petersburg. An open treaty was first signed, which simply stated that a good understanding was restored between the two governments, and that they would not permit the emigrants of either country to entertain treasonable intrigues in their former land. This article was intended for the Poles on the one hand, and the Bourbons on the other. To this open treaty was added a secret convention, in which it was declared, that the two empires having reaped the benefit of their interposition in the affairs of Germany, at the treaty of Teschen, they would again unite their influence to effect in Germany the territorial arrangements most favourable to the equilibrium of Europe; that France especially would endeavour to obtain an advantageous indemnity for the elector of Bavaria, the Grand-duke of Wurtemberg, the Grand-duke of Baden; (the latter had been added to the list of the protégés of Russia, on account of the new empress, who was a princess of

Baden;) that the Neapolitan states would be evacuated on the conclusion of the maritime peace, and enjoy neutrality in case of war; and that lastly, an amicable arrangement of the affairs of the King of Sardinia should be made, when opportunity offered, and in the manner most compatible with the actual condition of things.

The First Consul immediately sent his aide-camp, Caulaincourt, to Petersburg, to carry to the young emperor a well-written and friendly letter, in which he congratulated him on the conclusion of peace, informed him with a kind of satisfaction of a multitude of details, and seemed to desire, in future, to conduct with him the great affairs of the world. M. de Caulaincourt, whilst waiting for an ambassador, was to supersede Duroc, who had been rather hasty in returning from Petersburg. The First Consul had sent the latter a large sum, with orders to be present at the coronation of the emperor, and to represent France with magnificence. Duroc, not having had time to receive this letter, had departed. Another cause had induced him. Alexander had ordered an invitation to be present at the coronation to be sent to him, but M. de Panin had not obeyed him. This affair having been subsequently explained, the emperor, hurt at this disobedience, banished M. de Panin to his country residence, and replaced him by M. de Kotschoubey, one of the members of his secret council. The young emperor thus began to get rid of the men who had assisted in his elevation, and who wanted to lead him in their policy, which was exclusively English. Every thing, therefore, augured well from Russia. The delicate and flattering attentions of the First Consul could not fail to render this result more certain.

These various treaties, which completed the peace of the world, were signed nearly at the same time as the preliminaries of London. Public joy was at its greatest height, and it was determined to celebrate the general peace by a splendid festival. This was fixed for the 18th of Brumaire. The day could not have been more wisely chosen, for to the revolution of the 18th of Brumaire these happy results were to be attributed. Lord Cornwallis was to be present. He arrived on the 16th of Brumaire—7th of November—at Paris, with a number of his countrymen. The signature of the preliminaries had scarcely been completed when the demand for passports for France rapidly increased. M. Otto had given three hundred. These were insufficient, an unlimited number was required. The vessels bringing English goods and coming for French productions, showed the same anxiety to obtain letters of safe conduct. All these demands were granted with the greatest alacrity, and the relations between the two countries were restored immediately with inconceivable rapidity and ardour. On the 18th of Brumaire, Paris was filled with Englishmen, impatient to see this France, so new and suddenly so brilliant, and above all to see the man who at this moment was the admiration of England and of the world. The illustrious Fox was among those most anxious to visit France. On the day of the festival, made magnificent by the tranquil

and profound joy of all classes of citizens, no carriages out those of Lord Cornwallis were allowed in the streets. The crowd hastily and respectfully opened before this honourable representative of the English armies, who had just concluded a peace with his own nation and ours. He was surprised to find France so different from the hideous picture painted at London by the emigrants. All his countrymen shared the same feeling, and expressed it with the most ingenious wonder.

Whilst this festival was taking place at Paris, a superb banquet was given in the city of London, and amid the most enthusiastic shouts, the following toasts were drunk.

The King of Great Britain!

The Prince of Wales!

The liberty and prosperity of the united kingdoms of Great Britain and Ireland!

The First Consul Bonaparte, the liberty and happiness of the French republic.

Loud and unanimous acclamations accompanied this last toast.

France was at peace with all the powers of the earth. There remained but one to conclude, more difficult perhaps than the preceding, for it required a genius far different from that of a warrior, and it was also very desirable, as it was to restore tranquillity to the minds of men, and union to families. This peace was that of the Republic with the Church. We will now proceed to relate the laborious negotiations of which this was the object, with the representative of the Holy See.

BOOK XII.

THE CONCORDATE.¹

State of the Catholic Church during the French Revolution—Civil Constitution of the Clergy decreed by the Constituent Assembly—The intention of this Constitution was to assimilate the administration of Religion to that of the Kingdom, by establishing a diocese in each department, cause the Bishops to be elected by the Faithful, and disengage them from the Canonical Government—Clergy required to swear fidelity to this Constitution—Refusal on their part, and Schism—Various Orders of Priests, their Character and Influence—Inconvenience of this state of things—Arguments furnished by it to the Enemies of the Revolution, to disturb the State and Private Families—Various Systems proposed to remedy this evil—The System of Inaction—The System of a French Church, of which the First Consul was to be the head—The System of an encouragement to Protestantism—Opinions of the First Consul on these different Systems—He forms the project of restoring the Catholic Religion, by adapting its Discipline to the new French Institutions—He wants to depose the old Titular Bishops, a circumscription of sixty leagues instead of one hundred and fifty-eight; the creation of a new Clergy, composed of respectable Priests of all Sects; the reformation of the Police of Religion to the State; a Salary to the Priests instead of a Landed Endowment; and, lastly, the authorizing by the Church, of the Sale of the National Properties—Amicable Relations of Pope Pius VII. with the First Consul—Monsignor Spina, charged with the Negotiation at Paris, retards it in a temporal interest of the Holy See—Secret desire to recover the Legations—Monsignor Spina at last aware of the necessity of haste—He confers with the Abbé Bernier, to whom is confided the Negotiation on the part of France—Difficulties of the plan proposed to the Court of Rome—The French Consul sends his plan to Rome and demands an Explanation from the Pope—Three Cardinals consulted—The Pope, after this consultation, desires that the Catholic be made the State Religion; that he be excused from deposing the old Titular Bishops, and from authorizing otherwise than by his silence the Sale of the Properties of the Church—Debates with M. de Cacault, Minister of France at Rome—The First Consul, weary with the delay, orders M. de Cacault to leave Rome within five days, if the Concordate is not adopted in that time—Terror of the Pope and Cardinal Consalvi—M. de Cacault suggests to the Pontifical Cabinet the idea of sending Cardinal Consalvi to Paris—Departure of the latter for France, and his fears. His arrival at Paris—Kind reception by the First Consul—Conferences with the Abbé Bernier—They agree upon the principle of a State Religion—The Catholic Religion is declared that of a majority of the French—All the other conditions of the First Consul, relative to the deposition of the old Titular Bishops, the new Circumscription, the Sale of the Church Properties, are accepted with a few modifications as to form—Definitive agreement on all points—Efforts made at the last moment by the adversaries of the Restoration of Religion, to prevent the First Consul from signing the Concordate—He insists—Signature affixed on the 15th of July, 1801—Return of Cardinal Consalvi to Rome—Satisfaction of the Pope—Solemnity of the Ratifications—Choice of Cardinal Caprara as Legate *a latere*—The First Consul would have wished to celebrate on the 18th of Brumaire, the Peace with the Church, as well as the Peace with all the European powers—The Necessity of addressing the old Titular Bishops, to obtain their Resignations, causes delay—Demand of their Resignation addressed by the Pope to all the old Bishops, constitutional or not constitutional—Wise submission of the Constitutional—Noble Resignation of the Members of the old Clergy—Admirable Answers—No Resistance on the part of any except those who had fled to London—Every thing ready for the Restoration of Religion in France, when a warm opposition in the Tribunate creates new delay—Necessity of conquering this opposition before proceeding further.

The First Consul would have wished that the anniversary of the 18th of Brumaire, intended for the celebration of the reconciliation of France with Europe, should have also witnessed the reconciliation of France with the church. He had made the greatest efforts to terminate the negotiation with the Holy See, so that the religious ceremonies might have been added to the popular festivals. But it is still less easy to treat with spiritual than with temporal powers, for the gain of a battle is not sufficient; and it is a point of honour with the

human mind to be conquered only by force, accompanied by persuasion.

This difficult labour of persuasion added to force, had the conqueror of Rivoli and Marengo undertaken with the Romish church, in order to reconcile her to the French republic.

The Revolution, as we have before frequently said, had shot beyond the mark in many things. To cause it to retrograde, only as regarded these things, and that neither within nor beyond the mark, was a legitimate and salutary reaction, which the First Consul had undertaken, and which he then rendered admirable, by the wisdom and skill of the means he employed.

¹ Concordate. A convention between the Bishop of Rome, as head of the church, and any secular government, for the settling of ecclesiastical affairs.—*Encyclopædia Americana*.

Religion was evidently one of the things in which the Revolution had exceeded all just and reasonable bounds. In no department was reform so necessary.

Under the old monarchy there had existed a powerful clergy, possessing a greater portion of the soil, supporting none of the public offices, making only when they pleased voluntary contributions to the royal treasury, erected into a political power, and forming one of the three orders which, in the states-general, expressed the will of the nation. The Revolution had swept away the clergy with their wealth, influence, and privileges; it had swept them away with the nobility, the parliament, and the throne itself. It was impossible for it to have done otherwise. A proprietary clergy, erected into a political power, might have suited the state of society in the middle ages, and have then been useful to civilization, but it was inadmissible in the eighteenth century. The constituent assembly had well done in abolishing it, and replacing it by a clergy, devoted solely to their religious duties, having no share in the deliberations of the state, and salaried instead of being proprietary. To ask the approval of all these changes from the Holy See, was demanding a great deal. In order to succeed, it was politic to stop these, and not furnish a legitimate pretext for saying, that religion herself was attacked in all she held most immutable and sacred. The Constituent Assembly, carried away by that taste for regularity, so natural to reformers, assimilated, without hesitation, the government of the church to that of the state. Some dioceses were too vast, others too small; it was wished that the ecclesiastical should be the same as the administrative limits, and a diocese was created for every department. The ecclesiastical, like the civil and judiciary officers, were to be made elective. This arrangement seemed to be a return to the times of the primitive church, when the bishops were elected by the faithful. The canonical institution, that is, the confirmation of the bishops by the Pope, was immediately suppressed; and a constitution, to which the name of Civil Constitution of the Clergy was formed. The men who acted in this way were animated by very pious intentions. They were true believers, fervent Jansenists, but of narrow minds, insatuated with theological disputations, and hence very dangerous in human affairs. To complete their mistakes, they required the French clergy to swear fidelity to the civil constitution. This was giving rise to a case of conscience for the sincere, and a pretext for the malevolent; it was, in short, creating a schism. Rome, already affected by the misfortunes of the throne, was soon wounded by those of the altar. She forbade the oath. A portion of the clergy, faithful to her voice, refused to take it; another portion consented, and formed, under the title of *sworn* (*assermenté*) or constitutional clergy, that recognised by the state, and the only one allowed to perform the offices of religious worship. Priests had not yet been proscribed: the exercise of the priesthood was merely interdicted to some, and granted to others. But the deposed priests were generally preferred

by the faithful, because the religious feeling is susceptible, easily alarmed, and especially distrustful of power. They turned towards the ecclesiastics considered as orthodox, and appearing persecuted. They left, by instinct, those whose orthodoxy was suspected, and who were supported by the government. There was a private as well as a public worship—the former more observed than the latter. The passions inimical to the Revolution leagued with offended religion, and hurried her into the errors of faction. In the province of La Vendée a horrible civil war was soon the consequence of this schism. The Revolution was not far behind, and from the mere suspension of the ecclesiastical functions, it soon passed to persecution. It proscribed and banished priests. Then ensued the abolition of all religion, and the proclamation of the Supreme Being. Then, priests who had or had not submitted to the laws, *sworn* or *not sworn*, were treated alike, and sent to the same scaffold, where royalists, Constituents, Girondists, and Mountainers, perished together.

Under the Directory this sanguinary proscription ceased. A variable government, sometimes inclining to indifference, and sometimes to severity, kept the church in a continual state of anxiety. The First Consul, encouraging, by his power, and evidence of intention of reformation, all those who had suffered, without regard to the manner, induced the ministers of religion to leave their hiding-places, or to return from exile. But by bringing them to the light, he made the schism more apparent, and widened, perhaps, the breach. In order to remove the difficulty of the oath, he ceased to require it, and substituted for it a simple promise of submission to the laws. This promise, which could not alarm the consciences of the priests, had facilitated their return, but had added, in some manner, new disputes to those already existing, by creating in the bosom of the clergy one order more.

There were the constitutional or *sworn* priests, legally invested with the sacerdotal functions, and enjoying the use of the religious edifices which had been restored to them by a decree of the consuls. There were priests, *not sworn*, who would never take the oath, who, after having lived in exile and in prison, had reappeared during the first days of the consulate, but who officiated in private houses, and pronounced the public worship performed in the churches improper. Lastly, these priests *not sworn*, were divided into priests who had not and those who had made the *promise*. The latter were not entirely approved of by the orthodox. They applied to Rome, which, fearing the First Consul, refused to answer. But Cardinal Maury, residing in the states of the Holy See, where he had become Bishop of Montefiascone, the medium of the Pope with the royalist party, and unwilling, at least then, to countenance the submission of the priests to the new government, had interpreted the silence of Rome, and sent to France, on the subject of the *promise*, disapprobatory letters, thus disturbing anew the consciences of the people

* Montagnards, members of the first assembly, belonging to that part called the Mountain, (*Montagne*.)

ALL these priests, thus divided, had each his own hierarchy. The constitutional priests obeyed the bishops, elected under the civil constitution. Of these bishops some had perished, either by a natural or a violent death. Those who had died, had been replaced by bishops, who, not having been regularly elected, amid the proscription levelled at all religion, had usurped their powers, or caused themselves to be elected by secret chapters, or kinds of religious coteries, without any authority either legal or moral. Thus the powers of the constitutional priests themselves, in the view of the civil constitution, were disputed by some amongst themselves, and had fallen into discredit. In this clergy were many respectable individuals; but, in general, they had lost the confidence of the faithful, because they were known to be at variance with Rome, and because, by meddling with the religious and political affairs of the day, they had derogated from the dignity of the priesthood. Many of them were violent clabbists, and very immoral. The best were sincere priests, whom the fury of Jansenism had driven into schism.

The clergy claiming to be orthodox had also its bishops, exerting a less public, but more real and very dangerous authority. The priests not sworn had nearly all emigrated. They were in Italy, Spain, Germany, and especially in England, whither they had been attracted by the subsidies of the British government. Corresponding with their diocese, by means of the grand-vicar chosen by them and approved by Rome, they governed their church from the bosom of their exile, under the inspiration of the passions excited by banishment, and frequently to the advantages of the enemies of France. The deceased, and they were many during the last ten years, were everywhere replaced by secret governors clothed with the powers of the Court of Rome; so that one of the wisest and oldest precautions of the Gallican church, that of filling vacancies by chapters, and not by the agents of the Holy See, was completely neglected. The French church had thus lost its independence, for it was directly governed by Rome, when it ceased to be by the emigrated bishops. Yet a little while, and the emigrated bishops would necessarily be nearly all dead, and the entire Church of France be under ultramontane authority.

There are men who are but slightly affected by the moral sight of a society torn by a thousand sects; they want the government either to disdain these religious divergences as foreign to it, or to respect them as sacred objects of its care. One circumstance, however, does not permit this proud indifference, which is the profound derangement of society, especially when this derangement is on the eve of being transformed into serious disorganization.

These various orders of clergy endeavoured to enlist proselytes in their favour. The constitutional clergy had but little power, and was only a subject of recriminations for the Jacobins, who were wont to say that the Revolution had been wholly forfeited, especially in the person of the priests alone who were attached to its

cause; a matter in which the government could do nothing, for on it did not depend the disposition of the faithful, in favour of one clergy or another. But the clergy reputed orthodox had an effect upon minds entirely opposite to that of the established clergy. They endeavoured to alienate from the government all those whom the tediousness of civil discussions would have driven to the First Consul. If possible, they would again have kindled the passions of La Vendée. They maintained still a sort of secret suspicion and discontent. They agitated the south, more excited than La Vendée, and in the mountains in the centre of France, riotously gathered the people around the orthodox priests. Everywhere this clergy threw discord into families, by persuading those who had been either baptized or married by the sworn, (*assermentés*,) that they were not in the bosom of the true Catholic church, and that they must be rebaptized or remarried if they wished to become true Christians, or abandon a life of concubinage. Thus the welfare of families became a question, not in a legal but in a religious point of view. There were more than 10,000 married priests, who, carried away by the giddiness of the times, or excited by terror, had sought in marriage, some the gratification of passions they could not repress, and others an abjuration which saved them from the scaffold. They were husbands, and fathers of families, ruined by public prejudice, so long as the pardon of the church was withheld from them.

The purchasers of the national domains, those whom, of all citizens, the government had most interest in protecting, lived also in a state of disturbance and oppression. On their death-beds they were besieged by perfidious suggestions, and threatened with eternal damnation, if they did not consent to the most rapacious arrangements. Confession became a powerful engine in the hands of the emigrants, in striking a blow at property, at public credit, and, in a word, at one of the most essential principles of the Revolution, the inviolability of the public sales. The police of the government and the laws were equally powerless against these evils.

These disorders were not such as a government can observe with indifference. When religious sects have no other result than to multiply, in a vast country like America, and to succeed each other *ad infinitum*, leaving no traces but the fleeting remembrance of ridiculous or indecent practices, it may be conceived, that, to a certain point, the state may look on with indifference or inaction. Society presents a melancholy moral aspect, but public order is not seriously disturbed. Such was not the case in the old French society of 1801. Without great danger, the government of souls could not be intrusted to inimical factions. The torch of civil war could not be left in their hands, with the liberty of applying it, wherever they listed, to La Vendée, Brittany, or the Cevennes. They could not be permitted to disturb the tranquillity of families; besiege the beds of the dying to extort iniquitous concessions; to bring into doubt the credit of the state.

and, in short, to shake a whole class of possessions, even those which the Revolution had promised to render eternally inviolable.

The ideas of the First Consul on the constitution of society were too just and profound to allow him to regard with an indifferent eye the religious disorder in France at this period; and he was induced, moreover, to interfere, by motives still more elevated than those we have just indicated, if there can be motives more elevated than public order and private tranquillity.

A religious belief and a form of worship are necessary to all human associations. Man, thrown into the middle of the universe, without knowing whence he comes or whither he goes, why he suffers, even why he exists, what reward or what punishment he will receive hereafter; a prey to the contradictions of his fellow-men, some of whom tell him, that there is a God, the author and prime-mover of all things, others that there is none; the former, that good and evil exist, which should serve as a guide for his conduct; the latter, that there is neither good nor evil, which are mere fables invented by the powerful of the earth—experiences the imperious irresistible desire, of creating for himself on all those objects some definite belief. True or false, ridiculous or sublime, he creates one. Everywhere, in all ages, in all countries, in ancient as in modern times, in civilized as in savage countries, he is found at the foot of an altar, sometimes venerable, sometimes ignoble or sanguinary. When an established belief does not prevail, a thousand sects as bitter in dispute as in America, a thousand superstitions as degrading as in China, agitate and debase the human mind. Or, indeed, if, as in France in 1793, a transitory disturbance sweeps away the old religion of the country; man, at the very moment in which he had made a vow to henceforward believe nothing, belies himself in a few days, and the insane worship of the Goddess Reason, inaugurated at the side of the scaffold, has just proved that this vow was as vain as it was impious.

Judging, therefore, from his ordinary and constant conduct, man requires a religious belief. What, consequently, better can be desired for a civilized society, than a national religion, founded on the true sentiments of the human heart, conformable to the rules of a pure morality, consecrated by time, and which, without intolerance and persecution, brings, if not the whole, at least a great majority of the citizens to the foot of an ancient and revered altar?

Such a belief cannot be invented, if it has not existed for ages. Philosophers, even the most profound, may create a philosophy, adorn by their science the age in which they live: they give excitement to thought, but not belief. A warrior covered with glory may found an empire, he cannot found a religion. In former times, sages and heroes, pretending to have communication with Heaven, have been seen to conquer the minds of nations, and give them a belief: but, in modern days, the creator of a religion would be considered as an impostor, and though surrounded with terror like Robespierre, or with glory like the youthful Bona-

parte, his career would terminate only in ridicule.

There was nothing to invent in 1800. That pure moral and antique belief existed: it was the old religion of Christ; according to some the work of God, according to others that of man; but according to all, the profound work of a sublime reformer. A reformer commented upon during eighteen centuries by countless vast assemblies of the eminent men of every period, occupied in discussing, under the title of heresies, the various systems of philosophy, adopting successively on each of the great problems of the destiny of man the most plausible and most social opinions, adopting them, as it were, by a majority of mankind, succeeding at last in producing that collection of unvarying doctrine, so often attacked, and always triumphant, called *Catholic Unity*, and at the foot of which the most splendid geniuses have bowed in silence. That religion, which had included in its ranks all civilized nations, had formed their manners, inspired their songs, furnished the subjects of their poetry, their paintings, and their statues, impressed with its seal all their national recollections, and stamped with its emblems their standards alternately victorious or vanquished, still existed! It had been lost temporarily in a great storm of human mind; but when the storm had ceased, the necessity of belief returned, and rose again from men's bosoms, as the natural and indispensable belief of France and Europe.

What could be more clearly indicated, and necessary in 1800, than to build up that altar of St. Louis, of Charlemagne, and of Clovis, for a time overthrown! General Bonaparte, who would have been ridiculous had he endeavoured to pass for a prophet or a revealer, was acting the true part assigned to him by Providence, by erecting with his victorious hands that venerable altar, and bringing back, by his example, nations wandering like a flock with the shepherd. And nothing short of his glory would have sufficed for such a work! Great geniuses, not only among philosophers, but among kings, Voltaire and Frederick, had heaped contempt on the Catholic religion, and given the signal of raillery for fifty years. General Bonaparte, who had as much talent as Voltaire, and more glory than Frederick, was able alone, by his example and reverence, to dispel the taunts and mockery of the last century.

Not the slightest doubt on this subject arose in his mind. The double motive of restoring order in the state and in families, of satisfying the moral wants of men, had inspired him with the firm determination of replacing the Catholic religion on its former basis, with the exception of its political attributes, which he regarded as incompatible with the present state of French society.

Is it needful to inquire, with motives such as those which governed him, whether he was actuated by religious faith or by policy and ambition? Wisdom, that is to say, a profound knowledge of human nature, guided his actions, that is sufficient. The rest is a mystery, which curiosity, always natural when a great man is concerned, may seek to penetrate, but

which is of little importance. It must, however, be stated that the moral constitution of General Bonaparte led him to religious ideas. An elevated mind appreciates, in proportion to its very elevation, the beauties of creation. It is intelligence that discovers intelligence in the universe, and a great mind is more capable than a contracted one of tracing God by means of his works. General Bonaparte discussed voluntarily philosophical and religious questions with Monge, Lagrange, Laplace, sages whom he honoured and loved, and frequently embarrassed them, in their incredulity, by the clearness and originality of his arguments. To this must be added, that, being educated in a wild and religious country, under the eyes of a pious mother, the sight of the old Catholic altar awakened in him recollections of infancy, always so powerful on a sensitive and exalted imagination. As to ambition, which some of his detractors have wished to assign as the sole motive of his conduct in this matter, at that time, he had no other than that of doing good, in every way; and certainly he may be pardoned, if, as a reward of having done well, he found his power augmented. The most noble and legitimate ambition is that which endeavours to found its empire on the satisfaction of the true wants of nations.

The task he had proposed to himself, apparently easy, since it was only the satisfying of a very real public want, was nevertheless very difficult. The men who surrounded him, with hardly an exception, were but little disposed to the restoration of the old religion; and these men, magistrates, warriors, litterateurs, or savans, were the authors of the French Revolution, the true and only defenders of that Revolution then condemned, and who were to terminate it, by redeeming its errors, and fixing definitively its rational and legitimate results. The First Consul, therefore, met with warm opposition from his collaborators, his supporters, and his friends. These men, taken from the ranks of the moderate revolutionists, had not with Robespierre and St. Just shed human blood, and it was easy for them to denounce the excesses of the Revolution; but they had partaken of the errors of the Constituent Assembly, repeated with a smile the witticisms of Voltaire, and it was difficult to make them confess that they had for a long time overlooked the higher truths of social order. Sages like Laplace, Lagrange, and especially Monge, told General Bonaparte that he was about to humble, before Rome, the dignity of his government and his age. M. Rœderer, the most fiery monarchist of the day, and anxious for the most rapid and entire return to monarchy, yet saw with regret the project of restoring the old religion. M. de Talleyrand himself, the assiduous partisan of every thing that could reconcile the present with the past, and France with Europe, a workman of second rank, but a useful and zealous promoter of the general peace, looked upon with great coldness what was called the religious peace. He did not want to persecute the priests any longer, but, annoyed by private recollections, he was not desirous of the re-establishment of the old Catholic church, with its

rules and discipline. The fellow-soldiers of General Bonaparte, the generals who had fought under his orders, wanting in primary education, and educated among the vulgar jests of camps, and declamations of clubs, were opposed to the restoration of religion. Though covered with glory, they seemed to fear that ridicule would attend their worship at the altar. Lastly, the brothers of General Bonaparte, living in close communion with the literati of the age, fearing every thing that had the appearance of serious opposition to their brother's power, and ignorant that beyond this interested or unenlightened resistance of men near the government, the real necessity was felt by the mass of the people, dissuaded him earnestly from what they considered as an imprudent or premature step.

The First Consul was therefore annoyed by advice of all kinds. Some told him not to meddle with religious affairs, to be satisfied with the non-persecution of the priests, and to let the *sworn* and *non-sworn* priests settle the matter in their own way. Others, aware of the danger of indifference or inaction, persuaded him to seize the opportunity and declare himself the head of a French church, and thus to remove from the hands of others the powerful engine of religion. Others proposed to drive France into Protestantism, and assured that, if he gave the example by his conversion to that faith, it would be followed with enthusiasm.

The First Consul opposed, with all his reason and eloquence, these pernicious counsels. He had formed a religious library, composed of a few but well chosen books, relating chiefly to the history of the church and the relations of church and state; he had ordered the Latin writings of Bossuet on this subject to be translated for him; he had devoured all this in the short intervals furnished him by the cares of government, and supplying by his genius all of which he was ignorant, as in the composition of the civil code he astonished the world by the accuracy, extent, and variety of his knowledge of religion. According to his custom, when deeply intent on an idea, he discussed it daily with his colleagues, his ministers, with the members of the Council of State or Legislative Body, with every one, in short from whom he might obtain information. He refuted successively the erroneous systems proposed to him, by cogent, clear, and decisive arguments.

To the system which consisted in abstaining from all participation in religious affairs, he replied, that indifference, so much vaunted by certain disdainful spirits, is not allowable in a people who had, for instance, just been seen invading a church and threatening to pillage it, because the rites of sepulture had been refused to a favourite actress of the public. How could one remain indifferent in a country, which, with the pretension of being indifferent, was so little so! The First Consul demanded, moreover, how it was possible to abstain from meddling, when the *sworn* and *non-sworn* priests were disputing for the possession of the house of worship, and solicited constantly the assistance of the public authority, to

obtain some and dispossess others. He asked what would be done, when the constitutional clergy, already but little followed by the believing part of the population, would be entirely abandoned by them, and when the clergy who had refused the oath, exclusively followed and listened to, would alone be able to perform worship, as had already happened, and would preside over clandestine meetings. Must not the temporality of worship be restored to those who had conquered its spirituality? Was there not reason for meddling? Again, it was necessary to support those priests whose landed endowments had been taken by the Revolution, and for that purpose either give them appointments on the budget of the state, or suffer them to organize under the title of voluntary contributions, a vast system of taxation, which would produce 30,000,000 or 40,000,000 francs, to be distributed by them alone, perhaps to some foreign power, and might one day, perhaps, unknown to the government, feed the old soldiers of the civil war of La Vendée. Whatever they might do, the government would be aroused, despite itself, from its inaction, either to maintain good order, to dispose of the houses of worship, or, lastly, to pay the priests itself, or watch over their mode of payment.

It would thus have all the responsibility of government, without its advantages, without being able (which it would be by a prudent arrangement with the Holy See for securing to itself the religious administration) to bring back the clergy to the government, and enlist them in the work of reparation, to re-establish repose in families, to tranquillize the dying, the possessors of national property, the married priests, &c.; in fact, all parties compromised by the part they had taken in the Revolution.

Inaction, then, according to the First Consul, was only a mere dream, besides being a subterfuge resorted to by men who had no practical notion of the *rationale* of government.

As to the idea of creating a French church independent of all foreign supremacy, like the Church of England, and having, in place of a spiritual foreign head, a temporal one located at Paris, which could be no other than the government itself; in other words, the First Consul looked on it to be as vain as it was contemptible. What! he, a warrior, wearing sword and spurs, and doing battle, to become the head of a church, a sort of Pope, regulating church discipline and dogma! But it was sought to render him as odious as Robespierre, the inventor of the worship of the Supreme Being, or as ridiculous as Larévellière-Lepeaux, the inventor of the theophilanthropia! Who, in that case, were to be his followers? Who were to constitute his flock of the faithful? He could not, assuredly, expect it would consist of the orthodox Christians, to which class the majority of Catholics belonged, and who had an aversion from following excellent orists who had no other fault than that of having taken an oath imposed on them by the laws. The only followers he could hope to have, then, would be a few bad priests, a few monks who had run away from their convents, and were frequenters of the clubs, who, having led dissolute lives before, wished to lead them

still, while they waited for the head of the new church to grant permission to the priests to marry! He could not even hope to count among his flock the Abbé Grégoire, who, while he demanded a return to the primitive church, held out for remaining in communion with the successor of St. Peter! He could not even hope to have Larévellière-Lepeaux, who wanted to confine religious worship to a few hymns, and to a few flowers strewed upon an altar! Was such the church of which they wanted to make him the head? Was that the part to be played by the conqueror of Marengo and Rivoli, the restorer of social order! Yet was this project proposed to him by the jealous supporters of liberty! But supposing that the project might succeed, which, by the way, was impossible, and that to his already immense temporal power the First Consul should unite the spiritual power; he would become the most formidable of tyrants, and the master of both body and soul in as great a degree as the sultan of Constantinople, who is at one and the same time head of the state, of the army, and of the religion. Moreover, the hypothesis was absurd; he would be a tyrant, open to derision, for he could succeed only in producing a schism, the most silly of all. He, whose wish was to be the pacificator of France and of the world, to terminate all political and religious divisions—was he to become the originator of a new schism, a little more absurd, and not less dangerous, than the preceding ones? "Yes! doubtless," said the First Consul, "a Pope I must have, but he must be a Pope who will approximate men's minds to each other instead of creating divisions, who will reunite them and give them to the government sprung from the Revolution, as a price for the protection that he shall have obtained from it. And for this purpose I must have the true Pope, the Catholic, Apostolic and Roman Pope, whose seat is at the Vatican. With the French armies and some deference I shall always be sufficiently his master. When I shall raise up the altars again, when I shall protect the priests, when I shall feed them and treat them as ministers of religion deserve to be treated in every country, he will do what I shall ask of him, through the interest which he will have in the general tranquillity. He will calm men's minds, reunite them under his hand, and place them under mine. Short of this, there is only a continuation and an aggravation of the desolating schism which is preying on us, and for me an immense and indelible ridicule."

As to the idea of urging France to Protestantism, it appeared to the First Consul more than ridiculous, it was odious to him. In the first place, he thought he could not succeed any better by it. In his opinion, persons were wrong in fancying that in France one could do whatever one wished. It was an error by no means creditable to those who committed it, for they were supposing France to be without conscience and without opinion. He, himself, said some, could do whatever he wished. "Yes," replied he, "but only with regard to the real and sensibly felt wants of France." She had been in deep desquiet, and he had brought her to the most perfect calm; he had found her

a prey to anarchists, who no longer knew how to defend her against foreign aggression, and he had dispersed these anarchists, re-established order, and driven far from their frontiers the Austrians and the Russians; given her the peace for which she was so eager; he had put an end, in a word, to the scandals of a weak and licentious government: was it so very astonishing that he should have been allowed to do such things? Again, quite recently, the opposers of the tribunal had wished to refuse him the means of clearing the high roads of the brigands who infested them! Yet, with that fact before them, persons pretended that he could do whatever he pleased! It was an error. He had power according to the wants and the opinions at the time predominant in France, but nothing more. He could use it better, more strenuously, than another, but he should be powerless against the actual movement of opinion. This movement inclined to the re-establishment of all things essential to society: religion was the first. "I am very powerful at present," exclaimed the First Consul; "what then! were I to wish to change the old religion of France, she would set herself against me, and conquer me. Do you know when the country was hostile to the Catholic religion? It was when the government, in coalition with it, used to burn books and send to the wheel the Callas and the Labarres; but, rely on it, were I to become the enemy of religion, the whole country would join her. I should change the indifferent into believers, into sincere Catholics. I should, perhaps, be a little less jeered for wishing to urge on to Protestantism, than if I set myself up as patriarch of a Gallican church, but I should soon become the object of public hatred. Is Protestantism the old religion of France? Is it the religion which, after long civil wars, after a thousand fights, has triumphed lastingly, as most suitable to the manners, to the genius of our nation? Is it not evident that it is violence to impose one's opinions on a people instead of their own, to create for them tastes, usages, even recollections which they have not. The principal charms of a religion are its recollections. For my part," said the First Consul, one day to one of those with whom he was in conversation, "when at Malmaison, I never hear the sound of the church bell in the neighbouring village without emotion; and what emotion could be created in France by Protestant meeting-houses, which were not frequented in childhood, and whose cold and stern aspect so badly accords with the manners of our nation? It may be thought, perhaps, that it is an advantage not to be dependent on a foreign head. It is an error. Everywhere, and for all things, there must be a head. There is no institution more to be admired than that which maintains unity in faith, and prevents, at least as much as is possible, religious dissensions. There can be nothing more odious than a crowd of sects disputing with one another, interchanging invectives, coming to open contention with arms in their hands, if they be in their first excitement, or, if they have got the habit of living together, looking at each other with a jealous eye—forming in the state coteries which stand

by one another, urge on their partisans, keep aloof those of rival sects, and give the government embarrassments of every sort. The bickerings of sects are the most insupportable that I know of. Dispute is the province of science; it animates it, sustains it, and leads it to discoveries. To what does dispute in religious matters lead, if not to uncertainty and to the destruction of all faith? Moreover, when the activity of the mind is directed to theological controversies, these controversies are so absorbing that they turn the thoughts of man from all useful research. Seldom do you find combined together great theological controversy with great mental operations. Religious quarrels are either cruel and sanguinary, or dry, barren, and bitter; there are none more odious than they. Inquiry in regard to science, faith in matters of religion, that is the true, the useful course. The institution which maintains unity of faith, that is to say, the Pope, as guardian of Catholic unity, is an admirable institution. The reproach of being a foreign sovereign is made against this head of the church. True, he is a foreign sovereign, and we ought to thank Heaven for it. What! in the same country can one picture to himself a like authority conjoined with the government of the state! United to the government, this authority would be the despotism of the sultans; were it separate from, perhaps hostile to the government, it would produce a frightful, an intolerable rivalry. The Pope is outside Paris, and well it is so; he is neither at Madrid nor at Vienna, and that is why we bear with his spiritual authority. Vienna and Madrid congratulate themselves for the same reason. Do you imagine that if he were at Paris the Viennese or Spaniards would consent to receive his decisions! We are then lucky that he is not a resident amongst us, and that, while residing away from us, he does not take up his abode amongst rivals; that he dwells in that old Rome, far from the hand of the Emperors of Germany, far from that of the Kings of France, or the Kings of Spain, holding the balance between the Catholic sovereigns, inclining always a little to the side of the strongest, but he soon recovers his attitude, if the stronger becomes an oppressor. Centuries have brought this about, and have done it well. For the government of souls, it is the most beneficent institution imaginable. I do not," added the First Consul, "maintain these opinions through the positiveness of a devotee, but from reason. Hear me!" said he one day to Monge, whom he esteemed most highly among the *savans* of the day, and whom he had constantly with him, "religion such as mine is very simple. I look at this universe, so vast, so complex, so magnificent, and I say to myself, that it cannot be the result of chance, but the work, however intended, of an unknown Omnipotent Being, as superior to man as the universe is to the finest machines of human invention. Search, Monge, obtain the assistance of your friends, the mathematicians and the philosophers; you will not find a more powerful or a more decisive argument, and whatever you may do to oppose it, you will not weaken it. But this truth is too succinct for man; he wishes to

know regarding himself, regarding his future, a crowd of secrets which the universe does not disclose. Allow religion to tell him all which he feels the want of knowing, and respect her disclosures. It is true, that what one class of religionists advance is contradicted by others. For my part, I come to conclusions different from those of M. de Volney. Inasmuch as there are different religions which naturally contradict each other, he draws a conclusion against all; he puts forward that all are bad. Now I should rather find them all good, all, at bottom, say the same thing. They are wrong only when they wish to proscribe each other; but that is what must be hindered by good laws. The Catholic religion is that of our country, that in which we were born; she has a government profoundly constructed, which obviates disputes as much as it is possible to obviate the tendency of man to disputation; that government is away from Paris, and we should felicitate ourselves that it is so; it is not at Vienna, it is not at Madrid, it is at Rome, and therefore should be acceptable. If, next after the institution of the papacy, there be any thing approaching it in perfection, it is the relation to the Holy See of the Gallican church, subject to it, yet independent of it, at one and the same time. Catholic unity and Bossuet's articles form, conjoined, the true form of religious government. It is that which we must re-establish. As to Protestantism, it has a right to the most firm protection of government: those who profess it have an absolute right to an equal share in social advantages; but it is not the religion of France. Ages have decided on it. If you propose to the government to make it prevail, you propose an act of violence and an impossibility. Besides, what is more hideous than schism? What can weaken a nation more? Of all civil wars, that which penetrates the heart most deeply, which troubles families the most painfully, is a religious war. We must put an end to that. We are at peace with Europe; let us maintain it as long as we shall be able, but religious peace is the most urgent of all. That being concluded, we have nothing more to apprehend. It is doubtful whether Europe will let us remain long in tranquillity, or that she will be satisfied to see us always as powerful as we are; but, when France shall be united as one man, when the Vendéans and the Bretons shall march in our armies with the men of Burgundy, Lorraine, and Franche Comté, we shall have nothing more to fear from Europe, were she to come against us with all her combined powers."

Such were the conversations held daily by the First Consul with his intimate advisers, with MM. Cambacérès and Lebrun, who were of his opinion, with MM. de Talleyrand, Fouché, Rœderer, who were of contrary opinions to his, with a crowd of members of the Council of State and of the Legislative Body, whose ideas in general differed from his. In these discussions, he spoke with unexemplified warmth and perseverance of purpose. He saw nothing more useful, more urgent, than to put an end to religious differences, and applied himself to it with that ardour which he displayed in

things that he looked on as of pre-eminent importance.

He had decided on his plan, which was simple, wisely conceived, and which has been successful in terminating the religious differences of France; for the unhappy disputes, which the First Consul, when emperor, had at a later period with the court of Rome, occurred between him, the Pope, and the bishops, and never affected the religious peace re-established amongst the people. There never sprung up again into existence, even when the Pope was a prisoner at Fontainebleau, two forms of worship, two sections of clergy, or two classes of the faithful.

The First Consul formed the project of reconciling the French republic and the Roman church, by treating with the Holy See, on the very basis of the principles laid down by the Revolution. No longer was there to be a clergy endowed with political power; no longer a clergy having landed property; the thing would have been anomalous in 1800. A clergy solely devoted to the performance of worship, paid by a stipend from the government, appointed by it, and the appointment ratified by the Pope; a new revision of the dioceses, which were to consist of sixty sees, instead of the one hundred and fifty-eight that formerly existed on the territory of old and new France; the regulation of the forms of worship transferred to the civil authority, the jurisdiction of the clergy to the Council of State, instead of the parliaments, since abolished—such was the plan of the First Consul. It was the chief constitution decreed in 1790, with modifications that would render it acceptable to Rome; that is to say, with bishops nominated by the government, and confirmed by the Pope, in place of bishops elected by their flocks, together with a general promise of submission to the laws, instead of the oath taken by the different religious communities—an oath which had served as a pretext for ill-disposed or timorous priests to excite scruples of conscience; it was, in a word, the true reform of worship—the reform to which the Resolution should have confined itself, in order to render it agreeable to the Pope—a circumstance not to be despised, for every religious establishment was impossible without a good understanding with Rome.

It has been said, that a matter of the greatest importance was omitted; namely, to require that bishops nominated by the civil power should be accepted by the Pope, whether he would or would not. In such a case, the government of Rome would have been seriously weakened—a matter not at all desirable. The civil power, in nominating a bishop, indicates the subject in whom it recognises, with the moral qualities of a pastor, the political qualities of a good citizen, who respects, and will cause to be respected, the laws of the country. It belongs to the Pope to say whether, in this subject, he recognises an orthodox priest who will teach the true doctrines of the Catholic church. To wish to confine the period of delay to some months, after which the ratification by the Pope should be considered as granted, would have been to force the ratifica-

tion itself, to deprive the Pope of his spiritual authority, and to renew no less than the memorable and terrible quarrel of investitures. In matters of religion, there are two authorities, to wit, the civil authority of the country where the religion is practised, charged to watch over the maintenance of the laws and the established powers; and the spiritual authority of the Holy See, charged with watching over the maintenance of unity of faith. It is needful that both should concur in the selection of the clergy. The religious authority of the Holy See sometimes refuses, it is true, to ratify the appointment of the bishops selected; it makes use of this means to force the temporal power. The like has been seen to have occurred, and it is an abuse, though fleeting, yet inevitable. The civil authority, also, may stand back, and that has been seen under Napoleon himself, that most enlightened and most courageous restorer of the ancient Catholic church.

The plan of the First Consul left nothing more to be desired for the definitive establishment of worship; but it was necessary that he should give his mind to the transition, that is to say, the passage from the present state to the approaching one about to be created. What was he to do regarding the sees as they stood? What arrangements were to be made with ecclesiastics of every sort, bishops or simple priests, some sworn and attached to the Revolution, performing worship publicly in the churches; others unsworn, who were emigrants, or had returned from emigration, exercising by stealth the functions of their ministry, and the greater part hostile to his government? A system occurred to the mind of General Bonaparte, the adoption of which was an immense difficulty at the court of Rome; for, during eighteen centuries, the church had never done what was about to be proposed to her. This new system was to abolish all existing dioceses. For that purpose, the former bishops, still living, were to be applied to, and the Pope was to demand of them their resignation. If they refused it, the Pope was to pronounce their deposition; and, when a *tabula rasa* should thus have been made, sixty new dioceses were to be traced out on the map of France, forty-five of which were to be bishoprics, and fifteen archbishoprics. To fill them, the First Consul was to nominate sixty prelates, taken indiscriminately from among the sworn and unsworn priests; but rather from the latter, who were the most numerous, were held in most consideration, and were most beloved by the faithful. He would choose both from among ecclesiastics worthy of the confidence of government, respectable from their morals, and reconciled to the French Revolution. These prelates, nominated by the First Consul, were to be instituted by the Pope, and at once to enter on their duties, under the surveillance of the civil authority and of the Council of State.

A salary, in proportion to their wants, was to be allotted to them from the Budget of the state. But, in return, the Pope was to recognise as valid the alienation of the church property, to interdict the suggestions which the priests were in the habit of making at the bed-

side of the dying; to reconcile to Rome the married clergy; to assist the government; in a word, in putting an end to all the calamities of the period.

This plan was a complete one; and, with some exceptions, excellent for the present as well as for the future. It reorganized the church, as much as possible, on the same model as that of the state; it fused down all individual peculiarities, selecting from all parties wise and moderate men, who valued the public good above their revolutionary or religious stubbornness. But we shall presently see how great is the difficulty of executing a good work, even when it is necessary, even when it is a real and pressing want; for, unfortunately, though it be a want, it does not result from it that it presents a clear, evident notion, unsusceptible of being contested.

At Paris, there was the party of scoffers—disciples still living of the philosophy of the eighteenth century; old Jansenists, who had become constitutional priests, and finally, generals, imbued with vulgar prejudices: this was the obstacle on the part of France. But at Rome, there was fidelity to antique precedents; the fear of touching dogma if discipline were altered; religious scruples, sincere or affected; above all, antipathies to our Revolution; and, in particular, a sort of complaisance with regard to the French royalist party, which was composed of emigrant priests or nobles, some residing at Rome, others in correspondence with her, all passionate enemies of France, and of the new order of things beginning to be established in it: this was the obstacle on the part of the Holy See.

The First Consul persisted in his plan with invincible firmness and patience, during one of the longest and most difficult negotiations known in the history of the church. Never had the temporal and spiritual powers met under more important circumstances; never had they been more worthily represented.

That young man, so sensible, so profound in his views, but so impetuous in his will—that young man, who governed France, found himself, by a singular design of Providence, placed on the stage of the world, in presence of a pontiff of rare virtue, of physiognomy and character angelic, but of a tenacity capable of braving martyrdom, where he thought that the interests of the Faith, or those of the court of Rome, were compromised. His countenance, animated, yet mild, told the elevated sensibility of his soul. About sixty years old, weak in health, though he lived to an advanced age, holding down his head and stooping, gifted with a keen and penetrating look, his language graceful and affecting, he was the fit representative not more of that imperious religion, which under Gregory VII. commanded, and deserved to command, barbarous Europe, than of that persecuted religion, which, having no longer in its hands the thunderbolts of the church, was unable to exercise on men any other power than that of mild persuasion.

A secret charm attached him to General Bonaparte; they had both met, as we have said elsewhere, during the wars of Italy, and, in place of these ferocious warriors, spawned by

the French Revolution, who were depicted in Europe as profaners of the altar and assassins of emigrant priests, Pius VII., at that time Bishop of Imola, had found a young man full of genius, speaking, like himself, the Italian language, displaying the most moderate sentiments, maintaining order, causing the temples to be respected, and, far from persecuting the French priests, making use of his power to oblige the Italian churches to take them in and support them. Surprised and delighted, the Bishop of Imola restrained the spirit of insubordination of the Italians of his diocese, and repaid General Bonaparte the services which his church had received from him. The impression produced by this first acquaintance was never effaced from the heart of the pontiff, and influenced his whole conduct towards the general, when he became Consul and Emperor; a striking proof that in all things, great or little, a good turn is never lost. In fact, at a later period, when the conclave was assembled at Venice, to elect a successor to Pius VII., who died a prisoner at Valencia, the remembrance of the first acts of the general of the army of Italy had influenced, in a manner we may call providential, the selection of the new Pope.

It will be remembered that, at the very time when Pius VII. was preferred by the conclave, in the hope of finding in him a conciliator, who would reconcile Rome with France, and perhaps put an end to the misfortunes of the church, the First Consul had gained the battle of Marengo, had become master of Italy and ruler of Europe, and had sent an emissary, the nephew of the Bishop of Vercelli, to announce his intentions to the newly-elected pontiff. He sent him word, that, pending ulterior arrangements, peace should exist between France and Rome *de facto*, on the footing of the treaty of Tolentino, signed in 1797; that there should be no more mention of a Roman republic, the invention of the Directory; that the Holy See should be re-established, and recognised by the French as in ancient times. As to the question of knowing whether the three great provinces of Bologna, Ferrara, and Romagna, were to be restored to the church, not a word was said. But the Pope was replaced on his throne and had peace. All the rest he left to Providence. The First Consul had, moreover, commanded the Neapolitans to evacuate the Roman States, which they had, in fact, evacuated, saving the environs of Benevento and Ponte Corvo. Still more, in all the movements of his armies around Naples and Otranto, the First Consul had given orders to respect the Roman States. He had even sent Murat, who commanded the French army in Lower Italy, to bend his knee at the foot of the papal throne. Monsignor Gonsalvi had then guessed aright, and he was amply rewarded for it; for, on his

arrival at Rome, the Pope appointed him Cardinal Secretary of State, first minister of the Holy See, a post which he held during the greatest part of the pontificate of Pius VII. It was in the train of these, in some sort miraculous events, that the Pope, at the request of the First Consul, sent Monsignor Spina, a keen, devout, greedy Genoese priest, to Paris, for the purpose of treating on all matters, political as well as religious. At first, Monsignor Spina had assumed no official title, so much did the holy father, notwithstanding his liking for General Bonaparte, notwithstanding his ardent desire for an approximation, dread to avow his relations with the French republic. But soon, when he saw the ministers of Prussia and of Spain, who were already in Paris, closely followed by those of Austria, Russia, Bavaria, Naples, those, in fact, of all the courts, the pontiff no longer hesitated, and allowed Monsignor Spina to assume an official character, and to avow the object of his mission. The French emigrant party made a great outcry, and tried useless efforts to hinder, by its remonstrances, the approximation of the church to France, knowing well that if it lost religion as a means of keeping up agitation, it would soon lose its best arm. But Pius VII., although chagrined, nay, sometimes intimidated by these remonstrances, showed himself decided to place the interests of religion and of the Holy See above all consideration of party. One single reason slackened a little his excellent resolutions; it was the vague, and by no means wise, hope of recovering the Legations, lost at the time of the treaty of Tolentino.¹

M. Spina, being now in Paris, had orders to gain time, in order to see if the First Consul, as master of Italy, and having the power of disposing of it as he pleased, would entertain the lucky thought of restoring the Legations to the Holy See. An expression which was frequently in the mouth of the First Consul had given rise to more hope than he intended to convey by it. "Let the holy father," said he, "put the utmost confidence in me, let him cast himself into my arms, and I will be for the church another Charlemagne." "If he be a new Charlemagne," replied those priests, who knew but little of the affairs of the age, "let him prove himself to be so by restoring to us the patrimony of St. Peter." Unfortunately, they were out in their reckoning, for the First Consul thought he had done a great deal in re-establishing the Pope at Rome, in restoring to him, with his pontifical throne, the Roman State, in offering to treat with him for the re-establishment of Catholic worship; and, in fact, he had done a great deal, the state of opinion in France and that in Italy being considered. If the French patriots, still full of the ideas of the eighteenth century, saw with little satisfaction the approaching re-establishment

¹ There does not exist a more curious negotiation, or one more deserving of meditation, than that of the Concordat. There does not exist one in which the archives of France are richer in documents; for, besides the diplomatic correspondence of our agents, and above all the Abbé Bernier's own correspondence, we possess that of Monsignor Spina and Cardinal Caprara with the Pope and Cardinal Gonsalvi. The last has remained in our hands in virtue of an article of the Concordat, by which

the archives of the Roman legation, in case of a rupture, were to remain in France. The letters of Monsignor Spina and Cardinal Caprara, written in Italian, form one of the most curious monuments of the time, and afford of themselves the secret of the religious negotiations of that period, a secret still very imperfectly known at the present day, even after the divers works published on this matter.

of the Catholic church, the Italian patriots saw with despair the re-erection of priestly government over them. It was then impossible for the First Consul to extend his complaisance to the length of restoring the Legations to the Holy See, which Legations could not be of any use in supporting clerical government, and which were, besides, a promised portion of the Cisalpine Republic. But the court of Rome, feeling itself distressed since it had been deprived of the revenues of Bologna, Ferrara, and Romagna, reasoned otherwise. As to the rest, the Pope, who, in the midst of the pomp of the Vatican, lived like an anchorite, thought less of this worldly interest than Cardinal Gonsalvi, and Cardinal Gonsalvi less than Monsignor Spina. The last walked with stealthy step in the negotiation, hearkening to all that was said to him regarding religious questions, having the air of attaching exclusive importance to those, and yet, by some random expressions, dropped from time to time on the poverty of the Holy See, trying to bring about the introduction of the question of the Legations. He had not succeeded in making his hints understood, and was protracting matters, in trying to obtain something that might answer the false hopes imprudently indulged in by his court.

To treat with Monsignor Spina, the First Consul had made choice, as we have said before, of the celebrated Abbé Bernier, the pacificator of La Vendée. This priest, a simple curé in the province of Anjou, unadorned with the externals which a careful education imparts, but gifted with a profound knowledge of mankind, of superior prudence, long exercised amidst the difficulties of civil war, very well read in canonical matters, was the principal author of the re-establishment of peace, in the provinces of the West. He was fond of this peace, because it was his work, and was naturally desirous of every thing that could strengthen it, and looked on the approximation of France to Rome as one of the surest means of rendering it complete and definitive. Nor did he cease from addressing to the First Consul the most earnest entreaties to hasten the negotiations with the church. Furnished with his instructions, he conveyed to the Archbishop of Corinth the proposals of the French government, already put forward: viz., resignation of their sees imposed on all former titular bishops; a new remodelling of dioceses; sixty sees instead of 168; the formation of a new body of clergy, composed of ecclesiastics of all parties; the nomination of this clergy by the First Consul, and their institution by the Pope; a promise of submission to the established form of government; salaries paid from the state budget; a renunciation of church property, and a complete recognition of the right of selling that property; superintendence of the forms of worship to be allowed to the civil authority represented by the Council of State; finally, the pardon of the church for the married priests, and their re-admission to the Catholic communion.

Monsignor Spina was loud in his language, on hearing these conditions put forward; he characterized them as exorbitant, as contrary

to the faith, and held up that the Pope would never consent to them. He, first of all, required that in the preamble of the Concordat the Catholic religion should be declared the *Religion of the State* in France, that the consuls should make a public profession of it, and that the laws and acts contrary to this declaration of a *State Religion* should be abrogated.

As to the new re-construction of the dioceses, he admitted that the number of sees was great, but he pretended that the Pope had not the right to depose a bishop, that none of his predecessors had dared to do so, in the history of the Roman church, and that if his holiness allowed such an innovation, he would create a second schism directed this time against the holy father himself; that all he could do on this subject was to have an amicable understanding with the First Consul; that those amongst the former bishops who should display good feeling towards the French government should be merely and simply reinstalled in their dioceses, or, at least, in the diocese corresponding to that which they had formerly occupied; that those, on the other hand, who had conducted themselves, or were conducting themselves still, in a manner not meriting the confidence of this government, should be laid aside, and, till their deaths, certainly not far off, considering their great age, administrators, chosen by the Pope and the First Consul, should govern their sees.

Monsignor Spina, then, did not entertain the idea of forming a new clergy, taken from all classes of priests, and from all parties, unless to fill the vacant sees. Still more, he did not wish that the constitutional priests should participate in it, unless they should make one of those solemn recantations, which are a triumph for Rome, and an indemnification for the pardon which she grants.

In regard to the nomination of bishops by the head of the Republic, and their institution by the Pope, there was but little difficulty. The point naturally set out from was the principle that, in treating with Rome, the new government should have all the prerogatives of the old government, and that the First Consul should be considered, in every particular, as the kings of France had been. Hence the nomination of the bishops was his right. Yet, the post of First Consul, at least for the nonce, was elective; General Bonaparte, now invested with that dignity, was a Catholic, but his successors might not be so; and, at Rome, it was not allowed that a Protestant sovereign could nominate bishops. Monsignor Spina demanded that this exception should be looked to.

Every thing regarding the curés was settled. They were to be nominated by the bishops, with the approval of the civil authority.

The promise of submission to the laws was admitted, without entering into the precise terms.

The Pope's sanction of the sales of church property was a stumbling-block to the Roman negotiator. He acknowledged the absolute impossibility of recalling those sales; but demanded that the Holy See should be spared a declaration which might imply a moral as-

proval of what had taken place on that head. He conceded a renunciation of all ulterior inquiry, while he refused the formal recognition of the right of alienation. "This property," said Monsignor Spina, "known by the names *Vota fidelium, patrimonium pauperum, sacrificia peccatorum*, the church herself had not the power to alienate. However, she can renounce the prosecution of its recovery." As an indemnification, he demanded a restitution of the domains not yet alienated, and that the dying should have the power of making wills in favour of religious establishments, which implied a renewal of property in mortmain, and was a recommencement of the old order of things, namely, that of a clergy endowed with lands. Finally, the pardon of the married priests, and their reconciliation with the church, was an affair of indulgence, easy, on the part of the court of Rome, which is always disposed to forgive, when the fault is acknowledged by him who has committed it. Still, she excepted from the pardon two classes of priests, to wit, former friars, who had made certain vows, and bishops. This was not the way to acquire for the Holy See the good wishes of the minister of foreign affairs, M. de Talleyrand.

These pretensions of the court of Rome, although they did not imply a real impossibility of coming to an understanding with the French government, showed a glimpse, nevertheless, of serious difference of opinion.

The First Consul felt this, and showed great impatience at it. He had had several interviews with Monsignor Spina, and had declared to him, in person, that he would never depart from the fundamental principle of his project, which consisted in making a *tabula rasa*, in forming new diocesan arrangements and a new clergy, in deposing the former bishops, and selecting their successors from all classes of priests. He had told him, that the amalgamation of honest and wise men of all parties was his principle of government; that he would apply that principle to the church as well as to the state; that it was the only way left him of putting an end to the troubles of France, and that he would persist in it undeviatingly.

The Abbé Bernier, who, to the very palpable ambition of being the principal instrument in the re-establishment of religion, joined a sincere love of whatever was good, addressed the most earnest entreaties to Monsignor Spina to smooth the difficulties laid in the way by the court of Rome, against the project of the First Consul. "To declare the Catholic religion," said he, "the Religion of the State, was impossible, was contrary to the ideas prevalent in France, and would never be admitted by the Tribunal and the Legislative Body." In place of such declaration, on his view of it, the mention of a fact might be substituted, namely, that the Catholic religion was that of the majority of Frenchmen. The mention of this fact was of as much use as the wished-for declaration. To insist on an impossibility, rather through pride than principle, was to compromise the true interest of the church. The First Consul might assist in person at the solemn rites of worship, and the pre-

sence of a man like him at these ceremonies was a great act; but it was necessary to renounce the demand of his going through certain forms, such as confession and communion; that went beyond the bounds within which it was fit he should confine himself with regard to the French public. It was needful to win back opinion, and not to shock it, above all, not to afford it subjects for laughter. The demand of resignation of their sees, addressed to the former bishops, was quite simple; it was a consequence of the step which they had taken in regard to Pius VI., in 1790. At that period, the French prelates, in order to make their resistance seem to arise from anxiety for the faith, and not for their own private interests, had declared that they accepted the Pope as arbitrator, and that they delivered their sees into his hands; that, if he was of opinion that they should abandon them in favour of the civil constitution, they would submit. At the present day, then, it was only taking them at their word, and enacting the fulfilment of that solemn offer. If some amongst them, through personal motives, should be a bar to so great a benefit as the restoration of religion to France, they should no longer be looked on as bishops, but be considered as having resigned from 1790. The Abbé Bernier added, that there was a precedent of this sort in the church, namely, the resignation *en masse* of the 300 bishops of Africa, agreed on for the purpose of putting an end to the schism of the Donatists. It is true that they had not been deposed. As to the new selections to be made, it was necessary to concede to the First Consul the principle of amalgamation. This principle the First Consul would apply, above all, to the benefit of the unsworn clergy; he would pick out two or three constitutional priests, merely for example's sake, but his principal selection would be from the mass of the orthodox clergy. The French negotiator advanced here on his own responsibility further than he should have done. It is true, that the First Consul set little value on the constitutional bishops, who, for the most part, were narrow-minded Jansenists, or declaimers at the clubs; it is true, that in that body of clergy he esteemed only the ordinary priests, who, in general, had taken the oath through submission to the laws, through a desire of continuing their sacred ministry, and had not taken advantage of the agitations of the time to raise themselves to the sacerdotal hierarchy. Nevertheless, if he had but little respect for the constitutional bishops, he adhered to his principle of amalgamation, and did not bargain away the rights of the sworn clergy so cheaply as the Abbé Bernier seemed to announce. But the Abbé Bernier expressed himself thus to further the success of the negotiation. As to the nomination of the bishops by the First Consul, it was necessary, according to the Abbé Bernier, to get over a very remote and very improbable difficulty, viz. that of some day having a Protestant First Consul. It was not worth while, in his opinion, to look forward to so very unlikely an occurrence. Relatively to the property of the clergy, it was needful to lose no time in drawing up a form of selling it, since they were agreed on the principle. Rela-

tively to the restitution of the unsold property, and to testamentary donations of houses and lands, they were irreconcilable with the political principles in vogue at the time in France, principles absolutely at variance with property in mortmain. That the Roman negotiator should be content in this respect with one concession, namely, that of donations of annuities from the public funds. "In fine," said the Abbé Bernier, "the time has arrived for concluding, for the First Consul was beginning to be dissatisfied. He thought that the Pope had not the energy to break with the emigrant party, for the purpose of giving himself entirely to France. He would end by renouncing the good of which he had at first entertained the thought, and, without persecuting the priests, leaving them to themselves, he would allow the church to become what it could in France, not taking into consideration that he would pursue in Italy a line of conduct hostile to the court of Rome. It was," continued Abbé Bernier, "to have lost all discernment not to profit by the dispositions of so great a man, the only man capable of saving religion. He himself, too, had great difficulties to overcome with regard to the revolutionary party; and, so far from thwarting, one ought to assist him in surmounting these difficulties, by making to him such concessions as he needed for winning to his side opinions, little disposed in France in favour of the Catholic religion."

Monsignor Spina was beginning to be very much embarrassed. He was a believer, but his covetousness surpassed his faith. Incessantly demanding money for his court, his most ardent wish was to make her as rich and as lavish as of yore. But the little success of his insinuations regarding the lost provinces discouraged him singularly. He perceived that the First Consul, as wily as the Italian priests, did not wish to be communicative with persons who were not communicative themselves. He saw, moreover, all the courts at his feet; he saw the Russian negotiator, M. de Kalitscheff, who had wished, in so insolent a manner, to protect the petty Italian princes, go away disappointed, all Germany dependent on France for the partition of the territorial indemnities; Portugal submissive, and England herself brought to make peace through fatigue. Confronted by such a state of things, he was convinced that he had no longer any other resource than to submit, and to trust for what he was desirous, to the sole will of the First Consul. Disposed to yield, Monsignor Spina was still afraid to give his adherence to the very arbitrary conditions which the French cabinet had laid down, with the evident resolution of not swerving from them, because they were established by the imperious necessities of the state of things.

The First Consul, with his accustomed cleverness, relieved the Roman negotiator from embarrassment. It was the moment, already described above, when all the negotiations were going on together, especially those with England. Thinking, with a sort of joy, on the prodigious effect that a general peace would have, which should comprise even the church herself, he wished to have done with it by a

quick and decided step. He caused a project of a Concordat to be drawn up, to offer it definitively to Monsignor Spina. This matter was managed by two ecclesiastics, who had laid aside holy orders, and belonged to the department for foreign affairs, to wit, M. de Talleyrand and M. de Hauterive. Fortunately, between them and Monsignor Spina was interposed the clever and orthodox Bernier. The project, written by M. de Hauterive, and revised by the Abbé Bernier, was simple, clear, decided. It contained, drawn up in law form, all that the French legation had proposed. This project was presented to Monsignor Spina, who was very much troubled by it, and offered to send it to his court, but declared that he could not sign it himself. "Why," he was asked, "do you refuse to sign it? Can it be that you have not powers? If so, what have you been doing in Paris for six months? Why do you take on you the part of a negotiator, which you cannot fill to its necessary term, that is to say, to a conclusion? Or perhaps you think the project inadmissible? If you do, have the boldness to say so; and the French cabinet, which can grant no other conditions, will cease to negotiate with you. It may, or may not break with the Holy See; but it will have done with Monsignor Spina."

The crafty prelate knew not what answer to make. He affirmed that he had powers. Not having the courage to avow that he considered the French proposal inadmissible, he alleged that, in matters of religion, the Pope, surrounded by his cardinals, could alone accept a treaty. And, in consequence, he renewed the offer of sending the First Consul's project to his Holiness. "Let it be so," said some to him; "but declare, at least, in sending it, that you approve of it." Monsignor Spina still refused any approving formula, and replied, "that he would impress urgently on his Holiness the adoption of a treaty which might work out in France the re-establishment of the Catholic faith."

A courier was despatched to Rome with the project of the Concordat, and with orders to M. de Cacault, the ambassador from France to the Holy See, to submit it to the Pope for his immediate and definitive acceptance. The courier was the bearer of a present which was destined to cause great joy in Italy; it was the famous wooden Virgin of Notre Dame Loretto, carried away, in the time of the Directory, from Loretto itself, and afterwards deposited in the National Library of Paris, as an object of curiosity. The First Consul knew that the placing of such a relic in the royal library was a source of scandal to many sincere yet irritable Christians, and made this pious restitution to precede the Concordat.

This present was welcomed in the Romagna with a gladness hard to be conceived in France. The Pope received the Concordat better than was expected. This worthy pontiff, pre-occupied with the interests of the faith more than with his temporal concerns, did not see any thing absolutely inadmissible in the project, and thought that, with some changes in the wording of it, he should succeed in satisfying the First Consul, which he

very important point; for the re-establishment of religion in France was, in his eyes, the greatest, the most essential, of the affairs of the church.

He appointed the three cardinals, Cavandini, Antonelli, and Gerdil, to make a primary examination of the project sent from Paris. The cardinals Antonelli and Gerdil passed for the two most learned personages of the church. Cardinal Gerdil had even become a Frenchman, for he belonged by birth to Savoy. The Pope enjoined these three to use despatch. The first examination ended, they were to make their report to a congregation of twelve cardinals, chosen from among those who were then in Rome, and who understood best the interests of the Roman church. They were required to promise secrecy on the Holy Gospels. The Pope, fearing the plottings and outcries of the French emigrants, sought to withhold the decision of the sacred college from all party influence. On his part, then, the efforts were in perfect sincerity. He had by him a French minister entirely to his taste: this was M. de Cacault, a man of feeling as well as wit, divided between the recollections of the eighteenth century, to which he belonged by his years and education, and the sentiments which Rome inspires in all those who live in the midst of her ruined grandeur and her religious pomp. In setting out from Paris, M. de Cacault had asked the First Consul for his instructions. He had answered him by that superb saying, "Treat the Pope as if he had 200,000 soldiers." M. de Cacault loved Pius VII. and General Bonaparte; and, by his kindly demeanour, disposed them to love one another. "Confide in the First Consul," said he, incessantly, to the Pope; "he will arrange your affairs. But do what he asks of you, for he has need of what he asks of you in order to succeed." He said to the First Consul, "Have a little patience. The Pope is the most holy, the most engaging of men. He wishes to satisfy you; but give him time for it. It is necessary to accustom his mind and that of the cardinals to the arbitrary proposals which you send hither. Rome is more trusting than you think. This court must be led with gentleness. If we ruffle her we shall bewilder her. She will fling herself into the endurance of martyrdom, as the only resource in her situation." These wise counsels moderated the impetuosity of the First Consul, and inclined him to wait patiently the fastidious examination of the court of Rome.

At last, when the business was finished, the Pope and Cardinal Gonsalvi had several interviews with M. de Cacault. They communicated the Roman project. M. de Cacault, finding it too distant from the French project, made reiterated efforts to obtain some modifications. It was necessary, a second time, to have recourse to the congregation of the twelve cardinals; this, again, took up much time; so that, without gaining advantages of any note, M. de Cacault contributed himself to the loss of an entire month. At length the parties came to an agreement, as nearly as possible; which ended in a plan, differing from the plan of the First Consul, in the following points.

The Catholic religion was to be declared in France the *religion of the State*; the Consuls were to profess it publicly; there was to be a new diocesan reconstruction, and only sixty sees, as the First Consul wished. The Pope was to address the former bishops, demanding their voluntary resignation, on the grounds of their offer of resignation made to Pius VI. in 1790. It was probable that a very great number would give it, and then, the sees vacant by death or resignation would furnish the French government with room for an ample list of nominations. As for those who should refuse, the Pope would take suitable measures that the administration of the sees should not remain in their hands.

The excellent pontiff said to the First Consul, in an affecting letter which he addressed to him: "Dispense with my declaring publicly that I will depose old prelates who have suffered cruel persecutions for the cause of the church. First, my right to do so is doubtful; secondly, it is grievous to me to treat in this manner ministers of the altar, in misfortune and in exile. What answer would you make to those who should require you to sacrifice the generals by whom you are surrounded, and whose devotedness has rendered you so many times victorious!... The result which you desire to obtain will be the same in the end, for the greater part of the sees will become vacant by death, or by resignation. You shall fill them up; and, as to the small number of those which will remain occupied, in consequence of some refusals of resignation, we will not nominate bishops to them, but cause them to be administered by vicars worthy of your confidence and ours." On the other points, the Roman project was nearly similar to the French. It granted the nominations to the First Consul, saving in the case where a First Consul should be a Protestant; it contained the sanction of the public sales; but, while it persisted in demanding that testamentary gifts of houses and lands might be made to the clergy, it conceded to the married priests the indulgences of the church.

Evidently the most serious difficulty was the deposition of those old bishops who should refuse to tender their resignation. Such a sacrifice was painful to the Pope; for it was, in a manner, immolating at the feet of the First Consul the old French clergy. However, this immolation was indispensable, to enable the First Consul to suppress, in his turn, the constitutional clergy, and, out of the different classes of priests, to make but one, composed of persons esteemed by all sects. It was one of those occasions, on which, in all ages, the papacy had not hesitated to take decisive resolutions to save the church. But, at the moment of resolving, the well-disposed though timorous mind of the pontiff was a prey to the most painful perplexities.

While the time was thus employed at Rome, whether in conferences of the cardinals with each other, or in conferences of the secretary of state with M. de Cacault, the First Consul, in Paris, had lost patience. He was beginning to fear that the court of Rome might be intriguing, either with the emigrants, or with

foreign courts, particularly that of Austria. To his natural distrust were joined the suggestions of the enemies of religion, who sought to persuade him that he was deceived, and that he was penetrating, so clever, was the dupe of Italian finesse. He was but little disposed to believe that their finesse was keener than his own, but he wished, however, to try the soundings of that sea which he was told was so deep; and, the same day (May 13th) that the courier, bearing the despatches of the Holy See was leaving Rome, he made a threatening demonstration in Paris.

He sent for the Abbé Bernier, Monsignor Spina, and M. de Talleyrand, to Malmaison. He informed them that he had no longer confidence in the dispositions of the court of Rome; that the desire of deferring to the emigrants was evidently of greater importance with her than the desire of becoming reconciled with France; and that party interest took precedence of the interests of religion; that he did not understand that inimical courts should be consulted, and, perhaps, even the heads of the emigrant party, to know if she ought to treat with the French republic; that, as the church might receive from him immense benefits, she ought to accept or refuse them on the spot, and not retard the welfare of the million, by useless hesitation, or by yet more misplaced consultations; that he would do without the Holy See, since his efforts were not seconded by her; that certainly he should not expose the church to the persecutions of by-gone days, but that he would leave the priests to themselves, confining himself to chastising the turbulent among them, and leaving the others to live as best they might; that he would hold himself relatively to the court of Rome, as free from all engagements to her, even from the engagements contained in the treaty of Tolentino, since, *de facto*, that treaty had become null the very day of the proclamation of war between Pius VII. and the Directory. In uttering these words, the tone of the First Consul was cold, positive, withering. He gave them to understand, in the illustrations following this declaration, that his confidence in the holy father was unchanged; but that he imputed the slow delays which gave him annoyance to Cardinal Gonsalvi and to the set of advisers about the Pope.

The First Consul had gained his end, for the unfortunate Spina quitted Malmaison in real disorder of mind, and hastened to Paris, in order to write to his court despatches brimful of the fear which agitated himself. M. de Talleyrand, on his part, wrote to M. de Cacault a despatch conformable to the scene at Malmaison. He enjoined him to repair to the Pope and Cardinal Gonsalvi, to declare to them that the First Consul, full of confidence in the personal character of the holy father, had not any in his cabinet; that he was resolved to break off a negotiation too insincere; and that he, M. de Cacault, had orders to quit Rome within five days, if the plan of the concordat was not immediately adopted, or was only adopted with modifications. M. de Cacault, in fact, was instructed to withdraw, pending this delay, to

Florence, there to wait until the First Consul should transmit to him his determination.

The despatch reached Rome at the latter end of May. It chagrined M. de Cacault very much; he feared, by the news of which he was the bearer, to disconcert, perhaps to push to desperate resolutions, the Roman court; he feared, above all, to afflict a pontiff for whom he had not been able to avoid feeling a real attachment. However, the commands of the First Consul were so absolute, that there were no means of evading their execution. M. de Cacault went then to the Pope, and to Cardinal Gonsalvi, and showed them his instructions, which caused them both poignant distress. Cardinal Gonsalvi, in particular, who saw himself clearly designated, in the despatches of the First Consul, as the author of the interminable delays of this negotiation, felt as if dying of consternation. Nevertheless, he was not much to blame, and the superannuated forms of that oldest chancery in the world was the sole cause of the delays of which the First Consul complained, at least since the affair was transferred to Rome. M. de Cacault proposed to the Pope and to Cardinal Gonsalvi an idea, which surprised and disturbed them at first, but which appeared to them, in the sequel, the only way to a safe issue. "You do not wish," said he to them, "to adopt the concordat sent from Paris, in all its expressions. Well! let the cardinal himself go to France, invested with your powers. He will make himself known to the First Consul; he will inspire him with confidence; he will obtain from him the indispensable changes in the document. If any difficulty should arise, he will be there to obviate it. He will anticipate, by his presence on the spot, the loss of time which particularly irritates the impatient character of the head of our government. You will be thus withdrawn from great peril, and the affairs of religion will be saved." It was painful to the Pope to part with a minister whom he could no longer dispense with, and who alone gave him strength to bear the pains of sovereignty. He was plunged into frightful perplexities, finding the idea of M. de Cacault very wise, but the separation proposed to him cruel.

That implacable faction, composed not only of emigrants, but of all those who, in Europe, detested the French Revolution—that faction, which would have longed for an eternal war with France, which had seen with sorrow the end of the civil war in La Vendée, and which saw, with no less sorrow, the approaching termination of schism—besieged Rome with letters, filled it with its tattle, and covered its walls with placards. It said, for instance, that Pius VI., to save the faith, had lost the Holy See; and that Pius VII., to save the Holy See, would destroy the faith.¹ The invectives, of which he was the object, had no effect with this pontiff, (who was sensitive, but devoted to his duties,) in shaking his resolution of sav-

¹ "Pio VI. per conservar la fede,
Perde la sede.
Pio VII. per conservar la sede,
Perde la fede."

ing the church, in spite of all parties—in spite of the church party itself; but he suffered severely from them. Cardinal Gonsalvi was his confidant and his friend; to part from him was a poignant grief to him. The cardinal, in his turn, dreaded the prospect of being in Paris, in that revolutionary gulf which had swallowed, as he was told, so many victims. He trembled at the sole idea of finding himself in the presence of that formidable general, the object at once of admiration and of fear, whom Monsignor Spina depicted to him as particularly irritated against the secretary of state. These two begone priests formed a thousand false notions regarding France and its government; and, improved as they were told it was, they shuddered at the very thought of being a moment in its hands. The cardinal decided, then, but his decision was as that of one about to brave death. "Since they must have a victim," said he, "I devote myself, and give myself up to Providence." He had even the imprudence to write to Naples letters in conformity with these words—letters which came to the knowledge of our minister at Naples, and were communicated to the First Consul, who fortunately regarded them as a subject of laughter, rather than of irritation.

But the journey of the secretary of state to Paris was far from smoothing all difficulties and anticipating all dangers. The departure of M. de Cacault to his retreat at Florence, the headquarters of the French army, might perhaps be a gloomy manifestation for the two governments of Rome and Naples. These two governments, in fact, were continually menaced by the repressed and always ardent passions of the Italian patriots. That of the Pope was odious to men who were unwilling to be governed any longer by priests, and the number of these men in the Roman State was large; that of Naples was abhorred for the blood it had spilt. The departure of M. de Cacault might be considered as a sort of permission, given to the mischievously inclined Italians to

try their hands at some dangerous attempt. The Pope, also, feared it. It was agreed, then, to prevent any misinterpretation, to let M. de Cacault and Cardinal Gonsalvi set out together. They were to be travelling companions as far as Florence. M. de Cacault, on quitting Rome, left there his secretary of legation.

MM. Gonsalvi and de Cacault quitted Rome on the 6th of June—17th Prairial—and journeyed towards Florence. They travelled in the same carriage, and, whenever they stopped, the cardinal pointed out M. de Cacault to the populace, saying to them: "This is the French minister;" so desirous was he that it should be known that no rupture had taken place. The agitation in Italy was brisk enough. However, it produced nothing vexatious for the nonce; for men awaited a clearer view of the dispositions of the French government, before essaying any change. Cardinal Gonsalvi separated from M. de Cacault at Florence, and took his road tremblingly towards Paris.¹

In this interval, the First Consul, receiving from Rome the amended project, and perceiving that the differences were more formal than fundamental, had become calm. The news that Cardinal Gonsalvi was coming himself to settle an agreement between the Holy See and the French cabinet satisfied him completely. He saw in it the certainty of a proximate arrangement. He prepared, then, to give the best reception to the prime minister of the Roman court.

Cardinal Gonsalvi arrived the 20th of June—1st Messidor—in Paris. The Abbé Bernier and Monsignor Spina hastened to meet him, and to cheer him respecting the disposition of the First Consul. The costume in which he was to be presented at Malmaison was agreed on, and he repaired thither, with great emotion at the idea of meeting General Bonaparte, who, being aware of it, did not care to add to the uneasiness of the cardinal. He displayed all the art of language with which nature had gifted him, to impress himself on the mind of

¹ Florence, 19 Prairial, year IX. François Cacault, minister plenipotentiary of the French republic, at Rome, to the citizen minister of foreign affairs.

Citizen Minister,—

Here I am at Florence. The cardinal secretary of state left Rome along with me. He called for me at my house. We have made the journey together in the same carriage. Our servants followed, after the same fashion, in a second carriage, and the expenses were paid by each one's respective courier.

We were looked on everywhere with staring wonder. The cardinal was much afraid it might be imagined that I was going away in consequence of a diplomatic rupture; he was incessantly saying to everybody, "This is the minister of France." This country, crushed by the hygienic evils of the war, shudders at the least idea of the movement of troops. The Roman government is more afraid of its own discontented subjects, particularly of those who have been allured to authority and to plunder by the sort of revolution that has passed. We have thus prevented, and dissipated at the same time, horrifying fears and rash hopes. I think that the tranquillity of Rome will not be troubled.

The cardinal has spent here the day of the 18th in great and manifest friendship with General Murat, who has given him a residence and a guard of honour. He offered the same to me. I have not accepted anything; I lodged at an inn.

The cardinal set out this morning for Paris. He will arrive shortly after my despatch; he will travel extremely quick. The poor fellow feels that if he fails he will be lost without hope, and that all will be lost for Rome. He is eager to know the upshot. I have made

him understand that a great means of saving every thing was despatch, because the First Consul had serious reasons for concluding quickly and executing promptly.

I had tried at Rome to induce the Pope to give his own signature solely to the Concordat, and if he had conceded that point I should not have left Rome; but this idea has not succeeded with me.

You are right in thinking that the cardinal is not sent to sign at Paris what the Pope has refused to sign at Rome; but he is first minister to his holiness and his favourite; it is the soul of the Pope that is about to enter into communication with you. I hope that an agreement concerning the modifications will be the result of it. It is a question of phrases, of words which may be turned in so many ways, that in the end a good one will be sifted out.

The cardinal carries to the First Consul a confidential letter from the Pope, and the most ardent desire to terminate the affair. He is a man of a clear mind. His person has nothing imposing; he is not fitted for grandeur; his elocution, a little verbose, is not captivating; his character is mild; his soul will open itself to overflowing, provided he be encouraged mildly to confidence.

I have written to Madrid, to the ambassador Lucien Bonaparte, to inform him of the meaning of Cardinal Gonsalvi's brilliant journey to Paris and of my retirement to Florence. In like manner I have informed the ministers of the Emperor and of the King of Spain at Rome, that there was no likelihood of war with the Pope.

I am, yours respectfully,
CACAULT.

his hearer, to show him thoroughly his intentions, so frankly benevolent towards the church, to make him sensible of the serious difficulties attached to the re-establishment of public worship in France; and, above all, to make him understand that the interest he had in deferring to French opinion was much greater than what he could have in gratifying the resentments of priests, of emigrants, of deposed princes, deposed and abandoned by Europe. He declared to Cardinal Gonsalvi, that he was ready to revise certain details, which were obscure to the court of Rome, provided that, at bottom, she would grant what he regarded as indispensable; namely, the creation of an ecclesiastical establishment entirely new, which might be his work, and might re-unite the wise and respectable priests of all parties.

The cardinal came away encouraged from this interview with the First Consul. He seldom showed himself in Paris, observed a becoming distance, equally remote from an exaggerated severity, and from that Italian facility, so much the reproach of the Roman priests. He accepted some invitations from the ministers and the consuls, but perseveringly refused to show himself in the public places. He set to work with the Abbé Bernier to resolve the last difficulties of the negotiation. Two points formed above all an obstacle to the agreement between the two governments: the one relative to the title of *Religion of the State*, which title was sought to be obtained for the Catholic religion; the other, the deposition of the former bishops. Cardinal Gonsalvi wished that, in order to justify, in the face of Christendom, the great concessions made to the First Consul, a solemn declaration should be put forward by the French republic in favour of the Catholic church; he wished that it should proclaim the Catholic religion the *dominant religion*, that it should promise abrogation of the laws that were opposed to it, and that the First Consul should engage to profess it publicly in person. His example was calculated to have an omnipotent effect on the minds of the multitude.

The Abbé Bernier repeated that, to proclaim a *Religion of State*, or a *dominant religion*, was to alarm the other religious persuasions, to create a fear of the return of a plundering, oppressive, intolerant religion, &c.; that it was impossible to go beyond the declaration of a fact, namely, that the majority of the French were Catholic. He added, that to abrogate anterior laws it was necessary to have the concurrence of the legislative power, which would throw the French cabinet into inextricable embarrassments; that the government, taken as a governing body, could not profess a religion; that the consuls might profess it personally; but that this fact, quite an individual and in some sort a private one, was not of a nature to figure in a treaty. As to the personal conduct of the First Consul, the Abbé Bernier said, in quite a low tone, that he would assist at a *Te Deum* or at a mass; but that, as to the other practices of religion, it was not necessary to expect them of him, and that there were things that the discernment of the cardinal ought to renounce the exaction of, for they would pro-

duce an effect more vexatious than salutary. A preamble was agreed on at length, which, in connection with the first article, nearly satisfied the two legations.

The government, it ran, recognising that the Catholic religion is the religion of the great majority of the French. . . .

The Pope, on his part, recognising that this religion had derived, and still expected at this moment, the greatest benefit from the re-establishment of the Catholic worship in France, and from the individual profession which the consuls of the republic made of it, &c.

From this double motive, the two authorities, for the good of religion, and for the maintenance of internal tranquillity, laid it down, (article first) *that the Catholic religion should be exercised in France, and that its forms of worship should be public, in conformity with the police regulations, which are judged to be necessary for the maintenance of tranquillity*: (article second) *that there should be a new arrangement of dioceses, &c.*

This preamble sufficiently satisfied the objects of all parties; for it proclaimed loudly the re-establishment of divine service, rendered the profession of it in France public as in former days, made the profession of this religion by the consuls an individual act, personally exercised by the three consuls, put this allegation as proceeding from the Pope's lips and not from those of the chief of the republic. These first difficulties then appeared to be happily overcome. Next came the contested points regarding the deposing of the former bishops. Fundamentally they were agreed to, but Cardinal Gonsalvi demanded that the Pope should be spared the pain of pronouncing the deposition in a public act, of the ancient French bishops. He promised, that those who should refuse to tender the resignation of their sees should no longer be considered as titular, and that the Pope would consent to appoint successors to them; but he did not wish that that should be formally contained in the Concordate. The First Consul showed himself inflexible on this point, and, without specifying the precise words, required that it should be stated in positive terms, that the Pope would address himself to the former bishops, that he would demand of them the resignation of their sees, which he expected with confidence from their love of religion, and that if they refused, "the bishoprics of new formation should be provided with new diocesans for their government." These were the exact expressions of the treaty.

The other conditions were not contested. The First Consul was to have the nomination of the bishops, and the Pope the institution of them. However, Cardinal Gonsalvi craved, and the First Consul granted, one reservation, by which it was said that, in case of a Protestant First Consul, a new convention should be had, to regulate the mode of nomination. It was stipulated that the bishops should nominate the curés, and should select them from amongst subjects approved of by the government. The question of the oath was settled by the mere and simple adoption of the oath formerly pledged to the kings of France. The Holy See had reasonably claimed powers, granted to it without difficulty, of establishing

seminaries for recruiting the clergy, but without obliging the state to endow them. The engagement not to disturb the holders of national property was formal. Their ownership of acquired property was expressly recognised. It was said that the government would take measures that the clergy should receive suitable salaries, that the old religious edifices, and all the parsonages not yet alienated, should be restored to them. It was agreed, that permission to make donations should be granted to the faithful, but that the church should regulate the form of them. Secretly, the form of payment out of the funds was mutually agreed on, seeing that the First Consul would not on any account re-establish property in mortmain. This settlement was to be found in ulterior regulations of the police superintending the forms of worship, which the government alone had the power to make.

With regard to the married priests, the cardinal had given his word, that a brief of indulgence should be immediately published; but he demanded that an act of religious charity, emanating from the clemency of the holy father, should preserve its free and spontaneous character, and not pass as a condition imposed on the Holy See. This consideration was granted.

All matters were finally agreed on, and on reasonable foundations, which guaranteed, at the same time, the independence of the French church and its perfect union with the Holy See. Never had there been made with Rome a convention more liberal and at the same time more orthodox; and, it must be acknowledged, that one serious resolution had been forced on the Pope, but it was perfectly justified by circumstances, that of deposing the former bishops who should refuse to resign. It was necessary then to remain satisfied and to conclude.

Meanwhile, agitation was at work around the First Consul to hinder his definitive consent. The men who usually had access to him, and who enjoyed the privilege of giving him their advice, combated his determination. The party of the constitutional clergy bestirred themselves a great deal for fear of being sacrificed to the unsworn clergy. It had obtained the power of assembling its members and forming a sort of national council at Paris. The First Consul had granted these powers for the purpose of stimulating the zeal of the Holy See, and of making it feel the danger of delays. In this assembly many senseless matters were broached, on the customs of the primitive church, to which the authors of the civil constitution had wished to bring back the French church. It was professed by them that episcopal functions ought to be conferred by election, that, if that was not completely possible, the First Consul should choose subjects from a list presented by the faithful of each diocese; that the nomination of the bishops should be confirmed by the metropolitans, that is by the archbishops, and that of the latter by the Pope alone; but that the papal ratification could not be allowed to the Holy See arbitrarily; and that, after a certain delay, one should be compelled: which latter was

equivalent to the complete annihilation of the rights of the court of Rome. All that was uttered in this sort of council was not, however, as destitute of practical reasoning. Some sound ideas on the limitation of bishoprics, or the emission of bulls, on the necessity of not allowing any publication emanating from pontifical authority, without the express permission of the civil authority. They intended to reunite these divers observations under the form of votes, which were to be presented to the First Consul to explain their resolutions. What was very glibly and very frequently repeated in this assembly was, that, during the reign of terror, the constitutional clergy had rendered great services to proscribed religion, that they had not fled nor abandoned the churches, and that it was not just to sacrifice them to those who, during the persecution, had assumed the pretext of orthodoxy to escape the dangers of the priesthood. All this was very accurate, particularly as regarded the ordinary priests, the greater part of whom had, in reality, the virtues attributed to them. But the constitutional bishops, some of whom, however, deserved respect, were disputants, real sectarians, whom ambition in some, and the pride of theological squabbles in others, had carried away, and who were inferior in worth to their subordinates, simple and unpretending men. He who, at their head, showed himself the most restless, the Abbé Grégoire, was the head of a sect: his morals were pure, but his mind narrow, his vanity excessive, and his political conduct stained by a melancholy reminiscence. Without being exposed to the impulses or the terrors which tore from the Convention a vote of death against the unfortunate Louis XVI., the Abbé Grégoire, at that time absent, and free to hold his tongue, had addressed to that assembly a letter breathing sentiments but little conformable to humanity and to religion. He was one of those whom a return to sane ideas suited least, and who were trying, though in vain, to struggle against the tendency incited in all things by the consular government. He had taken care to make attachments for himself in the Bonaparte family, and by that means conveyed to the head of that family a multitude of objections against the resolution in preparation. The First Consul allowed the constitutionalists to talk and do, but was ready to stop them if their agitation proceeded to scandal; and he was not sorry to render their presence irksome to the Holy See, and to apply to her slowness this sort of stimulant. Although he had little fondness for the members of this branch of the clergy, because they were in general squabbling theologians, he wished to defend their rights, and to force on the Pope, as bishops, those who were known for pure morality and a manageable disposition. More was not required by the greater number, for they were far from being repugnant to the reunion with the Holy See. They even desired it, as the surest and most honourable means for them to abandon a life of agitation and a state of vexatious disesteem with their flocks. The greater part resisted an arrangement with Rome only through the fear of being sacrificed, *en masse*, to the former bishops.



A. Chierzy



W. G. G. G.

There was a more formidable in-door opposition to the First Consul; it was that produced in the ministry itself. M. de Talleyrand, wounded by the animus of the court of Rome, which had shown itself less easy, less indulgent, than he had thought it at the outset, was become cold and ill-disposed to it. He was evidently baffling the negotiation, after having begun it with so much good-will, when he looked on it only as one peace more to be concluded. He had set out for the *Baths*, as we have already stated, leaving with the First Consul a project completely drawn up—a project arbitrary in form, hurtful without usefulness, and which the court of Rome would not admit on any consideration. M. d'Hauterive had taken his place. The latter, half-plighted to holy orders, having freed himself from that bond at the time of the Revolution, was but little favourable to the desires of the Holy See. He opposed a thousand technical difficulties to the project agreed upon by the Abbé Bernier and Cardinal Gonsalvi. In his opinion, the deposition of the former bishops should be expressed in it in a more positive and manifest manner; they ought to have mentioned in it that pious legacies could be made only through the funds; to have specified, in short, in a formal article, the Catholic reinstatement of the married priests, &c. M. d'Hauterive thus brought again into existence the technical difficulties before the negotiation had well nigh succumbed. On the very day of signing, he sent a most pressing memorial, on these various points, to the First Consul.

All these debates being ended, an assembly of the consuls and the ministers was held, in which the question was definitively discussed and settled. The objections, already known, were repeated there; great stress was laid on the inconvenience of ruffling the French mind, of adding to the budget new charges, of putting in peril, it was said, even the national property, by awakening among the clergy, restored to their functions, more hopes than they were willing to satisfy. A project of simple toleration was spoken of, which should consist merely in giving up, to the sworn as well as to the unsworn priests, the religious edifices, and for the government to remain a quiet spectator of their quarrels, saving intervention if order happened to be materially disturbed by them.

The Consul Cambacérès, a strong partisan of the concordate, expressed himself on this subject with warmth, and replied triumphantly to all the objections. He maintained that the danger of ruffling the French mind was not real, except as regarded some *beaux esprits* of the oppositionists, but the mass of the people would willingly welcome, with open arms, the re-establishment of worship, and felt already a real moral want of it; that the consideration of the expense was a contemptible consideration in such a matter; that the national property was, on the contrary, more solemnly guaranteed than ever, by the sanction obtained from the Holy See of the national sales. M. de Cambacérès was, in this place, interrupted by the First Consul, who, ever in-

flexible when there was question of the national property, declared that he was making the concordate precisely on account of the holders of national property, particularly in their behalf; that he would crush, with all his might, those priests who were foolish enough or ill disposed enough to abuse the great act about to be performed. The Consul Cambacérès, resuming his discourse, showed how ridiculous, how hard of execution was this project of indifference to religious parties, who would dispute among each other for the confidence of the faithful, for the religious edifices, for the voluntary donations of public piety, who would bestow on government all the weariness of active intervention, without any of its advantages, and would end, perhaps, in the reunion of all sects in one single hostile church, independent of the state, and depending on foreign authority.

The Consul Lebrun spoke in the same strain; and, lastly, the First Consul gave his opinion in a few words, in a clear, precise, and peremptory manner. He was aware of the difficulties, even of the perils of this undertaking; the extent of his views went beyond some difficulties of the moment, and he was resolved. He showed himself so in his words. Henceforward there was no more resistance, except disapproval or grumbling at his resolution, when out of his presence. Then came submission, and the command was given to sign the Concordate, such as the Abbé Bernier and Cardinal Gonsalvi had definitively drawn it up.

According to his custom of reserving for his elder brother the conclusion of all important acts, the First Consul appointed, as plenipotentiaries, Joseph Bonaparte, the councillor of state, Cretet, and lastly, the Abbé Bernier, to whom this honour was deservedly due for the pains he had taken, and the ability he had displayed, in this long and memorable negotiation. The Pope had for plenipotentiaries, Cardinal Gonsalvi, Monsignor Spina, and Father Caselli, a learned Italian, who had followed the Roman legation, in order to assist it by his theological knowledge. They met together, for form sake, at Joseph Bonaparte's house; they read over the acts again; they made some slight changes of detail, always reserved for the last moment; and, on the 16th of July, 1801—26th Messidor—this great act was signed, the most important that the court of Rome had ever concluded with France, and, perhaps, with any Christian power, for it terminated one of the most frightful storms that the Catholic religion had ever gone through. As to France, it put a stop to a deplorable schism, and put a stop to it, by placing the church and the state in suitable relations of union and independence.

There remained much to be done after the signature of this treaty, which has since borne the title of Concordate. It was necessary to demand the ratification of it at Rome, then to obtain the bulls which were to accompany the publication of it, as well as briefs to all the former bishops, to call for their resignation; it was next necessary to trace out the new demarcations of the dioceses, to choose the six

new prelates, and, in all things, to proceed in accordance with Rome. It was an uninterrupted negotiation, until the day on which they could, at last, chant a *Te Deum* at Notre Dame, to celebrate the re-establishment of religion. The First Consul, always eager to arrive at the result, would have wished that all this might be finished promptly, in order to celebrate at the same time the peace with the European powers and the peace with the church. The accomplishment of such a desire was difficult. Haste was made, nevertheless, in expediting these details, in order not to retard in the slightest degree the grand act of religious restoration.

The First Consul did not make public as yet the treaty signed with the Pope, for it was first necessary to have received the ratifications. But he imparted it to the Council of State, in the sitting of the 6th of August—18th Thermidor. He did not communicate the act in its tenour; he contented himself with giving an analysis of the substance of it, and accompanied this analysis with the enumeration of the motives which had decided this act of the government. Those who heard him that day were struck with the precision, the vigour, the loftiness of his language. It was the eloquence of the chief magistrate of a state. However, if they were impressed by that simple and nervous eloquence which Cicero called, coming from Cæsar's lips, "*vim Cæsaris*," they were little reconciled to the proceeding of the First Consul.¹ They remained sullen and dumb, as if they had seen one of the most to be regretted works of the Revolution perish along with the schism. The act not being yet submitted to the deliberations of the Council of State, there was no discussing it, nor voting on it. Nothing disturbed the silent coldness of this scene. They were silent; they separated without saying a word, without expressing a suffrage. But the First Consul had exhibited his will, henceforth irrevocable, and that went far with a vast number of persons. It was, at the least, the safe silence of those who did not wish to displease him, and of those too, who, respecting his genius, valuing the immensity of benefits that he had conferred upon France, were decided to pass over even his faults.

The First Consul, thinking that he had now sufficiently stimulated the Court of Rome, judged that it was necessary to put an end to the pretended council of the constitutional clergy. In consequence, he commanded them to separate, and they obeyed. Not one of them would have dared to offend the authority which was going to distribute sixty bishoprics raised

up, this time, by pontifical institution. In separating, they presented to the First Consul an act suitable in form, and which contained their views relative to the new religious establishments. It contained the propositions which we have already made known.

The Cardinal Gonsalvi had left Paris to return to Rome, and to bring back M. de Cacaault to the presence of the Holy See. The Pope was sighing for this double return, for Lower Italy was dangerously agitated. The Italian patriots of Naples and the Roman State were waiting with impatience the opportunity of a new commotion; and the old Ruffo party, the cut-throats of the Queen of Naples, sought nothing better than a pretext to fall on the French. These men, so different in intention, were ready to combine their efforts for the purpose of throwing every thing into confusion. The news of the agreement established between the two governments, French and Roman, the certainty of the intervention of General Murat, placed in the neighbourhood at the head of an army, restrained the plottings and hindered these sinister intentions. The Pope was overjoyed on seeing Cardinal Gonsalvi and the Minister of France return to Rome. He immediately called together the congregation of the cardinals, in order to submit to them the new work, and he caused the bulls, the briefs, in fine, all the acts, the necessary sequel of the Concordate, to be prepared. The worthy pontiff was joyous, but agitated. He had the certainty of doing good, and of immolating nothing but the interests of faction to the general good of the church. But the disapprobation of the old throne and altar party broke forth with violence at Rome, and, although the holy father had put at a distance from him all the ill-disposed, he heard their bitter words; he was disturbed by them. Cardinal Maury, with his usual acuteness, judging the cause of the emigrants to be lost, and already, perhaps, looking forward with secret satisfaction to the moment when all, now sighing in exile, would be restored to their native land, kept himself aloof in his diocese of Montefiascone, occupying himself solely with the care of a library, which was the charm of his exile. The Pope, in order not to give any umbrage to the First Consul, had, besides, made that cardinal understand that his unrestricted retreat at Montefiascone, was at the moment an expedient of the pontifical government.

The Pope, then, was satisfied, but full of emotion,² and he eagerly pressed the completion of the undertaking so happily begun.

¹ Letter from Monsignor Spina to Cardinal Gonsalvi, Secretary of State:—

Paris, 8th August.

"On Thursday last, the First Consul, being present at the Council of State, and having been informed that the Convention concluded by him with his Holiness was the general conversation at Paris, and that every one, though ignorant of its precise tenour, spoke of it, and commented upon it, each after his own fancy, therefore took the opportunity of communicating to the Council itself the whole details. I know for certain that he spoke for an hour and a half, demonstrating the necessity and advantage of it, and I have been told that he spoke most admirably. As he did not ask for the opinion of the Council, all the members remained silent. I have not yet been able to learn what impression was

produced on the minds of the councillors in general. The good were delighted at it, but their number is very limited. I will endeavour to discover what impression was made on those who are adverse to it. It appears that the First Consul is desirous of preparing the minds of those who are hostile to this measure, with the view of disarming their opposition; but he will not succeed, unless he adopts some more energetic proceedings against the Constitutionallists, or whilst he leaves the Catholic worship exposed to the lash of the minister of police.

² Letter of M. de Cacaault, Minister Plenipotentiary of the French Republic at Rome, to the Minister of Foreign relations:—

Rome, 8th August, 1801—30th Thermidor, year X. Citizen Minister,—To inform you of the state of the affair of the Pope's ratification, expected at Paris, I can

The congregation of the cardinals was wholly favourable to the concordate, since its new revision, and they pronounced themselves in an affirmative manner. The Pope, thinking that it was necessary henceforth to cast himself into the arms of the First Consul, and to accomplish with *déclat* a work which had so noble an object as the re-establishment of the Catholic religion in France, wished that the ceremony of the ratification should be surrounded with much solemnity. In consequence, he gave his ratification in grand consistory, and, to add to the brilliancy of that pontifical solemnity, he nominated three cardinals. He received M. de Cacault in pomp, and displayed, notwithstanding the straitness of his means, all the luxury that became the occasion. Having to make choice of a legate to send to France, he fixed on the most eminent diplomatist of the Roman court; this was Cardinal Caprara, a distinguished personage by his birth, (he was of the illustrious family of the Montecucculi,) distinguished by his understanding, his experience, his moderation. Formerly ambassador at the court of Joseph II., he had seen the tribulations of the church in the last century; he had, by his skill and ready wit, relieved the Holy See of many an inconvenience. The First Consul had himself expressed the desire of having near his person this prince of the church. The Pope hastened to satisfy this desire, and made great efforts to overcome the resistance of the cardinal, aged, infirm, and little disposed to recommence the career of his early youth. However, this repugnance was overcome by the earnest entreaties of the holy father and by the pressing interests of the church. The Pope wished to confer on Cardinal Caprara the highest diplomatic dignity of the Roman court, that of Legate *a latere*. This legate has the most extended powers; the cross is carried before him everywhere; he has power to do every thing that is possible away from the Pope. Pius VII. renewed on this occasion the ceremonies of old, in which the venerated sign of their mission was confided to the representatives of St. Peter. A grand consistory was convoked anew, and in the presence of all the cardinals, of all the foreign ministers, Cardinal Caprara received the silver cross, which it was his duty to have carried before him in that republican France, so long a stranger to Catholic pomp.

The First Consul, sensible of the cordial conduct of the Pope, testified the kindest consideration for him. He enjoined Murat to spare the Roman States the passage of troops; he made the Cisalpines evacuate the little

duchy of Urbino, which they had seized, upon pretext of a dispute concerning boundary. He announced the approaching evacuation of Ancona, and, in the interim, sent money to pay the garrison of it, in order to relieve the pontifical treasury of this expense. The Neapolitans, persisting in holding possession of the two confine territories belonging to the Holy See, to wit, Benevento and Ponte Corvo, received anew an injunction to evacuate them. The First Consul had also caused one of the fine hotels of Paris to be got ready, and furnished luxuriously, as a lodging for Cardinal Caprara, at the expense of the French treasury.

The ratifications had been exchanged; the bulls approved of; the briefs were in course of being expedited throughout all Christendom, to call for the resignations of the ancient diocessans. Cardinal Caprara, notwithstanding his age, had hastened his journey to Paris. Every where orders had been given to the authorities to welcome him in a manner conformable to his exalted dignity. They had done so with earnest regard; and the populace of the provinces, seconding their zeal, had given to the representative of the Holy See marks of respect, which proved the dominion of the old religion over the rural population. But there was a dread of putting the jibing people of Paris to the same proof, and every thing was arranged that the cardinal should enter the capital by night. He was received there with eager attentions, and lodged in the hotel prepared for him. He was given to understand, in the most delicate manner, that a part of the expenses of his mission was at the cost of the French government, and that this was a diplomatic usage, intended to be established in reference to the Holy See. The First Consul had sent to the legate's residence two carriages drawn by his finest horses.

Cardinal Caprara was received as a foreign ambassador, but not, as yet, as a representative of the church. That reception was adjourned to the time of the definitive re-establishment of religion. To institute the new bishops, to chant the *Te Deum*, and to tender to the cardinal-legate the oath due by him to the First Consul, were reserved for one and the same day.

The indispensable formalities by which it was necessary that the publication of the Concordate should be preceded, had taken much more time than was thought of at the commencement, and had led to the period in which the preliminaries of peace had just been signed in London. The First Consul would have been

do no better than transmit you the original letter which I have this moment received from Cardinal Gonsalvi.

This Cardinal having been unable to leave his bed, his Holiness has come to work to-day at the house of his secretary of state.

The Sacred College is to concur in the ratification; all the doctors of the first rank are employed, and in motion. The holy father is in the agitation, the inquietude, and the desire of a young wife, who dares not be merry on the festal marriage day. Never has the pontifical court been seen more self-collected, more seriously, and more secretly occupied with the novelty about to burst forth, while France, for whose interest it is, for whom they work, neither intrigues, promises, gives, nor even shines here, according to ancient usage. The First Consul will soon enjoy the accomplishment of his

views with regard to an accordance with the Holy See, and that will take place in a novel, simple, and truly respectable manner.

This will be the work of a hero and of a saint, for the Pope is a man of real piety.

He has said several times to me: "Rely on it, that if France, in place of being a dominant power, were prostrate and weak with regard to her enemies, I should not do less for her than I am granting to-day."

I do not think it can have often happened that so great a result, on which the tranquillity of France and the welfare of Europe will henceforward materially depend, could have been obtained without violence, as well as without corruption.

I have the honour to be yours, respectfully,

C. CAULT

glad to be able to make the *fête* dedicated, on the 18th of Brumaire, to the general peace, coincide with the grand religious solemnity of the restoration of religion. But it was necessary that the resignations of the ancient dioceses should have arrived at Rome, before the approval there of the new demarcations, and the choice of the new bishops. These resignations demanded by the Pope from the ancient clergy of France, were at that moment the object of general attention. There was a desire to know, from all quarters, how this great act of the Pope and the First Consul would be received. They, hand in hand, appealing to the ancient ministers of religion, whether friends or enemies to the Revolution, scattered through Germany, Russia, England, or Spain, demanded of them the sacrifice of their position, of their party affections, of the very pride of their doctrines, to make church unity triumph, and to re-establish the internal tranquillity of France. How many of them could there be found so sufficiently sensible to this double motive, as to immolate so many personal feelings and interests at once? The result proved the wisdom of the great act which the Pope and the First Consul did at that moment; it proved the dominion that can be exercised over souls by the love of good, nobly invoked by a saintlike pontiff and a hero.

The briefs addressed to the orthodox bishops and to the constitutional bishops were not similar. The brief addressed to the bishops who had refused to recognise the civil constitution of the clergy, treated them as legitimate titulars of their sees, demanded of them to resign in the name of the interest of the church, in virtue of an offer formerly made to Pius VI., and, in case of refusal, declared them deposed. The language to them was affectionate, sad, but replete with authority.

The brief addressed to the constitutionalists was paternal likewise, was redolent of the mildest indulgence, but did not speak of resignation, seeing that the church had never recognised the constitutionalists as legitimate bishops. It demanded of them an abjuration of former errors, a return to the bosom of the church, and to terminate a schism which was at once a scandal and a calamity. It was a manner of inducing their resignation without calling for it, for, to call for it, would have been a recognition of their title which the Holy See could not grant.

We must render equal justice to all men who facilitated this great act of reunion. The constitutional bishops, some of whom would have wished to resist, but the majority of whom, well advised, were sincerely desirous of seconding the First Consul, resigned in a body. The brief, although full of cordiality, annoyed them, because it spoke only of their errors and not of their resignations. They imagined a form of adhesion to the wishes of the Pope, which, without implying any retraction of the past, implied, nevertheless, their submission and their resignation. They declared that they adhered to the new Concordate, and consequently stripped themselves of their episcopal dignity. They were about 800 in number. All submitted, with one ex-

ception, viz., Bishop Saurine, a man of a very vivid imagination, of a religious zeal more ardent than enlightened, a priest besides of pure morals, whom the First Consul at a later period called to the episcopacy, after having made him acceptable to the Pope.

This part of the work was not the most difficult. It was, besides, the most readily realized, because the constitutionalists were almost all in Paris, under the grasp of the First Consul, and under the influence of the friends who had constituted themselves their defenders and their guides.

The unsworn bishops were scattered through all Europe. There was, however, a certain number of them in France. The immense majority offered a noble example of evangelical piety and submission. Seven resided in Paris, eight in the provinces—in all fifteen. Not one hesitated in the reply to be made to the pontiff and to the new head of the state. They made that reply in language worthy of the best times of the church. The old Bishop of Belloy, a venerable prelate, who had replaced M. de Belsunce at Marseilles, and who was the model of the ancient clergy, hastened to give to his brother-bishops the signal of self-denial. "Full," said he, "of veneration and obedience for the decrees of his Holiness, and wishing always to be united to him in heart and mind, I do not hesitate to deposit, in the hands of the holy father, my resignation of the bishopric of Marseilles. It is enough that he thinks it necessary for the preservation of religion in France that I should submit to it."

One of the most learned bishops of the French clergy, the historian of Bossuet and of Fénelon, the Bishop of Alais, wrote, "happy to be able to concur by my resignation, as much as is in my power, to the views of wisdom, of peace, and of conciliation, which his Holiness has adopted, I pray God to bless his pious intentions, and to avert from him the contradictions which might afflict his paternal heart."

The Bishop of Acqs wrote to the holy father, "I have not hesitated a moment to immolate myself, as soon as I had learned that this painful sacrifice was necessary to the peace of the country and to the triumph of religion. . . . May she issue glorious from her ruins! May she rise, I will not say only, on the wreck of all my dearest interests, of all my temporal advantages, but on my very ashes, if I could serve as her expiatory victim! . . . May my fellow-citizens return to concord, to faith, to holy morals! Never shall I form any other wishes during my life, and my death will be too happy if I see them accomplished."

Let us confess it, beautiful is the institution which commands such sacrifices and such language. The greatest names of the ancient clergy of ancient France, the Rohans, the Latours du Pin, the Castellanes, the Polignacs, the Clermont-Tonnerres, the Latours d'Auvergne, were found in the list of the bishops who had resigned. There was a general enthusiasm which recalled to mind the generous sacrifices of the ancient French nobility in the night of the 4th of August. It was *le*

same eager desire to facilitate, by a great act of self-denial, the execution of that Concordate, which M. de Cacaault had designated as the work of a hero and of a saint.

The bishops who had taken refuge in Germany, in Italy, in Spain, followed this example for the most part. There remained the eighteen bishops who had retired to England. These latter were waited for, to see if they could escape the hostile influences which surrounded them. The British government, actuated at the time by a friendly spirit towards France, wished to have nothing to do with their determination. But the princes of the house of Bourbon, the heads of the Chouan party, the instigators of civil war, the accomplices of the infernal machine, Georges and his associates, were in London, living on the means given to the emigrants. They surrounded the eighteen prelates, resolved to hinder them from completing, by their adherence, the union of all the French clergy about the Pope, and about General Bonaparte. Long deliberations were set on foot. Amongst the refractory were found the Archbishop of Narbonne, to whom very temporal interests were attributed, for, with his see, he would lose immense revenues; and the Bishop of Saint-Pol-de-Léon, who had created for himself a post, said to be lucrative, that of the distributing the British subsidies among the transported priests. Those factions acted on the bishops, and seduced thirteen of them. But they met with a noble resistance from the five other prelates, at the head of whom were found two of the most illustrious, of the most imposing, of the old clergy. M. de Cicé, archbishop of Bordeaux, formerly keeper of the seals under Louis XVI., a personage in whom was recognised a superior political mind; M. de Boisgelin, a learned bishop, and of great seigneurial possessions, who had in former times displayed the attitude of a worthy priest, faithful to his religion, but by no means inimical to the lights of the age he lived in. They, with their three colleagues, MM. d'Osmond, de Noé, and Du Plessis d'Argenteuil, sent in their adherence. Almost all the ancient clergy had then submitted. The work of the Pope was accomplished with less bitterness to his feelings than, at first, he had apprehended. All those resignations inserted in succession

in the *Moniteur*, side by side with the treaties signed with the courts of Europe, with Russia, England, Bavaria, Portugal, produced an immense effect, of which contemporaries have retained a deep recollection. If any thing made the overwhelming influence of the new government be felt, it was that respectful, earnest submission, of two hostile churches, the one devoted to the Revolution, but corrupted by the demon of disputation; the other, haughty, proud of its orthodoxy, of the greatness of its names, infected by the spirit of emigration, animated with sincere royalism, and believing, besides, that time was sufficient to render her victorious. This triumph was one of the finest, the most deserved, the most universally felt.

The 18th Brumaire, fixed for the grand fête of the general peace, was approaching. The First Consul was seized with one of those personal feelings, which often, in men, are mingled with the noblest resolutions. He wished to enjoy the result of his work, and to be able to celebrate the re-establishment of religious peace on the 18th Brumaire. But to do so, two things were necessary; first, that they should have sent from Rome the bull relative to the diocesan arrangements; and, secondly, that Cardinal Caprara might have the faculty of installing the new bishops. Had these things been done, the sixty bishops might have been nominated and consecrated, and a solemn *Te Deum* sung in their presence in the church of Notre Dame. Unfortunately, at Rome, they had been waiting for the reply of the five French bishops, who had retired to the north of Germany, and, as to the faculty of giving canonical investiture, it had not been conferred on Cardinal Caprara, because never had such a power been deputed, even to a legate *à latere*. It was already the 1st of November—10th Brumaire—there were only a few days left. The First Consul sent for Cardinal Caprara, spoke to him in the bitterest manner, complained, with a vivacity which was neither becoming nor deserved, of the little assistance that he obtained from the pontifical government for the accomplishment of his projects, and produced a deep emotion in the worthy cardinal.¹ But he very speedily perceived his error, and sought as quickly to

¹ Letter from Cardinal Caprara to Cardinal Gonsalvi. Paris, 2d of November, 1801.

Having just returned from Malmaison, about 11 o'clock at night, I sat down to detail to you the substance of the interview I have had with the First Consul. He did not say one word upon the subject of the five articles which I annexed to my letter of the 1st of November; but, with his characteristic vivacity, and, I must add also, with marked indications of displeasure, he launched out into the most bitter complaints against all Romans, saying that they wished to lead him a dance, and that they were trying to insnare him, by their eternal procrastination in expediting the bull of circumscription, and that they added to the delay by not sending the Pope's letters to the bishops in proper time: and further still, by not sending them by couriers, as every other government would have done which felt an interest in a reparation of this kind; that they were trying to ensnare him, for they sought, by making a bugaboo of him, to deter the Pope from assenting to the nominations which he might make of the constitutional bishops: and, continuing to talk like a torrent, he repeated precisely every thing that Councillor Portalis had told me yesterday evening in the presence of Monsignor Spina.

After an attack so vehement, in language so full of rectitude, I took upon myself to justify the accused Ro-

mans; when he, interrupting me, said, "I will listen to no justification; I make but one exception, and that is the Pope, for whom I feel respect and affection." . . .

It appearing to me that at this moment he was less excited than at the beginning of the conversation, I endeavoured to make him feel, that, entertaining an affection for his Holiness, he ought to give some proof of it, by sparing him the pain of nominating constitutional bishops. On this suggestion being made, he resumed his previous angry tone, and replied, "The constitutional bishops shall be appointed by me, and their number shall be fifteen. I have conceded all in my power, and I will not deviate one iota from the determination at which I have arrived." . . .

As to the chiefs of the sectarians, Councillor Portalis, who was present, assured me that I might be easy upon that point, as well as upon the subject of the subordination: but on the subject of the submission being mooted, the First Consul exclaimed, "It is arrogance to demand such a thing, and it would be cowardice to yield to it;" then, without waiting for an answer, he entered into a wide field of discursive argument on canonical institutions, and, completely throwing aside his military character, held forth for a very long time in a strain worthy of a canon. I will not say that he tried to convince, but only to keep me at arm's length. At last he wound up

repair. H. immediately felt that he was wrong, and, wishing to soften the effect produced by his vehemence, he kept the cardinal a whole day at Malmaison, charmed him by his grace and his kindness, and consoled him for the hastiness of the morning.

Letters were written to Rome, and a respectable priest, M. de Pancemont, curé of Saint Sulpice, afterwards Bishop of Vannes, was despatched to Germany to fetch the impatiently-expected reply of the five bishops. However, the 18th Brumaire passed over before the arrival of the desired acts. The *déclat* of that day was, nevertheless, great enough to make the First Consul forget what might be additionally wanting to it. At length the answers of Rome arrived. The Pope, still inclined to do what he, whom he called his "*dear son*," desired, sent the bull for the settlement of the dioceses, and the power of instituting the new bishops, conferred on the legate in a manner unprecedented. As a compensation for so much deference, he desired one thing, which he confided to the skill of Cardinal Caprara, namely, that he might be spared the vexation of instituting constitutionalists.

Thenceforward nothing any longer opposed the proclamation of the great religious act accomplished after so much labour, but the pro-

pitious moment had been allowed to pass. The session of the year X. was opened, according to custom, reckoning from the 1st Frimaire—22d of November, 1801. The Tribunal, the Legislative Body, the Senate, were assembled: active resistance and scandalous remarks were made against the Concordate. The First Consul did not at all like that such bursts should interfere to disturb an august ceremony, and he resolved to await the re-establishment of the forms of worship until he had brought round or crushed the Tribunal. Now the delays were to come from him, and it was the Holy See that was to show itself pressing. However, the sudden difficulties, which he was likely to meet with, proved the merit and the courage of his resolution. It was not only to the Concordate, but to the Civil Code itself, and to some of the treaties which had just secured the peace of the world, that active opposition was threatened. Proud of his works, strong in the public approval, the First Consul was resolved to proceed to the greatest extremities. He spoke only of crushing the bodies that should resist him. Thus were the human passions about to mingle their impulses with the finest works of a great man and of a great epoch.

by observing, "But the bishops do not make profession of faith, nor take the oath." Councillor Portalis having said, "Yes they do;" "Well," concluded he, "that act of obedience to the Pope is of more value than a thousand submissions." Then turning to me, he laconically said, "Endeavour to arrange that the bull of circumscription be soon here, and that the other, regarding which I spoke to you on a former occasion, may not, at Rome, meet with the same fate which the Pope's letters to the bishops have experienced, and which, as I am apprized, were not received by any of the several parties in Germany until the 31st of the last month."

This closed the interview. I ought, however, to add that, at its conclusion, about one o'clock in the day, he took an airing with madame, and was absent for about an hour, but previously insisted that I should stay to dinner, although I was already engaged to dine with his brother Joseph, to whom, however, he sent word: certainly, without exaggeration, from dinner time until ten o'clock at night, he never ceased to talk to me, walking nearly all the while up and down the room, in his usual manner, and descanting upon every imaginable topic in politics and economy which concerned us.

BOOK XIII.

THE TRIBUNATE.¹

Internal Administration—The High-roads cleared of Robbers, and repaired—Revival of Commerce—Exports and Imports of the year 1801—Material Results of the French Revolution, as to Agriculture, Industry, and Population—Influence of the Prefects and Sub-Prefects on the Administration—Order and Rapidity in the Despatch of Business—Counsellors of State on a Circuit—Discussion of the Civil Code—Brilliant Winter of 1801-1802—Extraordinary influx of Strangers to Paris—Court of the First Consul—Organization of his Military and Civil Establishment—The Consular Guard—Prefects of the Palace and Maids of Honour—Sisters of the First Consul—Hortense de Beauharnais marries Louis Bonaparte—Messrs. Fox and De Calonne at Paris—Wealth and Luxury of all Classes—Approach of the Session of year X.—Violent Opposition to the most magnificent Works of the First Consul—Causes of this Opposition, disseminated not only among the Members of the Deliberative Assembly, but also some Chiefs of the Army—Conduct of Generals Lannes, Augereau, and Moreau—Opening of the Session—Dupuis, the Author of the "Origin of all Religions," elected President of the Legislative Body—Ballotings for the Vacancies in the Senate—Nomination of the Abbé Grégoire, contrary to the wish of the First Consul—Violent Discussion in the Tribune, about the word *subject*, inserted in the Treaty with Prussia—Opposition to the Civil Code—Irritation of the First Consul—Discussion in the Council of State, on the Conduct to be pursued under these Circumstances—They determine to wait for the Discussion of the first Articles of the Civil Code—The Tribune rejects the First Articles—Result of the Ballotings for the Vacancies in the Senate—The First Consul has proposed some old Generals, who were not included among his creatures—The Tribune and Legislative Chamber reject them, and combine to propose M. Daunou, known to be opposed to the Government—Warm Address of the First Consul to an Assembly of the Senators—Threats of Violent Measures—The intimidated Opposition submits, and devises a subterfuge to Annul the effect of their first Ballot—Cambacérès dissuades the First Consul from all illegal Measures, and persuades him to remove his Opponents, by means of Article 38 of the Constitution, which fixes the year X. for the expiration of the first fifth of the Legislative Chamber and Tribune—The First Consul adopts this idea—Suspension of all legislative Labours—Advantage is taken of it, to assemble at Lyons, under the title of Consul, an Italian Diet—Before leaving Paris, the First Consul expedites a Fleet loaded with Troops for Saint Domingo—Project of re-conquering this Colony—Negotiations of Amiens—Object of the Consul, convoked at Lyons—Divers modes of re-establishing Italy—Projects of the First Consul on this Subject—Creation of the Italian Republic—General Bonaparte proclaimed President of this Republic—Enthusiasm of the Italians and French collected at Lyons—Grand Review of the Army of Egypt—Return of the First Consul to Paris.

We have just seen by what persevering and skillful efforts the First Consul, after having subjugated Europe by his victories, had succeeded in binding her to France by his policy; by what efforts, not less meritorious, he had effected a reconciliation of the Romish church with the French republic, and given a death-blow to the calamities of schism. His efforts to restore security in travelling on the high-roads, activity in commerce and manufactures, ease in the finances, order in the administration, to enact a civil code suited to our manners and customs, to organize, in short, in all its parts, French society, had not been less constant, nor less successful.

The horde of brigands, composed of deserters from the army, disbanded soldiers of the civil war, who attacked rich inhabitants in the country, travellers on the high-roads, plundered the public treasures, and spread terror through the country, had been treated with extreme severity. These brigands had chosen to commit their depredations the moment when the armies, being nearly all abroad, had deprived the interior of the forces necessary for its protection. But after the peace of Lunéville, and the return of a portion of our troops, their situation was no longer the same. Numerous movable troops, accompanied at first by military commissioners, and subsequently by those special tribunals, the formation of which we have described; had scourged the roads in every direction, and punished with remorseless activity all those found infesting them. Several hundred had been shot in six months, without a voice in favour of those rascals, the dregs of civil war. The others, completely frightened,

had laid down their arms and submitted. Security was thus restored on the high-roads, and whilst in the months of January and February, 1801, there was great danger in travelling from Paris to Rouen, or from Paris to Orleans, of being assassinated, at the close of this same year every part of France could be traversed without interruption. There remained only a few of these robbers in the recesses of Brittany or the interior of Cévennes, and they were soon to be dispersed.

It has been seen how ten years of trouble had nearly interrupted all travelling in France; how the old statute-labour had been replaced by the turnpike-tolls; how, under the existence of this tax, at once inconvenient and insufficient, the roads had fallen into complete disrepair; how, in short, the First Consul, in Nivôse last, had devoted an extraordinary subsidy to the repair of twenty of the principal highways traversing the soil of France. He had himself superintended the disbursement of this subsidy, and by constant attention, stimulated to the highest degree the zeal of the engineers. Each one of his aid-de-camps, or public functionaries travelling through France, was questioned by him to know if his orders were executed. This year the funds had been voted somewhat late; the close of the year had been rainy, and moreover workmen were very scarce. This was the consequence of sudden and immense clearings, and especially of a long civil war. These various causes had retarded the works; but the improvement was nevertheless remarkable. The First Consul had just appropriated a new subsidy, taken from the year X.—1801 to 1802—to repairing forty-two other roads. This

¹ Tribune. The French constitution of December 13, 1799, projected by Bonaparte and Sieyès, committed the legislative power, though more in appearance than reality, to a body (corps législatif) of 300 men, and a Tribune chosen by the Conservative Senate, from the three lists of candidates proposed by the departmental colleges. To the three consuls was reserved the right of initiating

laws: to the Tribune, that of deliberating on subjects thus proposed, and to the Legislative Body, that of accepting or rejecting measures thus proposed by the first and discussed by the second. The Tribune was renewed every five years, by the re-election of one-fifth of its members yearly.—*Encyclopædia Americana*

subsidy, borrowed from the general fund of the treasury, was to be added to the toll collected. Reckoning two millions unemployed in the year IX., ten millions extraordinary taken from the year X., and sixteen millions arising from tolls, the whole sum appropriated to the repair of the roads for the current year would be twenty-eight millions. This was two or three times as much as had ever been devoted to that purpose before. Hence the repairs were rapidly made, and every thing gave promise that, in the course of 1802, the roads in France would be in the finest state of repair and condition for travelling.

Orders were given for the construction of new communications between the various parts of old and new France. Four great roads were making between Italy and France. That over the Simplon, already mentioned, was rapidly advancing. That over Mount Cenis, uniting Piedmont and Savoy, was commenced. A third, over Mount Genevra, uniting Piedmont and the south of France was projected. The repair of the highway through the defile of Tende, traversing the Maritime Alps was undertaken. Thus the barrier of the Alps between France and Italy was, as it were, overthrown, by means of these four roads made passable for the largest civil and military trains. The miracle of the passage of the St. Bernard would in future be useless, should it become necessary to hasten to the assistance of Italy.

The canal of St. Quentin was making. The First Consul himself inspected the canal of the Ourcq, and ordered the works to be renewed. The canal from Aigues-Mortes to Beaucaire, intrusted to a company, was in progress of execution. The government had encouraged the company by giving it large grants of land. The new bridges over the Seine, ceded to a number of capitalists, were nearly completed. These numerous and splendid enterprises attracted public attention, which, always on the alert in France, turned with a sort of enthusiasm from the triumphs of war to the triumphs of peace.

Already during the year IX.—1800, 1801—commerce had taken a great start, although the maritime war lasted during the whole of that year. The imports, which in the year VIII. only amounted to 325,000,000, rose to 417,000,000 in the year IX. This was an increase of nearly one-fourth, in a single year. This increase was owing to two causes; the greatly augmented consumption of colonial provisions, and the introduction in bulk of a large quantity of material for manufactures, such as cotton in bales, wool, oils; an evident sign of the renewed energy of our manufactories. The exports had partaken less of this general increase, because our foreign commerce was not yet re-established in the year IX.—1800, 1801—and because, moreover, the manufacture of products must necessarily exceed their exportation. Nevertheless the exports which in the year VIII. were only 271,000,000, rose in the year IX. to 305,000,000. The increase of 34,000,000 was chiefly owing to extraordinary exportations of our wines and brandies, which had excited at Bordeaux a great commercial activity. The reader will also remark the dif-

ference produced, between our exports and imports, by these ten years of naval war since we received 417,000,000 in value, and exported only 305,000,000. But the restoration of our manufactories would soon fill up this difference.

The silk factories in the south began to flourish. Lyons, the favourite city of the First Consul, began anew her beautiful business. Of 15,000 workshops formerly devoted to the silk weaving, only 2000 continued to be occupied during our troubles. Seven thousand were already in full work. Lille, St. Quentin, Rouen showed the same spirit, and the seaports from which the blockade was to be removed were preparing a host of vessels. The First Consul, on his part, began for the re-establishment of our colonies, preparations the object and extent of which will soon be seen.

It was important to take some account of the state France was left in by the Revolution, as regards agriculture and population. Statistical researches, impossible when collective administrations directed the provincial affairs, had become practicable since the institution of prefects and sub-prefects. New examinations were ordered, which furnished singular results, confirmed moreover by the general councils of the departments, assembled for the first time in the year IX. The census had then been taken in sixty-seven of the one hundred and two departments composing France in 1801. The population which in these sixty-seven departments, was of 21,176,423 inhabitants in 1789, was of 22,297,443 in 1800. This was an increase of 1,100,000 souls, nearly one-ninth. This result, almost incredible, if it were not confirmed by the declarations of several of the general councils, proved that, after all, the evil produced by great social revolutions is rather apparent than real, at least as regards the main object, and that moreover, the good rapidly effaces the evil. Agriculture was everywhere flourishing. The suppression of the ranger-ships had been useful in most of the provinces. If, by the destruction of the game, one of the chief enjoyments of the richer classes had been destroyed, on the other hand agriculture was delivered from many ruinous vexations. The sale of a vast number of country seats had caused a large quantity of land to be cleared, and gave value to a portion of the soil hitherto unproductive. Many church glebes, having passed from the hands of a negligent tenant into those of an intelligent and active proprietor, increasing daily the amount of agricultural productions. The revolution which took place among our landed proprietors, by dividing their possessions amongst many individuals, prodigiously increased the number of proprietors, as well as the extent of land cultivated, and was productive of immense results. The processer of culture were not yet sensibly improved, but the tillage of the soil had extended in an extraordinary manner.

The forests belonging either to the government, or to the communes, were effected by the administrative negligence of past years. This was one of the objects for which it was absolutely necessary to provide, for the wool-verse

cleared without any respect to the property of government or of individuals. The bureau of finances, possessed of a large extent of forests by the confiscation of the properties of the emigrants, did not yet understand how to watch nor how to improve them. Many proprietors, either absent or intimidated, abandoned the defence of the woods which they held, some in reality, others fictitiously, on account of proscribed families. This was the result of a state of things which were about to have an end. The First Consul had paid particular attention to the preservation of the forest wealth of France, and had begun to restore order, and respect for property. A rural code was universally requisite, to prevent the damage done by flocks and herds.

The new institution of prefects and sub-prefects, created by the law of Pluviose, year VIII., had been productive of immediate results. To disorder and neglect in the collectors, had succeeded regularity and promptness, the evident and necessary consequences of unity of power. The affairs of the state and the communes had both profited by it, for they had at last found agents who devoted their whole attention to their business. The completion of the tax-rolls and collection of taxes, formerly so much neglected, were now nowhere retarded. Some order was also introduced in the revenues and expenses of the communes. Several departments of their administration were, however, still in a deplorable condition. The hospitals, for instance, were in a wretched state. The annihilation of a portion of their revenue, by the sale of their estates and the privation of many abolished rights, had reduced them to the greatest distress. In some small towns the octroi (city toll) had been devised, and indirect contributions tried in a small way. But these city tolls, as yet not firmly founded, were neither sufficient, nor generally enough applied. The Foundling Hospitals shared the general disorder. Numbers of children were known to be abandoned, and not received by public charity, or intrusted to miserable nurses whose wages were unpaid. Almost everywhere the Sisters Hospitaliers¹ were sought for, as nurses in the hospitals.

The parish registers, taken from the priests and intrusted to municipal officers, were very badly kept. In order to restore order in this branch of the government, so important to the welfare of families, not only zeal and vigilance were necessary in the officers, but also an amendment of the law, hitherto insufficient or badly devised. This was one of the topics to be regulated by the civil code, now under discussion by the council of state.

The great number, and infinite division of the communes was complained of, and their reduction, by adding several together, was demand-

ed. This splendid French administration now completed, and surpassing in regularity, precision, and vigour, all the administrations of Europe, was thus rapidly organized under the creative and all-powerful hand of the First Consul. He had devised the most efficacious plan of knowing every thing, and giving to this vast machine all the perfection of which it was susceptible. He ordered some of the most able state councillors to travel over France, and observe on the spot the progress of the administration. These councillors, having reached the principal departments, sent for the prefects of the adjacent departments, the chiefs of various branches of service, and held meetings, in which were stated to them the difficulties which could not have been foreseen, the unexpected obstacles arising from the very nature of things, the weak points in the laws or regulations which had been made ten years since. They examined, at the same time, if this hierarchy of prefects, sub-prefects, and mayors, discharged their duty with order and regularity: if the individuals were well selected, if they appeared imbued with the intentions of their chief; if they were, like him, firm, laborious, impartial, and free from all party spirit. These inspections produced the happiest effects. The councillors stimulated the zeal of the officers, and brought to the state council information, useful either for the regulation of current affairs or the enactment or improvement of administrative laws. Encouraged particularly by the energy of the First Consul, they did not hesitate to report to him the weak, incapable, or evil-disposed agents.

The solicitude of the First Consul was not confined to this review of the country by the councillors of state. The numerous aides-de-camp despatched by him, sometimes to the armies, sometimes to the seaports, to communicate his orders, were directed, during their travels, to observe and report every thing to their general. Colonels Lacuée, Lauriston, and Savary, sent to Antwerp, Boulogne, Brest, Rochefort, Toulon, Genoa and Otranto, were ordered to stop in each place on their return, to see, listen, and take notes of every thing; the condition of the roads, the state of commerce, the conduct of public officers, wishes of the people, and public opinion. None of them failed in so doing, none feared to tell the truth to a just and all powerful chief. This chief, intent at that time on doing good alone, because this good, infinite in its extent and diversity, was sufficient to absorb the energy of his mind, received gladly the truth he had elicited, and boldly made use of it, either to remove a guilty functionary, to repair a hiatus in the new institutions, or to direct his attention to some object which till then had escaped his indefatigable research.²

¹ *Sœurs hospitalières*, an order of holy women, resembling the Sisters of Charity.

² The following are some specimens of the instructions given to his aides-de-camp.

To the Citizen Lauriston, Aide-de-camp.

Paris, 7th Pluviose, year XI.—27th Jan. 1801.

You will start, citizen, for Rochefort. You will examine minutely the port and arsenal, referring yourself, with this intention, to the maritime prefect.

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You will bring me reports on the following subjects:

1. The exact number of men on board of the two frigates ready to sail, and an inventory of the artillery and all other objects in them. You will remain at Rochefort until they have sailed.
2. How many frigates are in the harbour?
3. A particular report of each of the frigates, the *Foudroyant*, *Duguay-Trouin* and *Atle*. How soon will each of these vessels be ready to sail?

A matter of great importance was at this moment engaging public attention, namely, the discussion of the Civil Code in the Council of State. The want of this code was certainly among the greatest wants of France. The old civil code, composed of feudal, common, and Roman law, did not suit a people so wholly revolutionized. The old laws of marriage, those in divorce and inheritance made for the occasion, were neither congenial to a new state of society, nor to a moral and regular order of things. A commission composed of M. de Portalis, Tronchet, Bigot de Préameneu and Malleville, had drawn up the plan of a Civil Code. This plan had been sent to the various tribunals, for their examination and criticism. In consequence of these, the plan had been modified, and submitted at last to the Council of State, which had just discussed it article by article, for several months. The First Consul, present at all the sittings, had displayed, whilst presiding over them, a method, a clearness, and frequently a depth of thought, which surprised every one. Skilled in directing armies, and governing conquered provinces, they were not astonished to find him a governor, for this quality is indispensable to a great general: but they were not prepared to find in him a legislator. His education on this subject had been soon perfected. Interested in every thing, because he understood every thing, he asked

Cambacérés for some law books, and especially for the materials prepared by the convention for the compilation of the new Civil Code. He had devoured them, with those books on religious controversy which he obtained, whilst occupied with the Concordate. Very soon classifying in his head the general principles of civil law, adding to these some rapidly collected ideas, a profound knowledge of men, and a perfectly clear mind, he had made himself capable of directing so important a work, and even suggested himself a large proportion of just, new, and profound ideas. Sometimes a want of knowledge of these matters led him to support strange notions; but he was soon convinced by the wise men who surrounded him, and he was superior to them all, when it was required to draw, from the conflict of the most contrary opinions, the most natural and rational conclusion. The principal service rendered by the First Consul, was to lend to the completion of this beautiful work, great firmness of mind and perseverance, thus overcoming the two difficulties on which, until then, they had split, namely, the infinite diversity of opinions, and the impossibility of working steadily during the troubles of the day. When the discussion, as frequently happened, was tedious, diffuse, and obstinate, the First Consul knew how to renew it, or cut it short by a word; and, moreover, he made every one work

4. A particular report of each of the frigates, the Vertu, Cybèle, Volontaire, Thétis, Embuscade, and Franchise.

5. The state of all the guns, pistols, sabres, and cannon-balls that have arrived at this port for the navy.

6. If there are in the naval storehouses provisions sufficient to victual six ships of war for six months, independently of the three above named?

7. Lastly, have all means been taken to recruit sailors, and to bring from Bordeaux and Nantes provisions, rigging, and the articles necessary for the fitting out of a squadron?

If you think you will remain at Rochefort more than six days, you will send your first report by mail. You will not fail to inform the prefect that in my opinion the minister of war has taken measures to have nine vessels ready for sailing from Rochefort at the beginning of Vendémiaire. You understand that this is to be mentioned as a profound secret to the prefect.

You will profit by all opportunities to gather, in all the places through which you may pass, information concerning the administration of public affairs and the state of public feeling.

If the departure of the frigates is retarded, I authorize you to go to Bordeaux and return by way of Nantes. You will bring me a report on the three frigates now equipping. I am, etc. **BONAPARTE.**

To Citizen Lacuée, Aide-de-camp.

Paris, 9th Vendémiaire, year IX.—28th Feb. 1801.

You will repair, citizen, with all haste to Toulon. You will deliver the inclosed to Vice-admiral Ganteaume. You will see all the vessels of the squadron, as also the arsenal; you will ascertain for yourself the force and number of the English vessels blockading the port of Toulon. If it be less than that of Vice-admiral Ganteaume, you will order him not to allow himself to be blockaded by an inferior force.

If circumstances decide General Ganteaume on continuing his mission, you will desire him to take at Toulon as many troops as he can carry. You will see that the military commandant removes all obstacles to this, and furnishes him the troops.

You will inform Vice-admiral Ganteaume that he has, generally, been somewhat blamed for his cruise toward Mahon, because it attracted the attention of Admiral Warren, whose only idea was to defend Mahon.

If Vice-admiral Ganteaume decides on continuing his mission, you will remain at Toulon four days after his departure.

If, on the contrary, your information would lead you to suppose that he will remain too long, you will return to Paris after having spent fifteen days at Toulon, six at Marseilles, four at Nîmes, and five or six at Lyons.

lon, six at Marseilles, four at Nîmes, and five or six at Lyons.

You will be careful to report to me the state of every thing on board of each ship; the state of the ships and frigates sent from Toulon since the 1st of Vendémiaire of year IX; the state of the arsenal; and notes on the public functionaries in the countries through which you may pass, and the state of the public mind.

You will send me information of the squadron, the sea, and the English, by all the couriers despatched by the maritime prefect.

You will encourage, by your discourse, all the naval captains, and explain to them of what immense interest their expedition is for the general peace.

I am, etc.

BONAPARTE.

To the Citizen Lauriston.

Paris, 30th Pluviose, year IX.—19th Feb. 1802.

I have received, citizen, your different letters, and your last of the 25th of Pluviose. I desire you to obtain secret information of the administration of the bureau of provisions, of which complaints are made.

On your return, bring me a detailed report of the merchandise of the North furnished by the company Leclie, during the year X. They assert that they now have in store the value of 1,700,000 francs.

How much timber has arrived from Havre since the peace, and are they completing the five vessels now being built?

Passing by Lorient, see how many vessels are being built, and when each will be ready for sea. Visit all the artillery and grenadier garde-côte, so as to inform me what kind of men they are, and what can be done with them on the conclusion of peace.

At Nantes, ascertain what northern merchandise has been received during the year X, and how much hemp still remains; if the transportation of timber to Brest is still going on. Stop two days at Pannes, to make suitable observations on the state of the public mind.

In all these observations, endeavour to see for yourself, without the assistance of others.

Inform me what character Charron left at Lorient, and remain there three or four days to observe the administration of affairs in that port.

In short, let no opportunity escape to see for yourself and form your opinion on the civil, military, and naval administrations.

Observe in each department the prospects of the approaching harvest.

I expect you will bring me notes as to the manner in which the troops are paid, clothed, and the condition of the principal hospitals on hand.

I am, etc.

BONAPARTE.

by working all day himself. The proceedings of these remarkable sittings were printed and published. However, before sending them to the *Moniteur*, Consul Cambacérés revised them, and suppressed those parts unfit for publication, either where the First Consul had advanced opinions, sometimes strange, or treated of questions of morals, with a familiarity of language intended for the ears of the Council alone. The proceedings, therefore, contained only the thoughts, sometimes corrected, sometimes misrepresented, but always striking, of the First Consul. The public were astonished, and began to consider him as the sole author of all that was good and great in France. They even took pride in finding a legislator in him, who had been a general, diplomatist, and governor, and always the first in these various characters.

The first book of the Civil Code was finished, and it was one of the numerous projects about to be submitted to the Legislative Chambers. The pacification of France and her internal reorganization kept equal pace. Although all the evil was not removed—although all the good was not accomplished, a comparison of the present with the past filled every one with satisfaction and hope. All the good done was attributed to the First Consul, and with justice, for, from the testimony of his industrious collaborator, Consul Cambacérés, he himself directed the whole, attended to all the details, and in each department did more than those to whom it was particularly confided.

The man who governed France from 1799 to 1815, undoubtedly had, in his career, days of intoxicating glory: but certainly, neither he nor France ever passed through similar times, times in which greatness was accompanied by more wisdom, and that wisdom which gave promise of duration. He had just concluded, after victory, the most splendid peace, and such as he never obtained after the maritime peace; from chaos he had established the most complete order; he had left some liberty, not all that was desirable, but that at least which was possible on the morrow of a bloody revolution; he had done nothing but good to all parties; except the banishing of one hundred and odd revolutionary proscribers, sentenced without any trial after the infernal machine; he had respected the laws; and this act itself, culpable, because it was illegal, was lost amongst so much good. Europe, in short, reconciled with the republic, feeling without expressing it, that she had been wrong in meddling with a revolution in which she was not interested, and that the unexampled grandeur of France was the righteous consequence of an unjust aggression heroically repulsed, hastened to do homage to the First Consul, happy to be able to say, for her own dignity, that she made peace only with a revolutionist full of genius, and a glorious restorer of social principles.

Great stress, indeed, must be laid on the wonders of those days, and history, in speaking of this reign, can relate that nothing more great and complete was ever seen on earth. All this was written on the anxious, admiring countenances of men of all ranks, and all nations, who thronged around the First Consul. An extraordinary number of strangers had arrived at

Paris, to see France, to see General Bonaparte; and the majority of them were presented to him by the ministers of their respective governments. His court, for he had created one, was at once military and civil, severe and elegant. He had added somewhat to it since the preceding year, he had constituted a military establishment for himself and the consuls, and given Madame Bonaparte a princely retinue.

The consular guard was composed of four battalions of infantry, each 1200 strong, some of them grenadiers, the others chasseurs; and of two regiments of cavalry, the first of mounted grenadiers, the second of mounted chasseurs. They were both composed of the finest and bravest men in the army. A numerous and well-served artillery completed this guard, and made it an absolute war division, provided with all arms, and amounting to about 6000 men. A brilliant staff commanded these superb troops. There was a colonel to each battalion, and a general of brigade to two united battalions. Four lieutenant-generals, one of infantry, one of cavalry, one of artillery, one of engineers, commanded alternately the whole corps for one decade, and did duty about the consuls. It was a corps of picked men, in which the best soldiers found a recompense for their good conduct, which surrounded the government with a splendour conformable with its warlike character, and which, on the day of battle, presented an invincible reserve. It will be recollected that the battalion of the grenadiers of the consular guard had nearly saved the army at Marengo. To this particular staff of the consular guard the First Consul had added a military governor for the palace of the Tuileries, accompanied by two officers of the staff with the title of adjutants. This governor was Duroc, the aide-de-camp, who was always employed in delicate missions. No officer was fitter for maintaining in the palace of the government that order and decorum which harmonized with the taste of the First Consul and the spirit of the time. It was necessary to temper this military display by a certain civil state. M. Benezech, a councillor of state, had been appointed in the first year to preside at receptions, and to receive with due honours either the foreign ministers or the high personages admitted to the consuls. Four civil officers, with the title of prefects of the palace, succeeded M. Benezech in this office. Four ladies of the palace were given to Madame Bonaparte, to assist in doing the honours of the First Consul's drawing-room. As soon as it was known that this organization of the palace was preparing, numerous candidates came forward, even from among the families belonging to what was called the *ancien régime*. It was not yet the high nobility, those who formerly filled the apartments of Versailles, that presented themselves to solicit; the moment for their submission had not yet arrived. Still they were families of distinction in past times, which had not figured in the emigration, and were the first to approach a powerful government, which, by its glory, rendered service about it honourable to any body. General Bonaparte selected for prefects of the palace M. Benezech, who had already performed the func-

tions, Messrs. Didelot and De Luçay engaged under the old system in the financial department, M. de Remusat in the magistracy. The four ladies of the palace, charged to do its honours by the side of Madame Bonaparte, were Mesdames de Luçay, De Lauriston, De Talhouët, and De Remusat. The most arrant slanderers of the emigrant drawing-rooms of Paris had nothing to allege against the fitness of these selections; and reasonable persons, who require no more of courts than what decorum renders necessary, had no fault to find with that military and civil organization. In fact, in a republic, as in a monarchy, the palace of the heads of the state must be guarded and surrounded by an imposing display of the public force; in the interior of that palace there must be men, women, chosen to do the honours of it either to illustrious foreigners or to distinguished citizens, who are admitted to the first magistrates of the republic. In this point, the court of the First Consul was imposing and worthy of him. It received a certain grace from his wife and his sisters, all remarkable either for manners, understanding, or beauty. We have elsewhere adverted to the brothers of the First Consul: this is the proper place to notice his sisters. The eldest sister of the First Consul, Madame Elisa Bacciochi, not remarkable for her person, was a woman of superior understanding, and drew around her the most distinguished literary men of the time, such as Messrs. Suard, Morellet, and Fontanes. The second, Caroline Murat, who had married the general of that name, ambitious and beautiful, intoxicated with her brother's fortune, striving to turn it to the best account for herself and her husband, was one of the women of this new court who gave it most animation and elegance. The third, Pauline Bonaparte, who had married General Leclerc, and who afterwards married a Prince Borghese, was one of the greatest beauties of her time. She had not yet provoked slander so much as she afterwards did, and, if her inconsiderate conduct sometimes grieved her brother, the passionate affection which she felt for him touched him and disarmed his severity. Madame Bonaparte was above them all from her position as wife of the First Consul, and charmed by her exquisite grace both the French and the foreigners admitted into the palace of the government. Inevitable and already observable rivalries between members of that family, so near to the throne, were repressed by General Bonaparte, who, though he loved his relations, treated with military roughness those who disturbed the peace which he desired to see reigning around him.

An event of some importance had just occurred in the consular family; this was the marriage of Hortense de Beauharnais with Louis Bonaparte. The First Consul, who was fondly attached to his wife's two children, had wished to marry Hortense with Duroc, believing that a reciprocal affection subsisted between those two young hearts; but this match, being disapproved by Madame Bonaparte, was not carried into effect. Madame Bonaparte, incessantly tormented by the dread of a divorce, ever since she had lost all hope of having more children, was for marrying her own daughter

to one of her husband's brothers, flattering herself that the offspring of that union, bound by two different ties to the new chief of France, might serve him for heirs. Joseph Bonaparte was married; Lucien led a very irregular life, and behaved like an enemy to his sister-in-law: Jerome was expiating some youthful indiscretions on board a ship. Louis was the only one who suited the views of Madame Bonaparte. She selected him. He was prudent, well-informed, but morose, and ill-matched in disposition with the wife who was destined for him. The First Consul, who was of this opinion, resisted at first, afterwards yielded, and assented to a marriage which was not destined to make either party happy, but which, for a time, appeared likely to give heirs to the empire of the world.

The nuptial benediction was given by Cardinal Caprara, and in a private house, as was then the practice with all the ceremonies of religion, when priests who had not taken the oath officiated. On the same occasion, that benediction was given to Murat and his wife Caroline, who had not yet received it, like many other husbands and wives of that time, whose marriage had been contracted before the civil magistrate only. General Bonaparte and Josephine were in the same predicament. The latter earnestly entreated her husband to add the religious bond to the civil bond, which already united them; but, whether from foresight, or from fear of avowing to the public the incomplete contract which bound him to Madame Bonaparte, he would not comply.

Such was then the consular family, afterwards the imperial family. These personages, all remarkable on different accounts, happy in the glory and the prosperity of the head who constituted their greatness, controlled by him, and not yet spoiled by fortune, presented an interesting sight, which did not pain the eye like that directorial court, the honours of which were done for several years by Barras, the director. If certain envious or disdainful Frenchmen, who were frequently under obligations to it, did, nevertheless, persecute it with their sarcasms, foreigners, more just, paid it a tribute of curiosity and commendation.

Once every decade, as we have elsewhere said, the First Consul received the ambassadors and the foreigners who were presented to him by the ministers of their nation. He went through the ranks of the assembly, which was always numerous, followed by his aides-de-camp. Madame Bonaparte came after him, accompanied by the ladies of the palace. It was the same ceremonial that was observed in other courts, with a smaller train of aides-de-camp and ladies of honour, but with the incomparable lustre which surrounded General Bonaparte. Twice in each decade, he invited to dinner the eminent personages of France and Europe, and once a month he gave in the gallery of Diana an entertainment, at which a hundred guests were sometimes assembled. On those days, he held a drawing-room at the Tuileries in the evening, and admitted to his presence the high functionaries, the ambassadors, and those persons of high French society, who were friendly towards the govern-

ment. Always carrying calculation into the minutest things, he enjoined his family to wear certain dresses, with a view to render the use of them general by imitation. He ordered silk to be worn, for the purpose of encouraging, as much as possible, the manufactures of Lyons. He recommended to his wife the stuff called *linon* (lawn), in order to favour those of St. Quentin.¹ As for himself, simple among all, he wore a plain dress of chasseur of the consular guard. He had obliged his colleagues to put on the embroidered dress of consul, and to hold a drawing-room in their apartments, for the purpose of repeating there, though with less splendour, what was done at the Tuileries. The winter of 1801 and 1802—year X.—was extremely brilliant, from the satisfaction prevailing among all classes, some happy to return to France, others to enjoy at last entire security, others to catch in the maritime peace a glimpse of unbounded prospects of commercial prosperity. The great resort of foreigners contributed to the splendour of the winter festivities. Among the persons who appeared in Paris this season, there were two who attracted general attention: one was an illustrious Englishman; the other an emigrant, whose name had formerly been very notorious.

The illustrious Englishman was Mr. Fox, the most eloquent orator in England; the famous emigrant was M. de Calonne, formerly minister of the finances, who, with a mind ready and fertile in expedients, contrived to hide for a few months from the eyes of the court of Versailles the abyss towards which it was hurrying. Mr. Fox felt a real impatience to see the man towards whom, notwithstanding his British patriotism, he was irresistibly attracted. He came to Paris immediately after the signature of the preliminaries of peace, and was presented to the First Consul by the English minister. He came not only to see France and its chief, but also to make researches into our diplomatic archives, for the great Whig orator was then employing his leisure in writing the history of the last two Stuarts. The First Consul ordered all the archives to be opened to Mr. Fox, and gave him such a welcome as would have sufficed to conciliate an enemy, but which charmed a friend whom he had won by his glory alone. The First Consul threw aside all etiquette with this generous foreigner; he had long and frequent conversations with him, and seemed desirous to make, in his person, a conquest of the English nation itself. Mr. Fox was endowed with that warm imagination which makes fascinating orators, but his understanding was neither positive nor practical. He was full of those noble illusions, which the First Consul, though he had as much imagination as depth of understanding, had never indulged, or at least had ceased to indulge. The young General Bonaparte was disenchanted, as one is after a revolution commenced in the name of humanity, and wrecked in blood. He

had shaken off all the first enchantments of the Revolution excepting one—that of greatness, and this he carried to excess. He was not liberal enough to please the leader of the Whigs, and too ambitious to please an Englishman. Each, therefore, galled the other sometimes by contrary opinions. Mr. Fox made the First Consul smile by a simplicity, by an inexperience, which were singular in a man who was nearly sixty years old. The First Consul at times alarmed the British patriotism of Mr. Fox by the vastness of his designs, which he took too little care to dissuade. They harmonized, nevertheless, in understanding and in heart, and were enchanted with each other. The First Consul took infinite pains to make Mr. Fox thoroughly acquainted with Paris, and sometimes he was pleased to accompany him himself to the public establishments. There was just then an exhibition of the productions of French industry, which was the second since the Revolution. Everybody was astonished at the progress of our manufactures, which, amidst the general commotion, participating, nevertheless, in the impulse given to the public mind, had invented a great number of improvements and new processes. Foreigners appeared powerfully struck, particularly the English, who are good judges of such matters. The First Consul took Mr. Fox to the halls fitted up for this exhibition in the court of the Louvre, and sometimes enjoyed the surprise of his illustrious guest. Mr. Fox, amidst the attentions which were paid to him, gave vent to a sally, which does honour to the feelings and the mind of that noble statesman, and which proves that in him justice towards France was combined with the warmest patriotism. In one of the halls of the Louvre, there was a very large and very handsome terrestrial globe, destined for the First Consul, and very ingeniously constructed. One of the personages who accompanied the First Consul, turning this globe, and putting his hand upon England, made the unlucky remark, that England occupied a very small place in the map of the world. "Yes," exclaimed Mr. Fox, warmly; "yes, it is in that little island that the English are born, and it is in that island that they all wish to die; but," added he, "extending his arms around the two oceans, and the two Indies, "but while they live, they fill the entire globe, and embrace it with their power." The First Consul applauded this proud and well-timed reply.

The personage who, next to Mr. Fox, attracted the greatest share of public attention, was M. de Calonne. It was the Prince of Wales who had solicited and obtained permission for him to appear again in Paris. M. de Calonne held, ever since his arrival, a language wholly unexpected, and which created a sensation among the royalists. He had no intention, he said, to serve the new government. He could not do it, attached as he had been to the house of

¹ Here is a letter written at St. Quentin to Cambacérès:—

St. Quentin, 31st Pluviose, year IX.—Feb. 10, 1801
The interesting manufacture of St. Quentin and environs, which employed 70,000 hands, and brought into France more than 15,000,000 in cash, have decreased five-sixths. It were to be wished that our ladies would

bring lawn into fashion, without giving such an absolute preference to muslins. The idea of reviving one of the most interesting manufactures, and which we possess exclusively, and of giving bread to such a great number of French families, is well calculated, in fact, to bring lawn into fashion: besides, have not lawns been long enough in disgrace?

Bourbon; but it was his duty to tell the truth to his friends. No man in Europe was capable of making head against the First Consul: generals, ministers, kings, were his inferiors and his dependents. The English, instead of hating, were now full of enthusiasm for him. This feeling was shared by all classes of the British population, and it was carried to an extreme, as all sentiments are by the English. They must, therefore, not reckon upon Europe for overthrowing General Bonaparte. Neither ought they to dishonour the royalist cause by odious plots, which filled all honest men throughout the whole world with horror. They must submit, hope every thing from time and from the double difficulty of governing France without royalty, and of founding a royalty without the family of Bourbon. The infinite vicissitudes of revolutions could alone bring about chances which did not now exist in favour of the exiled princes. But, happen what would, they must expect every thing from France alone, from enlightened France, from France animated by better sentiments, but nothing from foreigners or from conspiracies. This language, singular on account of its wisdom, especially in the mouth of M. de Calonne, caused real astonishment, and induced a belief that M. de Calonne would not be long before he connected himself with the consular government. He had seen the Consul Lebrun, who received the royalists with the consent of the First Consul, and had conversed with him on the affairs of France. It was even asserted that he was about to become for the finances what M. de Talleyrand was for diplomacy, the reclaimed noble, lending his experience and the influence of his name to the First Consul. The surmise was unfounded. The First Consul had less need of brilliant understanding than of application, which M. de Calonne had never shown, and he had found all that he wanted in M. Gaudin, who had introduced perfect order into our finances. Nevertheless, on

this mere rumour, a crowd of applicants, who had recently returned to France, and were desirous of bettering their fortunes by taking office, had beset M. de Calonne, thinking that they could not choose a fitter person to introduce them to the new government, or one who would better justify by his example their adhesion to the First Consul.¹

Who would believe that, notwithstanding so much good, either already done, or on the point of being done, an opposition, and a warm one too, could be raised? An opposition, and one of the most vehement, was, nevertheless, preparing against the best measures of the First Consul. It was not in the violent parties radically opposed to the government of the First Consul, royalist or revolutionary, that this opposition was preparing, but in the same party which had desired and seconded the overthrow of the Directory as insufficient, and called for a new government that should be at once able and firm. The subaltern revolutionists, men of commotion and of blood, were repressed, submissive, or transported, and were daily sinking deeper and deeper into their obscurity, never more to emerge from it. The villains of royalism had need to take breath since the infernal machine, and kept quiet. Besides, part of those who infested the high roads had been put to death. The royalists of high quality, while holding impertinent language in the saloons of Paris, nevertheless began already to show the disposition which led them subsequently to act, the men the part of chamberlains, the women that of ladies of honour, in the palace of the Tuileries, which the Bourbons no longer inhabited.

But the moderate revolutionary party, called to compose the new government, was divided, as it is almost always the case with every victorious party which sets about founding a government, and disagrees about the manner of constituting it. From the very first days of the Consulate, this party, which had con-

¹ There were in Paris agents of the exiled princes, some of whom were men of talent, and very well informed into the bargain. These agents made almost daily reports, to which I have already adverted. I subjoin an extract from one of these reports relative to M. de Calonne.

"M. de Calonne returned to Paris about a month ago. Before he left England, he had a conference with the ministers, and was cordially received by them. He was asked if, in returning to France, it was not his intention also to enter into the administration? He replied that his principles, his conduct during the Revolution, and his attachment to the royal family, absolutely forbade him to accept any place at the hands of the new government; but that attached to France by taste and by instinct, he should not refuse to give his advice, if it were asked, and if he believed that it would be advantageous to his country.

"His arrival in Paris has produced a great sensation. He is every day beset with visitors, and surrounded by creatures, as at the most brilliant period of his fortune and influence. The notion that he is about to be raised to the ministry brings swarms of applicants to him; and, to escape from them, he is obliged to betake himself to the country. It does not appear, however, that this opinion is well founded; and, if it ever is realized, it will not be at present. All that is known is, that he was to be presented a few days since to Bonaparte, and to have a private conference with him.

"He sees all his old friends, and expresses his sentiments to them with entire freedom. Having witnessed the weakness and the nullity of foreign powers, he does not think that there is to be found in them the slightest guarantee against revolutionary invasion, and still less, any efficient protection for the cause of the King. He repeats a fact we have long known, that the men who govern

in Europe are men without means and without character, who are unacquainted with the time in which they live, who can neither judge of the present nor foresee the future, and who are alike destitute of the courage which incites to undertake, and of the firmness which enables to persevere. He considers them all as delivered up to Bonaparte, trembling before him, and ready humbly to execute all his commands. In consequence, he is persuaded that it is in France only that there is any possibility of labouring for the restoration of the monarchy; not by putting one's self forward, and by fomenting stupid and ridiculous plots, more calculated to dishonour one's cause, than to pave the way to its real success; but by striving, without noise and without show, to re-establish public opinion, to destroy prejudice, to diminish fears, to unite all the servants of the king, and to keep them in readiness to profit in his favour by all the events which the natural course of things must bring about.

"M. de Calonne asserts, that in England the enthusiasm for Bonaparte is not only general, but carried to an excess, of which it is difficult to form an idea. The court and the city, the capital and the country, all classes of the citizens, from the minister to the artisan, are eager to proclaim his praises, and vie with each other in chanting his victories and the splendour of his power. Besides, this enthusiasm is not peculiar to England; all Europe is, as it were, infected with it. From all parts people are hastening to Paris to see the great man at least once in their lives; and the police has been obliged to threaten to apprehend some Danes, who had publicly bent the knee before him whenever they saw him.

"This is one of the principal causes of his strength and of his immense power. How could the French dare to oppose him, so long as they see the European powers prostrate at his feet?"

curred, in various ways, in the 18th Brumaire, had appeared divided between two contrary tendencies the one, consisting in making the Revolution terminate in a democratic and moderate republic, such as Washington had recently established in America; the other, in making it end in a monarchy, resembling, more or less, the English monarchy, and, if need were, the old French monarchy, without its former prejudices, without the feudal system, but retaining its grandeur. The consular government had entered its third year, and, as usual, these two tendencies kept gaining strength by the very contradiction. Some, again, became almost violent revolutionists, on seeing how things were proceeding; on seeing the authority of the First Consul increasing, monarchical ideas spreading, a court forming at the Tuilleries, the Catholic worship restored, or on the point of being restored, and the emigrants returning in shoals. The others became almost the royalists of former times, so eager were they to re-act and to re-found a monarchy, so strongly were they disposed to put up with even an enlightened despotism, as the total result of the Revolution. As to enlightened despotism, that which was arising in France at this moment had so much genius, insured such a sweet repose, that the seduction was great. Meanwhile, the contradiction was carried to such a length on both sides, that a crisis might soon be expected to ensue.

The Tribunal, agitated during the preceding sessions, at one time on account of the laws relative to finances, at another on account of the special tribunals, was much more so this year, at the aspect of all that was passing, and at the sight of this government proceeding so rapidly towards its goal. The Concordate excited particular indignation, as the most counter-revolutionary act that could be imagined. The Civil Code was not, according to this assembly, sufficiently conformable with equality. Those treaties of peace themselves, which comprehended the greatness of France, displeased it in their wording, as we shall see presently.

M. Sieyès, while striving to prevent all agitation, by means of his constitutional precautions, had not, as we have seen, prevented any, for constitutions do not create human passions, neither can they destroy them; they are only the stage upon which the passions come forward. In placing all the seriousness, all the activity, of affairs, in the Council of State; the noise, declamation, empty animadversion in the Tribunal; in confining the latter to pleading for or against the acts of the government, before a Legislative Body, confined to answering yes or no; in placing above an idle Senate, which, at long intervals, elected the men charged to perform those two almost useless parts in the two legislative assemblies; in choosing the *personnel* of the government in the same spirit; in placing the men fit for business in the Council of State, the men fit for speech-making, inclined to clamour, in the Tribunal, the obscure superannuated in the Legislative Body, the superannuated of a higher order in the Senate—M. de Sieyès had scarcely prevented the passions of the time from breaking forth he

had even added, it must be confessed, a certain jealousy of these bodies one towards another. The Tribunal was sensible of the declamatory vanity of its part; the Legislative Body was sensible of the ridiculousness of its silence, and contained, moreover, many priests who had quitted orders, organized by the Abbé Grégoire into a silent but annoying opposition. The Senate itself, which M. Sieyès had designed to mould into a wealthy and quiet old man, was not so quiet as he had expected. That body was somewhat tired of its idle dignity, for the senators were debarred from public functions, and their electoral power, so rarely exercised, was far from filling up their time. All of them were jealous of the Council of State, which shared with the First Consul the glory of the great things that were daily accomplished. Thus this body, which M. Sieyès had designed to lull into a sort of aristocratic stupor, after the example of Venice and Genoa, still tossed, like one who has some remains of fever, and might be checked, controlled by a master, but not composed into a tranquil sleep, as its maker had hoped.

And, strange to tell, M. Sieyès, the inventor of all these constitutional arrangements, by virtue of which there reigned so much activity on the one hand and so little on the other, M. Sieyès began to weary himself with his own inaction. Moderate, and even monarchical in his opinions, he ought to have approved the acts of the First Consul; but causes, some of them inevitable, others accidental, began to embroil them. That great speculative genius, limited to seeing every thing, and doing nothing, could not but feel jealous of that active and mighty genius, which was daily acquiring the mastery of France and of the world. In the magnificent works of General Bonaparte, M. Sieyès already perceived the germ of his future faults; and, if he did not yet say so aloud, he sometimes indicated it by his silence, or by a phrase in language profound as his thoughts. It is possible that, if attention had been at all times paid to him, they might have soothed and attached him to the First Consul; but the latter had rather too early considered himself quit with M. Sieyès by the gift of the estate of Crosne, and, besides, absorbed by his immense labours, he had too much neglected the superior man who had so nobly ceded to him the first place on the 18th Brumaire. M. de Sieyès, indolent, jealous, piqued, had faults to find, even in the immensity of the present good, and showed himself a morose and cold censurer. The First Consul was not sufficiently master of his temper to leave all the wrong to his adversaries. He talked cavalierly of the metaphysics of M. Sieyès, of his impotent ambition, and made a thousand remarks on that subject, which were immediately repeated and aggravated by malevolent persons. M. Sieyès had at his side some friends, such as M. de Tracy, a man of superior mind, but not religious, an original philosopher in a school that had but little originality, and a very respectable character; M. Garat, a specious philosopher, more pretending than profound; M. Cabanis, devoted to the study of the material man, and seeing nothing beyond two

limits of matter; M. Lanjunais, a sincerely pious, honest, vehement man, who had nobly defended the Girondins, and who now warmed at the idea of resisting the new Cæsar. They surrounded M. Sieyès, and already formed a perceptible opposition in the Senate. The concordate appeared to them, as to many others, the most striking proof of a speedy counter-revolution.

The First Consul, seeing France and Europe enchanted with his proceedings, could not comprehend how it was that the only declaimers against those proceedings should be found precisely around him. Piqued at this opposition, he called the members of the Senate from whom it proceeded *ideologues*, led on by a pouter, who regretted the exercise of the supreme power, of which he was incapable; he called the members of the Tribunate busy-bodies, with whom he should know how to break a lance, and to prove that he was not to be frightened with noise; he called the more or less numerous malcontents of the Legislative Body unfrocked priests, Jansenists, whom the Abbé Grégoire, in concert with the Abbé Sieyès, was striving to organize into an opposition against the government; but he declared that he would break all those resistances, and that they should not easily stop him and prevent the good which he purposed to accomplish. Never having lived in the assemblies, he was ignorant of that art of coaxing men, which Cæsar himself, powerful as he was, did not neglect, and which he had learned in the senate of Rome. The First Consul expressed his displeasure publicly, boldly, with the feeling of his strength and of his glory, and scarcely listened to the wise Cambacérès, who, possessing great experience in the management of the assemblies, exhorted him to no purpose to use moderation and soothing. "You must prove to those people," replied the First Consul, "that you are not afraid of them; and they will be frightened, on condition that you are not frightened yourself." Here were already, as we see, the manners, the ideas, of pure royalty, in proportion as the moment approached when monarchy would become inevitable.

It was not only in the bodies of the state that opposition manifested itself, but also in the army. The mass of the army, like the mass of the nation, sensible of the important results obtained during the last two years, was entirely devoted to the First Consul. Still, among the chiefs there were malcontents, some of them sincere, others merely jealous. The sincere malcontents were the stanch revolutionists, who beheld with chagrin the return of the emigrants and the speedy obligation to go and exhibit their uniforms in the churches. The malcontents from jealousy were those who saw with mortification an equal, who, having first surpassed them in glory, was now on the point of becoming their master. The former belonged mostly to the army of Italy, which had always been downright revolutionary; the latter to the

army of the Rhine, calm, moderate, but rather envious.

The chiefs of the army of Italy, in general devoted to the First Consul, but ardent in their sentiments, disliked both priests and emigrants, complained that they were to be made churchmen of, and said all this in the original and no most decent language of soldiers. Augereau, Lannes, bad politicians, but heroic warriors, especially the second, who was an accomplished captain, used the most extraordinary expressions. Lannes, having become commander-in-chief of the consular guard, administered its chest with a prodigality known to the First Consul and authorized by him. A mansion was furnished in a sumptuous style for the accommodation of the staff of that guard. Lannes there kept open table for all his comrades, and there, at their soldierly banquets, he launched forth invectives against the proceedings of the government. The First Consul had no reason to fear that the attachment of these unoccupied soldiers to himself was diminished. At the first signal, he was sure to find them all about him, and Lannes above all the rest. Still, it was dangerous to allow those heads and tongues to go any further, and he sent for Lannes. The latter accustomed to great familiarity with his general-in-chief, gave way to some outbursts of passion, which were soon repressed by the calm superiority of the First Consul. He retired, grieved at his fault, and grieved at the displeasure which he had incurred. From a feeling of honourable susceptibility, he determined to pay the sums drawn from the chest of the guard with the consent of the First Consul. But this general, after all his campaigns in Italy, possessed scarcely any property. Augereau, just as inconsiderate as himself, but who had an excellent heart, lent him a sum, being all that he had, saying, "Here, take this money; go to that ungrateful fellow for whom we have spilt our blood; give him back what is due to the chest, and let neither of us be any longer under obligations to him." The First Consul would not suffer his old companions in arms, at once heroes and boys, to throw off their affection for him. He dispersed them. Lannes was destined for a profitable embassy, that of Portugal. It was Cambacérès, the consul, who was charged with this arrangement. Augereau had orders to be more circumspect for the future, and to return to his army.

These scenes, however, greatly exaggerated by malevolence, which distorted while propagating them, produced a mischievous effect on public opinion, especially in the provinces. Not a single voice, indeed, was raised against the First Consul, whom people were disposed to think in the right against all opposition; but they excited uneasiness and apprehension of serious difficulties for the supreme authority, the re-establishment of which was earnestly desired.¹

These scenes with the officers of the army

¹ Here is a passage from a letter of M. de Talleyrand's, who had gone some time afterwards to Lyons for the organization of the Italian Consulta:—

Lyons, 7th Nivôse, year X.—Dec. 26, 1801.

General,—I have the honour to inform you of my

arrival at Lyons, at half-past one o'clock, this morning. The road through Burgundy, with the exception of six or eight leagues, is not very bad, and the prefects on that line of communication have taken advantage of the movement of enthusiasm, produced by the hope of your

of Italy were scenes between friends, falling out one day and embracing on the next. They were rather more serious with the generals of the Rhine, who were colder and more malicious. Unfortunately, a fatal division began to manifest itself between the general-in-chief of the army of Italy and the general-in-chief of the army of the Rhine—between General Bonaparte and General Moreau.

Moreau, ever since the campaign against Austria, the success of which he owed, at least in part, to the First Consul, who had given him the command of the finest army of France, Moreau was reputed the second general of the republic. In reality, nobody was mistaken in regard to his value; he was well known to possess a mind of moderate powers, incapable of great combinations, and totally destitute of political genius. But people laid stress on his real qualities of a prudent, discreet, and vigorous general, to make of him a superior commander, capable of coping with the conqueror of Italy and Egypt. Parties have a wonderful instinct for discovering the weaknesses of eminent men. They flatter or abuse them by turns, till they have found an avenue by which they can penetrate to their hearts, and infuse their poisons into them. They had very soon discovered the weak side of Moreau; this was vanity. While flattering him, they had inspired him with a fatal jealousy against the First Consul, which was destined before long to prove his ruin. The females of the two families of Bonaparte and Moreau had quarrelled, about some of those trifles for which women do quarrel with one another. The members of Moreau's family strove to persuade him that he ought to be the first and not the second; that General Bonaparte was ill-disposed towards him; that he sought to depreciate him, and to make him play a secondary part. Moreau, who was destitute of character, had listened but too willingly to these dangerous suggestions. The First Consul, on his part, had never wronged him in any way whatever; on the contrary, he had loaded him with distinctions; he had affected to speak of him more highly than he thought, especially in reference to the battle of Hohenlinden, which he proclaimed in public a masterpiece of military art, whereas in private he considered it rather as a piece of good luck than as a scientific and deliberate combination. But, when Moreau had once taken it into his head that he was wronged, he would not be left far behind, and, with the usual promptness of his character, he soon began to resent those wrongs. One day he invited Moreau to accompany him to a review; Moreau drily refused, that he might not be lost amidst the staff of the First Consul, and alleged as an excuse that he had no saddle-horse. The First Consul, nettled at this refusal, soon returned it in kind. On one of the great festive occasions

which were frequently occurring, all the high functionaries were invited to dine at the Tuileries. Moreau was in the country, but, returning the day before on some business or other, he called upon Cambacérés, to speak to him on the subject. The consul, who made it his incessant business to conciliate, received Moreau with the utmost cordiality. Surprised to see him in Paris, he hastened to the First Consul, and warmly urged him to invite the commander-in-chief of the army of the Rhine to the grand dinner that was to take place on the following day. "He has given me one public refusal," replied the First Consul, "I will not run the risk of receiving a second from him." Nothing could change his determination, and, on the morrow, while all the generals and the high functionaries of the republic were seated in the Tuileries, at the table of the First Consul, Moreau revenged himself for having been neglected by going publicly, and in plain clothes, to dine at one of the most frequented restaurants of the capital, with a party of discontented officers. This circumstance was much noticed, and produced a most mischievous effect.

From that day, that is to say, from the autumn of 1801, Generals Bonaparte and Moreau manifested extreme coldness towards each other. The public was soon aware of it, and the hostile parties hastened to avail themselves of this disposition. They began to extol Moreau at the expense of General Bonaparte, and strove to fill the hearts of both with the poison of hatred. These details will perhaps appear far beneath the dignity of history; but whatever serves to make known the characters of men, and the deplorable littleness even of the greatest, is worthy of history; for every thing that is capable of instructing belongs to it. One cannot too strongly warn high personages against the frivolousness of the motives which frequently embroil them, especially when their divisions become those of the country.

The opening of the session of the year X. took place on the 1st Frimaire—November 22d, 1801—agreeably to the injunction of the Constitution itself, which fixed that day for the purpose. Assuredly, if ever man had a right to feel proud in presenting himself before a legislative assembly, it was with that which the consular government then brought along with it. Peace concluded with Russia, England, the German and Italian powers, Portugal, the Porte, and concluded with all those powers on glorious conditions; a plan of conciliation with the church, which put an end to the religious troubles, and which, while reforming the French church upon the principles of the Revolution, nevertheless obtained the adhesion of the orthodox to the consequences of that revolution; a Civil Code, a monument since admired by the whole world; laws of high utility respecting public instruction, ine

passage, to cause the repair of the roads to be prosecuted with activity. Wherever I came to communes, to habitations, I heard cries of "*Vive Bonaparte!*" For the last ten leagues, which I travelled in the middle of the night, every one came as I passed, with light in hand, to repeat those words. It is an expression which you are destined to hear continually.

The story about General Lannes has spread, and appeared to excite great attention; the sub-prefect of Autun and a citizen of Avallon talked to me about it, but mentioned various circumstances, which letters from Paris had reported to them as anecdotes. I have again had occasion to remark to what a degree every thing that relates to your person engages the public attention, and is instantly talked of throughout France.

Legion of Honour, and an infinity of other important matters; financial measures, which placed the expenditure and the revenues of the state in perfect equilibrium—what more complete, more extraordinary, than such a mass of results to submit to a nation! Nevertheless, all these things were, as we shall presently see, very unfavourably received.

The session of the Legislative Body was this time opened with a certain solemnity. The minister of the interior was commissioned to preside on this occasion. Set speeches were made on either side, and there seemed to be an intention to imitate the forms customary in England, when Parliament is opened by commission. This new ceremonial, borrowed from a constitutional monarchy, drew forth malicious remarks from the opposition. The Tribune and the Legislative Body constituted themselves, and proceeded to that kind of manifestations by which assemblies take pleasure in revealing their secret sentiments—the election of persons. The Legislative Body chose for its president M. Dupuis, author of the celebrated work, *Sur l'Origine de tous les Cultes*. M. Dupuis was not so strong an oppositionist as might be supposed from his book; for he had acknowledged to the First Consul, in conversation with him, that the reconciliation with Rome was necessary; but his name carried great weight at a moment when the Concordate was one of the principal grievances alleged against the consular policy. The intention was easy to be inferred, and it was comprehended by the public, especially by the First Consul, who even exaggerated the importance of it to himself.

The two assemblies exercising the legislative power, that is to say, the Tribune and the Legislative Body, being constituted, three councillors of state presented the exposition of the situation of the republic. This exposition, dictated by the First Consul, was simple and noble in regard to language, magnificent in regard to subject. It made a deep impression upon the public mind. On the following day, a numerous train of councillors of state brought such a series of bills (*projets de lois*) as a government rarely has occasion to present to assembled chambers. They were the bills destined to convert into laws the treaties with Russia, Bavaria, Naples, Portugal, America, and the Ottoman Porte.

The treaty with England, previously concluded in London, under the form of preliminaries of peace, was on the point of receiving, at this moment, in the congress of Amiens, the form of a definitive treaty, and could not yet be submitted to the deliberations of the Legislative Body. As for the Concordate, it was thought right not to expose it immediately to the ill-will of the opposition. Portalis, the councillor of state, next read an address, which has ever since enjoyed a just celebrity, on the subject of the Civil Code. The first three heads of that code were brought up at the same time by three councillors of state: the first related to the publication of the laws; the second to the enjoyment and the privation of civil rights; the third to the acts of the civil state.

One would think that such a prospectus of

legislative labours ought to have silenced all opposition: it did no such thing. When, according to custom, those bills (*projets*) were communicated to the Tribune, the communication of the treaty with Russia produced a most violent scene. The third article of that treaty contained an important stipulation, that the two governments had agreed upon, in order to secure themselves against the underhand dealings in which one of them might have engaged against the other, in case they had been inimically disposed. They had promised, said that article III., "not to suffer any of their subjects to maintain any correspondence whatever, either direct or indirect, with the internal enemies of the present government of the two states; to propagate their principles contrary to their respective constitutions; or, to foment disturbances." The French government had had in view the emigrants; the Russian government had had in view the Poles. Nothing was more natural than such a precaution, especially for the French government, which had the Bourbons to fear and to watch. But, in adverting to the persons who might attempt to disturb the mutual repose of the two countries, the negotiators had employed the word which naturally occurred, as the one most frequently employed in diplomatic language, namely, the word *subjects*. It had been employed without any intention, because it was the word usually employed in all treaties; because it was common to say the *subjects* of a republic, as well as the *subjects* of a monarchy. No sooner was the reading of the treaty finished than Thibaut, the tribune, one of the members of the opposition, demanded leave to speak. "Into the text of this treaty," said he, "there has crept an expression inadmissible in our language, and which is not to be endured. I mean the word *subjects*, applied to the citizens of one of the two states. A republic has no subjects, but citizens. It is no doubt an error of the writer, but it ought to be rectified." These words produced a vehement agitation, as is sure to be the case in an assembly previously excited, which expects an event, and which is thrilled by every circumstance, however slight, if connected with the subjects that preoccupy the minds of the members. The president cut short the explanation that was about to be entered upon, by remarking that the deliberation was not then opened; and that these observations ought to be reserved for the day when, upon the report of a commission, the treaty presented would be submitted for discussion. This appeal to the regulations prevented the tumult from breaking out at the moment, and a commission was immediately appointed.

This manifestation increased the ferment prevailing in the great bodies of the state, and irritated the First Consul still more. The manifestations by means of the election of new members continued. There were several places to fill in the Senate. One was vacant by the death of the Senator Crassous; two others were to be filled in virtue of the Constitution. That Constitution, as the reader will recollect, had at first supplied only sixty out of the eighty senators, who were to compose the total num-

ber of the Senate. To reach that number, two were to be appointed every year for ten years. At this moment, then, there were three places to be given away, including that which had become vacant by the death of Crassous. According to the Constitution, the First Consul, the Legislative Body, and the Tribunal, were each to present a candidate, and the Senate then chose from among the candidates presented.

The ballots for this purpose commenced both in the Legislative Body and in the Tribunal. In the Tribunal, the opposition supported M. Daunou, who had publicly fallen out with the First Consul, on occasion of the special tribunals, so warmly discussed during the last session. From that time, he would not attend the meetings of the Tribunal, saying that he would have nothing to do with any legislative proceedings *while the tyranny lasted*. He had actually kept his word, and not shown himself afterwards. The opposition members had, therefore, selected M. Daunou as the candidate most disagreeable to the First Consul. The decided partisans of the government in the same body proposed one of the authors of the Civil Code, M. Bigot de Préameneu. Neither of these was elected. The majority of votes was given to a candidate of no importance, the tribune Desmeuniers, a moderate man, and who, through his friends, was not a stranger to the First Consul. But the Legislative Body spoke out more decidedly, and chose the Abbé Grégoire for its candidate to the Senate. This choice, after the gift of the presidency to M. Dupuis, was a double manifestation against the Concordate. In that body, M. Bigot de Préameneu had had a certain number of votes, nearly two-fifths.

The First Consul resolved to make, on his part, a significant proposal. He might have waited till the two bodies, authorized to present candidates concurrently with the executive power, had chosen those candidates for the two places which remained to be filled. It was probable that the Legislative Body and the Tribunal, unwilling to break definitively with so popular a government as that of the First Consul, subject, moreover, to that oscillating movement of assemblies, which, when they have advanced too far one day, always fall back on the next, would make less obnoxious selections, and even fill up the two remaining vacancies with persons acceptable to the government. Thus, M. Desmeuniers, for instance, was a person whom the First Consul could perfectly approve; for he had promised to reward his services by a senator's place. It was probable that the name of M. Bigot de Préameneu would turn up from one of the ballots either of the Legislative Body or of the Tribunal. The First Consul would then have it in his power to present, on his own account, such of the candidates adopted by those assemblies as should suit him best, and, in this case, a name presented by two authorities out of three was almost certain to be favoured by the majority of the Senate. Cambacérès recommended this course; but it was a kind of compromise, frequently resorted to in a representative government, but to which the First Consul had a

supreme aversion. The general-magistrate, a stranger to that form of government, would not place himself in this manner behind the Legislative Body or the Tribunal, and await their preferences before he manifested his own. In consequence, he immediately presented not one candidate, but three at once; and he chose three generals. Notwithstanding the hopes previously given to M. Desmeuniers, the First Consul, displeased with him because he had not spoken out with sufficient energy in the discussions which had already taken place on the Civil Code, set him aside, and presented Generals Jourdan, Lamartillière, and Berruyer. It is true, that these selections were perfectly suited to the occasion. General Jourdan had appeared hostile to the 18th Brumaire, but he enjoyed universal respect; he conducted himself prudently, and had since been invested with the government of Piedmont. In presenting him to the Senate, the First Consul gave a proof of that genuine impartiality which befits the head of a government. As for General Lamartillière, he was the oldest officer of the artillery, and had served in all the campaigns of the Revolution. General Berruyer was a very aged officer of infantry, who, after participating in the Seven Years' War, had been wounded in the armies of the republic. These, then, were not creatures of his own, whom General Bonaparte purposed to reward, but old servants of France under all the governments. This bold and decisive conduct once adopted, it was impossible to make a more worthy selection. A circumstance still more singular is, that it was justified in a preamble. The spirit of this preamble was as follows: "You are at peace," said the government to the Senate "you are indebted for it to the blood which your generals have shed in a hundred battles. Prove to them, by calling them into your bosom, that the country is not ungrateful to them."

The Senate assembled, and was agitated by many intrigues. M. Sieyès, who resided habitually in the country, left it on this occasion, and came to join in these intrigues. Many well-disposed persons, such as old Kellermann, for example, were led away by being told that the Legislative Body, in case its candidate, that is to say, the Abbé Grégoire, were preferred, would repay that preference by proposing for the second vacant place General Lamartillière, one of the three candidates of the First Consul, and that then, by choosing that general a little afterwards, it would satisfy two authorities at once, the Legislative Body and the government. These manœuvres succeeded, and the Abbé Grégoire was elected senator by a great majority.

While these elections were agitating people's minds and giving great joy to the oppositionists, the discussions in the Legislative Body and the Tribunal were assuming a most mischievous character. The treaty with Russia had become, on account of the word *subjects*, the occasion of the most violent discussions in the commission of the Tribunal. M. Costaz, the reporter of that commission, who was not of the opposition party, had applied to the government for some explanations. The First Consul had received him, and explained to him the meaning

of the article so vehemently attacked, and the motive of its insertion in the treaty; and, as for the word *subjects*, he proved to him, by referring to the Dictionary of the Academy, that this word, used diplomatically, applied to the citizens of a republic as well as to those of a monarchy. In order to satisfy him entirely, he had even entered into various details concerning the relations of France with Russia touching emigrants. M. Costaz, convinced by the evidence of these explanations, made his report in a spirit favourable to the article in question; but, intimidated by the violence of the Tribunal, he found fault with the use of the word *subjects*, and related things in a very awkward manner, which was liable to give Russia the appearance of a weak government, delivering up the emigrants to the First Consul, and to the First Consul the appearance of a persecuting government, pursuing the emigrants even into their most distant asylum. M. Costaz, as it frequently happens to circumspect men, who wish to conciliate all parties, equally displeased the opposition and the First Consul, whom he compromised with Russia.

The day for the discussion having arrived—it was the 7th of December, 1801—16th Frimaire—the tribune Jard-Panvilliers moved, that the debate should take place in secret committee. This very wise proposal was adopted. No sooner were the tribunes relieved from the presence of the public, which, by the by, was far from favourable to them, than they gave way to the most inconceivable transports of passion. They declared their determination to reject the treaty, and to propose its rejection to the Legislative Body. If ever there was culpable folly, it was this; for, on account of a word, correct, moreover, and perfectly innocent, to reject such a treaty, so long and so difficult to conclude, and which procured peace with the first power of the continent, was to act like idiots, like lunatics. Messrs. Chénier and Benjamin Constant launched out into the most violent declamations. M. Chénier went so far as to pretend that he had important things to say upon this question, but that he should not say them till the sitting was public, for he wished all France to hear them. He was told that it would be better to begin by communicating them to his own colleagues. He drew back, however; and an unknown tribune, a simple and sensible man, restored the minds of his colleagues to reason by a short speech. “I know nothing of diplomacy,” said he, “I am a stranger both to the art and to its language. But I see in the proposed treaty a treaty of peace. A treaty of peace is a precious thing, which must be adopted entire, with all the words that it contains. Depend upon it that France will not forgive you for its rejection, and that the responsibility which would rest upon you would be terrible. I move, therefore, that an end be put to the discussion, that the sitting be rendered public, and that the treaty be immediately put to the vote.” After this short address, delivered with calmness and simplicity, the assembly was about to vote, when the opposition members moved an adjournment till the next day, on account of the lateness of the hour. The ad-

jourment was carried. On the following day, the tumult was quite as great as it had been the day before. M. Benjamin Constant delivered a written speech, very perspicuous and very subtle. M. Chénier declaimed anew with vehemence, saying that five million Frenchmen had died that they might cease to be *subjects*, and that this word ought to remain buried among the ruins of the Bastille. The majority, weary of all this violence, was about to put an end to it, when a letter from Fleuriu, councillor of state, addressed to Costaz, the reporter, arrived. M. Costaz had treated as official the explanation which he had presented in his report, and had given the assembly to understand that they came from the First Consul. Furnish positive proof of that, was the answer made to him. He had then provoked a declaration from M. Fleuriu, who was the councillor of state appointed to support the bill (*projet*). The latter, after taking the orders of the First Consul, sent the desired declaration, accompanied by numerous corrections, which the report of M. Costaz rendered indispensable, and which revived the debate. M. Ginguéné put an end to it by an epigrammatic and not very becoming motion. Acknowledging that it was difficult to reject a treaty of peace, on account of one displeasing word, he proposed the passing of a vote couched in these terms: “For the love of peace, the Tribunal adopts the treaty concluded with the court of Russia.”

M. de Girardin, who was one of the most reasonable and intelligent members of the Tribunal, induced the assembly to reject all these propositions, and to pass immediately to the vote. After all, the majority of the Tribunal meant, by its choice of persons, to give the First Consul signs of dissatisfaction; it had no wish to enter upon a struggle, especially on account of a treaty, the rejection of which would have drawn upon it the public animadversion. It was adopted by seventy-seven votes against fourteen. The adoption in the Legislative Body took place without tumult, thanks to the form of the institution.

This scene produced a painful effect in Paris. People did not consider the First Consul as a minister liable to lose the majority, and no fears were entertained for his political existence. He was considered as a hundred times more necessary than a king appeared to be in a well-established monarchy. But they beheld with grief the slightest appearance of fresh troubles; and the friends of a wise liberty asked themselves how, with such a character as that of General Bonaparte; how, with a constitution, into which the framer had neglected to admit the power of dissolution, such a contest would terminate if it were prolonged?

In fact, if a dissolution had been possible, the difficulty would soon have been solved, for France, when convoked, would not have re-elected one of the adversaries of the government. But, obliged to live together till renewal by one-fifth, the powers were liable, as under the Directory, to some violence the one from the other; and, if such a thing occurred, it was evidently neither the Tribunal nor the Legislative Body that could triumph. It needed

but an arbitrary act of the First Consul's, to reduce to nothing both the Constitution and those who made such a use of it. All wise men, therefore, trembled on seeing this state of things.

The discussion of the Civil Code served only to strengthen these apprehensions. Now that time has obtained universal esteem for that Code, one would scarcely conceive all the objections urged against it at that period. The opposition at first expressed great astonishment on finding that Code so simple, and that it had so little novelty. What, said they, is that all!—in that bill (*projet*) there is no new conception, no great legislative creation which is peculiar to French society, which can stamp it with a particular and durable character; it is but a translation of the Roman or common law. Its authors have taken Domat, Pothier, the Institutes of Justinian, they have digested into French all that they contain; they have divided this into articles, and connected these articles by numbers rather than by a logical deduction; and then they present this compilation to France, as a monument which has a claim to its admiration and its respect! Messrs. Benjamin Constant, Chénier, Ginguéné, Andrieux, all of them men who might have employed their understandings to better purpose, jeered the councillors of state, saying, that it was lawyers under the guidance of a soldier who had made this paltry compilation, pompously called the Civil Code of France.

M. Portalis, and the men of sense who were his fellow-labourers, replied that, on the subject of legislation, the point was not to be original, but clear, just, and judicious; that they had not a new society to constitute, like Lycurgus or Moses, but an old society to reform in some points, and to restore in many others; that the French law had subsisted for ten centuries; that it was the produce at once of Roman science, of feudalism, of monarchy, and of the modern spirit, acting together for a long period of time on French manners; that the civil law of France, resulting from these different causes, had now to be adapted to a society which had ceased to be aristocratic and become democratic; that it was necessary, for example, to revise the laws relative to marriage, to the paternal authority, to successions, to divest them of every thing that was repugnant to the spirit of the present time; that it was necessary to purge the laws relative to property of all feudal servitude; to draw up this mass of prescriptions in clear, precise language, which should afford no occasion for ambiguities, for endless disputes; and to put the whole into excellent order; that this was the only monument to be erected; and that if, contrary to the intention of its authors, it should happen to surprise by its structure, if it should please a few scholars by new and original views, instead of obtaining the cold and silent esteem of lawyers, it would miss its real aim, though it were to please certain minds, more eccentric than judicious.

All this was perfectly reasonable and true. In this respect, the Code was a masterpiece of legislation. Grave lawyers, full of learning and experience, thoroughly acquainted with

the language of the law, under the guidance of a chief—a soldier, it is true, but of a superior mind, capable of deciding their doubts and keeping them to work—has composed this beautiful digest of French law completely purified from feudal law. It was impossible to do otherwise or to do better.

It is true that, in this vast Code, one might here and there substitute one word for another word, transpose an article from one place to another place; one might do it without much danger, but likewise without much utility; and that is precisely what even well-intentioned assemblies are fond of doing, solely that they may have some hand in the work which is submitted to them. Sometimes, in fact, after the presentation of an important bill (*projet de loi*), we see men of subordinate and ignorant minds lay hold of a legislative work, the fruit of profound experience and long labour, alter this and that, make out of a perfectly connected whole a shapeless, incoherent mass, without relation to the existing laws and to real facts. Frequently they act thus, not out of a spirit of opposition, but merely from a fondness for retouching the work of another. Only figure to yourself vehement tribunes, men of little information, exercising themselves in this manner on a code of some thousand articles! it was enough to make its authors throw up the work in disgust.

The preliminary portion had to sustain the first attack of the critics of the Tribunate. It had been referred to a commission, of which Andrieux was the reporter. This part contained, with the exception of a few unimportant differences in the wording, the same dispositions as were definitively adopted, and which now form the preface, as it were, to that admirable monument of legislation. The first article related to the promulgation of the laws. The ancient system, by virtue of which the law could not be enforced, till the parliaments and the tribunals had assented to its registration, was abandoned. That system had formerly produced the struggle between the parliaments and royalty, a struggle which, in its time, had been a useful corrective of absolute monarchy, but which would have been an egregious blunder, at a period when there existed representative assemblies charged to grant or to refuse taxes. To this system, had been substituted the very simple idea of causing the law to be promulgated by the executive power, to render it executable at the seat of the government twenty-four hours after its promulgation, and in the departments, after a delay proportioned to the distances. The second article forbade any retro-active effect to the laws. Some great errors of the Convention on this point rendered that article useful and even necessary. It was requisite to lay it down as a principle, that the law could never disturb the past, and regulate only the future. After limiting the action of the laws as to time, it was necessary to limit their action as to places; to declare what laws should follow Frenchmen out of the territories of France, and be obligatory on them in all places, as those, for instance, which regulated marriages and successions; and what laws

should be obligatory on them in the territory of France only, but which within that territory should be obligatory on foreigners as well as on natives of France. The laws relative to the police and to property were to come under this latter head; it was the subject of Article III. The fourth article obliged the judge to try, even when the law appeared to him insufficient. This case had occurred more than once in the transition from one legislation to another. Frequently, in fact, the tribunals had been, for want of laws, really embarrassed to pronounce sentence; frequently, too, they had fraudfully withdrawn themselves from the obligation to render justice. The Court of Cassation and the Legislative Body were beset with addresses for interpretations of laws. It was requisite to prevent this abuse, by obliging the judge to give a decision in all cases; but it was requisite, at the same time, to prevent him from constituting himself legislator. This was the object of Article V., which forbade tribunals to decide any thing but the special case which was submitted to them, and to pronounce by way of general disposition. Lastly, the sixth article limited the natural faculty which all the citizens have to renounce the benefit of certain laws by particular agreements. It rendered the laws relative to public order, to the constitution of families, to good manners, absolute and impossible to be evaded. It decided that no person could withdraw himself from them by any particular agreement.

These preliminary dispositions were indispensable, for it was necessary to declare, somewhere in our legislation, how the laws were to be promulgated, at what moment they became executable, how far their effects extended in regard to time and in regard to place. It was necessary to prescribe to the judges the general mode of the application of the laws, to oblige them to try, but to forbid them to constitute themselves legislators; lastly, it was necessary to render immutable the laws which constitute social order and morality, and to withdraw them from the variations of particular agreements. If it was indispensable that these things should be written, where was it more proper to be done than at the head of the Civil Code, the first, the most general, the most important of all codes? Would they have been better placed, for example, at the head of a commercial code, or a code of civil proceedings? These general maxims were evidently necessary, well written, and well placed.

It would be difficult to form an idea, at the present day, of the animadversions directed by M. Andrieux against the preliminary part of the Civil Code, in the name of the commission of the Tribunal. In the first place, these depositions, according to him, might be put anywhere; they belonged no more to the Civil Code than to any other. They might, for instance, be placed at the head of the Constitution, as well as at the head of the Civil Code. That was true; but, since the framer of the Constitution had omitted to place them at the head of it, which was natural, for they had no political character, where could they be better placed than in that Code which might be called the Social Code?

Secondly, the order of these six articles was arbitrary, according to M. Andrieux. The first might be put last, and the last first. This was not quite correct, for, on close examination, it was easy to discover a real logical deduction in the manner in which they were arranged. But, at any rate, what signified the order of these articles, if one was as good as the other? Was not that the best order which eminent lawyers, after the most conscientious labour, had preferred? Were there not natural difficulties enough in this great work, without adding to them puerile difficulties?

Lastly, according to M. Andrieux, it contained general, theoretical maxims, belonging rather to jurisprudence than to the positive law, which disposes and commands. This was false; for the form of the promulgation of the laws, the limit given to their effects, the obligation imposed upon the judges to give judgment and not make regulations, the prohibition of certain particular agreements, contrary to the laws—all this was imperative.

These animadversions, then, were as frivolous as they were ridiculous. They, nevertheless, made an impression on the Tribunal, which deemed them worthy of the greatest attention. Thiessé, the tribune, considered the disposition which denied all retro-active effect to the laws as extremely dangerous and counter-revolutionary. It was annulling, he said, to a certain point, the consequences of the night of the 4th of August; for persons born under the system of the law of primogeniture and of substitutions might allege, that the new law relative to the equal division of property was retro-active, in regard to them, and consequently null, as far as they were concerned.

Such absurdities were supported, and this preliminary part was rejected by sixty-three votes against fifteen. The opposition, delighted with this commencement, resolved to follow up this first success. Agreeably to the Constitution, the Tribunal nominated three orators, to undertake, against three councillors of state, the discussion of the laws before the Legislative Body. Messrs. Thiessé, Andrieux, and Favard were directed to demand the rejection of this preliminary portion. They obtained it by 142 votes against 139.

This result, together with the different votes at the elections, and with the scene occasioned by the word *subject*, was serious. It was rumoured that the two other parts already presented, *on the enjoyment of civil rights*, and *on the form of the acts of the civil state*, were nearly certain to be rejected also. The report of M. Siméon, on the enjoyment and privation of civil rights, was, in fact, in favour of rejection. M. Siméon, so discreet in general, had, among other animadversions, alleged that the proposed law neglected to say that the children born of French parents, in the French colonies, were French by right. We cite this singular objection, because it excited in the First Consul an astonishment mingled with anger. He summoned the Council of State, to consult what was to be done on this occasion. Was the government to persist in the course adopted, or not? Ought the mode of presentation to the Legislative Body to be changed? or would it be better

to defer this great work, so impatiently expected, and to put it off till another time! The First Consul was exasperated. "What would you do," he exclaimed, "with people who, before the discussion, said that the councillors of state and the consuls were downright asses, and that their work ought to be flung at their heads? What will you do when such a man as Siméon alleges a law to be incomplete, because it does not declare the children of French parents, born in the colonies, to be French? Indeed, one is astounded at such strange aberrations. Even with all the sincerity brought to this discussion in the bosom of the Council of State, we have had the greatest difficulty to agree; how, then, is it possible to succeed in an assembly five or six times as numerous, and which discusses without sincerity? How is an entire code to be drawn up on such conditions? I have read the speech of Portalis to the Legislative Body, in reply to the orators of the Tribunal; he has left them nothing to say; he has drawn their teeth. But, let a man be ever so eloquent; let him speak twenty-four hours successively, he will make no impression on a prejudiced assembly, which is determined not to listen to him."

After these complaints, expressed in warm and bitter language, the First Consul asked the opinion of the Council of State as to the best course to be pursued to insure the adoption of the Civil Code by the Tribunal and the Legislative Body. The subject was not new in the Council of State. The difficulty had been there foreseen, and various means proposed for getting over it. Some proposed the presentation of general principles only, on which the Legislative Body should vote, with the understanding that the developments should afterwards be given, by way of regulations. This was scarcely admissible, for it is difficult to comprehend the general principles of laws, if the developments are drawn up separately. Others proposed a more simple plan—to present the entire code at once. "You would have no more trouble," said they, "about the three books of the code than you have about one. The tribunes would fall foul of the first heads; they would then tire, and let the rest pass. The discussion would thus be abridged by its very immensity." This course was the most plausible, and the wisest. Unfortunately, several conditions were wanting, in order to its success. The assemblies had not then the faculty of amending the propositions of the government, that permits those little sacrifices, by means of which the vanity of some is gratified and the scruples of others are disarmed, in ameliorating the laws. The opposition members, too, were deficient in that sincerity without which all grave discussion is impossible; and, lastly, the First Consul was deficient in that constitutional patience which the habit of contradiction imparts to men accustomed to representative government. He did not admit that good, sincerely intended and laboriously prepared, ought to be delayed or spoiled, to please what he called babblers.

Some resolute spirits went so far as to propose to present the Civil Code as the treaties were presented, with a law of acceptance be-

side it, and thus get it voted in the lump by yes or no. This method of proceeding was not dictatorial, and it was not seriously contemplated.

On the recommendation of the most enlightened members, particularly Tronchet, it was resolved to await the fate of the two other heads presented to the Tribunal—"Yes," said the First Consul, "we can risk two more battles. If we gain them, we shall continue the march that is begun. If we lose them, we must go into winter quarters, and consider what course to pursue."

This plan of proceeding was adopted, and the issue of the two discussions was awaited. The public opinion began to be strongly expressed against the Tribunal. The leaders, therefore, bethought them of an expedient to temper the effect of their successive rejections, and that was to intermingle them with an adoption. The head relative to the keeping of the acts of the civil state pleased them much in itself, because it sanctioned still more strictly the principles of the Revolution in regard to the clergy, by absolutely forbidding them the registration of births, deaths, and marriages, and attributing it exclusively to the municipal officers. This head, presented by Thibaudeau, councillor of state, was excellent, but that would not have saved it, if it had not contained dispositions against the clergy. It was, therefore, agreed to adopt it. But, in the order of presentation it should have come third. It was introduced second, and voted without difficulty, to make the more sure of the rejection of the head relative to the enjoyment and the privation of civil rights. The latter, brought under discussion in its turn, was rejected in the Tribunal by an immense majority. Its rejection by the Legislative Body was not doubtful. Thus the whole series of difficulties which had been foreseen started forth at once. Those difficulties could not fail to be aggravated, when the laws on marriage, on divorce, and on the paternal authority, should be under consideration. As for the Concordate and the bill (*projet*) relative to public instruction, there was evidently no chance of succeeding in obtaining their adoption.

But what served to push matters to extremity was a new ballot for members, which assumed the character of direct hostility against the First Consul. The election of the Abbé Grégoire as senator had already been carried, in opposition to the wishes of the government, and to give a sign of disapprobation of its religious policy. There were, as we have just seen, two places to fill, and not only were the assemblies desirous to fill them in a manner contrary to the already known intentions of the First Consul in favour of three generals, but they were bent on making such a choice as would be most disagreeable to him. This choice was, therefore, that of M. Daunou. Pains were therefore taken to obtain the presentation of M. Daunou by the two legislative authorities at once, that is to say by the Tribunal and the Legislative Body, which would render his nomination by the Senate almost inevitable.

The most active steps were taken, and votes

were solicited, with a boldness which justly excited astonishment, in opposition to so formidable an authority as that of the First Consul.

M. Daunou was balloted for in the Legislative Body against General Lamartillière, the government candidate. Repeated ballots took place. At last, M. Daunou obtained 135 votes, and General Lamartillière 122. He was declared the candidate of the Legislative Body for one of the vacant places in the Senate. In the Tribunate, also, M. Daunou had General Lamartillière for a competitor. He obtained forty-eight votes, General Lamartillière thirty-nine: he was declared candidate. He had, therefore, two presentations for one. This ballot took place on the 1st of January, 1802—11th Nivôse—the very day on which the head of the Civil Code relative to the *enjoyment and privation of civil rights* was rejected.

According to the ordinary rules of the representative system, one would have been obliged to say, that the majority was lost. But, in this case, the person who must have retired was the First Consul, since he was the grand object of the admiration of France as well as of the hatred of his enemies. No one, however, set up any pretension to exclude him, because no one possessed the means to do so. It was, therefore, a mere shuffling trick, unworthy of serious men. It was spite of the most puerile and, at the same time, the most dangerous; for they were pushing to extremity a violent character, full of the feeling of its strength, and capable of any thing. Cambacérès himself, usually so moderate, regarding the proceedings as absolutely disorderly, said that hostilities so direct could not be suffered, and that, for his part, he could not answer for it that it would be possible to appease the First Consul. The indignation of the latter was, indeed, extreme, and he loudly declared his resolution to rid himself of the obstacles which persons were striving to throw in the way of all the good that he purposed to do.

The following day, the 2d of January—12th Nivôse—was the day of the decade on which he gave audience to the senators. A great number, even of those who had acted against him, attended. They came, some from curiosity, others from weakness, and to disavow by their presence their participation in what was passing. M. Sieyès was one of the visitors. The First Consul was, as usual, in uniform; his countenance appeared animated, and some violent scene was expected. A circle was formed around him. "You are determined, then, to nominate no more generals," said he; "yet to them you are indebted for peace; this would be the right time for showing your gratitude to them." After these few words, the senators, Kellerman, François de Neufchâteau, and others, were roughly taken to task. They made a very lame defence. The conversation then became general again, and the First Consul, casting his eyes towards M. Sieyès, thus resumed: "There are people," said he in a very loud voice, "who want to give us a Grand Elector, and who are thinking of a prince of the house of Orleans. This system has its partisans. I know, even in the Sen-

nate." These words alluded to a scheme, truly or falsely attributed to M. Sieyès, and reported by his enemies to the First Consul. M. Sieyès, on hearing these offensive words, withdrew, blushing. The First Consul, then addressing the assembled senators, added: "I declare to you, that, if you nominate M. Daunou senator, I will take it as a personal affront, and you know that I have never yet put up with one."

This scene frightened the mass of the senators present, and grieved the most discreet. These saw with pain, a man so great, so necessary, but so little master of himself when he was offended, urged into such irritation. The malevolent went away, crying that never had members of the bodies of the state been treated in a manner more indecent and more insupportable. Fear had penetrated into those rancorous but timid minds; and that noisy opposition was destined soon to humble itself before the man whom it had attempted to brave.

The consuls discussed among themselves the course to be pursued. General Bonaparte was bent upon some signal act of violence. If he had possessed legal authority to dissolve the Tribunate and the Legislative Body, the solution would have been easy by regular means, and it would have produced, by a general election, a majority entirely favourable to the views of the First Consul. It is true that a general election would have excluded *en masse* the men of the Revolution, and brought forward totally new men, animated, more or less, by royalist sentiments, like those against whom it had been necessary to act on the 19th Fructidor, which would have been a misfortune of another kind. So true it is that, on the morrow of a sanguinary revolution, which had deeply exasperated minds against one another, the free action of constitutional institutions was impossible. To get out of the hands of hot-headed revolutionists, one would have fallen into the hands of evil-disposed royalists. But, at any rate, the law was silent on the subject of dissolution; it was, therefore, requisite to devise some other expedient.

The First Consul proposed to withdraw the Civil Code, to let the Legislative Body and the Tribunate keep holiday, to submit nothing to them but the laws of finance; and then, when he should have made all France thoroughly sensible that these bodies were the sole cause of the interruption given to the beneficent operations of the government, to seize an occasion for breaking the inconvenient instruments which the Constitution imposed upon him. But Cambacérès, a man skilful in expedients, found gentler means, the legality of which was defensible enough, and which, moreover, were alone practicable at the moment. He dissuaded his colleague, the general, from any illegal and violent measure. "You can do up any thing," said he; "people would put up with it from you. They even permitted the Directory to do what it pleased—the Directory, which had not the advantage either of your glory, or of your moral ascendancy, or of your immense military and political successes. But the arbitrary proceeding of the 18th Fructidor, necessary as it was, ruined the Directory &

rendered the directorial Constitution so despicable, that nobody could afterwards take it in earnest. Ours is much better. With skill to use it, one may do good with it. Let us not then consign it to the public contempt by violating it, on account of the first obstacle that we meet with." Cambacérés admitted that it would be necessary to withdraw the Civil Code, to break off the session, to give a vacation to the deliberative bodies, and to throw upon them, as a subject of serious reproach, the compulsory inaction to which the government would be reduced. But this inaction would be a blind alley, which they must get out of. M. Cambacérés found the means of doing so in Article XXXVII. of the Constitution, which runs thus: "The first renewal of the Legislative Body and the Tribunal shall not take place before the year X."

It was then the year X. (1801—1802.) Government had a right to choose any period of the year that it pleased for effecting this renewal. It might, for example, proceed to it in the course of the winter, in Pluviôse or Vendémiaire; then dismiss one-fifth of the Tribunal and of the Legislative Body, which would be twenty members for the Tribunal, sixty for the Legislative Body; remove in this manner the most hostile, fill their places with discreet, peaceable men, and open an extraordinary session in spring, to obtain the adoption of the laws which were now stopped in their passage, by the malevolence of the opposition. This method was evidently the best. By excluding twenty members of the Tribunal and sixty of the Legislative Body, the government would remove those restless men who swayed the inert mass, and intimidate such as might be again tempted to resist. But, if it wished to succeed, it must first gain the concurrence of the Senate in two things: firstly, an interpretation of Article XXXVIII. in accordance with the proposed plan; secondly, the exclusion of the opposition members, and the nomination of men devoted to the government to fill their places. M. Cambacérés, thoroughly acquainted with that body, knowing that the mass was timid, and the opposition far from courageous, answered for it that the Senate, when it saw how far it was likely to be hurried beyond the bounds of prudence and reason, would readily comply with all the wishes of the government. Article XXXVIII., the interpretation of which now became an important point, did not specify the mode to be employed for the designation of the fifth that was to go out. In the silence of that article, the Senate, charged to choose, might, if it pleased, prefer the ballot to the lot. Against such an interpretation it might be urged that the constant practice, when an assembly is to be partially renewed, is to have recourse to the lot, in order to designate the portion which is to be first excluded. To this it might be answered that recourse is had to the lot when one cannot do otherwise. One cannot, in fact, apply to several hundred electoral colleges to designate the fifth that is to go out, for to address any part of them is to designate that fifth one's self; to address all is to have recourse to a general election, and, in a general election, one cannot fix beforehand the

number of the excluded, for that again would be to designate one's self the fifth to be removed. The lot is, therefore, the only resource, in the ordinary system of elections by electoral colleges. But, having here the Senate, charged to elect, and which could easily be induced to designate by ballot the fifth to be excluded; it was more natural to have recourse to the clear-sighted authority of its votes, than to the blind authority of the lot. The Senate, it is true, was thus made the arbiter of the question; but this was acting in conformity with the real spirit of the Constitution; for, in conferring on the Senate all the prerogatives of the electoral body, it had been made judge of the conflicts which might arise between the legislative majorities and the government. In short, the faculty of dissolution, indispensable in every regular government, was re-established by a subterfuge.

The most important reason was, that the government extricated itself from embarrassment, without ostensibly violating the Constitution. The First Consul declared that he would admit this plan or any other, provided that he were rid of the men who prevented him from pursuing measures conducive to the welfare of France. M. Cambacérés took upon himself the task of preparing a memorial on the subject. A message, was also prepared, to announce to the Legislative Body that the Civil Code was withdrawn. General Bonaparte undertook to draw it up himself in a noble and austere style.

The explosion of his anger began already to be dreaded; it was said that a manifestation of it would speedily be exhibited. On the day after the scene with the senators, the 3d of January—13th Nivôse—a message was sent to the president of the Legislative Body. It was read amidst profound silence, which expressed a sort of terror. The message was as follows:

"Legislators—The government has resolved to withdraw the bills (*projets de loi*) of the Civil Code.

"It is with pain that it finds itself obliged to defer till a future period the laws so anxiously awaited by the nation; but it is convinced that the time is not yet come, when these important discussions can be carried on with the calmness and unity of purpose which they require."

This deserved severity produced the strongest effect. All governments cannot and ought not to use such language; they must, however, be permitted to do so when they are in the right, and when they have conferred on a country immense glory and immense benefits, repaid by an inconsiderate opposition.

The Legislative Body, intimidated by this blow, fell at the feet of the government in not the most honourable manner. A motion was made that, before it broke up, the assembly should ballot for the presentation of a candidate for the third and last vacant place in the Senate. The same men—will it be believed?—who had so spitefully persisted in presenting Messrs. Grégoire and Daunou, instantly voted for General Lamartillière. He obtained 233 out of 252 votes. It was impossible to comply more promptly with the wishes of the First Consul. In consequence, General Lamartillière

lière was declared the candidate of the Legislative Body.

This presentation furnished the Senate with an expedient for satisfying the First Consul, without humbling itself too deeply. After the threat held out to the senators at the audience on the 2d of January, all idea of taking M. Daunou was relinquished. M. Daunou had, nevertheless, been presented by two bodies at once, the Legislative Body and the Tribunate. To prefer the government candidate to one, who had in his favour the double presentation of the two legislative assemblies, would be throwing themselves too openly at the knees of the First Consul. A paltry subterfuge was therefore devised, but it did not save the dignity of the Senate, and served only to exhibit its embarrassment in a clearer light. It met on the following day, the 4th of January—14th Nivôse. The presentation of M. Daunou by the Legislative Body had been determined on the 30th of December, that of General Lamartillière on the 3d of January. The senate pretended that the resolution of the 30th of December was not communicated, while that of the 3d of January only had been, and that General Lamartillière was consequently the only known candidate of the Legislative Body. To this subterfuge it added another trick still more paltry. It filled up the second of the three vacant places. Now General Lamartillière was the first, General Jourdan the second, on the list of the First Consul. It affected, therefore, to consider General Jourdan as the government candidate for the place still vacant. The Senate then drew up its decision in these terms:

“Considering the message of the First Consul of the 25th Frimaire, by which he presents General Jourdan; considering the message of the Tribunate of the 11th Nivôse, by which it presents citizen Daunou; considering, lastly, the message of the Legislative Body of the 13th Nivôse, by which it presents General Lamartillière, the Senate adopts General Lamartillière, and declares him a member of the Conservative Senate.”

By this device the Senate feigned that it had adopted, not the candidate of the First Consul, but the candidate of the Legislative Body. This was adding to the shame of submission the disgrace of a lie which deceived nobody. Assuredly, it was acting judiciously to give way to an indispensable man, without whom France would have plunged into chaos, without whom not one of the opposition members would have been sure of keeping his head on his shoulders; but people should have taken care not to affront him, when they knew that they were unable to carry through the affront.

The opposition members in the Tribunate loudly inveighed against the weakness of the Senate, a weakness which they were themselves destined soon to imitate, and even to surpass.

The plan adopted by the government was immediately put into execution. The legislative labours were suspended, and it was publicly announced that the First Consul was about to quit Paris for Lyons, and that he would be absent nearly a month. The object of this journey had the accustomed greatness of the acts of General Bonaparte. It was

undertaken for the purpose of constituting the Cisalpine Republic; and 500 deputies, of all ages, and of all conditions, were at this moment crossing the Alps, in a severe winter, to form at Lyons a great diet, by the name of *Consulta*, and to receive, from the hand of General Bonaparte, laws, magistrates, an entire government. It had been agreed that they should meet him half way; and Lyons had been considered, next to Paris, as the most suitable point for such a meeting. Prodigious preparations had been made in that city for this imposing political spectacle. He was also to be surrounded by a great military display; for the 22,000 men left of the army of Egypt, having been landed by the English fleet at Marseilles and Toulon, were on march for Lyons, to be reviewed by their former general.

Nobody bestowed further thought either on the Legislative Body, or on the Tribunate. They were left in total inactivity, without any sort of explanation of the plans which the government might have conceived. The Constitution no more conferred the faculty of prorogation than that of dissolution. The two assemblies, therefore, were not dismissed, but they were not furnished with any employment. The government had withdrawn not only the laws of the Civil Code, but also a law relative to the re-establishment of branding for the crime of forgery. This crime, owing to the circumstances of the Revolution, had increased in a frightful manner. So many papers required by the new regulations for the accountable officers of government: so many certificates of civism, formerly indispensable for every one who would not be considered as suspected; so many certificates of presence required of returned emigrants to clear themselves of the offence of emigration; so many verifications of all kinds, demanded and furnished in writing, had given rise to a detestable class of criminals—that of forgers. They infested the sphere of business, as robbers had formerly infested the high roads. The First Consul designed to have a special punishment for them, as he had wished to have a special jurisdiction for the banditti of the highways, and he had proposed branding. “The crime of forgery enriched,” he said; “a forger, who has undergone his punishment, returns into society, and his wealth causes his crimes to be forgotten. There ought to be an indelible mark set upon him by the hand of the executioner, which would forbid those complaisant persons, whom opulence always draws around it, to sit at table with the enriched forger.” This proposal had to encounter the same difficulties as the Civil Code. It was withdrawn, and nothing whatever was left under deliberation; for the laws relative to public instruction and to the re-establishment of religious worship had not even been presented. As to the laws of finance, they were reserved to furnish a pretext for an extraordinary session in the spring. This species of parliament was thus left, not dissolved, not prorogued, idle, useless, weary of its inaction, and bearing, in the eyes of France, the responsibility of the complete interruption of all the excellent and useful operations of the government.

It was agreed that, during the absence of the First Consul, M. Cambacères, who had peculiar skill in managing the Senate, should take care to get such an interpretation as was desired put upon Article XXXVIII. of the Constitution, and that he should superintend himself the exclusion of the twenty and of the sixty members, whom it was intended to remove from the Tribunal and the Legislative Body.

Before he set out, the First Consul had to attend to two important subjects; the expedition of St. Domingo, and the Congress of Amiens. The second detained him beyond the term fixed for his departure.

The desire to possess distant possessions was an old deep-seated feeling of ambition, which the reign of Louis XVI., the palmy days of our navy, had roused, and which subsequent maritime reverses had not yet completely extinguished. The possession of colonies was, at that time, eagerly coveted by all commercial nations. The expedition of Egypt, which had been undertaken with a view of disputing the dominion of the East Indies with the English, was the natural consequence of this universally prevailing inclination, and its unfortunate issue had excited a very earnest desire to compensate for this loss in some other way. The First Consul proposed to indemnify us in two modes, by Louisiana and St. Domingo. He had granted Tuscany, that fertile and valuable portion of Italy, to the court of Spain, in order to obtain Louisiana in exchange; and at this moment he was pressing for the due performance of the engagement entered into by that cabinet. He was determined, at the same time, to repossess himself of the island of St. Domingo. This island, previously to the Revolution, was the first and most important of the West India islands, and the most coveted amongst all the colonies which produced sugar and coffee. It furnished materials to our ports and our navy for the most extensive trade. The imprudent policy of the Constituent Assembly had caused an insurrection of the slaves, and had led to those ever-to-be-lamented horrors, by which the liberty of the blacks was first proclaimed to the world. A negro, endowed with true genius, Toussaint l'Ouverture,¹ had achieved at St. Domingo an humble imitation of that which the First Consul had accomplished in France. He had subdued and established a government over this revolted people, and had succeeded in restoring some degree of order. Thanks to him, the negroes no longer slaughtered each other in St. Domingo, but were beginning to work. He had drawn up a constitution, which he had submitted to the First Consul for his approbation, and ex-

hibited a sort of national attachment for the mother country. This negro had a profound aversion for British connection; he only required to be free, but still to continue French. The First Consul had at first acquiesced in this state of things; but, shortly afterwards, conceiving doubts of Toussaint l'Ouverture's fidelity, and, without wishing to bring back the negroes to a state of slavery, he meditated taking advantage of the maritime armistice which succeeded the preliminaries of peace in London, to despatch an expedition to St. Domingo, consisting of a squadron and an army. With regard to the blacks, the First Consul contemplated the continuance of that condition which events had brought about. He intended, in all the colonies which the spirit of revolt had not pervaded, still to uphold slavery, relaxing, however, its rigour; but in St. Domingo to tolerate freedom, which had now become impossible of restraint. But he meant fully to establish the authority of the parent country in this latter island, and, for that purpose, to keep an army stationed there. In the event of the blacks, after their emancipation, becoming disloyal subjects, or of the English renewing the war, his intention was, without interfering with the freedom of the blacks, to reinstate the proprietors in the possession of their colonial estates, as they filled all Paris with their complaints of their lamentable poverty, and with their imprecations against Toussaint l'Ouverture's government. A considerable portion of the French nobility, already deprived of their property in France by the Revolution, were also proprietors of estates in St. Domingo, and had been plundered of the rich possessions which they had formerly held in that island. They were refused the restoration of their estates in France, as they had become national domains; but it was in our power to restore to them their sugar and coffee plantations in St. Domingo, and this compensation seemed in some measure to satisfy them. These were the various motives which influenced the proceedings of the First Consul. To recover the greater part of our colonies, to hold it, not by the tenure of the doubtful fidelity of a black raised to dictatorial power, but by force of arms; to keep firm possession of it against the blacks and the English; to restore to the old colonists their estates, which were to be cultivated by free labour; finally, to connect this queen of the West Indies with the mouth of the Mississippi by the acquisition of Louisiana—such were the combined objects which the First Consul had in view; a combination of objects certainly much to be regretted, as will soon be seen, but imperatively required,

¹ TOUSSAINT L'OUVERTURE. The celebrated black chieftain, born a slave in 1745, on the plantation of the Count de Noë, near Cape François, now Cape Haytien. His excellent qualities gained him not only the ascendancy over his fellow slaves, but the good offices of M. Bayon de Lebertus, the agent of the estate, who taught him reading, writing, and arithmetic. When the blacks rose in 1791, Toussaint declined joining them, until he had secured the escape of his benefactor. This done, he became lieutenant to Biasson, and, when he was degraded for cruelty, succeeded to the chief command. When the English attacked the island in 1794, Toussaint defended it with various success until 1797, when he was appointed commander-in-chief of the armies of St. Domingo by the French government, and signed a conven-

tion with General Maitland for the evacuation of the island by the British. From 1798 until 1801 he governed the island mildly and peaceably, and would probably have succeeded in establishing a permanent government, but for the ill-judged expedition which Bonaparte sent against the island under Leclerc. A long war followed, in which the blacks were ultimately forced to capitulate. Inviolability of person and property was guaranteed to Toussaint by this treaty, but he was treacherously seized by night, hurried on board a man-of-war, conveyed to Brest, and thence first to Chateau Joux, and thence to Besançon, where he was immured *au secret* in a damp subterraneous dungeon, where cold and misery destroyed him, as it was intended, by lingering disease in 1803.—*Encyclopædia Americana*.

so to speak, by the general opinion prevalent in France at that period.

It was very important to use the utmost expedition, as, although the definitive peace negotiated at this moment at the congress of Amiens was almost certain, yet it was necessary, at all events, in case the English should raise new and inadmissible pretensions, to take advantage of the interval during which the seas would be open to despatch the fleet. The First Consul caused an immense armament to be prepared at Flushing, Brest, Nantes, Rochefort, and Cadiz, consisting of twenty-six ships of the line, and twenty frigates, capable of transporting 20,000 men. He appointed Admiral Villaret-Joyeuse to the command of the squadron, and General Leclerc, one of the best officers of the army of the Rhine, to the command of the troops; the latter had recently married his sister Pauline. He insisted upon his sister accompanying her husband to St. Domingo. He loved her with tender affection; he, therefore, sent thither one of the objects most dear to him, and he had no intention at the time, as party rancour subsequently ascribed to him, to transport to an unhealthy climate, subject to dangerous fevers, those soldiers and generals of the army of the Rhine who had given him umbrage. Another circumstance fully proves the feeling which actuated him in the selection of the corps to St. Domingo. As peace appeared, at that time, likely to become general, military men were under the apprehension that their vocation would cease. Great numbers solicited permission to join the expedition, and this favour was distributed amongst them with a due regard to justice and equality in the various appointments. The brave Richepanse, the hero of the army of Germany, was appointed lieutenant under General Leclerc.

The First Consul applied his accustomed energy to the speedy completion of these preparations, and as much as possible urged the departure of the several naval divisions, distributed in the various ports situated between Holland and the southern extremity of the Peninsula. However, before they set sail, he was under the necessity of coming to an explanation with the English ministry, to whom this vast armament occasioned considerable misgivings. He had some difficulty in satisfying them upon this subject, although, in fact, they were rather desirous that the expedition should proceed. They were not, at that time, so eager for the emancipation of the negroes as the English ministers have since that time appeared to be. The freedom of the blacks of St. Domingo in-

spired them with great alarm for their own colonies, and above all for Jamaica. They were anxious, therefore, for the success of our enterprise; but the extent of the means employed disturbed them, and they would have preferred the troops being sent over in transports. We succeeded, however, in inducing them to listen to reason; and they reluctantly acquiesced in allowing this immense armament to put to sea, at the same time despatching a squadron to watch its movements. They even promised to place all the provisions and ammunition which the resources of Jamaica could command at the disposal of the French army, subject, of course, to payment for whatever might be supplied. The chief naval division, equipped at Brest, set sail on the 14th of December. The others followed shortly afterwards. By the end of December, the whole expedition had put to sea, and would consequently reach St. Domingo, whatever might be the final result of the negotiations of Amiens.

These negotiations, conducted by Lord Cornwallis and Joseph Bonaparte, proceeded slowly, without, however, giving apprehension of a rupture. The first cause of delay had arisen from the actual composition of the Congress, which was to embrace not only the French and English plenipotentiaries, but also the Dutch and Spanish plenipotentiaries; as after the preliminaries, peace was to be concluded between the two great belligerent nations and all their allies. Spain, which, from a state of close amity, had gone almost to the other extreme of hostility, thwarted the views of the First Consul by not sending her plenipotentiaries to the Congress. As, in point of fact, she knew that peace was inevitable, and that she should only appear in the protocol for the purpose of surrendering Trinidad, she did not hurry herself in sending her negotiator to the meeting. The English, on their part, were anxious to have a Spanish ambassador at the Congress of Amiens, in order to obtain a formal cession of the island of Trinidad. They even intimated that they would not enter into negotiation if the Spanish ambassador were not present. The First Consul was under the necessity of assuming a tone with the court of Spain, which should rouse her from her apathy, and he ordered General Saint-Cyr, who had been appointed ambassador in the room of Lucien, to lay before the king and queen the extravagant conduct of the Prince of the Peace, and to declare to them that, if such a course of conduct were persevered in, it would end in some thunder-clap.¹

¹ The following important letter will enable us to form a correct opinion of the relations between France and Spain at this juncture:—

To citizen Saint-Cyr, ambassador at Madrid.

10th Frimaire, year X.—1st Dec. 1801.

The conduct of the cabinet of Madrid becomes a riddle to me. I enjoin you, especially, citizen ambassador, to take every means to open the eyes of this cabinet, to induce it to adopt some consistent and becoming course of proceeding. It has appeared so important to me, that I have thought it my duty to write to you myself on the subject.

The most intimate union subsisted between France and Spain when his Majesty thought proper to ratify the treaty of Badajoz

M. the Prince of the Peace transmitted at that time a note to our ambassador, a copy of which I have ordered to be transmitted to you. This note was couched in such offensive terms as rendered it quite impossible for me to pay any attention to it. A few days afterwards he forwarded to the French ambassador at Madrid a note, in which he declared that his Catholic Majesty was about to make his peace separately with England. I also order a copy of this letter to be sent to you. I felt at that time what little reliance I could have upon the support of a power, whose minister expressed himself so unbecomingly, and manifested such inconsistency in his conduct. Being fully conscious of the good intentions of the king, I should have made him acquainted directly with the improper conduct of his minister, if the illness of his Majesty had not supervened.

The Spanish minister destined to figure so conspicuously at the Congress of Amiens, M. Campo-Arlange, was ill in Italy. Spain at length determined to give orders to M. d'Azara, ambassador at Paris, to repair to the Congress. This difficulty got over with the Spaniards, there was still another to overcome with the Dutch. The Dutch plenipotentiary, M. Schimmelpenninck, would not admit the basis of the preliminaries, that is to say, the cession of Ceylon, before he was aware how Holland would be treated with respect to the restitution of her fleets put into the possession of England; with respect to the indemnities laid claim to on behalf of the dispossessed stadtholder; and finally, with respect to certain questions of limits on the French side. Joseph Bonaparte received orders to notify to M. Schimmelpenninck, that he would only be received at Congress, on the condition of his first admitting the preliminaries of London as the basis of the negotiation. Lord Cornwallis having expressed himself satisfied with this formality, the Congress thus became constituted.

Nevertheless, the English were anxious to introduce Portugal as a party, under the pretence that she was an ally of England. The real secret motive was, to procure the exemption of the court of Lisbon from the payment of the contribution of 20,000,000 frs. which had been imposed upon it by one of the conditions of the treaty of Madrid. The First Consul refused his consent to this, declaring that peace between France and Portugal was already made, and nothing more had to be done. This pretension being set aside, the Congress set to work, and the basis was soon agreed upon.

In order to avoid incalculable difficulties, it was agreed that every demand should be rejected if it did not fall within the scope of the preliminaries. *Nothing more, nothing less than the articles of London*, was the rule thus reciprocally laid down. The English had, in fact, again brought under discussion the subject of the abandonment of the island of Tobago by France. The First Consul, on the part of France, had demanded an extension of territory in the region of Newfoundland, for the improvement of the French fisheries. These several pretensions were mutually rejected, and to put an end to similar claims, it was agreed not to entertain any subject of further concessions, but what was contained in the preliminary treaty. Otherwise, by reviving the difficulties

which had been so happily overcome, peace itself might be placed in jeopardy. This principle being laid down, it only remained to draw up the formal *precis* of the preliminaries stipulated in London.

Two important points remained to be solved: the payment of the cost of supporting the prisoners, and the administrative government proper to be established in Malta.

The number of French prisoners supported by England far exceeded the number of English prisoners maintained by France, and the English accordingly claimed reimbursement of the difference. France rejoined, that the principle generally admitted was, that each nation should maintain the prisoners which she had made; that if a different principle were acted upon, France would have to require repayment for the Russian, Bavarian, and other soldiers, in the pay of England, whom she had taken prisoners and supported; that all soldiers paid by England should be included in the number of prisoners whom she was bound to maintain. "Besides," added the French plenipotentiary, "it is purely a question of amount, which can be settled by means of commissioners specially appointed for the liquidation of such claims."

With respect to Malta, the question was of a more serious nature. The English and the French greatly distrusted each other on the subject. They seemed to have a foresight into futurity, each fearing that, at some subsequent period, the island would again fall into the hands of one power or the other. The First Consul, by a singular instinct, proposed utterly to destroy all the military works, to leave only the dismantled city, to establish a great neutral lazaretto, open to all nations, and to convert the order into an hospitable foundation, wholly divested of any military attributes.

This proposition did not satisfy the English. They alleged that the rock was naturally so strong a defence that, even stripped of the fortifications, raised at successive periods by the knights, it would still remain a formidable place of strength. They urged, also, that the Maltese people would offer great resistance to the destruction of these fine fortresses, and proposed the re-constitution of the Order upon a new and more solid basis. They had no objection to allow the French language still to be used there, stipulating only that a college should be instituted for teaching the English and also the Maltese language; the latter for

I have several times intimated to the court of Spain that its refusal to execute the convention of Madrid, that is to say, to occupy a fourth part of the Portuguese territories, would lead to the loss of Trinidad; no attention has been paid to these observations.

In the negotiations which have taken place in London, France has contended for the interests of Spain, just as she would have done for herself; but, as, after all, his Britannic Majesty would not give up Trinidad, I could no longer insist upon it, especially as Spain, in an official note, threatened France with a private negotiation; we could no longer rely upon her assistance in continuing the war.

The Congress of Amiens has met, and a definitive treaty of peace will be signed; nevertheless, his Catholic Majesty has not yet published the preliminaries, nor intimated in what manner he wishes to treat with England. It, however, becomes very essential to his position among European powers, and to the interests of his crown, that he should make up his mind without delay,

without which a definitive peace will be shortly signed without his being a party to it.

It has been reported to me, that at Madrid they want to retract their bargain respecting the cession of Louisiana; France has never swerved from the strict fulfilment of any treaty made with her, and she will not permit any power to be wanting to her in this respect. The King of Tuscany is seated upon his throne, and in possession of his States, and his Catholic Majesty is too well aware of the faith due to his engagements to refuse any longer to put us in possession of Louisiana.

I desire you will express to their Majesties my extreme displeasure at the unjust and inconsistent conduct of the Prince of the Peace.

During the last month, this minister has spared neither insulting notes nor hazardous measures; every thing he had in his power to do against France he has done. If this system of conduct be persevered in, tell the queen, and the Prince of the Peace, boldly, that it will end by some unexpected thunder-clap.

the advantage of the Maltese people, who should have a share in its management; they were desirous of placing this new settlement under the guarantee of some great power, Russia for example. The English were in hopes that, with the English and Maltese languages spoken by the people, who would be devoted to them, they should still have an influence in the island, which would prevent the French from again obtaining possession of it.

The First Consul insisted upon the destruction of the fortifications, stating that at present it would be very difficult to re-constitute the Order; that already Bavaria had seized upon their property in Germany; that Spain, since the establishment of Russian protection over Malta, meditated the same thing, and to appropriate the lands situated in her territory; that the institution of Protestant knights would be a conclusive reason with her; that the Pope, already very adverse to every thing which was done in regard to the Order, would not, under any consideration, give his assent to these new arrangements, and that France had not the requisite means of affording instruction so as to secure the introduction of the French language, inasmuch as her present laws did not permit, under any modification, the re-establishment of an order of nobility. He was ready, if it were insisted upon, to assent to the re-establishment of Malta upon its ancient basis, with the preservation of the existing fortifications, but without either the French or English languages, and that the island should be placed under the guarantee of the court situated nearest to it, namely, that of Naples. He rejected the guarantee of Russia.

None of the continental arrangements were touched upon. The First Consul had expressly forbidden the French legation to allude to them. Nevertheless, as the king of England took a deep interest in the house of Orange, now deprived of the stadtholdership, the First Consul was willing to take upon himself to procure for it a territorial compensation in Germany, when the great question of the German indemnities should be determined. In return, he demanded the restitution, either in ships or in money, of the Dutch fleet carried off by the English.

In the main, there was nothing in all this absolutely irreconcilable; inasmuch as the question of the prisoners was one purely of money, which could be arranged by means of a joint commission. The question of Malta was of more difficult solution, as it involved a feeling of mutual distrust. It was important to discover, and it was within the scope of possibility, some specific scheme which should remove the fears of all parties of an eventual contingency which might happen; namely, the sudden occupation of the island by one of the two great maritime nations. As regarded the stadtholder, nothing was more easy, since both parties were agreed upon that subject.

The First Consul was anxious to bring things to a conclusion as soon as possible. He wished to have the treaty ready on his return from Lyons, as he intended to present this state document (which rendered the general

peace complete,) together with the Concordat, and the laws relating to finance, to the new Legislative Body. He therefore gave orders to his brother Joseph not to make unnecessary difficulties in the adjustment of the remaining details, but to get the treaty signed with as little delay as possible.

The First Consul left Paris on the 8th of January—18th Nivôse—accompanied by his wife and a numerous military escort, to proceed to Lyons. M. de Talleyrand had preceded him, in order to arrange all the business, so that, upon the First Consul's arrival, it would only be necessary to give his sanction, by his presence, to the plans submitted to him. The winter was very severe; nevertheless all the Italian deputies were already assembled, and impatient to see General Bonaparte, the great object of their journey.

The time had now arrived for the regulation of the affairs of Italy, by constituting the Cisalpine Republic a second time. M. de Talleyrand was greatly opposed to this step. This minister dwelt upon the great difficulty of carrying on business in a republic; he cited the examples of the Dutch, Helvetic, Ligurian, Roman, and Parthenopean republics, and pointed out the difficulties under which they had formerly laboured, or were at present labouring. He said, that there were quite enough of these offsets of the French republic, that not one more was necessary; and he suggested in lieu either a principality or a monarchy, similar to that of Etruria, which could be conferred upon some prince, a friend and dependent upon France. He would not have objected to grant this state to a prince of the house of Austria, to the Grand-duke of Tuscany for instance, who must be indemnified in Germany, if he were not indemnified in Italy. This arrangement, which would have been highly agreeable to Austria, would have strongly influenced her to remain at peace. It would have equally satisfied the German powers, who, by this plan, would have had one co-participator the less to indemnify with the lands of the ecclesiastical princes. Above all, it would have highly pleased the Pope, who cherished the hope that the Legations would be restored to him, when we should be released from the promises made respecting the Cisalpine. This arrangement, in one word, was in accordance with the general opinion of all Europe; as it extinguished one republic, and left one territory more to be appropriated, and made a corresponding diminution of one state less under the direct dominion of the French republic.

Undoubtedly, to render in any way the greatness of France less insupportable to the nations of Europe, was a reason of very great weight, as thereby the probability of the longer duration of peace would be considerably increased. Now that France had the Rhine and the Alps for her frontiers; now that she had Switzerland, Holland, Spain, and Italy, under her immediate control; now that she held Piedmont directly, with the general though tacit consent of all the powers; now that she had reached to this height of greatness, the most moderate line of policy was, from this moment, the most rational and prudent. In this view of the case,

M. de Talleyrand was certainly in the right. Nevertheless, after all that had been already done, we were compulsorily under the obligation of reconstituting Italy; and, as Austria had been now deprived of it, it was necessary to devise a plan of making the loss irrevocable, which could only be accomplished by constituting it upon a firm and independent footing. By this act, we only endangered a collision with Austria, and one only of the hundred battles since fought for the purpose of creating French kingdoms throughout the continent, would have sufficed to consolidate for ever in Europe any state of things we might have chosen to establish in Italy.

Upon this plan, we must have renounced the possession of Piedmont, as, if the Italians prefer the French to the Germans, at the bottom they are not attached to either, inasmuch as both are regarded by them as foreigners. This is a natural and legitimate feeling which ought to be respected. The French, by keeping Italy under their protection, without having actual possession of it, would have secured the permanent attachment of the people, and would not have superinduced those sudden revulsions of feeling, which they have so often exhibited, since, banded between the French and the Germans, they have incessantly changed masters. Under this arrangement, Etruria ought not to have been granted to a Spanish prince. Then, by uniting Lombardy, Piedmont, the duchies of Parma and Modena, Mantua, the Legations, and Tuscany, a magnificent country would have been formed, extending from the Maritime Alps to the Adige, from Switzerland to the Roman State. It would have been easy to detach, either in Tuscany or in Romagna, a portion of territory to indemnify the Pope, whose devotion could not last long, unless, sooner or later, we administered to his poverty. It would have been necessary to unite these different provinces under one federative government, in which the executive power should be strongly constituted, so as to enable it to concentrate its forces promptly, and afford time to our armies to repair to its assistance. The alliance between this state and France should be, in fact, most intimate, as it could not exist but through her; and France, on her side, must at all times have a deep interest in her permanent stability.

An Italian state, containing 10,000,000 or 12,000,000 of inhabitants, possessing admirable frontiers, with the sea on both sides, with a certain chance, at the first favourable war, of augmenting its territory by the addition of the Venetian States, and of extending its line along the natural boundaries of Italy, that is to say, the Julian Alps; embracing, within its limits at a later period, the newly-constituted Genoese republic, by means of a simple federative tie, which might leave each principality its respective independence; retaining the Pope, with the necessary conditions for his political and religious authority; including, also, the state of Naples, delivered from an incapable and sanguinary court; such a state, thus constituted, and with the additions which futurity might bring, would be the foundation of Italian regeneration, and would create a third federa-

tion, which, added to the two already existing, the German and the Swiss, would contribute immensely to the adjustment of the general balance of Europe.

With regard to the difficulty of governing Italy, that could be solved by its being placed under the protectorate of France, which, if only prolonged for one entire reign, would thus, in the infancy of the state, direct it in the path of liberty and independence.

Now, the plan actually followed at this moment did not exclude the possibility of this bright futurity, inasmuch as Piedmont might be, some day, restored to the new Italian State, the duchy of Parma, at the decease of the present duke—an event which, according to all probability, could not be far distant; Etruria itself might be restored, if it were found expedient. It was, therefore, easy to recur to this plan at a future period, and a firm and ample foundation was now being laid, by constituting the Cisalpine into an independent republic. Moreover, perhaps, it was better, at the moment, not to avow unreservedly the project of Italian regeneration, in order to avoid frightening Europe. But, to parcel out the five provinces we had already, into inconsiderable fragments, as M. de Talleyrand proposed, for the purpose of constructing one more diminutive kingdom for the benefit of an Austrian prince, was, in point of fact, handing over Italy to Austria; as this prince, whatever, might be done, would always be essentially an Austrian, and the people themselves, whose hopes would have been unworthily betrayed, conceiving a well-founded hatred against France, would fly back to the Germans, out of a feeling of resentment and despair.

General Bonaparte, who had acquired his first and perhaps his greatest glory by delivering Italy from the hands of the Austrians, was not capable of committing such an error. He adopted a middle course, which did not stand in the way of an extensive scheme of Italian independence at a future period, and which, indeed, might be the commencement of it at the present time.

He accordingly bestowed upon the Cisalpine republic the whole of Lombardy, as far as the Adige, together with the Legations and the duchy of Modena; every thing, in short, which it possessed at the peace of Campo-Formio. The duchy of Parma remained in abeyance; Piedmont, for the present, appertained to France. The Cisalpine, thus constituted, contained a population of nearly 5,000,000 of people. It could easily be made to produce 70,000,000 or 80,000,000*l.*, and to maintain an army of 40,000 men, which would not absorb more than one-half of its revenue, leaving sufficient resources to pay conveniently the charges of the civil government. It was protected on the north by the Alps and the Adige; on the left, it had Piedmont, now a French dependency; on the right, the Adriatic; and, on the south, Tuscany, placed under the protection of France. It was thus supported on all sides by our protective power. Immense fortified works, ordered by General Bonaparte, who was guided in their construction by that consummate quicksightedness and experience of the

country, which no one in the world possessed in the same degree, must render it impregnable to the Austrians, and always capable of being timely relieved by the French. The Adige was fortified from Rivoli to Legnago, in such a manner that it could not be crossed. The environs of the Lago di Garda, and especially the position of the Rocca d'Anfo, were sufficiently well closed, so as to prevent the possibility of the line of the Adige being turned. The Mincio formed a second line in the rear. Peschiera and Mantua, with a great augmentation of territory, added considerable strength to this second line of defence. Mantua, especially, improved both in respect to the strength and healthiness of the place, might still hold out by itself, even if the Adige were forced. The object of other works was to insure at all times the arrival of the French armies. They could debouch, first by the Valais, into the Milanese, over the road of the Simplon; secondly, by Savoy, or by Provence into Piedmont, over Mont Cenis, Mont Genève, or the Col de Tende. It has been stated, that works were ordered to be executed, which would shortly render these four roads passable for any purpose of conveyance. It was requisite to erect solid *points d'appui*, with vast military establishments, adapted both to receive any French army, which might be suddenly compelled to evacuate the country, or if necessary, to serve the same army to debouch, when again in a state to resume the offensive. For these purposes, two stations had been pitched upon, and a vast expense had been incurred to render them effective; one at the debouché of the Simplon road, the other at the debouché of the three roads of Mont Cenis, Mont Genève, and the Col de Tende. The first, and the smaller of the two, was to be situated at the extremity of the Lago Maggiore. According to the plan upon which it was to be constructed, it would be capable of containing the sick, the wounded, the stores of the troops when retreating, as also the flotilla of the lake, and would be able to hold out, if invested, for three or four weeks, until an army, crossing the Simplon, could advance to its assistance. The second, and the larger fortress destined to keep Piedmont in check, and for the reception of the whole resources of the French armies, to serve also as a *point d'appui*, and as a means of descending at all times into Italy, as strong, as extensive as that of Mayence, Metz, or Lille, capable of sustaining a long siege, was to be erected at Alexandria. This point, contiguous to the field of battle of Marengo, was most favourably adapted for any great military movements, of which Italy might become the theatre. Turin was too much under the influence of a numerous, and, in some cases, hostile population. Pavia was beyond the Po. Alexandria, between the Po and the Tanaro, at the real debouché of all the roads, united great advantages, and on this account was preferred. Vast works were ordered to be executed. These latter being situated in Piedmont, the expenses were to be defrayed by the French treasury; all the others were to be paid out of the funds of the Cisalpine, as they more particularly concerned her interests.

Owing to these arrangements, France was, at all times, in a position to throw succours into the Cisalpine; she held Upper and Middle Italy under her control, and ruled over Southern Italy by her influence. She might transmit to Rome and to Naples her less ostensible commands, but they would be as much obeyed, as in Turin or in Milan.

It was necessary to confer some form of government upon this Cisalpine republic. A beginning had been made, by the appointment of provisional authorities, consisting of an executive committee of three members, Messrs. de Somma-Riva, Visconti, and Ruga, and of a *Consulium*, a sort of legislative assembly, of limited number, chosen from amongst the wisest men, most devoted to our interests. But such a state of things could not be of long duration.

The First Consul had with him in Paris, the minister of the Cisalpine, M. de Marescalchi, besides Messrs. Aldini, Serbelloni, and Melzi, sent to France respecting the affairs of Italy. They were the most important personages of their own country. The First Consul consulted them upon the organization best adapted for the new republic, and in concurrence with them, digested a Constitution, resembling both the French, and the ancient Italian constitutions.

In lieu of the list of notables of M. Sieyès, which began to be decried in France, the First Consul and his fellow-labourers devised three electoral colleges, permanent and for life, with power to fill up vacancies occasioned by death. The first was to consist of great landed proprietors, to the number of 300; the second of the chief merchants, to the number of 200; the third, of literary and learned men, and the most distinguished clergy of Italy, to the number of 200. These three colleges were to select from their own body a committee consisting of twenty-one members, called the *Commission de Censure*, whose province was to elect all the bodies of the state, and to perform the same electoral duty which the Senate fulfilled in France.

This creative authority was afterwards to nominate, under the designation of the *Consulium* of State, a Senate of eight members empowered, like that of France, to watch over the Constitution; to decide upon extraordinary emergencies; to order under arrest any dangerous individual; to exclude from the pale of the Constitution any department which might have deserved it; to deliberate upon treaties, and to nominate the President of the republic. One of these eight members was *ex officio* minister of foreign affairs.

There was to be a Council of State under the title of Legislative Council, composed of six members, to digest the laws and regulations, and to support them before the Legislative Body; finally, a Legislative Body of seventy-five members, which was to select from this number fifteen orators, whose duty would be to discuss before it the laws upon which it might be afterwards required to vote.

Finally, at the head of this republic were to be a president and a vice-president, appointed

for ten years. These were, as we have just said, to be nominated by the *Consulium* of State or Senate; but all the other authorities could only be formed by the choice of the *Commission de Censure*.

These functionaries of every grade were to derive considerable emoluments from their respective offices.

It may be perceived that it was an imitation of the French Constitution, with corrections, or, in other words, an improved edition of the work of M. Sieyès. For the list of notables were substituted three electoral colleges constituted for life. The Senate, or the *Consulium* of State, had not the power of election; it only nominated the chief of the executive power, but it deliberated on treaties, which by this arrangement were withdrawn from the tumultuous discussions of the assemblies. The Tribunate was merged into the Legislative Body. In lieu of three consuls, there was to be one president.

When the First Consul had determined, in conjunction with Messrs. Marescalchi, Aldini, Melzi, and Zerbelloni, upon the adoption of this scheme of government, it became necessary to think of the persons who were to compose this government. The selection of these was of the more consequence, as the permanence of the principal bodies was of greater importance, and the good or evil resulting from their composition would endure for a longer period. Now Italy was split, like France, into parties difficult to conciliate. On the one hand, there were the partisans of the past order of things, devoted to the Austrian government; and, on the other extreme, the *ultra* patriots, ready, as in all places, for the perpetration of all kinds of excesses, but who as yet had not shed blood, kept under restraint as they had been by the French army. Besides these, between the two, were the moderate liberals, bearing the weight of the government, with all the unpopularity incident thereto, especially in time of war, when very heavy burdens must unavoidably be imposed upon the country. With these different parties, the elections could not, as in France, produce satisfactory results. The First Consul, in order to supersede the necessity for these elections, fixed upon a plan, which was not on his part the inspiration of ambition, but rather of great good sense; this was to nominate himself the persons who should compose this government, in the same way as he had just decided upon its structure, and thus, for the first time, to make the whole of the appointments by virtue of his own absolute authority. In taking this step he was only actuated by a desire to do good, and at all events he had an undoubted right to act as he deemed fit; as this new state was created by a simple act of his will, and in constituting it in this spontaneous manner, he had a right to model it agreeably to his own views, which, on this occasion, were unquestionably both pure and exalted.

But, amongst all these appointments, the most difficult to be decided upon was that of President. Italy, always governed by priests and foreigners, had not been able to produce statesmen; nor was there amongst them one

single illustrious name before which the others could consent to waive their own pretensions. The First Consul, accordingly, conceived the idea of conferring upon himself the dignity of President, and of nominating a Vice-President, selected from amongst the most distinguished Italian personages, to whom he could delegate the details of affairs, reserving to himself the supreme direction. For the infancy of the Republic, this was the only practicable system of government. Had it been given up to its own choice, and to an Italian president, it would soon have been like a ship left without compass, exposed to the mercy of the waves; but, the government being administered, on the contrary, by Italians, and directed at a distance by the man to whom it owed its origin, and who would remain, for a long time to come, its protector, the great probability was that, under such a system, it would be at once both independent and well governed.

For this purpose, a solemn, imposing inauguration was necessary, when the Constitution should be granted to the new state in due form, and all the authorities publicly proclaimed. This act of inauguration could not be celebrated with too much splendour. It should simultaneously address itself to Italy and to all Europe. The First Consul conceived the idea of a vast meeting of all the Italians at Lyons, as it was too far for them to repair to Paris, and too far for him to go to Milan. The city of Lyons, which is situated on this side of the Alps, and in which Italy, in former days, had assembled in council, was the spot naturally pointed out by circumstances. The First Consul, moreover, took an earnest and sincere interest in bringing Italians and Frenchmen to mingle in each others' society. He even aimed, by this means, at re-establishing the trade between the two countries, as it was at Lyons that the produce of Lombardy was formerly exchanged for the products of our eastern provinces.

Some intimation of these views was given by M. de Talleyrand to the Italians sent to Paris, that is to say, Messrs. Marescalchi, Aldini, Serbelloni, and Melzi. He was only silent upon that part of the scheme which had reference to conferring the presidency upon the First Consul. This he wished to elicit from the *Consulium*, by a burst of enthusiasm, at the period when it should assemble. The views of the First Consul were too much in conformity with the real interests of the whole country of Italy not to meet with unanimous concurrence. Accordingly, these personages set out, and accompanied by M. Petiet, the French minister at Milan, a wise and influential man, repaired to Lyons to perfect the plan of organization, which had been concerted at Paris.

The scheme of the new Constitution encountered no opposition. It was received with great satisfaction, as the people were eager to emerge from the precarious state in which they lived, and to acquire a political existence well secured to them. The executive committee, and the *Consulium*, who were invested with the provisional authority, accepted the project with alacrity, with the exception of some slight modifications in the details, which

were transmitted to Paris for approval, and there sanctioned. But they were very much perplexed as to the mode of first giving vitality to the new Constitution, and as to the choice of the persons who were to set it in motion. M. Petiet secretly communicated to several influential personages the idea of giving up to the First Consul the nomination of all the members of the government, from the president down to the three electoral colleges. No sooner was this idea of a supreme arbiter, so admirably situated with regard to them, as to be perfectly exempt from all the passions and prejudices which divided the Italians, and who could only be actuated by a desire for their happiness—no sooner was this idea broached than it instantly succeeded, and the provisional government forthwith yielded up to the First Consul the power of choosing all the authorities.

A message was addressed to him, to announce to him the formal acceptance of the Constitution, and to express to him the wish of the Cisalpine people, to see the first magistrate of the French republic exercise himself the power of choosing the magistrates of the Italian republic.

They went no further than this, and not a word was said respecting the presidency. But it was expedient to induce the Italians to come to Lyons, and this formed the subject of a fresh communication to the members of the provisional government. They were made sensible of the extreme difficulty of constituting the Cisalpine republic, with the First Consul residing at Paris, and who would have to select individuals to fill 700 or 800 offices, when he was necessarily at a distance both from them and their respective localities; the difficulty was also dwelt upon, of the First Consul making a journey from Paris to Milan; on the contrary, the great advantage of dividing the distance; of assembling all the Italians in a body at Lyons; of the First Consul repairing thither; of forming there a sort of great Italian Diet, where the new republic would be constituted, with a pomp and splendour which would give more solemnity to the engagement made by the First Consul on its creation, to maintain and to defend it. This idea carried something noble in it, which was calculated to please the imaginations of the Italians. It succeeded just like the arrangements concerted beforehand, and was immediately adopted. A scheme was already prepared, and it was converted into a decree by the provisional government. Deputations were appointed, the members of which were chosen from the clergy, the nobility, the great landed proprietors, the mercantile body, the universities, the tribunals, and the national guards. Four hundred and fifty-two persons were selected, amongst whom were to be found venerable prelates, greatly advanced in years, some of whom would probably sink under the fatigues of the journey. They set out in the month of December, and crossed the Alps during one of the most rigorous winters that had been experienced for a long time. They were all anxious to be present at this proclamation of the independence of their country, by the hero who had achieved it. The roads of the Milanese, of Switzerland, and of the Jura

were completely obstructed by the travellers. The First Consul, whose foresight extended to every thing, had given orders that these representatives of Italian nationality should wait for nothing either on their journey or at Lyons, as, by their presence, they revived the recollection of his earliest and brightest triumphs. The prefect of the Rhône had made immense preparations for their reception, and fitted up spacious and magnificent halls for the solemnities which were to take place. A portion of the consular guard had been sent to Lyons. The army of Egypt, formerly the army of Italy, had recently landed on its return. It was magnificently clothed in a short time, and in a manner suitable to the French climate, which seemed quite new to the soldiers, who were tanned by an Egyptian sun, so much so as to be transformed in appearance into complete Africans. The Lyonese youth had been collected, and formed into a body of cavalry, with the arms and colours of the ancient city of Lyons. M. de Talleyrand, and M. Chaptal, the minister of the interior, had preceded the First Consul on his journey, for the purpose of receiving the members of the *Consulium*. General Murat and M. Petiet had hastened from Milan, and M. Marescalchi from Paris to the general place of rendezvous. The prefects and authorities of the twenty departments were collected at Lyons. The First Consul kept them waiting, on account of the Congress of Amiens, the negotiations of which required his presence for some days longer. The Italian deputies began to grow impatient. With a view of occupying their attention, they were divided into five sections, one for each province of the new state, and the scheme of the new Constitution was presented to them. They suggested a variety of useful observations which M. de Talleyrand was instructed to listen to, to deliberate upon, and to admit, without prejudice, however, to the fundamental principles of the project. With the exception of some minute details which were modified, the new Constitution met with general approval. It was suggested also, with a view of pacifying the impatience of the Cisalpine deputies, to draw up a list of candidates, in order to assist the First Consul in the numerous selections which he had to make. This ransacking of names satisfactorily filled up their time.

The First Consul arrived on the 11th of January, 1802—21st Nivôse. The whole population of the country, collected on the roads, waited anxiously for him day and night. They assembled round immense fires, and ran before all the carriages coming from Paris, crying out—"Vive Bonaparte!" The First Consul at length made his appearance, and on his road to Lyons was received throughout with the most tumultuous transports of enthusiasm. He arrived there in the evening, accompanied by his wife and his adopted children, with his aide-de-camp, and was received by his ministers, the civil and military authorities, an Italian deputation, the staff of Egypt, and the youth of Lyons mounted on horseback. The city, illuminated in every part, appeared as brilliant as at noon-day. He passed under a triumphal arch, which was surmounted by a noble em-

blem of consular France—a sleeping hol. He alighted at the Hôtel de Ville, which had been suitably fitted up for his residence.

The following day, the First Consul was wholly occupied in receiving the departmental deputations, and, after these, the Italian *Consultum*, which amounted to 450 members, actually present, out of 452—an instance of punctuality almost unprecedented, if the number of persons, the season, and the distance are taken into consideration; and, moreover, that one of the absentees was the respectable Archbishop of Milan, who had just died of apoplexy at the house of M. de Talleyrand. The Italians, with whom the First Consul conversed in their own language, were delighted to see him again, and to find united in him all the characteristics of both the French and the Italians. The succeeding days were devoted to the last labours of the *Consultum*. The modifications proposed to be made to the Constitution had been acceded to by the First Consul; and lists of candidates were drawn up. The plan was conceived of forming a committee of thirty members, selected from the entire *Consultum*, which was to discuss with the First Consul the long series of nominations to be made. This business occupied several days, during which the First Consul, after having employed a portion of the day in seeing and entertaining the Italians, also occupied himself in the affairs of France, received the prefects and the departmental deputations, listened to a statement of their wants and wishes, and thus personally became acquainted with the true state of the republic. The enthusiasm increased every day, and it was at the height of this general excitement, whilst the French and the Italians were in intimate communication with each other, that the idea was suggested of nominating the First Consul President of the Cisalpine republic. Messrs. Marescalchi, Petiet, Murat, and De Talleyrand had interviews every day with the members of the Committee of Thirty, and conferred with them upon the choice of a president. When they conceived them perfectly at a loss, and divided amongst themselves about the selection, a mode of relieving them from their embarrassment was cautiously insinuated into their minds, by the suggestion of conferring upon the Italian personage, who might be most preferred, the simple dignity of vice-president, and of covering his insufficiency by the glory of the First Consul, who might be appointed president. This simple thought, still more essential to the existence of the Cisalpine, and to the administration of its affairs, than to the greatness of the First Consul, was generally approved, nevertheless, with the condition of having an Italian vice-president. Citizen Melzi was induced to accept the vice-presidency, under the First Consul. Every thing being arranged, one of the members of the Thirty made this proposition to the committee. It was received with delight, and instantly assumed the official form of a *projet* of a decree. No time was lost, and, on the following day, the *projet* was presented to the *Consultum*. They received it with acclamations, and proclaimed NAPOLEON BONAPARTE President of the Italian republic. This was the first occasion on which the names of NAPO-

LEON and BONAPARTE were used together. The general was to add to the title of First Consul of the French republic that of President of the Italian republic. A deputation was sent to him to express their wishes.

Whilst these deliberations were going on, the general of the armies of Italy and Egypt inspected his old soldiers at a public review. The demi-brigades of the army of Egypt, which there had been time to collect, had been assembled with the consular guard, with numerous detachments of troops, and the Lyonesse militia. On that day the fogs of winter were dispersed, and, under a brilliant sun, but with the weather intensely cold, General Bonaparte passed along the lines of these veterans, who received him with inconceivable transports of joy. The soldiers of Egypt and of Italy, delighted to find this child of their own making grown so great, greeted him with their shouts, and tried to make him understand that they had not ceased to be worthy of him, although, for a moment, they had been commanded by chiefs unworthy of themselves. He called some of the old grenadiers out of the ranks, talked with them about the battles in which they had been engaged, and the wounds they had received; he recognised, here and there, officers whom he had seen, in more than one encounter, shook hands with them all, and filled them with a sort of intoxication, from which even he himself could not escape, at the sight of so many brave fellows, who had contributed, by their devotion, to produce the wondrous fortune which he enjoyed, and which France enjoyed with him. This scene took place upon the ruins of the Place Bellecour, and obliterated the sad recollection connected with the spot, in the same way that glory makes us forget the troubles we have endured.

At the entrance of the Hôtel de Ville, on his return from this review, the First Consul found the deputation of the *Consultum*, received their address, intimated his acceptance of their proposal, and that, on the following day, he would give his reply to this new mark of confidence of the Italian nation.

On the next day, 26th of January—6th Pluviôse—he repaired to the spot where the general sittings of the *Consultum* had been held. It was at a great church fitted up and decorated for this purpose. All the arrangements were similar to those observed, both in France and in England, when royalty is present at the sittings. The First Consul, surrounded by his family, by the French ministers, by a great number of generals and prefects, was seated upon a dais. He delivered in the Italian language, which he spoke perfectly, a simple and concise speech, in which he announced his acceptance of the dignity, explained his views respecting the government and prosperity of the new republic, and proclaimed the chief selections which he had made in conformity with the wishes of the *Consultum*. His words were drowned in cries of "*Vive Bonaparte! Vive le Premier Consul de la République Française! Vive le Président de la République Italienne!*" The Constitution was afterwards read, together with the list of all the citizens who were to aid in carrying it into effect. A long continued

about of applause expressed the concord which prevailed between the Italians and the hero who had enfranchised them. This sitting was most solemn and imposing; it opened in a suitably dignified manner the proceedings of the new republic, which, henceforward, was to be designated the ITALIAN REPUBLIC. Upon this occasion, as upon so many others, only one wish could be expressed respecting General Bonaparte; that the creative genius which inspired this favourite of fortune might ever go hand in hand with the conservative genius, by which alone his works could be perpetuated.

The First Consul had now been twenty days at Lyons. The government of France required his presence at Paris, as he had to give his final orders for the signature of the definitive treaty of peace, which was in the course of negotiation at the Congress of Amiens. During this time, the Consul Cambacérès and the Senate were labouring to get rid of the unruly members, who had opposed him so violently at a moment of his career when he had least of all deserved it. He was about to be in a position to resume that long series of labours which constituted the happiness and greatness of France. He was accordingly urgent to return to Paris, to resume his accustomed occu-

pations, to acquire there, probably, as a reward for his labours, a new glory, which would be only a just recompense for the most noble, comprehensive ambition ever embraced by the conception of man.

He set out on the 28th of January—8th Pluviôse—leaving the Italians filled with enthusiasm and hope, and also the Lyonese delighted with having had a visit of *some* days from the extraordinary man, whose name was spread throughout the whole world, and who had shown so marked a predilection for their city. He had received from the Emperor Alexander an answer to a letter, in which he solicited some advantages for the trade of Lyons. The substance of this answer, which intimated the most friendly dispositions on the part of Russia, was published, and produced the greatest satisfaction. On his departure, the First Consul presented the three mayors of the city of Lyons with three scarfs in commemoration of this glorious visit. The inhabitants of Bordeaux had sent a deputation to request him to come within their walls. He made them a promise to this effect, as soon as the definitive peace should afford him a little leisure. He came back by way of St. Etienne and Nevers, and reached Paris on the 31st of January—11th Pluviôse.

¹ We subjoin some extracts from the correspondence of the First Consul during his stay at Lyons.

To the Consuls Cambacérès and Lebrun.

Lyons, 24th Nivôse, year X.—14th Jan. 1802.

I have received, citizens consuls, your letter of the 31st. The weather is excessively cold here, and I pass the mornings, from noon till six o'clock, in receiving the prefects and the notables of the neighbouring departments. You know perfectly well that at this sort of conferences, one must talk a great deal.

This evening the city of Lyons gives a concert and ball. I am going there in about an hour.

The labours of the *Consulat* are in progress.

The troops of the army of the east are now arriving in great strength at Lyons; I am taking steps to have them clothed; I hope to review them on the 25th.

I continue to be extremely pleased with every thing I see, both with the people of Lyons, and with those of the south of France.

The negotiations at Amiens appear to be getting on.

I congratulate you on the manner in which every thing proceeds under your direction.

Joseph writes to me from Amiens, that Lord Cornwallis told him that the British cabinet has received favourable news about the French army at St. Domingo, and that a spirit of dissension had manifested itself in Toussaint's army.

From the Same.

Lyons, 26th Nivôse, year X.—16th Jan. 1802.

I have received, citizens consuls, your despatches of the 22d and 23d Nivôse. . . . The Lyonese have given us a most magnificent *fête*. Annexed you will find the details, with the songs sung on the occasion.

I am proceeding very slowly in my operations, as I pass the whole of my mornings in giving audience to the deputations of the neighbouring departments.

It is very fine to-day, but very cold.

The improvement in the happiness of the republic, during the last two years is obvious. The population of Lyons has increased during the years VIII. and IX. more than 30,000 souls; and all the manufacturers that I have seen from St. Etienne, Annonay, &c., tell me that their works are in a high state of activity.

All minds seem to be full of energy. Not that which

overturas empires, but that which re-establishes them, and conduces to their prosperity and riches.

I shall, in a few days, review nearly six demi-brigades of the army of the east.

To the Consul Cambacérès.

Lyons, 26th Nivôse, year X.—16th Jan. 1802.

I have just received, citizen consul, a deputation from Bordeaux. It has presented a petition to me, soliciting me to visit their city, which I have promised to do, as soon as their relations with the West Indies and the Isle of France shall be in full activity.

Your letter of the 25th communicates to me the deliberations of the Senate. I beg you particularly to see that the twenty and the sixty unruly members whom we have in the constituted authorities, are every one got rid of. The wish of the nation is, that the government shall not be obstructed in its endeavours to act for the public good, and that the head of Medusa shall no longer show itself, either in our tribunes, or in our assemblies.

Sleyer's conduct on the present occasion completely proves that, having contributed to the destruction of all the several constitutions since '91, he wants now to try his hand against the present. It is very extraordinary that he cannot perceive the folly of it. He ought to burn a wax-candle to Our Lady, for having got out of the scrape so fortunately, and in so unexpected a manner; but the older I grow the more I perceive that each man must fulfil his destiny.

I take it for granted that you have taken the proper measures for demolishing the Châtelet.

If the minister of marine should stand in need of the frigates of the King of Naples, he may make use of them. Indeed, it will be as well to despatch them to America as soon as possible. Every thing can be arranged afterwards with the King of Naples.

The cold is not so great to-day.

General Jourdan, who has arrived to-day from Piedmont, gives me a very satisfactory account of the state of that province.

The proceedings of the *Consulat* are in an advanced state, all their organic laws are being digested.

I have been occupied part of the morning in a conference with the prefects.

I recommend you to see the minister of marine, to ascertain whether the provisions for St. Domingo have been actually sent off.

To the Consuls Cambacérès and Lebrun.

Lyons, 30th Nivôse, year X.—30th Jan. 1802.

I should wish, citizens consuls, the minister of the public treasury to send citizen Roger to the 10th military division, to examine into the accounts of the paymaster, and those of the principal receivers of the departments composing that division.

I also wish the minister of the public treasury to send to Rennes some individual like citizen Roger, to perform the same duty in the 13th military division.

Despatch also the councillors of state, Thibaudau and Fourcroy, one to the 13th military division, and the other to the 16th, to inspect these divisions in the same way as they did on their former mission. One subject of complaint is, that the minister of war has not caused the compensation money, in lieu of forage and lodging, for the first three months of the year X. to be paid over to the officers, that the receivers keep the money a long time, and that the paymasters put off the payment to as late a period as they can. The paymasters and the receivers are the greatest nuisances in the state.

To the Same.

Lyons, 30th Nivôse, year X.—30th Jan. 1802.

I have received, citizens consuls, your letter of the 30th and 27th. At Lyons, as at Paris, the weather has become considerably milder.

Yesterday I visited several factories. I was pleased with the industry, and with the severe economy, which I thought I perceived practised throughout by the manufacturers in the employment of their workmen.

I ought to-day to have held my grand review, but I have postponed it till the 5th Pluviôse; the troops of the army of the east had not yet got their new clothes; I am in hopes that by the 5th, they will be all ready, so that they will present a fine appearance.

I perceive, with much pleasure, the decision you have come to about the Châtelet. If the weather should become severe, I do not think the steps you have taken, of allowing 4000 frs. per month for the extraordinary factories will be sufficient.

Besides the 100,000 frs. which the minister of the interior grants monthly to the committees of *bienfaisance*, it will be necessary for you to add a further sum of 25,000 frs., extraordinary, for the distribution of wood, and if the cold weather returns, it will be necessary, as in '89, to light fires in the churches and other great buildings, to give warmth to a great number of people.

I calculate on being back in Paris in the course of the Decade. I beg you to consider whether it will not be expedient to insert in the *Moniteur* the last message to the Senate, and to add two lines at the bottom, to state that the Senate having appointed a commission, which made its report in the sitting of the . . . it is decided upon to proceed to a renewal of the chamber, in conformity with the XXXVIIIth article of the constitution, &c., &c.

Reports from various quarters lead me to believe that Caparra requires the priests to sign some formula or profession of faith, couched nearly in these words:—

"We rejoice, moreover, in hereby making a solemn profession of filial respect, of complete submission, and perfect obedience to," &c., &c.

This information has reached me, amongst the rest, from Maastricht. I beg you to confer upon the subject with Portalis. This formula appears to me quite inconceivable.

To the Same.

Lyons, 2d Pluviôse, year X.—22d Jan. 1802.

I only received to-day, citizens consuls, your letter of the 20th Nivôse, which reached me about three o'clock in the afternoon. The thaw and the inundations have retarded your courier some hours.

The forage department is entirely disorganized in the department of the Drôme; an amount of 10,000 francs must be set apart out of the ordonnance of Pluviôse, until this branch of the service is placed upon a proper footing.

The civil hospitals, which are allowed only fourteen sous per day for the sick military, complain that they have not yet received anything for the year X. That of Valence even, besides the whole year X., claims an arrear for the month of Fructidor, IX.

The order issued for the organization of the Piedmontese troops, which I signed more than a month ago, has not yet reached Turin, which occasions some degree of perplexity amongst those troops. Generally speaking, there is a good deal of backwardness, and any thing but activity, in the war department: this is the general opinion amongst all who have any thing to do with that department.

It is indispensably requisite that the minister of war should send a good and experienced commissary to Turin. . . .

All the most important arrangements of the *Consulat* are decided upon. I still depend upon reaching Paris in the course of the Decade.

It would be desirable for the Senate to name a dozen prefects either to the Tribune or to the Legislative Body. The prefect of Mont Blanc should be amongst them.

I should wish you to insert in the journals some articles respecting the roguery of Foulhoux, to turn into ridicule the foreign gulls, who spread absurd reports, which had no other foundation than the written bulletin of a rogue in a small way, who was in want of a dinner, and duped them. It would be as well to recur to this subject several times.

To the Same.

Lyons, 6th Pluviôse, year X.—30th Jan. 1802.

I have received, citizens consuls, your letter of the 2d Pluviôse.

I had to-day a grand review on the Place Bellecour. The weather was magnificent. The sun shone as if it were the month of Floréal.

The *Consulat* has appointed a committee of thirty individuals, which has made a report to the effect that, considering the interior and exterior circumstances of the Cisalpine republic, it was indispensable to leave me to perform the duty of the chief magistracy, until circumstances should permit, or I should deem it expedient to appoint a successor. To-morrow I calculate upon presenting myself to the assembled *Consulat*. The constitution will be read, with the list of the appointments, and every thing will be brought to a conclusion. I shall be in Paris on Decadi.

To the Same.

Lyons, 6th Pluviôse, year X.—30th Jan. 1802.

I have received, citizens consuls, your letter of the 2d Pluviôse. I think it will be well to wait till the peace of Amiens is signed, before we raise the state of siege of the city of Brest.

At two o'clock I went to the hall of the sittings of the extraordinary *Consulat*; I delivered a short speech in Italian, of which you will find enclosed a French translation. The constitution was read, the first organic law, and one relating to the clergy. The different nominations were published.

I will send you to-morrow a minute of the whole proceedings of the *Consulat*, in which will be found a copy of the Constitution. The two ministers, four councillors of state, twenty prefects, with the general and superior officers, accompanied me. This sitting exhibited both majesty and unanimity, and I hope that the Congress of Lyons will produce all the results which I anticipated from it.

I think it is useless, unless false reports are circulated about the Congress of Lyons, to publish any thing before the arrival of the courier whom I shall send you to-morrow. Only in case of its being rumoured that the *Consulat* has nominated me president, you can print the two papers enclosed, which will make known the exact turn that matters have taken.

I shall be occupied all day to-morrow in bringing the whole business to a close, and I shall start at night. On Decadi I shall be in Paris. . . .

BOOK XIV.

CONSULATE FOR LIFE.

Arrival of the First Consul in Paris—Scrutiny of the Senate, which excludes sixty Members of the Legislative Body and twenty Members of the Tribunal—The excluded Members succeeded by Men devoted to the Government—End of the Congress of Amiens—Some Difficulties arise at the last Moment of the Negotiation, in consequence of Jealousies excited in England—The First Consul surmounts these Difficulties by his Moderation and his Firmness—The Definitive Peace signed 25th of March, 1802—Although the first Enthusiasm for Peace has subsided in France and in England, they welcome, with renewed Joy, the Hope of a sincere and durable Reconciliation—Extraordinary Session of the Year X., destined to convert into Law, the Concordate, the Treaty of Amiens, and different Projects of high Importance—The Law for regulating Religious Matters added to the Concordate, under the Title of *Organic Articles*—Presentation of this Law and of the Concordate to the new Legislative Body and Tribunal—Coldness with which these two Projects are received, even after the Exclusion of the Oppositionists—They are adopted—The First Consul fixes on Easter Sunday for the Publication of the Concordate, and for the first Ceremony of the Re-established Religion—Organization of the New Clergy—Part assigned to the Constitutionals in the Nomination of Bishops—Cardinal Caprara refuses, in the name of the Holy See, to institute the Constitutionals—Firmness of the First Consul, and submission of Cardinal Caprara—Official Reception of the Cardinal as Legate à latere—Consecration of the four principal Bishops at Notre Dame on Palm Sunday—Curiosity and Emotion of the Public—The very Eve of Easter Day, and of the solemn *Te Deum* which was to be chanted at Notre Dame, Cardinal Caprara wishes to impose on the Constitutionals a humiliating Recantation of their Past Conduct—New Resistance on the part of the First Consul—Cardinal Caprara does not yield until the Night before Easter Day—Repugnance of the Generals to repair to Notre Dame—The First Consul obliges them to it—Solemn *Te Deum* and Official Restoration of Religion—Adherence of the Public, and Joy of the First Consul on seeing the Success of his Efforts—Publication of the *Génie du Christianisme*—Project of a General Amnesty with regard to the Emigrants—This Measure, having been discussed in the Council of State, becomes the Object of a *Sénatus Consultum*—Views of the First Consul on the Organization of Society in France—His Opinions on Social Distinctions, and on the Education of Youth—Two Projects of Law of high Importance, on the Institution of the Legion of Honour, and on Public Instruction—Discussion of these two Projects in a full Council of State—Character of the Discussions of that Great Body—Language of the First Consul—Presentation of the two Projects to the Legislative Body and to the Tribunal—Adoption, by a great Majority, of the Project of Law relative to Public Instruction—A large Minority pronounces against the Project relative to the Legion of Honour—The Treaty of Amiens presented last, as the Crowning Work of the First Consul—Reception given to this Treaty—It affords occasion for saying that a National Reconscience ought to be conferred on the Author of all the Benefits enjoyed by France—The Partisans and Brothers of Bonaparte contemplate the Re-establishment of Monarchy—This Idea appears premature—The Idea of conferring the Consulate for Life prevails generally—The Consul Cambacérés offers his Intervention with the Senate—Disimulation of the First Consul, who will not avow what he is desirous of—Embarrassment of Consul Cambacérés—His Efforts to induce the Senate to confer the Consulate on General Bonaparte for the rest of his Life—The Secret Enemies of the General profit by his Silence to persuade the Senate that a Prolongation of the Consulate for Ten Years should suffice—Vote of the Senate on this Construction—Displeasure of the First Consul—He thinks of refusing—His Colleague, Cambacérés, hinders him from doing so, and proposes, as an Expedient, to appeal to the National Sovereignty, and to put the question to France, to know if General Bonaparte shall be Consul for Life—The Council of State charged to draw up the Question—Opening of Registries to secure Votes in the Mayoralty Offices, the Tribunals, and the Offices of Notaries—Public—Eagerness of all the Citizens to tender their affirmative Votes—Change wrought in the Constitution of M. Sieyès—The First Consul receives the Consulate for Life, with the power of appointing a Successor—The Senate is invested with the Constituent Power—The Lists of Notability abolished, and replaced by electoral Colleges for Life—The Tribunal reduced to be only a Section of the Council of State—The new Constitution becomes completely Monarchical—Civil List of the First Consul—He is proclaimed solemnly by the Senate—General Satisfaction at having founded, at last, a strong and durable Power—The First Consul takes the Name of Napoleon Bonaparte—His Moral Power is at its Culminating Point—*Résumé* of this Period of Three Years.

THE journey of the First Consul to Lyons had had for its object the constitution of the Italian republic, and to secure to himself the government of it, for the advantage of Italy and of France. His object was, also, to embarrass the opposition, and to bring it into discredit by leaving it idle, by proving that good was impossible to be expected while hampered by it; in fine, to give time to the Consul Cambacérés to exclude from the Legislative Body and from the Tribunal the most restless and most troublesome members.

Every wish was realized. The Italian republic constituted with *éclat*, found itself bound to the policy of France without losing its own integrity. The oppositionists in the Tribunal, and in the Legislative Body, struck by the message which withdrew the Civil Code, being left in Paris without a single project of law to discuss, knew not how to extricate themselves from the dilemma. Everywhere it was laid to their charge that they interrupted the best efforts of government: everywhere they were blamed for a petty and unreasonable imitation of the agitators of former days. So situated, M. Cambacérés dealt them the last blow by the ingenious plan that he had conceived. He sent for the able lawyer, Tron-

chet, who had been introduced into the Senate by his influence, and in which body he enjoyed the twofold influence of learning and character. He communicated his plan, and obtained his approval of it. We have seen in the preceding book what that plan was; we have seen that it consisted in the interpretation of Article XXXVIII. of the Constitution, which fixed for the year X. the going out of a first fifth of the Tribunal and of the Legislative Body, and the giving to the Senate the power of designating that fifth. There were many reasons for and against this mode of interpretation of Article XXXVIII.: the best of all was the necessity of affording to the executive power the faculty of dissolution, which had not been made one of its attributes by the Constitution. M. Tronchet, a wise man, a good citizen, admiring, and at the same time fearing the First Consul, but judging him indispensable, and foreseeing with M. Cambacérés that if he were not delivered from the importunate opposition of the Tribunal, he would have recourse to violent measures, even from solicitude to effect the good which they prevented him from doing, M. Tronchet entered into the views of the government, and undertook to prepare the Senate for the adop-

tion of the projected measures. He succeeded in it without difficulty, for the Senate felt that it had been rendered an accomplice and a dupe of the ill humour of the oppositionists. That body had already receded with great haste and little dignity in the affair of the elections. Swayed by that love of repose and of power which had taken possession of every body, it consented to remove the oppositionists whose projects it had at first seconded. The plan having been favourably received by the principal personages of the body, Lacépède, La Place, Jacqueminot, and others, they proceeded without delay to its execution by a message dated January 7, 1802—17th Nivôse, year X.

"Senators," said the message, "Article XXXVIII of the Constitution ordains that the renewal of the first fifth of the Legislative Body and of the Tribunal should take place within the year X, and we are close on the fourth month of that year. The consuls have thought it their duty to call your attention to this circumstance. Your wisdom will find in it the necessity of taking into consideration without delay the operations which must precede this renewal."

This message, the intention of which it was easy to guess, struck with surprise the oppositionists of both legislative assemblies, and naturally excited in them the most vehement irritation. From thoughtlessness, from impulse, they had run headlong in that career of opposition, without foreseeing the issue of it, and they were strangely surprised by the blow which threatened them, a blow which would have been more severe, but for the intervention of M. Cambacérès. They assembled to draw up a memorial and present it to the Senate. M. Cambacérès, who was personally acquainted with almost all of them, addressed himself to the least compromised. He represented to them that, in further signaling themselves by their resistance, they would draw upon them, individually, the attention of the Senate, and the exercise of the power of exclusion with which that body was about to be invested. This observation quieted the greater number of them, and they awaited in silence the decision of that supreme authority. In the sittings of the 15th and 18th of January—25th and 28th Nivôse—the Senate resolved the question arising out of the message of the consuls. By a very great majority, it decided that the renewal of the first fifth, in the two legislative assemblies, should take place immediately, and that the designation of that fifth should be made by ballot and not by lot. But a modification of form was adopted, and instead of balloting for those who were to go out, it was decided that the ballot should designate those who were to stay in. Hence the measure had the appearance of a preference, in place of having that of an exclusion. By means of this slight softening down of form, they proceeded, without delay, to the designation of the 240 members of the Legislative Body, and of the eighty members of the Tribunal, destined to continue in the legislature. The senators most immediately under the influence of the govern-

ment were intrusted with the secret of the members to be saved from exclusion, and at the close of January—the end of Nivôse and commencement of Pluviôse—the ballots of the Senate, followed up without intermission effected the separation of the partisans from the opposers of government. Sixty members of the Legislative Body, who had shown most resistance to the projects of the First Consul, particularly to the project of the re-establishment of religion, and twenty of the most active members of the Tribunal, were struck off by exclusion, or, in the language of the day, by elimination. The leading men amongst the twenty, were Messrs. Chénier, Ginguéné, Chazal, Bailleul, Courtois, Ganilh, Daunou, and Benjamin Constant. The remainder, less known, men of letters or of business, former conventionalists, former priests, had no other claim to admission into the Tribunal than the friendship of M. Sieyès and his party; the same claim was the cause of their exclusion.

Such was the end, not of the Tribunal which continued in existence some time longer, but of the momentary importance which this body had acquired. It might have been desirable that the First Consul, so full of glory, so indemnified by the universal adherence of France for an unseemly opposition, could have made up his mind to bear with a few impotent detractors. This resignation would have been more worthy, and also less hurtful to the species of liberty which he would have been able to leave us at the time, in order to prepare for us at a later period a genuine liberty. But in this world wisdom is more rare than ability, more rare even than genius: for, wisdom implies a victory over one's own passions, a victory of which great men are not more capable than little men. The First Consul, it must be acknowledged, wanted wisdom on this occasion, and one single excuse can alone be made in his favour; it is, that such an opposition, emboldened by his patience, would have become, perhaps, more than inconvenient, ay, dangerous, and even insurmountable, if the majority of the Legislative Body and of the Senate had at last taken part in it, which was possible. This excuse had some foundation, and it proves that there are times in which dictatorship is necessary, even in countries which are free, or are destined to be free.

As to this opposition of the Tribunal, it has not merited the eulogies which have so often been awarded to it. Inconsistent and shuffling, it resisted the Civil Code, the re-establishment of religion, in fine, the best acts of the First Consul, and looked on, in silence, at the proscription of the unfortunate revolutionists, who had been unjustly transported on account of that infernal machine, of which they were not the originators. The tribunes had held their tongues at that time, because the terrible explosion of the 3d Nivôse had stunned them with terror, and they dared not defend the principles of justice, in the persons of men the greater number of whom were stained with blood. The courage which they lacked for blaming a flagrant illegality, they sadly found for impeding excellent measures. If, however, a sincere sentiment of liberty in

spired many among them, in others there could be seen that vexatious spirit of envy, which animated the Tribunal against the Council of State, the men reduced to do-nothings against those who had the power to do every thing. They committed, then, serious faults, and unhappily provoked not less serious ones on the part of the First Consul: deplorable concatenation, which history so often observes in our agitated world, the passions of which are invariably the moving principle.

It was necessary to find successors for the excluded fifth in the Legislative Body and the Tribunal. The majority, who had pronounced the exclusion, pronounced the new admissions, and did it in the most satisfactory manner for the consular government. They made use, for the new elections, of the lists of notability invented by M. Sieyès as a principal basis of the Constitution. Notwithstanding the efforts of the Council of State to find out a suitable manner of forming these lists, not one of the systems devised had remedied the inconvenience of the principle. The lists were slow and difficult of formation, because the citizens were not zealous about them, for they saw in this vast presentation of candidates, no direct and immediate means of influencing the composition of the chief authorities. They were in reality only a method of saving appearances, and of dissembling the necessity, at the time inevitable, of the composition of the great bodies of the state by themselves; for every election turned out badly, that is to say, went to extremes. There had been the greatest difficulty in completing these lists, and, out of 102 departments then existing, two of which, those of Corsica, were out of the pale of the law, four, those of the left bank of the Rhine, not organized, and eighty-three only had sent in their lists. It was agreed that the selections should be made from the lists sent in, with a reservation of indemnity, by after selections, to the departments which had not yet executed the law.

There were called to the Legislative Body a large number of those great proprietors, whom the new security which they were enabled to enjoy induced to abandon the retirement in which they had hitherto sought to live. There were also called to it some prefects, some magistrates, who, for three years past, had been in training to the practice of business affairs under the direction of the consular government. Amongst the personages introduced to the Tribunal was Lucien Bonaparte, who had returned from Spain, after an embassy more agitated than useful; and who affected to desire nothing more than a quiet life employed in serving his brother in one of the great bodies of the state. Along with him had been introduced Carnot, who had lately been in the ministry of war, where he had not succeeded in pleasing the First Consul. Carnot was not more favourable to the consular government than the recently excluded tribunes; but he was a grave personage, universally respected, whose opposition would not be very active, and whom the Revolution could not have laid aside without hateful ingratitude. This nomination was, in other words, a last homage to

liberty. Next to these two names, the most notable was that of M. Daru, an able and upright administrator, a man of a discreet and cultivated understanding.

Whilst these operations were in progress, the First Consul had returned to Paris, after an absence of twenty-four days. He arrived on the evening of the 31st of January—11th Pluviôse. In every quarter there was submission, and that singular movement of resistance, which was seen not long before in both legislative assemblies, was now completely appeased. The new authority with which the First Consul had been invested, had itself acted on the public mind. Assuredly it was not much for the power of the First Consul to have the Italian republic added to that French republic which had conquered and disarmed the world; but that example of deference given to the genius of General Bonaparte by an allied people had produced a great effect. The bodies of the state all came eagerly to offer him their congratulations, and to address to him speeches in which, along with the loftiness of language that he ordinarily inspired, was to be found a marked tone of respect. It seemed as if one saw already, on that domineering brow, the double crown of France and of Italy.

He had all power now, both for the organization of France, which was his first object, and for his personal aggrandizement, which was his second. He had no longer to apprehend that the Codes which he had caused to be drawn up, and which he caused to be again revised, nor that the arrangements concluded with the Pope for the restoration of the altars, would be thwarted by the ill-will or the prejudices of the great bodies of the state. These were not the only projects that he contemplated. For some months, he had been preparing a vast system of public instruction, to mould the youth of France to the system which had sprung from the Revolution. He was projecting a plan of national rewards, which, under a military form, suitable to the time and to the warlike imagination of the French, might also serve to remunerate great civil actions as well as great military actions: this was the Legion of Honour, a noble institution, long meditated in private, and certainly not the least difficult of the works which the First Consul wished to render agreeable to republican France. He wished also to close one of the deepest wounds of the Revolution—emigration. Many Frenchmen were still living in foreign countries, nursing the bad feelings which exile imparts, deprived of their families, their fortune, and their country. With the project of effacing the traces of our deep discords, and of preserving all the good that attended the Revolution, of separating from it all the evil mixed up with it, emigration was one of its results which could not be allowed to subsist. But, on account of those who had acquired national property, persons ever susceptible and distrustful, it was one of the most difficult acts, and one which required most courage. Yet the time was at hand when such an act was likely to become possible. In fine, if, as it was said on all sides at that

period, it was requisite to consolidate power in the hands of the man who had exercised it in a manner so admirable: if it were requisite to give his authority a new, a more elevated, a more lasting character than that of a temporary magistracy of ten years, three of which had already passed away, the moment had already arrived; for the public prosperity, the fruit of order, victory, and peace, was at its height; it was felt, at that instant, with a fervency which time might damp, but could not increase.

Meanwhile, these projects for the public weal and for personal aggrandizement, which he fostered together, needed, for their accomplishment, one last act, namely, the definitive conclusion of the maritime peace, which was negotiating at the congress of Amiens. The preliminaries of London had laid down the basis of this peace; but, as long as these preliminaries were not converted into a definitive treaty, the alarmists, interested in disturbing public repose, did not fail to say every week that the negotiation was broken off, and that the country would soon be replunged into a maritime war, and by a maritime war into a continental war. Wherefore, immediately on his return to Paris, the First Consul imparted new activity to the negotiations at Amiens. "Sign," he wrote day after day to Joseph, "for, after the preliminaries, there is no other serious question to discuss." This was true. The preliminaries of London had resolved the only important questions, in stipulating the restitution of all the maritime conquests of the English, excepting Ceylon and Trinidad, which the Dutch and Spaniards were to sacrifice. The English had, to be sure, demanded of the congress of Amiens the little island of Tobago; but the First Consul had firmly resisted this, and they had renounced it. Hence, there was no other controversy, but relative to points altogether accessory, such as the support of prisoners, and the form of government to be given to Malta.

We have, in a preceding chapter, explained the difficulty with regard to prisoners. It was a mere question of money, always easy to be resolved. The form of government to be given to Malta presented a more real difficulty, for a reciprocal distrust complicated the views of the two powers. The First Consul, by a singular presentiment, wished to demolish the fortifications of the island, to reduce it to a rock, and to make of it a neutral lazaretto open to all nations. The English, who looked at Malta as a stepping-stone by which to reach Egypt, said that the rock of itself was too important to leave it always accessible to the French, who from Italy might pass into Sicily, from Sicily into Malta. They proposed the re-establishment of the Order on its ancient basis, with the creation of an English tongue and a Maltese tongue, the latter composed of the inhabitants of the island, who were devoted to them. The First Consul had not admitted these conditions; for, in the state of manners in France, there could be no hope of creating a French tongue numerous enough to counterbalance the creation of an English tongue. Finally, this point was settled. The Order was to be re-established without there being

any new tongue. A different Grand Master was to be named, for M. de Hompesch, who, in 1789, had delivered up Malta to General Bonaparte, was not to be thought of. Awaiting the re-organization of the Order, it was decided that the King of Naples should be asked to furnish a Neapolitan garrison of 2000 men, who were to be stationed in the island on its evacuation by the English. By way of additional precaution, it was desired that some great power should guarantee this arrangement, to preserve Malta from any attacks like those which, for the last five years, had made it fall at one time under the power of the French, at another under that of the English. There were thoughts of making application to Russia to furnish that guarantee, grounding it on the kindness which that power had shown for the Order under Paul I. All these points were settled at the time of the departure of the First Consul for Lyons. The fisheries, re-established on their former footing; the territorial indemnity promised in Germany to the House of Orange, for the loss of the stadholdership; the peace and integrity of territory secured, whether to Portugal or Turkey, presented only resolved questions. However, since the return of the First Consul to Paris, the negotiations appeared languid, and Lord Cornwallis seemed to retreat in disquietude, as the French negotiator advanced with new steps towards him. Lord Cornwallis could not be suspected, good and estimable soldier as he was, who wished only for an amicable termination of the difficulties of the negotiation, and to add to his military services the performance of a great civil service, that of giving peace to his native land. But his instructions had suddenly become more rigorous, and the pain that he felt on this account was plainly depicted in his face. His cabinet had enjoined him, in fact, to be more particular, more vigilant in the wording of the treaty, and had imposed on him conditions of detail, which it was difficult for him to reconcile with the haughty and distrustful humour of the First Consul. This brave officer, who had hoped to crown his career by a memorable act, had reason to fear that he should see his old renown tarnished by the part he was about to be compelled to play, in a negotiation shamefully broken off. In his vexation he unbosomed himself freely to Joseph Bonaparte, and joined with him in making sincere efforts to overcome the obstacles opposed to the conclusion of peace.

It will be asked, what motive could have destroyed all at once, or, at least, cooled the pacific dispositions of the cabinet over which Mr. Addington presided? That motive is easy to be understood. The administration had taken a different tack, no uncommon thing in free countries. The preliminaries had been signed six months, and, in this intermediate state, which, excepting the absence of cannonading, was very like war, few benefits had been conferred by the peace. The leading merchants, who, in England, were the class most interested in the resumption of hostilities, because war afforded them a universal monopoly, had hoped to indemnify themselves

for what they were losing, by making numerous shipments to the ports of France. There, they found prohibitory regulations which had originated during a violent contest, and which there had not been time to soften down. The people, who were hoping for a fall in the price of provisions, had not hitherto seen their hopes realized; for a definitive treaty was necessary to overcome the speculators, who kept the prices of corn still very high. Finally, the great landed proprietors, who wished for a reduction of all imposts, and the middle classes, who were demanding the repeal of the income-tax, had not yet reaped any of the fruits promised by the pacification of the world. A little disenchantment had then succeeded that unparalleled infatuation for peace, which, six months previously, had suddenly seized on the English people—a people just as subject to infatuation as the French. But, more than all the rest, the scenes at Lyons had acted on its jealous fancy. That taking possession of Italy, made so manifest, had appeared for France and for her chief something so great, that British jealousy had been warmly excited by it. It was an additional argument for the war party, who already were not backward in saying that France was growing greater and greater, and England less and less in proportion. A recent and far-spread piece of news likewise acted on their minds; it was that of a considerable acquisition made by the French in America. Tuscany had been seen given away, under the title of kingdom of Etruria, to an Infante, without the price of that gift, paid by Spain, having been made known. Now that the First Consul claimed, at Madrid, the cession of Louisiana, which was the stipulated equivalent for Tuscany, this condition of the treaty became divulged; and that fact, joined to the St. Domingo expedition, revealed new and vast projects in America. To all this was added that a considerable port was acquired by France in the Mediterranean, namely, that of the isle of Elba, in exchange for the duchy of Piombino.

These different reports, spread at once, whilst the *Consultum* assembled at Lyons was decreeing to General Bonaparte the government of Italy, gave some strength to the war party in London, which had been previously obliged to shroud itself in extreme reserve, and to hail, at least with hypocritical homage, the re-establishment of peace.

Mr. Pitt, who had retired from the cabinet the year before, but who was still more powerful in his retirement than were his upright and weak successors in their plenitude of power, was silent on the preliminaries. He had said nothing about the conditions, but he had approved of the fact of the peace itself. His former colleagues, very inferior to him and consequently less moderate, Messrs. Wyndham, Dundas, Grenville, had blamed the weakness of the Addington cabinet, and found the conditions of the preliminaries disadvantageous to Great Britain. On learning the departure of a fleet conveying 20,000 men to St. Domingo, they had exclaimed against the stupidity of Mr. Addington, who had allowed a squadron to pass which was destined to re-establish the

French power in the Antilles, without having first secured a definitive peace. They predicted that he would be the victim of his imprudent confidence. With the news of the events at Lyons, of the cession of Louisiana, of the acquisition of the Isle of Elba, they exclaimed still more loudly, and Lord Carlisle had made a violent attack upon the gigantic ambition of France, and upon the weakness of the new British cabinet.

Mr. Pitt continued silent, thinking that it was necessary to allow this fondness for peace with which the London multitude seemed to be smitten, to exhaust itself, and that it was becoming to protect, for some time longer, the cabinet destined to satisfy a taste probably transient. The English cabinet itself appeared moved by the effect produced on public opinion; but it feared much more what would be said, if the peace were broken off as soon as entered on, and if a treaty in form were not to take the place of the preliminaries. It confined itself then to despatching some armed vessels, which had been prematurely called into harbour, and sending them to the Antilles to watch the French fleet which had sailed for St. Domingo. It sent instructions to Lord Cornwallis which, without changing the groundwork of things, aggravated certain conditions, and overloaded the definitive treaty with precautions either useless, or disagreeable to the dignity of the French government. Lord Hawkesbury wished for the precise stipulation of a sum of money to be paid to England for the number of prisoners which she had had to support; he wished that Holland should pay the House of Orange an indemnity in money, independently of the indemnity of territory promised in Germany; he wished it to be formally stipulated, that the former Grand Master should not be reinstated as the head of the order of Malta. He would above all have desired to make a Turkish plenipotentiary figure at the congress of Amiens; for, ever filled with the remembrance of Egypt, the British cabinet clung to their intention of curbing the daring of the First Consul in the East. In fine, he wished for an instrument which might give Portugal the means of escaping the stipulations of the treaty of Badajoz, stipulations, in virtue of which the court of Lisbon had lost Olivença in Europe and a certain tract of territory in America.

Such were the instructions sent to Lord Cornwallis. However, there was one proposition which was reserved to be directly made by Lord Hawkesbury to M. Otto. That proposition was relative to Italy. "We see," said Lord Hawkesbury to M. Otto, "that there is nothing to be got from the First Consul, so far as Piedmont is concerned. To ask any thing on that score would be desiring impossibilities. But let the First Consul concede to the King of Sardinia the smallest territorial indemnity, in whatever corner of Italy it may be, and, in exchange for that concession, we will instantly recognise all that France has done in that country. We will recognise the kingdom of Etruria, the Italian republic, and the Ligurian republic."

The changes demanded, whether by Lord

Cornwallis or by Lord Hawkesbury, consisting rather in the form than in the groundwork, were not much at variance either with the power or the pride of France. Peace was too fine a thing in itself not to accept it in the way proposed. But the First Consul, unable to discover whether these new demands were merely a precaution of the English cabinet, with the intention of rendering the treaty more presentable to parliament, or, whether in fact this backing out from points already conceded, accompanied with maritime armaments, concealed a secret intention of breaking off, acted, as he always did, by proceeding direct for the mark. He conceded what, as it seemed to him, ought to be conceded, and decidedly refused the remainder. Relative to the prisoners, he repelled the precise stipulation of a sum of money to be paid to England, but agreed to the formation of a commission which was to regulate the account of expenses, still considering German or other soldiers who had been in the English service English prisoners. He insisted that Holland should not give a single florin to the stadtholder. He agreed to the nomination of a new Grand Master of Malta, but without any expression applicable to M. de Hompesch, or from which it might be inferred that France allowed the abandonment of those who had done her service to be imposed on her. He wished that the guarantee of Malta, proposed to Russia, should be asked also of Austria, Prussia, and Spain. In fine, without admitting a Turkish or Portuguese plenipotentiary, he consented to the insertion of an article in which the integrity of the Turkish territory, and that of the Portuguese territory, should be formally guaranteed.

As to the recognition of the Italian republic, of the Ligurian republic, and of the kingdom of Etruria, he declared that he would do without it, and that he would not purchase it by making any concession to the King of Piedmont, whose dominions he was resolved henceforth to keep definitively.

After having sent these answers to his brother Joseph, with a sufficient liberty of settling their form, he recommended him to act with great prudence, in order to have a proof that the refusal of signing the peace came not from him but from England. He caused it to be intimated, moreover, both in London and at Amiens, that if the English ministers were not willing to accept what he proposed, they ought to put an end to the matter, and that he would instantly re-arm the former flotilla at Boulogne, and form a camp opposite to the coast of England.

The rupture was not more desired in London than in Paris, or at Amiens. The English cabinet was sensible that it would be exposed to ridicule if the truce of six months, the consequence of the preliminaries, had served only to open the seas to the French fleets. Lord Cornwallis, who knew that the English legation would be unjustifiable, for it was that alone which had raised the last difficulties, was very conciliating in the terms of the treaty. Joseph Bonaparte was not less so, and in the evening of the 25th of March, 1802—4th Germinal, year X.—the peace with Great Britain

was signed, on an instrument overloaded with corrections of every sort.

Thirty-six hours were taken up in translating the treaty into as many languages as there were powers interested. On the 26th of March—6th Germinal—the plenipotentiaries assembled at the hôtel de ville. The First Consul had wished that every thing should be transacted with the greatest parade. Long before, he had sent off for Amiens a detachment of his finest troops, newly clothed; he had had the roads from Amiens to Calais, and from Amiens to Paris, repaired; and had sent relief to the labourers of the country out of work, that nothing might excite in the English negotiator an unfavourable idea of France. He had given orders for preparations in the town of Amiens itself, in order that the signature should be given with a sort of solemnity. On the 27th, at eleven o'clock in the morning, detachments of cavalry went to the abodes of the plenipotentiaries, and escorted them to the hôtel de ville, where a hall had been prepared to receive them. It took them some time to look over the copies of the treaty, and, at length, about two o'clock, admittance was given to the authorities and the crowd, eager to be present at the imposing ceremony of the two first nations of the universe becoming reconciled, before the face of the world; becoming reconciled, alas! for how short a time! The two plenipotentiaries signed the peace, and then cordially embraced each other, amidst the acclamations of the bystanders, who, full of emotion, were transported with joy. Lord Cornwallis and Joseph Bonaparte were reconducted to their residences, amidst the most boisterous acclamations of the multitude. Lord Cornwallis heard blessings pronounced on his name by the French people, and Joseph went home, hearing on all sides the cry which was to be for a long time, and which might, by possibility, have been still, the cry of France, "*Vive Bonaparte!*"

Lord Cornwallis set out immediately for London, notwithstanding the invitation he had received to go to Paris. He feared that the facilities in the drawing up of the treaty to which he had lent himself might not be approved by his government, and he wished to secure the ratification of the treaty by his presence.

The successful issue of the congress at Amiens, if it did not excite among the English people the same transports of enthusiasm as the signing of the preliminaries, yet found them joyous and cheery. This time they were told that they were going to enjoy the reality of peace, provisions at a low price, and the abolition of the income tax. They believed it, and showed themselves truly satisfied.

The effect was nearly the same on our side. Fewer external demonstrations, but not less internal satisfaction—such was the spectacle presented by the people of France. In fine, it was felt that the real peace, that of the seas was obtained, as a certain and necessary condition of the continental peace. After ten years of the most violent, the most terrible, struggle that had ever been seen among men, they laid down arms; the temple of Janus was shut.

By whom had all this been accomplished?

Who had rendered France so great and so prosperous—Europe so calm! One single man, by the might of his sword, and by the depth of his policy. France proclaimed this, and entire Europe re-echoed her proclamation. He has since conquered at Austerlitz, at Jena, at Friedland, at Wagram; he has conquered in a hundred battles; has dazzled, startled, subdued the world; but never was he so great, for never was he so wise!

All the bodies of the state, too, came anew to tell him, in harangues full of sincere enthusiasm, that he had been the conqueror, that now he was the benefactor, of Europe. The young author of so much good, the possessor of so much glory, was far from thinking himself at the end of his task; he hardly enjoyed what he had done, so impatient was he to do more. Devoted at the time to the labours of peace, without being very sure that peace would be of long duration, he was anxious to complete what he called the organization of France, and to reconcile what was true and good in the Revolution with what was useful and necessary to all times in the old monarchy. The matters he now had most at heart were the restoration of the Catholic religion, the organization of public education, the recall of the emigrants, and the institution of the Legion of Honour. These were not the only things that he contemplated; but they were, according to him, the most urgent. Master, henceforth, of the opinions in the bodies of the state, he made use of the prerogatives of the Constitution to command an extraordinary session. He had returned on the 31st of January, 1802—11th Pluviôse—from the *Consultum* held at Lyons; the treaty of Amiens had been signed on the 25th of March—4th Germinal;—the promotions to the Legislative Body and to the Tribunal were finished several weeks before, and the newly-elected members had repaired to their posts: he convoked, therefore, an extraordinary session for the 6th of April—15th Germinal. It was to last to the 20th of May—30th Floreal—that is to say, one month and a half. This was sufficient for his plans, however great they might be; for the contradiction which he was henceforth liable to meet with, could not cause him the loss of much time.

The first of the projects submitted to the Legislative Body, was the Concordate. It was still the most difficult of the new projects to get adopted, if not by the popular masses, at least by the men, civil and military, who surrounded the government. The Holy See, which had been so slow in conceding, at one time, the very principle of the Concordate; at another time, the bull regarding the new bishoprics; at another, the faculty of instituting the new bishops, had long ago sent all to Cardinal Caprara, that he might be prepared to exhibit the powers of the Holy See, whenever the First Consul should think it opportune. The First Consul had thought, and justly too, that the proclamation of the definitive peace was the moment, when, under favour of the public joy, the spectacle of the republican government prostrated at the foot of the altars, and thanking God for the benefits that it had received from Him, might be exhibited for the first time.

He prepared every thing, therefore, for dedicating Easter Sunday to the performance of this great solemnity. But the fifteen days preceding this grand ceremony were neither the least critical nor the least laborious. It was necessary, in the first place, besides the treaty called the Concordate, and which, by the name of treaty, was to be voted by the Legislative Body, it was necessary to draw up and present a law, which should regulate the police of worship, agreeably to the principles of the Concordate and of the Gallican church. It was necessary to appoint the new clergy destined to replace the former bishops, whose resignation had been demanded by the Pope, and almost universally obtained. There were sixty sees to be filled up at once, by selecting, from priests of all parties, respectable subjects; taking care not to give offence to religious sentiments by those selections, or to rekindle schism through excess of the same zeal that was used for its extinction.

These were difficulties which the tenacity, enveloped in mildness, of Cardinal Caprara, and which the passions of the clergy, as great as those of other men, rendered very serious and even disquieting, up to the last instant, up to the very eve of the day on which the grand act of the re-establishment of the altars was consummated.

The First Consul began with the law destined to regulate the police of worship. It is that which in our Codes bears the title of Organic Articles. It was very voluminous, and regulated the relations of government with all religions, whether Catholic, Protestant, or Hebrew. It rested on the principle of religious liberty, granting to all religions security and protection, imposing on them mutual respect and toleration towards each other, with submission to the government. As to the Catholic religion, that which embraces almost the whole of the population of our country, it was regulated after the principles of the Roman church, consecrated in the Concordate, and the principles of the Gallican church, proclaimed by Bossuet. First of all, it was established that no bull, brief, or writing whatsoever of the Holy See, could be published in France without the authority of government; that no delegate from Rome, excepting him whom she sent publicly as her official representative, should be admitted, recognised, or tolerated; which cleared the country of those secret mandatories whom the Holy See employed to govern the French church clandestinely during the Revolution. Every infraction whatsoever of the rules resulting, whether from treaties with the Holy See, or from the French laws committed by a member of the clergy, was styled an *abuse*, and referred to the jurisdiction of the Council of State, a political and administrative body, animated by the true spirit of government, and which could not feel for the clergy the old hatred which the magistracy had vowed against it under the ancient monarchy. No council, general or particular, could be held in France without a formal permission from the government. There was to be one catechism alone, approved by public authority. Every ecclesiastic devoted to the instruction of the clergy,

was to profess the declaration of 1682, known by the title of *Propositions de Bossuet*. These propositions, as everybody knows, contain those beautiful principles of submission and independence which particularly characterize the Gallican church: she, ever submissive to Catholic unity, has made it triumphant in France, and has defended it in Europe; but, independent in her internal government, and faithful to her sovereign, she has never ended in Protestantism, like the churches of England or of Germany, or in the Inquisition, like the church of Spain. Submission to the head of the universal church in spirituals, submission to the head of the state in temporals, such is the double principle on which the First Consul wished that the French church should remain established. Wherefore, he exacted formally that the clergy should be instructed in the propositions of Bossuet.

It was settled, of course, in the organic articles, that the bishops nominated by the First Consul, and instituted by the Pope, should select the curés, but, before they installed them, they should be obliged to submit them to the approval of government. Permission was granted to the bishops to form chapters of canons in the cathedrals and seminaries of the dioceses. All the appointments of professors in these seminaries were to be approved of by the public authorities. No pupil of these seminaries could be ordained priest before the age of twenty-five, unless he brought forward proof of his having property to the amount of 300 francs annual income (12*l.*), unless he were approved of by the administration of worship. This condition of property it was found impossible to carry out; but it would have been desirable had it been practicable, for the spirit of the clergy would have sunk less than we have seen it do since. The archbishops were to receive a salary of 15,000 francs (600*l.*), the bishops 10,000 francs (400*l.*) First class curés were to receive 1500 francs (60*l.*), those of the second 1000 francs (40*l.*), but without the addition of ecclesiastical pensions, which many priests enjoyed in compensation for alienated ecclesiastical property. The fees, that is to say, the voluntary contributions of the faithful for the administration of certain sacraments, were reserved, on condition of a regulation to be made by the bishops. For the rest, it was stipulated that all the consolations of religion should be administered gratuitously. The churches were restored to the new clergy. The presbyteries and the gardens belonging to them, or what is called among the rural population the *curés' houses*, were to be the only portions of former church property restored to the priests; on the understanding that this did not form a precedent in regard to the church property which had been sold. The use of bells was re-established for calling the faithful to church; but with a prohibition of their being used for any civil use, unless by permission from the proper authority. The sinister remembrance of the tocsin had caused the adoption of this precaution. No holiday, except Sunday, could be established, unless authorized

by government. Worship was not to be performed externally, that is, outside the temples, in towns where temples existed belonging to different religions. Finally, the Gregorian calendar was made partly to correspond with the calendar of the republic. This was certainly the most serious of the difficulties. The calendar which recalled more than any other institution the memory of the Revolution, and which had been adapted to the new system of weights and measures, could not be abolished. But neither was it possible to re-establish the Catholic religion without re-establishing the Sunday, and with the Sunday the week. In other respects morals had already done what the law had not yet dared to do, and the Sunday was become again a religious holiday, more or less observed, but universally admitted as an interruption of the labour of the week. The First Consul adopted a middle term. He decided that the year and the month should be named as in the republican calendar, and the day and the week as in the Gregorian calendar; one should say, for instance, for Easter day, Sunday 28th Germinal, year X., which corresponded with the 18th of April, 1802. Lastly, he required, that no person should be married in church without the previous production of the act of civil marriage, and, as to the registries of births, deaths, and marriages, which the priests had continued to keep from habit, he caused it to be declared, that these registries should never be of any value in courts of justice. Finally, every testamentary, or other donation made to the clergy was to be constituted into a general fund.

Such is in substance the wise and profound law which bears the name of *Organic articles*. It was for the French government quite an internal act, which regarded itself alone, and which by that title was not to be submitted to the Holy See. It sufficed that it contained nothing contrary to the Concordate, so that the court of Rome might have no reasonable ground of complaint. To submit it to her was to prepare interminable difficulties, difficulties greater, more numerous than those which the Concordate itself had met with. The First Consul took care not to expose himself to this. He knew that when once religion was publicly established, the Holy See would not break the new peace entered into between France and Rome, for articles which concerned the internal police of the republic. It is true that, at a later period, these articles became one of the causes of complaint against Napoleon, but they were a pretext rather than a real grievance. They had been, besides, communicated to Cardinal Caprara, who did not appear at all shocked at reading them,¹ if we are to judge of him by what he wrote to his court. He made some reservations, and advised the holy father not to be grieved at them, hoping, he said, that these articles would not be executed rigorously.

The law of the organic articles having been drawn up and discussed in the Council of State, it became necessary to direct attention to the clerical appointments. This was a considerable labour, for there was a multitude of se-

¹ It was not abolished till February, 1810.

² These assertions are founded on the correspondence itself of Cardinal Caprara.

lections to be examined closely before deciding on them definitively. M. Portalis, whom the First Consul had charged with the administration of religion, and who was eminently fit either to treat with the clergy, or to represent them in the bodies of the state, and to defend them with an eloquence which was mild, brilliant, and tempered with a certain religious unction; M. Portalis usually resisted the Holy See with respectful firmness. On this occasion he had become in some measure the ally of Cardinal Caprara, in a demand of the court of Rome; namely, that of completely excluding the constitutional clergy from the new sees. The Pope, still affected by an act so exorbitant in his eyes as the deposition of the former bishops, wished, at least, to indemnify himself for it, by keeping out of the episcopacy the ministers of religion who had formed a compact with the French Revolution, and taken an oath to the civil Constitution. Since the signing of the Concordate, that is to say, about eight or nine months, Cardinal Caprara, who was filling, incognito, the office of legate *à latere*, and who saw the First Consul every day, insinuated to him mildly, but with firmness, the desires of the Romish church, advancing more boldly when the Consul was in a humour to let him speak, retiring precipitately and with humility when he was of a contrary humour. These desires of the Romish church did not consist solely in excluding from the composition of the new order of French clergy the priests whom she called *intruders*, but to recover the lost provinces, Bologna, Ferrara, and Romagna. "The holy father," said the cardinal, "is very poor since he has been stripped of these his most fertile provinces; he is so poor that he is unable to pay troops to guard him, or to pay the administration of his states or the Sacred College. He has lost even part of his foreign revenues. In the midst of his grievances, the re-establishment of religion in France is the greatest of his consolations; but do not mingle bitterness with this balm, by obliging him to institute priests who have apostatized—by depriving the faithful clergy of the places already so much reduced by the new limitation." "Yes," replied the First Consul, "the holy father is poor; I will assist him. All the boundaries of the states in Italy are not irrevocably fixed; those of Europe itself are not definitively agreed on. But I cannot now take away provinces from the Italian republic, which has just chosen me for its chief. Meanwhile, the holy father is in want of more money than he has. He requires some millions, and I am ready to give them to him. As to the intruders," added he, "that is another affair. The Pope has promised, when once the resignations were sent in, to reconcile with the church, without any distinction, all those who should submit to the Concordate. This he has promised, and he must keep his word; I shall remind him of it, and he is neither a man nor a pontiff if he fail in it. Besides, my mission is not to make one party or another triumph; my mission is to reconcile them one to the other by holding the balance equally between them. For some time past, you have compelled me to read the history of the church.

I have there seen that religious quarrels occur in no wise differently from political ones; for you priests, and we soldiers, or magistrates, we are all of us men. They end only by the intervention of an authority strong enough to oblige the parties to be reconciled to each other and to amalgamate. I will, therefore, mix some constitutional bishops with the bishops that you call faithful; I will choose them well; I will choose few, but there shall be some of them. You will reconcile them with the Roman church; I will compel them to be obedient to the Concordate, and all will go well. However, it is a thing resolved on—don't return to it again." The *Gazetier* Consul, as the cardinal used to call him, if pressed, took fire immediately; and the cardinal desisted, for he equally admired, loved, and feared him, and said to the holy father, "Let us not irritate this man! He alone sustains us in this country, where every one is against us; for if, unfortunately, he were to die, there would be no longer a religion in France." The cardinal, though he had not succeeded, tried, nevertheless, to appear satisfied; for General Bonaparte loved to see people content, and was vexed when any one appeared before him with a doleful look. The cardinal then showed himself always mild and serene, and by this means had found out the art of pleasing him. He saw, besides, the troubles that annoyed General Bonaparte, and he did not wish to add to them. The general, in his turn, tried to explain to the cardinal the susceptibilities, the jealousies of the French mind; and, notwithstanding his power, he made as many efforts to convince him as the cardinal could make on his side to bring him to his views. One day, impatient at the entreaties of the legate, he imposed silence on him by these words, at once gracious and profound. "Hold!" said he, "Cardinal Caprara, do you still possess the power of working miracles? Do you possess it? If you do, employ it, for you will render me a great service. If you have it not, leave me to myself; and, since I am reduced to human means, permit me to make use of them as I know how to save the church."

A curious and striking picture, preserved entire in the correspondence of Cardinal Caprara, is that of this powerful warrior displaying by turns a finesse, a grace, an extraordinary vehemence, to persuade the old cardinal, theologian, and diplomatist. Both were thus arrived at the moment of the publication of the Concordate, without either having been able to convince the other. M. de Portalis, who, on this point only, was of the opinion of the Holy See, dared not, as he wished to do at first, completely exclude the constitutionalists from his propositions for the filling of the sixty sees, but he presented only two of them. Having had an understanding with the Abbé Bernier for the selections to be made among the orthodox clergy, he had proposed the most eminent and wisest members of the old episcopacy, and estimable curés, in sufficient number, distinguished by their piety, their moderation, and the continuance of their services during the Reign of Terror. He said, with Abbé Bernier, that, to call no member of the

ancient episcopacy, and to point out none but curés, would be creating a clergy too new, too unprovided with authority; that, on the contrary, to nominate former bishops alone to all the sees, would be too great a forgetfulness of the inferior clergy, who had rendered real services during the Revolution, and whose just ambition would thus be grievously offended. These views were reasonable and were admitted by the First Consul. But, as to the two constitutional prelates, he was not at all content with them.

"Of sixty sees," said he, "I mean to give one-fifth to the clergy of the Revolution, that is to say, twelve. There shall be two constitutional archbishops to ten, and ten constitutional bishops to fifty, which is not too much." After having concerted with Messrs. Portalis and Bernier, he made, with them, the best conceived selections, excepting one or two. M. de Belloy, bishop of Marseilles, the most respectable, the most aged of the members of the ancient church of France, the worthy minister of a religion of charity, who joined a venerable countenance to the sagest piety, was nominated Archbishop of Paris. M. de Cicé, formerly keeper of the seals under Louis XVI., and Archbishop of Bordeaux, a man of firm political mind, was promoted to the archbishopric of Aix. M. de Boisgelin, a man of high birth, an enlightened priest, well informed and mild, formerly Archbishop of Aix, became Archbishop of Tours. M. de la Tour du Pin, formerly Archbishop of Auch, received the bishopric of Troyes. This worthy prelate, illustrious by his knowledge as much as by his birth, had the modesty to accept that post, so inferior to the one which he resigned. The First Consul rewarded him for it, at a later period, with the cardinal's hat. M. de Roquelaure, formerly Bishop of Senlis, one of the most distinguished prelates of the ancient church, by the union of amenity of manners and good morals, obtained the archbishopric of Malines. M. Cambacérés, brother of the second consul, was called to the archbishopric of Rouen. L'abbé Fesch, uncle of the First Consul, a proud priest, who made it his glory to resist his nephew, was created Archbishop of Lyons, that is to say, primate of the Gauls. M. Lecoz, constitutional bishop of Rennes, a priest of good morals, but an ardent and unaccommodating Jansenist, was nominated Archbishop of Besançon. M. Primat, constitutional Bishop of Lyons, formerly an Oratorian, a well-informed and mild priest, having occasioned sad scandal with regard to the schism, but none with regard to morals, was promoted to the archbishopric of Toulouse. A distinguished curé, M. de Pancemont, who had been much employed in the affair of the resignations, was taken from the parish of St. Sulpice, to be sent to Vannes as bishop. Lastly, the Abbé Bernier, the celebrated curé of Saint-Laud d'Angers, formerly the concealed plotter in La Vendée, afterwards its pacificator, and under the First Consul, the negotiator of the Concordate, received the bishopric of Orleans. This see was not commensurate with the high influence which the First Consul had allowed him over the affairs of the church of France; but the Abbé Bernier felt that the recollections

of a civil war attached to his name, did not permit too marked or too sudden an elevation that the real power which he enjoyed was of more value than external honours. Besides, the First Consul had in view for him a cardinal's hat.

When these nominations, which were decided on, but which were not to be published until after the conversion of the Concordate into the law of the state, were communicated to Cardinal Caprara, the latter opposed a strong resistance to them; he even shed tears, saying that he was unprovided with powers, although he had received from Rome an arbitrary latitude, extending to the extraordinary faculty of instituting prelates, without recourse to the Holy See. Messrs. Portalis and Bernier declared to him that the will of the First Consul was irrevocable; that he should submit, or renounce the solemn restoration of the altars, which was to take place within a few days. He did submit, writing to the Pope, that the salvation of souls who would be deprived of religion, if he had persisted, had gained the victory, in his mind, over the interest of the faithful clergy. "I shall be blamed," said he, to the holy father, "but I have obeyed what I believed to be the voice of Heaven."

He consented, therefore, reserving to himself the right to exact from the newly-elected constitutionalists a recantation, which might cover this last condescension of the Holy See.

Every thing being ready, the First Consul caused the Concordate to be carried up to the Legislative Body, there to be voted into a law, as prescribed by the constitution. To the Concordate were joined the Organic Articles. It was on the first day of the extraordinary session, 5th of April, 1802—15th Germinal—that the Concordate was presented to the Legislative Body by the councillors of state, Portalis, Régnier, and Regnault de Saint Jean d'Angely. The Legislative Body was not sitting when the treaty of Amiens, signed the 25th of March, became known in Paris. It had not, therefore, been among the authorities, which had come forward to congratulate the First Consul. On this first sitting, it was proposed to send a deputation of twenty-five members, to compliment the First Consul on the occasion of the general peace. In this proposition there was not a word said of the Concordate, which shows the spirit of the time, even in the heart of the renewed Legislative Body. The deputation was presented the 6th of April, 1802—16th Germinal.

"Citizen Consul," said the president of the Legislative Body, "the first craving of the French people, when attacked by Europe, was for victory, and you have conquered. Its dearest aspiration, after victory, was for peace, and peace you have given to it. What glory for the past! what hope for the future! And all this is your work! Enjoy the lustre and the happiness which the republic owes you!" The president concluded this address with the most lively expression of the national gratitude; but he was absolutely dumb on the subject of the Concordate. The First Consul took the opportunity to give him, on this subject, a sort of lesson, and to speak nothing but the

Concordate, a people who spoke only of the peace of Amiens. "I thank you," said he, to the messengers of the Legislative Body, "for the sentiments that you express to me. Your session begins with the most important operation of all, that which has for its object the appeasing of religious quarrels. All France solicits an end to these deplorable quarrels, and the re-establishment of the altars. I hope that, in your vote, like her, you will be of one mind. France will see, with a lively joy, that her legislators have voted the peace of consciences, the peace of families, a hundred times more important for the happiness of a people than that peace on occasion of which you come to congratulate the government."

These noble expressions produced the effect which the First Consul expected from them. The project, carried immediately from the Legislative Body to the Tribunal, was examined there gravely, even favourably, and discussed without vehemence. On the report of M. Siméon, it was carried by seventy-eight votes against seven. In the Legislative Body 228 voices pronounced for, and twenty-eight against it.

On the 8th of April—18th Germinal—the two projects were converted into laws. There was no further obstacle. It was the Thursday preceding Palm Sunday; the following Sunday would be Easter Day. The First Consul wished to consecrate these solemn days of the Catholic religion to the great festival of the re-establishment of public worship. He had not yet received Cardinal Caprara officially, as legate from the Holy See. He appointed the following day, Friday, for this official reception. The usage with legates *à latere*, is to have the gold cross carried before them. It is a sign of the extraordinary powers which the Holy See delegates to its representatives of this rank. Cardinal Caprara wishing, conformably with the views of his court, that the exercise of religion might be as public and as pompous as possible in France, desired that, according to custom, on the day on which he was to go to the Tuileries, the gold cross should be carried before him, by an officer dressed in red, and on horseback. Some hesitation was felt to exhibit such a spectacle to the populace of Paris. Negotiations took place, and it was settled that this cross should be borne in one of the carriages which were to precede that of the legate.

On Friday, the 9th of April—19th Germinal—the cardinal legate repaired in pomp to the Tuileries, in the equipages of the First Consul, escorted by the consular guard, and preceded by the cross borne in one of the carriages. The First Consul received him at the head of a numerous train, composed of his colleagues, of several councillors of state, and of a brilliant staff. Cardinal Caprara, whose exterior was mild and grave, addressed to the First Consul a discourse, in which dignity was blended with the expression of gratitude. He took the oath agreed upon, to do nothing against the laws of the state, and to vacate his functions as soon as he should be required to do so. The First Consul replied to him in elevated terms—terms destined, above all, to

resound elsewhere than in the palace of the Tuileries.

This external manifestation was the first of all those which were in preparation, and was not much remarked, because the people of Paris, not having notice of it, had not the opportunity of yielding to their ordinary curiosity. The next day but one was to be Palm Sunday. The First Consul had already reconciled the cardinal to some of the principal prelates whose nomination was decided on. He wished that their consecration should take place on this Palm Sunday, in order that they might be able to officiate the following Sunday, Easter Day, in the grand solemnity which he had projected. They were Messrs. de Belloy, nominated Archbishop of Paris; de Cambacérès, Archbishop of Rouen; Bernier, Bishop of Orleans; de Pancemont, Bishop of Vannes. The church of Notre Dame was still occupied by the constitutionalists, who kept the keys of it. A formal order was necessary to oblige them to give them up. That beautiful temple was found in a state of sad ruin; nothing there was in readiness for the consecration of the four prelates. This defect was provided for by means of a sum of money furnished by the First Consul; and so great was the precipitation, that, when the day of the ceremony came, no place had been fitted up for a sacristy. An adjoining house was employed for that purpose. The new prelates there invested themselves in their pontifical ornaments, and in that dress crossed the open space in front of the cathedral. The people, having notice that a grand ceremony was in preparation, had hurried thither, and behaved calmly and respectfully. The face of the venerable Archbishop de Belloy was so noble and so handsome, that it affected the simple hearts of which that crowd was composed; and all, men and women, bowed respectfully. The church was full of that numerous class of Christians, who had mourned for the misfortunes of religion, and who, belonging to no faction, received with gratitude the boon which the First Consul was conferring on them that day. The ceremony was affecting, even in default of pomp, through the sentiment which was brought to it. The four prelates were consecrated after the usual form.

From that moment, it must be said, the satisfaction was general amongst the many; there was a certainty of public approbation for the great manifestation fixed for the following Sunday. Excepting party men, revolutionists, obstinate in their systems, or factions royalists, who saw with chagrin the lever of revolt slipping from their clutch, every one approved of what was going on, and the First Consul was able to recognise already that his views had been more just than those of his advisers.

On the following Sunday, Easter Day, a solemn *Te Deum* was to be sung for the celebration, at the same time, of the general peace and the reconciliation with the church. This ceremony was announced by public authority as a genuine national festival. The preparations and the programme of it were published.

The First Consul wished to proceed thither in grand *cortege*, accompanied by all that was most elevated in the state. Through the ladies of the palace he had it conveyed to the wives of the high officials, that they would satisfy one of his most ardent desires if they attended the metropolitan church on the day of the *Tê Deum*. The greater number did not require pressing. It is known what frivolous motives are joined to motives the most pious, to increase the concourse in these ceremonies of religion. The most brilliant women in Paris obeyed the First Consul. The principal ladies amongst them were to assemble at the Tuileries, to accompany Madame Bonaparte in the equipages of the new court.

The First Consul had given a formal order to his generals to accompany him. These were the most difficult to be gained over; for, it was said everywhere, that they held unbecoming and almost factious language. We have already seen the waywardness of Lannes. Augereau, tolerated at Paris, was actually one of those who spoke loudest. He was commissioned by his comrades to present himself to the First Consul, and to express to him their desire not to appear at *Nôtre Dame*. In consular sitting, in the presence of the three consuls, and of the ministers, was the audience to be given, in which General Bonaparte was pleased to receive Augereau. The latter delivered his message; but the First Consul recalled him to his duty with that *hurleur* that he knew how to assume in command, particularly with regard to military men. He made him sensible of the impropriety of his conduct, reminded him that the Concordate was now the law of the state; that the laws were obligatory for all classes of citizens, as well for the army as for the humblest and weakest of the people; that, moreover, he would take care, in his double capacity of general and chief magistrate of the republic, to see them executed; that it was not for the officers of the army, but for the government, to judge of the suitability of the ceremonies ordered for Easter Day; that all the authorities had orders to attend at them, the military as well as the civil authorities, and all should obey; that, as to the dignity of the army, he was as jealous of it, and as good a judge of it, as any of the generals his companions in arms; and that he was sure of not compromising it by assisting in person at the ceremonies of religion; that, to put an end to the matter, they had not to deliberate on, but to execute, an order, and that he expected to see them all on Sunday at his side, in the metropolitan church. Augereau made no reply, and brought back to his comrades only the embarrassment of having committed an indiscretion, and the resolution to obey.

Every thing was ready, but, at the last moment, the second thoughts of Cardinal Caprara were nigh frustrating the noble plans of the First Consul. The bishops selected from the constitutional clergy had gone to Cardinal Caprara's for the *protes informatif*, which was drawn up in regard to every bishop presented to the Holy See. The cardinal had required of them a recantation, by which they were to

abjure their former errors, and which characterized in the most condemnatory manner their adhesion to the civil constitution of the clergy. It was a humiliating step not only for them, but for the Revolution itself. When the First Consul was informed of it he would not allow it, and enjoined them not to yield, promising to support them, and to force the representative of the Holy See to renounce his unchristian-like intentions. Cardinal Caprara had seen no other excuse for his condescension, if he instituted what were called *intruders*, than in a formal recantation of their past conduct. But the First Consul did not understand it in that shape. "When I accept for bishop," said he, "the Abbé Bernier, the apostle of *La Vendée*, the Pope may well be satisfied with Jansenists or Oratorians, who have had no other fault than that of adhering to the Revolution." He directed them to confine themselves to a simple declaration, which consisted in saying, that they adhered to the Concordate, and the wishes of the Holy See, written in that treaty. He insisted, with reason, that, as the Concordate contained the principles on which the French church and the Roman church had agreed, more could not be exacted, without an avowed intention of humiliating one party for the benefit of another, and he declared that he would not permit it.

Saturday evening, Easter eve, this contest was not over. M. de Portalis was charged to go and announce to the cardinal that the ceremony of the next day should not take place, that the Concordate should not be published, and should remain without effect if he insisted any longer on the recantation demanded. This resolution was over and above serious, and the First Consul, showing himself full of condescension for the church, would not, however, yield on the points which seemed to him to compromise the object itself, that is to say, the amalgamation of parties. He knew that to be a conciliator it is necessary to be energetic, for it costs nearly as much trouble to bring parties to a compromise as it does to conquer them.

The cardinal at length yielded, but at a very advanced hour of the night. It was agreed that the newly-elected prelates, taken from among the constitutional clergy, should go through at his house the *protes informatif*, and that they should profess, *viva voce*, their sincere union to the church, and that, as a consequence, a declaration should be made that they and the church were reconciled, without saying how or in what terms. Still, it is a fact, that the recantation demanded was not made.

The day afterwards, Easter day, 18th of April, 1802—28th Germinal, year X.—the Concordate was published in all quarters of Paris with great show, and by the principal authorities. Whilst this publication was taking place in the streets of the capital, the First Consul, who wished to solemnize on the same day every thing that was for the good of France, was exchanging the ratifications of the peace of Amiens. This important formality having been accomplished, he set out for *Nôtre Dame*, followed by the chief bodies of the state and by a great number of functionaries of every class, by a brilliant staff, and by a

crowd of ladies of the highest rank, who accompanied Madame Bonaparte. A long suite of carriages composed this magnificent *cortège*. The troops of the first military division, assembled at Paris, formed a line from the Tuilleries to the cathedral. The archbishop of Paris advanced in procession to receive the First Consul at the porch of the church, and to present the holy water to him. The new head of the state was conducted under the canopy to the place reserved for him. The Senate, the Legislative Body, the Tribunate, were ranged on each side of the altar. Behind the First Consul were found standing the generals in full uniform, rather obedient than converted, some affecting a demeanour by no means becoming. As to himself, habited in the red dress of the consuls, motionless, with a stern countenance, he displayed neither the distraction of some nor the devoutness of others. He was calm, grave, in the attitude of a chief of empire, who is performing a grand act of will, and who commands by his look submission from all the world.

The ceremony was long and dignified, in spite of the bad disposition of most of those whom it had been necessary to bring thither. For the rest, the effect of it was destined to be decisive, for, the example once given by the most imposing of men, all the ancient religious habits were about to revive and all resistance to subside.

There were two motives for this *fête*, to wit, the re-establishment of worship and the general peace. Naturally the satisfaction was general, and whosoever had not in his heart the bad passions of party was happy in the public welfare. On that day there were grand dinners at the ministers', attended by the principal members of the administrations. The representatives of the powers were guests of the minister for foreign affairs. There was a brilliant banquet at the First Consul's, to which were invited the Cardinal Caprara, the Archbishop of Paris, the principal bishops elect of the new clergy, the highest personages of the state. The First Consul discoursed long with the cardinal; he testified to him his joy at having achieved so great a work. He was proud of his courage and his success. One light shade crossed his noble brow, and that scarcely for an instant; it was when he cast a glance at certain of his generals, whose attitude and language had not been becoming in this conjuncture. He expressed to them his discontent with a firmness of tone which admitted of no reply, and which left no fear of a relapse.

To complete the effect which the First Consul had wished to produce on that same day, M. de Fontanes gave an account in the *Moniteur* of a new book which was making a great noise at the time; it was the *Genie du Christianisme*. This book, written by a young Breton gentleman, M. de Chateaubriand, related to the Malesherbes, and long absent from his country, described with infinite brilliancy the beauties of Christianity, and extolled the moral and poetical influence of religious practices, which had been exposed twenty years before to the most bitter railleries. Severely criticised by Messrs. Chénier and Gingiené, who re-

proached it with false and overcharged colours, passionately supported by the partisans of religious restoration, the *Genie du Christianisme*, like all remarkable books, very much praised, very much attacked, produced a profound impression, because it expressed a true sentiment, very generally felt at the time in French society; it was that peculiar indefinable regret for what exists no longer, for what one has disdained or destroyed when possessed of it, for what one sadly desires when it is lost. Such is the human heart! What exists fatigues or oppresses it; what has ceased to exist acquires, all at once, a potent charm. The social and religious customs of a former period, odious and ridiculous in 1789, because they were then in all their force, and, moreover, were often oppressive; now that the eighteenth century, changed towards its close into an impetuous torrent, had swept them away in its devastating course, now, these customs returned to the recollection of an agitated generation, and touched its heart, disposed to emotions by the tragic spectacle of fifteen years. The work of the young writer, impressed with this profound sentiment, stirred up men's minds strongly, and had been welcomed with marked favour by the man who was then dispensing all glories. If it did not exhibit the pure taste, the simple and solid faith of the writers of the age of Louis XIV., it painted in charming colours the old religious manners which were no more. Without doubt, one might censure in it the misuse of a fine imagination, but after Virgil, after Horace, there has remained in the memory of mankind, a place for the ingenious Ovid, for the brilliant Lucan, and alone, perhaps, among the books of its day, the *Genie du Christianisme* will live, strongly linked as it is to a memorable epoch, it will live, as those friezes sculptured on the marble of a building live with the monument which bears them.

In recalling the priests to the altar, in withdrawing them from the dark retreats, where they practised their religion, and often conspired against the government, the First Consul had repaired one of the most vexatious disorders of the time, and had satisfied one of the greatest moral wants of every society. But there remained another extremely sad disorder, one which left to France the aspect of a country torn by factions; it was the exile of a considerable number of Frenchmen, living in foreign lands in indigence, sometimes in hatred of their country, and receiving from hostile governments a mouthful of bread, which many of them paid for by unworthy acts towards France. A frightful invention of discord is exile; it renders the banished man wretched, it de-naturalizes his heart, leaves him to the altars doled out by a stranger; it parades afar the afflicting exhibition of the troubles of the land. Of all the traces of a revolution it is that which should be the first effaced. General Bonaparte considered the recall of the emigrants as the indispensable completion of the general pacification. It was a reparatory act of which he was impatient to brave the difficulties, and to have the glory. Already there existed for emigrants a system of recall very incomplete, very partial, very

irregular, which had all the inconveniences of a general measure, and which had not its high and beneficent character; it was the system of erasures, which were granted to the best recommended emigrants, under pretext that they had been unduly placed on the lists. Such amnesty was not always given to the most excusable or the most deserving.

The First Consul then formed the resolution of permitting the return of the emigrants *en masse*, with certain exceptions. Grave objections were made against this measure. At first, all the constitutions, particularly the Consular Constitution, said expressly, that the emigrants were never to be recalled. They said so, particularly on account of those who had acquired national domains, who were very suspicious, and who looked on the exile of the former possessors of their property as necessary for their safety. The First Consul, considering himself as the firmest support of those holders, having always expressed the firm will to defend them, the only mortal having the power to do so, believed himself sufficiently strong in the confidence he had inspired in them all, to be able to open the gates of France to the emigrants. He then caused a resolution to be prepared, the first clause of which was, the new and irrevocable consecration of the sales made by the state to the holders of national property. He next had inserted in it a provision by which all emigrants were recalled *en masse*, placing them under the surveillance of the high police, and submitting to this surveillance, for the whole of their lives, those who should have, at any time, provoked the application of it. There were yet some exceptions to this general recall. The benefit of it was refused to the chiefs of the troops raised against the republic; to those who had held rank in the armies of the enemy; to individuals who had continued to hold places or titles in the house of the princes of Bourbon; to the generals or representatives of the people, who had made compacts with the enemy (this concerned Pichegru, and some members of the legislative assemblies); finally, to the bishops and archbishops who had refused their resignation demanded by the Pope. The number of these excluded persons was very inconceivable.

The most difficult question to be solved was that which arose on the subject of the property of the emigrants not yet sold. If, with all reason, the sales made by the state should be declared inviolable, still it might appear hard not to make restitution of their property to the emigrants, when it remained untouched in the hands of the government. "I do nothing," said the First Consul, "if I restore these emigrants to their country, without restoring to them their patrimony. I wish to efface the traces of our civil wars; and, by filling France with returned emigrants, who will remain in indigence, whilst their properties shall be thus under the sequestration of the state, I create a class of malcontents who will give no rest. And, these properties kept under the sequestration of the state, who, think you, will purchase them, in the presence of their ancient owners now returned? The

First Consul then resolved to restore all the unsold domains, excepting houses or buildings appropriated to the public service.

This resolution thus drawn up was submitted to a privy council, composed of the consuls, of the ministers, of a certain number of councillors of state, and of senators. It was warmly discussed in this assembly, and appeared to excite sharp jealousies. However, the general impulse towards all reparatory measures which tended to efface the traces of our troubles, the *prestige* of the general peace, the positive will of the First Consul, all these causes combined led to the adoption of the principle of the measure. But care was taken to insert in the resolution the word amnesty, to fix upon emigration the character of a criminal act which the victorious and happy nation was willing enough to forget. The First Consul, desiring to do things in a complete manner, repelled the employment of the word amnesty. He said that it was not right to humble persons whose reconciliation with France they were endeavouring to bring about, and that to treat them as pardoned criminals was to humble them deeply. He was told in reply, that emigration had originally been a crime, for it had for its principal object to make war on France, and that it was necessary that it should remain condemned by the laws. A warm dispute took place relative to the property of the emigrants. The councillors called to the deliberation, obstinately refused the restitution of woods and forests, which the law of the 2d Nivôse, year IV., had declared inalienable. It was, in their opinion, replacing immense riches in the hands of the great emigration, depriving the state of prodigious resources, and, above all, of forests of indispensable utility for the service of the army and navy. Notwithstanding all his efforts, the First Consul was obliged to yield, and he thus preserved, without dreaming of it, one of the most powerful means of influence over the ancient French nobility, that which afterwards served to bring them back to him almost entirely: this means was the individual restitution which he made at a later period of their properties, to those of the emigrants who submitted to his government.

The resolution being thus modified, it remained to be settled how a legal character was to be given to it. It was not the intention to make it into a law; it was designed to give it a more elevated character, if it were possible. The idea was conceived of making an organic *Senatus-Consultum* of it. The resolution touched the constitution itself, and, in that way, seemed to belong more particularly to the Senate. Already the Senate, by two important acts, that which had proscribed the Jacobins, falsely accused on account of the infernal machine, and that which had interpreted the thirty-eighth article of the Constitution, and excluded the oppositionists of the two legislative assemblies, had acquired a sort of power superior to the constitution itself; for it had legitimized either extraordinary measures or new constitutional arrangements, which the government had thought needful. After having performed rigorous acts, it could not but be agreeable to

the Senate to be intrusted with an act of national clemency. It was then decreed that the resolution pronouncing the recall of the emigrants should be first discussed in the Council of State, as were the standing orders, laws, *Senatus-consulta*, and next be submitted to the Senate, there to be deliberated on, as a measure touching the Constitution itself.

The thing was thus executed. The project of amnesty discussed in the Council of State, on the 16th of April—26th Germinal—two days before the publication of the Concordate, was carried ten days afterwards to the Senate, on the 26th of April, 1802—6th Floréal. It was there adopted without controversy, and with remarkable motives.

"Considering," said the Senate, "that the proposed measure is called for by the actual state of things, by justice, by the national interest, and that it is in conformity with the spirit of the Constitution ;

"Considering that, at different epochs, when the laws relative to emigration were enacted, France, torn by intestine divisions, sustained against almost all Europe a war, for which history presents no parallel, and which necessitated rigorous and extraordinary arrangements ;

"That at the present day, peace being made abroad, it is important to cement it at home, by every thing which can rally Frenchmen, tranquillize families, and cause evils inseparable from a long revolution to be forgotten ;

"That nothing can better consolidate peace at home, than a measure which tempers the severity of the laws, and puts an end to the uncertainties and delays resulting from the forms established for the erasures :

"Considering that this measure can only be an amnesty, which may extend pardon to the greater number, always more misdeed than criminal, and that may extend punishment to the principal culprits by permanently keeping them on the list of emigrants ;

"That this amnesty, devised by clemency, is, however, granted only on conditions just in themselves, tranquillizing for the public safety, and wisely combined with the national welfare ;

"That particular provisions of the amnesty, by defending from all attack the acts done with the republic, consecrate anew the guarantee of the sales of national property, the upholding of which will always be a particular object of the solicitude of the Conservative Senate, as it is of the Consuls: the Senate adopts the proposed resolution."

This courageous act of clemency could not but obtain the approbation of all wise men who sincerely wished for an end to our civil broils. Thanks to the new guarantees given to the holders of national property, thanks to the confidence which the First Consul inspired them with, this last measure of government did not cause them too great disquietude, and it satisfied that honest, and luckily the most numerous, mass of the royalist party, which received without murmur the good that was conferred on it. It met with ingratitude only among the highest class of emigrants, who were living in the saloons of Paris, repaying there, in bad language, the benefits of the

government. According to them, the act was insignificant, incomplete, unjust, because it made some distinctions between persons, because it did not restore the property of the emigrants, sold or unsold. The approbation of these vain talkers could well be dispensed with. However, the First Consul was so greedy of glory, that these wretched critics sometimes disturbed the pleasure which he received from the universal assent of France and of Europe.

But his ardour for well doing did not depend on praise and censure, and scarcely had he consummated the great act which we have just related, before he already had in preparation others of the highest political and social importance. Relieved from the impediments which the resistance of the Tribunate presented to his fruitful activity, he was resolved, during that extraordinary session of Germinal and Floréal, to conclude, or at least to advance considerably, the re-organization of France. It is proper to exhibit his ideas on this subject.

By the acts of the First Consul, already known, particularly by the re-establishment of religious worship, it was easy to guess what was the ordinary tendency of his mind, and his particular manner of thinking on questions of social organization. In general he was disposed to contradict the narrow or exaggerated systems of the Revolution, or, to speak more correctly, of some revolutionists; for, in its first movements the Revolution had been always generous and true. It had wished to abolish the irregularities, the caprices, the unjust distinctions arising from the feudal system, and in virtue of which, for instance, a Jew, a Catholic, a Protestant, a noble, a priest, a shopkeeper, a Burgundian, a Provençal, a Breton, had not the same rights, the same duties, did not support the same burdens, did not enjoy the same advantages; in a word, did not live under the same laws. To make of all these Frenchmen, whatever might be their religion, their birth, their native province, citizens equal in rights and in duties, eligible to every thing according to their merit, this is what the Revolution wished to do in its first enthusiasm, before contradiction had irritated it even to delirium; this is what the First Consul wished to accomplish after that delirium had given place to reason. But that chimerical equality which demagogues had been dreaming about for a moment, which was to put all men on the same level, which hardly admitted the natural inequalities proceeding from a difference of minds and talents, that equality he despised, either as a chimera of the spirit of system, or as a revolt of envy.

He wished, then, in society for a hierarchy, on the steps of which all men, without distinction of birth, should come and place themselves according to their merit, and on the steps of which should remain fixed those whose ancestors had borne them thither, still without offering any obstacle to the new comers who might try to raise themselves in their turn.

To this sort of social vegetation, resulting from nature herself, observed in all countries and at all times, he intended to give a free course, in the institutions he was occupied in founding. Like all powerful minds, who apply themselves to discover in the sentiments of

the masses the true interests of humanity, and love to oppose that sentiment to the narrow views of the spirit of system, he sought in the dispositions manifested before his eyes by the people itself, arguments for his opinions.

To those who, in matters of religion, had recommended indifference, he had opposed that popular movement, which had been recently produced at the door of a church, to force the priests to give burial to an actress. "See," said he, to these partizans of indifference, "see, how indifferent is that multitude! And yourselves," said he also to them, "why have you, in the midst of the greatest revolutionary paroxysm, proclaimed the Supreme Being!—Because, in the bottom of the heart of a people there is something which inclines them to have a God—no matter what."

"As to the manner of classing men in society," said he to those who wished for no distinction: "why then have you created fusils and sabres of honour! Is not that a distinction! And ridiculously enough invented, for men do not carry a fusil or a sabre of honour at their breast, and, for things of this sort, men like what is seen at a distance." The First Consul had observed a singular fact, and he was fond of mentioning it to those with whom he was in the habit of conversing. Since France, the object of the respect and of the attentions of Europe, became filled with the ministers of all the powers, or with foreigners of distinction who came to visit it, he was struck with the curiosity with which the populace, and even persons above the populace, followed these foreigners, and were eager to see their rich uniforms and their brilliant decorations. There was often a crowd in the courtyard of the Tuileries to be present at their arrival and departure. "See," said he, "these futile vanities, which geniuses disdain so much. The populace is not of their opinion. It loves those many-coloured cordons as it loves religious pomp. The democrat philosophers call that vanity, idolatry. Idolatry, vanity, let it be. But that idolatry, that vanity, are weaknesses common to the whole human race, and from both great virtues may be made to spring. With these, so much despised baubles, heroes are made! To the one, as to the other of these alleged weaknesses external signs are necessary; there must be a worship for religious sentiment, there must be visible distinctions for the noble sentiment of glory."

The First Consul resolved to create an order which should replace arms of honour, which would have the advantage of being given to the soldier as well as to the general, to the peaceful *savant* as well as to the military man, which should consist in decorations similar in form to those worn throughout Europe, and moreover in useful endowments, useful particularly to the private soldier, when he should have returned to his fields. It was, in his eyes, an additional means of putting new France in relation with other countries. Since it was thus that, throughout all Europe, services rendered were marked out for public esteem, why not admit the same system in France! "Nations," said he, "should not strive to be singular any more than individuals. The affectation

of acting differently from the rest of the world is an affectation reproved by persons of sense, and above all by persons of modesty. Cordons are in use in all countries; let them be," added the First Consul, "in use in France! It will be one relation the more established with Europe. In France alone they were not given, among our neighbours they were given only to the man of gentle birth; I will give them to the man who shall have served best in the army and in the state, or who shall have produced the finest works."

One remark more particularly struck the First Consul, and had become a subject which largely engaged his thoughts; it was, to what a degree the men of the Revolution were disunited, without a bond between them, without strength against their common enemies. Whilst the ancient nobles gave each other the hand; whilst the Vendéens were, although exhausted and subdued, secretly coalesced still; whilst the clergy, although reconstituted, formed, nevertheless, a powerful corporation, very equivocal in its friendship to the government, the men who had made that revolution were divided, and even disavowed, it must be said, by ungrateful and mistaken opinion. No sooner had the elections been allowed to go on alone, than there were seen starting up new personages to whom one could not impute either good or evil; or, *vice-versa*, hot-brained revolutionists, the remembrance of whom inspired terror. In the eyes of a new generation, which gave no thanks for their efforts, to those who from '89 to 1800, had suffered so much to enfranchise France, their best claim was to have done nothing. The First Consul was convinced, and with reason, that if this movement had assistance, there would soon not be one of the authors of the Revolution left on the stage; that a new class, easily inclined to royalism, would be produced; that at the very utmost there would be, when opportunity offered, a revolutionary reaction, which would cause the reappearance of some men of blood; that the elections conducted under the Directory, alternately royalist, after the fashion of the club of Clichy, or revolutionary, after the fashion of Babeuf, were a proof of it, and that, from convulsions to convulsions, they would end with the triumph of the Bourbons and of foreigners, that is to say, with a pure counter-revolution.

He looked on it, then, as indispensable to slacken the movement of free institutions, by so doing, to maintain in power the generation which had effected the Revolution, to maintain them in it, with the exception only of some few blood-stained individuals, and even to those, to secure oblivion for their past errors, and a subsistence for their future years; to found with this generation a society, tranquil, regular, and brilliant, of which he should be the head, of which his companions in arms, and his civil colleagues should form the upper class, the aristocracy, if one chose to call it so, but an aristocracy always open to rising merit, in which should be placed, they and their children, the men who had rendered great services, and in which men capable of rendering new services might always come and take their

stat on. This society, thus formed after the eternal laws of nature, he wished to surround with all sorts of glories, to embellish by all the arts, for the purpose of opposing with advantage that *ancien régime*, existing like a living recollection in the memory of the emigrants, existing as a reality in all Europe; and he hoped to re-attach to it the emigrants themselves, when time should have corrected them, when the charm of high employments should have attracted them, yet, on condition that they would come, not as disdainful protectors, but as useful and submissive servants. What degree of political liberty would he grant to that society thus constituted? He knew not. He thought that the present moment was not particularly adapted to it, for, all liberty granted changed into cruel reactions; and he believed, moreover, that liberty would arrest his creative genius. Besides, he thought but little at the time on this question; and the country, eager for order only, did not allow him to think of it much. He wished them to found this society upon the principles of the French Revolution, to give it good civil laws, a powerful administration, rich finances, and external grandeur; that is to say, all benefits, save one alone, leaving for others, at a later period, the care of conferring on it, or of letting it take, as much public liberty as was consistent.

It was from ideas, such as these, that he had conceived his system of civil and military rewards, and his plan of education.

The arms of honour, devised by the Convention, had not excited much interest, because they were not adapted to manners. They had, besides, involved administrative complications, which were very vexatious, on account of the double pay granted to some, and refused to others. The First Consul conceived the idea of instituting an order, in military form, but not destined for military men alone. He called it the Legion of Honour, wishing to impress the idea of an assemblage of men pledged to the cultivation of honour, and the defence of certain principles. It was to be composed of fifteen cohorts, each cohort of seven grand officers, twenty commanders, thirty officers, and 350 private legionaries, in all 6000 individuals of every rank. The oath indicated to what cause they were to dedicate themselves, when enrolled in the Legion of Honour. Each member promised to devote himself to the defence of the republic, of the integrity of its territory, of the principle of equality, and of the inviolability of properties called national. It was, consequently, a legion which would pledge its honour to make the principles and the interests of the Revolution triumphant. Decorations and endowments were attached to each rank. To the grand officers was allotted a salary of 5000 francs (200*l.* sterling), to commanders, 2000 francs (80*l.* sterling), to officers 1000 francs (40*l.* sterling), to the private legionaries 250 francs (10*l.* sterling). An endowment in national property was to provide for these expenses. Each cohort was to have its station in the district where its particular possessions were situated. All the combined cohorts were to be administered by a superior council formed of

seven members; the three Consuls first, then four grand officers; the first of the latter was to be named by the Senate, the second by the Legislative Body, the third by the Tribunate, the fourth by the Council of State. The council of the Legion of Honour, composed in this manner, was charged with the duty of managing the possessions of the Legion, and of deliberating on the nomination of its members. What served to complete the institution and to indicate its spirit was, that civil services in every line, such as the administration, the government, sciences, letters, arts, were as much titles of admission as military services. Setting out from the present state of things, it was decided that officers and soldiers who had Arms of Honour, should be, by right, members of the Legion, and classed in its ranks according to their grade in the army.

This institution numbers not much more than forty years, and it is already consecrated as if it had passed through centuries, to such a degree has it become in those forty years, the recompense of heroism, of knowledge, of merit of every sort! so much has it been sought after by the *grands* and princes of Europe, the most proud of their origin. Time, the judge of institutions, has then pronounced its decision on the utility and dignity of this particular one. Let us set aside the abuse which may have been made sometimes of such a recompense, through the different governments that have succeeded each other, an abuse inherent in every recompense given to man by his fellow-man, and let us recognise what was beautiful, profound, novel to the world, in an institution whose intent was to place on the breast of the private soldier, and of the modest *subant*, the same decoration that was to figure on the breasts of leaders of armies, of princes, and of kings! let us recognise that this creation of an honour-conferring distinction was the most dazzling triumph of equality itself, not of that equality which puts men on a level by debasing them, but which equalizes while it elevates them; in a word, let us recognise, that if for the great men of the civil or military order, it might possibly be only a gratification of vanity, it was for the private soldier, when returning to his rural home, an addition to the comforts of the peasant, at the same time that it was a visible proof of heroism.

Next after this admirable system of rewards, the First Consul had employed himself with no less assiduity on a system of education for the French youth. Education, in fact, was at this time null, or abandoned to the enemies of the Revolution.

The religious communities formerly engaged in the education of youth, had disappeared with the ancient order of things. There was a tendency towards their revival; but the First Consul had no intention of giving up the guidance of the new generation to them; looking on them as the secret agents of his enemies. The institutions by which the convention had sought to supply their place had been only a chimera, which had already almost disappeared. The convention had meant to give gratuitously primary instruction to the common peo-

ple, and secondary instruction to the middle classes, so as to render both accessible to all families. It ended in nothing. The communes had given habitations to the primary instructors, in general the parsonage houses of the ancient country curés, but had not paid them salaries, or, at least, had done so in assignments. Indigence very soon dispersed these unfortunate masters. The central schools, in which secondary instruction was dispensed, being placed in each chief town of a department, were establishments in some sort academical, where public courses were held, at which youths might attend some hours a day, but returned from them afterwards to their homes, or to boarding-houses established by private speculation. The nature of the studies was conformable to the spirit of the times. Classical studies, considered as an antiquated routine, had been almost abandoned in them. The natural and exact sciences, and the living languages, had taken the place of the ancient ones. A museum of natural history was attached to each of these schools. Such a mode of instruction had little influence on youth; for a course of study which lasts one or two hours a day is not the way to make an impression upon it. Youth was left to be moulded by the heads of the boarding-schools, at that time, for the most part, hostile to the new order of things, or greedy speculators, treating youth as an object of traffic, not as a sacred trust of the state and of families. The central schools, besides, placed in the hundred and two departments, one in each chief town, were too numerous. There were not pupils enough for these hundred and two schools. Thirty-two only had drawn attendance, and become nurseries of instruction. Some distinguished professors, who still preserved the spirit of sound erudition, had made their appearance there. But political vicissitudes, there as elsewhere, had exercised their melancholy influence. The professors chosen by the juries of instruction, had succeeded one another, as the parties did, to power, had appeared and disappeared by turns, and the pupils along with them. In short, these schools, without bond, without unity, without a common direction, presented scattered fragments, and not a grand edifice of public instruction. The First Consul formed his project at the first cast, with his usual resolution of mind.

In the first place, the finances of France did not allow primary instruction to be given everywhere and gratuitously to the people, who, besides, would not have leisure enough to avail themselves of it, if the state had had money enough to afford it to them. The most that could be done was to provide for the expenses of the new clergy, and this it was possible to do, owing to a particular circumstance of the time, namely the mass of ecclesiastical pensions, which served instead of salaries to most of the curés. It was therefore impossible to pay a primary instructor in each commune. They were consequently established only among populations in sufficiently easy circumstances to bear the expenses themselves. The commune gave a residence and a school-room, the scholars paid a remuneration, cal-

culated by the wants of the master. It was all that could be done at the time.

For the moment, the most important was the secondary instruction. The First Consul suppressed, in his project, the central schools, which were only public courses, without uniformity, without effect on youth. There were found to be thirty-two central schools, which had more or less succeeded. This was an indication of the want of instruction in the different parts of France. The First Consul projected thirty-two establishments, which he named *LYCÉES*, a name borrowed from antiquity, and which were boarding-houses where youth, retained during the principal years of adolescence, should be subjected to the double influence of a sound literary instruction, and an education masculine, severe, and sufficiently religious, altogether military, modelled on the régime of civil equality. He wished to re-establish in them the old classic system, which assigned the first place to the ancient languages, and gave the second only to the mathematical and physical sciences, leaving to the special schools the care of completing the teaching of the latter. He was right in that as in the remainder. The study of the dead languages is not only a study of words, but a study of things; it is the study of antiquity, with its laws, its manners, its arts, its history; so moral, so deeply instructive. There is only one age at which to learn these things; it is boyhood. When youth has once arrived, with its passions, its tendency to exaggeration and to false taste, or ripen age with its positive interests, life passes away without a moment having been bestowed on the study of a world, dead as the tongues that open the entrance of it to us. If a late curiosity leads us to it again, it is through the medium of faint and insufficient translations that we penetrate into this beauteous antiquity. And in a time when religious ideas are weakened, if the acquaintance with antiquity cease too, we should form nothing more than a society without moral tie to the past, informed only concerning the present, and occupied with it; a society ignorant, debased, and fitted exclusively for the mechanical arts.

The First Consul wished then that, in his project, the classical studies should resume their rank. The sciences were to come next. So much of them was to be taught as is useful in all the professions of life, and as was necessary to pass from the secondary to the special schools. Religious instruction was to be given by chaplains, military instruction by old officers who had left the army. All movements were to be executed there at a military pace, and with beat of drum. This system was suitable to a nation destined universally to bear arms, either in the army or in the national guard. Eight professors of ancient languages or of *belles-lettres*, a censor of studies, a steward, having charge of the chattels, one head-master, under the name of *proviseur*, composed the establishment of these institutions.

Such were the schools in which the First Consul wished to form the French youth. But how was it to be attracted thither? There was the difficulty. The First Consul provided for

it by bold and sure means, such as must be employed when one earnestly wishes to attain one's ends. He thought of creating 6400 gratuitous exhibitions, of which the state should bear the expenses, and which, at a medium rate of 700 to 800*fr.*, (28*l.* to 32*l.* sterling,) would represent a total expense of 5,000,000 to 6,000,000*fr.* (200,000*l.* to 240,000*l.* sterling) per annum, a considerable sum at the time. These 6000 and some hundred pupils were sufficient to furnish the nucleus of the population of the Lyceums. The confidence of families, which it was hoped to acquire in the sequel, would some day relieve the state from the continuance of such a sacrifice. The produce of these 6000 exhibitions formed at the same time a sufficient resource for covering the greater part of the expense of the new establishments.

The First Consul intended to distribute in the following manner the exhibitions of which the government was to have the disposal: 2400 were to be given to the children of retired soldiers whose circumstances were narrow; of civil functionaries who had done useful service; of the inhabitants of the provinces lately united to France. The 4000 remaining were destined to the boarding-schools already established. A great number of these boarding-schools were, in fact, private speculations. The First Consul thought it right to let them remain; but he connected them with his plan by means the most simple and efficacious. These boarding-schools could not henceforward subsist without the authority of government; they were to be inspected annually by the agents of the state; they were obliged to send their pupils to the lectures at the Lyceums, paying a trifling remuneration; finally, the 4000 exhibitions were, after an annual examination, to be distributed among the pupils of the various boarding-schools, in proportion to the recognised merit and good order of each house. Thus connected with the general plan, the boarding-schools absolutely formed a part of it.

Passing next to the special instruction, the First Consul occupied himself with completing its organization. The study of jurisprudence had perished with the ancient judiciary establishment; he created ten schools of law. The schools of medicine, less neglected, subsisted to the number of three; he proposed to create six of them. The Polytechnic school existed; it was connected with this organization. To these were added a school of public services, since known by the title of "School of Bridges and Roads;" a school for the mechanical arts, at that time fixed at Compiègne, since at Châlons-sur-Marne, the first model of the schools of arts and

trades which are at this day judged to be so useful; finally, a school for the grand art which then constituted the power of the First Consul and of France, a school of military art, destined to occupy the palace of Fontainebleau.

One thing was yet wanting to the perfection of this work, namely, a body of learned men, which might supply these colleges with instructors, which might embrace them in its surveillance; in a word, what has since been called the University. But the moment had not yet arrived for that. It was already a great deal to save from wreck the establishments of public instruction, and to create, all at once, with the actual professors, colleges dependent on the state, where the youth of all classes, attracted by gratuitous education, should be formed on one common model, regular and conformable to the principles of the French Revolution, and to sound literary education. The First Consul said to Fourcroy: "This is only a commencement; by and by we shall do more and better."

These two important projects were carried to the Council of State, and warmly debated in that enlightened body. The First Consul, who did not like public discussions, because, at the time, it agitated minds which had been too long ruffled, sought it, nay provoked it, in the sittings of the Council of State. It was his representative government. There he was familiar and eloquent, there he allowed himself every latitude, and permitted the same to others, and by the collision of his mind with that of his opponents, produced more flashes than can be obtained in a great assembly, where the solemnity of the tribune, and the inconveniences of publicity, incessantly impede and repress true liberty of thought. This form of discussion would be even the best for the elucidation of affairs, so it were not dependent on a determined master to confine it to limits fixed by his will. But for enlightened despotism, when it wishes to be enlightened, such a body is the best of institutions.

The Council of State, composed of all the men of the Revolution, and of some of those who had more recently sprung up, presented in its *ensemble* the different shades of public opinion, and those very little softened; for if, on the one hand, Messrs. Portalis, Roderer, Regnaud de Saint Jean d'Angely, Devaines, efficiently represented in it the party inclined to monarchical reaction; Messrs. Thibáudeau,¹ Berlier, Truguet,² Emmercy,³ Berenger, represented the party faithful to the Revolution, even sometimes to a defence of its prejudices. But there, within the closed doors of the Coun-

¹ THIBAUDEAU, ANTOINE CLAIRE. Deputy synde of Notiers in September, 1792. Deputy to the National Convention, voted for the death of Louis XVI. He showed great courage, and firmness, and moderation throughout the Revolution. He was proscribed on the 18th Fructidor, 1797, but had some powerful defenders, who procured the erasure of his name. After the 18th Brumaire, 1799, he became prefect for the department of Gironde, and the counsellor of state. In 1803 he received the cross of the Legion of Honour, and was made prefect of Marseilles.—*Biographie Moderne*, n.

² TRUGUET. Son to the captain of the port of Toulon. He was first in the naval guard, and then commanded the vessel which carried M. de Choiseul Gouffier to Constantinople. Rear-admiral in 1792. During the Reign of Terror he served in the navy with various success.

In 1795 he was appointed minister of the Marine by the Directory. He was then sent ambassador to Madrid, re-called to France, and his name placed on the emigrant list. After the 18th Brumaire he entered the council of state in the section of the Marine. In 1803 he was appointed to the command of the Brest squadron, which he retained until Napoleon became Emperor, after which he held no employment nor received any title.—*Biographie Moderne*, n.

³ EMMERCY. J. L. C. A lawyer at Metz. Deputy from the Tierce-état to the States-General of 1790. He played a moderate part during the Revolution. After the 18th of Brumaire he was summoned to the judiciary section of the Council of State, and in 1803 removed to the Conservative Senate.—*Biographie Moderne*. n

cit of State, the discussions were sincere and pre-eminently useful.

The project of the Legion of Honour was strongly attacked. Here, as in the affair of the Concordate, the First Consul was, perhaps, in advance of the intelligence of the day. That generation, which very soon afterwards prostrated itself before the altars, which very soon afterwards covered itself with decorations with boyish eagerness, still resisted, for the moment, the re-establishment of public worship and the institution of the Legion of Honour.

It was even found in the Council of State, that the institution of the Legion of Honour was a blow to equality, that it was the recommencement of an abolished aristocracy, that it was too avowed a return to the *ancien régime*. The object so elevated, so positive, indicated by the oath, that is to say, the maintenance of the principles of the Revolution, affected its opponents but slightly. They asked if the obligations contained in that oath were not common to all citizens, if all were not to concur in defending the territory, the principles of equality, the national property, &c.; and if to particularize this obligation for some was not to render it less binding on others. It was asked if this Legion had not too exceptionable an object, as, for instance, that of defending a power to which it should be attached by the link of benefits. Others, citing the Constitution, objected that it had spoken of a system of military rewards only. They added, that the institution would be better understood, would raise fewer objections, if it had for its end the rewarding of warlike actions exclusively; that actions of this kind were so much matters of fact, so easily appreciable, so generally recompensed in all countries, that nobody could find fault if it were confined to this clear and limited object.

The First Consul replied to all these objections with the strongest arguments. "What is there aristocratic," said he, "in a distinction purely personal, and merely for life, bestowed on the man who has displayed merit, whether civil or military; bestowed on himself alone, bestowed for his life only, and not passing to his children? Such a distinction is the reverse of aristocratic, for the essential of aristocratic titles is, that they are transmissible from the man who has earned them to his son, who has done nothing to acquire them. An order is the most personal, the least aristocratic, of institutions. But, it may be said, after this will come something else. That is possible," added the First Consul, "but let us first see what is given to us; we will judge of the remainder afterwards. It is asked what this legion of six thousand individuals signifies, and what are to be its duties? It is asked, if it has other duties than those imposed on the whole mass of the citizens, who are all equally bound to defend territory, constitution, equality. In the first place, to this question one may reply, that all citizens must defend their common country, and that, nevertheless, there is an army on which that duty is more particularly imposed. Would it then be astonishing if in the army there should be a *corps d'élite*, from which would be expected more devotion to its duties,

and more disposition to the grand sacrifice of life? But, do you want to know what this legion is to be?" exclaimed the First Consul, returning to his favourite idea; "here is an explanation. It is an essay at organization for the men, originators or partisans of the Revolution; who are neither emigrants nor Vendéans, nor priests. The *ancien régime*, so battered by the ram of the Revolution, is more entire than is believed. All the emigrants hold one another by the hand; the Vendéans are still secretly enrolled; and with the words legitimate king, religion, there might in an instant be assembled thousands of arms, which would be raised, depend upon it, if their fatigue and the strength of the government did not restrain them. The priests form a body, not very friendly, at bottom, to us all. It is needful that, on their side, the men who have taken part in the Revolution should be united, bonded together, should form, too, a solid combination, and cease to depend on the first accident which might strike one single head. You had an exceedingly narrow escape from being hurled back into chaos by the explosion of the 3d Nivôse, and given up defenceless to your enemies. For ten years we have been only making ruins: we must now found an edifice, wherein to establish ourselves, and to dwell. These 6000 legionaries, composed of all the men who have effected the Revolution, who have defended it after having made it, who wish to continue it in all that it has reasonable and just; these 6000 legionaries, officers and soldiers, civil functionaries, magistrates, endowed with the national possessions, that is to say, with the patrimony of the Revolution, are one of the strongest guarantees that you can give to the new order of things. And then, depend upon it, the struggle is not over with Europe; be assured, that that struggle will begin again. Is it not a happiness to have in our hands so easy a means of keeping up, of exciting, the bravery of our soldiers? In place of that chimerical 1,000,000,000 francs which you would not even dare to promise again, you may, with only 3,000,000 francs of revenue in national property, raise up as many heroes to uphold the Revolution as were found for undertaking it."

Such were the arguments of the First Consul. There were others besides, destined for those who insisted that the new order was purely military, and decreed exclusively to the army. "It is not my intention," said he, "to found a government of prætorians; it is not my intention to reward soldiers only. My notion is that all sorts of merit are brothers; that the courage of the president of the Convention, resisting the populace, ought to be ranked with the courage of Kléber, mounting to the assault of St. Jean d'Acre. People talk of the terms of the Constitution. They ought not to suffer themselves to be so fettered by words. The Constitution was desirous of embracing every thing, and has not always succeeded in doing so: it is our province to supply what is deficient. It is right that civil virtues should have their share of reward, as well as the military virtues. Those who oppose this course reason like barbarians. It is the

religion of brute force that they recommend to us. But intelligence has its rights before those of force: force itself is nothing without intelligence. In the heroic ages, the general was the strongest and the most dexterous man in person; in civilized times, the general is the most intelligent of the brave. When we were at Cairo, the Egyptians could not comprehend how it should be that Kléber, with his advantages of person, was not commander-in-chief. When Murad Bey had closely observed our tactics, he could comprehend that I, and no other, ought to be the general of an army so conducted. You reason like the Egyptians, when you pretend to confine rewards to military valour. The soldiers," added the First Consul, "the soldiers reason better than you. Go to their bivouacs: listen to them. Do you imagine that it is the tallest of their officers, and the most imposing by his stature, for whom they feel the highest regard? No, it is the bravest. Do you imagine even that the bravest stands first in their esteem? No doubt, they would despise the man whose courage they suspected; but they rank above the merely brave man him whom they consider as the most intelligent. As for myself, do you suppose that it is solely because I am reputed a great general that I rule France? No; it is because the qualities of a statesman and a magistrate are attributed to me. France will never tolerate the government of the sword; those who think so are strangely mistaken. It would require an abject servitude of fifty years before that could be the case. France is too noble, too intelligent a country, to submit to material power, and to inaugurate within her limits that worship of force. Let us honour intelligence, virtue, the civil qualities; in short, let us bestow upon them in all professions the like reward."

These reasons, assigned with warmth and energy, and issuing from the lips of the greatest captain of modern times, at once persuaded and charmed the whole Council of State. They were, it must be confessed, both sincere and interested. The First Consul was desirous that it should be thoroughly understood, especially by the military, that it was not as general alone, but as the man of genius, that he was the ruler of France.

As he was not to be prevailed upon to forego his plan, he was earnestly exhorted to withhold it, upon the plea that it was yet too early; that, having, perhaps, outstripped the march of intelligence in regard to the Concordate, it would be right to pause a moment, and to give public opinion a short respite. He would not listen to any of these counsels. It was his nature to be, in all things, impatient for the result.

The plan relative to the system of public education likewise excited grave discussions in the Council of State. The party in favour of monarchical reaction was not far from wishing for the re-establishment of the religious corporations. The contrary party supported the central schools, and insisted rather on the improvement than the abolition of that system. The latter likewise showed some distrust on account of the 6400 exhibitions left in the gift of the government.

"The ancient corporations are not suited to the present time," said the First Consul; "besides, they are hostile. The clergy accommodates itself to the present government, and prefers it to the Convention and the Directory; but the Bourbons would be much better liked by it. As for the central schools, they no longer exist. They are a cipher. We must create a vast system and organize public education in France. People imagine, perhaps, that it was for the sake of influence that those 6400 exhibitions were proposed. That is looking at the question in a very petty point of view. Of influence, the present government has more than it wants. There is nothing, in fact, that it could not do at this moment, especially if it purposed to react against the Revolution, to destroy what it created, to re-establish what it destroyed. From all quarters this is called for. It is assailed by confidential papers of all kinds, in which each of the writers proposes the restoration of some part or other of the ancient system. We must beware of giving way to such an impulsion. Those 6000 exhibitions are necessary for organizing a new society, and filling it with the spirit of the age. In the first place, it is necessary to provide for the military and their children. We owe every thing to them. They have received no part of the promised 1,000,000,000. The least we can do is to insure to them a subsistence. Those exhibitions are an indispensable supplement to their slender pay. The civil functionaries, on their part, deserve to be rewarded and encouraged, when they have served faithfully. Besides, they are as poor as the military. Both will give us their children to educate, to fashion according to the new system. The 4000 exhibitions which we take in the boarding-schools will also be a nursery of subjects, which we shall secure for the same purpose. It behoves us to found a new society upon the principles of civil equality, in which every one finds his place, which presents neither the injustices of feudalism nor the confusion of anarchy. It is urgently necessary to found this society, for it does not exist. In order to found it, we must have materials; the only good materials are the youth of the country. We must, therefore, make up our minds to take them; and if we do not draw them to us by the bait of gratuitous education, the parents will not give them to us of their own motion. We are all suspected, we authors, accomplices, or defenders of the Revolution: so changeable are nations! so weaned are people from the illusions of '89! We shall not readily have the children of good families given to us, unless we take measures to attract them. If we were to found lycæums without exhibitions, they would be a hundred times more deserted than the central schools; for parents can send their children, without fear, to public courses, in which Latin and mathematics are taught; but they would not easily send them to boarding-schools, completely under the control of the supreme authority. There is but one way of drawing them, that is by exhibitions. And then, the inhabitants of the recently incorporated departments must be made Frenchmen

too. To accomplish this, there is again but one way, that is, to take their children, even somewhat against their will, and to place them with the sons of your military officers, of your functionaries, and of your families in narrow circumstances, whom the advantages of a gratuitous education shall have disposed to a confidence which they would not naturally have. Those children will then learn our language; they will imbibe our spirit; we shall thus blend together the French of past times and the French of the present day; the French of the centre, and the French of the banks of the Rhine, the Scheldt, and the Po."

These profound reasons, repeated in more than one meeting, and in a thousand different forms, and merely the substance of which we record here, gained acceptance for the *projet de loi*. M. Fourcroy was charged to carry it to the Legislative Body, and to support it in the discussion.

This bill (*projet*) and that of the Legion of Honour were submitted to the Legislative Body nearly at the same time; for the First Consul would not suffer this short session to pass without laying the principal foundations of his new edifice. The law relative to public instruction met with no great obstacles; and, supported by M. Fourcroy, who, with the First Consul, was half its author, it was adopted by a considerable majority. In the Tribunal, it obtained eighty white balls against nine black ones; in the Legislative Body two hundred and fifty-one against twenty-seven. But the law relative to the Legion of Honour was not so favourably received. In both assemblies it met with an equally violent resistance. Lucien Bonaparte was nominated Reporter, and, from the warmth with which he took up its defence, it was but too evident that he was defending a family idea. The institution was vehemently attacked in the Tribunal by Messrs. Savois-Rollin and de Chauvelin, the latter making a point, in a manner, of defending the principle of equality, notwithstanding the name which he bore. Lucien, who had a talent for public speaking, but who had not exercised it sufficiently, replied with little temper and moderation, and contributed much to indispose the Tribunal. In spite of the sifting which that body had undergone, the *projet*, when presented, obtained only fifty-six white balls against thirty-eight black ones. In the Legislative Body, the discussion, though turning entirely one way, since the Tribunal, having adopted the proposition of the government, had sent only orators to support it, the discussion failed to gain many minds. There were only 166 favourable votes against 110 contrary. The *projet de loi* was, therefore, adopted, but rarely had the minority been so strong and the majority so weak, even before the exclusion of the opposition members. The reason was, because the First Consul had shocked the sentiment of equality, the only one which survived him in men's hearts. This sentiment took alarm, unjustly, no doubt, for there was nothing less aristocratic than an institution which had for its object to decree to soldiers and men of science a distinction merely for life, and the same that was to be

worn by generals and princes. But every sentiment, when violent, is susceptible and jealous. The First Consul had proceeded too hastily; and this he admitted—"We ought to have waited," said he, "that is true. But we were right; and when one is in the right one ought to be able to risk something. Besides, this *projet* was not well supported; proper stress was not laid on the best arguments. Had they been urged with truth and energy, the opposition would have given way."

The conclusion of this prolific session approached; and yet the treaty of Amiens had not been carried to the Legislative Body, to be converted by it into a law. This important act was reserved for the last. It was intended to serve, in some measure, as a crown to the works of the First Consul, and to the deliberations of that extraordinary session. It was considered, moreover, as an occasion for the display of the public gratitude to the author of all the blessings which the nation enjoyed.

For some time past, in fact, people had been asking themselves if some signal testimony of national gratitude was not to be given to the man who, in two years and a half, had drawn France out of chaos, and reconciled her with Europe, with the Church, with herself, and who had already almost completely organized her. This feeling of gratitude was universal and deserved. It was easy to make this subservient to the secret wishes of the First Consul—wishes which consisted in obtaining, in perpetuity, the power that had been conferred on him for ten years. The minds of people in general were, moreover, made up on this point; and, with the exception, of a small number of royalists or Jacobins, nobody would have wished that the supreme power should fall into other hands than those of General Bonaparte. The indefinite continuance of his authority was considered as the simplest and most inevitable matter. It was easy, therefore, to convert this disposition of minds into a legal act; and if, eighteen months before, when the famous "Parallel between Caesar, Cromwell, and General Bonaparte," provoked too early a discussion on this point, some repulsion was met with, that was no longer the case. There needed but a word to be said, to cause a real sovereignty to be offered to the First Consul, under whatever title and whatever form he pleased. It would have been sufficient to choose any suitable occasion, and to put forward the proposition, to induce its immediate adoption.

The moment when so many memorable acts succeeded close upon the heels of each other, was, in reality, that which the First Consul in his calculations, his friends in their interested impatience, and considerate minds in their foresight, had designated, and which the public, simple and sincere in its sentiments, was ready to accept, for a great manifestation. General Bonaparte wished for the supreme power; that was natural and excusable. In doing good, he had followed the impulse of his genius; and, in doing it, he had hoped for its reward. There was nothing culpable in that, more especially as, in his conviction and in reality, an omnipotent chief would be re-

quired for a long time to come, in order to complete that good. In a country which could not do without a strong and creative authority, it was legitimate to aspire to the supreme power, when a man was the greatest of his age, and one of the greatest men of all ages. Washington, amidst a democratic, republican, exclusively commercial, and, for a long period, pacific society—Washington was right to show but little ambition. In a society, republican by accident, monarchical by nature, surrounded by enemies, thenceforth military, unable to govern and to defend itself without unity of action, General Bonaparte was right in aspiring to the supreme power, no matter under what title. He was wrong, not in assuming the dictatorship, at that time necessary, but in not having always employed it as he did in the first years of his career. General Bonaparte carefully concealed in his heart desires which were plainly perceived by all, even by the simplest of the people. If he communicated them to his brothers, that was as much as he did. He never said that the title of First Consul for ten years had ceased to satisfy him. It is true that, when the question presented itself in a theoretic form, when the necessity for a strong authority was spoken of in a general manner, he launched out, and expressed his ideas on that subject. But never did he conclude to demand a prolongation of power for himself. At once dissembling and trustful, he communicated certain things to some, certain things to others, and concealed something from all. To his colleagues, especially to M. Cambacérès, whose extraordinary prudence he appreciated, and to Messrs. Fouché and De Talleyrand, to whom he granted a great share of influence, he spoke explicitly on all that concerned the public affairs, much more than to his brothers, to whom he was far from intrusting the secrets of the state. On points that touched him personally, on the contrary, he said little, either to his colleagues or to his ministers, and much to his brothers. Still, he had not disclosed even to them the secret ambition of his heart; but it was so easy to be guessed, and the members of his family were so anxious to contribute towards its accomplishment, that they spared him the trouble of being the first to open his mind on the subject. They talked to him incessantly about it, and they left him the more convenient position of having to moderate, rather than to excite, zeal for his aggrandisement. Accordingly, they assured him that the time was come for constituting, in his favour, something better than an ephemeral, a transient, power; that he ought to think of attributing to himself one that was perfectly solid and durable. Joseph, with the peaceable mildness of his character; Lucien, with the petulance of his nature, tended openly to the same end. They had, for confidants and co-operators, the men with whom they were intimate, and who, either in the Council of State or in the Senate, shared their sentiments from conviction, or from a desire to please. Messrs. Regnault, Laplace, Talleyrand, and Roderer, the latter always the most ardent in that vote, were frankly of opinion that monarchy ought to be restored,

the sooner and the more completely the better. M. de Talleyrand, the calmest, but not the least active of them, was very partial to monarchy, elegant and brilliant, as in the palace of Versailles; but yet without the Bourbons, with whom he, at that time, deemed himself incompatible. He was incessantly repeating, with an authority which could belong to none but himself, that, for negotiating with Europe, it would be much easier to treat in the name of a monarchy than of a republic; that the Bourbons were troublesome and disesteemed guests for the sovereigns; that General Bonaparte, with his glory, his power, his courage in repressing anarchy, was for them the most desirable, the most expected, of all sovereigns; that, as for himself, the minister for foreign affairs, he affirmed that, to add, no matter how, to the present authority of the First Consul was conciliating, so far from offending Europe. These intimate confidants of the Bonaparte family had largely discussed among themselves the question of the moment. Still, to vault at one leap into a sovereignty, whether it were to be called empire or royalty, appeared very great temerity. Perhaps it would be better to attain it by passing through several intermediate stages. Now, without changing the title of First Consul, which was more convenient, an equivalent to royal power, and an equivalent even to hereditary succession, might be given to him—this was the consulship for life, with the authority to appoint his successor. By making a few modifications in the Constitution, modifications easy to be obtained from the Senate, which had become a sort of constituent power, it was possible to create a real sovereignty, under a republican title. There would even be secured, by the faculty of appointing a successor, the only actually desirable advantages of hereditary succession: for, the First Consul having no children, having only brothers and nephews, it would be better to invest him with the right of choosing from among them the one whom he should judge most worthy to succeed his power.

This idea, appearing the wisest and the most prudent, seemed to be adopted in preference by the Bonaparte family. That family was, at the moment, extremely agitated. The brothers of the First Consul, who had on their brows a ray of his glory, but who were not satisfied with that, and desired to see him a real monarch, that they might become princes by the right of blood, were very restless, complaining that they were nothing, that they had contributed to the elevation of their brother, but had not a rank in the state proportionate to their merit and their services. Joseph, of a more quiet disposition, satisfied with the part of ordinary negotiator of peace, wealthy, and held in consideration, was less impatient. Lucien, who gave himself out for republican, was, nevertheless, the one who showed most anxiety to see the sovereign power of his brother erected on the ruins of the republic. Quite recently, he had refused to dine at Madame Bonaparte's, saying that he would go when a place should be marked out there for the brothers of the First Consul. In the bosom of

that family, Madame Bonaparte, more worthy of interest, because she felt none of those ambitious aspirations, but dreaded them, on the contrary—Madame Bonaparte was, as usual, more alarmed than pleased at the changes which were preparing. She was afraid, as we have already observed, that her husband would be urged to ascend too hastily the steps of that throne on which she had beheld the Bourbons seated, and on which it appeared incredible to her that any other persons could sit. She was apprehensive lest inconsiderate brothers, solicitous to share the greatness of their brother, might imprudently accelerate his elevation, and, in making him ascend too quickly, might precipitate her, him, themselves, all together, into an abyss. Relieved, to a certain degree, by the affection of her husband, from the dread of a speedy divorce, she was haunted at the moment by but one image—that of the new Cæsar, stabbed at the moment when he should attempt to place the diadem upon his head.

Madame Bonaparte frankly avowed her fears to her husband, who made her hold her tongue, by sharply enjoining silence. Repulsed by him, she had recourse to those who had any influence over him, beseeching them to oppose the counsels of ambitious and ill-advised brothers; and thus gave to her dislikes and her terrors a mischievous notoriety, which displeased the First Consul.

Among the personages admitted into the circle of this family, Fouché, the minister, entered more than any other into the views of Madame Bonaparte. Not that he had more pride of sentiment than the men by whom the First Consul was surrounded, and that he was the only one of them all who sought not to please the inevitable master—nothing of the sort. But he possessed great shrewdness: he saw with apprehension the impatience of the Bonaparte family; he heard more closely than any one else the subdued murmurs of the vanquished republicans, who were not numerous, but indignant at so speedy a usurpation; and he himself, amidst this agitation, felt some emotion on account of what was about to be undertaken. Though he had no wish to forfeit the confidence of the First Consul, which, on the contrary, he was more desirous than ever to retain, since the First Consul was soon likely to be the arbiter of the fate of all, still he allowed part of what he thought to be guessed at. Being on friendly terms with Madame Bonaparte, he had listened to the expression of the alarms with which she was beset, and, fearing the resentment of her husband, had endeavoured to soothe her—"Madam," said he, "keep yourself quiet. You cross your husband to no purpose. He will be consul for life, king, or emperor, all that it is possible to be. Your fears annoy, my advice would irritate him. Let us, then, keep in our places, and leave events, which neither you nor I can prevent, to take their own course."

The *dénouement* of this agitated scene approached in proportion as the extraordinary session of the year X. drew towards a close; and the leaders were heard repeating more frequently and more loudly, that it was necessary to give stability to the supreme power,

and a testimony of gratitude to the benefactor of France and of the world. This *dénouement*, however, could not be brought about in a safe and natural manner without the aid of one man, and that man was the Consul Cambacérés. We have already adverted to his secret, but real and skilfully managed, influence over the mind of the First Consul. His ascendancy over the Senate was equally great. That body paid a real deference to the old lawyer, who had become the confidant of the new Cæsar. M. Sieyès, the creator, in some measure, of the Senate, had at first possessed a certain influence in it. His intention of gaining over that body to the opposition having been very soon discovered and thwarted, M. Sieyès was now nothing more than he had always been; that is to say, a man of a superior mind, but soured, impotent, henceforward confined to the part of finding fault with every thing at his seat at Grosne—the vulgar recompense of his great services. M. Cambacérés, on the contrary, had become the secret director of the senate. As, at the present juncture, General Bonaparte could not proclaim himself consul for life or emperor, because it was necessary that some one body should take the initiative, it was evidently the Senate, and in the Senate the man who directed it, to whom the greatest importance belonged.

M. Cambacérés, though devoted to the First Consul, beheld not without some mortification the change which tended to place him at a still greater distance from his illustrious colleague. Knowing, however, that things would not remain as they were, that it would be lost labour to oppose the desires of General Bonaparte, and that, moreover, in their present limits, those desires were legitimate, M. Cambacérés resolved to interpose spontaneously, for the purpose of causing all this internal agitation to terminate in a reasonable result, and of giving to the government a stable form, which should satisfy the ambition of the First Consul, without too completely effacing those republican forms which were still dear to the hearts of many.

While those around the First Consul were engaged in animated conversation on this subject, he himself listening, and even affecting to keep silence, M. Cambacérés put an end to this state of constraint, by speaking first to his colleague of what was passing. He did not disguise from him the danger of precipitation in an affair of this nature, and the advantage which there would be in retaining a modest and wholly republican form for a power so real and so great as his. Nevertheless, offering him, in his own name, and in the name of the third Consul, Lebrun, an unreserved devotedness, he declared to him, that they were both ready to do whatever he pleased, and to spare him the embarrassment of interfering personally, in a circumstance in which he ought to appear to receive and not to take the title, which it was in contemplation to give him. The First Consul expressed his gratitude for such an overture, admitted the danger that there would be in doing too much or too hastily, declared that he had formed no desire; that he was content with his present position; that he

was not anxious to change it, and should not take any step towards quitting it; that, nevertheless, the constitution of the supreme power was, he thought, precarious, and did not exhibit a sufficient character of solidity and durability; that, in his opinion, some changes ought to be made in the form of the government, but that he was too directly interested in this question to interfere in it; that he should, therefore, wait, and not take any initiative.

M. Cambacérés, in reply to the First Consul, observed that his personal dignity certainly required great reserve, and forbade him ostensibly to take the initiative; but that, if he would thoroughly explain himself to his two colleagues and make them both acquainted with his inmost thoughts, they, when once aware of his intentions, would spare him the trouble of manifesting them, and fall to work without further delay. Whether because he felt a certain embarrassment to avow what he wished, or because he desired more than was destined for him—the sovereignty, perhaps—the First Consul covered himself with fresh veils, and merely repeated that he had no fixed idea, but that it would give him pleasure to see his two colleagues watch over the movement of minds and even direct it, to prevent those imprudences which unskilful friends might commit.

Never would the First Consul avow his idea to his colleague Cambacérés. To the natural restraint which he felt was added an illusion. He conceived that, without his having any occasion to interfere, people would come and lay a crown at his feet. This was a mistake. The public, quiet, happy, grateful, was disposed to sanction all that might be done; but, having abdicated, as it were, all participation in public affairs, it was not ready to mix itself up in them, even to express the gratitude with which it was filled. The bodies of the state, with the exception of the interested leaders, were seized with a fit of modesty, at the idea of coming before the face of heaven, to abjure those republican forms which they had but recently sworn to uphold. Many persons, not versed in the secrets of politics, went so far as to imagine that the First Consul, content with the omnipotence which he enjoyed, especially since he had got rid of the opposition of the Tribunalate, would be satisfied with the power to do whatever he pleased, and assume to himself the easy glory of being a new Washington, with far more genius and glory than the American Washington. Thus, when the leaders asserted that nothing had been done for the First Consul, who had done so much for France, certain simple-minded men innocently replied, "What would you have us do with him? what would you have us offer him? What recompense would be adequate to the services which he has rendered? His true recompense is his glory." M. Cambacérés was too discreet to revenge himself for the dissimulation of the First Consul, by leaving things in this stagnation. It was necessary to settle the matter; and he resolved to set about it immediately. In his opinion, and in that of many other enlightened men, a prolongation of power for ten years conferred on the First Consul, which, with the

seven years remaining of the first period, would make the total duration of his consulship amount to seventeen, would be quite sufficient. This would, in fact, be thwarting those enemies, whether in France or in Europe, who should have calculated on the legal term of his power. But M. Cambacérés was well aware that the First Consul would not be satisfied with this, that something more must be offered him, and that, with the consulship for life, accompanied by the faculty of nominating his successor, all the advantages of hereditary monarchy would be obtained, without the inconveniences of a change of title, without the displeasure which this change might excite in many honest men. He stopped short, therefore, at this idea, which he strove to propagate in the Senate, in the Legislative Body, and in the Tribunalate. But, if there were many members ready to vote any thing, there were others who hesitated, and who were for granting no more than a prolongation of ten years.

The First Consul had deferred till this day, and intentionally, the presentation of the treaty of Amiens to the Legislative Body, to be converted into law. M. Cambacérés, comprehending that this was the circumstance which was to be used to draw forth a general acclamation of the proposed changes, made arrangements for producing such a result. The 6th of May—Floréal 16—had been fixed for carrying to the Legislative Body the treaty which completed the general peace. M. Chabot de l'Allier, president of the Tribunalate, was one of the friends of the Consul Cambacérés. The latter sent for him, and concerted with him the course to be pursued. It was agreed between them that, when the treaty should be carried from the Legislative Body to the Tribunalate, M. Siméon should propose a deputation to the First Consul, to testify the satisfaction of that assembly; that the president, Chabot de l'Allier, should then quit the chair, and propose the following vote: "The Senate is invited to give the Consuls a testimony of the national gratitude."

Things being thus arranged, on the 6th of May—16th Floréal—the *projet de loi* was carried by three councillors of state to the Legislative Body; these were Messrs. Roederer, Bruix (admiral,) and Bertier. In general, bills (*projets*) were communicated purely and simply by the Legislative Body to the Tribunalate; this time, in consequence of the importance of the object, the government resolved to communicate directly to the Tribunalate the treaty submitted to the legislative deliberations. Three councillors of state, Regnier, Thibau deau, and Bigot Préameneu, were charged with this commission. No sooner had they finished making this communication, than Siméon, the tribune, applied for leave to speak. "Since the government," said he, "has communicated to us in so solemn a manner the treaty of peace concluded with Great Britain, we ought to respond to this procedure by one of a similar nature. I propose that a deputation be sent to the government, to congratulate it on the re-establishment of the general peace." This

¹ CHABOT DE L'ALLIER. This gentleman must be carefully distinguished from the bloody ruffian, F. Chabot, of the Reign of Terror. N. W. S.

proposition was immediately adopted. The president, Chabot de l'Allier, having given up the chair to M. Stanislas de Girardin, proceeded to the Tribune, and spoke as follows:—

"Among all nations, public honours have been decreed to men who, by splendid actions, have honoured their country, and saved it from great dangers.

"What man ever had stronger claims to the national gratitude than General Bonaparte?

"What man, whether at the head of armies, or at the head of the government, reflected greater honour upon the country and rendered it more signal services?

"His valour and his genius have saved the French people from the excesses of anarchy and the miseries of war, and the French people is too great, too magnanimous, to leave such benefits without a great reward.

"Tribunes, be its organs. To us it belongs more especially to take the initiative, when the point is to express, in so memorable a circumstance, the sentiments and the will of the French people!"

M. Chabot de l'Allier concluded this speech by proposing to the Tribune the vote of some great manifestation of gratitude towards the First Consul.

He proposed, moreover, to communicate this wish to the Senate, to the Legislative Body, and to the government. The proposition was adopted unanimously.

This deliberation was soon known to the Senate, and that body immediately decided that a special commission should be formed, in order to present its ideas concerning the testimony of national gratitude suitable to be given to the First Consul.

The deputation which Siméon, the tribune, had proposed to send to the government was received on the following day, the 7th of May—17th Floréal—at the Tuileries. The First Consul was surrounded by his colleagues, a great number of high functionaries, and generals. His attitude was grave and modest. M. Siméon was the spokesman. He celebrated the exploits of General Bonaparte, and the prodigies of his government, greater than those of his sword; he attributed to him the victories of the republic, the peace which had followed them, the re-establishment of order, the return of prosperity, and, at length concluding his address, "I must break off," he said, "I am afraid that I shall appear to praise, when all I aim at is to be just, and to express in a few words a profound sentiment, which ingratitude alone could have stifled. We expect the first body of the nation to stand forward as the interpreter of the general sentiment, the expression of which only the Tribune is permitted to wish and to vote for."

The First Consul, having thanked Siméon, the tribune, for the sentiments which he had just expressed towards him, and said that he regarded this as a result of the more cordial communications established between the government and the Tribune, thus making a direct allusion to the changes effected in that body, the First Consul finished with these noble words: "As for me, I received with deep gratitude the wish expressed by the Tribune.

I desire no other glory than that of having completely performed the task imposed upon me. I aspire to no other reward than the affection of my fellow-citizens: happy, if they are thoroughly convinced that the evils which they may experience will always be to me the severest of misfortunes; that life is dear to me solely for the services which I am able to render to my country; that death itself will have no bitterness for me, if my last looks can see the happiness of the republic as firmly secured as its glory."

The only point now left was to decide upon the testimony of gratitude that was to be given to General Bonaparte. About the nature of it there could be no doubt: everybody was fully aware that it was by an extension of power that the nation would have to pay the illustrious general for the immense benefits which it had received from him. Some simple minds, however, both in the Tribune and in the Senate, imagined, when voting, that the public testimony in contemplation was a statue or a monument. But these simple minds were very few in number. The mass of the tribunes and of the senators knew perfectly well what sort of an expression of gratitude was expected. During that and the following day, the Tuileries and the hotel of M. Cambacérés, who resided out of the palace, were thronged. The senators came, eagerly inquiring how they were to act. Their zeal was warm; it was only necessary to speak, and they were ready to decree whatever was desired. One of them even went to Cambacérés, and said, "What does the general want? Does he wish to be king? Only let him say so: I and my colleagues of the Constituent are quite ready to vote the re-establishment of royalty, and more willingly for him than for others, because he is the most worthy." Curious to learn the real sentiments of the First Consul, the senators approached as near to him as they could, and tried in a hundred ways to obtain a single word from his lips, however slightly significant. But he took good care not to reveal his wishes even to Laplace, the senator, who was one of his particular friends, and who, on that account, had been desired to sound his secret intentions. He always replied, that any thing they did, whatever it might be, would be received with gratitude, and that he had not fixed his mind upon any thing. Some wished to know if a prolongation of ten years would be agreeable to him. He replied, with affected humility, that any testimony of the public confidence, whether that or any other, would be sufficient for him, and fill him with satisfaction. The senators, having learned nothing from such communications, returned to the Consuls Cambacérés and Lebrun, to inquire what course they were to pursue. "Appoint him consul for life," replied they; "that is the best thing you can do." "But it is said that he does not wish for it," replied the most simple "and that a prolongation for ten years will satisfy him. Why go further than he wishes?" Lebrun and Cambacérés had difficulty to persuade them. The latter apprized the First Consul of it. "You are wrong," said he, "not to explain yourself. Your enemies, for you

have some left, in spite of your services, even in the Senate, will abuse our reserve." The First Consul appeared neither surprised, nor even flattered, by the eager officiousness of the senators. "Let them alone," he replied to M. Cambacérés; "the majority of the Senate is always ready to do more than it is asked. They will go farther than you imagine."

M. Cambacérés answered that he was mistaken. But it was impossible to overcome that stubborn dissimulation, and, as we shall see, the consequences were singular. Notwithstanding the intimations of Messrs. Cambacérés and Lebrun, many good men, who thought it more convenient to give less than more, imagined that the First Consul considered a prolongation of ten years as an ample testimony of the public confidence, and as a sufficient consolidation of his power. The Sieyès party, always extremely spiteful, had roused on this occasion, and was clandestinely exerting itself. The senators who were secretly connected with this party circumvented their wavering colleagues, and affirmed that the sentiments of the First Consul were known; that he would be content with a prolongation for ten years; that he preferred it to any thing else; that everybody knew, moreover, that it was rather by himself than by this combination that the public power was consolidated, the republic upheld, and the dignity of the nation saved. As in the affair of the elections to the Senate, the gallant Lefebvre was one of those who listened to these persuasions, and who imagined that, in voting for a prolongation of ten years, they were doing what General Bonaparte wished. They had been forty-eight hours deliberating. It was necessary to bring the affair to a conclusion. Lanjuinais, the senator, with the courage of which he had exhibited so many proofs, attacked what he called the flagrant usurpation with which the republic was threatened. His speech was listened to with pain and as something supererogatory. Skillful enemies had prepared a better manœuvre. They had gained a majority in favour of the plan for prolonging the powers of the First Consul for ten years. This resolution was accordingly adopted on the 8th of May—18th Floréal—in the evening. Lefebvre hurried among the first to the Tuileries, to report what had been done, conceiving that he should bring most agreeable intelligence. It arrived from all quarters, and produced a surprise equally unseen and painful.

The First Consul, surrounded by his brothers, Joseph and Lucien, learned this result with the warmest displeasure. At the first moment, he thought of nothing less than refusing the offer of the Senate. He sent immediately for his colleague Cambacérés, who hastened to him forthwith. Too wise and too prudent to exult over his own foresight and the fault of the First Consul, he said that what had happened was, no doubt, disagreeable, but might be easily repaired; that, above all things, it was necessary not to show any ill-humour; that in twice twenty-four hours every thing might be changed; but for this it was requisite to give the affair a new face, and this he undertook to do.—"The Senate offers you a pro-

longation of power," said M. Cambacérés; answer that you are very thankful for such an offer, but that it is not from it, but from the suffrage of the nation that you should hold your authority; that it is from the nation, alone, that you can receive the prolongation of it; and that you will consult it by the same means that were employed for the adoption of the consular Constitution, that is to say, by registers opened throughout all France. We will then have drawn up by the Council of State the form that is to be submitted to the national sanction. By this act of deference to the sovereignty of the people, we shall obtain the substitution of one plan instead of another. We will put the question, not whether General Bonaparte is to receive a prolongation of the consular power for ten years, but whether he is to be invested with the consulship for life. If the First Consul were to do such a thing himself," added M. Cambacérés, "too great a shock would be given to decorum. But I, who am second consul, and wholly disinterested in this affair, can give the impulsion. Let the general set out publicly for Malmaison; I will remain alone in Paris; I will convoke the Council of State, and I will instigate the Council of State to draw up the new proposition which is to be submitted to the acceptance of the nation."

This clever expedient was adopted with great satisfaction by General Bonaparte and by his brothers. M. Cambacérés was warmly thanked for his ingenious combination, and charged with the entire management of the affair. It was agreed that the First Consul should leave Paris next day, after drawing up himself, with M. Cambacérés, the answer to the message.

That answer was composed on the following morning, the 9th of May—19th Floréal—by M. Cambacérés and the First Consul, and addressed immediately to the Senate in reply to its message.

"Senators," said the First Consul, "the honourable proof of esteem given in your deliberation of the 18th will remain for ever engraven on my heart.

"In the three years that have just elapsed, Fortune has smiled upon the republic; but Fortune is fickle: and how many men whom she has loaded with her favours have lived a few years too long!

"The interest of my glory and that of my happiness would seem to have marked the term of my public life at the moment when the peace of the world is proclaimed.

"But the glory and the happiness of the citizen ought to be silent when the interest of the state and the public partiality call him.

"You judge that I owe a new sacrifice to the people; I will make it, if the wish of the people commands what your suffrage authorizes."

The First Consul, without explaining himself, indicated pretty plainly that he did not accept the resolution of the Senate precisely as it stood. He set out immediately for Malmaison, leaving to his colleague Cambacérés the task of terminating that important affair agreeably to his wishes. The latter summoned to him the councillors of state who were most accustomed to second the views of the government, and concerted with them what was to be

done at the meeting of the council. On the following day, May 10th—20th Floréal—an extraordinary meeting of the Council of State was held. The two consuls, Cambacérés and Lebrun, and all the ministers, excepting M. Fouché, attended this meeting. M. Cambacérés presided. He explained the object of the meeting, and appealed to the wisdom of that great body in the important circumstance in which the government was placed. Messrs. Bigot de Préameneu, Roderer, Regnault, Portalis, spoke immediately afterwards, maintained that the stability of the government was at that moment the most urgent want of the state; that foreign powers, for the purpose of treating with France, that public credit, commerce, manufactures, to recover their prosperity, had need of confidence; that the perpetuity of the power of the First Consul was the surest medium of inspiring them with it; that that authority, conferred for ten years, was an ephemeral authority, without solidity, without greatness, because it was without duration; that the Senate, cramped by the Constitution, had not deemed it possible to add a prolongation of more than two years to the power of the First Consul; but that, in addressing themselves to the national sovereignty, as had been done in regard to all anterior constitutions, they should no longer be cramped by the existing law, because they should go back to the source of all laws; and that it was necessary to put purely and simply this question: **SHALL THE FIRST CONSUL BE CONSUL FOR LIFE?**

Dubois, prefect of police, member of the Council of State, a man of a generally decided and independent character, acquainted the assembly with the opinion prevailing in Paris. In all quarters the proposition of the Senate was deemed ridiculous; people said that France needed a government; that one had been at last found, strong, able, fortunate, and that this ought to be preserved; that one ought not to have been able to meddle with the Constitution, but if it was to be meddled with, one had better do so once for all, and organize that government in such a manner as to retain it for ever. What Dubois, the prefect, reported was true. Public opinion was so favourable to the First Consul, that people were universally for settling the question at once, and giving to his power the duration of his life. After these various speeches, M. Cambacérés asked if any member had objections to make; and, as the oppositionists, to the number of five or six, such as Messrs. Berlier, Thibadeau, Emery, Dessoles, Berenger, were silent, he put the resolution to the vote, and it was adopted by an immense majority. It was, therefore, resolved that a public vote should be called for on the question, **SHALL NAPOLEON BONAPARTE BE CONSUL FOR LIFE?**

This resolution being taken, M. Roderer, who was the boldest of all the members of the monarchical party, proposed to add a second question to the first: it was this—**SHALL THE FIRST CONSUL HAVE THE FACULTY OF APPOINTING HIS SUCCESSOR?** M. Roderer was extremely tenacious in regard to this question, and very justly. If they acted with sincerity, if they harboured no after-thought of recurring

by and by to what they were doing that day, if in short, they wished to constitute the new power definitively, the faculty of appointing a successor was the best equivalent to hereditary succession, sometimes superior in its effects to hereditary succession itself; for, it is the expedient which gave to the world the reign of the Antonines. A consul for life, with the faculty of appointing his successor, was a real monarchy under a republican appearance. It was a fine and a powerful government, which, at least, saved the dignity of the present generation, which had sworn to live republican or to die. M. Roderer, who was obstinate in his ideas, insisted on the second question being put. It was adopted, like the preceding. The next point was to decide on the form to be given to both. It was thought that this appeal made to the French people, by means of the registers opened in the communes, was an act which ought to belong to the government, for it was, in some measure, a mere convocation; that it was, therefore natural that it should be discussed in the Council of State; that the publication of this deliberation, which had taken place in the presence of the second and third Consuls, and in the absence of the first, saved all conveniences; that nothing more was now wanting but to put it into proper form. A commission composed of several councillors of state was directed, before the assembly separated, to draw up the result of the deliberation. This commission fell to work immediately, and returned in an hour with the act destined for publication on the following day.

That act was as follows:—

"The Consuls of the Republic, considering that the resolution of the First Consul is a striking homage paid to the sovereignty of the people; that the people, consulted on its dearest interests, ought to know no other limit than its interests themselves, decree as follows, &c. The French people shall be consulted on these two questions,—

"1. **SHALL NAPOLEON BONAPARTE BE CONSUL FOR LIFE?**

"2. **SHALL HE HAVE THE FACULTY OF APPOINTING HIS SUCCESSOR?**

"Registers shall be opened for this purpose at all the *mairies*, at the offices of the clerks of all the tribunals, at the houses of the notaries, and those of all public officers."

The period allowed for giving votes was three weeks.

M. Cambacérés then repaired to the First Consul, to submit to him the resolution of the Council of State. The First Consul, from a disposition of mind difficult to be accounted for, obstinately rejected the second question. "Whom," said he, "would you have me appoint my successor? My brothers! But will France, which has consented to be governed by me, consent to be governed by Joseph or Lucien? Shall I nominate you, Consul Cambacérés, you? Darest you undertake such a task? And then, the will of Louis XIV. was not respected; is it likely that mine would be? A dead man, let him be who he will, is nobody." On this point the First Consul was not to be overcome. He was even angry with M. Roderer, who, without consult

ing any one, following only the impulse of his own mind, had put forward this idea. He therefore ordered the second question relative to the choice of a successor to be erased from the resolution of the Council of State. The motive of the First Consul on this occasion is very obscure. Was it his intention, in leaving a chasm in the organization of the government, to reserve to himself a fresh pretext for again asserting, at a somewhat later period, that the government was without future, without greatness, and that it was necessary to convert it into an hereditary monarchy? or did he dread family rivalries and the tribulations that would be brought upon him by the faculty of choosing a successor from among his brothers and his nephews? Judging from his language at this period, the latter conjecture appears to be nearest the truth. Be this as it may, he retrenched the second question of the act emanating from the Council of State, and, to avoid the loss of time which must have arisen from a new convocation, the deliberation, thus mutilated, was sent to the official journal.

It appeared on the morning of the 11th—21st Floréal—two days after that of the Senate. To announce that such a question had been put to France was to announce that it was resolved upon. If public opinion, which had become passive, did not take the initiative of great resolutions, it might, nevertheless, be relied upon that it would cordially sanction whatever might be proposed to it in favour of the First Consul. It felt for him confidence, admiration, gratitude, all the sentiments which a susceptible and enthusiastic people is capable of feeling for a great man, from whom it has received so many benefits at once. Assuredly, if questions of form had retained any importance at a time in which constitutions had been seen made and re-made so often, it would have been thought singular that, after the Senate had proposed a mere prolongation for ten years, that proposition, emanating from the only authority which had power to make it, should be converted into a proposition of consulship for life, made by a body, which was neither the Senate, nor the Legislative Body, nor the Tribunal, which was but a council dependent on the government. It is true that the Council of State had then a high importance, which rendered it nearly the equal of the legislative assemblies: that the appeal to the national sovereignty was a corrective, which covered all the irregularities of that mode of proceeding, and gave to the Council of State the apparent part of a mere digester of the question to be submitted to France. Besides, at that time, people did not look so closely into things. The result, that is, the consolidation and the perpetuation of the government of the First Consul, was universally agreeable, and the most direct way possible to that result appeared the most natural and the best. The Senate was exposed to some raillery; in fact, it was rather ashamed of not having

better understood the wishes of General Bonaparte, and it kept silence, having nothing to the purpose either to say or to do; for it could neither recall its determination nor appropriate to itself that of the Council of State. As for resisting, it had not the means, and never conceived such an idea. Of course, the torrent was not so general but that censure was to be heard in certain places, for instance, in the obscure retreats in which the stanch republicans hid their despair; in the brilliant hotels of the Faubourg St. Germain, where the royalists detested this new power, which they had not yet begun to serve. But this censure, scarcely distinguishable amidst the chorus of praise which was raised everywhere around the First Consul, and ascended to his ear, was of little effect. Only considerate men, and these are always few in number, could make singular reflections on the vicissitudes of revolutions, on the inconsistency of this generation, overthrowing a royalty of twelve centuries, striving even in its delirium to overthrow all the monarchies in Europe, and now, having got over its worst paroxysms, rebuilding, piece by piece, a demolished throne, and eagerly seeking one to whom to give it. Luckily, it had found for this purpose an extraordinary man. It is not always that nations, in such an emergency, meet with a master who ennobles their inconsistencies to such a degree. The embarrassment of modesty, however, had for a moment seized all minds, that master himself not daring at first to avow his desires, the Senate next not daring to guess and hesitating to gratify them, till the Council of State, throwing off all that false shame, had the courage, for all, to avow what it was necessary to say and to do.

These momentary difficulties soon gave place to a real ovation. The Legislative Body and the Tribunal resolved to go to the First Consul's, to give the signal for adhesions, by proceeding in a body to vote in his hands for the perpetuity of his power. The motive devised for colouring this step was that the members of the Legislative Body and of the Tribunal, being detained during this extraordinary session in their places as legislators, could not be in their communes to vote there. The reason was deemed good, and they repaired in a body to the Tuileries. M. de Vaublanc spoke in behalf of the Legislative Body, and M. Chabot de l'Allier in the name of the Tribunal. It would be tedious to introduce the speeches delivered on this occasion. They invariably expressed the same gratitude and the same confidence in the government of the First Consul. Such an example could not have failed to induce the citizens to vote, if they had needed it; but so high an impulsion was not necessary. They went most cheerfully to the *mairies*, to the notaries, to the offices of the clerks of the tribunals, to inscribe their approving votes in the registers opened to receive them.

* VAUBLANC, VIENNOT V. M. President of the department of Seine et Marne, whence he was deputed to the legislature, in which he became one of the most distinguished moderate members. In 1795 he was condemned to death, but escaped; and was shortly after made deputy to the Council of Five Hundred. On the 18th Fructidor he was proscribed and condemned to transport-

tation, but escaped to Switzerland. He was recalled after the 18th Brumaire, and appointed to the *corps Législatif*, of which he became the questor in 1804. He was afterwards made prefect of the department of Moselle, and in 1805 commander of the Legion of Honour—*Bibliographie Moderne*.

The end of Floréal had arrived. The government hastened to close this short and memorable session by the presentation of the financial laws. The proposed budget was most satisfactory. All the revenues had increased, thanks to the peace, while the expenses of the army and navy were considerably diminished. This budget of the year X. amounted to 500,000,000 frs., 26,000,000 frs. less than that of the year IX.; it was raised to 526,000,000 frs. by the most recent estimates, and if there were added the additional centimes for the service of the departments, which were at that time reckoned separately and amounted to about 60,000,000 frs.; if there were added the expenses of collection, which were not carried to the general budget, because each department of the taxes paid its own expenses, which amounted to 70,000,000 frs., the total might be estimated at 626,000,000 frs. or 630,000,000 frs., the definitive budget of France at this period.

Peace brought with it a saving in certain services, augmentations in some others, but, by manifestly increasing the produce of all the taxes, paved the way to the re-establishment of the balance between the expenditure and the revenue, a balance so desired and so far from being foreseen two years before. The war department, divided into two ministries, that of the *matériel* and that of the *personnel*, was to cost 210,000,000 francs instead of 250,000,000 frs. It will, no doubt, appear astonishing that there should be a difference of only 40,000,000 frs. between a state of war and a state of peace; but it should be recollected that our victorious armies had lived upon a foreign soil, and that, having returned to our own territory, with the exception of about 100,000 men, they were now subsisted by the French treasury. The navy, which at first it had been thought right to fix at 80,000,000 frs. since the conclusion of hostilities, had been raised to 105,000,000 frs. by the First Consul, who was of opinion that a time of peace ought to be employed in organizing the marine of a great state. Other expenses, materially reduced, proved by their reduction the prosperous progress of credit. The obligations of the receivers-general, the origin, utility and success of which have been explained elsewhere, had at first been discounted at only one per cent. per month, and afterwards at three quarters. They were now discounted at one-half per cent. per month, that is at six per cent. per annum. Hence the government had been enabled to reduce, without injustice, the interest of the securities from seven to six per cent. All these savings had reduced the cost of negotiation of the Treasury from 32,000,000 frs. to 15,000,000 frs. No reduction did so much honour to the government; or afforded stronger proof of the credit which it enjoyed. The five per cent. *rente*, which had at first risen from twelve to forty and fifty francs, was at the moment at sixty.

Along with these diminutions of expense, there occurred some augmentations, which were the consequence of the wise financial

* The amount for the year IX. was at first fixed at 415,000,000 frs., then at 526,000,000 frs., and finally at 546,000,000 frs.

arrangements proposed in the year IX., and so unjustly censured by the Tribunal. Government had proposed, as we have said in the proper place, to complete the inscription of the *consolidated* third, that is, the third of the old debt, the only one excepted from the bankruptcy of the Directory. As for the *mobilised* two-thirds, that is to say the unliquidated portion of that debt, it had designed to give them a sort of value by taking them in payment for certain national domains, or by permitting their conversion into five per cent. *consolidated*, at the rate of one-twentieth of the capital, which corresponded with the actual currency. The First Consul, desirous of completing these arrangements as soon as possible, caused it to be decided, by the law of finance of the year X., that the *mobilised* two-thirds should be compulsorily converted into five per cent. *rentes*, at the rate fixed in the law of Ventôse, year IX. The definitive inscription of the *consolidated* third, the conversion of the *mobilised* two-thirds into five per cent., other liquidations yet left to be made for the ancient credits of the emigrants, and for the transfer of the debts of the conquered countries to the Great Book, would make the total of the public debt amount to 59,000,000 or 60,000,000 of five per cent. annuities. Meanwhile, it was of importance to satisfy people's minds respecting the sum to which these various liquidations were likely to raise the public debt. It was therefore decided, by an article of this same budget of the year X., that it should not be raised, either by loan, or in consequence of the liquidations remaining to be completed, to more than 50,000,000 of annuities. It was hoped that the redemptions of the Sinking Fund, largely endowed with national domains, would absorb this foreseen excess of 9,000,000 or 10,000,000 before it had time to be produced. But, at any rate, an article of the budget added that, as soon as the inscriptions should exceed 50,000,000 frs., a redeeming portion should be immediately created for absorbing in fifteen years the sum exceeding the amount henceforward fixed for the national debt.

The title of that debt was also to be regulated. The various denominations of *consolidated third*, *mobilised two-thirds*, *Belgian debt*, and others, were abolished, and in their stead was adopted the single title of five per cent. *consolidated*. It was settled that the debt should be the first thing inscribed in the budget; that the interest of it should be paid before any other expense, and always in the month following the expiration of each half-year. It was estimated that the life-debt, amounting at the moment to 20,000,000 frs., might rise to 24,000,000 frs.; but it was supposed that, the extinctions proceeding as rapidly as the new liquidations, it would always be kept down to the sum of 20,000,000 frs. The civil pensions also were fixed at the amount of 20,000,000 frs. The expenses likely to be further increased were those of the interior for roads and public works, those of the clergy for the successive establishment of new incumbents—expenses rather welcome than to be regretted. As for those of public instruction and the Legion of Honour, they were provided for, as we have

already seen, by an endowment in national domains.

In regard to these increasing expenses, the progress of the revenue afforded a prospect of a still more rapidly increasing income. The customs, the post, the registration, the domains of the state, furnished considerable surpluses. Besides, there was yet left the resource of the indirect taxes, which had been re-established till this moment solely for the profit of the towns and for the service of the hospitals. Grievous complaints had this year been made in the Legislative Body and the Tribunate of the burden of the direct contributions, and had suggested new arguments for the re-establishment of the taxes on articles of consumption. Very accurate calculations had shown in a stronger light than ever the excessive proportions of the direct contributions. The tax on immovable property amounted to 210,000,000 frs., the tax on personal and movable property to 32,000,000 frs., the tax on doors and windows to 16,000 frs., on patents to 21,000,000 frs.; total, 279,000,000 frs., consequently more than half in a budget of receipts of 502,000,000 frs. People compared these sums with those which had been paid during the administration of Messrs. Turgot and Necker, and demanded the re-establishment of a more just proportion between the different contributions. Before 1789, in fact, the tax on immovable and personal property produced 221,000,000 frs., the indirect taxes 294,000,000 frs.; total, 515,000,000 frs. The natural conclusion from these complaints was the re-establishment of the old duties levied on liquors, tobacco, salt, &c. The First Consul was pleased to hear these remonstrances; they furnished him with a powerful reason for a financial creation, long resolved upon in his mind, but not yet mature enough to be proposed.

The state of our finances then was excellent, and it was becoming better regulated every day. The 90,000,000 frs. assigned, by means of a creation of *rentes* for clearing off arrears of V., VI., and VII., anterior to the Consulate, were found to be sufficient; the 21,000,000 frs. devoted to the liquidation of the year VIII., the first year of the Consulate, likewise sufficed for discharging all outstanding demands upon it. Lastly, the expenditure of the year IX., the first that had been regularly fixed, though amounting to 526,000,000 francs, instead of 415,000,000 frs., was totally liquidated by means of the extraordinary increase of the revenue. We have already observed that the estimates of the current expenditure and income, those of the year X., exactly balanced.

To sum up—a debt in perpetual *rentes* of 50,000,000 frs., perfectly regulated, reduced to one denomination, provided for by a sufficient endowment in national domains; a debt in life annuities of 20,060,000 frs., in civil pensions to the amount of 20,000,000 frs.; 210,000,000 frs. assigned to the war department, 105,000,000 frs. to the navy, composed, with other less considerable expenses, a budget of 500,000,000 frs., exclusive of the additional centimes and cost of collection, and of 625,000,000 frs. including those centimes and costs: a budget covered by the revenue, which was manifestly

increasing, without taking into account the re-establishment of the indirect contributions left as a resource for new necessities that might afterwards arise. Thus after ten years of war and of splendid conquests, the estimates reverted to 500,000,000 frs., the budget of 1789, with this difference, that the debt formed a small portion in comparison with the revenue, and that this amount of 500,000,000 frs. raised to 625,000,000 frs. by the additional centimes and the costs of collection, represented all the charges of the country; whereas the 500,000,000 frs. of the budget of Louis XIV. omitted not only the costs of collection, but the revenues of the clergy, the feudal dues, the *corvées*, that is to say, charges to the amount of several hundred millions. If, in 1802, France paid 625,000,000 frs. equally assessed, in 1789 it paid 1,100,000,000 frs. or 1,200,000,000 frs. unequally assessed, with a territory smaller by one-fourth. The Revolution had therefore produced, at least in a material point of view, something besides calamities, to say nothing of the benefit of a complete social reform. In all this financial prosperity there was but one subject for regret; this was the bankruptcy resulting from the paper-money, but in no way imputable to the consular government.

These propositions were not now received, as those of the year IX. had been, by a violent opposition. They satisfied the two legislative assemblies, and were voted with mere observations on the direct and indirect contributions—observations which the government would have dictated itself, if they had not been made spontaneously.

This was the last act of that session of forty-five days devoted to such important objects.

The Tribunate and the Legislative Body broke up on the 20th of May—30th Floréal—leaving France in a state in which she had never yet been, and perhaps never will be again.

At this moment the population was thronging to the *mairies*, to the offices of the clerks of the tribunals, to the notaries, to give an affirmative answer to the question put by the Council of State. The number of the votes that were or were about to be given, was estimated at between 3,000,000 and 4,000,000. This is apparently a small proportion out of a population of 36,000,000 souls, but it is a large one, larger than is expected, and such as is not obtained, in the greater part of the known constitutions, in which three, four, five hundred thousand votes, at most, express the national will. In fact, out of 36,000,000 individuals, half must be deducted as belonging to a sex which has no political rights. Among the remaining 18,000,000, there are aged men and children, who reduce the male and valid population of a country to 12,000,000 at most. It is, therefore, an extraordinary number, if we consider the men labouring with their hands, most of them illiterate, scarcely knowing under what government they live; it is an extraordinary number, 4,000,000 out of 12,000,000, brought to form an opinion, and, above all, to express it.

There were, it is true, some republican and royalist dissentients, who came to give their negative vote, and who, by their presence,

attested the liberty left to everybody. But it was an imperceptible minority. For the rest, whether voting affirmatively or negatively, they were perfectly calm, and produced by their concurrence a movement that was scarcely perceptible, so quiet and content was the whole population.

Around the government, however, there was a sort of fermentation, on account of the changes which could not but be made in the Constitution, in consequence of the prolongation of the consulship for life. On this occasion a thousand different reports originating in the wishes of each party were circulated.

The brothers of General Bonaparte, Lucien in particular, had not entirely renounced the hereditary monarchy, which would at once give them the rank of princes, and place them on a level with the other great functionaries of the state. Of all the persons who took it upon themselves to give an opinion, M. Rœderer was the warmest advocate of monarchical sentiments, much more, however, from natural inclination than from any interested suggestion. He was councillor of state, charged with the public instruction, under the orders of Chaptal, minister of the interior, and he availed himself of this position to transmit to the prefects circulars which, totally foreign to the nature of his office, had a direct relation to the questions which then engaged the government and the public. These circulars, in which certain questions were addressed to the prefects, and the answers indicated, and indicated in an absolutely monarchical spirit, these circulars, not emanating from the minister himself, but yet proceeding from a very high authority, seemed to reveal some secret plan, perhaps originating in a very lofty source. They agitated the minds of the people of the provinces, and gave rise to a thousand rumours.

M. Rœderer, and those who coincided in his ideas, would fain have drawn from the departments a sort of spontaneous wish, that should authorize more boldness than had recently been shown. They did not fail to address to the First Consul urgent solicitations to settle in a bolder manner the questions that were raised. But the First Consul was decided. He thought, with all the discreet friends of the government, that it was sufficient, at least for this time, to establish the consulship for life; that it was monarchy itself, especially if the faculty of designating his successor were added to it. A sufficiently expressive movement of opinion among the men surrounding the supreme power, and among even the most devoted, had warned the First Consul that no more ought to be attempted. He had resolved, therefore, to pause, and he characterized as indiscreet a! that was done and said by the injudicious friends about him, whose zeal was far from displeasing him, but was not shared generally enough to be approved.

He fell to work himself to make some changes in the Constitution, which seemed to him indispensable. Though disposed to find fault with the work of M. Sieyès, he was for retaining the ground-work of it, and merely adding to it certain new conveniences for the government.

In some men a strange disposition of mind was produced. They insisted on the re-establishment of monarchy, since the force of circumstances required it, but that in return there should be granted to France liberties which, in monarchy, are compatible with royalty—that is to say, that there should be given to it purely and simply the English monarchy, with an hereditary royalty and two independent Chambers. On this subject, M. Camille Jordan had published a work, much noticed by the small number of persons who still intermeddled with political questions; for the mass had no other opinion but to let the First Consul do what he pleased. Hence this idea of representative monarchy, which, at the very outset of the Revolution, had presented itself to Messrs. Lally Tollendal and Mounier, as the form necessary for our government, and which, fifty years later, was destined to become the last form, this idea once more appeared to some minds like one of those lofty and distant mountains, which in a long route are seen more than once before they are reached.

The sincere royalists, who wished for monarchy, even without the Bourbons, if the Bourbons were found impracticable, and with General Bonaparte, if it were not practicable unless with him, were strongly of this opinion; so were, also, those of the royalist party, but the latter from different motives. They hoped that, with the elections and a free press, every thing would soon be thrown into confusion, as had been the case under the Directory, and that from this renewal of chaos would at length emerge the legitimate monarchy of the Bourbons, as the necessary term of the calamities of France.

The First Consul had no notion of adopting such a scheme, even though that scheme were to bring with it royalty for himself. It was not merely out of aversion for the resistances that would have opposed such a form of government; it was from sincere conviction of the impossibility of such an establishment in the actual state of things.

Those who are determined to consider him in no other character than a warrior, at most as an administrator, but not as a statesman, imagine that he had no idea of the English Constitution. In his frequent conversations on matters of government, he reasoned with extraordinary sagacity. In the British Constitution there was one thing that displeased him much, and he expressed his sentiments upon it in that energetic language which was peculiar to him: it was to see important affairs of state, such as require, in order to succeed, long meditation, a great consequence in the views, profound secrecy in the execution, given up to publicity, and to the hazards of intrigue or of eloquence.

"Let Messrs. Fox, Pitt, or Addington," said he, "be more clever one than the other in the management of parliamentary intrigue, or more eloquent in one sitting of Parliament, and we shall have war instead of peace; the world will be on fire again; France will destroy England, or be destroyed by her. Give up," he exclaimed, with indignation, "give up the fate of the world to such influences!"—That great

mind, exclusively occupied with the conditions of the due execution of the affairs of state, forgot that, if we will not submit those affairs to parliamentary influences, which, after all, are only the national influences, represented, it is true, by passionate and fallible men, as they all are, they fall under mischievous influences of another kind, under those of a Madame de Maintenon in a devout age, of Madame de Pompadour in a dissolute age; and, even if we have the very transient good fortune to possess a great man, like Frederick or Napoleon, under the influence of ambition, which drains the chance of battles to the very dregs.

The First Consul insisted that such a Constitution required, in the first place, a strong dose of hereditary right, that a king and hereditary peers were necessary, that in France public opinion ran counter to this system, that the people were ready to accept him, General Bonaparte, as a dictator, but that they would not accept him as an hereditary monarch, (which was certainly true at this moment,) that the same sentiments prevailed with regard to the Senate, which no party in the country would consent to make hereditary, although it would grant it extraordinary constitutive power; that the want of stability was felt to such a degree by the nation, that it would readily consent to grant every branch of authority, the most extensive powers, but that these must be for life only; that such was the prevailing opinion amongst reflecting men, that they had not at command all the elements of English royalty, as there existed neither king nor peers; that the senators for life of M. Sieyès, aristocrats of yesterday, most of them without fortune, living upon public salaries, would become ridiculous if it were attempted to transform them into lords as in England; that if, in the absence of these latter, they wished to take the great landed proprietors, they would bring down upon them their most formidable enemies, for at the bottom of their hearts, these were all royalists, more friendly to the English and to the Austrians than to the French; that there was not wherewith to create a second upper chamber; that by taking the best speakers of the Tribune and the silent members of the Legislative Body, there would certainly be, strictly considered, materials for making a lower chamber, but that to make this branch effective, in imitation of England, a free tribune, a free press, and free elections were necessary, and all these would inevitably revive the scenes of the four years of the Directory, of which he had been a witness, and which would never be effaced from his memory; that, at that period, a majority was created in the electoral colleges, which, under pretext of dispersing the men sullied with blood, would only elect men more or less avowed royalists; that, at the same period, there were a hundred journals breathing a spirit of rabid royalism, all with the same

tendency, and that but for the 18th Fructid^{re} but for the strength imparted to the Directory by the army of Italy, they would have contributed to the triumph of this disguised counter-revolution; that soon afterwards, by an inevitable reaction, these royalist elections were succeeded by terrorist elections, which had alarmed all honest men, who demanded that they should be annulled; that, if the door were again opened to these demagogues, one convulsion would succeed another, till the Bourbons and the foreigner triumphed; that a stop must be put to all this, that the torrent must be arrested, and the Revolution brought to an end, by maintaining in power the men who had accomplished it, and by consolidating its just and necessary principles on the firm foundation of the laws.

On this occasion, the First Consul repeated his favourite theme, which consisted in saying that, in order to maintain the Revolution, it was indispensably requisite first to protect its authors, by keeping them at the head of affairs; and that without him they would all have been by this time removed from the scene by the ingratitude of the present generation. "Ask yourselves what has become of Rewbell, Barras, Larévellière! where are they? who thinks of them? no one has been saved but those whom I have taken by the hand, placed in power, supported in spite of the movement which carries us away. Look at M. Fouché, what trouble I had to defend him; M. de Talleyrand inveighs against M. Fouché; but the Malouets,¹ the Talons, the Calottes, who tendered me their plans, and their assistance, would have soon got rid of M. de Talleyrand, if I had chosen to lend myself to it. They tolerate military men because they fear them, and because it is not easy to step into the place of a Lannes and a Masséna at the head of an army. But if they tolerate them at present, will they continue to do so long? I myself, do I not know what they would do with me? Have they not proposed to me to appoint me Grand Constable to Louis XVIII.? Doubtless the spirit of the Revolution is immortal, and would survive the present generation. The Revolution will finally triumph, but will it be by the hands of the society of the Manège!—no! there would be perpetually reactions, revolutions, which would end finally in counter-revolution!

"At present," added the First Consul, "a government must first be formed with the men of the Revolution; with men who have had experience, who have performed services, who have no blood upon their hands, unless it be the blood of the Russians and the Austrians; then we must add to these a small number of men newly raised, duly qualified for employment, or men of the old times, taken from Versailles, if you will, provided that they are also men of capacity, and that they take office as submissive adherents, and not as disdainful

¹ MALOUE. Inspector of the Marine at Toulon, sent deputy from Riom to the States-General, in which he proved himself a steady friend to monarchy. In 1792, he left Paris for London, but on hearing that Louis XVI. was about to be tried, claimed the right of returning to France to defend the king, but the Convention decreed

him an emigrant. After the 18th Brumaire, he returned, and was at first arrested by the minister of police, but soon afterward liberated, and in 1803, appointed commissioner-general of the Marine at Antwerp.—*Biographie Moderne.*

protectors. The Constitution of M. Sieyès is well adapted, with some modifications, for the attainment of this end. We must, above all, consecrate the great principle of the French Revolution, which is civil liberty, that is to say, equal justice in every branch, in legislation, in the tribunals, in the administration, the taxes, military service, and distribution of offices, &c. At present each department is equal to any other department; all Frenchmen are equal alike; every citizen obeys the same law, appears before the same judge, suffers the same punishment, receives the same reward, pays the same taxes, is subject to the same military service, is eligible to and attains the same rank, whatever may be his birth, his religion, or his place of origin. These are the great social results of the Revolution, which are well worth the troubles we have suffered in achieving them, and which we must unalterably maintain. After these results, there is still one thing more, which must be maintained with equal vigour, and that is the greatness of France. The efforts of the press, the speeches from the tribune, no longer side with us, but in other times, they may both be turned in our favour. At present, we stand in need of repose, of order, of prosperity, of well-managed affairs, and the preservation of our external greatness. For the maintenance of this greatness the struggle is not over, it will be renewed; and, to maintain our rank amongst nations, vast strength and perfect unity in the government will be wanting!"

Such was the substance of the successive conversations which the First Consul held with those whom he had permitted to give him their ideas, and with whom he meditated a remodelling of the Consular Constitution.

We can easily recognise in these arguments his habitual mode of thinking. Without shutting his understanding to the future, yet only troubling himself about the present, he saw that the present welfare of France depended upon the union of all parties, upon the maintenance and perfection of social reform accomplished by the Revolution; and, finally, upon the development of the power acquired by our arms. With regard to unrestrained liberty, he rejected it as involving an inevitable recurrence to all our troubles, as an obstacle to all his schemes of improvements, and it left on his mind the impression of a difficult, obscure problem, the solution of which did not concern him, as twelve years' agitation had for a long time to come deprived the nation of any want or wish to renew it. M. Sieyès, with his aristocratic Constitution, borrowed from the republics of the middle ages when on their decline, with his Senate invested with the electoral power, with its list of notables, a sort of unalterable golden book, had hit upon the Constitution best adapted to the situation.

The First Consul took care not to meddle with the Senate; on the contrary, he was anxious to render it more powerful; but he had in view one primary alteration, which, in appearance, was a concession to the popular influence.

The lists of notables, which contained the 500,000 individuals, from whom the councils of the arrondissements and the departments

were chosen, and also the Legislative Bodies, the Tribunal, and the Senate itself, which lists were never altered, except for the purpose of filling up the vacancies caused by death, and those occasioned by the names of parties being struck out as unworthy to remain on them, such as bankrupts, for example; these lists of notables appeared too delusive, and left the government, as would be said at the present day, with no tie in common with the country. They were, moreover, very difficult to frame, as the citizens took no interest in so insignificant a matter.

The First Consul thought that the increase of authority which was about to be granted to him, with some other modifications strengthening the power of the Constitution, ought to be requited by some popular concession, at any rate in appearance. He resolved, therefore, to establish electoral colleges.

Consequently, several different kinds of colleges were suggested. First, meetings of the district were to be convened, consisting of the inhabitants of the district, of the age and quality of citizens, who were to elect two electoral colleges, one of the arrondissement and another of the department. The college of the arrondissement was to be formed in proportion to the population, and was to consist of one individual out of five hundred. The college of the department was to be formed in the same manner, in the ratio of one to every thousand. But the number of electors were not to exceed six hundred, taken from those highest rated to the public taxes.

The two electoral colleges, of the arrondissement and of the department, were to be elected for life, by the assemblies of the districts, which, having once performed this duty, had nothing more to do than fill up the vacancies caused by death, bankruptcy, &c.

The government was to appoint the presidents of all these assemblies, whether district assemblies or electoral colleges. It was to have the power of dissolving an electoral college. In that case the district assemblies were to be convened, in order to re-elect the college which had been dissolved.

The district assemblies, and the two electoral colleges of arrondissement and department were to present candidates to the Consuls, for the offices of *Justices de paix*, and the municipal and departmental authorities. The colleges of the arrondissements were to present two candidates for the vacancies in the Tribunal; the colleges of the departments two candidates for the vacancies in the Senate. Each of these two colleges was also to present two candidates for the vacancies in the Legislative Body, which made together four candidates. So that the Tribunal originated from the council of arrondissement; the Senate originated from the council of department; the Legislative Body from both.

The Senate still exercised the right of choosing the members of the Tribunal, of the Legislative Body, and also of the Senate itself, from the candidates presented.

The nature of the change thus made in the constitution is obvious. In lieu of the lists of notables, completed or modified from time to

time by the whole body of the citizens, electoral colleges for life, appointed by the same entire body, were now to elect the candidates, from which the Senate was to make the selection, as the body which generated all the others. The alteration was not very great, as these electoral colleges for life, sometimes modified, when vacancies occurred through death or bankruptcy, were almost as immutable as the lists of notables, but they occasionally assembled to elect candidates. In this way the citizens recovered some portion of the right of electing the deliberative assemblies. Tumults at elections were, moreover, little to be apprehended by this arrangement.

The Legislative Body and the Tribunal were to be divided into five series, each series going out in rotation every year. The Senate was to fill up the vacancies occasioned by the retiring series, by selecting the new members from among the candidates presented. The colleges for life were afterwards to replace the candidates whom the election of the fifth had absorbed.

After this concession, which at that time appeared so excessive, that the colleagues of the First Consul said broadly, that he must feel very conscious of his own power, very sure of his position, to concede so much to the popular influence; they set about completing the powers of the Senate, in conformity with the inferences which they had deduced from recent events.

The Senate was to retain at first the privilege of electing all the bodies of the state. It was wished, also, to confer upon it a more complete constitutive power. The government had already made it exercise the power, by requiring it to interpret the thirty-eighth article of the Constitution, by calling upon it to pronounce the recall of the emigrants, and by demanding of it a prolongation of the authority of the First Consul. It was convenient to have at hand a constitutive power always ready to create whatever might be necessary.

It was accordingly settled, that the Senate, by means of *senatus-consultes*, called *organic*, should have the power of interpreting the Constitution, in order to perfect it, to perform, in short, every thing which might be necessary to make it work.

It was arranged, also, that, by means of simple *senatus-consultes*, the Senate could declare the suspension of the Constitution, or the trial by jury, in certain departments, and determine in what cases an individual confined extraordinarily should be sent to trial in the ordinary mode, or kept in prison. Finally, two extraordinary privileges were delegated to this body, one incidental to royalty in a monarchy, the other not possessed by any branch of power in a regular state: the first was the power of dissolving the Legislative Body and the Tribunal; the second was that of annulling the decisions of the tribunals whenever they might be dangerous to the safety of the state.

This last privilege would be unintelligible, if the circumstances of the time did not explain it. Certain tribunals had, in fact, recently pronounced decisions in cases relating

to the national domains, which might drive the numerous and powerful class of persons who had become their possessors to despair.

It was next settled, that the Senate, which, in the course of ten years, was to be increased from sixty members to eighty, by means of two nominations annually, should be at once increased to the number of eighty. Thus there were fourteen nominations to be made immediately. The First Consul, in addition to these, had the privilege of appointing directly senators to the number of forty, which raised the total number of that body to 120. By these means, the government was relieved from the danger of new annoyances, such as those which took place at the commencement of the session of the year X.

The Tribunal and the Council of State were equally modified in their respective organization. Whilst the Council of State might be raised to fifty members, the Tribunal was to be reduced to fifty, by the successive extinction of members, and was to be divided into sections, corresponding with the sections of the Council of State. It was to make a first examination, in sections, with closed doors, of the *projets de lois* (bills), which might be afterwards submitted to them in the general meeting of the whole body. These bills were still to be discussed, by three orators, who were to argue before the silent Legislative Body, in opposition to three councillors of state, or on the same side with them, according as the bill might have been rejected or adopted.

Henceforth, in short, it was to be nothing more than a second Council of State, whose province it would be to canvass with closed doors, and, consequently, without energy, the measures prepared by the first.

Finally, the prerogative of voting treaties was taken from the Legislative Body and the Tribunal. The First Consul recollected what had occurred in respect to the treaty with Russia, and he would not expose himself to a repetition of a similar scene. He projected a Privy Council, consisting of the Consuls, of the ministers, two senators, two councillors of state, two members of the Legion of Honour, having the rank of great officers, each severally summoned by the First Consul, upon every important occasion. This Privy Council was to be consulted upon the ratification of treaties. It was also empowered to digest the organic *senatus-consultes*.

The creation of a Privy Council was an encroachment on the power of the Council of State, and the latter seemed to view it seriously in this light. The First Consul, by the erection of the Privy Council, withdrew from the consideration of the Council of State the treaties, of which, hitherto, it had taken cognisance, as he began to feel that thirty or forty individuals were too numerous a body for communications of this nature.

The executive power had still to be adjusted upon the new basis of the Consulate for life. The First Consul wished that the power which was tendered to him for life should be also extended, for the same duration, to his colleagues. "You have done so much for me," said he to the Consul Cambacérés, "that I ought now to

secure your position." The principle of a continuance for life was, accordingly, fixed, with respect to the three consuls, both as well for the present as for the time to come. The great question of the nomination of a successor to the First Consul remained still to be determined, by which the right of hereditary succession was, in the present case, to be disposed of. General Bonaparte at first wished to decline the power which it was wished to confer upon him—that of himself naming his successor. He yielded at length, and it was settled that he should have the power of appointing him during his lifetime. In this case, the successor appointed was to be presented to the Senate in great state; he was to take an oath to the republic, before the senate, in presence of the consuls, the ministers, the Legislative Body, the Tribunal, the Council of State, the Tribunal of *Cassation*, the archbishops and bishops, the presidents of the electoral colleges, the grand officers of the Legion of Honour, and the mayors of the twenty-four great cities of the republic. After this solemnity, he was to be adopted by the living Consul, and by the nation. He was to take rank in the Senate with the consuls, immediately after the third.

However, if, with a view of sparing the feelings of his family, the First Consul should not nominate a successor during his lifetime, but only resolve to fix upon him in his will, in that case, he was, prior to his death, to deliver his will, duly sealed with his own seal, into the custody of the three consuls, in presence of the ministers and presidents of the Council of State. This will was to remain deposited in the archives of the republic. But, in this case, it was necessary for the Senate to ratify the testamentary will, which had not been produced during the lifetime of the testator.

In the event of the First Consul not making his adoption during his lifetime, or of not leaving a will, or of the will not being ratified, then the second and third consuls were empowered to appoint a successor. They were to propose him to the Senate, whose duty it was to elect him.

Such were the forms employed to guarantee the due transmission of power. It was a principle of adoption in lieu of hereditary succession, but nothing prevented it from being hereditary, as the chief of the state was free to choose his own son, if he had one. Only, he was empowered to prefer amongst his heirs the one who appeared most worthy.

The consuls were *ex officio* members of the Senate; they were to preside at the sittings.

One great prerogative was added to the power of the First Consul. He was invested with the right of granting pardon for offences. This was assimilating his authority, as much as possible, to that of royalty.

On the accession of a first consul, a law was to fix his allowance, or, to speak more properly, his civil list. On the present occasion a sum of 6,000,000 frs. (250,000*l.* sterling), for the First Consul, and 1,200,000 frs. (50,000*l.* sterling), for his two colleagues, were to be provided for in the budget.

To all these arrangements, some others were added, relating to the regulation of the tribunals. The ministerial duties of the government were better conducted than the administration of justice, because the ministers, guided by an impartial and firm master, holding their offices during pleasure, pursued exactly the course dictated by his directing mind. But the judges used their independence, as all unfettered liberty at that time was used, for the purpose of becoming subservient to the predominating feelings of the time. In some places, they persecuted the parties who had acquired the national domains; in others, they favoured them unjustly. But in no part of the country did they exhibit that regularity of proceeding which has prevailed since, and which confers upon a great body of magistrates, a dignified, but still deferential authority. To the powers just conferred in certain cases upon the Senate, of reviewing the judgments of the tribunals, an extra-judicial authority, and happily not permanent, a further power to regulate the tribunals was annexed. The tribunals of first instance were placed under the regulation of the tribunals of appeal, and the tribunals of appeal under that of the Court of *Cassation*. A judge who failed in the discharge of his duties, might be summoned before the superior tribunal, reprimanded or suspended. At the head of the whole magistracy, a *Grand Juge* was to be placed, with power to preside at the tribunals if he chose, whose duty it was to watch over them, and to manage them. He was thus minister of justice, as well as a public magistrate.

Such were the modifications introduced into the Consular Constitution, some of them conceived by the First Consul, others proposed by his advisers. They were all collected in the form of an organic *senatus-consulte*, which was to be presented to the Senate, and adopted by that body.

They consisted, as we have just seen, in getting rid of the list of notables, an extensive, inert, and illusory constituency, and in substituting in lieu electoral colleges for life, which were to assemble occasionally for the purpose of presenting candidates for the choice of the Senate; they conferred upon the Senate, already invested with the electoral functions and with the duty of watching over the Constitution, the power of modifying that Constitution, of perfecting it, of removing every obstacle in the way of its practical working, the power, in short, of dissolving the Tribunal and the Legislative Body; they conferred upon General Bonaparte the Consulate for life, with power to appoint his successor; and, moreover, they bestowed upon him the brightest prerogative of royalty, the power of pardoning offences. By these alterations, the Tribunal was deprived of the power of numbers, and almost of that of publicity, by being thus made a second Council of State, empowered to animadvert on the proceedings of the first; furthermore, they transferred from the Legislative Body and the Council of State to a Privy Council certain important affairs of the government. as, for instance, the sanction of

treaties; and, finally, they established for the tribunals a hierarchy and a discipline.

It was still the aristocratic Constitution of M. Sieyès, apt to turn either to aristocracy or to despotism according to the hand which guided it; tending, at this moment, to absolute power in the hand of General Bonaparte, but after his death, it was capable of being transformed into a downright aristocracy, if, before his death, he did not hurl the whole structure into an abyss.

By conferring such high powers upon the Senate, for his own convenience, the First Consul had secured, during his life, a devoted instrument, by whose hand he could do whatever he wished: but, after his death, the instrument, become independent, would be all-powerful in its turn. Under a less great, a less glorious successor, with the minds of men awakened after a long repose, an entirely new spectacle would present itself. The departmental aristocracy, which formed the electoral colleges for life, and the national aristocracy of which the Senate was composed, the one presenting candidates to the other, might easily, at some future period, by a community of interest, both natural and even necessary, create in the Legislative Body and the Tribunal a majority, which could not be shaken by the monarchical authority, under the denomination of First Consul, and thus might revive a sort of freedom, an aristocratic freedom, it is true, but one which, compared with other forms of government, is, in general, not behind them in haughtiness, or consistency, or durability. Besides, liberty is always guaranteed when the power is divided, and its exercise is subject to deliberations. There can never, in fact, exist more than two plausible opinions respecting the great interests of a country. If the executive power has opposed to it an authority capable of successfully resisting it, the latter, whether aristocratic or otherwise, embraces, by an irresistible propensity to contradiction, the opinion which the former has rejected. It tends to peace, when the executive power is inclined to war; it tends to war when the executive power inclines to peace; it adopts a liberal policy, when the monarchical power is inclined to conservative measures. In short, there is contradiction, and hence arise investigation and freedom; as liberty in all countries consists chiefly in the free and unfettered discussion of the affairs of the state. This Constitution, then, of M. Sieyès might, at some future period, restore things to the end for which it was originally designed; but, at the present, it was but a mask for a dictatorship. A constitution, of whatever kind it may be, produces results conformable to the actual state of public opinion at the period. There are times when opposition is the prevailing tendency, at others there is a general disposition to adhere to the government. At the present time, the nation was inclined to adhere to the government: the form of power was, therefore, at bottom, of secondary consideration.

We must, however, admit, that this nominal republic possessed unusual grandeur; it re-

called, in some measure, the idea of the Roman republic, when converted into the empire. This Senate possessed the power of the senate of ancient Rome, a power which it surrendered to the emperor when the latter was strong, resuming it, on the contrary, in order to exercise it, whenever the emperor was weak, or liberal. The First Consul had, indeed, the power of the Roman emperors; he possessed the hereditary authority, that is to say the choice of appointing his successor, natural or adopted. Let us add that he enjoyed almost the same power over the world.

The new Constitution, thus remodelled, was now ready; the votes required from all the citizens were given. The Consul Cambacérès, always conciliating, suggested a very wise course; namely, to confide to the Senate the duty of reckoning up the collected votes, and of proclaiming their numbers. "It is," he said, with truth, "a very natural mode of extricating this great body from a false situation, occasioned by a mistake." The Senate had, in fact, proposed a prolongation of ten years, and the First Consul had assumed the Consulship for life. Since then, the Senate had become silent, and had neither taken nor could take any step. To concede to that body the task of proclaiming the result, would be making it a party, and extricate it from the state of embarrassment in which it was placed. "Come," said M. Cambacérès to the First Consul, "come to the assistance of men, who have made a mistake, in trying to guess your wishes." The First Consul smiled, with an unusually sarcastic expression, at his prudent colleague, and consented with alacrity to the judicious proposal made to him. The registers in which the votes had been entered were sent to the Senate to be reckoned up. A total of 3,577,259 citizens had given their suffrages, and out of this number 3,568,885 had voted for the Consulate for life. Amongst this enormous mass of approving votes, there were only 8000 and some hundred dissidents: it was an insignificant minority. No government ever obtained such an assent, and none ever merited it in the same degree.

This result being verified, the Senate issued a *senatus-consulte*, in three articles. The first of those articles was couched in these terms: The French people appoints, and the Senate proclaims, NAPOLEON BONAPARTE, First Consul for life.

It was from this epoch that the prenomén of NAPOLEON began to appear in the public acts, together with the family name of Bonaparte, which only, up to that time, was known to the world. This illustrious prenomén, which the voice of nations has so many times since repeated, had hitherto been employed but once, namely, in the constituent act of the Italian republic. In approximating to the sovereign power, the prenomén, being gradually separated from the family name, was destined soon to stand alone conspicuously in the language of the world, and General Bonaparte, at one short moment called Napoleon Bonaparte, was soon to be styled Napoleon only, in conformity with the manner adopted in designating monarchs.

The second article of the *senatus-consulte* de-

clared, that a statue of Peace, holding a laurel in one hand, and in the other the decree of the Senate, should perpetuate the gratitude of the nation to posterity.

Finally, the third article declared, that the Senate, in a body, should proceed to the First Consul, with this *senatus-consulte*, the expression of the confidence, love, and admiration of the French people. These three expressions are used in the decree itself.

A day was fixed for a grand diplomatic reception, when the Senate should proceed to the Tuileries. It was on the morning of the 3d of August, 1802—15th Thermidor. All the ministers from the different courts of Europe, now at peace, were assembled in a spacious saloon, where the First Consul was in the habit of receiving them, and where foreigners of distinction were presented. The levee was scarcely commenced when the Senate was announced. All the members of this body were assembled, and were instantly admitted. The president Barthélemy delivered the following speech:

"The French people," said he, addressing the First Consul, "the French people, grateful for the immense services which you have rendered them, are desirous that the first magistracy of the state should remain permanently in your hands. By thus rendering it secure during your whole life, it only expresses the wishes of the Senate, as set forth in the *senatus-consulte* of the 18th Floréal. The nation, by this solemn act of gratitude, confers upon you the privilege of consolidating our institutions."

After this exordium, the president briefly enumerated the great deeds of General Bonaparte in war and in peace, predicted prosperity for the future, exempt from the calamities which at that time no one foresaw, and reiterated to him, in short, all that Fame, with her thousand tongues, proclaimed throughout the world. The president then read the decree. The First Consul bowing to the Senate, replied in these noble words:

"The life of a citizen belongs to his country. The French nation wishes that mine should be wholly consecrated to it. I obey its will.

"Through my efforts, by your assistance, citizens, senators, by the assistance of all the authorities, by the confidence, and by the will of this mighty people, the liberty, equality, and prosperity of France will be rendered secure against the caprices of fate and the uncertainty of futurity. The most virtuous of nations will be the most happy, as they most deserve to be; and their felicity will contribute to the general happiness of all Europe.

"Proud, then, of being thus called by the command of that power from which every thing emanates, to bring back order, justice, equality, to the earth, when my last hour approaches, I shall yield myself up, with resignation, and without any solicitude respecting the opinion of future generations."

After receiving the affectionate thanks of the Senate, the First Consul accompanied this body back to the antechamber, and afterwards continued to receive the various foreigners who were presented to him by the ministers of England, Russia, Austria, Prussia, Sweden,

Bavaria, Hesse, Wurtemberg, Spain, Naples, America, as, indeed, the whole world was at that moment at peace with France. On the same day, Lord Holland and Lord Grey, (the same known to the present generation,) were presented to the First Consul, with a number of other persons of distinction.

On the following day, the 4th of August, the new articles modifying the Constitution were submitted to the Council of State. The First Consul presided at this solemn sitting; he read the articles one by one, and explained the reasons for each with perspicuity and vigour. He expressed his ideas on each article in the manner which we have already represented. He even started objections, and replied to them. Upon the article relating to the appointment of a successor, there was a short discussion, in which some indication of the resistance which he had offered to this arrangement might be discerned. Messrs. Petiet and Rœderer maintained that the appointment of a successor, by a testamentary act, ought to be as obligatory as if it were made by a solemn adoption, in presence of the public bodies of the state. The First Consul contended that the testamentary act ought not to be obligatory for the Senate, inasmuch as a man deceased, however illustrious he may have been, ceases to be any thing; that his last will might always be cancelled; and that, in submitting it for the ratification of the Senate, he only yielded to an unavoidable necessity. On this occasion, some singular expressions escaped him, when speaking upon hereditary succession, which proved that, for the moment, he had given up all thought of it. He said, in substance, when elucidating the subject, that it was not consonant to the prevailing manners and opinions. He was not addicted by nature to falsehood or hypocrisy; but placed, as men always are, under the influence of the passing moment, he rejected hereditary succession, because he perceived that the minds of the people were but little inclined to adopt it, and that, moreover, invested as he was, with a power altogether monarchical, he was satisfied with the reality without the title. To judge by his words, he had fully made up his mind upon this subject.

Some objections were afterwards offered against the institution of the Privy Council, on behalf of the Council of State, whose power was in some degree diminished by this institution. On this subject the First Consul betrayed some embarrassment, towards a body which up to that moment he had treated with so marked a predilection, and which he seemed to deprive of some of its importance. He said that the Privy Council was only established for very rare cases, in which the strictest secrecy was requisite, which in a body of forty or fifty persons it was impossible to preserve; that, moreover, the Council of State would always retain the same importance, together with the cognisance of all great affairs.

After some modifications of detail, the *senatus-consulte* was carried up to the Senate, and, after receiving a sort of approbation, was converted into an *organic senatus-consulte*. The following day, 5th of August—17th Thermidor—it was promulgated with the usual formalities,

and thus became a supplementary act to the Consular Constitution.

France experienced the most profound satisfaction. The family of the First Consul had neither all their fears nor all their hopes realized; nevertheless, they participated in the general happiness. Madame Bonaparte began to be tranquillized, now that all thoughts of royalty had evaporated. This kind of hereditary succession, which devolved upon the chief of the state the duty of choosing his successor, was all she wished, as she had no child by General Bonaparte, but had one beloved daughter, married to Louis Bonaparte, who was about to become a mother. She wished for, and counted upon having a grandson. She thought to see in him the heir to the sceptre of the world. Her husband shared in her anticipations. The brothers of Napoleon (we shall call him henceforth by this name) were not so well pleased; at least, Lucien was not, whose perpetual recklessness of mind nothing could tranquillize. But an arrangement had been thought of, with a view of pleasing them, and accordingly it had just been introduced amongst the Organic Articles. The law of the Legion of Honour enacted that the grand council of the Legion should be composed of three consuls, and of a representative of each of the great bodies of the state. The Council of State had appointed Joseph Bonaparte to fill this dignity; the Tribunate had chosen Lucien. One article of the *senatus-consulte* provided, that the members of the grand Council of the Legion of Honour should be *ex officio* senators. The two brothers of Napoleon were accordingly important personages in the noble institution, upon which the duty of distributing rewards devolved, and they were, moreover, as members of the Senate, called upon to exercise a considerable influence over that body. Joseph, moderate in his desires, seemed to wish for nothing beyond. Lucien was only half satisfied; it was not in his nature to be more so. The First Consul, by making his colleagues, Cambacérès and Lebrun, consuls for life, sought thereby to place round his person colleagues who were pleased with his own elevation. He had succeeded. One personage, alone, of the time, came out of this crisis, so favourable to the general advancement of every body else, rather ill-treated—this was M. Fouché, minister of police. Whether it was that his personal advice with regard to the family arrangements of the Bonapartes was seen through, or whether the efforts that were made to prejudice him with his master succeeded, or, which is most probable, that the First Consul was desirous of adding to all his recent acts of clemency and conciliation a measure which should have more than any other the appearance of confidence, and of total oblivion of the past, at any rate, the minister of police was left out.

This minister, as we have already said elsewhere, possessed an importance which he never would have had, under a regular régime, thanks to the arbitrary power with which he was invested, thanks to the funds which he disposed of without any control. Emigrants, either returned, or about to return, Vendéans, Re-

publicans, nonjuring priests, all these troublesome agents were under his surveillance, and he performed his duty without any compunction.

Although M. Fouché executed the duties of this ministry with judgment and a good deal of lenity, it had become odious to the parties whom it kept under restraint. The First Consul suppressed it, and made the police a mere general direction, attached to the ministry of justice. The councillor of state, Réal, was invested with this directorship. The department of justice was taken from M. Abrial, an able, prudent man, wholly devoted to its duties, but whose slow and laborious mode of doing business was disagreeable to the First Consul. It was bestowed upon M. Regnier, since Duke of Massa, a learned, eloquent magistrate, who had inspired the chief who disposed of the fortunes of all around, with confidence, and a liking for him. M. Regnier received, with the administration of justice, the title of grand judge, a title recently created by the organic *senatus-consulte*. His peculiar qualifications rendered him a very fit person to guide M. Réal in the difficult investigations of the police; and, on the other hand, M. Réal, transacting business direct with the First Consul, became himself almost independent of the minister of justice. Unfortunately, the loss of M. Fouché carried with it his great personal knowledge of men, and connections with parties, which no one possessed in the same degree. The sacrifice, made too hastily to the opinions of the day, had not been sufficiently well considered; and it produced, as we shall soon see, consequences much to be deplored. Nevertheless, it was not politic to make M. Fouché appear disgraced. A place was accordingly reserved for him in the Senate, and another for M. Abrial. The act by which M. Fouché was raised to the dignity of a senator, contained a flattering recital of his public services. It was even declared in this act, that, if the urgency of the times should require the restoration of the office now suppressed, M. Fouché would be sought after on the benches of the Senate, again to be created minister of police. Some other official changes took place in the ministry; M. Röderer, who did not coincide altogether with M. Chaptal in his views respecting the duties of the department of public instruction, which was under his care, relinquished this appointment in favour of the learned Fourcroy, and was compensated, like Messrs. Fouché and Abrial, by a seat in the Senate. The First Consul also raised to the Senate the respectable archbishop of Paris, M. de Belloy. By acting in this mode, he had no intention of giving the clergy an influence in political affairs; but he wished all the social interests to be represented in the Senate, and religion amongst the rest.

The 15th of August—27th Thermidor—was celebrated, for the first time, as the anniversary of the birthday of the First Consul. This marked the progressive introduction of monarchical usages, by which the natal day of the sovereign is an established festival, observed by the whole nation. On the morning of that day, the First Consul received the

Senate, the Tribunal, the Council of State, the clergy, the civil and military authorities of the capital, the diplomatic body, who waited upon him for the purpose of congratulating him on the public happiness, and on his own private felicity. At noon, a *Te Deum* was sung in the church of Notre Dame, and in all the churches of the republic. At night, brilliant illuminations represented, in Paris, here an emblematical figure of Victory; there, another of Peace; and, further on, upon one of the towers of Notre Dame, the sign of the zodiac under which the author of all the good the nation enjoyed was born, and for whose birth the nation thus offered up their gratitude to Heaven.

Some days afterwards, the 21st of August—3d Fructidor—the First Consul went in state to take possession of the presidency of the Senate. All the troops of the division lined the way, from the Tuileries to the palace of the Luxembourg. The carriage of the new master of France, escorted by a numerous staff, and by the consular guard on horseback, was drawn by eight magnificent horses, like the carriages of our kings in former times. No one shared with him the honour of occupying it. The second and third consuls, the ministers, and the presidents of the Council of State, followed in their carriages. Upon the arrival of the cortege at the palace of the Luxembourg, the First Consul was received by a deputation of ten senators. Seated upon a chair, similar to a throne, he received the oath from his two brothers, Lucien and Joseph, created senators, *ex officio*, by virtue of their rank, as members of the great council of the Legion of Honour. After this formality, the councillors of state chosen to perform this duty presented five *projets de senatus-consultes*, the first relating to the ceremonial to be observed by the great authorities; the second to the renewal by series of the Legislative Body and the Tribunal; the third to the mode of proceeding in the event of a dissolution of these two assemblies; the fourth, to the designation of the twenty great cities of the republic; and finally, the fifth, to the union of the Island of Elba with the territory of France.

In order to put the Senate into immediate possession of the influence promised it in great affairs of state, M. de Talleyrand read a report of the highest importance, respecting the arrangements preparing in Germany, under the direction of France, for indemnifying the dispossessed hereditary princes on the left bank of the Rhine, with the ecclesiastical principalities. It was, as will be presently seen in the sequel of this history, the most important event of that period. That affair being brought to a conclusion, the world seemed likely to remain in a state of repose for a long time to come. By publishing in this report the views of France to the Senate, the First Consul promulgated to all Europe his own ideas upon this important subject; or, to speak more correctly, intimated his will upon the subject; as it was well known that he was not a man to recoil from the performance of that which he now publicly announced. The reading of this report being concluded, he withdrew, leaving

to the Senate the task of examining the five organic *senatus-consultes* which had just been submitted to them.

Accompanied back by the ten senators, who had received him on his arrival, greeted as he passed by the acclamations of the people of Paris, he returned to the palace of the Tuileries, like a constitutional monarch, who had just held a royal sitting.

The summer was far advanced, as the end of August was now approaching. The First Consul took possession of the château of St. Cloud, which he had at first declined when it was offered him for a country residence. Having changed his mind upon this subject, he had ordered repairs, which although not very extensive at first, had at length extended to the whole château. They were recently completed; the First Consul seized the opportunity of establishing himself in this beautiful mansion. He there received, upon certain fixed days, high functionaries, great personages of all classes, foreigners, and ambassadors. On Sunday, mass was celebrated in the chapel, and the opponents of the Concordate began to attend it, as formerly people attended mass at Versailles. The First Consul, accompanied by his wife, heard a very short mass, and afterwards conversed in the gallery of the château with the company who might be present. The visitors, ranged in two lines, waited for him, and listened to his words in the same way that the words of royalty or of genius are caught up. In this circle he was the exclusive object of observation and attention. No potentate on the earth has ever obtained, or merited in the same degree, the pure homage of which he was at that time the object, both on the part of France and of the whole world.

It was already the imperial authority, which he afterwards assumed, but with the universal assent of the people, with forms less regal, but more worthy of that dignity, as there still remained a certain republican modesty, which was extremely becoming in this new authority, and which reminded the spectator of Augustus retaining, amidst the supreme power, the exterior habits of the Roman citizen.

Sometimes, after a long journey across a vast and beautiful country, the traveller stops a while, to contemplate, from some commanding eminence, the track through which he has passed: let us imitate his example, let us stop here, and, casting a lingering look behind, let us contemplate the prodigious labours of General Bonaparte, since the 18th Brumaire. What a multitude, what a variety of events, and what stupendous greatness reigns throughout the whole!

After having crossed the seas almost by a miracle, he reached France, astonished and delighted at his return; he overthrew the Directory, seized the supreme power, accepted the Constitution of M. Sieyès with some modification in regard to the executive authority, restored some order in the administration, re-established a new system for the collection of the taxes, raised public credit, supplied the most pressing wants of the armies, took advantage of the winter to overwhelm La Vendée by pouring in troops unexpectedly, then sud

denly brought back these troops to the frontiers, and amidst the apparent confusion of all these movements, created an army unperceived at the foot of the Alps, which, as if dropped from the clouds, was destined to fall unexpectedly in the midst of the enemy, who could not even credit its existence. Every thing being prepared for the campaign, he offered Europe peace or war; and war having been its choice, he commanded his troops to pass the Rhine, pushed Moreau upon the Danube, threw Masséna into Genoa, for the purpose of arresting the march of the Austrians, and of detaining them there. Then Moreau, on one side, having forced M. de Kray upon Ulm, whilst Masséna, on the other, was keeping M. de Mélas at Genoa, by an heroic defence, he had unexpectedly crossed the Alps, despite the want of roads, with his artillery drawn in trunks of trees, appeared suddenly in the heart of astounded Italy, cut off the retreat of the Austrians, and in a decisive battle, lost and won several times during the day, taken their whole army, recovered Italy, annihilated the designs of the coalition, and extorted from Europe, utterly confounded by these exploits, an armistice of six months.

It was during this six months' truce, that the labours of the First Consul became still more surprising. Negotiating, and attending to the administration at the same time, he changed the whole aspect of European affairs, turned the affections of the surrounding nations towards France and against England, gained the heart of Paul I., decided the wavering court of Prussia, inspired Denmark and Sweden with courage to resist the maritime violence of which their commerce was the victim, concocted the league of the neutral powers against Great Britain, closed all the ports of the continent against that power, from the Texel to Cadiz, from Cadiz to Otranto, and prepared immense armaments to succour Egypt. Whilst he was performing all this, he had perfected the reorganization of the finances, restored public credit, paid the creditors of the state in cash, established the Bank of France, repaired the public roads, suppressed highway robbery, cut magnificent communications over the Alps, founded hospitals on their summits, undertaken the great fortifications of Alexandria, improved Mantua, opened canals, erected new bridges, and commenced the compilation of the Codes. At length, after an armistice of six months, Austria hesitating still to sign peace, he ordered Moreau to advance, and that general, after completing the destruction of the Austrian forces at the memorable battle of Hohenlinden, had extorted, under the very walls of Vienna, the promise of a peace, which was soon after concluded at Lunéville.

It was at this moment that a frightful crime, the infernal machine, placing in peril the life of the First Consul, exasperated his fiery spirit, and urged him to the commission of the only fault, which marred the consummate ability and moderation of conduct then evinced by him—the banishment, without trial, of 130 revolutionists. What sad vicissitudes men of violence experience in revolutionary times! The assassins of September, struck down in

their turn, found neither laws to protect nor courage to defend them: and the Tribunate, which opposed the best measures of the First Consul, durst not offer one word in favour of these proscriptions!

All-powerful on the continent, having discredited and driven from office the two ministers who had abetted all the coalitions against him, M. de Thugut, at Vienna, and Mr. Pitt, in London, the First Consul had raised the whole of Europe against England. Nelson by the blow inflicted on the Danes at Copenhagen, and the Russians by assassinating their emperor, had saved England from the disasters which menaced her; but saved though she was from these dangers, she had neither courage nor means to prolong the war.

The English nation, inspired alike with fear and admiration at the achievements of General Bonaparte, at length had consented to the peace of Amiens, the most glorious and advantageous that France ever made.

The temple of Janus was accordingly shut! And now, the First Consul, desirous of adding a peace with the church to the peace with the European powers, hastened to negotiate the Concordate, to reconcile the Vatican with the Revolution, to raise the altars, to restore to France every thing that is essential to civilized society, and having arrived at the third year of his Consulate, he presented himself to the two legislative assemblies, the bearer of peace both on land, and at sea, peace with Heaven, amnesty to all the proscribed, a splendid code of laws, an effective scheme of public education, and a glorious system of social distinctions. Although he presented himself with his hands loaded with these gifts, he had, nevertheless, encountered an unexpected, violent, and senseless opposition, attributable partly to worthy, and partly to very unworthy motives—to the envy of some members, and to the love entertained by others of a liberty at that time altogether impracticable. Delivered by the wisdom of his colleague, Cambacères, from this opposition, which, in his fury, he would have crushed by violence, he had now at length crowned all his labours, and had succeeded in procuring the national assent to the treaties concluded with Europe, to the *Concordat*, his system of lay and national education, and to the institution of the Legion of Honour, and had received, as a reward for all these services, the chief power for life, and thus attained a greatness equal to that of the Roman emperors. At this instant, he resumed the labour of the Codes, adjusted as arbiter the conflicting interests on the continent, reformed the constitution of Germany, and distributed the territories to the various princes with an equity which was acknowledged by all Europe.

Now if, dismissing from the mind every thing which has happened since, we imagine for a moment this dictator, at that time necessary to the country, continuing as wise as he was great, uniting those opposing attributes, which the Almighty, it is true, has never yet combined in one mortal, that vigour of genius which constitutes a great commander, with that patience which is the distinguishing feature of the founder of an empire, tranquillizing, by a

long repose, the convulsed French nation, and preparing the people, by slow degrees, for that liberty which is the honour, and the indispensable ingredient in modern societies; then, after having rendered France so great, appeasing, instead of irritating the jealousies of the surrounding nations, establishing the territorial demarcations, fixed by the treaties of Lunéville and Amiens, upon a settled foundation, as the permanent, immutable basis upon which the balance of Europe should rest; at length terminating his career by an act worthy of the Antonines, by selecting, no matter in what quarter, the most worthy successor, in whose hands to place this organized France, now prepared for liberty, and for ever aggrandized: what man had ever equalled this? But such a man, combining the military genius of Cæsar, and the political talents of Augustus, with the noble qualities and sublime virtues of Marcus Aurelius, would have been more than human; and the rulers assigned to us by Providence are not divine.

And yet, at this period, he appeared so moderate after having been so victorious, he showed himself so profound a legislator after having proved himself so great a commander, he evinced so much love for the arts of peace after having excelled in the arts of war, that well might he excite illusions in France and in the world. Only some few amongst the personages who were admitted to his councils, who were capable of judging of futurity by the present, were filled with as much anxiety as admiration, on witnessing the indefatigable activity of his mind and body, the energy of his will, and the impetuosity of his desires. They trembled even at seeing him do good in the way he did, so impatient was he to accomplish it quickly, and upon an immense scale. The wise, sagacious Tronchet, who both admired and loved him, and looked upon him as the saviour of France, said, nevertheless, one day, in a tone of deep feeling to Cambacérès, "This young man begins like Cæsar; I fear that he will end like him."

BOOK XV.

THE SECULARIZATIONS.

Congratulations addressed to the First Consul by all the Cabinets, on Occasion of the Consulship for Life—First Effects of the Peace in England—British Industry anxious for a Treaty of Commerce with France—Difficulty of harmonizing the Mercantile Interests of the two Countries—Pamphlets written in London by Emigrants against the First Consul—Re-establishment of a good Understanding with Spain—Vacancy of the Duchy of Parma, and Desire of the Court of Spain to add that Duchy to the Kingdom of Etruria—Necessity for deferring any Resolution on that Subject—Definitive Annexation of Piedmont to France—Excellent Understanding with the Holy See—Momentary Disagreement on Occasion of a Promotion of French Cardinals—The First Consul obtains the Creation of Five at once—He makes a Present to the Pope of two Brigs of War, the St. Peter and the St. Paul—Quarrel speedily settled with the Dey of Algiers—Disturbances in Switzerland—Description of that Country and of its Constitution—The Unitary Party and the Oligarchic Party—Journey of Reding, the Landammann, to Paris—His Promises to the First Consul soon contradicted by the Event—Expulsion of Reding, and Return of the Moderate Party to Power—Establishment of the Constitution of the 29th of May, and Danger of fresh Disturbances on Account of the Weakness of the Helvetic Government—Efforts of the Oligarchic Party to draw the Attention of the Powers to Switzerland—That Attention exclusively engrossed by the Affairs of Germany—Altered state of Germany since the Treaty of Lunéville—Principle of the Secularizations laid down by that Treaty—Great Changes in the Germanic Constitution occasioned by the Suppression of the Ecclesiastical States—Description of that Constitution—The Protestant Party, and the Catholic Party; Prussia and Austria; their respective Claims—Extent and Value of the Territories to be distributed—Austria strives to obtain Indemnities for the Archdukes deprived of their Dominions in Italy, and urges this as a Motive for seizing Bavaria as far as the Inn and the Isar—Prussia, under Pretext of compensating herself for what she has lost on the Rhine, and obtaining an Indemnity for the House of Orange, aims at a considerable acquisition of territory in Franconia—Despair of the Petty Courts, threatened by the Ambition of the Great Powers—All Eyes in Germany turned towards the First Consul—He determines to interpose, to cause the Treaty of Lunéville to be carried into Effect, and to put an End to an Affair liable every Moment to involve Europe in War—He favours an Alliance with Prussia, and supports the Claims of that Power to a certain Degree—Plan of Indemnity framed in concert with Prussia and the Petty Princes of Germany—This Plan communicated to Russia—Overture to that Court to concur with France in a general Mediation—The Emperor Alexander accepts the Offer—France and Russia, in quality of Mediating Powers, present the Plan of Indemnity arranged in Paris to the Diet of Ratisbon—Mortification of Austria, deserted by all the Cabinets, and her Resolution to avail herself of the Dilatoriness of the Germanic Constitution to oppose the Plan of the First Consul—The First Consul thwarts that Design, and causes the proposed Plan, with some Modifications, to be adopted by the extraordinary Deputation—Austria, in order to intimidate the Prussian Party, which France supports, takes Possession of Passau—Prompt Resolution of the First Consul, who threatens to have Recourse to Arms—General Intimidation—The Negotiation continued—Discussions in the Diet—The Plan obstructed for a Moment by the Greediness of Prussia—The First Consul, in order to effect a Final Arrangement, makes a Concession to the House of Austria, and allots to it the Bishopric of Eichstätt—The Court of Vienna yields and adopts the *Conclusum* of the Diet—Recess of February, 1803, and definitive Settlement of the Affairs of Germany—Character of that able and difficult Negotiation.

The elevation of General Bonaparte to the supreme power by the title of Consul for life had neither surprised nor mortified any of the European cabinets. Most of them, on the contrary, had regarded it as a new pledge of peace for all the States. In England, where every circumstance that occurred in France

was watched with a restless attention, Mr. Addington, the minister, had warmly expressed to M. Otto, the satisfaction of the British government, and its entire approbation of an event destined to consolidate order and power in France. Though the ambition of General Bonaparte began to excite apprehensions, still

there was a disposition to forgive him for it, because it was employed in controlling the French Revolution. The re-establishment of religion and the recall of the emigrants had pleased the English aristocracy, and the pious George III., in particular. In Prussia, testimonies not less significant were given. That court, compromised in the esteem of European diplomacy for having concluded peace with the National Convention, now felt proud of its connection with a government full of genius, and deemed itself fortunate in seeing the affairs of France definitively placed in the hands of a man whose concurrence in its ambitious plans relative to Germany it hoped to obtain. M. Haugwitz addressed the most cordial congratulations to our ambassador; he even went so far as to say that the simplest way would be to come to the point at once, and to convert the dictatorship for life, just conferred on the First Consul, into an hereditary sovereignty.

The Emperor Alexander, who affected to appear a stranger to the prejudices of the Russian aristocracy, and who kept up a frequent and friendly correspondence with the head of the French government, expressed himself in terms full of courtesy and kindness, respecting the late changes. He caused the new Consul for life to be complimented with equal promptness and cordiality. The subject of the ideas was in all cases the same. In Petersburg, as in Berlin and in London, people rejoiced to see order guaranteed in France in a durable manner, by the indefinite prolongation of the authority of the First Consul. In Vienna, where the wounds inflicted by the sword of the conqueror of Marengo had been more keenly felt than elsewhere, a sort of personal kindness for him seemed to be springing up. So strong was the hatred to the Revolution in that capital of the old Germanic empire, that people were ready to forgive the energetic and obeyed magistrate for the victories of the general. They even affected to consider his government as decidedly counter-revolutionary, though as yet it was but reparative. The archduke Charles, who was then at the head of the war department, observed to M. de Champagny that the First Consul had proved himself by his campaigns to be the greatest captain of modern times; that, by an administration of three years, he had shown himself the ablest of statesmen; and that, in thus uniting the merit of government with that of arms, he had set the seal to his glory. What will appear still more extraordinary, Caroline, the celebrated queen of Naples, mother of the empress of Austria, a bitter enemy to the Revolution and to France—the queen of Naples, being at Vienna, and receiving M. de Champagny, charged him with the most unexpected congratulations for the chief of the Republic, “General Bonaparte,” said she, “is a great man. He has done me much injury, but that shall not prevent me from acknowledging his genius. By checking disorder among you, he has rendered a service to all of us. If he has attained the government of his country, it is because he is most worthy of it. I hold him out every day as a pattern to the young princes

of the imperial family; I exhort them to study that extraordinary personage, to learn from him how to direct nations, how to make the yoke of authority endurable by means of genius and glory.”

Assuredly no tribute could be so flattering to the First Consul as that of this hostile and vanquished queen, not less remarkable for the superiority of her understanding than for the warmth of her passions.

The Pope, who had just finished in concert with the First Consul the great work of the re-establishment of religion, and who, notwithstanding many crosses, looked to that work for the glory of his reign—the Pope rejoiced to see a man whom he considered as the strongest support of religion against the irreligious prejudices of the age, ascending step by step to the throne. He expressed his satisfaction with a truly paternal affection. Lastly, Spain, which the fickle and incongruous policy of the favourite had estranged for a moment from France, did not continue silent on this occasion, but expressed her gratification at an event which she agreed with the other courts in considering as fortunate for all Europe.

It was, therefore, amidst the applause of the world that this repainer of so many evils, this author of so much good, took possession of the new power with which the nation had just invested him. He was treated like the real sovereign of France. The foreign ministers spoke of him to the French ministers with the forms of respect employed in speaking of kings themselves. The etiquette was already almost monarchical. Our ambassadors had assumed the green livery, which was that of the First Consul. This was thought simple, natural, necessary. This unanimous approval of an elevation so sudden and so prodigious, was sincere. Some secret apprehensions, it is true, were mingled with it; but they were at any rate prudently dissembled. It was possible, in fact, to discern in the elevation of the First Consul his ambition, and in his ambition the speedy humiliation of Europe: but it was the clearest-sighted minds alone that could penetrate so deeply into the future, and it was these that most felt the immense good already effected by the consular government. Congratulations, however, are things of a day: business soon comes again to press with its heavy and continuous weight upon the existence of governments as upon that of individuals.

In England, the first effects of the peace began to be felt. As it almost always happens in this world, those effects fell short of the hopes entertained. Three hundred British vessels, sent into our ports at once, had not been able to sell their entire cargoes, because they brought goods prohibited by the laws of the Revolution. The treaty of 1786 having formerly thrown open our markets imprudently to British productions, French industry, and especially the manufacture of cottons, had sunk in a very short time. Since the renewal of the war, the prohibitory measures adopted by the revolutionary government had been a principle of life for our manufactures, which, amidst the most frightful political convulsions,

had made advances and attained an extraordinary development. The First Consul had, as we have related, at this moment, at the moment of signing the preliminaries of London, no mind to change such a state of things, and to renew the evils which had resulted from the treaty of 1786. English importations were consequently very much circumscribed, and the merchants of the city of London complained bitterly. They had, however, the resource of smuggling, and it was carried on upon a very great scale, either by the frontiers of Belgium, which were still imperfectly guarded, or by way of Hamburg. The merchants of the latter place, by introducing English goods upon the continent, and dissembling their origin, furnished them with the means of penetrating into France as well as into the countries under our domination. In spite, therefore, of the legal prohibitions which awaited British produce in our ports, smuggling was sufficient to create markets for them. The manufactories of Birmingham and Manchester were in full activity.

That activity, the low price of bread, the announced abandonment of the income-tax, were subjects of satisfaction, which balanced to a certain point the discontent of the great merchants. But this discontent was strong, for the great merchants derived no profit from speculations founded on smuggling. They beheld the sea covered with rival and hostile flags; they were deprived of the monopoly of the carrying trade which the war had procured them, and they no longer had the great financial operations of Mr. Pitt to indemnify them. Grievously did they therefore complain of the illusory policy of the peace, of its disadvantages for England, and its exclusive benefits for France. The laying up of the navy had turned adrift a prodigious number of sailors, whom British commerce, in its present state, was not capable of employing; and these poor fellows were seen wandering about the wharfs of the Thames, some of them reduced to the utmost distress—a sight as painful to the English as it would have been to the French to see the conquerors of Marengo or Hohenlinden begging their bread in the streets of Paris.

Mr. Addington, always animated by friendly dispositions, had made the First Consul sensible of the necessity of devising commercial arrangements that should satisfy both countries, and had intimated that there were no means so capable of consolidating the peace. The First Consul, participating in the dispositions of Mr. Addington, consented to appoint an agent and to send him to London, to seek, in concert with the English ministers, in what way the interests of the two nations could be adjusted, without sacrificing French industry.

This was a problem which it was difficult to resolve. Public opinion in London was so impressed with the importance of every thing relating to these commercial arrangements, that a great noise was made about the arrival of the French agent. His name was Coquebert: he was called *Colbert*, and said to be a descendant of the great Colbert; and the selection of a person of that name to conclude a treaty of commerce was highly commended.

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Notwithstanding the good-will and the abilities of that agent, a favourable result of his efforts was scarcely to be hoped for. On both sides, the sacrifices to be made were great, and almost beyond compensation. The iron and cotton manufactures constitute at this day the richest branches of industry both of France and England, and the principal object of their commercial rivalry. We French have found means to forge iron, and to spin and weave cotton, in immense quantity, and of course we are not disposed to sacrifice these two branches of trade. It was chiefly in cottons and hardware that the two nations strove to rival each other. The English desired that our markets should be opened to their productions in those two branches. The First Consul, aware of the alarm of our manufacturers, and impatient to develop the manufacturing wealth of France, refused every concession that would tend to thwart his patriotic intentions. The English, on their part, were no more disposed then than at this day to favour our special productions. Wines and silks were the articles which we were desirous of introducing among them. This they opposed for two reasons: the engagement contracted with Portugal to give a preference to her wines; and the desire to protect the silk manufactures, which had begun to flourish in England. While the interdiction of the communications had encouraged our cotton manufactures, it had encouraged in return their manufactures of silks. It is true that the cotton manufacture among us had attained a prodigious degree of development, because there was nothing to prevent us from completely succeeding in it; while the silk manufactures, on the contrary, prospered but moderately in England, owing to the climate, and likewise to a certain inferiority of taste. The English, however, would not sacrifice to us either the Methuen treaty, which attached them to Portugal, or their rising silk manufactures, of which they had conceived exaggerated hopes.

It was scarcely possible to reconcile such interests. It had been proposed to levy on the entry of goods imported into both countries a duty equal to the profit derived by the smuggler, so as to render free and profitable to the public treasury a trade that was beneficial only to the dishonest. This proposal alarmed both the French and English manufacturers. Besides, the first Consul, convinced of the necessity of great means for great results, and then considering the cotton manufacture as the first and most desirable branch of all, was desirous of insuring to it the immense encouragement of an absolute prohibition of rival productions.

To overcome these difficulties, the French agent devised a system, seductive at first sight, but almost impracticable. He proposed to permit the importation into France of any English productions whatever at a moderate duty, on condition that the vessel which brought them should export immediately French produce to an equivalent amount. Vessels of our nation going to England were to be required to do the same. This would be a certain method of encouraging the national industry

In the same proportion as foreign industry. In this combination there would have been another advantage, that of depriving the English of a medium of influence, of which, in consequence of their vast capitals, they were enabled to make a fearful use in certain countries. It consisted in giving credit to the nations with which they trafficked, and in thus making them their debtors for considerable sums, and themselves partners in their trade. This was the course which they had pursued in Russia and Portugal. They had become owners of part of the capital circulating in both those countries. In giving these credits they encouraged the sale of their productions, and secured, moreover, the superiority of him who lends to him who borrows. The impossibility for Russian commerce to do without them, an impossibility so absolute that the emperors were no longer free in their choice of peace or war, unless they set the dagger at defiance, sufficiently proved the danger of this superiority.

The proposed combination, which tended to confine English commerce within certain limits, was unluckily attended with such difficulties of execution, that it was scarcely possible to adopt it. It served, however, to occupy the imagination, and left a certain hope of an arrangement. This incompatibility of commercial interests would not have been sufficient to rekindle the war between the two nations, if their political views could have been reconciled, and above all, if Mr. Addington's administration could have maintained its ground against that of Mr. Pitt.

Mr. Addington considered himself as the author of the peace; he knew that herein lay his advantage over Mr. Pitt; and he was desirous to retain this advantage. In a long conversation with M. Otto, he had expressed himself in the most sensible and friendly manner on this subject. "A treaty of commerce," said he, "would be the surest, the most durable guarantee of peace. Until we come to an arrangement on this point, some forbearance on the part of the First Consul on certain points is necessary to keep the English public well disposed towards France. You have really taken possession of Italy, by annexing Piedmont to your territory, and by conferring on the First Consul the presidency of the Italian Republic; your troops occupy Switzerland; you regulate as arbiters the affairs of Germany. We pass over all those extensions of the French power; we give up the continent to you. But there are certain countries in regard to which the mind of the English people would be easily excited: there is Holland, there is Turkey. You are masters of Holland; it is a natural consequence of your position on the Rhine. But beware of adding any thing ostensible to the real domination which you habitually exercise over that country. If you were to attempt, for example, to do there what you have already done in Italy, and seek to obtain for the First Consul the presidency of that republic, English commerce would regard this as a sort of incorporation of Holland with France, and would conceive the strongest alarm. As for Turkey, any

fresh manifestation whatever of the ideas which produced the expedition to Egypt would cause a sudden and universal explosion in England. Abstain, then, from creating any new difficulty of this kind for us; let us conclude the best arrangement we can respecting our commercial affairs; let us obtain the guarantee of the powers for the Order of Malta, that we may be able to evacuate the island, and you will see peace consolidated, and the last signs of animosity disappear."

These words of Mr. Addington's were sincere, and he proved them to be so by using the utmost diligence to obtain from the powers the guarantee of the new state of things constituted in Malta by the treaty of Amiens. Unluckily, M. de Talleyrand, by a negligence of which he was sometimes guilty in the most important affairs, had omitted to transmit to our agents instructions upon this subject; and left the English agents to solicit alone a guarantee which was the preliminary condition of the evacuation of Malta. Hence arose mischievous delays, and subsequently consequences to be regretted. Mr. Addington, then, was sincere in his desire to maintain the peace. As it had not been procured through the ascendancy of Mr. Pitt, there was ground to hope that it might be preserved. But Mr. Pitt, though out of office, was more powerful than ever. While Dundas, Wyndham, Grenville, had publicly attacked the preliminaries of London and the treaty of Amiens, he had kept himself aloof, leaving to his friends the odium of these open provocations to war, profiting by their violence, keeping an imposing silence, still possessing the sympathies of the old majority by which he had been supported for eighteen years, and abandoning it to Mr. Addington till he should conceive the moment for withdrawing it to have arrived. He abstained, moreover, from every act that could bear the semblance of hostility to the administration. He always called Mr. Addington his friend; but everybody knew that there needed but a signal from him to upset the Parliament. The king hated him, and wished for his removal, but the great mercantile interest was devoted to him, and had no confidence in any other. His friends, less prudent than himself, waged an undisguised war against Mr. Addington; and they were supposed to be the organs of his real sentiments. This tory opposition was joined by the old whig opposition of Fox and Sheridan, though there was no concert between them, and they were even hostile to each other. The whigs had constantly demanded peace. Ever since it had been procured for them, they had shown the usual disposition of the human heart to undervalue what it possesses. They seemed no longer to appreciate that peace so highly extolled, and let the exaggerated friends of Mr. Pitt run on as they pleased when they were declaiming against France. Indeed, the French Revolution, under the new and less liberal form which it had taken, appeared to have lost part of the sympathies of the whigs. Mr. Addington had, therefore, enemies of two

* This is an accurate summary of several conversations detailed in the despatches of M. Otto.

kind—the tory opposition of the friends of Mr. Pitt, who always found fault with the peace; and the whig opposition, who began to congratulate themselves rather less upon it. If that administration were overthrown, Pitt was the only possible minister, and with him would return war, inevitable, rancorous, interminable, save by the ruin of one of the two nations. Unfortunately, one of those faults which the impatience of oppositions often leads them to commit, had procured Mr. Pitt an unparalleled triumph. Though already attacking the Addington administration jointly, but not in concert, with the exaggerated friends of Pitt, the whig opposition always cherished an implacable hatred to the latter. Sir Francis Burdett made a motion tending to call for an inquiry concerning the state in which Pitt had left England after his long administration. The friends of that minister replied with warmth, substituting for that motion another for an address to the king, praying his majesty to bestow some mark of the national gratitude on the great statesman, who had saved the constitution of England and doubled her power. They were for putting it to the vote immediately. The opposition then drew back, and demanded a delay of a few days. Pitt caused it to be granted with a sort of disdain. After those few days, the motion was again brought forward. This time Pitt took care to be absent; and in his absence, after a most vehement debate, an immense majority negatived Burdett's motion, and adopted one which contained the warmest expression of national gratitude to the late minister. Amidst these struggles the Addington administration succumbed; Pitt was aggrandized by all the hatred of his enemies, and his return to office was a threatening peril for the peace of the world. Meanwhile, people surmised more than they knew of his designs, and he uttered not a word that could be construed to signify peace or war.

The English journals, without recurring to the same violent language as formerly, were less friendly to the First Consul, and began to declaim afresh against the ambition of France. Still they were far from displaying the odious violence to which they afterwards descended. That part was left, with pain it must be confessed, to French emigrants, whom the peace robbed of all their hopes, and who strove, by vilifying the First Consul and their country, to rekindle the flames of discord between two nations, which it was but too easy to exasperate. A pamphleteer, named Peltier, devoted to the service of the princes of Bourbon, wrote against the First Consul, against his wife, against his sisters and his brothers, abominable pamphlets, in which they were charged with every vice. These pamphlets, treated by the English with the contempt which a free nation, accustomed to the license of the press, feels for its excesses, produced a totally different effect in Paris. They filled the heart of the First Consul with bitterness; and a vulgar writer, an instrument of the basest passions, had the power to reach in his glory the greatest of men, like those insects which instinctively torment the noblest animals of the creation. Happy the countries which have long been

accustomed to liberty! there those vile agents of defamation are deprived of the means of injuring; there they are so well known, so despised, that they have not the power to ruffle the minds of the truly great.

To these outrages were added the intrigues of the famous Georges, and those of the Bishops of Arras and St. Pol de Leon, who were at the head of the nonjuring bishops. The police had detected their agents carrying pamphlets into La Vendée, and striving to rekindle there scarcely extinguished animosities. These causes, despicable as they were, nevertheless produced extreme irritation, and led to an embarrassing demand to the British cabinet from that of France. The First Consul, too sensible to attacks more worthy of contempt than anger, applied in virtue of the Alien Act for the expulsion from England of Peltier, Georges, and the Bishops of Arras and St. Pol. Mr. Addington, closely watched by adversaries ready to reproach him with the slightest condescension towards France, did not precisely refuse what was demanded, and what the English laws authorized: but he endeavoured to temporize, alleging the necessity for paying regard to the public opinion—an opinion extremely susceptible in England, and at the moment liable to be misled under the influence of the declamations of parties. The First Consul, accustomed to despise parties, could not well comprehend these reasons, and complained of the weakness of the Addington administration with a vehemence that was almost offensive. The two cabinets, however, still continued to be upon friendly terms. Both endeavoured to prevent the renewal of a war that was scarcely over. Mr. Addington made this a point of honour, of existence. The First Consul beheld in the continuation of peace the occasion of a new glory for him, and the accomplishment of the noblest ideas of public prosperity.

Spain began to breathe after her long distress. The galleons were, as formerly, the sole resource of her government. Considerable quantities of dollars, buried during the war in the captaincies-general of Mexico and Peru, had been conveyed to Europe. The amount already received was about 3,000,000 francs. If any other government but that of an incapable and reckless favourite had been charged with the destinies of Spain, she might have raised her credit, recruited her naval power, and put herself into a condition to figure in a more glorious manner in the wars with which the world was still threatened. But these metallic riches of America, received and squandered by incapable hands, were not employed for those noble purposes to which they ought to have been devoted. The smallest part went to uphold the credit of the paper money; the greatest to defray the expenses of that Court. Nothing or next to nothing was allotted to the arsenals of Ferrol, Cadiz, and Carthage. All that Spain seemed capable of doing was to complain of the French alliance, to impute to it the loss of Trinidad, as though she had a right to find fault with France for the sorry part which the Prince of Peace had made her act both in war and in the nego-

unions An alliance is not profitable unless a State brings to its allies a real force which they appreciate, and which they are obliged to make much of. But Spain, when she made common cause with France, drawn into the maritime war by the evidence of her interests, could not keep it up, and, as soon as she was engaged in it, became almost as great a trouble as an aid to her allies, dragging herself along in their train, always discontented both with herself and with others. In this way she had gradually passed from a state of intimacy to a state of hostility in regard to France. The French division sent to Portugal had been unworthily treated, as we have seen, and a thundering denunciation from the First Consul had been required to prevent the consequences of a senseless line of conduct. From that period, the two powers had been upon better terms. There subsisted between them not only general interests which had been common to them for a century past, but interests of the moment, which deeply touched the heart of the King and Queen of Spain, and which were of a nature to bind them more closely to the First Consul. These were interests arising from the creation of the kingdom of Etruria.

The Court of Madrid complained of the tone of superiority assumed at Florence by General Clarke, the minister of France. The First Consul had attended to these complaints, and ordered General Clarke to be less free and more delicate in giving advice to the young prince and princess who were called to reign. Out of respect to the Court of Spain, he had allowed the old Grand-duke of Parma, brother of Queen Louisa, to die in full possession of that duchy. But, on the death of this prince, his duchy belonged to France, in virtue of the treaty which constituted the kingdom of Etruria. Charles IV. and the queen, his consort, strongly coveted it for their children, for this increase of territory would have made the kingdom of Etruria the second State in Italy. The First Consul did not oppose any absolute refusal to the wishes of the royal family of Spain; but he begged for time, that he might not give too much umbrage to the great Courts by a fresh act of omnipotence. By holding this duchy in trust, he left to the cabinets which protected the old dynasty of Piedmont the hope of an indemnification for that unfortunate house; it afforded the Pope a glimpse of an improvement in his present condition, which was much reduced since the loss of the Legations; lastly, it allowed the affairs of Italy, placed for some years so prominently before the eyes of Europe, to rest for a moment. Though deferred, the new transactions relative to Parma had soon drawn the cabinets of Paris and Madrid closer together. Charles IV., with his wife and his Court, had recently travelled with great pomp to Barcelona, to celebrate a double marriage, that of the heir-presumptive to the crown of Spain, afterwards Ferdinand VII., with a Princess of Naples, and that of the heir to the crown of Naples with an Infanta of Spain. On this occasion, extraordinary luxury was displayed in the capital of Catalonia, much greater indeed than the state of the Spanish finances warranted. From

that city the most gracious communications were exchanged with the consular court. Charles IV. announced the double marriage of his children to the First Consul as to a friendly sovereign. The First Consul replied with the same warmth and in a tone of the most frank cordiality. Ever mindful of serious interests, he was desirous to avail himself of this moment for improving the commercial relations of the two countries. He attempted to introduce our cottons, but without success, because the government of Charles IV. made an especial point of fostering the rising manufactures of Catalonia; but he obtained the re-establishment of the advantages formerly granted in the Peninsula to most of our productions. He was particularly anxious to accomplish one object, of great importance in his estimation: this was the introduction of the fine breeds of Spanish sheep into France. Formerly, the National Convention had conceived the happy idea of inserting in the treaty of Basle a secret article, by which Spain engaged to permit the exportation for five years of 1000 Merino ewes and 100 rams annually, with 50 Andalusian stallions and 150 mares. Amidst the troubles of that period, neither a sheep nor a horse had ever been purchased. By order of the First Consul, the minister of the interior had just sent agents to the Peninsula, with directions to execute in a single year what ought to have been done in five. The Spanish administration, always extremely jealous of the exclusive possession of those fine animals, obstinately refused to comply with the application, alleging in excuse the great mortality of the preceding years. At the same time, there were 7,000,000 Merino sheep in Spain, and there could be no difficulty in picking up five or six thousand of those animals. After a sharp resistance, the Spanish government yielded to the wishes of the First Consul, but not without interposing some delay to their accomplishment. The relations between the two Courts had thus become again perfectly amicable. General Beurnonville, recently ambassador in Berlin, had just quitted that capital for the purpose of repairing to Madrid; and he had been invited to the family festivities held in Barcelona.

The safety of navigation in the Mediterranean engaged in a most particular manner the attention of the First Consul. The Dey of Algiers had been ill-advised enough to treat France as he treated the second-rate Christian powers. Two French vessels had been seized on their voyage and carried to Algiers. One of our officers had been molested in the road of Tunis by an Algerine officer. The crew of a vessel wrecked on the coast of Africa had been made prisoners by the Arabs. The coral fishery was interrupted. Lastly, a Neapolitan vessel had been captured by African corsairs in the waters of the Hyeres Islands. The Algerine government, when applied to for redress of these various grievances, dared to demand a tribute similar to that which it exacted from Spain and the Italian powers, before it would do justice to France. The First Consul was indignant: he immediately despatched an officer of his household, adjutant Hulst, with a

letter for the Dey. In this letter he reminded the Dey that he had destroyed the empire of the Mamelukes: he assured him that he would send a squadron and an army, and threatened him with the conquest of the whole coast of Africa, if the French and Italians who were detained, and the captured vessels were not instantly restored, and if a formal promise were not given to respect in future the flags of France and Italy. "God has decided," said he, "that all those who are unjust towards me shall be punished. I will destroy your city and your port, I will take possession of your coast, unless you respect France, of which I am the head, and Italy, where I command." What the First Consul threatened he really designed to perform; for he had already remarked that the north of Africa was very fertile, and might be advantageously cultivated by European hands, instead of serving for the haunt of pirates. Three ships sailed from Toulon, two were moved into the road, five were ordered to proceed from the ocean into the Mediterranean: but all these preparations proved needless. The Dey, learning very soon what kind of power he had to deal with, threw himself at the feet of the conqueror of Egypt, released all the Christian prisoners whom he held captive, restored the Neapolitan and French vessels which he had taken, condemned to death the agents of whom we had reason to complain, and spared their lives only on the petition for their pardon presented by the minister of France. He re-established the coral fishery, and promised equal and absolute respect for the French and Italian flags.

Italy was extremely quiet. The new Italian Republic began to organize itself under the direction of the president whom it had chosen, and who repressed by his powerful authority the disorderly movements to which a new and republican state is always liable. The First Consul had at length decided to unite officially the Isle of Elba and Piedmont with France. Elba, exchanged by the king of Etruria for the principality of Piombino, which had been obtained from the court of Naples, had just been evacuated by the English. It had been immediately declared part of the French territory. The incorporation of Piedmont, consummated in fact two years before, passed over in silence by England during the negotiations of Amiens, admitted by Russia herself, who merely demanded some sort of indemnity for the house of Savoy, was tolerated as an inevitable necessity by all the courts. Prussia and Austria were ready to confirm it by their adhesion, upon the promise of a large share in the distribution of the ecclesiastical states. This incorporation of Piedmont, officially pronounced by an organic senatus-consultum of the 24th Fructidor, year X.—September 11th, 1802—consequently excited no surprise, and was nothing new. Besides, the vacancy of the duchy of Parma left a hope to all the chafed interests in Italy. The fine country of Piedmont was divided into six departments—the Po, the Doria, Marengo, the Sesia, the Stura, and the Tanaro. It was to send seventeen deputies to the legislative body. Turin was declared one of the

great cities of the republic. This was the first step taken by Napoleon beyond what are called the natural boundaries of France, that is to say, beyond the Rhine, the Alps, and the Pyrenees. In the eyes of the cabinets of Europe, an aggrandizement would never appear a fault, to judge at least from their usual conduct. There are, nevertheless, aggrandizements which are real faults, as the sequel of this history will show. They ought to be considered as such, when they pass the limit that may be easily defended, when they wound respectable and resisting nationalities. But it must be confessed, of all the extraordinary acquisitions made by France in this quarter of a century, that of Piedmont was least liable to censure. Had it been possible to constitute Italy forthwith, the wisest thing that could be done would have been to unite the whole of it into one state; but, powerful as the First Consul was at that time, he was not sufficiently master of Europe to venture upon such a creation. He had been obliged to leave one part of Italy to Austria, which possessed the ancient state of Venice, as far as the Adige; another to Spain, which had solicited the formation of the kingdom of Etruria for its two infants. He had found it expedient to suffer the Pope to exist for the sake of a religious interest, and the Bourbons of Naples for the interest of a general peace. To organize Italy definitively and completely was, therefore, impossible for the moment. All that the First Consul could do was to procure for it a transitory state, better than its past state, and suitable as a preparation for its future state. By constituting in its bosom a republic, which occupied the middle of the valley of the Po, he had there deposited a germ of liberty and independence. In taking Piedmont, he secured a solid base for combating the Austrians. In leaving the Pope, in striving to attach him to himself, in supporting the Bourbons of Naples, he indulged the ancient policy of Europe, yet without sacrificing to it the policy of France. What he was now doing was, in short, a commencement, which did not preclude future arrangements; which, on the contrary, paved the way to a better and a definitive state.

The relations with the court of Rome became daily more cordial. The First Consul listened with great complaisance to the complaints of his Holiness on such matters as chagrined him. The sensibility of the venerable pontiff to every thing connected with the affairs of the church, was extreme. The loss of the legations had greatly reduced the financial resources of the Holy See. The abolition of a multitude of dues formerly levied in France, an abolition which threatened to extend itself to Spain, had impoverished him still more. Of this Pius VII. complained bitterly, not for his own sake, for he lived like an anchorite, but for the sake of his clergy, whom he could scarcely support. Still, as, in the estimation of that worthy pontiff, spiritual interests were far above temporal interests, he complained, mildly but with a keen feeling of grief, about the famous organic articles. It will be recollected that the First Consul, after introducing into a treaty with Rome, called Concordat, the

general conditions of the re-establishment of the clergy, had embodied in a law all that related to the police of religion. This law he had drawn up agreeably to the maxims of the old French monarchy. The prohibition to publish any bull in writing without the permission of the public authority; the interdiction to every legate of the Holy See to exercise his functions, without the previous recognition of his powers by the French government; the jurisdiction of the Council of State, to which were referred appeals as well as abuses; the rigid rules to which the organization of seminaries was subjected; the obligation imposed upon their inmates to profess the declaration of 1682; the introduction of divorce into our laws; the prohibition to celebrate religious marriage before civil marriage; the complete and definitive attribution of the registers of the civil state to the municipal magistrates, were so many subjects on which the Pope presented remonstrances, to which the First Consul listened, but without acceding to them, considering those subjects as wisely and definitively settled by the organic articles. The Pope remonstrated with perseverance, but without any intention of pushing his remonstrances to a rupture. Lastly, the state of religious affairs in the Italian Republic, the secularizations in Germany, in consequence of which the church was about to lose part of her German territory, crowned his mortifications; and, but for the joy which he felt on account of the re-establishment of the Catholic religion in France, his life, he said, would be but a long martyrdom. His language breathed, at the same time, the most sincere affection for the person of the First Consul, who, on his part, suffered his Holiness to say what he pleased, with a patience which was most extraordinary, and altogether foreign to his character.

As for the privation of the legations and the impoverishment of the Holy See, he often turned his thoughts to that subject, and cherished a vague intention of increasing the domain of St. Peter: but he knew not how to set about it, placed as it was between the Italian Republic, which, so far from being disposed to restore the legations, demanded, on the contrary, the Duchy of Parma; between Spain, which coveted the same duchy; between the great protectors of the house of Sardinia, who were desirous to turn it into an indemnity for that house. He therefore offered money to the Pope, till he should have it in his power to meliorate his territorial condition—an offer which the pontiff would have accepted if the dignity of the church had permitted him. In default of this kind of aid, he had made a particular point of paying for the support of the French troops during their passage through the Roman States. He had caused Ancona to be evacuated at the same time as Otranto and the whole south of Italy; he had required the Neapolitan government to evacuate Ponte Corvo and Benevento. Lastly, in the affairs of Germany, he showed himself disposed to defend, in a certain extent, the ecclesiastical party, which the Protestant party, that is to say, Prussia, was for weakening and even destroying. To these efforts, calculated to gratify

the Holy See, he added acts of the most gracious courtesy. He had caused all the subjects of the Roman States detained at Algiers to be delivered up, and had sent them to the Pope. As that sovereign prince possessed not a single vessel to drive the African pirates from his coasts, the First Consul had selected two fine brigs in the naval arsenal of Toulon, ordered them to be completely equipped and fitted up with elegance, and, after giving them the names of St. Peter and St. Paul, had sent them as a present to Pius VIII. To such a length did he carry his attention, that a cutter accompanied those vessels to Civita Vecchia, to carry the crews back to Toulon, and to spare the papal treasury all expense whatever. The venerable pontiff insisted on bringing the French seamen to Rome, exhibited to them the pomp of the Catholic worship in the great Church of St. Peter, and sent them back loaded with such humble presents as the state of his finances permitted him to make.

A wish of the First Consul's, ardent and prompt as were all those which he conceived, had recently created a difficulty with the Holy See, which, fortunately, was transient and soon surmounted. He was desirous that the new Church of France should have its cardinals as the old Church had. France had formerly numbered eight, nine, and even ten. The First Consul would have wished to have so many and even more hats at his disposal, if it were possible to obtain them; for he considered them as valuable means of influence with the French clergy, eager after these high dignities, and means of influence still more desirable in the sacred college, which elects the Popes and regulates the great affairs of the church. In 1789, France numbered five cardinals, Messrs. de Bernis, de La Rochefoucauld, de Lomenie, de Rohan, de Montmorency. The first three, Messrs. de Bernis, de La Rochefoucauld, and de Lomenie, were dead. M. de Rohan had ceased to be a Frenchman, for his archbishopric had become German. M. de Montmorency was one of the recusants who had resisted the Holy See at the time when the prelates were called upon to resign. Cardinal Maury, nominated in 1789, had emigrated, and was then considered as an enemy. There were two belonging to Belgium and Savoy—Cardinal Frankenberg, formerly archbishop of Malines, and the learned Gerdil. The former archbishop of Malines was separated from his see, and had no intention of returning to it. Cardinal Gerdil had always lived in Rome, absorbed in theological studies, and belonged to no country. Neither of these could be considered as French. The First Consul wished that seven cardinals should be granted immediately to France. This was a much greater number than it was possible for the Pope to grant at the moment. There were, it is true, several hats vacant, but the promotion of the crowns was approaching, and it was necessary to provide for that. The promotion of the crowns was a custom which had become almost a law, in virtue of which the Pope authorized six Catholic powers to name each of them a person, on whom he conferred the hat at his presentation. These powers were Austria, Po-

land, the Republic of Venice, France, Spain, and Portugal. Two of them had ceased to exist—Poland and Venice; but there remained four, including France; and there was not a sufficient number of vacant hats either to satisfy them, or to fulfil the demands of the First Consul. The Pope alleged this reason for refusing what was desired of him. But the First Consul, conceiving that this resistance to his wishes arose not solely from the difficulty respecting the number, which was real, but also from the fear of showing too much condescension towards France, was greatly incensed, and declared that, if the hats for which he applied were refused him, he would do without them, but, in that case, he would not accept one; for he would not suffer the French Church, if it had cardinals, to have fewer than the other churches of Christendom. The Pope, not fond of exciting the displeasure of the First Consul, accommodated the matter, and consented to grant him five cardinals. But, as there were not hats sufficient for this extraordinary promotion and for that of the crowns, the courts of Austria, Spain, and Portugal, were solicited to assent to an adjournment of their just claims, which all three did with great cheerfulness and complaisance. The powers on this occasion took pleasure in gratifying wishes, which ere long they were obliged to fulfil as commands.

The First Consul consented to give the hat to M. de Bayanne, for many years auditor of the Rota for France, and senior of that tribunal. He then proposed to the Pope M. de Belloy, archbishop of Paris; the Abbé Fesch, archbishop of Lyons, and his uncle; M. Cambacérès, brother of the Second Consul and archbishop of Rouen; lastly, M. de Boisgelin, archbishop of Tours. To these five nominations he would fain have added a sixth, that of the Abbé Bernier, bishop of Orleans, pacificator of La Vendée and principal negotiator of the Concordat. But the idea of including in so signal a promotion a man who had been so conspicuous in the civil war greatly embarrassed the First Consul. He communicated his sentiments on the subject to his Holiness, and begged him to decide at once that the first vacant hat should be given to the Abbé Bernier, but keeping that resolution *in petto*, as the court of Rome expresses it, and writing to acquaint the Abbé Bernier with the motive of that adjournment. This was accordingly done, and it became a subject of mortification for that prelate, as yet scantily recompensed for the services which he had rendered. The Abbé Bernier was well aware of the good-will borne him by the First Consul, but he was deeply chagrined at the embarrassment that was felt to avow it publicly—a just punishment of the civil war, but falling, indeed, on a man more worthy by his services than any other of the indulgence of the government of the country.

The Pope sent to France a Prince Doria, to carry the hats to the cardinals recently elected. At that moment the French Church, invested with so large a part of the Roman purple, was

one of the most favoured and the most resplendent in Christendom.

The Church of Italy was still to be organised in concert with the Pope. The First Consul demanded a Concordat for the Italian Republic; but this time the Pope would not suffer himself to be overcome. The Italian Republic comprehended the Legations, and, according to him, to treat with the Republic to which they belonged would have been an acknowledgment of the cession of those provinces. It was agreed that the deficiency should be supplied by a series of briefs destined to regulate every affair in a special manner. Lastly, Pius VII. deferred entirely to the First Consul in regard to the definitive constitution of the Order of Malta. The priories had met in the different countries of Europe, to proceed to the election of a new grand-master, and, to facilitate that election, they agreed to leave the choice for this time to the Pope. On the recommendation of the First Consul, who was desirous to organize the Order as speedily as possible, that he might soon transfer to it the island of Malta, the Pope selected an Italian, the *bailli* Ruspoli, a Roman Prince of a high family. The First Consul preferred a Roman to either a German or a Neapolitan. The person chosen was moreover a discreet and enlightened man, and worthy of the honour that was decreed him: though, indeed, his acceptance of it was not very probable. No time was lost in writing to him in England, where he lived in retirement.

The French troops had evacuated Ancona and the gulf of Tarento. They had returned to the Italian Republic, which they were to occupy till that republic had formed an army. They laboured upon the roads over the Alps, and the fortifications of Alessandria, Mantua, Legnago, Verona, and Peschiera. Six thousand men guarded Etruria till a Spanish corps should arrive. All the conditions of the treaty of Amiens relative to Italy were therefore fulfilled on the part of France.

While the agitation of the public mind began to subside in most of the states of Europe, under the soothing influence of peace, it was far from being appeased in Switzerland. The people of those mountains were the last to continue in commotion, and that commotion was violent. One might have said that discord, driven from France and Italy by General Bonaparte, had taken refuge in the inaccessible retreats of the Alps. Two parties, by the names of Unitarians and Oligarchs, that of the revolution and that of the old system, were struggling there against each other. These two parties, nearly balanced in point of strength, produced no equilibrium, but continual and mischievous oscillations. In the space of eighteen months they had alternately possessed themselves of the chief power, and had exercised it without discretion, without justice, without humanity. It may not be amiss to explain in a few words the origin of these parties, and their conduct since the commencement of the Helvetic Revolution.

Switzerland, anterior to '89, was composed of thirteen cantons; six democratic—Schwiz, Uri, Unterwalden, Zug, Glarus, Appenzell; seven oligarchic—Berne, Solothurn, Zurich,

* Cardinal Fesch was half-brother of Letitia Romolino, (Napoleon's mother), their mother's second husband having been a Swiss officer named Fesch.—Trans.

Lucerne, Freiburg, Basle, Schaffhausen. The canton of Neuchâtel was a principality dependent on Prussia. The Grisons, the Valais, Geneva, formed three separate republics, allies of Switzerland, each under a particular and independent government; but the first, that of the Grisons, from its geographical position, leaning rather towards Austria; the two others, the Valais and Geneva, for the same reason having a bias for France.

The French Republic produced the first change in this state of things. To indemnify herself for the war, she took possession of the country of Bienne and the ancient principality of Porrentruy, and, with the addition of part of the old bishopric of Basle, formed the department of Mont Tonnerre. She took also Geneva, with which she formed the department of the Léman. She indemnified Switzerland, by annexing to it the Grisons and the Valais, reserving in the latter a military road, which was to commence at the extremity of the lake of Geneva near Villeneuve, to ascend the valley of the Rhone, by Martigny and Sion, as far as Brieg, the point where began the celebrated road of the Simplon, debouching on Lago Maggiore. After these territorial changes, which were suitable to the French Republic, came those that were the consequence of the ideas of justice and equality, which the Revolutionary party aimed at making predominant in Switzerland, in imitation of what had been accomplished in France in '89.

The Revolutionary party in Switzerland was composed of all those who were adverse to the oligarchic system, and they were spread through the democratic as well as the aristocratic cantons; for they had as much to suffer in the one as in the other. Thus, in the petty cantons of Uri, Unterwalden, and Schwitz, where the entire population, meeting once a year, chose their magistrates and investigated their administration in a few hours, this universal suffrage, destined to flatter the ignorant and corrupt multitudes for a moment, was a mere farce. A small number of families, having made themselves masters of every thing in the course of time and by corruption, settled affairs, and disposed of offices at their pleasure. In Schwitz, for instance, the family of Reding appointed at will all the officers in a Swiss regiment in the service of Spain, which constituted the sole object of solicitude in the country, for these appointments were the only ambition of all who would not remain herdsmen or farmers. The small cantons had moreover the Italian bailiwicks as dependencies, and governed them, by the designation of subject countries, in the most arbitrary manner. These democracies, therefore, were, what all pure democracies come to be in time, nothing but oligarchies disguised under popular forms. This serves to explain how it happened that there were, even in the democratic cantons, minds deeply aggrieved by the old state of things. Subject provinces, after the fashion of the Italian bailiwicks, were attached to more than one canton. Thus Berne governed with harshness the Pays de Vaud and Argau. Lastly, in these aristocratic cantons, the lower class of citizens were excluded from offices.

Hence, when the signal was given by the entry of the French armies in 1798, the rising was prompt and general. In the cantons with subject provinces, the oppressed bailiwicks rose against the oppressing master-country; and, in the bosom of the sovereign cities, the middle class rose against the oligarchy. Out of the thirteen cantons, it was proposed to make nineteen, all equal, all uniformly administered, placed under a central and sole authority, imagining the unity of the French government. In acting thus, people were governed by the need of distributive justice, and especially by the ambition of raising themselves above the state of nullity peculiar to federative governments. The hope of figuring rather more actively on the theatre of the world powerfully moved at that time the hearts of the Swiss, proud of their ancient valour and of the part which it had formerly gained for them in Europe, and weary of that perpetual neutrality which necessitated them to sell their blood to foreign powers.

In this application of the ideas of the French Revolution to Switzerland, brought about as much by conformity of wants as by a spirit of imitation, certain cantons were partitioned to form several, as several separate districts were incorporated to compose a single canton. The territory of Berne, forming with Argau and the Pays de Vaud a fourth of Switzerland, was divided; and Argau and the Pays de Vaud were made distinct cantons. The Italian bailiwicks were separated from Uri, and out of them was created the canton of the Tessino. The canton of Appenzell was increased by the annexation of St. Gall, Tockenbourg, and the Rheintal, to the canton of Glarus were added the bailiwicks of Sargans, Werdenberg, Gaster, Uznach, and Rapperschwil. These additions granted to the cantons of Appenzell and Glarus were designed to destroy for ever the old democratic system, by giving them an extent which would render that system impossible. These nineteen cantons were made dependent on one legislative body, which gave them uniform laws, and one executive power which executed those laws for all and among all. There were in Switzerland ministers, prefects, and sub-prefects.

The opposite party, against which all this uniformity was directed, adopted the contrary theme, and wanted the federative system in its utmost exaggeration, with its most absurd irregularities, with the complete independence of confederated states in regard to each other. They wanted it in this form, because, under favour of these irregularities, this independence, each petty oligarchy could resume its empire. The aristocracies of Berne, Zurich, Basle, made alliance with the democracies of Schwitz, Uri, Unterwalden, and agreed perfectly together; for, in fact, they aimed at the same thing, that is, the domination of a few powerful families, as well in the petty, mountainous cantons as in the most opulent cities. The one received the name of Oligarchs; the others, who sought justice and equality in the uniformity of the government, were denominated Unitarians. They had been struggling against one another for some years, without

having ever been able to govern unhappy Switzerland with any moderation and for any length of time. Constitutions had followed each other there as rapidly as in France, and at the moment they were bestirring themselves to frame a new one.

One circumstance which served to aggravate the troubles in Switzerland was the disposition of the parties to seek support abroad, which is always the case when a country is too weak to depend on itself alone, and too important, from its geographical position, to be viewed by its neighbours with an indifferent eye. The oligarchic party, having much correspondence with Vienna, London, and even Petersburg, where a Swiss, Colonel Laharpe, had formed the heart and mind of the young emperor, addressed the strongest solicitations to all those courts; beseeching them not to suffer France, in consolidating the revolutionary system in Switzerland, to subject to her influence a country, which, in a military point of view, was the most important of the continent. They were likewise in close intercourse with England. The citizens of Berne and of several sovereign cities had deposited the capital of their municipal savings in the bank of London, conduct which, by-the-by, did them honour; for while the free cities of all Europe, and especially in Germany, were ruined by debts, the cities of Switzerland had amassed considerable sums. The English government, making a handle of the French occupation, had, without scruple, seized the funds so deposited; and it had not restored them since the peace. The oligarchs of Berne besought it, if it would not afford them assistance, to retain at least the capitals which they had remitted to the bank of England. They had placed about ten millions in that bank, and two in that of Vienna.

The revolutionary party naturally sought support from France, and it was easy to derive it from her, since the French armies had never ceased to occupy the Helvetic territory. But such an occupation could not last long. It would be necessary very soon to evacuate Switzerland, as Italy had been evacuated. Though the obligation to evacuate the one was not so formally stipulated as the obligation to evacuate the other, still, as the treaty of Lunéville guaranteed the independence of Switzerland, the execution of the treaties might be deemed incomplete, and the peace uncertain, so long as our troops had not withdrawn. Political observers, therefore, had their eyes particularly fixed on Switzerland, which was still in a state of agitation, and on Germany, where the ecclesiastical territories were parceling out, to see whether the attempt at a general pacification making at that moment was likely to be durable. The First Consul had taken the formal resolution not to compromise the peace on occasion of what might happen in either of these countries, unless, indeed, the counter-revolution, which he would not suffer on any of the frontiers of France, should strive to establish itself amidst the Alps. It would have been easy for him to cause himself to be accepted as legislator of Helvetia, as he had been for the Italian Republic; but the *Consulta* of Lyons had pro-

duced such an effect in Europe, especially in England, that he durst not exhibit the same scene twice. He confined himself, therefore to prudent advice, which was listened to, but little followed, notwithstanding the presence of our troops. He recommended to the Swiss to give up the chimera of absolute unity, a unity impossible, in a country so peculiarly circumstanced as theirs, insupportable, moreover, to the small cantons, which could not pay heavy taxes, like Berne or Basle, or bow to the yoke of a general rule. He advised them to institute a central government for the foreign affairs of the Confederation; and as for the internal affairs, to leave the local governments to organize themselves, according to the soil, and the manners and character of the inhabitants. He exhorted them to take from the French Revolution whatever it had that was good and incontestably useful—equality among all classes of the citizens, equality between all parts of the territory: to leave separated from each other incompatible provinces, such as Vaud and Berne, the Italian bailiwicks and Uri; but to renounce certain incorporations of territory which ran counter to nature in several of the small cantons, such as those of Appenzell and Glarus; to put an end in the great cities to the alternate domination of the oligarchs and of the populace, and to adopt the government of the middle *bourgeoisie*, but without systematically excluding any class; to imitate, in short, that compromising policy between all the parties, which had restored tranquillity to France. These counsels, comprehended by enlightened men, misconceived by passionate men, who always form the majority, produced no effect. As, however, they tended to give some slight check to the Revolution, they were received with pleasure by the oligarchic faction, lulling itself with illusions, as did certain French emigrants in Paris, and believing that the First Consul, because he was moderate, purposed to restore the ancient system.

A question of territory added a very serious difficulty to this situation. During the Revolution, France and Switzerland, being in some respects blended, had passed from a system of neutrality to that of offensive and defensive alliance. In this system, the Swiss had not hesitated to concede to France, by the treaty of 1798, the military road through the Valais, terminating at the foot of the Simplon. At the time of the last treaties, Europe had not dared to remonstrate against this state of things, the result of a long war; it had merely stipulated the independence of Switzerland. The First Consul, preferring from system the neutrality of Switzerland to her alliance, thought to enjoy the road of the Simplon, without being obliged to borrow the Helvetic territory, which was incompatible with neutrality; and, to this end, he conceived the idea of obtaining the gift of the Valais. This was not asking any great thing, for it was of France that Switzerland held the Valais, formerly independent. But the First Consul did not desire to have it without compensation: he offered in exchange a province which Austria had ceded to him by the treaty of Lunéville.

this was the Frickthal, a small country, but of great importance as a frontier, comprehending the road through the Forest Towns, extending from the conflux of the Aar and the Rhine, to the boundary of the canton of Basle, and consequently connecting that canton with Switzerland. This little tract, facing the Black Forest, besides its intrinsic value, possessed a high conventional value. Thanks to this exchange, France, having become proprietor of the Valais, would have no further need of the Helvetic territory for the passage of her armies, so that one might revert from the system of alliance to the system of neutrality. The Swiss, both unitarians and oligarchs, vied with each other in declaiming upon this subject. They would not on any account give up the Valais for the Frickthal. They demanded other concessions along the Jura, especially the country of Bienne, the Erguel, and some detached districts of Porentruy. This would have been sacrificing to them a portion of the department of Mont Terrible. Even on these conditions, they had a repugnance to the cession of the Valais; and as, under the interests called general, very particular interests often lurked concealed, the little cantons, apprehensive of the effect of the rivalry of the Simplon route on that of the St. Gothard, pushed the proposed exchange to a refusal. The First Consul had caused the Valais to be provisionally occupied by three battalions, resolved not to take any decided step before the arrangement of the Helvetic affairs.

Until the definitive organization of Switzerland, a temporary government, composed of an executive council and a not numerous legislative body, had been formed. Various plans of constitution had been digested and secretly submitted to the First Consul. Among these different plans, he had preferred one, which seemed to originate in wise and enlightened views, and had sent it back to Berne with a sort of recommendation. The provisional government, composed itself of the most moderate patriots, had adopted this constitution, and had presented it for the acceptance of a general Diet. In this Diet, the hot-headed unitarian party had a considerable majority—fifty voices out of eighty. It soon declared the Diet constituent, drew up a new plan consistent with the ideas of absolute unity, and, affecting even to defy France, proclaimed the Valais an integral part of the territory of the Helvetic Confederation. The representatives of the small cantons withdrew, declaring that they would never submit to such a constitution. Masters of the provisional government, the moderate patriots, seeing what was passing, concerted with Verninac, minister of France, and issued a resolution, by which they dissolved the Diet, for having exceeded its powers and made itself a constituent assembly, when it was not called upon to be so. They themselves put in force the new constitution of the 29th of May, 1801, and proceeded to the election of the authorities instituted by it. These authorities were the senate, the little council, and the landammann. The senate was composed of twenty-two members. It nominated the little council, consisting of

seven, and the landammann, who was the head of the Republic. Not only did the senate appoint these two authorities, it counselled them also. As the moderate patriots had upon their hands the furious unitarians, who had been dispersed by the dissolution of the Diet, they were obliged to court the contrary party, that of the oligarchs. They chose from among it the most discreet men, and incorporated them with themselves by adding them to the senate. They so mingled them with revolutionists as to secure a majority to the latter. But, in their irritation, five of the revolutionists chosen refused to serve. The majority was consequently changed in a manner the more unlucky, since the senate, once formed, was to complete itself. Accordingly, it did complete itself, but in the spirit of the oligarchs. Thus, when it was to proceed to the election of landammann and to choose between two candidates—M. Reding, who was the head of the oligarchs, and M. Dolder, who was the chief of the moderate revolutionists—M. Reding won by a single vote. M. Dolder was a prudent, able man, but of not much energy. M. Reding, formerly a military officer, not particularly enlightened but energetic, having served among the Swiss troops in the pay of foreign powers, and displayed intelligence in the mountain war against the French in 1798. He was a native of the little canton of Schwitz, and the head of that privileged family which disposed of all commissions in Reding's regiment. The oligarchs of all Switzerland had adopted this chieftain, as it were, of a clan, and had given him their confidence. Rough as he was, M. Reding was not destitute of a certain tact. He was flattered with his new dignity and solicitous to retain it: but this he knew he could not long do against the will of France. In concert with his party, he determined to make a rapid journey to Paris, and strive to persuade the First Consul that the party of the oligarchs was the party of the honest men; that he ought to suffer him to retain the chief power, to permit him to do what he pleased, and on these conditions he should have a Switzerland devoted to France. The First Consul received M. Reding with courtesy and listened to him with some attention. M. Reding affected to exhibit himself as free from prejudices, and more of a soldier than an oligarch; he appeared flattered to approach the greatest general of modern times, and who was disposed like him to place himself above the passions of party. He proposed various adjustments, which might be accepted till it should be seen whether his conduct corresponded with his promises. According to these proposed adjustments, the senate was to be raised to thirty members, and the five new members were to be chosen exclusively from among the patriots. There was likewise to be chosen from among them a second landammann, taking turns with the first in the exercise of power. Cantonal commissions, composed half by the senate and half by the cantons themselves, were to be appointed for the purpose of giving to each of them the constitution best adapted to it. It was, moreover, assented to that Argau and the Pays de Vaud

should remain separated from Berne; and on the other hand that the incorporations of territory which had disfigured certain small cantons should be revoked. With all these reservations, the First Consul promised to recognise Switzerland, to replace it in a state of perpetual neutrality, and to withdraw the French troops. To insure to him the military road which he demanded, the Valais was dismembered, and that portion of it which is on the right bank of the Rhone was ceded to France. France engaged to cede the Frickthal, besides an *arrondissement* of territory towards the Jura, in exchange. M. Reding left Paris full of hope, conceiving that he had gained the favour of the First Consul, and that he could thenceforward do whatever he pleased in Switzerland.

But no sooner had this head of the oligarchs arrived in Berne, than, hurried away by his party, he became all that he could and must necessarily be under such influences, and with ideas of government so unsettled as his own. Five new members taken from the patriot party were added to the senate, and a colleague was given to M. Reding, to perform alternately with him the functions of landammann, which colleague was not M. Dolder himself, but M. Ruger, a considerable personage among the moderate revolutionists. These new elections, which procured for the revolutionary party a majority in the little council, vested with the executive power, left it to the oligarchic party in the senate. Moreover, M. Reding, being landammann for this year, composed the authorities agreeably to the interests of his party. He sent both to Vienna and to other courts agents devoted to the counter-revolution, with instructions hostile to France, and with which she was soon acquainted. M. Reding, in particular, desired that representatives of all the powers might be accredited to him, in order to second him against the influence of M. Verninac, chargé-d'affaires of France. The only agent abroad whom he durst not remove was M. Sapper, minister in Paris, a respectable man devoted to his country, who had found means to win the confidence of the French government, and for this reason could not well be recalled. M. Reding had promised to leave the Pays de Vaud and Argau independent, and yet petitions were circulating in all parts for claiming the restitution of those provinces to the canton of Berne. Notwithstanding the promise to enfranchise the Italian bailiwicks, Uri loudly insisted, and with threats, that the Levantine valley should be restored to it. The cantonal commissions, charged with framing the particular constitution of each canton, were, with the exception of two or three, composed in a spirit contrary to the new order of things, and favourable to the re-establishment of the old. No further mention was made of the Valais or of the road promised to France. Lastly, the Vaudois, seeing that a counter-revolution was imminent, had risen, and, rather than submit to M. Reding, solicited their incorporation with France.

Thus, unhappy Switzerland, suffering a year before from the extravagances of the absolute unitarians, was this year a prey to the counter-

revolutionary machinations of the oligarchs. The First Consul then made up his mind respecting the Valais; he declared that he detached it from the confederation and restored its ancient independence. This was evidently the best solution of the question, for to divide that extensive valley, and to give one bank to Switzerland and the other to France, would be running counter to the nature of things; to leave it entire to Switzerland, while creating a French military road and establishments in it, would be rendering Helvetic neutrality impossible. When M. Reding was apprized of this resolution, he was enraged: he declared that the First Consul had violated his promises, which was false, and proposed to the little council a letter so violent that the council shrunk back in alarm. The situation was not more tenable between the oligarchs of the great and little cantons, labouring to reconstruct the ancient system, and the revolutionists, who had risen in the Pays de Vaud, to obtain its incorporation with France. M. Dolder and his friends in the little council united. In this little council, invested with the executive power, they were six to three. Availing themselves of the absence of M. Reding, who had gone for a few days into the small cantons, they cancelled all that had been done by him, annulled the cantonal commissions, and summoned an assembly of notables, composed of forty-eight persons, selected from among the most respectable and the most moderate men of all opinions, to meet at Berne. The constitution of the 29th of May recommended by France was to be submitted to them; such modifications as should be thought indispensable were to be made in it, and the public authorities were to be immediately organized in conformity with that constitution.

To deprive the oligarchs of the support of the senate, in which they had a majority, the council pronounced the suspension of that body. On these tidings, M. Reding hastened back, and protested against the resolutions that had been taken. But having lost the support of the senate, which was suspended, he withdrew, declaring that he renounced his quality of first magistrate, and proceeded to the small cantons to foment insurrection there. He was considered as having resigned, and the office of first landammann was conferred on citizen Ruttimann. Thus Switzerland, snatched by turns from the hands of the absolute unitarians and from those of the oligarchs, was replaced, by means of a series of petty strokes of policy, in the hands of the moderate revolutionists. Unluckily, these latter had not at their head, like the French moderates on the 18th Brumaire, a powerful chief to give to wisdom the support of force. Enlightened, however, by events, the partisans of revolution, of whatever shade they might be, were disposed to agree, and to adopt the constitution of the 29th of May, after the introduction of certain alterations. But M. Reding was endeavouring to excite a rising in the little cantons, and the necessity of recurring to a powerful arm out of Switzerland, since there was not one in Switzerland, he

case almost inevitable. Manifest as was this necessity, still no one durst avow it. The oligarchs, who anticipated their certain ruin from the intervention of France, made it a crime in the revolutionists to wish for that intervention. The latter, that they might not furnish their adversaries with such a cause of complaint, loudly disclaimed it. At length, the First Consul himself, desirous to spare Europe uneasiness, decided, unless in case of extraordinary events, not to compromise the French troops in the commotions in Switzerland. Thus, though 30,000 French were dispersed amidst the Alps, never did our generals comply with the requisitions of the different parties, and our soldiers, with the piece upon their arms, were quiet spectators of the disturbances. Their very immobility became a subject of reproach, and the patriots said, with some show of reason, that, now general peace prevailed in Europe, the French army, not having to defend them against the Austrians, not choosing to defend them against internal insurrections, they reaped no other fruit from its presence but the burden of maintaining it and the unpleasantness of a foreign occupation. The removal of our troops soon became a sort of patriotic satisfaction, which the moderates conceived themselves obliged to grant to all the parties, and they demanded it of the First Consul, while M. Reding was kindling the flames of insurrection in the mountains of Schwitz, Uri, and Unterwalden. It seemed the more necessary to grant the desired satisfaction, as the separation of the Valais, definitely resolved upon, was a keen mortification to the hearts of the Swiss patriots. The first Consul consented to the evacuation, wishing to give entire moral support to the moderate party, though at bottom, he had great dread of the experiment that was about to be made. Orders for the evacuation were immediately despatched. Three thousand Swiss troops remained at the disposal of the new government. There were left, moreover, close to the frontier, the Helvetic demi-brigades in the service of France; and it was hoped that these might settle matters without ulterior recourse to our army. A momentary calm succeeded these agitations. The constitution of the 29th of May, adopted with certain modifications, was everywhere accepted. The little cantons alone refused to put it in force among them. Still they appeared disposed to keep quiet, at least for the moment.

The separation of the Valais was accomplished without difficulty. That country was constituted anew into a small independent State, under the protection of France and of the Italian Republic. France reserved, as the only mark of paramountship, a military road which she was to keep up at her own expense, and to provide with magazines and barracks. The road was declared exempt from every kind of toll, which was an immense benefit for the country. In opening the Simplon, in creating the fine road which now crosses it, France bestowed on the Valais a magnificent boon, which was assuredly worth the price that she demanded for it.

The affairs of Switzerland remained, there-

fore, in suspense. The oligarchs, at first rejoicing at the removal of the French troops, soon became alarmed at it. They feared that, in losing inconvenient masters, they had also lost useful protectors, in the probable case of new revolutionary convulsions. It was the wisest of them, it is true, who reasoned thus. The others flattered themselves that they should be able to overthrow once more the government of the modern patriots, ardently wishing that the evacuation might be definitive, and, by means of their secret agents, they besought the different courts not to permit the French troops to enter Switzerland again. They might have been able, they said, to endure the continuance of their presence as a consequence of the war; but their return, if it took place, could not be considered in any other light than the violation of an independent territory guarantied by all Europe.

The First Consul was aware of their underhand manoeuvres, for the correspondence of Reding had just been discovered and sent to Paris. But he appeared to care very little about it; he even entered freely and unreservedly into explanations on this subject, as he was accustomed to do on all occasions. He said that he did not want Switzerland, that he preferred general peace to the conquest of such a territory, but that he would not tolerate there a government hostile to France; and that on this point his resolutions were irrevocable.

In England, the solicitations of the Swiss oligarchs produced some effect, not on the cabinet, but on the Grenville and Wyndham party, who sought in every thing fresh grievances against France. Austria and Prussia were too much engaged with the territorial arrangements of Germany to interfere in the affairs of Helvetia. They had too much need of the favour of the First Consul, to think of giving him the slightest displeasure. M. de Cobentzel, at Vienna, carried his courtesy to such a length, as to show to our ambassador, M. de Champagny, all that the Reding party wrote to him, and the discouraging answers which he returned to the urgent solicitations of that party. Russia, perfectly enlightened respecting the views of the First Consul, was aware that the commotions in Switzerland were an embarrassment from which he would be glad to escape, rather than an occasion wilfully prepared to obtain an increase of territory or of influence for himself.

Serious as the Swiss affairs were in themselves, serious more especially as they were liable to become, if our troops were brought back to the Helvetic territory, they could not, at the moment, divert the attention of the powers from the affairs of Germany. We have already seen that the cession of the left bank of the Rhine to France had left a great number of princes without dominions, and that it had been agreed at Lunéville to indemnify them by secularizing the ecclesiastical principalities with which ancient Germany was covered. It was a forced occasion for a general remoulding of the Germanic territory. Such a question left no attention for others in most of the courts of the North.

Austria, exhausted by a long struggle, was

striving to repair her dilapidated finances, and to raise the credit of her paper-money. The Archduke Charles had gained all the influence which M. de Thugut had lost. This prince, who had proved himself an able warrior, was a declared partisan of peace. He had seen the glory which he had acquired on the banks of the Rhine, in fighting Generals Jourdan and Moreau, eclipsed in a moment on the banks of the Tagliamento in fighting General Bonaparte, and he was not tempted to try his fortune anew against this formidable adversary. Still more exalted motives influenced his political dispositions. He saw his house ruined by two long and sanguinary wars, in which passion had had a greater share than reason; and he said to himself that Austria, fortunate enough, though beaten, to find in the acquisition of the Venetian States an indemnity for the loss of the Netherlands and the Milanese, would perhaps lose, in a third war, the Venetian States themselves, and that without compensation. This prince, having become minister, applied himself to the formation of an army, which was better organized and less expensive than those which for the last ten years had in vain opposed the French army. The emperor, with a discreet mind, more solid than brilliant, shared the opinions of the archduke, and was intent only on deriving all the advantage possible from the affair of the indemnities. He hoped to find in it some favourable conjuncture for repairing the late reverses of his house.

Prussia, which had separated herself in 1795 from the coalition, to make her peace with the French Republic at Basle, which had since that time re-established her finances by means of neutrality, and gained new provinces in consequence of the last insurrection in Poland—Prussia now sought, in the partition of the territories of the Germanic Church, an occasion to aggrandize herself in Germany, a sort of aggrandizement which she preferred to any other. She had a very young and very discreet king, who was particularly tenacious of being accounted honest; who really was so, but who was extremely fond of acquisitions of territory, on condition, however, that they were not purchased by war. For the rest, they had in Prussia a singular method of explaining every thing in an honourable manner. Equivocal acts, of disputable honesty, were attributed to M. Haugwitz, to whom was generally imputed all that could not well be justified, and who suffered himself to be sacrificed with a good grace to the reputation of his sovereign. This court, possessing intelligence and having few prejudices, had managed to live tolerably with the Convention and the Directory, and on very good terms with the First Consul. On the accession of the latter, it had shown for a moment a disposition to interpose between the belligerent powers, to force them to peace; and since the First Consul had forced them to it alone, it made the most, at any rate, of its good intentions; it caressed him incessantly, and held forth to him a prospect of an alliance offensive and defensive, on condition of being favoured in the division of the spoils of the Germanic Church.

Russia, uninterested in the territorial question which was agitating Germany, was neither called upon nor authorized by the treaty of Lunéville to meddle in it; but she would gladly have performed a part. To be taken for umpire would have flattered the vanity of the young emperor, a vanity which began to peep forth from beneath an apparent modesty and ingenuousness. This prince had at first shown submission to two persons, who had borne him through a frightful catastrophe to the throne: these were Count Pahlen and Count Panin. But his honesty and his pride suffered equally from such a yoke. It was painful to him to have at his side men who reminded him of horrible circumstances: he felt humbled in having ministers who treated him like a minor. We have already observed that, surrounded by companions of his early years, Messrs. de Strogonoff, Nowosiltzoff, and Czartoryski, and a more mature friend, M. de Kotschubey, he soon seized with them the reins of government. He had taken advantage of an occasion offered by the impetuous character of Count Pahlen to banish him to Courland. He had done the same by Count Panin, and introduced M. de Kotschubey into the cabinet. For vice-chancellor, he had just taken an old member of the Russian government, Prince Kurakin, a man of easy temper, fond of the pomp of power, and complaisantly lending his name, known throughout Europe, to three or four young men, who began secretly to govern the empire. In this strange association of a czar of twenty-four and a few Russian and Polish nobles of the same age, singular ideas, as we have already seen, had been formed on all subjects. Paul I. and Catherine herself were there considered as barbarous and unenlightened sovereigns. The partition of Poland was regarded as an outrage, the war against the French Revolution as the result of blind prejudices. Russia was thenceforth to give herself a totally different mission: she was to protect the weak, to curb the strong, to oblige France and England to confine themselves within the limits of justice, to force both of them to respect in their struggle the interests of nations. Happy pretensions, noble ideas if they had been serious; if they had not resembled those liberal impulses of the French noblesse, brought up in the school of Voltaire and Rousseau, talking of humanity and liberty, till the day when the French Revolution came to require them to conform their acts with their theories. Then those titled philosophers became the emigrants of Coblenz. As, however, there was in France a minority of the nobles faithful to the end to its first sentiments, so among those young governors of Russia there were two distinguished for more settled views, for a more serious character: these were M. de Strogonoff and Prince Adam Czartoryski. M. de Strogonoff manifested a sound and sincere mind. Prince Czartoryski, industrious, well-informed, serious, at twenty-five, had gained a sort of ascendancy over Alexander, was full of the hereditary sentiments of his family, that is to say, of the desire to re-establish Poland, and he strove, as we shall presently see, to direct the combinations of Russian policy to

this end. These young men, with the dispositions which animated them, could not but feel desirous to commence in Germany that equitable and sovereign arbitration, which was so seductive for them. Austria had the skill to discover their dispositions, and thought to avail herself of them. Clearly perceiving the predilection of the First Consul for Prussia, she had turned towards the Emperor Alexander; she flattered him, and offered him the part of arbiter in the affairs of Germany. It was not for want of ambition that the czar declined such a part; it was not easy to seize it in presence of General Bonaparte, whom a formal treaty invested with the right and duty of interfering in the question of the Germanic indemnities, and who was not a man to leave others to do what it was his province to do himself. Hence the Emperor Alexander, though impatient to figure on the stage of the world, manifested a reserve meritorious at his age, especially with the ambitious sentiments which filled his heart.

We must now penetrate into the obscure and difficult affair of the Germanic indemnities. This affair, taken up at the congress of Rastadt, after the peace of Campo Formio, abandoned in consequence of the murder of our plenipotentiaries and the second coalition, resumed after the peace of Lunéville, frequently begun, never finished, was a serious question for Europe, a question which people thrust aside, not knowing how to solve it. It was only by the firm will of the First Consul that it could be solved, for it was impossible that Germany alone should perform the task.

By the treaties of Campo Formio and Lunéville, the left bank of the Rhine had become our property, from the point where that noble river issues from the Swiss territory, between Basle and Huningue, to that where it enters the Dutch territory between Emerick and Nimeguen. But, by the cession of this bank to France, German Princes of all ranks and conditions, as well hereditary as ecclesiastic, had suffered considerable losses in territory and revenue. Bavaria had seen the duchy of Deux-Ponts, the Palatinate of the Rhine, and the Duchy of Juliers, taken from her. Wirtemberg, Baden, had been deprived of the principality of Montbeliard and other domains. The three ecclesiastical electors of Mayence, Treves, and Cologne, had been stripped of nearly all their dominions. The two Hesses had lost several lordships; the Bishop of Liege and the Bishop of Basle had been completely dispossessed of their sees. Prussia had been obliged to renounce, in favour of France, the duchy of Gueldres, part of that of Cleves, and the little principality of Mörs, territories situated on the lower course of the Rhine. Lastly, a great number of princes of the second and third order had seen their principalities and their imperial fiefs swept away. Nor were these all the dispossessions caused by the war. In Italy, two archdukes of Austria had been forced to renounce, the one Tuscany, the other the duchy of Modena. In Holland, the house of Orange-Nassau, allied to Prussia, had lost the stadtholdership, besides a vast amount of private property.

According to the rules of strict justice, the German princes only ought to have been compensated on the Germanic territory. The archdukes, uncles or brothers of the emperor, having long been considered as Italian princes, had no title for obtaining compensation in Germany, none whatever, unless that of being relations of the emperor. Now, it was the emperor who had urged unfortunate Germany into the war, who had thus exposed it to considerable losses of territory, and yet he wished to force it to indemnify his own kinsmen, who also had been constrained against their will to take part in that foolish and ill-conducted war! The same might be said of the stadtholder. If that prince had lost his dominions, there was no reason why Germany should have to pay for the faults which he had been induced to commit. But the stadtholder was brother-in-law of the King of Prussia, and that king, feeling it incumbent on him to do no less for his family than the emperor was doing for his, required that the house of Orange-Nassau should be indemnified in Germany. It was necessary, therefore, in addition to the German princes, to indemnify the archdukes deprived of their dominions in Italy, and the Orange-Nassaus dispossessed of the stadtholdership. Application had been made to France, at the treaty of Lunéville, and earlier, at the treaty of Campo Formio, to consent to the archdukes receiving an indemnity in Germany. Prussia at the congress of Basle, and England at the congress of Amiens, had required that the stadtholder should be indemnified, without the designation of any place, but with the avowed intention of choosing that place within the limits of the Germanic territory. France, who had only to consider the indemnities from the point of view of the general equilibrium,—France, to whom it was of no consequence whether a bishop or a prince of Nassau was settled at Fulda, whether an archbishop or an archduke was established at Salzburg, could not do otherwise than consent.

The treaty of Lunéville having been ratified by the Diet, the burden which the emperor insisted on imposing upon the Germanic territory was accepted with regret but in a formal manner. The treaties of Basle and Amiens, which stipulated an indemnity for the stadtholder, were, it is true, foreign to the confederation; but England, with the influence which she derived from the possession of Hanover; Prussia, with her power over the Diet—both of them, moreover, assured of the concurrence of France—had no refusal to fear when claiming a territorial indemnity for the stadtholder. It was, therefore, agreed, with almost unanimous consent, that the stadtholder, as well as the two Italian archdukes, should have their share of the secularized bishoprics. Assuredly fine domains were not wanting for indemnifying the German, Italian, and Dutch princes. Those subject to the ecclesiastical rule were numerous and very considerable. By secularizing them, it would be possible to find extensive territories, covered with inhabitants, yielding large revenues, to form dominions for all the victims of the war.

It would be difficult to specify the precise

value in territory, inhabitants, and revenues, of the whole of the German principalities susceptible of secularization. The peace of Westphalia had already secularized a great number; but those which were left formed about one-sixth of Germany, properly so called, both in extent and in population. As for the revenues, if we refer to the estimates of the time, which were very incomplete and strongly contested, they might amount to thirteen or fourteen millions of florins. But we should be in error if we were to consider this sum as the total revenue of the principalities in question. It was the revenue, deducting the costs of collection and administration, deducting, also, a great number of ecclesiastical benefices, such as abbeys, canonries, &c., not comprehended in the net product which we have just stated, and which, in consequence of the secularization, were to belong to the new possessor; that is to say, if we were to calculate the product of these countries as that of France was calculated in 1803; and as it is much more closely calculated at the present day, we should arrive at an estimate three or four times as considerable, consequently at 40,000,000 or 50,000,000 of florins, (or 120,000,000 of francs.)

It is therefore impossible to fix the value of those States more precisely, than in affirming that they comprehended about a sixth of Germany, properly so called. Their enumeration will be sufficient to show that several of them compose at this day flourishing provinces; and some of the finest in the confederation. Beginning at the east and south of Germany, there were in the Tyrol the bishoprics of Trent and Brixen, which Austria considered as belonging to her, and which, for this reason, she would never suffer to figure in the group of the German indemnities, but which had been entered, in spite of her, in the list of disposable possessions. The estimate of their revenues varied from 200,000 to 900,000 florins. Passing from the Tyrol into Bavaria, you came to the superb bishopric of Salzburg, now one of the most important provinces of the Austrian monarchy, comprising the valley of the Salza, producing, according to some, 1,200,000 florins, according to others, 2,700,000, and furnishing a race of excellent soldiers, as skilful marksmen as the Tyrolese. In the bishopric of Salzburg was included the provostship of Berchtesgaden, valuable for the produce of salt. On fairly entering Bavaria, you met with the bishopric of Augsburg on the Lech, that of Freisingen on the Isar, and, at the conflux of the Inn and the Danube, that of Passau, all three much coveted by Bavaria, whose territory they would have advantageously completed; they produced together 800,000 florins, an amount, as usual, very differently estimated, and the subject of dispute. On the other side of the Danube, that is to say, in Franconia, was the rich bishopric of Wurtzburg, whose bishops formerly aspired to the title of dukes of Franconia, and were opulent enough to build at Wurtzburg a palace almost as magnificent as that of Versailles. The revenue of this benefice was estimated at 1,400,000 florins, and, with that of Bamberg, adjoining to it, at 2,000,000. It was the lot that could best round the territory

of Bavaria in Franconia, and indemnify her for her immense losses. Prussia coveted this lot, on account of its value and its contiguity to the margravates of Anspach and Bayreuth. There is still to be mentioned the bishopric of Eichstädt in the same province, far inferior to the two preceding, but still very considerable.

There was left that part of the archbishoprics of Mayence, Treves, and Cologne, situated on the right of the Rhine, archbishoprics and electorates at one and the same time, producing a revenue difficult to be estimated. There were also left portions of the electorate of Mayence, enclosed in Thuringia, as Erfurt and the territory of Eichsfeld; then, descending towards Westphalia, the duchy of that name, the revenue of which was estimated at four or five hundred thousand florins; the bishoprics of Paderborn, Osnabrück, and Hildesheim, which were supposed to produce about 400,000 florins each; and, lastly, the vast bishopric of Münster, the third in Germany in revenue, the most extensive in territory, yielding, it was said, at that time, 1,200,000 florins.

If to these archbishoprics, we add bishoprics and duchies, to the number of fourteen, to those remnants of the ancient ecclesiastical electorates, the wrecks of the bishoprics of Spire, Worms, Strasburg, Basle, and Constance, a quantity of rich abbeys, besides forty-nine free cities, which were not designed to be secularized, but incorporated with the neighbouring States—which was then called *mediatizing*—we shall have a tolerably accurate idea of all the possessions that were available to make the secular princes forget the calamities of the war. It should be observed that, if it had not been arranged to indemnify the archdukes and the stadtholder, who demanded, for their three shares, at least one-fourth of the disposable territories, it would not have been necessary to suppress all the ecclesiastical principalities, and the Germanic Constitution might have been spared the destructive blow which was about to be inflicted upon it.

It was, in fact, giving a deep wound to that constitution to secularize all the ecclesiastical States at once; for they acted a considerable part. Some details are here necessary to convey an idea of that ancient constitution, the oldest in Europe, the most respectable after the English constitution, and which was about to perish from the greediness of the German princes themselves.

The Germanic empire was elective. Though, for a long series of years, the imperial crown had not gone out of the house of Austria, it was requisite that a formal election, at each change of reign, should transfer it to the heir of that house, who, in his own full right, was King of Bohemia and Hungary, Archduke of Austria, Duke of Milan, of Corinthia, of Styria, &c., but not head of the empire. The election was made formerly by seven, and, at the period of which we are speaking, by eight princes electors. Five of the eight were laymen, and three ecclesiastics. The five lay princes were, the house of Austria for Bohemia: the elector palatine for Bavaria and the Palatinate; the Duke of Saxony for Saxony; the King of Prussia for Brandenburg; the King of England for

Hanover. The three ecclesiastical electors were: the Archbishop of Mayence, possessing part of both banks of the Rhine in the environs of Mayence, the city of Mayence itself, and the banks of the Mayn, to above Aschaffenburg; the Archbishop of Treves, possessing the country of Treves, that is, the valley of the Moselle, from the frontiers of old France to the junction of that river with the Rhine, towards Coblenz; lastly, the Archbishop of Cologne, possessing the left bank of the Rhine from Bonn to near the frontiers of Holland. These three archbishops, according to the general practice of the Church, wherever royalty had not usurped the ecclesiastical nominations, were elected by their chapters, saving the canonical institution reserved to the Pope. The canons, members of these chapters and electors of their archbishops, were chosen from among the highest of the German nobility. Thus, for Mayence they were required to be members of the immediate nobility, that is to say, of the nobility holding direct from the empire, and not from the territorial princes in whose domains they were situated. Hence, neither the archbishop, nor the canons who had to elect him, could be dependent subjects of any prince whatever, excepting the emperor. This precaution was requisite for so high a personage as the Archbishop-elect of Mayence, who was chancellor of the confederation. He it was who presided over the German Diet. The Archbishops-Electors of Treves and Cologne had only the titles of ancient functions which time had swept away. The Archbishop of Cologne was formerly chancellor of the kingdom of Italy; the Archbishop of Treves Chancellor of the kingdom of Arles.

These eight princes electors conferred the imperial crown. In the first half of the last century, at the time of the Austrian war of succession, they had been obliged to choose for emperor a prince of Bavaria; but they had soon reverted, from ancient usage and a traditional respect, to the descendants of Rudolph of Hapsburg. Besides, the Catholic electors had the majority, that is to say, they were five to three; and the preference of the Catholics for Austria was natural and secular. The empire was not only elective, it was, if I may so express myself in speaking of a time which had no analogy with ours, it was representative. The affairs of the confederation were discussed in a general diet, which met at Ratisbon, under the direction of the chancellor, the archbishop of Mayence.

This diet was composed of three colleges: the electoral college, composed of the eight electors whom we have just mentioned; the college of the princes, in which sat the princes lay or ecclesiastical, each of them for the territory of which he was direct sovereign, (certain houses having several votes, according to the importance of the principalities which they represented in the diet; others, on the contrary, having only part of a vote, as the counts of Westphalia;) lastly, the college of the cities, in which met, to the number of forty-nine, the representatives of the free cities, almost all in debt, and having but very little influence in

that deliberative government of ancient Germany.

The process of collecting the votes was extremely complicated. When the protocol was open, each of the three colleges voted separately. The electors, besides their representative in the college of electors, had representatives in that of the princes, and thus had seats in two colleges at once. Austria had a seat in the electoral college for Bohemia, in the college of the princes for the archduchy of Austria. Prussia had a seat in the college of the electors for Brandenburg, in the college of the princes for Anspach, Bayreuth, &c. Bavaria had a seat in the college of the electors for Bavaria, in the college of the princes for Deux-Ponts, Juliers, &c.; and such was also the case with others. There was no absolute debating, but each state, called upon in an hierarchic order, expressed its opinion verbally through the medium of a minister. These opinions were collected several times, and thus each had leisure to modify his. When the colleges differed in opinion, they entered into conference with one another, and sought to come to an agreement. This was called *relation* and *correlation* between the colleges. They made concessions to each other, and at length came to one general decision, which was called *conclusum*.

The importance of these three colleges was not equal. That of the cities was estimated at next to nothing. Formerly, in the middle ages, when all the wealth was concentrated in the free cities, they had, in giving or refusing their money, the means of making their importance felt. This was no longer the case, after Nuremberg, Augsburg, Cologne, ceased to be the centres of commercial and financial power. Not only were the forms employed in regard to them offensive, but little respect was paid to their opinion. The electors, that is the great houses, with their votes in the college of the electors, with their votes and their dependents in the college of the princes, carried things their own way in almost all the deliberations.

We should not convey a complete idea of this constitution, were we not to add that, independently of this general government, there was a local government, for the protection of the particular interests, and the assessment of the general charges of the confederation. This local government was that of the circles. All Germany was divided into ten circles, the last of which, that of Burgundy, was an empty name, for it comprehended provinces which had been long wrested from the empire. The most powerful prince of the circle was its director. He summoned the States composing it to deliberate; he executed their resolutions; and went to the assistance of such as were threatened with violence. Two tribunals of the empire, one at Wetlar, the other in Vienna, rendered justice between these very different classes of confederates—kings, princes, bishops, abbots, and republics.

Such as it was, this constitution was a venerable monument of ages. It exhibited some of the characteristics of liberty, not of that which affords protection to each citizen in modern society, but of that liberty which pro-

jects weak States against powerful States, by allowing them to defend, in the bosom of a confederation, their existence, their property, their particular rights, and to appeal from the tyranny of the stronger to the justice of all. Hence arose a certain development of mind, a profound study of the law of nations, great art in managing men in assemblies, very similar, though seemingly different to that which is practised in the representative governments of the present day.

The secularizations could not but produce a considerable change in this constitution. In the first place, they removed from the electoral college the three ecclesiastical electors, and from the college of the princes a great number of Catholic members. The Catholic majority, which had been, in this second college, fifty-four votes to forty-three, was changed into a minority, for the princes destined to inherit the ecclesiastical votes were almost all Protestants. It was a great shock given to the constitution and to the balance of power. It is true that the tolerance resulting from the spirit of the age had taken from the terms Protestant party and Catholic party their ancient religious signification; but these expressions had acquired an extremely serious political signification. The Protestant party signified the Prussian party; the Catholic party signified the Austrian party. Now, these two influences had long divided Germany between them. It might be said that in the empire Prussia was the head of the opposition, Austria the leader of the government party. Frederick the Great, in making Prussia a power of the first order by means of the spoils of Austria, had kindled a violent animosity between the two great German houses. This animosity, subsiding for a moment in the presence of the French revolution, had soon blazed forth again, when Prussia, separating herself from the coalition, had made her peace with France, and had enriched herself by her neutrality, while Austria was exhausting herself to maintain single-handed the war that had been undertaken jointly. Now, more especially, that, the war being over, the patrimony of the Church was to be parcelled out, the greediness of the two courts had added new fuel to the passion which divided them.

Prussia naturally wished to profit by the occasion of the secularizations to weaken Austria for ever. The latter was, at the conclusion of the 18th century, as in the 'Thirty Years' war, as in the wars of Charles V., the main stay of the Catholic party: not that in all cases the Protestants were in favour of Prussia and the Catholics of Austria: jealousies of neighbourhood, on the contrary, often modified these relations. Thus Bavaria, stanch Catholic, but incessantly alarmed respecting the designs of Austria upon her territory, usually voted with Prussia. Saxony,¹ though Protestant, was often opposed to Prussia, from distrust of neighbourhood, and voted with Austria. But, in general, Austria had for clients the Catholic princes, and particularly the ecclesiastical

States. The latter gave her their votes in elections for emperor; and they conformed to her opinion in the meetings in which the general affairs were discussed. Having no armies of their own, they suffered Austrian recruiting officers to enlist soldiers in their territories, and moreover they furnished apanages for the younger branches of the imperial house. The Archduke Charles, for instance, had just been presented with a rich benefice in the grand-mastership of the Teutonic Order recently conferred upon him. The Bishop of Münster and the Archbishop of Cologne being dead, the chapters of those two sees had chosen the Archduke Anthony to succeed the deceased prelates. Thus here, as in all aristocratic countries, the Church furnished establishments for the junior members of the great families. Prussia of course was not pleased with the ecclesiastical States for giving to Austria soldiers, apanages, and votes in the diet.

Having once engaged in constitutional reforms, the German princes were soon led into further changes, particularly the suppression of the free cities and of the immediate nobility.

The free cities owed their origin to the emperors. As of old the kings of France had emancipated the communes from the tyranny of the lords, so the emperors had given to the cities of Germany, formed by industry and commerce, an independent existence, acknowledged rights, and frequently privileges also. It was this that had introduced into that vast German feudal system democratic republics celebrated for their wealth and their genius, besides feudal lords, besides sovereign priests wearing the crowns of counts or dukes. In regard to the arts, manufactures, and commerce, Augsburg, Nuremberg, and Cologne, had formerly deserved well of Germany and of the whole human race. All these cities had fallen under the yoke of petty local aristocracies, and most of them were deplorably administered. Those whose commerce had maintained its ground, escaped the general ruin, and even exhibited very prosperous republics. But they were coveted by the neighbouring princes, who sought to annex them to their territories. Prussia, in particular, would fain have incorporated Nuremberg with her dominions, and Bavaria Augsburg, though both these cities had declined greatly from their ancient splendour.

The immediate nobility had an origin very like that of the free cities, for its title was derived from the imperial protection granted to the lords who were too weak to defend themselves. Hence it was particularly numerous in Franconia and Suabia, because, at the epoch of the destruction of the house of Suabia, the nobles of that country, finding themselves without liege-lord, had given themselves to the emperor. They were called *immediate*, because they depended directly on the emperor, and not on the princes in whose territories their domains were situated. The same title of *immediate* was given to every state, city, and alby, depending directly on the empire. Every State directly dependent on the prince in whose territory it lay, was called *mediate*. This immedi-

¹ It must be observed, however, that, at this period, the elector of Saxony was Catholic, while his country was Protestant, and counted for such.

ate nobility, whose obedience was divided between the local sovereign and the emperor, whom it acknowledged as its only liege-lord, was proud of this higher vassalage, served in the armies and in the imperial chancelleries, and allowed the Austrian officers to take recruits from the population of the towns and villages belonging to it.

The territorial princes, to whichever party they belonged, ardently wished for the double incorporation of the immediate nobility, and of the free cities with their dominions. Austria, backward enough to support the free cities, a certain number of which she coveted for herself, was ardent, on the contrary, for maintaining the immediate nobility, for which she cherished a particular affection. In general, however, she desired the preservation of all that could be preserved.

From our modern point of view, nothing ought to appear more natural, more legitimate, than the annexation of all these parcels of territory, cities, or immediate lordships, to the body of the State. No doubt it would have been better if, as was done in France in 1789, they had in Germany substituted, for these local liberties, a general liberty, guarantying at once all existences and all rights. But these incorporations would have increased the absolute power of the kings of Prussia, of the electors of Bavaria, of the dukes of Wirtemberg. On this account it was allowable to view them with some regret.

In the history of the European monarchies, there are two revolutions, extremely different in their object and in their date: the first, is that by means of which loyalty conquers the petty local sovereignties from feudalism, thus absorbing many particular existences to form a single State; the second, is that by means of which royalty, after it has formed this single State, is obliged to settle accounts with the nation, and to grant a general, uniform, regular liberty, far preferable assuredly to the particular liberties of feudalism. France, in 1789, after she had achieved this first revolution, set about the second. Germany, in 1803, was yet at the first, and to this day she has not completed it. Austria, with no other view but to preserve her influence in the empire, defended the old Germanic constitution, and with it the feudal liberties of Germany. Prussia, on the contrary, eager after incorporations, longing to absorb the free cities and the immediate nobility, became an innovator from ambition, and sought to give to Germany the forms of modern society, that is to say, to commence, without intending, without knowing it, the work of the French Revolution in the old Germanic empire.

If the constitutional views of these two powers were at variance, their territorial pretensions were not less so.

Austria was desirous to obtain large indemnities for her two archdukes, and upon this pretext to extend and improve the frontier of her own dominions. She concerned herself but little about the Duke of Modena, to whom, by the treaties of Campo Formio and Lunéville, had long before been assigned the Brisgau, (a small province of the country of Baden,)

which he cared little about, preferring to live quietly in Venice on his immense wealth, accumulated by dint of avarice. But she interested herself seriously for the Archduke Ferdinand, lately sovereign of Tuscany. For him she coveted the fine archbishopric of Salzburg, which would connect the Tyrol with the body of the Austrian monarchy; likewise the provostship of Berchtholsgaden, enclosed in the archbishopric of Salzburg. These two principalities were formally promised her; but she wished to obtain more. She wanted for the same archduke the bishopric of Passau, which would secure to her house the important fortress of Passau, situated at the conflux of the Inn and the Danube, the superb bishopric of Augsburg, extending longitudinally upon the Lech, in the very heart of Bavaria; lastly, the county of Werdenfels,¹ and the abbey of Kempton, two possessions situated on the slope of the Tyrolese Alps, commanding both of them the sources of the rivers which run through Bavaria, as the Inn, the Isar, the Loisach, and the Lech. If to these we add nineteen free cities in Suabia, besides twelve great immediate abbeys, and if we consider that Austria, exclusively of what she demanded for the archduke in Suabia, had a multitude of ancient possessions in that country, we shall easily comprehend the designs she then meditated. She was desirous, by means of the pretended indemnity for the Archduke Ferdinand, to obtain a position in the centre of Bavaria by Augsburg; above, by Werdenfels and Kempton; beyond, by her possessions in Suabia, and by thus squeezing her in the claws of the imperial eagle, to force her to cede that part of her territory which she had long coveted, that is to say, the line of the Inn, perhaps even that of the Isar.

It was one of the most ancient schemes of Austria to extend herself into Bavaria, in order to obtain a better frontier, and at the same time to prolong her posts in the Tyrolese Alps to the borders of Switzerland. The possession of the line of the Isar was the fondest of her wishes, and, had it been gratified, it would not have been the last. To have obtained the country as far as the Isar, she would have relinquished to the house of Bavaria Augsburg, (bishopric and city,) besides all the Austrian possessions in Suabia. According to this plan, the city of Munich, seated on the Isar, would be on the frontier, and as it could not continue to be the seat of the Bavarian government, Augsburg would have been the new capital offered to the elector palatine. But this would be absorbing nearly half that electorate, and entirely throwing back the palatine house into Suabia. In default of the realization of this far too flattering dream, the course of the Inn would have consoled Austria for her misfortunes. She possessed only the lower part of the Inn, from Braunau to Passau. But above, between Braunau and the Tyrolese Alps, it was Bavaria that had both banks of that river. Austria would have wished for the whole course of the Inn, from its entry into

¹ This county was a dependency of the bishopric of Freisingen.

Bavaria at Kufstein to its junction with the Danube. This line would have comprehended a less extent of country than that of the Isar; still it was a fine slice, and more solid in a military point of view. It was by way of exchange that Austria proposed to acquire one or the other of these frontiers. Accordingly, from the time that the question of the indemnities began to be discussed by the cabinets, she never ceased to beset with her offers, and when these were not listened to, with her menacer the unfortunate Elector of Bavaria, who immediately communicated his anxieties to his two natural protectors, Prussia and France.

Such was the share which Austria would fain have allotted to herself in the distribution of the indemnities. Let us see what she proposed to give to the others.

For the losses sustained by Bavaria on the left bank of the Rhine, losses which exceeded those of all the other German princes—for that house had lost the duchy of Deux-Ponts, the palatinate of the Rhine, the duchy of Juliers, the margravate of Bergen-op-Zoom, and a multitude of domains in Alsace—Austria assigned to her two bishoprics in Franconia those of Wirtemberg and Bamberg, very conveniently situated for Bavaria, since they were contiguous to the Upper Palatinate, but scarcely equal to two-thirds of what was due to her. To this lot Austria would perhaps have added the bishopric of Freisingen, situated on the Isar, quite close to Munich. To Prussia, Austria designed to give a large bishopric in the north, for instance Paderborn, perhaps two or three abbeys, as Essen and Werden; lastly, to the stadtholder, some territory or other in Westphalia, that is to say, a fourth at most of what the house of Brandenburg expected for itself and for its kinsman. After conceding to the two Hesses, Baden, and Wirtemberg, some of the spoils of the inferior clergy, and a certain number of abbeys to the multitude of petty hereditary princes, who she said would be extremely glad to take what was given them, Austria proposed, with the bulk of the territories in the north and the centre of Germany, such as Münster, Osnabrück, Hildesheim, Fulda, with the wrecks of the electorates of Cologne, Mayence, and Treves, to preserve the three ecclesiastical electors, and thereby to retain her influence in the empire.

The first of the three ecclesiastical electorates, that of Mayence, had recently devolved to the coadjutor of the last archbishop. This new incumbent, a member of the house of Dalberg, was a prelate of high attainments, a man of talent, and a man of the world. The electorate of Treves belonged to a Saxon prince, who lived retired in the bishopric of Augsburg, which see he held along with that of Treves, forgetting his lost electoral grandeur in the strict observance of the practices of religion and in the opulence which pensions from his family secured to him. The electorate of Cologne had become vacant by the death of the last possessor. The bishoprics of Münster, Freisingen, and Ratisbon, and the provostship of Berchtolsgraden, had also recently become vacant. Whether Austria was

in league with the chapters or not, she had permitted the Archduke Anthony to be nominated bishop of Münster and elector of Cologne, in the presence of an imperial commissioner. Prussia had loudly remonstrated alleging that this nomination of new incumbents was designed to raise obstacles to the secularizations, and to obstruct the free execution of the treaty of Lunéville. The object of her remonstrances was to prevent the yet vacant benefices of Freisingen, Ratisbon, and Berchtolsgraden from being filled in like manner.

An accurate idea of the plans of Prussia might be formed by imagining precisely the reverse of those of Austria. In the first place, she considered the loss of the Grand-duke of Tuscany as exaggerated two-fold at least. It was alleged at Vienna that he had lost a revenue of 4,000,000 florins. This assertion was greatly exaggerated; it was founded on the confusion of net revenue with gross revenue. The net revenue which the grand-duke had lost amounted at most to 2,500,000 florins. Prussia insisted that the revenues of Salzburg, Passau, and Berchtolsgraden equalled, if not exceeded, the revenue of Tuscany; without taking into account that Tuscany, separated from the Austrian monarchy, had no value from position for the latter, whereas Salzburg, Berchtolsgraden, and Passau, attached to the very body of that monarchy, give it a capital frontier, and in the mountaineers of Salzburg a numerous military population. It was thought that Austria might raise there 25,000 men. There was, of course, no just ground for adding to the lot of the archduke the bishoprics of Augsburg and Eichstädt, the abbey of Kempten, the county of Werdenfels, as well as all the free cities and abbeys demanded in Suabia. Still Prussia insisted less upon the extravagance of the pretensions of Austria than upon the reasonableness of her own. She estimated the losses which she said she had sustained at double their real value, and diminished by one half the worth of the territories which she claimed in compensation. In the first place, she, like Austria, was desirous of extending herself towards the centre and the south of Germany. She would fain be doing in Franconia what Austria was endeavouring to do in Suabia; she wished to double at least her territory there. It was the constant ambition of those two great courts to take advanced positions in the centre of Germany, either against one another, or against France, or else, to maintain their influence over the States in the centre of the confederation. In the first flights of ambition, Prussia had demanded nothing less than the bishoprics of Wurtzburg and Bamberg, contiguous to the margravates of Anspach and Bayreuth, which, according to universal opinion, were destined to indemnify Bavaria. This claim had met with such objections, especially in Paris, that Prussia had been obliged to relinquish it.

In default of Wurtzburg and Bamberg, Prussia, which had lost only the duchy or Gueldres, part of the duchy of Cleves, the little principality of Mörs, some tolls suppressed on

the Rhine, and the enclosed districts of Saverne, Huisen, and Marburg, ceded to Holland, producing a revenue of 700,000 florins according to Russia, 1,200,000 according to France, wished for nothing less than a portion of the north of Germany, namely the bishoprics of Münster, Paderborn, Osnabrück, and Hildesheim, besides the relics of the electorate of Mayence in Thuringia, such as Eichsfeld and Erfurt, and further in Franconia, where she abated none of her claims, the bishopric of Eichstätt and the famous city of Nuremberg.

Making, in regard to the indemnity of the stadtholder, the same calculations as Austria in regard to the indemnity of the Duke of Tuscany, she demanded for the house of Orange-Nassau an establishment contiguous to the Prussian territory, and comprehending the following countries: the duchy of Westphalia, the district of Recklinghausen, and the remnant of the electorates of Cologne and Treves on the right bank of the Rhine. Hence would result from the stadtholder, not only the advantage of being backed upon Prussia, a very important advantage both for himself and for her, but also that of being situated near Holland, ready to take advantage of any turn of fortune there. Now, if we consider the fallacy of the estimates of Prussia, if we consider that, after doubling and even trebling the value of her losses, she misrepresented in the like proportion the value of the compensations which she demanded, that she estimated the bishopric of Münster, for instance, at 350,000 florins, while, in Paris, the most impartial calculations raised it to 1,200,000; that she estimated the bishopric of Osnabrück at 150,000 florins, whereas in Paris it was computed at 369,000, and so of the rest, we shall have some idea of the wild extravagance of her pretensions.

She proved herself more generous than Austria towards the princes of the second and third order, for these were so many Protestant votes to introduce in the diet. She was for suppressing the ecclesiastical electors of Cologne and Treves, for suffering at most the Elector of Mayence alone to exist, with the relics of his territory, situate on the right bank of the Rhine; for filling the places of these two suppressed ecclesiastical electors by two Protestant electors, taken from among the princes of Hesse, Wirtemberg, Baden, even Orange-Nassau, if possible. The support which Austria sought from Russia, Prussia sought from France. She offered, on condition that her claims were seconded, to unite her policy with that of the First Consul, to bind herself to him by a formal alliance, to guarantee all the arrangements made in Italy, such as the creation of the new-kingdom of Etruria, the new constitution given to the Italian Republic, and the annexation of Piedmont to France. She made, at the same time, great efforts to fix in Paris the negotiation which Austria was striving to transfer to Petersburg. She knew that out of Paris she was not regarded in the most favourable light; that in all the courts she was keenly censured for having deserted the cause of Europe for that of the French Revolution; that, if the pretensions of the emperor were blamed, her own

were criticised with much more severity, for they had not the excuse of the great losses sustained by the house of Austria in the late war; she knew, in short, that she had no support to hope for but on the part of France; that to consent to change the place of the negotiation would be disobliging the First Consul, and accepting umpires unfavourably disposed towards herself. Accordingly she gave a plump refusal to all the overtures of Austria, who, hopeless of her cause, proposed that they should arrange matters between them, allot to each other the lion's share, sacrificing all the second and third rate princes, and then apply to Petersburg for a confirmation of the division which they should have made with the especial view of withdrawing Germany from the yoke of the French.

All the German princes, following the example of Prussia, had recourse to France. Instead of soliciting in London, Petersburg, Vienna, Berlin, they solicited in Paris. Bavaria, tormented by Austria; the dukes of Baden, Wirtemberg, and Hesse, jealous of each other; the petty families, alarmed at the rapacity of the great ones; the free cities threatened with incorporation; the immediate nobility, exposed to the same danger as the free cities—all, great and small, republics and hereditary sovereigns, pleaded their cause in Paris, some through the medium of their ministers, others directly and in person. The late stadtholder had sent thither his son, the Prince of Orange, since king of the Netherlands, a distinguished prince, whom the First Consul had received with great favour. Several other princes also had repaired to the French capital. All of them assiduously frequented that palace of St. Cloud, where a general of the republic was not less courted than any crowned monarch.

Singular, indeed, was the spectacle which Europe then presented, and which strongly proves the inconsistency of human passions, and the depth of the designs of Providence.

Prussia and Austria had dragged Germany into an unjust war against the French Revolution, and they had been vanquished. France, by the right of victory, an incontestible right when the victorious power has been provoked, had conquered the left bank of the Rhine. Part of the German princes were thenceforward without dominions. It was natural to indemnify them in Germany, and to indemnify none but them. Prussia and Austria, who had caused their ruin, nevertheless strove to indemnify, at the expense of this unfortunate Germany, their own relations, Italians as the archdukes, or Dutch as the stadtholder; and what is still more strange, they strove, under the name of their relations, to indemnify themselves, at the expense of that Germany, the victim of their faults. And where did they look for these compensations? among the possessions of the Church; that is to say, the professed champions of the throne and altar, on returning home after being beaten, purposed to indemnify themselves for a disastrous war by despoiling the altar which they had gone forth to defend, and by imitating the French Revolution which they had come to attack. And, what was still more extraordinary, if pos-

sible, they applied to the victorious representative of that revolution to divide between them these spoils of the altar, which they knew not how to divide themselves!

The First Consul gave himself very little concern about the efforts making around him to transfer the negotiation sometimes to one place sometimes to another. He knew that it would be held nowhere but in Paris, because such was his pleasure, and because that was the best point for it. Free in his movements

ever since the signature of the general peace, he listened successively to the interested parties: Prussia, who desired to act only with him and by him; Austria, who, while striving to remove the arbitration to Petersburg, neglected nothing to dispose him in her favour; Bavaria, who solicited his advice and support against the threatening offers of Austria; the house of Orange, which had sent its heir to Paris; the houses of Baden, Wirtemberg, and Hesse, who promised entire devotedness if their interests were considered; lastly, the mass of petty princes, who appealed to their old alliance with France. After hearing these different claimants, the First Consul soon perceived that, without the interference of a powerful will, the peace of Germany, and of course that of the continent, would continue indefinitely in peril. He determined, therefore, to offer, in reality to impose, his mediation, and to submit such arrangements as should do honour to the justice of France and to the wisdom of his policy.

Nothing could be more judicious, more admirable, than the views of the First Consul at this happy epoch of his life, when, covered with as much glory as he ever had, he possessed not yet sufficient material force to despise Europe and to dispense with having recourse to a profoundly calculated policy. He perceived, indeed, that, with the precarious dispositions of England, it behoved him to think of preventing the danger of a new general war; that to this end it was requisite to secure a solid alliance on the continent; that the alliance of Prussia was the most suitable; that this court, innovating by nature, by origin, by interest, had affinities with the French Revolution which no other court could have; that, by seriously attaching it to him, he should render coalitions impracticable; for at the degree of power to which France had attained, it was as much as they dared do to attack her when all the powers were united against her; but that, if only one were missing from the coalition, and if that one had ranged itself on the side of France, the rest would never risk the chances of a new war. Still, while purposing to ally himself with Prussia, the First Consul concluded, with rare sagacity, that he ought not to make her so strong as to crush Austria, for then she would become, in her turn, the dangerous power, instead of being the useful ally; that he ought not to sacrifice to her either the petty princes, old allies of France, or the ecclesiastical States without exception, states that were not compact, not military, and preferable as neighbours to lay and warlike princes; or the free cities, respectable for the historical recollections attached to

them, respectable more especially as republics to the French Republic; that, to sacrifice at once to Prussia all the petty hereditary, ecclesiastical, republican States, would be favouring the realization of that German unity, more dangerous to the equilibrium of Europe, if it were ever accomplished, than the power of Austria had ever been; that, in short, in turning the scale in favour of the Protestant and innovating party, it was necessary to make it sink gently, not to upset the other, for that would be driving Austria to despair, perhaps to accelerate her downfall, to exalt one enemy instead of another, and to prepare France in time to come a rivalry with the house of Brandenburg, quite as formidable as that which had for several centuries kept her at war with the house of Austria.

Impressed with these wise considerations, the First Consul first set about leading Prussia into more moderate views. When he had established a good understanding with her, he purposed to negotiate with the interested parties of the second rank, and to satisfy them by means of a just share of the indemnities; he then intended to open a negotiation of pure courtesy in Petersburg, to gratify the pride of the young emperor, which he plainly discovered under a feigned modesty, and to gain by civilities his assent to the territorial arrangements which should be decided upon. With the concurrence of Prussia satisfied and Russia flattered, he hoped to render the resignation of Austria inevitable, that is to say, if care were taken not to exasperate her too much by the arrangements adopted.

In combinations so complicated, it was to be expected that it would be necessary to travel through several plans before they came to the definitive plan. The idea of the First Consul relative to the territorial distribution of Germany had at first been to keep the three great central powers of the continent, Austria, Prussia, and France, apart from one another, and to place between them the entire mass of the Germanic confederation. With this view, the First Consul would have conceded to Austria not only the whole of her claims, that is, the course of the Isar, for the Palatine house must, in this case, have been removed into Suabia and Franconia, but he would have conceded to her the Inn throughout its whole course, that is the bishopric of Salzburg, the provostship of Berchtesgaden, the country between the Salza and the Inn, besides the bishoprics of Brixen and Trent, situated in Tyrol. Austria, thus indemnified on her own account and that of the two archdukes, must have renounced all possessions in Suabia; she would have been placed completely behind the Inn; there she would have been compact and covered by an excellent frontier; she would have found repose and given it to Bavaria by the solution of the old question about the Inn.

As Austria was to be induced to renounce her possessions in Suabia, so Prussia was to be induced to renounce her possessions in Franconia, and to be required to give up the margravates of Anspach and Bayreuth. With these margravates and the contiguous bishoprics of Wutzburg and Bamberg, with the

possessions sacrificed by Austria in Suabia, with the bishoprics of Freisingen and Eichstätt, enclosed in the Bavarian dominions, might have been formed a well-rounded territory, extending at once into Bavaria, Suabia, and Franconia, and capable of serving for a barrier between France and Austria. At this rate, the Palatine house could have afforded to give up the remnant of the Palatinate of the Rhine and the fine duchy of Berg, situated at the other extremity of Germany, that is towards Westphalia. Prussia, excluded from Franconia, as Austria from Suabia, would have been moved back towards the north. To effect her complete removal to it, the obstacle which separated her from it was to be done away with; that is to say, the two branches of the house of Mecklenburg were to be settled in the territories which had become vacant in the centre of Germany. Prussia would thus have found herself on the shore of the Baltic; the bishoprics of Münster, Osnabrück, and Hildesheim were, moreover, to have been given to her. Indemnified in this manner for her old and her new losses, she might well have abandoned the whole duchy of Cleves, the part of which situated on the left bank of the Rhine was transferred to France, while the part on the right bank would have served to augment the mass of the indemnities. Then, separated from Austria by the relinquishment of Franconia, she would also have been separated from France by her removal from the banks of the Rhine.

There would have been left in the vacant duchies of Cleves, Berg, and Westphalia, in the remnants of the electorates of Cologne, Treves, and Mayence, in the Mayence districts of Erfurt and Eichsfeld, in the bishopric of Fulda and other ecclesiastical possessions, in the wrecks of the Palatinate of the Rhine, in the great number of abbeys, mediate or immediate, scattered all over Germany, there would have been left wherewithal to compose a State for the house of Mecklenburg and for that of Orange, and to indemnify the houses of Hesse, Baden, Wirtemberg, and the multitude of inferior princes. Lastly, in the sees of Eichstätt, Augsburg, Ratisbon, and Passau, there would have been sufficient to retain two of the three ecclesiastical electors, as the First Consul thought of doing, for he wished to avoid altering the Germanic constitution too much, and, besides, he took pleasure in protecting the Church in every country.

In this plan, so profoundly conceived, Austria, Prussia, and France, were kept widely asunder; the Germanic confederation was collected into one mass, placed amidst these three great powers of the continent, and had the useful, important, and honourable part assigned to it of separating them, and of preventing collisions between them; the limits of the German States were accurately defined; the Germanic constitution was beneficially reformed, not destroyed.

The plan of the First Consul, first proposed to Prussia, was not immediately refused. It suited that power to become compact, to border the Baltic, to occupy the whole north of Germany. Her definitive consent depended on

the quantities that would be offered to her when the details of the partition came to be regulated. But if the princes in the centre of Germany, whose States rested for the moment on the variable will alone of the negotiators, might be easily removed to the north or to the south, to the east or to the west, the case was different with two princes confined to the northern extremity of the Confederation, such as the princes of Mecklenburg, firmly established among subjects whose affection they had possessed for ages, strangers to all the territorial vicissitudes occasioned by the war, and difficult to persuade, when so considerable a displacement should be proposed to them. Besides, if they said but a word to England, she would not fail to thwart a project for putting the coast of the Baltic into the hands of Prussia.

Whether spontaneously or not, they refused in a peremptory manner what was offered them. Nevertheless, Prussia, which had been charged with the overture, had clearly insinuated that France, in wishing to have them for neighbours, wished also to make them her friends, and that she would behave liberally to them in the distribution of the indemnities.

Important as was this part of the plan which had been refused, it was worth while to prosecute the realization of the rest. It was still desirable, in fact, to confine Austria behind the Inn, and to concede to her once for all that everlasting object of her wishes; it was still desirable to concentrate Prussia towards the north of Germany, and to exclude her from Franconia, where her presence was not serviceable to any one, and might even become dangerous for herself in case of war; for, the provinces of Anspach and Bayreuth lying in the route of the French and Austrian armies, it was rendered very difficult to respect her neutrality. The sequel of this history will show the serious inconvenience of such a situation.

But Prussia and Austria were extremely tenacious in what related to themselves. Though Austria found the boundary of the Inn particularly seducing, she would not give up any thing in Suabia; she still pretended to have possession there, even after the acquisition of the Inn. She demanded, besides Salzburg and Berchtesgaden, besides the country between the Salza and the Inn, the bishopric of Passau. The bishoprics of Brixen and Trent, which were conceded to her, she scarcely considered as a gift; for they were in Tyrol, and whatever was in Tyrol appeared to belong to her so rightfully that, in receiving them, she thought she was receiving nothing new. Prussia, on her part, would not waive any of her claims in Franconia. In this state of things, the First Consul resolved to give up the desirable for the possible—a painful necessity, but frequent in important affairs. He endeavoured to come to a definitive arrangement with Prussia, that he might afterwards concert with Russia, reserving for the conclusion of the negotiation the agreement with Austria, who manifested a provoking obstinacy, which it was found impossible to overcome until the whole of the adhesions were obtained.

In the first place, he declared it to be his firm resolution not to suffer any interest to be sacrificed, not to give every thing to the great houses at the expense of the less, not to suppress all the free cities, not to destroy completely the Catholic party. General Beurnonville, ambassador of France in Berlin, was at this moment on leave in Paris. He was directed, in the month of May, 1802—Floreal, year X.—to confer with M. de Lucchesini, minister of Prussia, and to sign a convention stipulating the separate arrangements of the houses of Brandenburg and Orange.

Prussia re-asserted all her claims, but with no power had she such a chance of treating advantageously as with France. She was, therefore, obliged to be content with an arrangement, which, though far inferior to what she desired, could not but appear to all Germany an act of great partiality towards her.

This power lost, as we have observed, on the left bank of the Rhine, the duchy of Gueldres, part of the duchy of Cleves, and the little principality of Mürs; to Holland she ceded a few enclosed districts; lastly, in consequence of a general arrangement, relative to navigation, she had been recently deprived of certain tolls on the Rhine. These united losses produced a diminution of revenue, which she estimated at 2,000,000 of florins, Austria at 750,000, Russia at 1,000,000, and France, by favour, at 1,200,000 or 1,300,000. By a convention, signed on the 23d of May, 1802—3d Prairial, year X.—France promised to procure for Prussia the bishoprics of Hildesheim and Paderborn, part of the bishopric of Münster, the districts of Erfurt and Eichsfeld, remnants of the old electorate of Mayence, lastly, certain abbeys and free cities, the whole producing a revenue of about 1,800,000 florins, 500,000 more than the supposed amount of the losses for which compensation was to be made. Prussia obtained nothing in Franconia, which was a subject of deep regret to her, for her ambition was persevering in that quarter; but Eichsfeld and Erfurt were intermediate points, which served for stages for reaching her provinces in Franconia. While pretending to make up her mind to great sacrifices, she signed, satisfied at bottom with the acquisitions which she had obtained. Next day, a separate convention was concluded with her for the indemnity of the house of Orange-Nassau. That house was not placed in Westphalia, as it would have wished to be, but in Upper Hesse. The bishopric and abbey of Fulda, the abbey of Corvey, not far distant from Fulda, that of Weingarten and some others, were allotted to it. By this arrangement, without being placed too near Holland and the recollections of the stadtholdership, it nevertheless found itself near enough to the country of Nassau, where all the branches of that family were to be indemnified.

These advantages were granted to Prussia and to her kindred, with a view to secure her alliance. The First Consul, therefore, purposed to avail himself of the occasion to wring from her a formal adhesion to all that he had done in Europe. He required and obtained from the head of the house of Orange-Nassau

the recognition of the Batavian Republic and the renunciation of the stadtholdership: he required of Prussia the recognition of the Italian Republic, the recognition of the kingdom of Etruria, and an implicit approval of the incorporation of Piedmont with France. King Frederick William thus found himself linked to the policy of the First Consul in all its most disagreeable bearings towards the rest of Europe. He made no hesitation, however, and gave the required adhesion in the same act that assigned to him his share of the Germanic indemnities.

Having settled the claims of Prussia, the First Consul, adhering to his plan of arranging successively and individually with the parties principally interested, signed on the same day a convention with Bavaria. In this convention, he treated her as an old ally of France. He insured to her all the ecclesiastical principalities enclosed in her territories, the bishopric of Augsburg, (excepting the city, which was to be retained as a free city,) the bishopric of Freisingen; the slopes of the mountains of Tyrol, coveted by Austria, such as the abbey of Kempten and the county of Werdenfels; the fortress of Passau, without the bishopric of Passau, enclosed in the Austrian territory, and destined for the Archduke Ferdinand; the bishopric of Eichstädt, situated on the banks of the Danube; the two extensive bishoprics of Würzburg and Bamberg, forming a considerable part of Franconia; lastly, several free cities and abbeys in Suabia, which Austria, in her ambitious dreams, had demanded for herself, particularly Ulm, Memmingen, Buehorn, &c. The question of the Inn between Austria and Bavaria was not resolved: the two interested powers were left to settle that by way of exchange. The Palatine house, concentrated in Suabia and Franconia, thus acquired a very compact territory. There was now nothing but the duchy of Berg, situated on the confines of Westphalia, that was at a distance from the mass of her dominions. It was with a view to agglomerate her territory that France had persuaded her to give up the whole Palatinate of the Rhine; but she was fully indemnified for what was taken from her, for, if she had lost a revenue of 3,000,000 florins she received 3,000,000 and some thousands in compensation.

The indemnity of Prussia and Bavaria being fixed, the greatest difficulty was overcome. France had satisfied two friends, and the two most considerable States in Germany, next to Austria. No insurmountable opposition was thenceforward to be apprehended. Still there were left Baden, Wirtemberg, and the two Hesses, to settle with. Baden and Wirtemberg were clients and relations of Russia. It was with Russia that their share was to be arranged. It consisted, as we have observed, with the plan of the First Consul, to allow the Emperor Alexander to participate in the arrangements of Germany, to interest him in them, by treating his protégés well, by flattering his pride, by appearing to rate his influence very highly. In the first place, he was bound to admit him to this participation by the secret articles annexed to the late treaty of

peace, articles by which he had engaged to concert with the Russian Cabinet respecting the Germanic indemnities. The First Consul, had thought that he ought not to leave him time to claim his right of intervention, and, in his personal correspondence with the young emperor, descanting confidentially on all the important affairs of Europe, he had inquired his intentions in regard to the houses of Wirtemberg and Baden, which had the honour of being allied to the imperial family. In fact, the empress-dowager, widow of Paul I., mother of Alexander, was princess of Wirtemberg; the reigning empress, consort of Alexander, was a princess of Baden. The latter was one of those three brilliant sisters, born at the little court of Carlsruhe, and seated at this period on the thrones of Bavaria, Sweden, and Russia.

The czar, flattered by these advances, cheerfully accepted the overtures of the First Consul, and had not for a moment any idea of entering into the scheme of Austria, who was desirous to remove the negotiation to Petersburg. Gratified as he would have been to see the most important affair of the continent arranged in this capital, he had the good sense not to pretend to any thing of the kind for an instant. He therefore authorized M. de Markoff to negotiate on this subject in Paris. Wirtemberg and Baden were to him inferior interests in this negotiation. His essential interest was to participate ostensibly in the whole of the negotiation. The First Consul left nothing to be wished by the Emperor Alexander in regard to the exterior of the part to be acted, and offered to place him ostensibly on a level with the French cabinet, by proposing to constitute France and Russia mediating powers between the various states of the Germanic confederation.

This was a most happy idea. It was necessary, in fact, after deciding with the principal parties interested what share they were to have, to enter into communication at length with the Germanic body assembled at Ratisbon, and to lead it to ratify the arrangements individually subscribed. The First Consul conceived the idea of combining these arrangements into one general plan, and to submit it to the Diet of Ratisbon in the name of France and Russia, spontaneously constituting themselves mediating powers. This form saved the dignity of the Germanic body, which no longer appeared to be dictatorially organized by France, but which, in the embarrassment into which it was thrown by the rival ambitions excited within its bosom, accepted as arbiters the two greatest, and the most disinterested, powers of the continent. It was impossible to disguise the real will of France under a form better suited to Germany, and more flattering to a young sovereign, who was but just entering upon the theatre of the world. The First Consul, in thus accepting an equality of character with a young prince who had not yet done any thing, while he himself was covered with glory, consummate in arms and politics, pursued the most skilful line of conduct, for, by means of some concessions, he brought all Europe into his views. The character of true policy is

always to place the real result before the external effect. Besides, the effect is inevitably produced, when the real result is obtained.

The proposal of the First Consul to the Emperor Alexander being accepted, it was agreed to present to the Germanic Diet a note signed by the two cabinets, and containing the spontaneous offer of their mediation. They had yet to agree upon the arrangements to be introduced into that note. The First Consul had great difficulty to induce M. de Markoff to admit the stipulations already made with the principal German powers, and which were contrary to the views of Austria, without being seriously injurious to her. While young Alexander affected to share none of the passions of the European aristocracy, M. de Markoff in Paris, M. de Woronzoff in London, displayed without reserve the passions which a French emigrant, an English tory, or an Austrian grandee might have felt. M. de Markoff, in particular, was a Russian, full of haughtiness, destitute of that attractive flexibility which is frequently met with in the distinguished men of his nation, having intelligence, still more pride, and an idea of the power of his cabinet which was at that time quite extravagant. The First Consul was not a man to endure the ridiculous arrogance of M. de Markoff, and contrived to keep the ambassador in his place by paying all due respect to the sovereign. He offered him, for Wirtemberg, for Baden, for Bavaria, advantages certainly superior to the losses which those three houses had sustained. But M. de Markoff, indifferent to the imperial kindred, and even to Russian policy, which began, after the peace of Teschen, to favour the petty powers of Germany, M. de Markoff, in his zeal for the cause of old Europe, showed himself not Russian but Austrian. It was Austria that seemed to interest him exclusively. Prussia was hateful to him; he disputed all her assertions, admitted, on the contrary, all those of Austria, and demanded for the latter as much as they could have demanded in Vienna. The bishopric of Salzburg and the provostship of Berchtolsgraden, granted by general consent to the Archduke Ferdinand, produced very nearly as much as Tuscany, that is to say, 2,500,000 florins. To these principalities were nevertheless added the bishoprics of Trent and Brixen. But M. de Markoff, the advocate of Austria, insisted that no account ought to be taken of this addition. Those bishoprics were in Tyrol, and consequently, he contended, they were so completely the property of Austria, that it was robbing the emperor to give to an archduke. To this it was replied that Trent and Brixen were ecclesiastical principalities, wholly independent, though enclosed within the Austrian territory, and that they would not belong to Austria till they had been formally assigned to her.

Austria wanted, moreover, the bishopric of Passau, which would secure to her the important fortress of Passau, situated at the conflux of the Inn and the Danube, and forming a tête de pont upon Bavaria. It was agreed to give to Austria the bishopric of Passau without the fortress, which was possible and expedient; for the territory of that bishopric was wholly enclosed in Austria, and the fortress of

Passau in Bavaria. To have given this place to Austria would have been giving her an offensive and threatening position in regard to Bavaria. Nothing, therefore, was more natural than to assign the bishopric to the Archduke Ferdinand, and Passau to the elector palatine. But Austria clung to Passau as to a capital position, and M. de Markoff defended it for Austria with extreme warmth. It was desirable, however, to conclude this long negotiation, and M. de Markoff, sensible that in the end the mediation of Russia might be dispensed with altogether, at last consented to a compromise, and agreed with M. de Talleyrand in the definitive plan.

The advantages already conceded by the First Consul to Prussia and to the house of Orange, though vehemently contested by M. de Markoff, were inserted entire in the definitive plan. These were, as we have already seen, for Prussia, the bishoprics of Hildesheim, Paderborn, and Münster. (part only of the latter,) the districts of Eichsfeld and Erfurt, besides some abbeys and free cities; and for the house of Orange-Nassau, Fulda and Corvey. In the same plan were also inserted the conditions already stipulated for Bavaria, that is to say, the bishoprics of Freisingen and Augsburg, the county of Werdenfels, the abbey of Kempten, the city of Passau without the bishopric, the bishoprics of Eichstädt, Würzburg, and Bamberg, besides several free cities and abbeys in Suabia.

Austria was to receive for the Archduke of Tuscany the bishoprics of Brixen, Trent, Salzburg, Passau, (this latter without the fortress of Passau,) and the provostship of Berchtoldsgaden. It was a revenue of 3,500,000 florins, in compensation for a net revenue of 2,500,000, with the advantage of a contiguity of territory not presented by Tuscany. Austria gained nothing in Suabia; she merely retained her old possessions there. She had a right, if she pleased, to exchange them for the frontier of the Inn. The Brisgau was, as in interior treaties, insured to the Duke of Modena.

The house of Baden, for which M. de Markoff showed a very moderate degree of interest, was most favourably treated. It had lost various lordships and lands in Alsace and Luxemburg, yielding a revenue of 315 000 florins at most. There was secured to it, in territories which lay handy, such as the bishopric of Constance, the remnant of the bishoprics of Spire, Strasburg, and Basle; the bailiwicks of Ladenburg, Bretten, and Heidelberg, there was secured to it a revenue of 450,000 florins, besides the electoral dignity, which was destined for it.

The house of Wirtemberg was not less favourably treated. The provostship of Ellwangen and various abbeys, forming a revenue of 380,000 florins, were conceded to it in compensation for the 350,000 which it had lost.

The houses of Hesse, and Nassau were also indemnified in territories situated within their reach and proportionate to their losses. The inferior princes were carefully defended by France, and obtained revenues nearly equivalent to those which had been taken from them. The houses of Aremberg and Solms were placed in Westphalia. The counts of West-

phalia obtained the lower bishopric of Münster. Very little notice was taken of England, which seemed to feel no great interest in the question of the Germanic indemnities. It was not, however, forgotten that King George III. was elector of Hanover, and that he attached great value to that ancient crown of his family. He even regarded it as his last resource, in those moments of gloomy depression, when he fancied that he beheld England convulsed by a revolution. A desire was felt to dispose him favourably, and as he had been required to give up certain duties, in favour of the cities of Bremen and Hamburg, and to make several little sacrifices in favour of Prussia, there was conceded to him in compensation the bishopric of Osnabrück, contiguous to Hanover—an indemnity far superior to what he had lost, and the object of which was to interest him strongly in the success of the mediation.

A certain number of mediate abbeys were reserved to complete the indemnities of such princes as might be ill used in this first division, and to furnish pensions for the members of the suppressed clergy. In general, the princes who received ecclesiastical territories were required to pay the pensions of all the incumbents living, as well bishops and abbots as members of the chapters, and the officers attached to their service. It was the least duty of humanity towards the former holders of benefices, whose possessions were taken from them and their princely existence destroyed. But, if provision had thus been made for the wants of the suppressed clergy on the right bank of the Rhine, there were still the dispossessed clergy on the left bank, and these being, in consequence of treaties, without redress against France, would have found no means of subsistence anywhere. It was for their support that great part of the reserved mediate abbeys were destined.

Such were the territorial arrangements agreed upon with M. de Markoff. Indemnities to the amount of nearly 14,000,000 had been distributed to compensate for losses to the amount of 13,000,000; and what provokes the greediness of the great courts, Austria took about 4,000,000 of them for her archdukes; Prussia 2,000,000 for herself, 500,000 for the stadtholder; Bavaria took 3,000,000, the exact equivalent of her losses; Wirtemberg, Baden, the two Hesses, Nassau, about 2,200,000; all the petty princes together 2,500,000. Thus Austria and Prussia obtained the greater part for themselves, or for princes forming no part of the Germanic confederation.

There were still left the constitutional arrangements which also it was very necessary to settle. The First Consul, inclining originally to retain two ecclesiastical electors, afterwards thwarted by the obstinacy of Austria, deprived of resources by the greediness of the great courts, could do no more than preserve one. The Elector of Cologne was dead, and his place filled merely for form by the Archduke Anthony, but without any pretension on the part of Austria to establish the validity of the election. The Elector-archbishop of Treves, a Saxon prince, who had retired to his second see, the bishopric of Augsburg,

was neither to be pitied nor regretted. A pension of 100,000 florins was to be given to him. The present Elector of Mayence was a prince of the house of Dalberg, of whom we have already made mention. Independently of his personal qualities, he had a title to be retained, namely the importance of his see, to which were attached the chancellorship of the German empire and the presidency of the diet. He was confirmed, therefore, in the quality of arch-chancellor of the empire, and president of the diet, and the bishopric of Ratisbon, the place where the diet met, was conferred on him. The bailiwick of Aschaffenburg, a remnant of the old electorate of Mayence was also left him, and it was agreed to compose for him a revenue of 1,000,000 florins by means of the reserved domains.

Consequently, one only of the three ecclesiastical electors was to be left, and this, with the five lay electors, made six in all. The First Consul was for increasing the number and making that number unequal. He proposed to create nine. The title was conferred on the Margrave of Baden, for the good conduct of that prince towards France, and on account of his relationship to Russia, on the Duke of Wirtemberg and the Landgrave of Hesse, on account of their importance in the confederation. These were three additional Protestant electors, making six Protestants against three Catholics. The majority in the electoral college was thus changed in favour of the Protestant party, but not to such a degree as to take from Austria her legitimate influence, for she was always sure of the votes of Bohemia, Saxony, and Mayence, most frequently of that of Hanover, and in certain cases of those of Baden and Wirtemberg.

It was agreed that the princes indemnified with ecclesiastical possessions should sit in the college of princes for the lordships to which they should acquire a title. This again changed the majority of the college of princes in favour of the Protestant party; but, owing to the respect which the imperial house had so long inspired, and owing to the interest which the petty princes had in preserving the Germanic constitution, the Protestant votes recently created were not all hostile to Austria. It was supposed that the Protestant or Prussian party, as people were pleased to call it, having, in consequence of the new arrangements, acquired a numerical majority in the colleges of the electors and of the princes, Austria, with the old spell which encompassed her, with the prerogatives attached to the imperial crown, with her direct influence over the Elector of Ratisbon, with the power of ratification which she possessed in regard to all the resolutions of the diet, would still have means to counterbalance the opposition of Prussia, and continue sufficiently powerful to prevent the introduction of anarchy into the Germanic body. It was calculated that, in taking the majority from Austria, the arbitrators had taken from her at most the power of swaying Germany at pleasure, and of dragging it into war to gratify her pride or her ambition. Such was the opinion of the new

arch-chancellor, who was deeply versed in the practical knowledge of the Germanic constitution.

It was, lastly, requisite to organize the college of the cities, which had but little influence at all times, and was not destined to have more in future. Though the treaty of Lunéville had made no mention of the suppression of the free cities, and specified only the suppression of the ecclesiastical principalities, still the existence of many of these cities was so illusory, their administration was so burdensome to themselves, the exception which they formed amidst the Germanic territory was so annoying and so frequent, that it was necessary to suppress the greater number of them. The protection which they had formerly sought in their quality of immediate cities, that is to say, dependent on the emperor alone, they found in the justice of the time and in a much stricter observance of the laws than formerly. It would, nevertheless, have been too harsh to suppress them all; and it may be affirmed that, but for the First Consul, the most celebrated would have sunk under the ambition of the neighbouring governments. He made it a point of honour to uphold the principal of them. He resolved to preserve Augsburg and Nuremberg, on account of their historical celebrity; Ratisbon, on account of the presence of the diet; Wetzlar, on account of the imperial chamber, Frankfurt and Lübeck, on account of their commercial importance. He proposed to unite two of them, which, though very considerable, nay, the most considerable of all, Hamburg and Bremen, had not even the quality of imperial cities. Bremen was dependent on Hanover. It was separated from it, in exchange for part of the bishopric of Osnabrück. Hamburg enjoyed a real independence, but it had no vote in the college of the cities. The First Consul caused useful privileges to be attached to the exceptional existence of the free cities. They were declared to be thenceforth neutral in the wars of the empire, exempt from all military charges, such as recruiting, the financial contingent, the quartering of troops. This was a way to legitimize the neutrality which was granted to them, and cause it to be respected. Another boon, from which they were destined to derive greater benefit than any other part of the Germanic States, was the suppression of the vexatious and onerous tolls established on the great rivers of Germany. The feudal tolls on the Rhine, on the Weser, and on the Elbe, were suppressed. The losses resulting from this suppression for the bordering States had been calculated and compensated beforehand. Certain princes who had property in some of the free cities, such as Augsburg, Frankfurt, Bremen, were even obliged to renounce it at the price of an augmentation of indemnity. It was to France alone, and to her persevering efforts, that these benefits were owing. Thus the number of those cities was diminished by all those which had lost their importance, but increased by the two richest, which had hitherto been excluded. Their existence was aggrandized and meliorated; they were placed

in a position to render great services to freedom of commerce, and to derive profit from them.

This matter, once settled, was introduced into a convention, signed on the 4th of June by M. de Markoff and the French plenipotentiary. Apprized, day by day, of the proceedings of M. de Markoff, Austria had held back. The First Consul, on his part, had taken little pains to gain her, striving, as he had done from the beginning, to obtain the majority of individual assents, that by the mass of them he might overcome the refractory. In this view, direct conventions with Württemberg and the other States made, out of the details of the plan, so many particular treaties between France and the indemnified countries.

For the rest, M. de Markoff would not enter into any but a conditional engagement, and insisted on referring the matter to his court. It was agreed that, if his court accepted the proposed plan, the note which was to contain it should be carried immediately to Ratisbon and presented to the diet, in the name of France and Russia, constituting themselves mediators for the Germanic body. The First Consul, in thus binding Russia to his plan, agreeing, moreover, in regard to this plan with Prussia, Bavaria, and the principal States of the second and third order, could not fail to overcome the resistance of Austria. But he was fearful of the efforts which she might make at Petersburg to shake the young emperor, to awaken his scruples, and to interest his justice against his vanity, so highly flattered by the part that was offered to him. He, therefore, directed General Hedouville, our ambassador in Petersburg, to declare that he should not wait longer than ten days for the consent of the Russian cabinet and the ratification of the convention of the 4th of June. He caused this declaration to be made in the most measured but positive terms. It plainly intimated that, if Russia did not appreciate highly enough the honour of regulating jointly with France the new state of Germany, the First Consul would do without her and constitute himself sole mediator. In the condescension shown to the court of Russia there had been ability and tact; neither was there less in the firmness shown at the end of the negotiation begun with her.

At this moment, the Emperor Alexander was absent from Petersburg: he was gone to Memel to have an interview with the King of Prussia. Though the Russian diplomacy was wholly favourable to Austria, and unfavourable to Prussia, whose ambition and condescension towards France it severely censured, the Emperor Alexander shared not these dispositions. He was persuaded, without exactly knowing why, that Prussia was a much more formidable power than Austria; he believed that the secret of the great art of war had continued, ever since the death of Frederick II., in the ranks of the Prussian army, and in this persuasion he even remained till the battle of Jena. He had heard of the reigning sovereign of Prussia, of his youth, of his virtues, of his understanding, of his resistance to his ministers, and, fancying that he discovered more than

one analogy between the position of that king and his own, he had conceived a desire to make his personal acquaintance. In consequence, he had caused an interview at Memel to be proposed to him. This proposal the King of Prussia had eagerly embraced, for he was still full of his scheme for interposing between Russia and France, still persuaded that he should exercise a beneficial influence over their relations, that he should induce them to live in harmony, that, holding the balance between them, he should hold it in Europe, and that to the importance of the part was added the certainty of preserving peace, the maintenance of which had become the most constant subject of his thoughts. This part, which he had dreamt of for a moment, in the lifetime of Paul, was rendered far more easy under the Emperor Alexander, with whom similarity of age and disposition seemed to ally him more closely. Confirmed in this idea by M. Haugwitz, he had repaired to Memel with a head full of the most honourable illusions. Frederick William and Alexander, now together, seemed to agree perfectly, and vowed everlasting friendship to each other. The King of Prussia was simple and a little awkward; the Emperor Alexander was neither simple nor awkward; on the contrary, he was amiable, courteous, lavish of demonstrations. He hesitated not to make the first advances towards the successor of the great Frederick, and expressed the warmest affection for him. The beautiful Queen of Prussia was present at this interview: from this period the Emperor Alexander devoted to her a respectful and chivalrous homage. They parted highly delighted with each other, and convinced that they loved one another, not like sovereigns, but like men. In fact, the Emperor Alexander prided himself upon continuing to be a man, though seated upon a throne. He returned, repeating to all who came near him, that he had at last found a friend worthy of himself. To all that was alleged concerning the Prussian cabinet, its ambition, its greediness, he replied by the explanation constantly employed when Prussia was talked of, that what was said might be true of M. Haugwitz, but was false of the young and virtuous king. He could not have wished for any thing better than to see all the acts of the court of Russia explained in the same manner. At the moment when the two monarchs were on the point of parting, a courier, arriving at Memel, delivered to King Frederick William a letter from the First Consul. This letter communicated the advantages granted to Prussia, and the definitive plan agreed upon with M. de Markoff. Every thing, added the First Consul, now depended on the assent of the Emperor of Russia. King Frederick William, enchanted with this result, would fain have taken advantage of the occasion to talk over the affairs of Germany with the young friend whom he imagined that he had gained for life. But that slippery friend refused to listen to him, and promised to answer as soon as he should have received from his ministers the communication of the plan arranged in Paris.

It was now the middle of June, 1802—the

end of Prairial, year X. Conriers were waiting for the emperor Alexander at Petersburg; and General Hedouville, extremely punctual in his obedience, had already presented a note intimating that, if by a certain time no positive explanation was given, he should consider the answer as negative, and write to Paris accordingly. Kurakin, the vice-chancellor, who was better disposed towards France than his colleagues, prevailed upon General Hedouville to withdraw his note, lest it should offend the Emperor Alexander, promising that, on the arrival of his sovereign, the business should be immediately submitted to him, and an answer given without delay. The emperor, on his return to the capital, gave audience to his ministers, and was strongly urged by several of them to reject the proposed plan. The cabinet appeared divided, but yet more disposed in favour of Austria than of Prussia. Alexander, though he perceived, with his precocious subtlety, that the governor of the affairs of the West gave up to him the appearance of a part, the reality of which he retained in his own hands; though he found that the conditions which they were to dictate jointly at Ratisbon came to him ready made from Paris—Alexander was, nevertheless, touched with the outward respect paid to his empire, and satisfied with a precedent which, added to that of Teschen, would in future establish the right of Russia to interfere in the affairs of Germany. He was convinced that the First Consul would proceed, if the Russian cabinet hesitated any longer; moreover, the pretensions of Austria, who was at this moment making her last efforts in Petersburg, seemed to him quite unreasonable; and, lastly, the letters of the King of Prussia became daily more urgent: from all these motives he decided in favour of the proposed plan, and ratified the convention on the 4th of June, in spite, as it were, of his ministers. At the moment of giving his assent, Prince Louis of Baden arrived at Petersburg to claim the rights of relationship, and to obtain the approval of a plan for increasing the territories and titles of his house; but he found his wishes granted. A few days afterwards, this unfortunate prince died in Finland from the effects of a carriage accident, on his way from his sister, the Empress of Russia, to his sister the Queen of Sweden.

The Emperor Alexander, though he had given his assent, had, however, made two reservations, not express, but verbal, and which he left it to the courtesy of the First Consul to take into consideration. The first was relative to the Bishop of Lübeck, Duke of Oldenburg, and his uncle. This prince lost, by the suppression of the toll of Elsfleth, on the Weser, a very considerable revenue, and solicited an augmentation of indemnity. There were a few thousand florins more to look for—that was all. The second reservation of the emperor related to the electoral dignity which he was desirous of conferring on the house of Mecklenburg, which itself appeared to care very little about it. This was a more difficult affair; for this new favour would have raised the number of the electors to ten, and placed another Protestant in the electoral college. It

was a matter for ulterior settlement with the diet.

Things had been so arranged that the couriers returning from Petersburg should come back by way of Ratisbon, and deliver to the ministers of Russia and France orders to act immediately. Russia had appointed, as her minister extraordinary on this occasion, M. de Buhler, her ordinary representative at the court of Bavaria. The First Consul on his part had chosen for the same character the minister of France at Munich. M. de Laforest, by his acquaintance with German affairs, and by his activity, combined the qualities suitable for the difficult functions with which he was about to be charged. The note announcing the mediation of the two courts had been drawn up beforehand, and sent to the two ministers, French and Russian, that they might deliver it as soon as the couriers should have returned from Petersburg. Both had orders to leave Munich immediately for Ratisbon. M. de Laforest executed this order forthwith, M. de Buhler promising to follow without delay. They arrived at Ratisbon on the 16th of August—28th Thermidor.

The diet had transferred the difficult work of the new Germanic organization to an extraordinary deputation composed of some of the principal German States. It was in imitation of what had been done at former periods in similar circumstances, particularly at the peace of Westphalia. The eight States selected were: Brandenburg, (Prussia,) Saxony, Bavaria, Bohemia, (Austria,) Wirtemberg, Teutonic Order, (Archduke Charles,) Mayence, Hesse-Cassel. These eight States were represented in the extraordinary deputation by ministers deliberating agreeably to the instructions of their governments.

All these ministers were not present. M. de Laforest was obliged to make great efforts to bring them to Ratisbon, efforts the more difficult since Austria, reduced to despair, had determined to oppose the tardiness of the Germanic constitution to the vivacity of French action. The note, in the form of a declaration, was delivered on the 18th of August—30th Thermidor—in the name of the two courts, to the directorial minister of the diet, charged to preside over all official communications. A copy was given to the imperial plenipotentiary, for there was in the grand deputation, as well as in the diet itself, a plenipotentiary exercising the imperial prerogative, which consisted in receiving communication of proposals addressed to the confederation, in examining them, and in ratifying or rejecting them, on behalf of the emperor.

The note of the mediating powers, worthy, amicable, but firm, merely said that the German States, not having yet been able to come to an agreement respecting the execution of the treaty of Lunéville, and it being to the interest of all Europe that the work of peace should be crowned by the arrangement of the Germanic affairs, France and Russia, friendly and disinterested powers, offered their mediation to the diet, submitted a plan to it, and declared that the interest of Germany, the consolidation of peace, and the general tranquillity

of Europe, required that every thing concerning the regulation of the Germanic indemnities should be settled in the space of two months. This fixed time had something imperious, it is true, but it rendered the proceedings of the two courts serious, and in this respect it was indispensable.

This declaration was designed to produce, and it did produce, the strongest effect. The directorial minister, that is to say, the president, transmitted it immediately to the extraordinary deputation.

While the ministers of the two powers were proceeding so resolutely at Ratisbon, an official step was taken at Vienna by the ambassador of France, to communicate to the court of Austria the plan of mediation, to declare that France had never wished, neither did she now wish, to offend her; but that the impossibility of arranging with her had obliged France to take a definitive part, a part imperatively required by the peace of Europe. It was insinuated, moreover, that the plan did not settle every thing in an irrevocable manner; that there were yet left many means for serving the court of Vienna, either in its negotiations with Bavaria, or in its efforts to secure to the archdukes the succession of the Teutonic Order and of the last ecclesiastical electorate; that, in all these things, the condescension of the First Consul, would be proportionate to the condescension of the emperor. For the rest, M. de Champagny, our ambassador, was ordered not to enter into any detail, and to cause it to be understood that all serious discussion would take place exclusively at Ratisbon.

During these inevitable delays of diplomacy, the indemnified princes became extremely impatient to occupy the territories awarded to them, and had demanded authority to take possession of them immediately. France had assented to it, in order to render the proposed plan nearly irrevocable. All at once, Prussia caused Hildesheim, Paderborn, Münster, Eichsfeld, and Erfurt to be occupied. Wirtemberg and Bavaria, not less impatient than Prussia, sent detachments of troops into the ecclesiastical principalities which were assigned to them. The resistance, if any were made by these principalities, could not be great, for they were either aged prelates or chapters administering the vacant sees, having neither means nor will to defend themselves. The harshness of the occupants equalled in some respects that formerly laid to the charge of the French Revolution. The natural protector of these unfortunate ecclesiastics was Austria, charged with the exercise of the imperial power. But most of them were situated at a great distance from her territory; and those who were within her reach, as the bishops of Augsburg and Freisingen, could not be assisted without violating the Bavarian territory, which would have been an act pregnant with the most serious results. There was, however, one of these bishoprics, easy to secure from Bavarian occupation and important to retain; this was the bishopric of Passau. To undertake its defence would have been an act of vigour tending to raise Austria from her very lowly situation

We have already described the geographical position of this bishopric, completely enclosed by Austria, and having only one point on the Bavarian territory, namely Passau. The court of Vienna had been desirous, as we have seen, that this fortress should be given to the archduke along with the bishopric itself. The Austrian troops were at the gates of Passau: a step would have carried them into the town. The temptation must have been strong, and pretexes were not wanting. In fact, the unfortunate bishop, on seeing the Bavarian troops approach, had applied to the emperor, the natural protector of every State of the empire exposed to violence. The plan which gave his bishopric partly to Bavaria, partly to the Archduke Ferdinand, was still but a project, not yet a law of the empire, and till then the execution of it might be considered as an illegal act. Acts of this kind, it is true, were committed throughout all Germany; but where it was possible to prevent them, why not do it, why not give some sign of life and vigour!

Austria was exasperated in the highest degree. She complained of everybody: of France, who, without saying any thing to her, had negotiated with Russia the plan that was to change the face of Germany; of Russia herself, who, at Petersburg, had kept secret from her the adoption of the plan of mediation; of Prussia and her confederates, who supported themselves upon foreign governments to overturn the empire completely. Her complaints had but little foundation, and she had to reproach none but herself, her exaggerated pretensions, and her ill-judged subtleties, for the forlorn state in which she was left by all at that moment. She had sought to negotiate with Russia unknown to France, and France had negotiated with Russia unknown to her. She had wished to call foreigners into the empire by having recourse to the Emperor Alexander, and Prussia and Bavaria, imitating her example, had called France, with this difference that Prussia and Bavaria obtained the intervention of a power in friendship with the Germanic body, and obliged by treaties themselves to intervene. As for previous occupations, they were premature acts, it is true, and strictly considered illegal; but, unfortunately for the logic of Austria, she had herself just occupied Salzburg and Berchtoldsgaden.

Be this as it may, Austria, exasperated and determined to show that her courage was not depressed by a concurrence of unfortunate circumstances, committed an act by no means in keeping with her usual circumspection. She ordered her troops to march through the suburbs of Passau, and to occupy the fortress, and accompanied this act with explanations, tending to extenuate its effect. She declared that, in thus acting, she complied with a formal demand of the bishop of Passau; that she meant not by any means to decide by force one of the knotty questions submitted to the Germanic diet; that she intended to perform a purely conservatory act; and that, immediately after the decision of that diet, she would withdraw her troops, and leave the contested town to the proprietor who should be legally invested

with it by the definitive plan of the indemnities.

Her troops entered Passau on the 18th of August. While they were on their march, the Bavarian troops, on their side, were marching too. There had well nigh been a serious collision, which might have set all Europe in flames. However, the prudence of the officers charged with these movements prevented that calamity. The Austrians remained masters of the place.

This conduct was bold, bolder than it was prudent for Austria to pursue, for it was opposing a formal act of resistance to the declaration of the mediating powers on an important point. It produced a very great effect at Ratisbon, among the numerous German public assembled in that city. There were representatives of all the States, maintained or suppressed, satisfied or dissatisfied, seeking some of them to procure the adoption of the proposed plan, others to change it in what concerned them. There were magistrates of the free cities, abbots, prelates, immediate nobles, in abundance. The immediate nobles, in particular, filling the armies and the chancelleries of the German courts, figured in great numbers as ministers to the diet. Even those who represented courts which had been treated liberally, and who, on that account, should have appeared content, retained, nevertheless, their personal passions, and, as German nobles, were far from being satisfied. M. de Görtz, minister of Prussia at Ratisbon, for example, was a partisan of the plan of indemnities on account of his court; but, in quality of immediate noble, he deeply regretted the old order of things. Several other ministers of the German courts were in the like predicament. These persons composed of themselves a public, under the influence of strong passions, and well-disposed towards Austria. It was not with France that they found most fault, for they saw that she was disinterested in all this, and that she had no other aim but to bring the affairs of Germany to a conclusion, but they poured forth their severest censure upon Prussia and Bavaria. The greediness of these courts, their connection with France, their eagerness to destroy the old Constitution, were spoken of in terms of extraordinary bitterness. The news of the occupation of Passau produced, among this public the strongest and most agreeable sensation. It was necessary, it was alleged, to act with vigour. France had no troops upon the Rhine; her peace with England was not so solid that she could lightly engage herself with the affairs of Germany; besides, the First Consul had just received a sort of monarchical authority, in recompense for the peace which he had given to the world; he could not so soon withdraw a benefit for which such a high price had been paid. The only course, therefore, was to display energy, to cross the Inn, to give a lesson to Bavaria, and to put down the numerous hands lifted all at once against the Germanic Constitution.

The effect produced at Ratisbon speedily spread over all Europe. The First Consul, attentive to the progress of these negotiations,

was struck by it. Thus far, he had carefully abstained from any step which could have affected the general peace. His object had been to consolidate not to endanger it. But he was not of a humour to suffer himself to be publicly defied, and especially to allow a result which he had pursued with so many efforts, and with such excellent intentions, to be put in jeopardy. He was aware what this boldness of Austria might produce at Ratisbon, if he did not repress it, and especially if he appeared to hesitate. He immediately sent for M. de Lucchesini, minister of Prussia, and M. de Cetto, minister of Bavaria. He pointed out to both of them the importance of a prompt and energetic resolution, to meet the new attitude taken by Austria, and the danger to which the plan of the indemnities would be exposed if the least hesitation were to be shown on this occasion. These two ministers were as sensible of all this as anybody; for the interest of their courts was sufficient to enlighten them on the subject. They adhered, therefore, without hesitation to the ideas of the First Consul. The latter proposed to them to bind themselves by a formal convention, in which they should declare anew that they were disposed to employ all necessary means to carry into effect the plan of mediation, and that if, within the sixty days assigned to the labours of the diet, the city of Passau were not evacuated, France and Prussia would unite their forces with those of Bavaria to secure to the latter the share promised her by the plan of the indemnities. This convention was signed in the evening of the very day on which it was proposed, that is to say, the 5th of September, 1802—18th Fructidor, year X.—The First Consul did not send for M. de Markoff, because he foresaw that a thousand difficulties would be raised by him in favour of Austria. Besides, he had no need of Russia for performing an act of energy. The convention itself became more threatening, signed by two powers, which were both seriously resolved to carry it into execution. It was merely communicated to M. de Markoff, who was requested to transmit it to Petersburg, that his cabinet might adhere to it if it should think fit.

Next day the First Consul despatched Lauriston, his aide-de-camp, with the convention which had just been signed, accompanied by a letter to the Elector of Bavaria. In this letter, he begged the elector to be of good cheer, guaranteed to him anew the whole of the indemnity that had been promised him, and assured him that at the time fixed a French army should enter Germany, to keep the word of France and Prussia. Lauriston was ordered to proceed to Passau for the purpose of showing himself there, and judging with his own eyes what number of Austrians were assembled on the frontier of Bavaria. He was then to show himself at Ratisbon, to go to Berlin, and to return through Holland. He was the bearer of letters for most of the princes of Germany.

This was more than was requisite for acting powerfully upon German heads. Colonel Lauriston set out immediately, and arrived without losing a moment at Munich. His

presence gave the greatest joy to the unfortunate elector. All the details contained in the letter of the First Consul passed from mouth to mouth. Colonel Lauriston continued his journey without delay, convinced himself with his own eyes that the Austrians upon the Inn were far too few for any thing but a bravado, proceeded to Ratisbon, and from Ratisbon to Berlin.

This promptness of action surprised Austria, struck terror into all the opposing party in the diet, and proved to them that a power like France had not entered into a public engagement with another power like Prussia to insure the success of a plan, without seriously intending to produce that effect. Besides, the object of the mediators was so evident, they aimed so plainly at securing the peace of the continent by the conclusion of the German affairs, that reason could not help joining the sentiment of a superior force to put down all resistance. Still, it is true, there remained difficulties of form to be overcome, and of these Austria would be likely to avail herself to retard the adoption of the plan, unless she obtained some concession to soothe her chagrin, and to save the dignity of the head of the empire, which was much compromised on this occasion.

The extraordinary deputation charged by the diet to prepare a *consensus* to be submitted to it, was at this moment assembled. The eight States composing it, Brandenburg, Saxony, Bavaria, Bohemia, Wirtemberg, the Teutonic Order, Mayence, and Hesse-Cassel, were present in the persons of their ministers. The protocol was open; each had begun to give his opinion. Of the eight States, four admitted without hesitation the plan of the mediators. Brandenburg, Bavaria, Hesse-Cassel, Wirtemberg, expressed their gratitude to the high powers who had condescended to come to the assistance of the Germanic body, and to extricate it from embarrassment by their disinterested arbitration; and moreover declared the plan to be wise, acceptable in its details, with the exception of a few points, on which the grand deputation might without inconvenience give its opinion and propose useful modifications. Lastly, they added, with reference to the term fixed, that it was urgent to bring matters to a close as speedily as possible, for the sake of the peace, not of Germany only, but of all Europe. Still the four approving states did not explain themselves in a precise manner relative to this term of two months. It would have been compromising their dignity to refer to this rigorous term for the purpose of proposing to submit to it; but this was what they meant to say, when they exhorted their co-estates to decide as speedily as possible.

One would have expected the approbation of Mayence, since that ancient ecclesiastical electorate alone was preserved and a revenue of 1,000,000 florins attached to it. But Baron d'Albini, who represented the elector-archbishop, a very sensible, clever man, wishing from the bottom of his heart the success of the mediation, was extremely embarrassed to approve, in presence of the whole ecclesiastical party, of a plan which swept away the ancient

feudal Church of Germany, and to approve it solely because the electorate of his archbishop had been retained. Besides, that archbishop was not completely satisfied with the combinations which related to himself. The bailiwick of Aschaffenburg, the last remnant of the electorate of Mentz, formed the only portion of revenue that was secured to him in territory. The rest was to be given in various assignments on the reserved possessions of the Church, and for this part of the promised 1,000,000, the most considerable part, since the bailiwick of Aschaffenburg was worth scarcely 300,000 florins, he was not without uneasiness.

M. d'Albini, on behalf of Mayence, expressed, therefore, an ambiguous opinion, warmly thanked the high mediating personages for their amicable intervention, deplored at great length the misfortunes of the Germanic Church, and distinguished in the plan two parts, one comprehending the distribution of the territories, the other the general considerations with which the plan was accompanied. As for the distributions of territory, excepting the petty indemnities, the minister of Mayence approved the proposals of the mediating powers. With regard to the general considerations, containing the indication of the regulations to be made, he thought them insufficient, and in particular the pensions of the clergy appeared to him to be not clearly enough insured. On this point, it must be confessed that the observations of the representative of Mayence were not destitute of reason.

Thus his opinion did not comprehend a formal approbation.

Saxony begged leave to reserve her vote for the present, which was a very common practice in the deliberations of the Germanic Diet. As the votes were collected several times, any member might defer giving his opinion till a subsequent sitting. This State, very disinterested, very discreet, placed in general under the influence of Prussia, but in heart preferring Austria, Catholic moreover, by the religion of the sovereign, though Protestant by the religion of the people, felt painful scruples, divided as it was between its affections and its reason—its affections which spoke for old Germany, its reason which spoke for the plan of the mediators.

Bohemia and the Teutonic Order were absolutely Austrian States. As for the first, that was a matter of course, since the emperor was King of Bohemia. Charles, brother of the emperor, his generalissimo, his minister at war, was grand-master of the Teutonic Order. In Vienna and at Ratisbon, they affected to make a difference between the minister of Bohemia, for instance, and the imperial minister. The minister of Bohemia, specially representing the house of Austria, might indulge in the expression of the family passions: he was therefore prompted to use the bitterest language. The imperial minister, speaking in the name of the emperor, affected to express himself more gravely, and to keep in view the general interests of the empire. He was less sincere and more pedantic. M. de Schraut was minister for Bohemia, M. von Hugel for the em

peror. This latter, one of the most consummate of formalists, was at the same time extremely acute, like many of those Germans who had grown old in the diet, and who disguised under the pedantry of forms all the subtlety of lawyers. As for the minister of the Teutonic grand-master, M. de Rabenau, he was wholly dependent on the Austrian deputation, who drew up his very notes for him with the knowledge and before the face of the diet; a part which caused that worthy minister great chagrin, and of which he complained himself. M. de Hugel, minister for the emperor, directed the Austrian votes, and was instructed to resort to artifices and delays in the struggle against the Prussian party and the mediating powers.

In the first sitting, M. de Schraut, for Bohemia, complained loudly of the conduct pursued towards Austria, and replied with acrimony to the reproach thrown out against that court of having never come to a conclusion—a reproach which constituted the chief argument of the mediating powers for interfering. This minister declared that, for nine months past, the imperial cabinet had not been able to obtain a single answer on the part of the French government to its overtures; that it had been left in complete ignorance of the negotiations going on in Paris; that its ambassador never could get initiated into the secret of the mediation, and that the plan of that mediation was unknown to him till the very moment of the communication made concerning it at Ratisbon. M. de Schraut then complained of the lot assigned to the Archduke Ferdinand, asserting that the treaty of Lunéville was violated, for that guaranteed to the archduke an entire indemnity of all his losses, and now there was given him a revenue of 1,350,000 florins at most, as an equivalent for 4,000,000 which he had lost. Salzburg, according to M. de Schraut, produced only 900,000 florins, Berchtoldsgaden 200,000, Passau 250,000. This was a downright falsehood. For the rest, Bohemia came to no conclusion.

The Teutonic Order, more moderate in language, would not admit the plan but as a document to be consulted.

Thus there were four approving votes, Brandenburg, Bavaria, Hesse-Cassel, Wirtemberg; one vote, Mayence, which at bottom was approbatory, but which it was requisite to bring round to be completely so: one vote, Saxony, which followed the majority, when that majority was pronounced; lastly two votes, Bohemia and the Teutonic Order, directly contrary, until satisfaction should be given to Austria.

This result was immediately communicated to the First Consul. When he was made acquainted with the first opinion of Bohemia, which imputed to the obstinate silence of France the impossibility of bringing the negotiation of the Germanic affairs to a conclusion, he determined not to put up quietly with this imputation. He replied immediately by a note which M. de Laforest was directed to communicate to the diet. In this note he expressed regret that he was forced to publish negotiations, which, from their nature, ought to have remained secret; but he added that,

since Austria compelled him to it by publicly calumniating his intentions, he declared that these pretended overtures of the cabinet of Vienna to the French cabinet related not to the general arrangement of the affair of the indemnities, but to the extension of the Austrian frontier to the Isar and even to the Lech, that is to say, the erasure of Bavaria from the list of German powers; that the pretensions of Austria, carried from Paris, where they were unsuccessful, to Petersburg, where they were equally unsuccessful, lastly to Munich, where they had assumed a threatening tone, had obliged the mediating powers to interfere, with a view to insure the peace of Germany, and with the peace of Germany that of the continent.

This reply, richly deserved, but exaggerated in one point, the imputation upon Austria of having been desirous to extend herself to the Lech (she had in fact made mention of the Isar only)—this reply deeply mortified the imperial cabinet, which clearly saw that it had to deal with an adversary as resolute in politics as he was in war.

Meanwhile, it was requisite that the negotiation should be kept going. M. de Laforest, authorized by his cabinet, employed the necessary means for deciding the vote of Mayence. A promise was given to M. d'Albini, representing the elector of Mayence, to insure the revenue of the arch-chancellor, not in annuities, but in immediate territories, not dependent on any prince. To this promise, which was made in a formal manner, were added some tolerably plain threats, in case the plan should be thwarted. In this manner the vote of M. d'Albini was decided. But it was not possible to obtain the pure and simple admission of the plan. The honour of the Germanic body required that the extraordinary deputation, in taking it for the ground-work of its labour, should make at least some slight alterations in it. The interest of some of the petty princes demanded several modifications of detail; and Prussia, moreover, from motives not to be avowed, agreed with Mayence to separate the general considerations from the plan itself, and to recast them in a new form. Among these considerations, in fact, there was one relative to the mediate possessions of the church, which had been reserved either to supply some complements of indemnity, or ecclesiastical pensions. Many of these domains were enclosed in the territory of Prussia, and that power, already so favourably treated, entertained a hope of saving them from any new assignation, and appropriating them exclusively to herself. She coincided, therefore, in the ideas of Mayence, and agreed with that state to remodel the part of the plan comprehending the general considerations; but she agreed, at the same time, to adopt the principal bases of the territorial division in a previous *conclusum*, declaring that the changes which were to be made in it should be made in concert with the ministers of the mediating powers. It was understood, moreover, that this whole business should be finished by the 24th of October, 1802—2d Brumaire, year XI.—which was two months, reckoning, not from the date of the declaration;

of the powers, but from the day on which their note had been dictated to the deputation, that is to say, read and transcribed into the minutes of the diet.

On the 8th of September—21st Fructidor—this previous *conclusum* was adopted, in spite of all the efforts of the imperial minister, M. de Hugel. Brandenburg, Bavaria, Wirtemberg, Hesse-Cassel, Mayence, that is to say, five States out of eight, admitted the previous *conclusum*, comprehending the entire plan, excepting some accessory modifications, which were to be introduced into it in concert with the mediating ministers. In this sitting, Saxony advanced a step by expressing a middle opinion. That state wished the plan to be received as a *clue* to guide them through the labyrinth of the indemnities.

Bohemia and the Teutonic Order opposed the adoption. According to the constitutional forms, the imperial minister ought to have communicated the *conclusum* voted to the mediating ministers. M. de Hugel obstinately refused to do so. For the rest, he was incessantly excusing himself for the obstacles which he was throwing in the way of the negotiation, and using his utmost efforts to draw a friendly overture from the ministers of France and Russia, repeating to them every day that the slightest advantage conceded to the house of Austria, to save at least her honour, would decide her to allow the *conclusum* to pass. His whole policy now consisted in tiring out the French and Russian legations, in order to induce the First Consul either to a concession of territory on the Inn, or to a combination of votes in the three colleges, which should insure the preservation of the Austrian influence in the empire. The conduct which M. de Laforest, an adept in this sort of tactics, adopted and persuaded his cabinet to adopt, was to proceed resolutely towards the goal, in spite of the Austrian legation, to grant nothing at Ratisbon, and to refer the Austrian ministers to Paris, saying that there they might perhaps obtain something, not before, but after the facilities which should have been obtained from them in the course of the negotiation.

The imperial legation, in order to gain time for negotiating in Paris, strove to procure the passing of a new modified *conclusum*, which was to be sent to the mediating ministers, for the purpose of consulting them upon the changes which it might appear expedient to adopt. This attempt ended in nothing but putting the legation of Saxony into an ill humour, and adding that member of the grand deputation to the majority of five votes, which was already pronounced.

Though the imperial plenipotency stood like a wall, as M. de Laforest wrote, between the extraordinary deputation and the mediating ministers—for it still persisted in refusing to communicate to the latter the acts of that extraordinary deputation—it was, nevertheless, agreed that the claims addressed to the diet by the petty princes should be officially communicated to those two ministers; that all this should take place by means of mere notes; and that the modifications admitted in consequence of these claims should be specified in resolutions.

the whole of which should form the *definition* *conclusum*.

As soon as the way was opened to claims, they were not long in arriving, as it may easily be supposed; but they came from petty princes, for the shares of the great houses had been settled in Paris, at the time of the general negotiation. These petty princes bestirred themselves in all directions to gain protectors. Unfortunately, and this was the only circumstance to be regretted in this memorable negotiation, French *employés*, men bred in the disorders of the Directory, soiled their hands with the pecuniary presents which the German princes, impatient to improve their condition, lavished without discernment. In general, the wretched agents, who received these presents, sold an influence which they did not possess. M. de Laforest, a man of perfect integrity, and principal representative of France at Ratisbon, paid little attention to the recommendations addressed to him in favour of this or that house; he even denounced them to his government. The First Consul, when apprized, wrote several letters to the minister of the police, with a view to put an end to this odious traffic, which only made dupes; for these pretended recommendations, paid for at a high rate, had no influence whatever upon the arrangements concluded at Ratisbon.

The greatest difficulty consisted not in settling the supplements to indemnities, but in laying them upon the reserved domains, which were moreover to supply the pensions of the abolished clergy. The efforts of Prussia to save the domains situated in her States from this double charge, occasioned vehement disputes, and were very injurious to the dignity of that Court. It was necessary, in the first place, to find the complement of revenue promised to the prince arch-chancellor, Elector of Mayence. The following plan of making it up for the moment was devised. Among the free cities retained were Ratisbon and Weizlar, the latter maintained in its quality of free city on account of the imperial chamber, which was seated there. Both ill administered, like most of the free cities, they had an existence the continuance of which was not very desirable. They were assigned to the prince arch-chancellor. This was a perfectly suitable arrangement; for Ratisbon was the city where the diet met, and Weizlar that where the supreme court of the empire sat. It was natural to give them to the prince-director of the affairs of Germany. Those two cities, Ratisbon in particular, were overjoyed at their new destination. The prince arch-chancellor, possessing Aschaffenburg, Ratisbon, and Weizlar, would have a revenue of 650,000 florins secured in territory. It was necessary to find 350,000 more for him: 53,000 were wanted for the House of Stolberg and Isenburg, and 10,000 for the Duke of Oldenburg, uncle and protégé of the Emperor Alexander. These made a total of 413,000 florins, to be charged upon the reserved possessions of the church, besides ecclesiastical pensions. Baden and Wirtemberg had already assented to the sum payable upon the reserved possessions situated in their dominions. Prussia and Bavaria had each

bear one-half of the 413,000 florins that were yet to be found. Bavaria was, in a financial point of view, very heavily burdened, as well by the quantity of pensions which had devolved upon her, as by the debts which had been transferred from her old States to the new. Prussia would not even contribute 200,000 of the 413,000 florins which were still deficient. She had devised a method of procuring them, which was to make the free cities of Hamburg, Bremen, and Lübeck, which she strongly coveted, pay these 413,000 florins. This rapacity excited scandal at Ratisbon; and M. de Götz, the Prussian minister, was so ashamed of it that, for a moment, he was ready to resign his post; but M. de Laforest dissuaded him from it, for the interest of the negotiation itself.

The faculty of preferring claims granted to the petty princes had revived a great number of extinct pretensions. Another cause had contributed to this revival, namely, the rumour generally current at Ratisbon, that Austria was on the point of obtaining in Paris a supplementary indemnity for the Archduke Ferdinand. Hesse-Cassel, jealous of what had been done for Baden, Hesse-Darmstadt of what had been done for Hesse-Cassel, Orange-Nassau, of the reported addition destined for the late Duke of Tuscany, demanded supplements, which, by the by, were nowhere to be found. The occupations by main force, continued without interruption, increased the general confusion. The Germanic body found itself in precisely the same state that France was under the Constituent Assembly, at the moment of the abolition of the feudal system. The Margrave of Baden, to whom Mannheim, formerly the property of the house of Bavaria, had been allotted, was at variance with this latter house about a collection of pictures. Detachments of troops belonging to the two princes had nearly come to blows. To complete this melancholy spectacle, Austria, having pretensions of feudal origin to a multitude of domains in Suabia, caused the poles with the arms of Baden, Wirtemberg, and Bavaria to be pulled down in the different towns or abbeys assigned to those States by the plan of the indemnities. Lastly, Prussia, seizing the bishopric of Münster, would not put into possession the counts of the empire, who were sharers with her in that bishopric.

Amidst these disorders, Austria, aware that she must compromise, offered to adhere immediately to the plan of the mediating powers, if the bank of the Inn were conceded to her, on condition of her relinquishment to Bavaria of some of her possessions in Suabia. She again proposed to that house the city of Augsburg for its capital. She demanded, moreover, the creation of two additional electors; one was to be the archduke of Tuscany, destined to become sovereign of Salzburg, and the other the Archduke Charles, then grand-master of the Teutonic Order. On these conditions, she was ready to consider the archdukes as sufficiently indemnified, and to yield to the wishes of the mediating powers.

After all that had occurred in regard to Passau, the First Consul could not prevail on

Bavaria to cede the frontier of the Inn; and it would have been still more difficult for him to induce Germany to accept three electors at once belonging to the single house of Austria, namely, Bohemia, Salzburg, and the Teutonic Order. Lastly, he was determined not to sacrifice the free city of Augsburg. He insinuated that he might perhaps go so far as to propose to Bavaria to give up a bishopric, such as Eichstädt, but that beyond this it was impossible for him to go.

Time passed: it was now Vendémiaire—October—and the final term, fixed for the 2d Brumaire—October 24th—approached. The mediators were in haste to finish. They had heard all the petty claims, entertained such as deserved to be listened to, and had drawn up the regulations which were to accompany the distribution of the territories. The electoral dignity, claimed by the Emperor Alexander for Mecklenburg, had not appeared to any one possible to be granted, for that would have been another Protestant elector added to the six already existing in a college of nine. The disproportion was too great to admit of further increase. This claim had been set aside. There had been made a new distribution of the *virile votes*, (so the votes in the college of the princes were called;) and the votes of the princes dispossessed on the left bank had been transferred to their new States. Hence resulted, in the college of the princes, as in the college of the electors, a considerable change in favour of the Protestants, for the places of prelates or abbots were filled up by secular princes of the reformed religion. To form a sort of counterpoise, new votes had been attributed to Austria for Salzburg, for Styria, for Carniola and Carinthia. But the Catholic princes had not principalities which could afford a pretext for the creation of new votes in the diet. Notwithstanding all that had been done, the proportion, which, as we have said, was formerly fifty-four Catholic votes to forty-three Protestant, was now thirty-one Catholic votes to sixty-two Protestant. Hence, however, it must not be inferred that the Austrian party was in an inferiority proportionate to these numbers. All the Protestant votes, as we have elsewhere observed, were not votes insured to Prussia; and, with the imperial prerogatives, with the respect still enjoyed by the House of Austria, with the apprehensions which the House of Brandenburg began to excite, the balance might still be maintained between the two rival houses.

As for the college of the cities, it had been organized in an independent manner, and pains had been taken to render it less inferior to the two others. The eight free cities were reduced to six, since Wetzlar and Ratisbon had been granted to the arch-chancellor. Prussia was for suppressing this third college, and giving to each of the cities a vote in the college of the princes. This would have been the means of suppressing one or two more, particularly Nuremberg, the possession of which she coveted. The French legation obstinately refused its assent.

Nothing was said concerning the condition of the immediate nobility, who were in the most

painful anxiety, being openly threatened by Prussia and Bavaria.

At length, the 2nd of Brumaire being near at hand, the new plan was submitted to the extraordinary deputation to be deliberated upon. Brandenburg, Bavaria, Hesse-Cassel, Wirtemberg, Mayence, approved it. Saxony, Bohemia, and the Teutonic Order, declared that they would take it into consideration, but that, before they pronounced definitively, they would await the conclusion of the negotiation begun in Paris with Austria; for otherwise, said they, we might be liable to vote a plan, which it would afterwards be necessary to modify.

The extraordinary deputation had still to give its definitive vote, and only three or four days of the term of two months were unexpired. The honour of the great mediating powers was concerned in obtaining the adoption of their plan within the time fixed. M. de Laforest and M. de Buhler, who sincerely co-operated together, made the utmost efforts to procure the definitive adoption of the *conclusum* on the 29th Vendemiaire—21st October. They encountered infinite difficulties, for M. de Hugel reported everywhere that a courier from Paris, bringing important changes, was expected every moment; that in Paris itself a postponement was desired. He even went so far as to threaten M. d'Albini, telling him that, according to certain intelligence, orders were coming from the elector of Mayence disavowing his conduct and enjoining him not to vote. This was shaking one of the five favourable votes, and, thus far, one of the most steady. These threats were carried so far that M. d'Albini was affronted, and only rendered the more firm in his resolution. To crown the embarrassment, Prussia, at the very last moment, created fresh obstacles: she desired an article dispensing her from furnishing, out of the reserved domains, her share of the 413,000 florins that remained to be provided. She even aspired to appropriate to herself certain dependencies of the ecclesiastical domains enclosed in her States, and assigned to various princes by the plan of the indemnities. She had, in short, a thousand pretensions, each more vexatious, more misplaced than the other, which, brought forward in an unexpected manner at the close of the negotiation, were of a nature to render it abortive. It was not the Prussian minister, M. de Görz, a very worthy personage, blushing for the part which he was obliged to act, but a financier who had been joined with him, that raised these difficulties. At length, Messrs. de Laforest and de Buhler gave a last impulsion, and on the 29th Vendemiaire—October 21st—the definitive *conclusum* was adopted by the extraordinary deputation of the eight States, and the mediation was in some sort accomplished within the term fixed by the mediating powers. On the last day, Saxony voted like the five States forming the usual majority, out of respect for that majority.

Still, however, there were many details to be settled. The division of the territories and the organic regulations did not form one and the same act. It had been proposed that the

latter should be embodied in a single resolution, which was to have a title already known in German diplomacy, that of *recess*. The work of the extraordinary deputation being finished, had then to be carried to the Germanic Diet, of which the extraordinary deputation was but a commission. The precaution had been taken in the draft of the definitive *conclusum* to say that the *recess* would be communicated directly to the mediating ministers. This was intended to prevent the refusal of communications on the part of the imperial ministers to the mediating ministers, a refusal which had already occasioned mischievous delays.

It now remained to blend the principal act and the regulations into one paper: this work was set about immediately. It afforded M. de Hugel a new opportunity for raising embarrassing questions. Thus, on occasion of this definitive digest, he doggedly asked if members were not aware that in the *recess* there was an assignment, upon some security or other, of the 413,000 florins due to the arch-chancellor, to the Duke of Oldenburg, and to the houses of Isenburg and Stolberg; he asked if this was not the moment for providing for the pensions of the Archbishop of Treves, the Bishops of Liege, Spire, and Strasburg, whose States had passed with the left bank of the Rhine to France, and who knew not to whom to address themselves to obtain alimentary pensions; whether an indemnity was not to be granted to the immediate nobility for the loss of their feudal rights, a loss for which they had heretofore been promised compensation.

To all demands for new allotments Prussia replied by refusals, or by referring to the free cities. Bavaria alleged with reason that she was overwhelmed with debt, and that her resources were likely to be further diminished by what would be granted to Austria in the negotiation set on foot in Paris. M. de Hugel replied that this was not the way to meet sacred debts.

These controversies produced a most mischievous effect at Ratisbon. The greediness of Prussia and the complaisance shown her by France were especial subjects of complaint: people, it was said, no longer recognised the lofty character of the First Consul, who allowed his name and his favour to be so abused. All minds rallied around Austria, and even those which were not in general well disposed towards her. It was better, they thought, to be under a preponderant influence in the empire, it was better to be under that of the ancient house of Austria, which, no doubt, had formerly abused its supremacy, but which had as often protected as oppressed the Germans. Among the second-rate States, such as Bavaria, Wirtemberg, the two Hesses, Baden, there arose a disposition to form, in the centre of Germany, a league to resist Prussia as well as Austria.

At length, in spite of all the art employed to foster these difficulties, the *recess* was digested and adopted by the extraordinary deputation on the 2d Frimaire, year XI.—23d November. No resource was pointed out for defraying the payment of the 413,000 florins left without assignation. The agents of Austria wished to know, they said, before they put a finishing

hand to the work, the result of the negotiations between their court and France.

The imperial legation thus found itself definitively vanquished by the activity and the perseverance of the mediating ministers, who steadily pursued their way, supported by a majority of five votes, sometimes of six, out of eight, when Saxony had been induced to join that majority by the obstinate resistance of Austria. M. de Hugel resolved to let things take their course. It was necessary to carry the *recess* of this special commission, called the extraordinary deputation, to the diet itself. To pass from one to the other, the members of the majority had determined to dispense with the medium of the ministers of the emperor, if they refused the transmission. The Germans, however, even those most favourable to the plan of indemnity, were inclined to the faithful observance of the constitutional regulations. They found the empire, indeed, terribly shaken, and in the overthrow of the constitution they discerned a new domination, which they dreaded quite as much as the old one. Even those who at first were partisans of Prussia rallied to those who had always venerated Austria as the most perfect image of the old order of things. They had arrived at that point at which people soon arrive in revolutions—to distrust new masters and to hate the old ones rather less. They wished, therefore, not to have to dispense with the imperial ministers; and the news of a conference in Paris between Austria and the First Consul gave rise to a hope of reconciliation, which was hailed with joy by all.

M. de Hugel, brought at length into the system of condescension, agreed to communicate the acts of the extraordinary deputation to the mediating ministers, that the latter might address themselves to the diet, and require the adoption of the *recess* as a law of the empire. But, with a meanness worthy of an old formalist, M. de Hugel refused to send the *recess* itself, clothed with the imperial colours; he communicated a printed copy, with a despatch guaranteeing its authenticity.

Without loss of time, on the 4th of December—13th Frimaire—the two French and Russian ministers communicated the *recess* to the diet, declaring that they approved the whole of it in the name of their respective courts; and they begged that it might be taken into consideration immediately, and adopted as a law of the empire with the least possible delay. This promptness in laying hold of the diet was one way to bring forward either the ministers of the German States who were absent, or the instructions of those who had not yet received any.

Here new precautions relative to the composition of the diet became necessary. To admit all the States suppressed on the left bank by the system of secularizations, to vote, would be running the risk of an invincible resistance on their part, or condemning them to pronounce their own suppression. It was agreed with the directorial minister, that is the arch-chancellor, to convoke exclusively the States preserved in the empire, whether their title was changed or not. Thus, in the college of the electors,

neither Treves nor Cologne was summoned, but Mayence, whose title was constituted *a jure novo*, was convoked. In the college of the princes were excluded those whose territories had been incorporated with the French Republic or with the Helvetic Republic, as, for example, the secular and ecclesiastical princes of Deux-Ponts, Montbelliard, Liege, Worms, Spire, Basle, Strasburg. There were provisionally retained the princes who had obtained new principalities, with the proviso of regularizing their title by and by, and causing it to be transferred to the secularized territories which had devolved to them. In the college of the cities, the whole mass of the incorporated cities was suppressed, and only the six cities preserved were retained, namely, Augsburg, Nuremberg, Frankfort, Bremen, Hamburg, and Lübeck.

These precautions were indispensable and they obtained the result expected from them. None of the suppressed States presented themselves, and in the first days of January the diet commenced its deliberations. The protocol was opened. The States in the three colleges were successively called. Some gave their opinion immediately, others reserved it for the present, as was customary in the diet. They awaited, before they pronounced definitively, the last remoulding which the proposed *conclusionum* would have to undergo, in consequence of the negotiation begun in Paris between France and the court of Vienna.

Things had been conducted to the point desired by the First Consul to permit him at length to grant a satisfaction to Austria. Strictly one might have dispensed with her good-will to the end, and made three colleges vote in spite of her opposition. The Germans, even such of them as were most mortified, were well aware that it was necessary to bring the business to a conclusion, and they were resolved to vote for the *recess*, after which the occupations of territory already consummated would have been clothed with a sort of legality, and the refusal of sanction on the part of the emperor would not have prevented the indemnified parties from quietly enjoying their new possessions. Still the opposition of the emperor to the new constitution, how unreasonable soever it might be, would have placed the empire in a false, uncertain situation, far from conformable to the pacific intentions of the mediating powers. It was better to compromise, and to obtain the adhesion of the court of Vienna. This was the intention of the First Consul: he had waited so long only that he might have fewer sacrifices to make to Austria and fewer sacrifices to require of Bavaria; for it was from her that he should be obliged to demand what would be granted to the other.

Accordingly, towards the end of December, he had consented to confer with M. de Cobenzel, and he had at length agreed with him upon some concessions in favour of the house of Austria. Bavaria having shown an invincible repugnance to concede the line of the Inn, either on account of the very valuable salt-works situated between the Inn and the Saale, or on account of the position of Munich,

which would have been too near the new frontier, he had been obliged to renounce this sort of arrangement. The First Consul was then reduced to the necessity of ceding the bishopric of Eichstädt, situated on the Danube, containing 70,000 inhabitants, yielding a revenue of 350,000 florins, and originally destined for the Palatine house. In consequence of this augmentation granted to the Archduke Ferdinand, the bishoprics of Brixen and Trent were withdrawn from his lot and secularized for the advantage of Austria. The latter thus avowed in a manner sufficiently plain the interest that lurked beneath her zeal of relationship. It is true that, in consideration of this secularization, she took from her own domains the little district of the Ortenau to increase the lot of the Duke of Modena, consisting as we have seen, of the Brisgau. The Ortenau was in the country of Baden and near the Brisgau.

Austria had demanded the creation of two more electors of her house; one of them was granted: this was the Grand-duke Ferdinand, thus destined to be elector of Salzburg. Thus there were to be ten electors instead of nine, according to the plan of the mediators, and instead of the eight comprehended in the late Germanic constitution. There were consequently four Catholic electors, Bohemia, Bavaria, Mayence, and Salzburg, against six Protestant, Brandenburg, Hanover, Saxony, Hesse-Cassel, Wirtemberg, and Baden.

These conditions were inserted in a convention signed in Paris on the 26th of December, 1802—5th Nivôse, year XI.—by M. de Cobentzel and Joseph Bonaparte. M. de Markoff was invited to accede to it on the behalf of Russia, and he needed not much inviting, devoted as he was to Austria. Prussia looked cold but made no resistance. Bavaria submitted, demanding to be indemnified for the sacrifice required of her, and especially to be relieved from her share of those 413,000 florins, which nobody was willing to pay.

Austria had promised to raise no further obstacle to the work of the mediation, and she almost kept her word. Besides the concessions obtained in Paris, she wished to obtain one more, which could not be negotiated but at Ratisbon with the persons who had to draw up the *recess*. This concession related to the number of the virile votes in the college of the princes. While the protocol was open at the diet, and opinions were expressed there in succession, the extraordinary deputation was sitting at the same time, and remodelling once more the plan of the mediation agreeably to the convention of Paris. Thus the diet was giving opinions upon a plan which the grand deputation was altering every day. The territorial changes agreed upon in Paris had been inserted; the creation of the new elector of Salzburg had been added; lastly, the new virile votes, which changed the proportion of the Protestant and Catholic votes in the college of the princes, and raised the Catholic votes to fifty-four against seventy-seven Protestant, instead of thirty-one against sixty-two, had been introduced. It was necessary, however, to settle all these questions, and espe-

cially that relating to the 413,000 florins. Bavaria, which had lost 350,000 florins with Eichstädt, could not be compelled to give 200,000 of that amount. She had refused to do so, and this refusal was thought but natural. But Prussia, though she had lost nothing, would not bear her share of so light a burden. They will not go to war for 200,000 florins said M. Haugwitz—a sorry remark, which had offended everybody at Ratisbon, and placed the part of Prussia far beneath that of Austria, which, in resisting, defended at least territories and constitutional principles.

The First Consul, had he acted strictly, could have overcome this penuriousness; but, having need of Prussia to the end, in order to insure the success of his plan, he was obliged to humour her. Nobody could tell how either the arch-chancellor, or the pensions of the clergy, or some other debts formerly assigned upon the reserved domains, were to be paid. To divide this charge, in the form of *Roman months*,¹ among the whole Germanic body, was impossible, on account of the insurmountable difficulty at all times of making the confederation pay the general expenses. The state of dilapidation of the federal fortresses was a proof of this. No other resource was left but to devise an expedient which somewhat diminished the liberality of the first French plan in regard to the navigation of the rivers. All the tolls on the Elbe, the Weser, and the Rhine had been abolished. It was necessary, however, to provide for some indispensable expenses; for instance, the keeping up of the towing-paths, without which the navigation would soon have been stopped. It was resolved to establish a moderate toll upon the Rhine, far inferior in amount to all the tolls of a feudal nature with which the river was formerly burdened, and from the surplus left by this toll to take the 350,000 florins for the prince arch-chancellor, the 10,000 florins for the Duke of Oldenburg, the 53,000 for the houses of Isenburg and Stolberg, and a few thousand florins more to humour various princes, who meanly refused to pay the contributions imposed upon them. In this manner, the avarice of Prussia was gratified; Bavaria was relieved from the 200,000 florins which she should have furnished for her share; the loss which she had sustained by ceding Eichstädt was reduced; and the promise given to the prince arch-chancellor to insure to him an independent revenue was fulfilled. All Germany approved this arrangement, for they thought that a revenue of 1,000,000 florins was barely sufficient for the prince who had the honour to preside over the Germanic Diet, and who was the last representative of the three ecclesiastical electors of the Holy Empire. He was constituted sole administrator of this toll, in concert with France, who had the right to control the expense incurred on the left bank. In this point of view, France had no reason to complain of this arrangement, for from this moment, the prince arch-chancellor had every interest to keep on good terms with her.

¹ The ordinary expenses divided among the whole confederation, according to proportions anciently established, were called *Roman months*.

At length the plan, re-modelled for the last time, was adopted on the 25th of February—6th Ventôse, year XI.—as a final act¹ by the extraordinary deputation, and sent immediately to the diet, where it was voted almost unanimously by the three colleges. It met with no opposition but on the part of Sweden, whose sovereign, already exhibiting symptoms of that derangement of mind which hurled him at last from the throne, astonished Europe by his royal vagaries. He launched violent censures against the mediating powers and the German princes who had concurred in giving so grievous a shock to the ancient Germanic Constitution. This ridiculous sally of a prince who was held of no account in Europe, lessened not the satisfaction that was felt on seeing an end put to the long anxieties of the empire.

The Germans, even those who regretted the old order of things, but who retained some equity in their judgment, acknowledged that on this occasion they reaped the inevitable fruits of an imprudent war; that, the left bank of the Rhine having been lost in consequence of that war, it was absolutely necessary to make a new division of the Germanic territory; that this division was certainly more advantageous to the great than to the petty houses, but that, had it not been for France, this inequality would have been carried still further; that the Constitution, modified in various respects, was nevertheless saved, as regarded the ground-work, and could not have been reformed in a more enlightened spirit of conservation. Lastly, they acknowledged that, but for the vigour of the First Consul, anarchy would have crept into Germany, in consequence of the pretensions of all kinds raised at the moment. What proves more strongly than any words the feeling then entertained for the head of the French government, is that, on consideration of the various questions left in suspense, it was desired that his powerful hand should not be withdrawn immediately from the affairs of Germany. It was wished that France should, in quality of guarantee, undertake to watch over her work.

There was, in fact, more than one question, general or particular, which the mediation had not been able to resolve. Prussia was in open quarrel with the city of Nuremberg, and ventured upon tyrannical proceedings towards it. The same power had as yet declined to put the counts of Westphalia in possession of their share of the Bishopric of Münster. Frankfort was at variance with the neighbouring princes on account of a charge imposed upon it in their favour, in compensation for certain possessions which they had ceded. Prussia and Bavaria, taking advantage of the silence of the *recess*, were for incorporating the immediate nobility with their states. Austria asserted in Suabia a great number of feudal rights of obscure ori-

gin, and infringing on the sovereignty of the Dukes of Wirtemberg, Baden, and Bavaria. She had above all committed an unheard of violation of property. The ecclesiastical principalities, recently secularized, had funds deposited in the bank of Vienna, funds which belonged to them, and which ought to have been transferred to the indemnified princes. The Austrian administration had seized these funds, amounting to the sum of 30,000,000 florins, which reduced certain princes to despair. All these acts of violence excited a wish for the institution of an authority which should attend to the execution of the *recess*, as had been the case after the peace of Westphalia. The re-composition of the ancient circles charged to provide for the defence of particular interests, was also desired. The German Church yet remained to be organized: deprived of its princely existence, it had great need of a new organization.

The First Consul could not undertake to resolve these last difficulties, for he would have been obliged to constitute himself the permanent legislator of Germany. All that he had a right to occupy himself with was to save the equilibrium of the empire, part of the European equilibrium, by determining what share each state ought to have, either in territory, or influence in the diet. The rest was the exclusive province of the diet itself, the only authority invested with the legislative power: and to this task it would be equal, if seconded by France, the guarantee of the new Germanic Constitution, as she was of the old. The weak, threatened by the strong, already invoked this guarantee. It was for the most powerful German courts to prevent by their moderation the new intervention of a foreign arm. Unfortunately, that was scarcely to be reckoned upon, considering the actual conduct of Prussia and Austria.

The emperor, after delaying his ratification, had at length sent it, but with two reservations. One had for its object the maintenance of all the privileges of the immediate nobility; the other a new distribution of the Protestant and Catholic votes in the diet. This was keeping but in part the promise given to the First Consul, as the price of the convention of the 26th of December.

However, the difficulties truly European, those of territory, were surmounted, thanks to the energy and prudent intervention of General Bonaparte. If any thing had made evident his ascendancy over Europe, it was this most ably conducted negotiation, in which, uniting address and firmness with justice, making use by turns of the ambition of Prussia and the pride of Russia to resist Austria, curbing the latter without driving her to despair, he had imposed his own will upon Germany, for the welfare of Germany itself and the peace of the world—the only case in which it is allowable and useful to interfere in the affairs of other States.

¹This important paper is given at full length in Schoell's "*Histoire abrégée des Traités de Paix*," chap. xviii.—*Translator*.

BOOK XVI.

RUPTURE OF THE PEACE OF AMIENS.

Efforts of the First Consul to re-establish the Colonial Greatness of France—Ambition of all the Powers to possess Colonies—America, the West and the East Indies—Mission of General Decaen to India—Efforts to recover St. Domingo—Description of that Island—Revolution of the Blacks—Character, Power, and Policy of Toussaint Louverture—He aspires to render himself independent—The First Consul sends an Expedition to ensure the Authority of the Mother-Country—Landing of the French Troops at St. Domingo, at the Cape, and at Port au Prince—Burning of the Cape—Submission of the Negroes—Temporary Prosperity of the Colony—Endeavour of the First Consul to restore the Navy—Mission of Colonel Sébastiani to the East—Attention bestowed on the Internal Prosperity—The Simplon, Mont Genève, the Fortress of Alexandria—Camp of Veterans in the conquered Provinces—New Towns founded in La Vendée—La Rochelle and Cherbourg—The Civil Code, the Institute, the Administration of the Clergy—Visit to Normandy—The Jealousy of England excited by the Greatness of France—The English Mercantile Interest more hostile to France than the English Aristocracy—Violence of the Newspapers conducted by the Emigrants—Pensions granted to Georges and to the Chouans—Remonstrances of the First Consul—Subterfuge of the British Cabinet—Articles in retaliation inserted in the *Moniteur*—Continuation of the Swiss Affair—The Petty Cantons rise under the Conduct of Reding, the Landammann, and march upon Berne—The Government of the Moderates are obliged to flee to Lausanne—The Interposition of the First Consul solicited; it is at first refused, but afterwards granted—He despatches General Ney with 30,000 Men, and summons to Paris Deputies chosen from among all the Parties to give a Constitution to Switzerland—Agitation in England; Outcries of the War-Party against the Interposition of France—The English Cabinet, alarmed by these Outcries, commits the Fault of countermanding the Evacuation of Malta, and sending an Agent into Switzerland to subsidize the Insurgents—Promptness of the French Interference—General Ney master of Helvetia in a few Days—The Swiss Deputies assembled in Paris are presented to the First Consul—His speech to them—Act of Mediation—The Wisdom of that Act admired by Europe—The English Cabinet embarrassed at the Promptness and the Excellence of the Result—Stormy Debates in the British Parliament—Violence of the Party of Grenville, Wyndham, &c.—Noble Language of Mr. Fox in favour of Peace—Public Opinion calmed for a Moment—Arrival of Lord Whitworth in Paris and of General Andrassy in London—Courteous Reception given on both Sides to the two Ambassadors—The British Cabinet sorry for having retained Malta, would fain evacuate it, but dares not—Unseasonable Publication of the Report of Colonel Sébastiani on the State of the East—Mischievous Effect of this Report in England—The First Consul determines to have a Personal Explanation with Lord Whitworth—Long and memorable Interview—The Frankness of the First Consul misunderstood and misinterpreted—Report of the State of the French Republic, containing an Expression offensive to British Pride—Royal Message in reply—The two Nations address a sort of Challenge to each other—Irritation of the First Consul, and public Attack on Lord Whitworth in presence of the Diplomatic Body—The First Consul suddenly passes from Ideas of Peace to Ideas of War—His first Preparations—Cession of Louisiana to the United States, for the sum of 80,000,000—M. de Talleyrand strives to pacify the First Consul, and opposes a studied Inertness to the increasing Irritation of the two Governments—Lord Whitworth seconds him—Prolongation of this Situation—Necessity for putting an end to it—The British Cabinet finally declares its Determination to retain Malta—The Addington Administration, for fear of losing its Influence in Parliament, persists in demanding Malta—Various Middle Terms devised, but without Success—Offer of France to place Malta as a Deposit in the Hands of the Emperor Alexander—Refusal of that Offer—Departure of the two Ambassadors—Rupture of the Peace of Amiens—Public Anxiety both in London and Paris—Causes of the Shortness of that Peace—Who is to blame for the Rupture?

WHILE the First Consul was regulating like supreme arbiter the affairs of the European continent, his ardent activity, embracing both worlds, extended to America and the Indies for the purpose of re-establishing there the ancient colonial greatness of France.

Now that the nations of Europe have become manufacturing rather than commercial; now that they have successfully imitated and even surpassed the productions which they formerly imported from beyond the seas; now, in short, that great colonies, emancipated from the mother-countries, have raised themselves to the rank of independent states, the aspect of the world is so changed as scarcely to be recognised. New objects of ambition have succeeded those which then divided it, and we find it difficult to comprehend the motives for which, a century ago, the blood of men was spilt. England possessed, by the title of colony, North America; Spain, by the same title, possessed South America; France was mistress of the principal West India islands, and the most flourishing of all, St. Domingo. Each of these powers imposed on its colonies the obligation not to dispose of any tropical productions but to herself, to take no European productions but from her, to admit no vessels but hers, to form no seamen but for her navy. Thus each colony was a plantation, a market, and a port, closed to all others. England wished to draw exclusively from her American

provinces, their sugar, their timber, and their raw cotton; Spain wished to be the only one to extract from Mexico and Peru the metals so coveted by all nations; England and France wished to rule India, that they might export from it the cotton thread, the muslins, the printed calicoes, objects in universal request; they wished to furnish their productions in exchange, and to carry on this traffic under their own flag alone. These ardent desires of nations have now given place to others. Sugar, which used only to be extracted from a reed bred and cultivated beneath the hottest sun, is now extracted from a plant grown on the Elbe and on the Scheldt. The cottons, then spun with such fineness and patience by Indian hands, are now spun in Europe by machines set in motion by the combustion of coal. Muslin is woven in the mountains of Switzerland and of the Forez. The cottons, woven in Scotland, in Ireland, in Normandy, in Flanders, printed in Alsace, fill America and inundate the markets of India. With the exception of coffee and tea, productions which art cannot imitate, every thing has been equalled or surpassed. European chemistry has already superseded most of the dye-stuffs formerly brought from between the tropics. Metals are extracted from the flanks of European mountains. Gold is obtained from the Ural; Spain is beginning to find silver in her own bosom. A great political revolution has accompanied these rev-

tations of industry. France has favoured the insurrection of the English Colonies in North America; England, in return, has contributed to the independence of the South American colonies. Both are at this day nations either great already or destined to become so. Under the influence of the same causes, an African society, whose destinies are not to be foreseen, has developed itself in St. Domingo. Lastly, India, under the sceptre of England, is now nothing but a conquest, ruined by the progress of European industry, and made use of to provide for a few military officers, a few civil servants, and a few officials of the mother-country. In our days, nations wish to produce every thing themselves, to dispose of their surplus produce to their less skilful neighbours, and to consent to import none but raw materials, nay, even to raise those materials as near as possible to their own soil: witness the repeated attempts to naturalize cotton in Egypt and in Algeria. In this manner, the grand spectacle of colonial ambition has been succeeded by the spectacle of manufacturing ambition. Thus the world is incessantly changing, and each age needs some efforts of memory and intelligence to comprehend the age which preceded it.

This immense revolution in commerce and industry began under Louis XVI. with the American war, and ended under Napoleon with the continental blockade. The long struggle between England and France was the principal cause of it; for while the first was anxious to secure to herself the monopoly of exotic productions, the second revenged herself by imitating them. The promoter of this imitation was Napoleon, whose destiny it thus was to give a new face to the world in every respect. But, before he threw France into the continental and manufacturing system, as he did at a later period, Napoleon the Consul, full of the ideas of the century which had just closed, more confident in the French naval power than he afterwards was, attempted several vast enterprises for the restoration of our colonial prosperity.

This prosperity had formerly been great enough to justify the regrets and the attempts of which it was then the object. In 1789, France imported from her colonies, sugar, coffee, indigo, &c., to the value of 250,000,000 a year; she consumed from 80 to 100,000,000 worth, and re-exported 150,000,000, which she distributed throughout all Europe, principally in the form of refined sugar. We must double these amounts if we would ascertain their equivalents at the present day; and, assuredly, we should highly value, should rank among our first interests, colonies furnishing materials for a commerce of 500,000,000. France would find in this commerce the means of drawing into her hands part of the specie of Spain, who would give us her dollars for our colonial and manufactured productions. At the period of which we are treating, that is in 1802, France, deprived of colonial produce, principally of sugar and coffee, not having any even for her own use, procured it from the Americans, from the Hansatic towns, from Holland, from Genoa, and, since the peace,

from the English. She paid them in specie, not yet having in her scarcely reviving industry the means of paying in the productions of her manufactures. Coin had never appeared, since the time of the assignats, in its former abundance; it was frequently scarce: and this was shown by the continual efforts of the new bank to obtain dollars smuggled out of Spain. Hence nothing was more common among the commercial class than to hear complaints of the scarcity of money, and of the inconvenience of being obliged to buy at high prices the sugar and coffee which we formerly obtained from the French possessions. This language must, no doubt, be attributed to certain erroneous ideas respecting the manner in which the balance of trade adjusts itself; but it must also be attributed to an indisputable fact—the difficulty of procuring colonial produce, and the still greater difficulty of paying for it, either in cash, which had been scarce ever since the assignats, or in the productions, as yet but scanty, of our industry.

If we add that numerous colonists, formerly opulent, but now ruined, encumbered Paris, and joined their complaints to those of the emigrants, the reader may form a complete idea of the motives which operated upon the mind of the First Consul, and inclined him to great colonial enterprises. It was under these powerful influences that he had given Etruria to Charles IV. to obtain Louisiana. The conditions of the contract were fulfilled on his part, since the Infants were placed on the throne of Etruria, and recognised by all the continental powers; he wished these conditions to be fulfilled on the part of Charles IV., and he had therefore required that Louisiana should be delivered up to us immediately. An expedition of two ships of the line and some frigates had assembled in the waters of Holland, at Helvoetsluis, to convey troops to the mouth of the Mississippi, and to bring that fine country under the dominion of France. The First Consul having the duchy of Parma at his disposal, was ready to cede it to Spain, at the price of the Floridas and the cession of a small portion of Tuscany, the Siennese, with which he purposed to indemnify the king of Sardinia. The indiscretion of the Spanish government having allowed the particulars of this negotiation to come to the knowledge of the ambassador of England, British jealousy raised a thousand obstacles to the conclusion of this new bargain. The First Consul directed his attention at the same time to the East Indies, and had conferred the government of our settlements of Pondicherry and Chandernagor on one of the most valiant officers of the army of the Rhine, General Decaen. This officer, whose intelligence was equal to his courage, and who was qualified for the greatest enterprises, had been selected and sent to India with distant but profound views. The English, said the First Consul to General Decaen, in the admirable instructions which he addressed to him, the English are masters of the continent of India; there they are restless, jealous; we must not give them any umbrage, conduct ourselves with mildness and simplicity, submit in those parts to all that honour

will allow us to put up with, have no further relations with the neighbouring princes than are indispensable for the maintenance of the French troops and the settlements. But, added the First Consul, you must watch those princes and those people, who support with impatience the British yoke; study their manners, their resources, the means of communicating with them in case of war; ascertain what European force would be necessary to assist them to shake off the English domination; with what *material* that force ought to be provided, above all things, the means of victualling it; discover a port which might serve a fleet laden with troops for the point of disembarkation; calculate the time and the means necessary for carrying that port by a *coup de main*; draw up, after a residence of six months, a first report on these various topics; send it by an intelligent and trusty officer, who has seen the whole, and is capable of adding verbal explanations to the written explanations of which he is the bearer; six months afterwards, report again on the same topics from recently acquired information, and send this fresh report by a second officer equally trust-worthy and intelligent; perform the like task and send off a like messenger every six months; weigh well, in the composition of these reports, the value of every expression, for a word might be liable to influence the most important resolutions; lastly, in case of war, act according to circumstances—either remain in Hindostan or retire to the Isle of France, despatching a great many light vessels to the mother-country, to apprise her of the resolutions adopted by the captain-general. Such were the instructions given to General Decaen, with a view, not to rekindle war, but to profit skilfully by it, if it should happen to break out again.

The greatest efforts of the First Consul were directed towards the West Indies, the principal seat of the colonial power of France. It was with Martinique, Guadeloupe, and St. Domingo, that French Commerce formerly kept up its most profitable relations. St. Domingo especially figured for at least three-fifths of the 250,000,000 worth of produce which France formerly received from her colonies. St. Domingo was then the most flourishing, the most envied, of our possessions beyond sea. Martinique had been fortunate enough to escape the consequences of the revolt of the negroes; but Guadeloupe and St. Domingo had been turned completely topsy-turvy, and it would require at least an army to re-establish there, not slavery, for that had become impossible, at least in St. Domingo, but the legitimate sway of the mother-country.

On this island, one hundred leagues long and thirty wide, happily situated at the entrance of the Gulf of Mexico, resplendent with fertility, suited to the cultivation of sugar, coffee, indigo—on this magnificent island, twenty and some thousand white planters, twenty and some thousand free people of different colours, and 400,000 black slaves, cultivated the soil and raised immense crops of colonial produce, worth 150 millions of francs, which 30,000 French seamen were employed in conveying to Europe, to be exchanged for

home manufactures to a like amount. What should we now think of a colony which supplied us with produce to the value of 300 millions, and opened to us a market for goods to the amount of 300 millions!—for 150 millions in 1789 were equivalent to at least 300 millions in 1845. Unhappily, among these white people, mulattoes, and blacks, were fermenting violent passions, owing to the climate and to a state of society which comprehended alone the two social extremes, haughty wealth, and crouching slavery. In no other colony were these whites so opulent and so wrong-headed, mulattoes so jealous of the superiority of the white race, blacks so inclined to shake off the yoke of both. The opinions professed in the Constituent Assembly at Paris, re-echoed amidst the passions natural to such a country could not fail to raise a violent tempest, like the hurricane produced in those seas by the sudden meeting of two contrary winds. The whites and the mulattoes, scarcely sufficient to defend themselves if they had been united, were at variance, and, after communicating to the blacks the contagion of their passions, had caused them to rise against themselves. They had felt first their cruelty, then their triumph and their domination. There, as in all societies where war breaks out amongst the classes, the first had been conquered by the second, the first and second by the third. But, unlike what is seen elsewhere, they bore upon their faces the stamp of their diverse origins; their hatred partook of the violence of the physical instincts, and their rage was ferocious as that of wild beasts. Hence the horrors of that revolution surpassed every thing that was witnessed in France, in '93, and, notwithstanding the distance, which always blunts the feelings, Europe, already so touched by the spectacles of the continent, had been deeply moved by the unparalleled atrocities to which imprudent, sometimes cruel, masters had driven ferocious slaves. The laws of human society, everywhere alike, had produced there, as elsewhere after long storms, the fatigue which demands a master, a superior being qualified to become such. This master was of the colour of the triumphant race, that is to say, black. His name was Toussaint Louverture. He was an old slave, destitute of the generous daring of Spartacus, but gifted with profound dissimulation and a most extraordinary turn for government. Not much of a soldier, acquainted at most with the art of ambuscades in a country difficult of access, and inferior even in this point to some of his lieutenants, he had, by his intelligence in the general direction of affairs, acquired a prodigious ascendancy. This barbarous race, which bore a grudge to Europeans for despising it, was proud of having in its ranks a man whom the whites themselves admitted to possess high faculties. It beheld in him a living title to liberty, to the consideration of the rest of mankind. Accordingly, it had accepted his iron yoke, a hundred times as heavy as that of the former planters, and submitted to the dire obligation of labour, an obligation which, by slaves, is most heartily detested.

This black slave, having become dictator

had re-established a tolerable state of society in St. Domingo, and accomplished things which one might almost venture to call great, if the theatre had been different, and if they had been less ephemeral.

In that island of St. Domingo, as in every country which has been a prey to a long civil war, a separation had taken place between the martial race, fit for arms, having a propensity for them, and the working race, less disposed to fighting, easy to be led back to labour, yet ready to front dangers, if its liberty should be threatened. The second was of course ten times as numerous as the first.

With the first Toussaint Louverture had composed a permanent army of about 20,000 men, formed into demi-brigades, upon the model of the French armies, having black, and some mulatto, or white officers. These troops, well paid, well fed, formidable enough in a climate which they alone could endure, and on broken ground covered with strong thorny bushes, were formed into several divisions, and commanded by generals of their own colour, most of them tolerably intelligent, but more ferocious than intelligent, such as Christophe, Dessalines, Moses, Maurepas, La-plume. Devoted to Toussaint, they all acknowledged his genius and submitted to his authority. The rest of the population, under the name of cultivators, had resumed their labours. They had been allowed to retain their fire-arms, that they might use them in case of need, if the mother-country should make an attack on their liberty; but they had been obliged to return to the plantations abandoned by the colonists. Toussaint had proclaimed that they were free, but obliged to work five years longer on the estates of their old masters, with a right to a fourth of the gross produce. The white proprietors had been encouraged to return, even such of them as, in a moment of despair, had joined the English in their attempt upon St. Domingo. They had been well received and reinstated in their plantations, peopled with negroes calling themselves free, to whom they gave up, agreeably to the regulation of Toussaint, a fourth of the gross produce, valued in practice in the most arbitrary manner. A very great number of the rich proprietors, who had either fallen in the disturbances in the colony, or emigrated with the old French nobility, to which they belonged, had neither made their appearance again nor sent out representatives. Their possessions, sequestered like the national domains in France, had been farmed to black officers at a rate which enabled them to enrich themselves. Certain generals, such as Christophe and Dessalines, had in this manner acquired a yearly income of more than a million. These black officers were designated inspectors of cultivation in the districts of which they were military commandants. They were incessantly going their rounds and treating the negroes with the harshness peculiar to new masters. Sometimes they saw to it that justice was done them by the planters; but more frequently ordered them to be flogged for idleness or insubordination, and engaged in a sort of incessant chase for the purpose of bringing

back to work those who had contracted a fondness for a vagabond life. Frequent visits to the parishes enabled them to discover what labourers had left their original habitations, and furnished the means of bringing them back. Often, too, Dessalines and Christophe caused them to be hanged in their presence. Hence labour had been resumed with incredible activity under these new chiefs, who made the submission of the so-called free negroes a profit to themselves. And, far be it for us to treat such a sight with contempt!—for these chiefs, assuming the authority to force their fellows to work, even for their exclusive advantage; those blacks, submitting to it without any great profit to themselves, compensated solely by the idea that they were free, excused in us more esteem than the spectacle of the idleness, profligacy, and moral debasement exhibited by the negroes left to themselves in the recently enfranchised colonies of England, where premature emancipation has proved a total failure.

Thanks to the system established by Toussaint, most of the abandoned plantations had been again brought into cultivation. Hence, in 1801, after ten years of commotion, the soil of St. Domingo, drenched with so much blood, presented an appearance of fertility nearly equal to that which it exhibited in 1789. Toussaint, independent of France, had given to the colony an almost absolute freedom of trade. Such a system of liberty, dangerous for colonies of moderate fertility, which, producing but little and at a dear rate, have an interest in taking the productions of the mother-country, that she may take theirs, is excellent, on the contrary, for a rich and fertile colony, needing no favour for the sale of its produce, interested thenceforward in trading freely with all nations, and resorting for articles of necessity or luxury to the best and the cheapest markets. This was the case with St. Domingo. The island had derived infinite advantage from the free admission of foreign flags, especially of the American flag. Provisions were abundant. European commodities fetched a good price, and its own produce found purchasers the moment it was offered for sale. Add to this that the new planters, some of them blacks, who had raised themselves by the revolt, others reinstated whites, all relieved from engagements towards the mortgagees of the mother-country, were not, like the old colonists in 1789, oppressed with debts, and obliged to deduct from their profits the interest of enormous borrowed capitals. They were more opulent with less profit. The towns of the Cape, Port au Prince, St. Marc, and Cayes, had recovered a sort of splendour. The traces of the war were almost obliterated: in most of them were seen elegant habitations erected by the black officers, inhabited by them, and rivalling the fine houses of the old white proprietors, formerly so proud and so noted for their luxurious and dissolute habits.

The black chief of the colony had crowned its recent prosperity by the bold occupation of the Spanish part of St. Domingo. This island was formerly divided into two portions, one of which, situated to the east, and first made by

ships coming from Europe, belonged to the Spaniards; while the other, situated to the west, nearer Cuba and the interior of the Gulf of Mexico, belonged to the French. This western part, composed of two advanced promontories, forming, besides a vast inner gulf, a multitude of roadsteads and little harbours, was more suitable than the other for plantations, which require to be situated near points of embarkation. Hence it was covered with rich establishments. The Spanish part, on the contrary, not very mountainous, having scarcely any gulfs, contained fewer sugar and coffee plantations; but, on the other hand, it bred more cattle, horses, and mules. United, these two portions were capable of rendering great services to each other, whereas, when separated by an exclusive colonial system, they were like two remote islands, the one naving what the other was deficient in, and what it was not able to procure on account of the distance. Toussaint, after expelling the English, had turned all his thoughts towards the occupation of the Spanish part. Affecting a scrupulous submission to the mother-country, though acting wholly according to his own pleasure, he had armed himself with the treaty of Basle, by which Spain ceded to France the entire possession of St. Domingo, and summoned the Spanish authorities to deliver up to him the province which they still held. There was at this moment a French commissioner in St. Domingo, for, since the Revolution, the mother-country had been represented in the island only by commissioners, to whom little attention was paid. This agent, apprehensive of the complications which might result in Europe from this proceeding, having, moreover, received no orders from France, had combated to no purpose the resolution of Toussaint. The latter, disregarding the objections addressed to him, had set in motion all the divisions of his army, and demanded of the Spanish authorities, incapable of resistance, the keys of St. Domingo. Those keys had been delivered to him, and he had then proceeded to the other towns, assuming no higher title than that of representative of France, but conducting himself in reality like a sovereign, and requiring the clergy to receive him in the churches with holy water and canopy.

The union of the two parts of the island under one rule had produced excellent and instantaneous effects upon commerce and internal order. The French part, abundantly provided with all the productions of the two worlds, had given a considerable quantity to the Spanish colonists in exchange for cattle, mules and horses, which it had great need of. At the same time, the negroes who attempted to withdraw themselves from labour by roving, no longer found, in the Spanish portion, an asylum against the incessant search of the black police.

By all these combined means, Toussaint had in two years restored the colony to a flourishing condition. We should not have a correct idea of his policy, unless we knew at the same time how he conducted himself between France and England. This slave, having made himself free and absolute, retained in his heart an

involuntary partiality for the nation whose chains he had worn, and disliked to see the English in St. Domingo. Accordingly, he had made noble efforts to expel them and had succeeded. His political intelligence, profound though uncultivated, confirmed him in his natural sentiments, and taught him that the English would be the most dangerous masters, for they possessed a maritime power which would render their authority on the island effective and absolute: he would not, therefore, submit to their sway on any account. The English, on evacuating Port au Prince, had offered him the royalty of St. Domingo, and the immediate recognition of that royalty, if he would insure to them the colony. He had refused it, whether from some remnant of attachment to the mother-country, or, alarmed by the news of the peace, he dreaded a French expedition capable of reducing his royalty to nothing. Besides, the vanity of belonging to the first military nation in the world, the secret pleasure of being a general in the service of France, under the hand of the First Consul himself, had outweighed in his mind all the offers of England. He was, therefore, resolved to continue French. To keep the English at a distance, while living peaceably with them, to recognise the nominal authority of France, and to pay her just so much obedience as not to provoke the display of her strength—such was the policy of this singular man. He had received the commissioners of the Directory, and then sent them away in succession, particularly General Houdeville, alleging that they misunderstood the interests of the mother-country and required of him things that either could not be executed or were injurious to her.

His internal policy is not less worthy of attention than his external policy. His conduct towards all the classes of inhabitants, whites, blacks, or mulattoes, corresponded with what we have already said of him. He detested the mulattoes as nearest to his own race, and, on the contrary, caressed the whites with extreme care, so he but obtained from them some tokens of esteem which should prove to him that his genius caused his colour to be overlooked. On this point he showed the vanity of an upstart black, of which the concentrated vanity of all the upstart whites in the world cannot afford any idea. As for the blacks, he treated them with incredible severity, but yet with justice; he made use with them of religion, which he professed with ardour, and more especially of liberty, which he promised to defend till his death, and of which he was the glorious emblem for the people of his colour, for they saw in him what, by means of it, a negro might become. His wild eloquence charmed them. From a chair, which he frequently mounted, he spoke to them of God, of the equality of the races of men, and spoke of these subjects in the most extraordinary and apposite parables. One day, for example, with a view to inspire them with confidence in themselves, he filled a glass with grains of black maize, mixed with them a few grains of white maize; then shaking the glass, he bade them take notice how soon the white grains were lost among the black. "There," said he, "that is what the

whites are among you. Work; insure your prosperity by labour; and, if the whites of the mother-country attempt to ravish our liberty from us, again we will take up our muskets, and again we will conquer them." Adored on account of these sentiments, he was dreaded at the same time for his rare vigilance. Endowed with surprising activity for his age, he had placed in the interior of the island relays of horses of extreme swiftness, and, attended by a few guards, moved with prodigious rapidity from one part of the island to another, sometimes travelling forty leagues on horseback in a day, and coming like lightning to punish offences of which he had been apprized. Provident and avaricious, he formed hoards of money and arms in the mountains of the interior, and buried them, it is said, in a place called Mornes du Chaos, near a house which had become his ordinary abode. These were resources for a future struggle, which he never ceased to consider as probable and not far distant. Making a point of imitating the First Consul in every thing, he had given himself a guard, a retinue, a sort of princely residence. In this residence he received proprietors of all colours, particularly whites, and rated the blacks who were deficient in good breeding. Hideous to see, even in his uniform of lieutenant-general, he had flatterers, toad-eaters, and, melancholy to relate, he more than once induced white women, belonging to the most ancient and wealthy families in the island, to prostitute themselves to him to obtain his protection. His courtiers persuaded him that he was in America what General Bonaparte was in Europe, and that he ought to assume the same dignity. When, therefore, he was informed of the conclusion of peace, and could foresee the re-establishment of the authority of the mother-country, he hastened to convoke the council of the colony in order to frame a constitution. The council assembled, and did in fact frame a most ridiculous constitution. According to the dispositions of this crude work, the council of the colony was to decree laws, the governor-general to sanction them and to exercise executive power in all its plenitude. Toussaint of course was appointed governor, and, moreover, governor for life, with the faculty of naming his successor. There could not be a more complete and puerile imitation of what had been done in France. As for the authority of the mother-country, it was not even mentioned. Only, the constitution was to be submitted to it for its approval; but, this approval once granted, the mother-country had no longer any power over the colony, for the council made laws. Toussaint governed, and could, if he pleased, deprive French commerce of all its advantages; which was the case at the moment—a state of things rendered excusable by the war, but which was not to be tolerated any longer. When Toussaint was asked what were to be the relations of St. Domingo with France, he replied, "The First Consul will send me commissioners to confer with me." Some of his friends who were wiser, particularly the French Colonel Vincent, charged with the direction of the fortifications, warned him of the danger of his conduct, told

him that he ought to be on his guard against his flatterers of all colours, that he would provoke a French expedition, and that it would be his ruin. The vanity of this slave, on becoming dictator, got the better of him. He was determined, he said, that the first of the blacks should be in fact and of right, in St. Domingo, what the first of the whites was in France, that is to say, chief for life, with the faculty of appointing his successor. He despatched Colonel Vincent to Europe with directions to explain his new constitutional establishment, and obtain the First Consul's assent to it. He required, moreover, the confirmation of all the military ranks conferred on black officers.

This imitation of his greatness, this pretension to assimilate himself to him, made the First Consul smile, but, be it understood, had no effect upon his resolutions. He was ready to suffer himself to be called the first of the whites by him who entitled himself the first of the blacks, on condition that the bond uniting the colony to the mother-country should be that of obedience, and that the possession of this colony, French for ages, should be real and not nominal. To confirm the military appointments which these blacks had attributed to themselves was not a difficulty in his estimation. He confirmed them all and made Toussaint lieutenant-general commanding in St. Domingo for France. But he purposed to have there a French captain-general, whose first lieutenant Toussaint was to be. Without this condition, St. Domingo would not belong to France. He resolved therefore to send thither a general and an army. The colony was again flourishing; it was not less valuable than it had formerly been; the planters who had remained in Paris loudly claimed their estates; France enjoyed peace, perhaps for some time; she had troops idle, officers full of ardour, longing for active service, no matter in what part of the world; it was impossible, therefore, to let such a possession slip out of her hands, without employing the forces which she had at her disposal to retain it. Such were the motives of the expedition, the departure of which we have already related. General Leclerc, brother-in-law of the First Consul, had instructions to soothe Toussaint, to offer him the post of lieutenant of France, the confirmation of the rank and property acquired by his officers, the guarantee of the liberty of the blacks, but with the positive authority of the mother-country represented by the captain-general. In order to prove to Toussaint the good-will of the French government, his two sons educated in France were sent back to him accompanied by their tutor, M. Coignon. The First Consul, moreover, added a noble and flattering letter, in which, treating Toussaint as the first man of his race, he seemed graciously to indulge a sort of comparison between the pacificator of France and the pacificator of St. Domingo.

But he had also foreseen resistance, and proper measures were taken to overcome it by main force. Had the First Consul been less impatient to avail himself of the signature of the preliminaries of peace for crossing the

sea, which was then thrown open, he might have made the squadrons wait for one another in some place agreed upon, so that they might arrive altogether at St. Domingo, and surprise Toussaint before he was in a condition to defend himself. Unfortunately, in the uncertainty respecting the signature of the definitive peace which prevailed at the moment of the expedition, he was obliged to let them sail from the ports of Brest, Rochefort, Cadiz, and Toulon, without obligation to wait for one another, and with orders to proceed as speedily as possible to their destination. Admiral Villaret Joyeuse, putting to sea from Brest and Lorient, with sixteen sail of the line and a force of about seven or eight thousand men, had orders to cruise for some time in the Gulf of Gascony, and try to fall in there with Admiral Latouche Treville, who was to leave Rochefort with six ships of the line, six frigates and three or four thousand men. Admiral Villaret, if he could not meet with Admiral Latouche, was to proceed to the Canaries, to see whether he might not there find Linois's division from Cadiz, and Ganteaume's from Toulon, both with a convoy of troops. He was then to steer for the Bay of Samana, the first that is reached by a squadron arriving from Europe. Conforming to the orders which they had received, these different squadrons, looking for one another, without losing time in waiting to join, arrived at different times at the general rendezvous of Samana. Admiral Villaret arrived there on the 20th of January, 1802—9th Pluviôse, year X. Admiral Latouche soon followed. The Cadiz and Toulon divisions did not reach St. Domingo till much later. But Admiral Villaret, with the squadron from Brest and L'Orient, Admiral Latouche Treville with the squadron from Rochefort, brought no fewer than from eleven to twelve thousand men. After conferring with the commanders of the fleet, Captain-general Leclerc thought that it was of importance not to lose time, and that he ought to make his appearance before all the ports at once, in order to seize the colony before Toussaint had time to look about him. Besides, many accounts received from the West Indies caused him to apprehend an unfriendly reception. In consequence, General Kerversau, with 2000 men embarked in frigates, was to proceed to St. Domingo, the capital of the Spanish part; Admiral Latouche Treville, with his squadron, having on board Brouet's division, was to steer for Port au Prince; lastly, the captain-general himself, with Admiral Villaret's squadron, intended to sail for the Cape, and make himself master of it. The French part, comprehending, with a considerable portion of the island, the two promontories running out to the west, was divided into the departments of the north, the west, and the south. In the department of the north, the Cape was the principal seaport, and the chief town; in the department of the west, Port au Prince. In the south, Les Cayes and Jacmel rivalled these in wealth and influence. By occupying St. Domingo in the Spanish part, the Cape and Port au Prince in the French part, the captain-general would have possession of nearly the whole island, though not,

indeed, of the mountains in the interior, a conquest which time alone could permit him to achieve.

These naval divisions left the bay in which they had anchored, to proceed to their respective destinations, in the first days of February. Toussaint, apprized of the appearance of a great number of ships at Samana, had hastened thither in person, to judge from personal observation of the danger with which he was threatened. No longer doubtful, when he beheld the French squadron, of the fate that awaited him, he determined to resort to the last extremities rather than submit to the authority of the mother-country. He was not quite certain that there was any design to reduce the negroes to slavery again; he could not even believe it; but he conceived that there was a determination to enforce obedience to France, and this was sufficient to decide him to resist. He resolved, therefore, to persuade the negroes that their liberty was in danger, and thus to induce them to abandon agriculture for war, to ravage the seaport-towns, to burn the habitations, to massacre the whites, and then retire to the mornes or bluffs, (such is the name given to the mountains of a particular form with which the French part is everywhere studded,) and wait in these retreats till, after the climate had thinned the whites, he could fall upon them and complete their extermination. Hoping, however, to stop the French army by mere threats, perhaps also fearing, if he gave orders too soon for atrocious acts, that they would not be punctually obeyed by the black chiefs, who, after his example, had cultivated an intercourse with the whites, he directed his officers to reply to the first summons of the French squadron that they had no orders to receive it; then, if it persisted, to threaten, in case of a landing, the total destruction of the towns; and lastly, if a landing were effected, to destroy and slaughter all before them, while retiring into the interior of the island. Such were the orders given to Christophe, who governed the north, to the ferocious Dessalines, chief of the west, and to Laplume, a more humane black, commanding in the south.

Villaret's squadron, having reached Mont-Christ, applied for pilots to steer it into the roads of Fort Dauphin and the Cape, had great difficulty to procure them, detached Magon's division upon Fort Dauphin, and arrived on the 3d of February—14th Pluviôse—off the Cape. All the buoys were taken up, the forts armed, and there was an evident disposition to resistance. A frigate sent to communicate with the shore, received the answer dictated by Toussaint. Christophe said that he had no instructions; that he must await the answer of the commander-in-chief, who was absent at the moment; that any attempt at landing executed by main force would be resisted by conflagration and massacre. The municipality of the Cape, composed of notables, whites and people of colour, went to the Captain-general Leclerc, to express their alarm. They at once rejoiced at the arrival of the troops of the mother-country, and were filled with terror by the horrible threats of Christophe. Ther

perturbation was soon communicated to the mind of the captain-general, who found himself placed between the obligation to fulfil his instructions and the fear of exposing a white and French population to the fury of the negroes. It was necessary, however, that he should land. He promised the inhabitants of the Cape to act with promptness and vigour, so as to take Christophe by surprise, and not leave him time to execute his horrible instructions. He earnestly exhorted them to arm for the defence of their persons and property, and delivered to them a proclamation of the First Consul's, destined to make the blacks easy in regard to the object of the expedition. He was then obliged to stand out to sea in compliance with a state of the winds that is regular in these parts. The captain-general, when once at sea, arranged with Admiral Villaret Joyeuse a plan for landing. This plan consisted in putting the troops on board frigates, setting them on shore in the environs of the Cape, beyond the heights which command the town, near a spot called the landing-place of Limbé; then, while they should endeavour to turn the Cape, to push with the squadron up the channels, and thus make a double attack by land and sea. It was hoped, by acting with great celerity, to take the town before Christophe had time to execute his atrocious threats. Captain Magon and General Rochambeau, if they were successful at Fort Dauphin, which they were directed to occupy, were to second the movement of the captain-general.

Next day, the troops were transferred to frigates and light vessels, and then put ashore near the landing-place of Limbé. This operation took a whole day. On the following, the troops marched for the purpose of turning the town, and the squadron entered the channels. Two ships of the line, the *Patriote* and the *Scipion*, brought up with a spring cable before Fort Picolet, which fired red-hot balls, and soon silenced it. The day was advanced; the land-breeze, which in the evening succeeds the sea-breeze, again obliged the squadron to stand off till the next morning. While getting out to sea, the crews had the pain to perceive a reddish glare rise above the surface of the water, and soon to behold the flames consuming Cape Town. Christophe, though less ferocious than his chief, had nevertheless obeyed his orders; he had set fire to the principal quarters, and, confining himself to the slaughter of a few whites, had obliged the others to follow him to the bluffs. While some of these unfortunate whites were falling beneath the weapons of the negroes, or were dragged away by them, the rest, following the municipality in a troop, had escaped from Christophe and were seeking to save their lives by throwing themselves into the arms of the French force. Great was the anxiety during that terrible night, both among the unfortunate creatures exposed to so many dangers, and among our soldiers and seamen, who witnessed the destruction of the town and the frightful situation of their countrymen, without being able to afford them any assistance. On the following day, February 6th, while Captain-general Leclerc was marching in all haste for the Cape,

on turning the heights, the admiral sailed into the harbour and came to an anchor. The resistance had ceased with the retreat of the negroes. He immediately landed 1200 seamen, under the command of General Humbert, to hasten to the assistance of the town, save the remnant of it from the fury of the blacks, and give a hand to the captain-general. The latter arrived, on his side, without being able to intercept Christophe, who had already betaken himself to flight. Those of the inhabitants who had followed the municipality, were found wandering about disconsolate; but they were soon cheered on finding themselves so speedily relieved and definitively protected from danger. They ran to their burning houses. The seamen assisted to extinguish the flames: the land forces pursued Christophe into the country. This pursuit, briskly kept up, prevented the blacks from destroying the rich plantations in the plain of the Cape, and caused a great number of whites, whom they had not time to carry along with them, to be rescued from their hands.

During these occurrences at the Cape, the brave Captain Magon had landed Rochambeau's division at the entrance of the bay of Mancenille, and then stood with his ships into the bay itself to second the operations of the troops. His vigorous conduct, ominous already of what he was destined to do at Trafalgar, concurred so well with the attack of Rochambeau's division, that Fort Dauphin was suddenly carried, and the French gained possession of it before the negroes could commit any ravage. This second landing completely cleared the country in the environs of the Cape, and obliged Christophe to retire finally to the bluffs.

The Captain-General Leclerc, established in Cape Town, had caused the fire to be extinguished. Luckily the disaster was not commensurate with the frightful threats of Tous-saint's lieutenant. The roofs only of the houses had taken fire. The number of the whites put to death was not so great as had at first been feared. Many of them returned successively, accompanied by the servants who had remained faithful to them. The rage of the black hordes had been particularly wreaked on the rich magazines of the Cape. The troops and the population did their best to obliterate the traces of the conflagration. An appeal was made to the black labourers who were weary of this life of ravage and of blood, in which people would fain have involved them again, and many of them returned to their masters and to their work. In a few days the town resumed a certain aspect of order and activity. The captain-general sent part of his vessels to the continent of America, to procure provisions and supplies in place of the resources that had been destroyed.

Meanwhile, the squadron of Admiral La-touche Treville, standing to the west, had doubled the point of the island, and proceeded to the bay of Port au Prince to effect its landing there. A white engaged in the service of the blacks, named Agé, an officer full of excellent sentiments, commanded there in the absence of Dessalines, residing at St. Marc.

His repugnance to execute the orders which he had received, the vigour of Admiral Latouche Treville, the promptness of General Boudet, lastly Fortune, which favoured this part of the operations, saved the town of Port au Prince from the calamities which had overtaken the Cape. Admiral Latouche had rafts constructed and armed with artillery, and thus succeeded in suddenly landing the troops at Point Lamentin, and then set sail in all haste for Port au Prince. During this rapid movement of the ships, the troops advanced on their side towards the town. Fort Bizoton was in their route. They approached it without firing. "Let us kill without noise," exclaimed General Boudet, "to prevent a collision, and to save, if we can, our unfortunate countrymen from the fury of the blacks." This was in fact the only way of avoiding the massacre with which the whites were threatened. The black garrison of Fort Bizoton, on seeing the amicable and resolute attitude of the French troops, surrendered and placed themselves in the ranks of Boudet's division. The troops reached Port au Prince at the very same moment that Admiral Latouche Treville came off it with his ships. Four thousand blacks formed the garrison. From the heights on which the army was marching, were seen these blacks posted in the middle of the principal places or in advance of the walls. General Boudet caused the town to be turned by two battalions, and marched with the bulk of the division upon the redoubts that covered it. "We are friends," cried the first black troops; "don't fire." Trusting to these words, our soldiers advanced with the musket on the arm. But a discharge of musketry and grape, fired nearly point-blank, swept down two hundred of them, some killed, the others wounded. The gallant General Pamphile Lacroix was among the latter. The soldiers then rushed with the bayonet upon those wretched blacks, and sacrificed such of them as had not time to escape. Admiral Latouche, who, during the voyage, had continually assured the generals of the army, that a squadron was far superior for its fire to any position on land, and that he would very soon prove it—Admiral Latouche brought to under the batteries of the blacks, and silenced them in a few moments. The blacks, cannonaded so closely, and attacked in the streets by the troops of Boudet's division, fled in disorder, without setting the town on fire, leaving the public chests full of money, and in the magazines an immense quantity of colonial produce. Unfortunately, they carried off with them troops of whites, to whom they showed no pity in their precipitate flight, and marked their track by the conflagration and ravage of the habitations. Columns of smoke rose to a great distance along the line of their retreat.

The ferocious Dessalines, when apprized of the landing of the French, had left St. Marc, passed behind Port au Prince, and by a rapid march occupied Leogane, to dispute the department of the south with the French. General Boudet sent thither a detachment, which drove Dessalines from Leogane. The French were informed that General Laplume, less barbarous than his colleagues, distrusting, more-

over, a district full of mulattoes, implacable enemies of the blacks, was disposed to submit. General Boudet immediately despatched emissaries to him. Laplume surrendered and gave up intact to our troops that rich department, comprehending Leogane, Great and Little Goave, Tiburon, the Cayes, and Jacmel. This submission of Laplume was a fortunate event, for one-third of the colony was thus saved from the ravages of barbarity. Meanwhile, the Spanish part fell under the sway of our troops. General Kerversau, sent to Santo Domingo with a few frigates and 2000 land-troops, seconded by the inhabitants and by the influence of the French bishop, Mauvielle, took possession of one-half of the Spanish part, that under the government of Paul Louverture, brother of Toussaint. Captain Magon, established in Fort Dauphin, succeeded, on his part, by adroit negotiations and the influence of the same bishop Mauvielle, in gaining the mulatto general, Clervaux, and wresting from him the rich plain of St. Jago. Thus, in the first ten days of February, the French troops made themselves masters of the coast, the seaports, the chief towns of the island, and the greater part of the cultivated lands. Toussaint had nothing left but three or four black demi-brigades, with Generals Maurepas, Christophe, and Dessalines, with his treasures and stores of arms, buried in the bluffs of Chaos. Unfortunately, there were also left with him a great number of whites, carried off as hostages, and cruelly treated, till they should be set at liberty or slaughtered. It was requisite to take advantage of the season, which was favourable, to complete the reduction of the island.

The mountainous and broken tract in which Toussaint had shut himself up, was situated to the west between the sea and Mount Cibao, the Central knot into which all the other chains of the island converge. This tract pours its scanty waters in several streams into the river Artibonite, which throws itself into the sea between the Gonaives and Port au Prince, quite close to St. Marc. It was requisite to march thither from all points at once, from the Cape, from Port au Prince, and from St. Marc, so as to place the blacks between two fires, and to drive them back upon the Gonaives for the purpose of surrounding them there. But to penetrate to these bluffs, the troops must pass through narrow gorges, rendered almost impenetrable by the vegetation of tropics, and in the bottoms of which the blacks, squatting as sharpshooters, presented a resistance difficult to be overcome. Still the veteran soldiers of the Rhine, transported across the Atlantic, had nothing to fear but the climate. That alone could conquer them; that alone did actually conquer them; for they fell only beneath the sun of St. Domingo and the frost of Moscow.

The Captain-general Leclerc was resolved to make the best use of the months of February, March, and April to complete this occupation; because, later in the season, the heats and the rain would render military operations impossible. In consequence of the arrival of the naval divisions from the Mediterranean, under Admirals Ganteaume and Linois, the land-troops were increased to 17,000 or 18,000 men. Some

of the soldiers, it is true, were ill: but there were 15,000 fit to act. The captain-general had, therefore, all the means for accomplishing his task.

Before he proceeded with its execution, he resolved to send a summons to Toussaint. This black, capable of the greatest atrocities to further his designs, was, nevertheless, sensible to the affections of nature. By order of the First Consul, the captain-general had brought with him, as we have said, the two sons of Toussaint, educated in France, for the purpose of trying the influence of filial solicitations upon his heart. The tutor who had been charged with their education was to conduct them to their father, to deliver to him the letter of the First Consul, and to endeavour to attach him to France by promising him the second authority of the island.

Toussaint received his two sons and preceptor at Ennery, his usual retreat. He clasped them long in his arms, and appeared for a moment overcome by his emotion. That old heart, devoured by ambition, was shaken. The sons of Toussaint, and the worthy man who had brought them up, represented to him the power and the humanity of the French nation, the advantages attached to a submission which would leave his situation in St. Domingo high enough, and would secure to his children a brilliant futurity; the danger, on the contrary, of almost certain ruin if he persisted in hostilities. The mother of one of these youths joined in trying to overcome Toussaint. Touched with these solicitations, he determined to take a few days to reflect, and during these few days appeared extremely wavering, sometimes alarmed by the danger of an unequal struggle, sometimes swayed by the ambition of being sole master of the fine empire of Haiti; sometimes, also, enraged at the idea that the whites should come to plunge the blacks again into slavery. Ambition and the love of liberty got the better of paternal affection. He sent for his two sons, again he embraced them, left them their choice between France, which had made them civilized creatures, or himself, the author of their existence, and declared that he should continue to love them, were they even in the ranks of his enemies. Those unhappy children, agitated like their father, hesitated also like him. One of them, however, throwing his arms around his neck, declared that he would die a free black at his side. The other, undecided, accompanied his mother to one of the seats of the dictator.

The answer of Toussaint left no doubt of the necessity of immediately resuming hostilities. The Captain-general Leclerc made his preparations, and commenced operations on the 17th of February.

His plan was to attack at once, from the north and from the west, the woody and almost inaccessible tract to which Toussaint had retired with his black generals. Maurepas occupied the narrow gorge called Trois Rivières, which debouches towards the sea at Port de Paix. Christophe had established himself on the slopes of the bluffs towards the plain of the Cape. Dessalines was at St. Marc, near the mouth of the Artibonite, with orders to

burn St. Marc, and to defend the bluffs of the Chaos on the east and the south. He had for appui a well-constructed and well-defended fort, full of military stores, collected through the foresight of Toussaint. This fort, called Crête à Pierrot, was situated in the flat country which the Artibonite traverses and inundates, while forming a thousand windings before it throws itself into the sea. In the centre of this tract, between Christophe, Maurepas, and Dessalines, Toussaint kept himself in reserve with a body of picked troops.

On the 17th of February, the Captain-general Leclerc broke up the camp; his army formed into three divisions. On his left, Rochambeau's division, setting out from Port Dauphin, was to march upon St. Raphael and St. Michael; Hardy's division was to march by the north plain upon La Marmelade; Desfourneaux's division was to proceed by Limbé to Plaisance. These three divisions had narrow gorges to clear and steep heights to scale, in order to penetrate into the region of the bluffs, and to make themselves masters of the streams which form the upper course of the Artibonite. General Humbert, with a detachment, was ordered to land at Port de Paix, to ascend the gorge of the Trois Rivières, and to drive back the black general Maurepas upon the Gros Morne. General Boudet had orders, while these four corps were marching from north to south, to ascend from south to north, setting out from Port au Prince, and to occupy the Mirabalais, the Verrettes, and St. Marc. Attacked thus on all sides, the blacks would have no asylum till towards the Goanives, where the French generals hoped to enclose them. These dispositions were judicious against an enemy whom it was necessary to envelop and to drive before one, rather than to fight according to rule. Each of these French corps was, in fact, strong enough not to experience a serious check anywhere. Against an experienced commander, having European troops, capable of concentrating himself suddenly on any one of the assailing corps, this plan would have been defective.

Breaking up on the 17th, the three divisions of Rochambeau, Hardy, and Desfourneaux, valiantly performed their task, scaled tremendous heights, traversed frightful jungles, and surprised the blacks by their daring march, almost without returning a shot to an enemy firing from all sides. On the 18th the division of Desfourneaux was in the environs of Plaisance, Hardy's division at Dondon, Rochambeau's division at St. Raphael.

On the 19th, Desfourneaux's division occupied Plaisance, which was delivered up to it by Jean Pierre Dumesnil, a very humane black, who surrendered to the French with his troops. Hardy's division penetrated by main force into Marmelade, overturning Christophe, who was there at the head of 2400 negroes, half troops of the line, and half armed labourers. Rochambeau's division took St. Michael. The negroes were surprised at such a fierce attack, and had never yet seen such troops among the whites. Only one of them made a vigorous resistance; Maurepas, who defended the gorge of Trois Rivières against General Humbert

The latter not having a sufficient force, General Debelle had been sent by sea to his succour, with a reinforcement of from twelve to fifteen hundred men. General Debelle was unable to land till rather late at Port de Paix, and, thwarted in his attacks by tremendous rain, gained little ground.

The captain-general, having halted for two days in the same places, as soon as the bad weather was over pushed Desfourneaux's division upon Gonaives, Hardy's division upon Ennery, and Rochambeau's division upon a formidable position called the Ravine aux Couleuvres. On the 23d of February, Desfourneaux's division entered Gonaives, which it found in flames; Hardy's division made itself master of Ennery, the principal residence of Toussaint; and Rochambeau's gallant division carried the Ravine aux Couleuvres. To force the latter position, the troops had been obliged to penetrate into a narrow gorge, bordered by precipitous heights, studded with gigantic trees and thorny bushes, and defended by blacks who were good marksmen. They had then to debouch upon a plain, occupied by Toussaint, with 3000 grenadiers of his colour and all his artillery. The intrepid Rochambeau boldly entered the gorge, in spite of a most annoying fire of sharpshooters, scaled both the steep sides, killing with the bayonet the blacks who were too slow in retiring, and debouched on the plateau. On reaching it, the old soldiers of the Rhine finished the affair with a single charge. Eight hundred blacks were left upon the plain. The whole of Toussaint's artillery was taken.

Meanwhile, General Boudet, in execution of the orders of the captain-general, had left General Pamphile Lacroix with a garrison of six or eight hundred men in Port au Prince, and marched with the rest of his troops for St. Marc. Dessalines was there waiting for the French, and ready to commit the greatest atrocities. Armed with a torch, he set fire himself to a fine house which he possessed at St. Marc, was imitated by his people, and then retired, slaughtering part of the whites, and dragging the rest along with him into the frightful retreat of the bluffs. General Boudet, therefore, was left in possession of nothing but ruins drenched with human blood. While he was pursuing Dessalines, the latter advanced by a rapid march upon Port au Prince, which he supposed to be weakly defended, and which actually had but a very small garrison. But the gallant General Pamphile Lacroix had assembled his scanty force and harangued it in spirit-stirring language. Admiral Latouche, apprized of the danger, landed with his seamen, saying to General Lacroix, "At sea, you would be under my command, on land I am I am under yours, and we will defend together the lives and property of our fellow-countrymen." Dessalines, repulsed, could not glut his barbarity, and fell back to the bluffs of Chaos. General Boudet, returning in the utmost haste to Port au Prince, found it saved by the united land-force and sailors; but, amidst these marches and counter-marches, it had been impossible for him to second the operations of

the general-in-chief. The blacks could not be surrounded and driven towards Gonaives.

They were beaten, however, at all points. The taking of the Ravine aux Couleuvres from Toussaint himself had deeply discouraged them. Captain-general Leclerc, in order to dishearten them completely, resolved to cut off Maurepas, the black, who maintained his ground against Generals Humbert and Debelle at the extremity of the gorge of Trois Rivières. Attacked on all sides, Maurepas had no resource but to surrender. He made his submission with 2000 of the bravest of the negroes. This was the severest shock to the moral power of Toussaint.

There yet remained the fort of Crête à Pierrot, and the bluffs of Chaos to be reduced, before Toussaint could be forced from his last asylum, unless he retired to the mountains in the interior of the island, to lead there the life of a partisan, deprived of all means of acting, and stripped of every spell. The captain-general ordered Hardy's and Rochambeau's divisions to advance from one side on the fort and the bluffs, and Boudet's from the other. Some hundreds of men were lost in attacking with too much confidence the works of the Crête à Pierrot, which were better defended than they were supposed to be. It was found necessary to undertake a sort of regular siege, to execute works of approach, to establish batteries. Two thousand blacks, good soldiers, commanded by officers less ignorant than the others, guarded this repository of the resources of Toussaint. The latter, seconded by Dessalines, strove to interrupt the siege by night-attacks, but without success; and, in a short time, the fort was pressed so closely, that an assault became practicable. The garrison, reduced to despair, then resolved to make a nocturnal sortie, in order to break through the lines of the besiegers and to escape. In the first moment they contrived to elude the vigilance of our troops, and to traverse their encampments; but, being soon discovered and attacked on all sides, they were partly driven back into the fort and partly destroyed by our soldiers. This sort of arsenal was stormed, and in it were found considerable stores of arms and ammunition, and many whites cruelly murdered.

The captain-general then directed the surrounding bluffs to be scoured in all directions, that the fugitive band of Toussaint might have no retreat left, and be reduced before the hottest part of the season. At Verrettes the army witnessed a horrible sight. The blacks had hurried away with them numbers of whites, whom they forced by beating to march as fast as they did. Having no hope of preventing them from falling into the hands of the troops by whom they were closely pursued, they butchered eight hundred of them, men and women, children and aged people. The earth was found covered with this hecatomb; and our generous soldiers, who had seen so much service in all parts of the world, who had been present at so many scenes of carnage, but had never yet seen women and children slaughtered, were filled with profound horror and a humane indignation, which proved fatal

to all the blacks whom they could catch. They pursued them with the utmost perseverance, and gave no quarter to any whom they fell in with.

It was now the month of April. The blacks had no more resources, at least for the present. Profound was the discouragement which prevailed among them. The chiefs, struck by the courtesy shown by the Captain-general Leclerc to those who had surrendered, and whom he suffered to retain their rank and their possessions, began to think of laying down their arms. Christophe addressed himself through the medium of the blacks who had already submitted, to the captain-general, and offered to make his submission, if he were promised the same appointments as the Generals Laplume, Maurepas, and Clervaux. The captain-general, who had as much humanity as good sense, assented cheerfully to the proposals of Christophe and accepted his offers. The surrender of Christophe soon led to that of the ferocious Dessalines, and lastly that of Toussaint himself. The latter was almost alone, being merely attended by a few blacks attached to his person. To rove about in the interior of the island, without attempting any thing important that was likely to regain him his influence over the negroes, seemed to him of little use, and calculated only to exhaust the zeal of his last partisans. His courage, moreover, was depressed, and he had no hope left but that which the climate was capable of inspiring. In fact, he had been long accustomed to see Europeans, especially soldiers, swept away by the action of that pernicious climate, and he flattered himself that he should find a formidable auxiliary in the yellow fever. He thought it advisable, therefore, to wait quietly for the propitious moment, and then, perhaps, a new appeal to arms might prove successful. In consequence, he offered to treat. The captain-general, who had little hopes of taking him, unreluctingly as he might pursue him among the numerous and remote fastnesses of the island, consented to grant him a capitulation similar to that which he had granted to his lieutenants. His rank, appointments, and property were restored to him on condition that he should reside in a specified place, and not change his abode without the permission of the captain-general. His house at Ennery was the place fixed upon for his retreat. The Captain-general Leclerc was far from supposing that the submission of Toussaint would be definitive; but he kept a good guard over him, ready to secure him on the first act that should prove his bad faith.

From this period, the end of April and beginning of May, order was restored in the colony, and the prosperity which it had enjoyed under its dictator began to revive. The regulations adopted by him were again enforced. The labourers had almost all returned to the plantations. A black gendarmerie pursued the runaways, and brought them back to the lands, to which, in virtue of anterior censuses, they were attached. Toussaint's troops, greatly reduced, subordinate to the French authority, were quiet, and seemed not disposed to rise, in case they were kept upon the same footing as before. Christophe, Maure-

pas, Dessalines, Clervaux, confirmed in their rank and possessions, were ready to accommodate themselves to this system as well as to that of Toussaint Louverture. To this end, nothing more was requisite than to set them at ease respecting the preservation of their wealth and their liberty.

The Captain-general Leclerc, who was not only a brave soldier, but a mild and discreet man, set about restoring order and security in the colony. To encourage the import of provisions, he had continued to admit foreign flags, and had assigned to them four principal ports: the Cape, Port au Prince, les Cayes, Santo Domingo; with a prohibition to touch elsewhere, to prevent the clandestine introduction of arms along the coast. He had restricted importation solely in regard to European productions, the exclusive supply of which he had reserved for the French merchants of the mother-country. A great number of merchantmen had, in fact, arrived from Havre, Nantes, and Bordeaux; and there was reason to hope that the prosperity of St. Domingo would soon be re-established, not for the benefit of the English and the Americans, as under the government of Toussaint, but for the benefit of France, and without loss to the colony of any of its advantages.

A two-fold danger, however, was to be apprehended: on the one hand, the climate, always fatal to European troops; on the other, the incurable distrust of the negroes, whose fears of the return of slavery it was impossible by any efforts to remove. To the seventeen or eighteen thousand men already transported to the colony, fresh naval divisions, sailing from Holland and France, had added three or four thousand, which made the number of the soldiers engaged in the expedition twenty-one or twenty-two thousand. But from four to five thousand were already *hors de combat*, a like number in the hospitals, and twelve thousand at the most remained for a new conflict, if the negroes should again have recourse to arms. The captain-general was particularly careful to let them have rest, refreshments, and healthy cantonments, and neglected nothing to render the success of the expedition intrusted to him complete and definitive.

At Guadeloupe, the brave Richepense, landing with a force of three or four thousand men, quelled the revolted negroes, and reduced them again to slavery, after destroying the leaders of the rebels. This species of counter-revolution was possible and without danger in an island like Guadeloupe; but it was attended with a serious inconvenience: it alarmed the blacks of St. Domingo respecting the lot that was reserved for them. For the rest, the affairs of our West India islands were as prosperous as could well be hoped in so short a time. In all our seaports, vessels were equipping to recommence the valuable traffic which France formerly carried on with them.

The First Consul, prosecuting his task with perseverance, had removed to the coasts the dépôts of the demi-brigades serving in the colonies. He was continually pouring recruits into them, and taking advantage of the sailing of merchantmen or ships of war to send off

fresh detachments. He had increased the sums granted to the navy, and raised the special budget of that department to 130,000,000—a considerable sum in a total budget of 589,000,000, equal to 720,000,000 at the present day. He had ordered 20,000,000 per annum to be devoted to the purchase of naval stores in all countries. He had, moreover, directed that twelve ships of the line should be built and launched every year. He was incessantly repeating that it was during peace that a navy must be created, because during peace the field for manœuvres, that is the sea, was free, and the way for supplies open. "The first year of a ministry," he wrote to Admiral Decrès, "is a year of apprenticeship. The second year of your ministry is commencing. You have the French navy to re-establish—a fine vocation for a man in the flower of life, and the more so the more conspicuous our past misfortunes have been. Fulfil it without intermission. *Every hour wasted, at the period in which we live, is an irreparable loss.*" (Feb. 14th 1803.)

From India and America the active mind of the First Consul reverted to the Ottoman empire, the fall of which seemed to be at hand; and he was by no means disposed to let its wrecks serve to extend the Russian or English possessions. He had renounced Egypt while England should respect the peace; but, if peace were broken through her fault, he held himself at liberty to resume his first ideas relative to a country which he still regarded as the route to India. However, he formed no plans for the moment; his intention was only to prevent the English from taking advantage of the peace to establish themselves at the mouth of the Nile. A formal engagement bound them to evacuate Egypt in three months; now it was twelve or thirteen since the signature of the preliminaries of London, seven or eight since the signature of the treaty of Amiens, and they seemed not yet disposed to leave Alexandria. The First Consul, therefore, sent for Colonel Sébastiani, an officer endowed with extraordinary intelligence, and directed him to put himself on board a frigate, to skirt the coast of the Mediterranean, to visit Tunis and Tripoli, to cause the flag of the Italian Republic to be acknowledged there; then to proceed to Egypt, to examine the situation of the English and the nature of their establishment in that country; to endeavour to learn how long that establishment was to last; to observe what was passing between the Turks and the Mamelukes; to visit the Arab sheiks and compliment them in his name; to go to Syria to the Christians, and to place them again under French protection; to obtain an interview with Djézzar Pacha, who had defended Acre against us, and to promise him a renewal of the good graces of France, if he were lenient to the Christians and favoured our commerce. Colonel Sébastiani was ordered them to return by way of Constantinople, and to deliver the fresh instructions of the cabinet to General Brune, our ambassador. Those instructions enjoined General Brune to display great magnificence, to pay court to the sultan, to give him reason

to hope for our support against his enemies, whoever they might be, to neglect nothing, in short, to render France imposing in the East.

Though much engaged with these distant enterprises, the First Consul never ceased to pay the greatest attention to the internal prosperity of France. He had caused the digest of the civil code to be resumed. A section of the Council of State and a section of the Tribunal, met every day at the residence of Cambacères, the consul, to resolve the difficulties natural to that great work. The repair of the roads had been prosecuted with the same activity. The First Consul had divided them, as we have said, into series of twenty each, transferring successively from some to others the extraordinary grants allotted to them. The progress of the canals of the Ourcq and St. Quentin had not been suspended for a moment. The works ordered in Italy, as well those upon the roads as those of the fortifications, continued to engage the attention of the First Consul. He purposed that, if a maritime war should again break out, and lead to a continental war, Italy should be definitively connected with France by great communications and strong defensive works. The possession of the Valais having facilitated the construction of the high road of the Simplon, that astonishing creation was almost completed. The works of the road over Mont Cenis had been somewhat slackened, in order to apply all the disposable resources to that of Mont Genève, so that one at least might be finished in 1803. As for the fortress of Alessandria, it had become the subject of a daily correspondence with Chasseloup, the able engineer. Barracks were preparing there for a permanent garrison of 6000 men, hospitals for 3000 wounded, magazines for a large army. The refounding of all the Italian artillery had been commenced for the purpose of reducing it to the calibres of six, eight, and twelve pounds. The First Consul recommended to the Vice-president Melzi the manufacture of a great quantity of muskets. "You have but fifty thousand muskets," he wrote to him; "that is nothing. I have five hundred thousand in France, besides those which are in the hands of the army. I shall not rest till I have a million."

The First Consul had recently entertained the idea of military colonies, an idea borrowed from the Romans. He had directed soldiers and officers numbering long years of service and honourable wounds to be selected from the army and conducted to Piedmont, where national domains situated around Alessandria, of a value proportionate to their condition, from the common soldier to the officer, were to be allotted to them. These veterans, thus provided for, were to marry Piedmontese women, to assemble twice a year to manœuvre, and, on the first danger, to throw themselves into the fortress of Alessandria with their most valuable effects. This was a way to infuse at once French blood and French sentiments into Italy. The same institution was to be introduced into the new departments of the Rhine around Mayence.

The author of these nine conceptions meditated something of the same kind for the pro-

vices of the Republic still infected with a bad spirit, such as La Vendée and Bretagne. He proposed to found there not only large establishments but towns. The agents of Georges, coming from England, called at the islands of Jersey and Guernsey, landed on the north coast, crossed the peninsula of Bretagne by Loudéac and Pontivy, and then spread themselves over the Morbihan or the Loire Inférieure, to keep up disaffection, and, if opportunity offered, to kindle revolt. The First Consul, corresponding with the gendarmerie, directed himself its movements and its investigations, and, foreseeing the possibility of new disturbances, had conceived the idea of erecting, in the principal passes of the mountains or forests, towers having at top a piece of artillery, turning upon a pivot—capable of holding a garrison of fifty men, some provisions, and some ammunition, and to serve for appui to the movable columns. Full of the notion that it was not less incumbent on the government to civilize than to curb the country, he had ordered the course of the Blavet to be improved, for the purpose of rendering that stream navigable as far as Pontivy. Thus was formed the first plan of that fine navigation, which runs along the coast of Bretagne from Nantes to Brest, penetrating by several navigable channels into the interior of the country, and insuring at all times the supply of the great arsenal of Brest. The First Consul had resolved to erect at Pontivy extensive buildings for the reception of troops, a numerous staff, tribunals, a military administration, lastly, manufactures, which he purposed to create at the expense of the State. He had directed the fittest places for founding new towns to be sought out, both in Bretagne and La Vendée. At the same time, he had works in progress at the fortifications of Quiberon, Belle-Isle, and Ile-Dieu. Fort Boyard was begun after his own plans, with a view to make the basin, situated between La Rochelle, Rochefort, and the isles of Ré and Oleron, a vast road, safe and inaccessible to the English. Cherbourg could not fail, of course, to engage his particular attention. Having no hope of finishing the dyke soon enough, he ordered its construction to be hastened more especially at three points, that they might be raised above the water as speedily as possible, and three batteries constructed capable of keeping off an enemy.

Amidst these labours, undertaken for the maritime, commercial and military greatness of France, the First Consul contrived to find time to attend to the Schools, the Institute, the advancement of the sciences, and the administration of the clergy.

His sister Elisa, his brother Lucien, formed with Messrs. Suard, Morellet, and Fontanes, what in our literary history has been called a *bureau d'esprit*. They affected a strong predilection for the past, especially in the department of literature; and, it must be confessed, if a predilection for the past is justifiable, it is in this department. But with this perfectly legitimate predilection they united other very puerile tastes. They affected to prefer the old literary societies to the Institute, and talked

unreservedly of a plan for re-constituting the French Academy with the literary men who had survived the Revolution, and who were no friends to it, such as Messrs. Suard, La Harpe, Morellet, &c. The reports circulated on this subject produced an unpleasant effect. Cambacérés, the consul, attentive to every circumstance likely to prejudice the government, gave timely notice to the First Consul of what was passing, and the First Consul, in his turn, roughly gave notice to his brother and sister of the displeasure excited in him by this kind of affectation.

On this occasion, he turned his attention to the Institute. He declared that any literary society, which should assume any other title than that of Institute; which should call itself, for instance, French Academy, should be dissolved, if it pretended to give itself a public character. The second class, that which then corresponded with the old French Academy, continued to be devoted to the belles-lettres. But he suppressed the class of the moral and political sciences, from an aversion strongly manifested already, not precisely against philosophy—we shall see by and by what he thought on that subject—but against certain persons, who affected to profess the philosophy of the eighteenth century in those points in which it was most contrary to religious ideas. He made this class enter into that which was appropriated to the belles-lettres, saying that they had a common object; that philosophy, politics, morality, the observation of human nature, were the groundwork of all literature; that the art of writing was but its form; that it was not right to separate what ought to continue united; that the class devoted to the belles-lettres was extremely frivolous, the class devoted to the moral and political sciences extremely pedantic, if they were absolutely separated; that writers who would never be thinkers, and thinkers who would never be writers, would be neither the one nor the other; and in short an age, even rich in talents, would scarcely be able to supply one of those companies with members worthy of it, unless recourse was had to mediocrity. These ideas, true or false, were with the First Consul a pretext rather than a reason for getting rid of a literary society, which was hostile to his views in regard to the re-establishment of religion. Out of the two classes, therefore, he made but one, by adding to it Messrs. Suard, Morellet, and Fontanes, and declared it the second class of the Institute, answering to the French Academy. While this union was in progress, he applied to the celebrated Haly for an elementary work on natural philosophy, which was yet wanting among our books of instruction; and replied to Laplace, who had just dedicated to him his great work, *Mécanique céleste*, in these nobly proud words: "I thank you for your dedication, and I hope that future generations, when reading your work, will not forget the esteem and friendship which I felt for its author." (Nov. 26, 1803.)

The First Consul observed with attention the conduct of the clergy since the restoration of religious worship. The bishops appointed were almost all settled in their dioceses

Most of them behaved well there; some, however, still filled with a sectarian spirit, were to blame for not bringing with them into their new functions evangelical mildness and indulgence, which alone could put an end to schism. If Messrs. de Belloy in Paris, de Boisgelin at Tours, Bernier at Orleans, Cambacérés at Rouen, de Poncepont at Vannes, showed themselves genuine pastors, pious and wise, others had manifested mischievous tendencies in the exercise of their ministry. The Bishop of Besançon, for instance, a Jansenist, and an old constitutionalist, endeavoured to prove to his priests, that the civil constitution of his clergy was a truly evangelical and orthodox institution, conformable to the spirit of the primitive Church. Hence agitation prevailed in his diocese. It must be confessed, however, that he was the only constitutionalist who afforded any cause for complaint. The faults to be found in the clergy proceeded from the intolerance of the orthodox bishops. Several of them affected the pride of a victorious party, and harshly spurned the priests who had taken the oath. The bishops of Bordeaux, Avignon, Rennes, removed these priests from the service of the parishes, and strove to humble them, and thus galled that part of the population which was attached to them.

Nothing was more energetic on this subject than the language of the First Consul. He wrote himself to certain bishops, or obliged the cardinal-legate to write to them, threatening to turn out of their sees, and to summon before the Council of State, such prelates as should disturb the new church. It was my intention, said he, to raise the overturned altars, to put an end to religious quarrels, but not to make one party triumph over another, and especially a party inimical to the Revolution. When the constitutional priests have adhered steadfastly to the rules of their condition, and been observers of good morals, when they have not given cause for scandal, I prefer them to their adversaries; for, after all, they are decried only for having embraced the cause of the Revolution, which is ours—he wrote to the prelates. Cardinal Fesch, his uncle, seeming in the diocese of Lyons to forget the injunctions of the government, the First Consul wrote to him as follows: "To mortify the constitutional priests, to remove them, is a violation of justice, of the interest of the state, of my interest, of your own, monsieur le cardinal; it is violating my express desires, and seriously displeasing me."

There were no bounds to his liberality to those bishops who conformed to his policy, at once firm and conciliatory. To some he gave church ornaments, to others furniture for their residences, and to all considerable sums for their poor. Twice or three times in a single winter, he gave 50,000 francs to M. de Belloy, for him to distribute personally among the poor of his diocese. He sent to the bishop of Vannes, a perfect model of a prelate, mild, pious, beneficent, 10,000 francs to furnish his episcopal mansion, 10,000 to remunerate the priests whose conduct he approved, 70,000 to give to his poor. In the current year, the year XL, he addressed 200,000 francs to Bishop

Bernier, for the purpose of secretly relieving the victims of the civil war in La Vendée—a sum of which that prelate made a humane and skilful use. For these donations he had recourse to the chest of the ministry of the interior, supplied by various proceeds which were not then paid into the treasury, and the source of which he purified by devoting them to the noblest purposes.

It was now the autumn of 1802: the weather was splendid. Nature seemed disposed to confer on this happy year a second spring. Owing to the extreme mildness of the temperature, the shrubs flowered a second time. The First Consul conceived a desire to visit a province of which very different accounts were given him: this was Normandy. Then, as at the present day, that fine country exhibited the interesting spectacle of rich manufactories rising amidst the most verdant and the best cultivated fields. Sharing in the general activity, which was awakening throughout all France at once, it exhibited a most animated appearance. Several persons, however, and especially Lebrun, the consul, had endeavoured to persuade the First Consul that this province was royalist. (One might have apprehended as much, on recollecting the energy with which it spoke out in 1792 against the excesses of the Revolution. The First Consul resolved to travel through it, to see it with his own eyes, and to try the ordinary effect of his presence upon the inhabitants. Madame Bonaparte was to accompany him.

The First Consul spent a fortnight in this tour. He passed through Rouen, Elbeuf, Havre, Dieppe, Gisors, Beauvais. He inspected the farms and the manufactories, examining every thing himself, showing himself without guards to the population eager to see him. His progress was retarded by the homage universally paid him: every moment, he was met on his route by the country clergy bringing holy water, the mayors offering the keys of their towns and addressing to him and to Madame Bonaparte speeches such as were formerly addressed to the kings and queens of France. He was delighted with this reception, and above all by the nascent prosperity which he everywhere remarked. The town of Elbeuf charmed him by its extraordinary increase. "Elbeuf," he wrote to his colleague Cambacérés, "is increased one-third since the Revolution. It is now but a single manufactory." He was singularly struck by Havre, and presaged the high commercial destinies to which that port was called. "I find everywhere," he again wrote to Cambacérés, "the best spirit. Normandy is not what Lebrun represented it to me. It is frankly devoted to the government. I here find again that unanimity of sentiments which rendered the days of '89 so bright." What he said was true. A better choice could not have been made than that of Normandy, for expressing to him the sentiments of France. It accurately represented that honest and sincere population of '89, at first enthusiastic in behalf of the Revolution, then alarmed at its excesses, accused of royalism by the proconsuls, whose atrocities it condemned, and now enchanted to find again, in an unhopd-for man

ner, order, justice, equality, glory, minus indeed liberty, for which, unfortunately, it did not care.

By the middle of November the First Consul had returned to St. Cloud.

Imagine an envious man witnessing the success of a dreaded rival, and you will have a tolerably correct idea of the sentiments with which England beheld the prosperity of France. That mighty and illustrious nation had, nevertheless, in its own greatness wherewithal to console itself for the greatness of another. But it was a prey to a singular jealousy. While the successes of General Bonaparte had been an argument against the administration of Mr. Pitt, they had been hailed in England with a sort of applause. But since these successes continued and heightened, were those of France herself; since she was seen to grow greater by peace as well as by war, by policy as much as by arms; since in eighteen months the Italian Republic had been seen to become, under the presidency of General Bonaparte, a French province, Piedmont added to our territory with the assent of the continent. Parma and Louisiana increasing our possessions by the mere execution of treaties, lastly, Germany reconstituted by our sole influence; since all this had been seen accomplished peaceably, naturally, as a thing arising from a universally accepted situation, a manifest spite had seized all English hearts, and this spite was no more dissembled than are usually the feelings of a passionate, proud, and free people.

The classes which had least share in the advantages of the peace displayed this jealousy more strongly than the others. We have already said that the manufacturers of Birmingham and Manchester, compensated by smuggling for the difficulties which they met with in our ports, complained but little; but that the great merchants, finding the seas covered with rival flags, and the source of financial gains cut off with the loans, publicly regretted the war, and manifested greater dissatisfaction with the peace than the aristocracy itself. That aristocracy, usually so proud and so patriotic, not leaving to any class of the nation the honour of serving and loving British greatness more than itself, was not sorry for this occasion of distinguishing itself from the mercantile interest by more elevated and more generous sentiments. It cherished Mr. Pitt rather less, since he was so fondly cherished by the mercantile world, eagerly rallied round the Prince of Wales, the *beau idéal* of aristocratic manners and licentiousness, and especially round Mr. Fox, who delighted it by the nobleness of his sentiments and incomparable eloquence. But the mercantile interest, omnipotent in London and in the seaports, having for its organs Messrs. Wyndham, Grenville, and Dundas, drowned the voice of the rest of the nation, and animated the British press with its passions. Hence the newspapers of London began to grow extremely hostile, leaving, however, to the journals conducted by French emigrants the duty of slandering the First Consul, his brothers, his sisters, and his whole family.

Unfortunately the Addington administration was wholly destitute of energy, and suffered

itself to drive at the mercy of the gale that began to blow. It committed, from weakness, acts of downright perfidy. It still paid Georges Cadoudal, whose perseverance in conspiring was known; it placed at his disposal considerable sums to pay cut-throats, whose band was incessantly hurrying from Portsmouth to Jersey, and from Jersey to the coast of Bretagne. It continued to suffer Peltier, the pamphleteer, to reside in London, notwithstanding the legal means furnished by the Alien Act; it treated the exiled princes with a respect that was very natural, but it did not confine itself to respect, and invited them to reviews of troops, to which they were admitted with the insignia of the ancient royalty. It acted thus, we repeat it, from weakness; for the probity of Mr. Addington, delivered from the influence of party, would have shrunk from such acts. It well knew that in paying Georges it was keeping a conspirator; but it durst not, in the face of the Wyndham, Dundas, and Grenville party, send him away, and perhaps estrange these old instruments of English policy.

The First Consul was deeply hurt at this conduct. To repeated applications for a treaty of commerce he replied by requiring the suppression of certain journals, the expulsion of Georges and Peltier, the removal of the French princes. Grant me, said he, the satisfactions that are due to me, that you cannot refuse me without declaring yourselves accomplices of my enemies, and I will then seek the means for granting satisfaction to your galled interests. But among the demands of the First Consul the English ministry found not one with which it could comply. As for the suppression of certain newspapers, Mr. Addington and Lord Hawkesbury replied very justly. The press is free in England, imitate us; we despise its licentiousness. If you choose, actions shall be commenced, but at your risk and peril, that is to say, standing the chance of affording a triumph to your enemies. As for Georges, Peltier, and the emigrant princes, Mr. Addington had no legal excuse to urge; for the Alien Act gave him a right to send them out of the country. He appealed to the necessity of humouring public opinion in England—a very sorry argument, it must be confessed, in regard to some of the men whose expulsion was demanded.

The First Consul did not consider himself as beaten. In the first place, said he, the advice which you give me to despise the licentiousness of the press would be good, if the question for me were to despise the licentiousness of the French press in France. It is natural that in one's own country one decides on enduring the inconveniences of freedom of writing, in consideration of the advantages which it procures. This is a wholly domestic question, in which each nation is the judge of that which it suits itself to do. But it is not right ever to suffer the daily press to abuse foreign governments, and thus to impair the relations between State and State. It would be a grievous abuse, a danger without compensation. And the proof of this danger lies in the present relations of France with England. We should be at peace but for the newspapers; as I her-

we are nearly at war. Your legislation relative to the press is therefore bad. You ought to permit every thing against your own government, nothing against foreign governments. Nevertheless, I set aside the abuse of the English papers. I respect your laws, in spite of what they have in them injurious to other nations. It is a disagreement of neighbourhood to which I must submit. But the French, who make in London so odious a use of your institutions, who write such base calumnies, why do you suffer them in England? You have the Alien Act, the very object of which is to prevent foreigners from doing mischief: why do you not apply it? And Georges and his gang, all proved accomplices in the infernal machine, and the bishops of Arras and St. Pol de Leon, publicly exciting the population of Bretagne to revolt—why do you refuse to expel them? What becomes, in your hands, of the treaty of Amiens, which stipulates expressly that no underhand dealings shall be suffered in one of the States against the other? You give an asylum to the emigrant princes—that is worthy of respect, no doubt. But the head of their family is at Warsaw; why not send them all off to him? Why, above all, allow them to wear decorations which the French laws no longer recognise, and which occasion great inconveniences when those decorations are worn beside the ambassador of France, in his presence, often at the same table? You ask me, added he, for a treaty of commerce and of better relations between the two countries; begin then by showing yourselves less spiteful towards France, and then I shall be able to seek whether there exist means of reconciling our rival interests.—There was assuredly nothing to find fault with in such arguments, nothing but the weakness of the great man, who, swaying Europe, took the trouble to advance them. What, in fact, needed the all-powerful conqueror of Marengo to care about either Georges, or Peltier, or Count d'Artois, with his royal decorations? Against the daggers of assassins he had his fortune: against the outrages of pamphleteers he had his glory; against the legitimacy of the Bourbons he had the love of France. But, oh weakness of great hearts! This man, raised so high, tormented himself about what was so low! We have already deplored this error on his part, and we cannot refrain from deploring it again,—as we approach the moment when it produced such baneful consequences.

The First Consul, no longer master of himself, took revenge by answers inserted in the *Moniteur*, frequently of his own writing, and the origin of which may be detected by an incomparable vigour of style. He there complained of the complaisance of the British administration towards Georges, the conspirator, towards Peltier, the libeller. He asked why such guests were suffered, why they were allowed to do such acts towards a friendly government, when it was a duty imposed by treaties, and an existing law furnished the means, to repress them. The First Consul went further, and, addressing the British government itself, he asked, in those articles inserted in the *Moniteur*, whether that govern-

ment approved, whether it was pleased with, those odious proceedings, those infamous diatribes, since it tolerated them, or whether, if not pleased with them, it was too weak to prevent them. And he came to the conclusion that there existed no government where one could not repress calumny, prevent assassination, protect, in short, the social order of Europe.

The English administration then complained in its turn. Those journals, it argued, whose language offends you, are not official; we cannot be answerable for them; but the *Moniteur* is the avowed organ of the French government; it is, moreover, easy to discover by the very language the source of these inspirations. It slanders us every day; we, therefore, and with more foundation, demand satisfaction.

Such were the sorry recriminations with which for several months the despatches of the two governments were filled. But more momentous events all at once supervened, and furnished their irascible dispositions with a more dangerous, though indeed a more worthy object.

Switzerland, wrested from the hands of Reding, the oligarch, had fallen into those of Dolder, the landammann, the head of the party of the moderate revolutionists. The retirement of the French troops was a concession made to that party, in order to render it popular, and a proof of the impatience felt by the First Consul to get rid of Swiss affairs. However, he reaped not the fruit of his excellent intentions. Almost all the cantons had adopted the new constitution, and approved the men appointed to put it in force; but in the little cantons, Schwitz, Uri, Unterwalden, Appenzell, Glarus, and the Grisons, the spirit of revolt, excited by M. Reding and his friends, had soon raised the people of the mountains. The oligarchs, flattering themselves that they should carry their point by force, after the departure of the French troops, assembled the people in the churches, and induced them to reject the proposed constitution. They had persuaded them that Milan was besieged by an Austro-Russian army, and that the French Republic was as near its downfall as in 1799. Though the constitution was rejected, they had not been able to urge them into civil war. The little cantons proceeded no further than to send deputies to Berne, to declare to Verninac, the minister of France, that they had no intention to overthrow the new government, but that they were resolved to separate from the Helvetic confederation, to constitute themselves apart in their mountains, and to revert to their proper system, which was pure democracy. They even desired to settle their new relations with the central government established in Berne under the auspices of France. Verninac, the minister, had of course been obliged to decline such communications, and to declare that he knew no other Helvetic government than that which was sitting at Berne.

In the Grisons were passing tumultuous scenes, that revealed more clearly than all the rest the influences by which the Swiss were then agitated. In the middle of the valley of the Upper Rhine, cultivated by the Grison

mountain: eers, was situated the lordship of Bazun, belonging to the Emperor of Austria. This lordship conferred on the emperor the quality of a member of the Grison leagues, and a direct action on the composition of their government. He chose the ammann of the country from among three candidates who were presented to him. Since the Grisons had been united by France with the Helvetic confederation, the emperor, continuing to be proprietor of Bazun, had managed his domain through the medium of an intendant. This intendant had put himself at the head of the insurgent Grisons, and had taken part in all the meetings in which they had declared their separation from the Helvetic confederation, and their return to the old order of things. He had been charged with and accepted the commission to lay their wishes at the feet of the emperor, and with their wishes their urgent prayer to take them under his protection.

Assuredly, it was impossible to show more clearly on what party persons sought to support themselves in Europe. To all this agitation of mind was superadded something still more serious: people were arming, repairing the muskets left by the Austrians and the Russians in the late war, offering and giving eighteen sous per day to the old soldiers of the Swiss regiments driven out of France, and replacing their former officers. The poor inhabitants of the mountains, simply believing that their religion and their independence were threatened, came tumultuously to fill the ranks of these insurgent bands. The money profusely distributed among them was advanced by the wealthy Swiss oligarchs out of the millions deposited in London, and speedily recoverable if they should happen to triumph. Reding, the landammann, had been declared head of the league. Morat and Sempach were the recollections invoked by these new martyrs of Helvetic independence.

Such an imprudence on their part is almost incomprehensible, the French lining the Swiss frontiers on all sides. But they had been persuaded that the First Consul had his hands tied, that the powers had interfered, and that he could not make a single regiment re-enter Switzerland, without exposing himself to a general war—a threat which assuredly he would not defy for the sake of supporting Dolder, the landammann, and his colleagues.

Notwithstanding all this agitation, however, the poor mountaineers of Uri, Schwitz, and Unterwalden, most deeply engaged in this lamentable adventure, did not proceed so fast as their leaders would have wished, and had declared that they would not leave their cantons. The Helvetic government had at its disposal from four to five thousand men, a thousand or twelve hundred of whom were employed in guarding Berne, a few hundred dispersed in various garrisons, and 3000 in the canton of Lucerne, on the border of Unterwalden: these latter destined to observe the insurrection. A body of insurgents was posted at the village of Hergyswil. The two parties soon began to exchange shots, and a few men were killed and wounded on either side. While this collision was taking place on the frontier

of Unterwalden, General Andermatt, commander of the Government troops, would have placed a few companies of infantry in the city of Zurich, to guard the arsenal there and to save it from the hands of the oligarchs. The aristocratic burghers of Zurich resisted and closed the gates against the soldiers of General Andermatt. The latter sent to no purpose a few howitzers to the city: the inhabitants declared that they would submit to be burned before they would surrender and deliver up Zurich to the oppressors of the independence of Helvetia. At the same moment, the partisans of the old aristocracy of Berne in the country of Argau and the Oberland were in such a state of commotion as to excite apprehensions of a rising. In the canton of Vaud was raised the usual cry for incorporation with France. The Swiss government knew not how to extricate itself from this perilous situation. Combated with open force by the oligarchs, it had not on its side either the ardent patriots, who wished for absolute unity, or the peaceable masses, who were well disposed to revolution, but knew nothing of that revolution excepting the horrors of war and the presence of foreign troops. It was now capable of judging the worth of the popularity acquired at the price of the removal of the French troops.

In its embarrassment, it agreed to an armistice with the insurgents, and then addressed itself to the First Consul, earnestly soliciting the intervention of France, which the insurgents on their part also applied for, since they wished that their relations with the central government should be finally settled under the auspices of Verninac, the minister.

When this demand for intervention was known in Paris, the First Consul repented of having given way too readily to the ideas of the Dolder party, as well as to his own desire to disengage himself from the affairs of Switzerland, which had induced him to withdraw the French troops prematurely. To send them back again now, in the face of England, so maliciously disposed, and complaining of our too manifest action on the States of the continent, was an extremely serious proceeding. For the rest, he was still unacquainted with what was passing in Switzerland; he knew not to what degree the instigators of the movement in the little cantons had revealed their real designs, so as to show that they were the agents of the European counter-revolution, and the allies of Austria and England. He refused, therefore, the universally solicited intervention, the inevitable consequence of which would have been the return of the French troops to Switzerland, and the military occupation of an independent State guarantied by Europe.

This answer threw the Helvetic government into consternation. Threatened with a speedy rupture of the armistice and a rising of the peasants of the Oberland, they knew not how to act at Berne. Certain members of the government were for sacrificing Dolder, the landammann, the head of the moderates, and who, as such, was hated alike by the unitary patriots and by the oligarchs. Both promised themselves that quiet would be restored on

this condition. They repaired to the residence of citizen Dolder, they used a sort of violence, and demanded his resignation, which he had the weakness to give. The senate, more firm, refused to accept this resignation, but citizen Dolder persisted in it. They then had recourse to the usual expedient of assemblies which are at a loss what resolution to adopt, and appointed an extraordinary commission, charged to devise means of safety. But at this moment the armistice was broken: the insurgents advanced upon Berne, obliging General Andermatt to fall back before them. These insurgents consisted of peasants, to the number of fifteen hundred or two thousand, carrying crucifixes and carbines, and preceded by the soldiers of the Swiss regiments formerly in the service of France, old wrecks of the 10th of August. They soon made their appearance at the gates of Berne, and fired a few cannon-shot with wretched pieces which they dragged after them. The municipality of Berne, under pretext of saving the city, interfered and negotiated a capitulation. It was agreed that the government, to spare Berne the horrors of an attack by main force, should retire with the troops of General Andermatt to the Pays de Vaud. This capitulation was immediately executed. The government repaired to Lausanne, whither it was followed by the minister of France. Its troops, concentrated since the cession of the country to the insurgents, were at Payerne, to the number of 4000 men, well disposed enough, encouraged moreover by the sentiments manifested in the Pays de Vaud, but incapable of recovering Berne.

The oligarchic party immediately established itself at Berne, and, to do things completely, reinstated the avoyer who was at the head of affairs in 1798, at the very time when the first revolution took place. This avoyer was M. de Mulinen. Thus this counter-revolution was not deficient either in regard to ground-work or to form; and, but for the silly illusions of the parties, but for the absurd reports circulated in Switzerland respecting the alleged impotence of the French government, so extravagant an attempt would have been incomprehensible.

Things having been carried to this point, however, it was impossible to reckon upon the further patience of the First Consul. The two governments, sitting at Lausanne and Berne, had despatched envoys, the one beseeching him to interpose, the other conjuring him to do nothing of the kind. The envoy of the oligarchic party was a member of the Mulinen family. He was commissioned to renew the promises of good conduct, of which M. Reding had been so lavish, and which he had so ill kept; to confer at the same time with the ambassadors of all the powers in Paris, and to place Switzerland under their special protection.

Supplications to the First Consul to act or not to act were henceforth useless. Face to face with a flagrant counter-revolution, having for its object to deliver up the Alps to the enemies of France, he was not a man to hesitate. He would not receive the agent of the oligarchic government, but to the intermediate persons charged to speak for that agent, he replied that

his resolution was taken—I cease, said he to them, to be neuter and inactive. I had resolved to respect the independence of Switzerland, and to spare the susceptibilities of Europe; I have carried my scruples to an absolute fault—the removal of the French troops. But this is sufficient condescension for interests inimical to France. While I saw in Switzerland nothing but conflicts, which could end only in making one party a little stronger than another, it was my duty to leave her to herself, but, now that an open counter-revolution is on foot, accomplished by soldiers, formerly in the service of the Bourbons, who have since been taken into the pay of England, I cannot make any mistake: if these insurgents wished to leave me under any illusion, they would introduce more dissimulation into their conduct, and not place soldiers of Buchmann's regiment at the head of their columns. I will not suffer counter-revolution anywhere, either in Switzerland, in Italy, in Holland, any more than in France itself. I will not deliver up to fifteen hundred mercenaries, paid by England, those formidable bastions of the Alps, which the European coalition has not been able in two campaigns to wrest from our exhausted soldiers. People talk to me about the will of the Swiss people; I cannot discover it in the will of two hundred aristocratic families. I esteem that brave people too highly to believe it to be desirous of such a yoke. But, at any rate, there is something that I estimate more highly than the will of the Swiss people, that is the safety of forty millions of men, over whom I rule. I will declare myself mediator of the Helvetic confederation, and give it a constitution founded on equality of rights and the nature of the soil. Thirty thousand men shall be on the frontier to insure the execution of my beneficent intentions. But if, contrary to my expectation, I cannot insure the tranquillity of an interesting people, for whom I wish to do all the good that it deserves, my resolution is taken. I shall unite to France all that in soil or manners resembles Franche-Comté; I shall unite the rest with the mountaineers of the petty cantons, give them the government which they had in the fourteenth century, and leave them to themselves. My principle is henceforth fixed: either a Switzerland friendly to France, or no Switzerland at all.

The First Consul enjoined M. de Talleyrand to make the envoy of Berne leave Paris within twelve hours, and to tell him that it was only in Berne itself that he could any longer serve his constituents, by advising them to separate instantly if they would avoid bringing a French army into Switzerland. He drew up with his own hand a proclamation to the Helvetic people, short, energetic, conceived in these terms:

“Inhabitants of Helvetia, for two years past, you have exhibited an afflicting spectacle. Hostile factions have successively seized the chief power; they have marked their transient rule by a system of partiality, which proved their weakness and their incompetence. ➤

“In the course of the year X., your government desired that the small number of French troops then in Helvetia should be withdrawn. The French government gladly ac-

casion to honour your independence; but it was not long before your different parties were agitated with new fury: the blood of Swiss was spilt by the hands of Swiss.

"You have been quarrelling three years without coming to any understanding. If you are left longer to yourselves, you will be killing one another for three years more, without any better prospect of agreeing. Your history, moreover, proves that your intestine wars never could be terminated but by the friendly interference of France.

"It is true that I had resolved to abstain from intermeddling at all in your affairs; I had constantly seen your different governments apply to me for my advice and not follow it, and sometimes make an improper use of my name, according to their interests and their passions. But I cannot, and ought not, to remain insensible to the calamities to which you are a prey: I revoke my resolution. I will be the mediator of your differences; but my mediation shall be efficacious, such as befits the great nation in whose name I speak."

To this noble preamble were subjoined imperative dispositions. Five days after the notification of this proclamation, the government, which had withdrawn to Lausanne, was to remove to Berne, the insurrectional government was to dissolve itself, all the armed assemblages, excepting the army of General Andermatt, were to disperse, and the soldiers of the old Swiss regiments were to lay down their arms in the communes in which they resided. Lastly, all those who had held public offices during the last three years, let them belong to what party they would, were invited to Paris, there to confer with the First Consul on the means of putting an end to the troubles of their country.

The First Consul ordered his aide-de-camp, Colonel Rapp, to proceed immediately to Switzerland; to deliver his proclamation to all the legal or insurrectional authorities; to go first to Lausanne, then to Berne, Zurich, Lucerne, to every place, in short, where there was any resistance to overcome. Colonel Rapp was, moreover, to concert respecting the movements of the troops with General Ney, who was to command them. Orders had already been despatched for these troops to march. A first corps of seven or eight thousand men, drawn from the Valais, Savoy, and the departments of the Rhone, was forming at Geneva. Six thousand men were assembling at Pontarlier, six thousand at Huningen and Basle. A division of the like force was concentrating in the Italian Republic, for the purpose of entering Switzerland by the Italian bailiwicks. General Ney was to wait at Geneva for the information he was to receive from Colonel Rapp, and, at the first signal from the latter, to enter the Pays de Vaud with the column formed at Geneva, to join by the way that which had penetrated by Pontarlier, and to advance upon Berne with twelve or fifteen thousand men. The troops from Basle had orders to form a junction in the little cantons with the detachment which should have come through the Italian bailiwicks.

All these dispositions, arranged with extra-

ordinary despatch, for in forty-eight hours the resolution was taken, the proclamation drawn up, the order for marching sent off to all the corps, and Colonel Rapp on his route for Switzerland, the First Consul awaited with calm courage the effect produced on Europe by so bold a resolution, which, added to all that he had done in Italy and Germany, must render more conspicuous a power that already dazzled all eyes. But, whatever might result from it, even war, his resolution was an act of wisdom; for, the point was to rescue the Alps from the European coalition. Energy, under the control of prudence, is one of the finest spectacles that policy can exhibit.

The agent of the oligarchy of Berne, sent to Paris, had not failed, on finding himself so roughly received, to have recourse to the ambassadors of the courts of Austria, Russia, Prussia, and England. M. de Markoff, though he declaimed every day against the conduct of France in Europe, M. de Markoff himself dared not reply. All the other representatives of the powers were silent, excepting Mr. Merry, the minister of England. This latter, after placing himself in communication with the envoy of Berne, immediately despatched a courier, to acquaint his court with what was passing in Switzerland, and to apprise it that the government of Berne formally claimed the protection of England.

Mr. Merry's courier arrived at Lord Hawkesbury's at the same time that the French papers reached London. Immediately there was heard in England but one cry in favour of the brave people of Helvetia, who, it was said, were defending their religion and their liberty against a barbarous oppressor. That emotion which we have seen in our times communicated to all Europe in behalf of the Greeks slaughtered by the Turks, people in England affected to feel for the oligarchs of Berne, exciting unfortunate peasants to arm on account of their privileges. Great zeal was feigned and subscriptions were opened. The emotion, however, was too factitious to be general: it descended no lower than those elevated classes, who in general take an interest only in the political circumstances of the day. Grenville, Wyndham, Dundas, made excursions to inflame people's minds, and railed with fresh vehemence against what they called the weakness of Mr. Addington. Parliament had just been dissolved and new elections were to take place. The English cabinet, between the Pitt party, which was visibly falling off from it, and the Fox party, which though mollified since the peace, had not ceased to be in opposition, knew not upon whom to support itself. It had great fears of the first meetings of the new parliament, and deemed it expedient to take some diplomatic steps which might serve for arguments against its adversaries.

The first step decided upon was to transmit a note to Paris, to remonstrate in favour of the independence of Switzerland, and to protest against all material intervention on the part of France. This was not the way to restrain the First Consul, but merely to draw upon itself an exchange of disagreeable communications.

But the Addington cabinet did not stop there. It sent an agent, Mr. Moore, to Switzerland, with instructions to see and hear the chiefs of the insurgents, to judge whether they were fairly resolved to defend themselves, and in this case to offer them the pecuniary assistance of England. He had orders to purchase arms in Germany, to be forwarded to them. This step, it must be confessed, was neither honourable nor easy to justify. Still more serious communications were addressed to the Court of Austria, to rekindle its old aversion against France, to exasperate its recent resentment on account of the affairs of Germany, and to alarm it above all respecting the frontier of the Alps. The English minister went so far as to offer it a subsidy of 100,000,000 of florins (225 millions of francs) if it would espouse the cause of Switzerland. Such, at least, was the information transmitted to Paris by Haugwitz himself, who took great pains to acquaint himself with every thing that could interest the maintenance of peace. A less open attempt was made upon the Emperor Alexander, who was known to be rather deeply involved in the policy of France, in consequence of the mediation exercised at Ratisbon. No overture was made to the Prussian cabinet, which was notoriously attached to the First Consul, and which, on this account, was treated with reserve and coldness.

These steps of the British cabinet, unbecoming as they were in a state of absolute peace, could not be of much consequence, for that cabinet found all the courts of the continent more or less bound to the policy of the First Consul; some, as Russia, because they were then associated in his proceedings; others, as Prussia and Austria, because they were on the point of obtaining from him purely personal advantages. It was, in fact, the moment when Austria was soliciting an extension of indemnities in favour of the Archduke of Tuscany, which she ultimately obtained. But the English cabinet committed an act of far greater importance, and which had subsequently immense consequences. The order to evacuate Egypt was despatched; that for the evacuation of Malta was not yet sent. Thus far this delay had arisen from excusable motives, and was rather imputable to the French ministry for foreign affairs than to the English. M. de Talleyrand, as the reader may recollect, had neglected to follow up one of the stipulations of the treaty of Amiens. This stipulation purported that Russia, Prussia, Austria, and Spain, should be requested to guaranty the new order of things established in Malta. Ever since the first days after the signature of the treaty, the English ministers, urged to obtain this guarantee before the evacuation of Malta, had been most zealous in their applications for it to all the courts. But the French agents had not yet received instructions from their minister. M. de Champagny had the prudence to act at Vienna as if he had received them, and the guarantee was granted. The young Emperor of Russia, on the contrary, not sharing the passion of his father for every thing that concerned the Order of St. John of Jerusalem, considering the solicited guarantee as onerous

to him, because it might sooner or later involve the obligation of taking part between France and England, was not disposed to give it. The ambassador of France having no instructions to second the proceedings of the English minister, and not daring to act without them, the Russian cabinet was in no hurry to explain, and availed itself of the circumstance to give no answer. The same thing, and from the same motives, took place in Berlin. Owing to this negligence, prolonged for several months, the question of the guarantee remained in suspense, and the English ministers, without any ill intention, had been authorized to defer the evacuation. The Neapolitan garrison, which, according to the treaty, was to be sent to Malta, till the reconstitution of the Order, had been received upon the island, but only outside the fortifications. The French chancellerie had at length bestirred itself, but too late. This time, the Emperor of Russia, urged to explain himself, had refused his guarantee. Another difficulty had arisen. The grand-master nominated by the Pope, the *bailli* Ruspoli, deterred by the fate of M. de Hompesch, his predecessor, seeing that the duty of the order consisted no longer in fighting the infidels, but in keeping itself in equilibrium between two great maritime nations, with the certainty of falling a prey to one or the other, would not accept the vain and onerous dignity which was offered him, and resisted the solicitations of the court of Rome as well as the pressing invitations of the First Consul.

Such were the circumstances which had caused the evacuation of Malta to be deferred till the month of November, 1802. Hence arose the dangerous temptation for the British cabinet to defer it still longer. Accordingly, on the very day that Moore, the agent, set out for Switzerland, a frigate sailed for the Mediterranean to carry orders to the garrison of Malta to remain there. It was a grievous fault on the part of an administration anxious to preserve peace, for it excited in England a national covetousness which no one could withstand after it had been excited. Moreover, it was a formal infringement of the treaty of Amiens, in the face of an adversary, who had taken a pride in executing it punctually, and who would take a great deal more in causing it to be executed by all the parties who had signed it. This was conduct at once imprudent and irregular.

The remonstrances of the British cabinet in behalf of the independence of Switzerland met with a most discourteous reception from the French cabinet; and, though it was easy to foresee the consequences of this reception, the First Consul was not to be shaken. He persisted more than ever in his resolutions. He repeated his orders to General Ney, and enjoined the most speedy and decisive execution of them. He insisted that this alleged national rising was but a ridiculous attempt, instigated by the interest of a few families, and no sooner made than suppressed.

He was convinced that in this circumstance he was obeying a great national interest, but he was, moreover, excited by the sort of challenge which had been given him in the face

of Europe, for the insurgents loudly asserted, and their agents everywhere repeated, that the First Consul had his hands tied and durst not act. In the answer addressed by his order to Lord Hawkesbury, there was something truly extraordinary. We give its substance, without advising any person whatever to imitate it.—“You are charged to declare,” wrote M. de Talleyrand to M. Otto, “that if the British administration, in the interest of its parliamentary situation, has recourse to any notification or any publication, from which it may be inferred that the First Consul has not done this or that, because he has been prevented, that very instant he will do it. For the rest, as for Switzerland, whatever may be said or not said, his resolution is irrevocable. He will not give up the Alps to fifteen hundred mercenaries, paid by England. He will not suffer Switzerland to be turned into another Jersey. The First Consul does not wish for war, because he believes that the French people can find in the extension of its commerce as many advantages as in the extension of its territory. But no consideration would stop him, if the honour or the interest of the Republic commanded him to resume arms.—You will never talk of war,” wrote M. de Talleyrand in another place to M. Otto, “but you will never suffer it to be mentioned to you. The least threat, how indirect soever it be, must be taken up with the greatest warmth. Besides, with what war would they threaten us! With a maritime war? But our commerce has scarcely revived, and the booty which we should give up to the English would be of very little value. Our West India Islands are provided with soldiers inured to the climate; St. Domingo alone contains twenty-five thousand. They would blockade our ports, it is true, but, at the very instant of a declaration of war, England would find herself blockaded in her turn. The coasts of Hanover, of Holland, of Portugal, of Italy, as far as Tarento, would be occupied by our troops. Those countries which we are accused of ruling too openly, Liguria, Lombardy, Switzerland, Holland, instead of being left in that uncertain situation, in which they raise up for us a thousand embarrassments, would be converted into French provinces, from which we should derive immense resources; and we should thus be forced to realize that empire of the Gauls, with which incessant efforts are made to terrify Europe. And how would it be, if the First Consul, leaving Paris, were to establish himself at Lille or at St. Omer, collecting all the flat-bottomed boats of Flanders and Holland, preparing means of transport for a hundred thousand men, keeping England in constant apprehension of an invasion, always possible, almost certain! Would England kindle a continental war? But where would she find allies? Not in Prussia and Bavaria, who owe to France the justice which they have obtained in the territorial arrangements of Germany. Not in Austria, exhausted through having chosen to be subservient to British policy. At any rate, if war should be renewed on the continent, it would be England that would have obliged us to conquer Europe.

The First Consul is but thirty-three years old; as yet he has destroyed none but States of the second order! Who knows what time it would take him, if he were forced to it, to change anew the face of Europe and to resuscitate the empire of the West!”

All the misfortunes of Europe, all those of France also, were comprehended in those formidable words, which one would suppose to have been written after the events, so prophetic are they.¹ Thus the lion, having become adult, began to feel his strength, and was ready to make use of it. Covered by the barrier of the Ocean, England delighted in chafing him. But this barrier is not impossible to be passed, and how very little was wanting to its having been passed!—and, had it been, England would have bitterly deplored the excitements to which she was instigated by an incurable jealousy. It was, besides, a cruel policy towards the continent, for it had to suffer all the consequences of a war provoked without reason as without justice.

M. Otto had orders not to mention either Malta or Egypt, for one would not have even supposed that England could violate a solemn treaty, signed before the face of the world. The only injunction given him was to sum up the whole policy of France in these words, *The whole treaty of Amiens; nothing but the treaty of Amiens.*

M. Otto, a man of discretion, very submissive to the First Consul, but capable, for a useful object, of introducing a little of his own in the execution of the orders which he received, greatly softened down the haughty language of his government. Nevertheless, with this answer, even when softened down, he embarrassed Lord Hawkesbury, who, fearful of the approaching meeting of parliament, would fain have something satisfactory to say. He insisted on having a note. M. Otto had orders to refuse it, and did refuse it, declaring, however, that the meeting of the principal citizens of Switzerland in Paris was not designed to imitate what had been done at Lyons, at the time of the Italian Consulta, but solely to give Switzerland a wise constitution, based on justice and the nature of the country, without the triumph of one party or another. Lord Hawkesbury, for whom, during this conference with M. Otto, the British cabinet, sitting at this moment, was waiting to learn the answer of France, appeared agitated and displeased. To the declaration, *The whole treaty of Amiens; nothing but the treaty of Amiens*, of the purport of which he was perfectly aware, for it alluded to Malta, he replied with this maxim, *The state of the continent at the time of the treaty of Amiens; nothing but that state.*

This manner of putting the question provoked an instantaneous and categorical answer on the part of the First Consul. France, said M. de Talleyrand, by his orders, France accepts the condition laid down by Lord Hawkesbury. At the time of the signature of the treaty of Amiens, France had ten thousand

¹ The despatch, the substance of which we have given above, is dated the 1st Brumaire, year XI: it is written by M. Talleyrand to M. Otto, at the dictation of the First Consul.

men in Switzerland, thirty thousand in Piedmont, forty thousand in Italy, twelve thousand in Holland. Would they have things replaced on this footing! At that time England was invited to join in arranging the affairs of the continent, but on condition that she should recognise and guaranty the States recently constituted. She refused: she chose to know nothing about the kingdom of Etruria, the Italian Republic, the Ligurian Republic. She had thus the advantage of not giving her guarantee to these new States, but she also lost the means of interfering subsequently in what concerned them. For the rest, she knew all that was already done, all that was to be done. She was aware of the presidency conferred by the Italian Republic on the First Consul; she was aware of the design of annexing Piedmont to France, because she had been refused the indemnity demanded for the King of Sardinia; and she nevertheless signed the treaty of Amiens! What then does she complain of! She stipulated one thing, the evacuation of Tarento in three months, and Tarento was evacuated in two. As for Switzerland, it was known that the business of constituting it had been taken in hand, and it could not be imagined by any one that France would suffer a counter-revolution to be effected there. But, at any rate, even on the ground of strict right, what is there still to object! The Helvetic government has claimed the mediation of France. The small cantons have claimed it also, by desiring to establish, under the auspices of the First Consul, their relations with the central authority. The citizens of all parties, even those of the oligarchic party, Messrs. Mulinen and d'Affry, are in Paris, conferring with the First Consul. In the affairs of Germany what is there new for England! What are they but the literal execution of the treaty of Lunéville, known and published long before the treaty of Amiens! Why has England signed the arrangements adopted for Germany, if it seemed wrong to her to secularize it! Why has the elector of Hanover, who is also King of Great Britain, approved the Germanic negotiation by accepting the bishopric of Osnabrück! Why, moreover, has the house of Hanover been so well, so liberally treated, unless in consideration of England! The British cabinet had no wish to interfere six months ago in the affairs of the continent; it would do so now: let it if it pleases. But has it more interest in those affairs than Prussia, than Russia, than Austria! Well, these three powers adhere at this moment to what has recently taken place in Germany. How could England allege a better right to judge of the interests of the continent! It is true that, in the great Germanic negotiation, the name of the King of England has not figured. It has not been mentioned, and this may perhaps offend his people, tenacious of holding, and having a right to hold, a conspicuous place in Europe. But whose fault is it, unless that of England herself! The First Consul would have desired nothing better than to show her friendship and confidence, than to resolve jointly with her the great questions which he has just resolved jointly with Russia; but for

friendship and confidence there should be a return. Now, in England are raised none but cries of hatred against France. The English constitution, we are told, will have it thus. Be it so: but it does not command French pamphleteers and the authors of the infernal machine to be tolerated in London, members of the house of Bourbon to be received and treated as princes with all the honours due to sovereignty. When other sentiments are shown for the First Consul, he will be led to cherish others too, and to share with England the European influence which he has thought fit to share this time with Russia.

Indeed, we know not whether we are blinded by our patriotic sentiments, but we seek truth without respect to nation, and it seems to us that the vigorous reasoning of the First Consul is unanswerable. England, when signing the treaty of Amiens, was aware that France swayed the neighbouring States, occupied by her troops, Italy, Switzerland, Holland, and was about to proceed to the distribution of the German indemnities: she was not ignorant of this, and, having need of peace, she signed the treaty of Amiens, without concerning herself about the interests of the continent. And now that peace had in her eyes fewer charms than in the first days; now that her commerce found in it less advantage than she had at first hoped for; now that the party of Mr. Pitt was raising its head; now, finally, that quiet, succeeding the agitations of war, permitted the power and the glory of France to be more clearly discerned, England was seized with jealousy; and, without having it in her power to specify any violation of the treaty of Amiens, she harboured the design of violating it herself in the most audacious and unheard-of manner.

It seems to us that M. Haugwitz, with his rare perspicacity, properly appreciated the British cabinet, when, on this occasion, he said to our ambassador, "this weak Addington administration was in such a hurry to sign the peace that it passed over every thing without raising any objection: it now perceives that France is great; that she is reaping the consequences of her greatness; and it wants to tear the treaty that it has signed."

During this exchange of angry communications between France and England, Russia, which had received the demands of the Swiss insurgents and the complaints of the English, Russia had sent to Paris a despatch written in very guarded terms, in which, without repeating any of the recriminations of Great Britain, she nevertheless insinuated to the First Consul that it was necessary, for the preservation of peace, to allay certain jealousies excited in Europe by the power of the French republic, and that it belonged to him, by his moderation, out of respect for the independence of the neighbouring states, to extinguish those jealousies. This was very wise advice, which had reference to Switzerland, which had nothing offensive to the First Consul, and well became that character of impartial moderation, which the young emperor seemed at that time desirous to make the glory of his reign. As for Prussia, she had declared that she highly

applauded the First Consul, for not suffering a focus of English and Austrian intrigues in Switzerland; that he did well to make haste and not give his enemies time to profit by such embarrassments; and that he would do still better, if he would deprive them of all pretext for complaint, and refrain from renewing in Paris the Consulta of Lyons. Lastly, as for Austria, she affected not to interfere in the matter, and indeed she durst not, having still need of France for the winding up of the German affairs.

The First Consul was of the same opinion as his friends; he resolved to act promptly, and not to imitate in Paris the Consulta of Lyons, that is to say, not to make himself president of the Helvetic republic. For the rest, that desperate resistance which, it was reported, the Swiss were to make against him was not, neither could it be, any thing but extravagance of emigrants. The moment Colonel Rapp, on his arrival at Lausanne, appeared at the advanced posts of the insurgents, unaccompanied by a single soldier, and bringing only the proclamation of the First Consul, he found people entirely disposed to submit. General Buchmann, expressing regret that he had not twenty-four hours more to fling the Helvetic government into the lake of Geneva, retired, nevertheless, towards Berne. There he found preparations for resistance on the part of the oligarchs. These were absolutely bent on obliging France to employ force, thinking thereby to compromise her with the European powers. Their wishes were gratified, for that force arrived in the utmost haste. The French troops, placed on the frontiers under the command of General Ney, entered, and then the insurrectional government hesitated no longer to dissolve itself. The members of which it was composed withdrew, declaring that they yielded to violence. The people everywhere readily submitted, excepting in the little cantons, where the agitation was greater, and where the insurrection had originated. There, however, as in other parts, the opinion of rational persons finally prevailed on the approach of our troops, and all serious resistance ceased in their presence. The French General Seras, at the head of some battalions, took possession of Lucerne, Stantz, Schwitz, and Altorf. M. Reding was apprehended with some agitators; the insurgents suffered themselves to be successively disarmed. The Helvetic government, which had fled to Lausanne, returned to Berne, under the escort of General Ney, who repaired thither in person, with a single demi-brigade. In a few days, the city of Constance, where Moore, the English agent, had established himself, swarmed with emigrants of the oligarchic party, returning after having uselessly expended the money of England, and acknowledging publicly the absurdity of that rash enterprise: Mr. Moore returned to London, to report the ill success of this Helvetic Vendée, which his government had endeavoured to raise up amidst the Alps.

This prompt submission was attended with one great advantage, for it proved that the Swiss, whose courage, even against a superior

force, could not be doubted, did not deem themselves obliged by honour or by interest to oppose the intervention of France. It thus did away with all ground of complaint on the part of England.

It was requisite to complete this work of pacification by giving Switzerland a constitution, and founding that constitution on reason and the nature of the country. The First Consul, with a view to divest the mission of General Ney of the too military character which it appeared to have, conferred on him, in lieu of the title of commander-in-chief, that of minister of France, with the most precise instructions to conduct himself mildly and moderately towards all the parties. There were, moreover, only 6000 French in Switzerland. The surplus had remained on the frontiers.

Men of all opinions, staunch revolutionists as well as decided oligarchs, had been called to Paris, provided that they were influential persons in the country, and enjoyed some consideration. The revolutionists of all shades appointed by the cantons went without hesitation. The oligarchs refused to nominate representatives. They wished to have no hand in what was about to be done in Paris, and thus to reserve the right of protesting. The First Consul was obliged to select himself the persons who were to represent them. He chose several, three in particular of the most noted, Messrs. de Mülinen, d'Affry, and de Watterville, all distinguished for their families, their talents, and their character. These gentlemen persisted in staying away. M. de Talleyrand represented to them that it was a mistaken pique on their part: that they were not invited for the purpose of attending the sacrifice of opinions which were dear to them; that, on the contrary, the balance would be kept equal between them and their adversaries; that they were good citizens, enlightened men, and ought not to refuse to contribute to a constitution, in which the French government would strive sincerely to reconcile all the legitimate interests, and by which, moreover, the destiny of their country would be fixed for a long time. Touched by this invitation, they had the good sense to withdraw themselves from the influences of faction, and answered the honourable appeal addressed to them by repairing immediately to Paris. The First Consul received them with distinction, told them that what he wished all moderate men must wish along with him, for he proposed the constitution which Nature herself had given to Switzerland, that is to say, the ancient constitution, but without the inequalities between citizen and citizen, between canton and canton. After he had endeavoured to soothe the oligarchs in particular, because it was against them that he had just employed force, he appointed four members of the Senate, Messrs. Barthelemy, Rœderer, Fouché, and Demeunier, and desired them to assemble the Swiss deputies, to confer with them together or separately, to bring them over as much as possible to reasonable views, always reserving to himself, as he remarked, the decision of all questions on which they could not agree. Before these conferences began, he admitted to an audience

the principal of them, who had been selected by their colleagues to be presented to him. He addressed them in an extempore speech, full of sound sense, profundity, and originality of language, which was taken down¹ at the moment, for the purpose of being transmitted to the entire deputation.

You must remain, said he to them in substance, what Nature has made you, that is to say, a union of small confederate States, differing in government as in soil, attached to each other by a mere federal bond—a bond which is neither annoying nor expensive. It is necessary also to put an end to the unjust domination of canton over canton, which renders one territory subject to another; it is necessary to put an end to the government of the aristocratic burghers, who in the great towns constitute a class subject to another class. These are barbarisms of the middle ages, which France, called to constitute you, cannot tolerate in your laws. It is important that genuine equality, that which forms the glory of the French Revolution, should triumph among you as among us; that every territory, every citizen, should be equal to the others in rights and in duties. These things granted, you must admit no inequalities, but the differences which Nature herself has established among you. I am not for comprehending you under a uniform and central government, like that of France. Nobody shall ever persuade me that mountaineers, descendants of William Tell, can be governed in the same manner as the wealthy inhabitants of Berne or Zurich. The former must have absolute democracy and a government without imposts. For the latter, on the contrary, pure democracy would be a contradiction. Besides, what would be the use of a central government? To have greatness! It will not come to you, at least not such as the ambition of your unitarians dreams of. To have a greatness after the fashion of that of France! Then you must have a central government, liberally endowed, and a permanent army. Would you like to pay for all this? could you? And then, beside France, which numbers five hundred thousand men, beside Austria, which numbers three hundred thousand, Prussia, which numbers two hundred thousand, what would you do with an army of fifteen or twenty thousand permanent troops? You cut a distinguished figure in the fourteenth century against the Dukes of Burgundy, because all the States were then parcelled out and their strength divided. Now, Burgundy is a point of France. You ought to be able to cope with France or Austria entire. If you want that kind of greatness, do you know what you must do? You must become French, blend yourselves with the great nation, share its charges that you may share its advantages, and then you would be associated in all the chances of its high fortune. But you do not want this, neither do I. The interest of Europe commands different resolu-

tions. You have your peculiar greatness, which is worth as much as any other. You must be a neutral people, whose neutrality all the world respects, because it obliges all the world to respect it. To stay at home, to be free, invincible, respected, is a noble condition enough. For this the federative system is the best. It has less of that unity which dares, but it has more of that inertness which resists. It is not conquered in a day like a central government; for it resides everywhere, in every part of the confederation. Thus, too, militia is better for you than a permanent army. You ought to be all soldiers, the moment the Alps are threatened. Then the permanent army is the entire population, and, in your mountains, your intrepid hunters form a respectable force both by sentiments and by number. You ought not to have any paid and permanent soldiers, but those who go to your neighbours to learn the military art, and to bring back their traditions to you. A confederation leaving to each his native independence, the difference of his manners and his soil, and invincible in its mountains—such is your true moral greatness. If I were not a sincere friend to Switzerland, if I designed to keep it dependent on me, I should wish it to have a central government, entirely resident at one spot. To this I would say, Do this, do that, or I will pass the frontier in twenty-four hours. A federative government, on the contrary, saves itself by the very impossibility of returning a speedy answer; it saves itself by its tardiness. In gaining two months' time, it escapes all foreign urgency. But, in desiring to remain independent, forget not that you must be friends of France. Her friendship is necessary for you. You have enjoyed it for ages, and you are indebted to it for your independence. Switzerland must not on any account become a focus of intrigues and of underhand hostilities; it must not be to Franche-Comté and Alsace what the islands of Jersey and Guernsey are to Bretagne and La Vendée. It must not, either for its own sake or for that of France. Besides, I would not suffer it. I am speaking only of your general constitution: there my knowledge ends. As for your cantonal constitutions, it is for you to enlighten me in regard to them, to make me acquainted with your wants. I will listen to you and endeavour to satisfy you, at the same time retrenching from your laws the barbarous injustices of past times. In particular, forget not that you want a just government, worthy of an enlightened age, conformable to the nature of your country, and, above all, economical. On these conditions it will last, and I desire that it should last; for, if the government which we are about to constitute together should happen to fall, Europe would say either that I contrived it so in order to make myself master of Switzerland, or that I could not produce any thing better: now I do not mean to give it a right to doubt either my sincerity or my skill.

Such was the exact sense of the words of the First Consul. We have changed them merely for the purpose of abridgment. It was impossible to think with more force, justice

¹ This speech was noted down by several persons; there exist different versions of it, two of which are in the archives of the foreign affairs. I have here embodied what is common to both, and what agrees with the letters written on the subject by the First Consul.

loftiness. The work was taken in hand immediately. The federal constitution was discussed at a meeting of all the Swiss deputies. The cantonal constitutions were prepared with the deputies of each canton, and revised at a general meeting. When the passions have cooled, and good sense prevails, the constitution of a people is easily framed, for all that is to be done is to write down a few just ideas, which are already impressed upon every mind. The passions of the Swiss were far from being entirely appeased, but their deputies assembled at Paris were more calm. The change of place and the presence of a superior, benevolent, enlightened authority had considerably modified them. And then, that authority was on the spot, to instil into them those just and not numerous ideas, which must subsist alone after the storms of the passions are dispelled.

The arrangements decided upon were the following:

The chimera of the unitarians was discarded; it was agreed that each canton should have its particular constitution, its civil legislation, its judicial forms, its system of imposts. The cantons were confederated solely for the interests common to the whole confederation, and especially for their relations with the other States. This confederation was to be represented by a diet, composed of an envoy sent by each canton; and this envoy was to have one or two voices in the deliberations, according to the extent of the population which he represented. The representatives of Berne, Zurich, Vaud, St. Gall, Argau, and the Grisons, whose population exceeded one hundred thousand souls, were to possess two votes. The others were to have but one. Thus the diet consisted of twenty-five members. It was called to sit for one month in each year, but each year in a different place. It was to meet alternately in the following cantons: Freiburg, Berne, Solothurn, Basle, Zurich, Lucerne. The canton where the diet was sitting was the directing canton for that year. The chief of that canton, avoyer, or burgo-master, was for that same year landammann of all Switzerland. He received foreign ministers, accredited the Swiss ministers, called out the militia, exercised in short the functions of the executive power of the confederation.

Switzerland was to keep on foot for the service of the confederation, a permanent force of 15,000 men, entailing an expense of 490,500 livres. The assessment of this contingent in men and money was made by the constitution itself among all the cantons, in proportion to their population and wealth. But every Swiss sixteen years of age was a soldier, a member of the militia, and might, in case of need, be called upon to defend the independence of Helvetia.

The confederation had but one and the same coin for the whole country.

There were to be in future no custom-house tariffs but on the general frontier, and these tariffs were to be approved by the diet. Each canton applied to its own benefit the duties levied on its frontiers.

The tolls of a feudal nature were suppressed.

There were retained only such as were necessary for the maintenance of the roads or the navigation. A canton, violating a decree of the diet, might be cited before a tribunal composed of the presidents of the criminal courts of the other cantons.

Such were the very limited powers of the central government. The other attributes of sovereignty not expressed in the federal act were left to the sovereignty of the cantons. There were formed nineteen cantons, and all the territorial questions, so strongly contested between the old sovereign States and the subject States were decided in favour of the latter. Vaud and Argau, formerly subject to Schaffhausen, the Tessin, formerly subject to Uri and Unterwalden, were constituted independent cantons. The small cantons, such as Glarus and Appenzell, which had been enlarged to an unnatural size, were relieved from the inconvenient greatness which had been forced upon them. The canton of St. Gall was composed out of all that Appenzell, Glarus, and Schwitz shook off. Schwitz alone retained some accessions. If to the nineteen following cantons, Appenzell, Argau, Basle, Berne, Freiburg, Glarus, Grisons, Lucerne, St. Gall, Schaffhausen, Schwitz, Solothurn, Tessin, Thurgau, Unterwalden, Uri, Vaud, Zug, and Zurich, we add Geneva, then a French department, the Valais, constituted separately, Neuchâtel, a principality belonging to Prussia, we shall have the twenty-two cantons at present existing.

As for the particular government imposed upon each of them, it had been rendered conformable to their ancient local constitution, purified indeed from all that was feudal or aristocratic. The *landsgemeinde* or assemblies of the citizens twenty years of age, meeting once a year to regulate all affairs and to appoint the landammann, were re-established in the small democratic cantons of Appenzell, Glarus, Schwitz, Uri, and Unterwalden. It was impossible to do otherwise, without driving them into revolt. The government of the *bourgeoisie* was re-established in Berne, Zurich, Basle, and such like cantons, but on condition that the rank should always remain open. Whoever possessed an income of a thousand livres at Berne, or five hundred at Zurich, became a member of the governing *bourgeoisie*, and eligible for all public functions. There were, as formerly, a great council charged to make laws, a little council charged to enforce their execution, an avoyer or burgo-master invested with the executive functions, under the superintendence of the little council. In the cantons where Nature had occasioned particular administrative divisions, such as the *inner* and *outer Rhodes* in Appenzell, the *Leagues* in the Grisons, these divisions were respected and maintained. It was, in short, the old Helvetic constitution, corrected agreeably to the principles of justice and the enlightenment of the times: it was old Switzerland remaining federative, but increased by the subject countries which were raised to the rank of cantons, maintained in a state of pure democracy where Nature would have it so, in the state of governing but not exclusive *bourgeoisie*, where Nature commanded that form. In this operation, so just

and so wise, each party gained and lost something; gained what it wanted of justice, lost what it wished unjust and tyrannical. The unitarians saw their chimera of absolute unity and democracy swept away, but they gained the enfranchisement of the subject countries and the opening of the ranks of the *bourgeoisie* in the oligarchic cantons. The oligarchs saw the subject countries wrested from them; (Berne, in particular, lost Argau and the Vaud;) they saw the patriciate abolished; but they obtained the suppression of the central government and the consecration of the rights of property in the opulent cities, such as Zurich, Basle, and Berne.

The work, however, would be left incomplete, if, while determining the form of the institutions, its authors were not at the same time to decide upon the choice of the persons called to put it in force. In presenting the French Constitution of the year VIII., and the Italian Constitution of the year X., the First Consul had designated in the Constitution itself the persons invested with the high constitutional offices. This was very wise, for, when the point is to pacify a long agitated country, men are of not less importance than things.

The usual tendency of the First Consul was at once to put every thing in its place again. To recall the high classes of society to power, without making those descend who by their merit had raised themselves to it, while insuring to all who should be worthy of it in future the means of rising to it in their turn—this is what he would have done immediately in France, if it had been in his power. But he had not even tried to do it, because the old French aristocracy had emigrated or scarcely returned from emigration, and become by emigrating strangers to the country and to business. Besides, he was obliged to take his point of support in France itself, from one of the parties which divided it; and of course he had taken that point of support from the revolutionary party, which was his. In France, then, he had exclusively surrounded himself, at least at that time, with men belonging to the Revolution. But in Switzerland he was more free; he had not to support himself upon a party, for he acted from without, from the pinnacle of French power: neither had he to do with an emigrant aristocracy. He hesitated not, therefore, and indulging the natural bent of his mind, he called to power, in equal portions, the partisans of the old system and of the new. Commissions, nominated in Paris, were to go to each canton, to carry to it the cantonal constitution, and to select there the persons called to form part of the new authorities. He took care to place in each an equal number of revolutionists and oligarchs, so as to balance one another. Having at last to choose the landammann out of the whole Helvetic confederation, the first destined to hold that office, he boldly selected the most distinguished, but also the most moderate personage of the oligarchic party, M. d'Affry.

M. d'Affry was a wise and a firm man, devoted to the profession of arms, formerly in the service of France, a citizen of the canton of Freiburg, then the least agitated

of the cantons of the confederation. In becoming landammann, M. d'Affry raised his canton to the quality of directing canton. A man of other times, reasonable, a soldier, attached from habit to France, member of a quiet canton—these were decisive reasons in the eyes of the First Consul, and he appointed M. d'Affry. Besides having defied Europe by interfering, it was right to avoid multiplying impressions painful to it by installing rampant democracy and its turbulent chiefs in Switzerland. It behoved him neither to do that nor to assume himself the presidency of the Helvetic Republic, as he had attributed to himself that of the Italian Republic. To settle Switzerland by judiciously reforming it; to wrest it from the enemies of France, by leaving it independent and neutral—such was the problem which he had to resolve, and it was resolved courageously and prudently in a few days.

When that clever work, which, by the title of Act of Mediation, has procured for Switzerland the longest period of tranquillity and good government that it has enjoyed for fifty years past—when that clever work was completed, the First Consul sent for the deputies assembled in Paris, delivered it to them in the presence of the senators who had presided over the whole composition, addressed them in a short and energetic speech, recommended to them union, moderation, impartiality, in short, the conduct that he was pursuing in France, and sent them to their own country, to supersede the provisional and impotent government of the landammann Dolder.

In Switzerland there were astonishment, disappointed passions, discontent, but in the masses, alone sensible to the real benefit, submission and gratitude. This sentiment was more particularly remarked in the little cantons, which, though vanquished, were not treated as such. In fact, M. Reding and his partisans had been immediately released. In Europe there was as much surprise as admiration of the promptness of this mediation and its perfect equity. It was a new act of moral power, like those which the First Consul had accomplished in Germany and Italy, but still more skilful, more meritorious, if possible, for in it Europe was at once braved and respected: braved, in as far as suited the interest of France; respected in its legitimate interests, which were the independence and the neutrality of the Swiss people.

Russia warmly congratulated the First Consul, on having brought so difficult an affair to so speedily and so happy a conclusion. The Prussian Cabinet, through the medium of M. Haugwitz, expressed its opinion in terms of the most cordial approbation. England was stupefied, embarrassed, as if deprived of a grievance about which she had made a great noise.

The parliament, so dreaded by Addington and Hawkesbury, had spent in brisk discussions the time which the First Consul had employed in constituting Switzerland. These discussions had been stormy, brilliant, worthy in particular of admiration, when Fox had pleaded the cause of justice and humanity against the ardent jealousy of his countrymen.

They had revealed, no doubt, the incompetence of the Addington cabinet, but also shown so conspicuously the violence of the war-party, that this party was momentarily weakened in parliament and Mr. Addington strengthened. With this minister peace recovered some of its last chances.

It was the king's speech, delivered on the 23d of November, that had become the theme of these discussions.

"In my intercourse with Foreign Powers," said his Britannic Majesty, "I have been actuated by a sincere disposition for the maintenance of peace; it is nevertheless impossible for me to lose sight of that established and wise system of policy, by which the interests of other States are connected with our own; and I cannot, therefore, be indifferent to any material change in their relative condition and strength. My conduct will be invariably regulated by a due consideration of the actual situation of Europe, and by a watchful solicitude for the permanent welfare of my people. You will, I am persuaded, agree with me in thinking that it is incumbent upon us to adopt those measures of security, which are best calculated to afford the prospect of preserving to my subjects the blessings of peace."

This speech, which marked the new position taken by the British cabinet in regard to France, was followed up by an application for supplies to raise the peace establishment of the navy to 50,000 men, though, according to the first arrangements of Mr. Addington, it was not to have exceeded 30,000. The ministers added that, on the first emergency, fifty sail of the line might be ready to put to sea in less than a month.

The debate was long and stormy, and the administration could perceive that it had gained but little by making concessions to the Grenville and Wyndham party. Mr. Pitt chose to be absent. His friends undertook, in his stead, the violent part which he disdained. "What!" exclaimed Grenville and Canning; "what! has the administration at last discovered that we have interests on the continent; that attention to those interests is an important part of British policy; and that they have never ceased to be sacrificed since the hollow peace signed with France? And is it the invasion of Switzerland that led ministers to perceive this? Was it not till then they began to discover that we were excluded from the continent; that our allies there were immolated to the insatiable ambition of that pretended French Republic, which has desisted from threatening European society with a demagogue convulsion, only to threaten it with a frightful military tyranny? Were your eyes," said they to Addington and Hawkesbury—"were your eyes then shut to the light, while the preliminaries of peace were negotiating, while the definitive treaty was negotiating, while that treaty was beginning to be executed? Scarcely had you signed the preliminaries of London, before our eternal enemy openly seized the Italian Republic, upon pretext of having the presidency of it decreed to him, appropriated Tuscany to himself, upon pretext of granting it to an Infant of Spain, and, as

the price of this false concession, made himself master of the finest part of the American continent—of Louisiana. This he did openly, immediately after the signature of the preliminaries, while you were busy negotiating in the city of Amiens; and this never struck you: Scarcely had you signed the definitive treaty—the wax which you had stamped with the arms of England upon that treaty was scarcely cold—when our indefatigable foe, disclosing the intentions which he had dexterously concealed from you, united Piedmont to France, and dethroned the worthy King of Sardinia, the constant ally of England, who adhered to her with invariable fidelity during a ten years' struggle; who, shut up in his capital by the troops of General Bonaparte, and having no means of saving himself but by a capitulation, would not sign it because it contained the obligation to declare war against Great Britain! When Portugal, when even Naples, closed their ports against us, the King of Sardinia opened his, and he has fallen, because he determined to leave them ever open to us. But this is not all: the definitive treaty was concluded in March; in June, Piedmont was united to France, and, in August, the consular government intimated to Europe, plumply and plainly, that the Germanic Constitution had ceased to exist. All the German States were blended together, and divided, as it were, into lots, which France assigned to whomsoever she pleased; and the only power on which we have reason to reckon for curbing the ambition of our enemy, Austria, has been so weakened, abased, humbled, that we know not whether she will ever be able to raise herself again. And that statholder, for whom we promised to obtain an indemnity equal to his losses, has been treated in a manner scornful to him, scornful to you, who have set yourselves up for protectors of the house of Orange. That house receives for the statholdership a paltry bishopric, nearly the same as the house of Hanover, which has been unworthily robbed of its personal property. Often," exclaimed Lord Grenville, "has it been alleged that England had suffered on account of Hanover; that cannot be said now, for it is on account of England that Hanover has suffered. It is because he was King of England, that the King of Hanover has been thus despoiled of his ancient patrimony. Not even the forms of civility, customary between powers of the same order, have been observed; no communication was made to your king that Germany, the native land of his house, to this day his associate in the Confederation—that Germany, the most extensive country of the continent, was about to be turned upside down. Your king knew nothing of it, nothing but what he could learn from a message of Talleyrand, the minister, to the Conservative Senate. Germany, then, is not one of the countries whose situation is of importance to England! Otherwise, the ministers who tell us, by the lips of his majesty, that they cannot be indifferent to any material change in Europe, would have roused themselves, on this occasion, from their apathy and stupor. Lastly, within these few days, Parma has been erased from the list of independent

States. Parma is become a territory which the First Consul of the French republic is at liberty to dispose of as he pleases. All this has been done before your eyes, and almost without interruption. Not a month, during the fourteen months of this baleful peace—not a month has passed unmarked by the fall of a State in alliance or in friendship with England. You have seen nothing, perceived nothing of it! All at once you awake—why? in behalf of whom? In behalf of the brave Swiss, very interesting people, assuredly, most deserving of all the sympathy of England, but not more interesting for her than Piedmont, than Lombardy, than Germany. And what have you discovered there more extraordinary, more prejudicial than all that has occurred during the last fourteen months? What! nothing drew your attention to the continent, neither Piedmont, nor Lombardy, nor Germany! and it is the Swiss alone who lead you to think that England ought not to be indifferent to the equilibrium of the European powers!" "You have been," said Mr. Canning, "the most incapable of men; for, in remonstrating on behalf of Switzerland, you have rendered England ridiculous, you have exposed her to the contempt of our enemy. At Constance there was an English agent, as everybody knew. Could you tell us what he did there—the part which he acted? It is matter of public notoriety that you addressed remonstrances to the First Consul in favour of Switzerland; can you tell us what answer he gave you? All we know is, that since your remonstrances, the Swiss have laid down their arms before the French troops, and that deputies from all the cantons, assembled in Paris, are receiving laws from the First Consul. You remonstrate, then, in the name of Great Britain, without insisting on being listened to! Better be silent, as you were when Piedmont was swept away, when Germany was overturned, than remonstrate without gaining attention. And how could it be otherwise, when you spoke as inconsiderately as you had held your peace; when you spoke before you had prepared your means, before you had a fleet, an army, or an ally. Either be silent, or raise your voice with the certainty of enforcing attention; then you will not expose the dignity of a great nation to hazard. You ask us for supplies: what would you do with them? If it is for peace, they are too large; if for war, not large enough. We will give you them, nevertheless, but on condition that you leave the duty of employing them to the man whom you succeeded, and who alone can save England in the crisis into which you have imprudently precipitated her."

Thus the English ministers obtained no credit even for their concessions to the party hostile to peace, for their very remonstrances in behalf of Switzerland were made a subject of reproach: and, it must be confessed, on this point and on this only, there was a foundation for those reproaches. Their conduct on this occasion had been puerile.

However, amidst these declarations, Lord Grenville had advanced something momentous and most extraordinary for one who had been

minister for foreign affairs. In censuring Mr. Addington and Lord Hawkesbury for having dismantled the fleet, disbanded the army, evacuated Egypt, given up the Cape, he commended them on one point, for not having yet withdrawn the English troops from Malta. It is from negligence, from levity, that you have acted thus, he exclaimed; lucky negligence, the only thing that we can approve in you! But we hope you will not let this last pledge, left by accident in your hands, slip from your grasp, and that you will hold it fast to indemnify us for all the violations of treaties committed by our insatiable enemy.

It was impossible to advocate in a more barefaced manner the violation of treaties.

Amidst this vituperation, the eloquent and generous Fox had recourse to the language of good sense, moderation, and national honour, in the genuine acceptance of the latter term—I have but little intercourse with the members of the cabinet, said he, addressing the Grenville and Canning opposition, and besides, I am not in the habit of defending the ministers of his Majesty; but I am astonished at all I hear, astonished particularly, on considering who they are that say such things. Indeed, I am more grieved than any of the honourable colleagues and friends of Mr. Pitt at the growing greatness of France, who is daily extending her power in Europe and in America. I am grieved at it, though I share not the prepossessions of the honourable members against the French Republic. But, after all, when was this extraordinary aggrandizement, which astonishes and alarms you; when was it produced? Was it during the administration of Mr. Addington and Lord Hawkesbury, or during the administration of Mr. Pitt and Lord Grenville? Under the administration of Mr. Pitt and Lord Grenville, had not France acquired the line of the Rhine, gained possession of Holland, Switzerland, Italy as far as Naples? Was this because no resistance had been made to her, because her encroachments had been tamely endured, that she had thus outstretched her giant arms? I apprehend not, for Mr. Pitt and Lord Grenville had banded together the most formidable of coalitions to crush that ambitious France. They laid siege to Valenciennes and Dunkirk, and already destined the first of these places for Austria, the second for Great Britain. That France, who is charged with intruding by force in the affairs of others, was then to be invaded, for the purpose of forcing upon her a government to which she would not submit, of obliging her to accept the family of the Bourbons, whose yoke she spurned: and, by one of those sublime movements, which history ought to preserve an eternal record of and to recommend to imitation, France repelled her invaders. Valenciennes and Dunkirk were not wrested from her; laws were not dictated to her; on the contrary, she has dictated laws to others. Now we, though warmly attached to the cause of Great Britain, have felt an involuntary movement of sympathy with that generous outburst of liberty and patriotism, and we have no desire to conceal it. Did not our ancestors applaud the resistance made by Holland to the

tyranny of the Spaniards? Has not old England applauded every noble inspiration in all nations? And you, who now deplore the greatness of France, was it not yourselves who provoked her victorious efforts? Was it not you, who, by striving to take Valenciennes and Dunkirk, urged her to take Belgium; who, by striving to impose laws upon her, urged her to give laws to half the continent? You talk of Italy; but was it not in the power of the French when you were treating? Did you not know that it was? Was not this one of your grievances? Did this circumstance prevent you from signing the peace? And you, colleagues of Mr. Pitt, who then felt how necessary this peace was rendered by the sufferings of a ten years' war, how indispensable it was for the assuaging the evils which were your work, you consented that the present ministers should sign it for you! Why did you not oppose it then? And if you did not oppose it, why not suffer them now to execute its conditions! The King of Piedmont interests you much—well and good: but Austria, whose ally he was much more than yours, Austria had abandoned him. She did not even choose to mention him in the negotiations, lest the indemnity that might be given to this prince should diminish the part of the Venetian States which she coveted for herself. England, then, would pretend to uphold the independence of Italy more effectively than Austria! You talk of Germany turned upside down: but what has been done in Germany? The ecclesiastical States have been secularized to indemnify the hereditary princes, by virtue of a formal article of the treaty of Lunéville, a treaty signed nine months before the preliminaries of London, more than twelve months before the treaty of Amiens, and signed at what period? When Mr. Pitt and Lord Grenville were ministers of England. When Mr. Addington and Lord Hawkesbury came into office, the pretended partition of Germany was agreed upon, promised, decreed, as was notorious to all the world. This, according to you, was turning Germany upside down. Why then do you not complain of Russia, who went halves with France in consummating the convulsion! The elector of Hanover, you say, because, unfortunately for himself, he was King of England, has been very ill-used. I have not heard that he was extremely dissatisfied with his lot; for, without losing any thing, he has obtained a rich bishopric. Besides, I strongly suspect those who so warmly interest themselves for the elector of Hanover, who manifest such solicitude for him, of aiming to gain through this medium the confidence of the King of England, and so striving to advance themselves in his councils. No doubt France is great, much greater than a good Englishman ought to wish; but with that greatness, of which the late ministers of England are the authors, we were acquainted before the preliminaries of London, before the negotiations of Amiens; and that ought not to be a motive for violating solemn treaties. Look vigilantly to the execution of those treaties; if they are violated, claim the fulfilment of the plighted oath; it is your right and your duty.

But because France now appears too great to us, greater than we thought her at first,—to break a solemn engagement, to retain Malta, for instance, would be an unworthy breach of faith, which would compromise the honour of Britain. If the conditions of the treaty of Amiens have really not been performed, we have a right to keep Malta until they are, but not a moment longer. I hope our ministers will not give cause for saying of them what was said of the French ministers after the treaties of Aix-la-Chapelle, Paris, and Versailles, that they had signed them with the secret intention of breaking them on the first opportunity. I think Mr. Addington and Lord Hawkesbury incapable of such conduct; it would be a stain to the honour of Great Britain. After all, these continual invectives against the greatness of France, these alarms which they are intended to excite, serve only to keep up jealousy and animosity between two great nations. I am certain that, if there were in Paris an assembly similar to this which is debating here, the British navy and its domination over the seas, would be talked of in the same terms as we talk in this house of the French armies and their domination over the continent. I can imagine a noble rivalry between two mighty nations; but to think of war, to propose it because a nation grows great, because it prospers, would be senseless and inhuman. If you were to be told that the First Consul were making a canal to carry the sea from Dieppe to Paris, there are people who would believe it, and would propose to you to go to war. They talk of the French manufactures, of their improved state: I have seen those manufactures; I have admired them; but, if I must give my opinion, I am no more afraid of them than of the navy of France. I am certain that the English manufactures will gain the day, whenever a competition takes place between them and the manufactures of France. Let them try their strength; but let them try it at Manchester, at St. Quentin. There the lists are open, that is the field in which the two nations ought to meet. To make war, in order to insure the success of the one or the other, would be barbarous. The French are abused for prohibiting the importation of our goods into their ports; but is that a right which you can prevent the exercise of? And you who complain, is there a nation that employs prohibitions more actively than you do? Part of our commerce is drooping, that is possible; but this has been the case at all times, after the peace of 1763, after the peace of 1782. In those days there were branches of industry which had been developed by the war beyond their usual proportions, which were obliged at the peace to contract themselves within narrower limits; and others, on the contrary, which were destined to acquire a greater expansion. What is to be done in this case? Must we then, to gratify the ambition of our merchants, spill torrents of British blood? For my part, my choice is made. If we must sacrifice thousands of men for insensate passions, I am for reverting to the extravagances of antiquity: I had rather blood should flow for romantic ex-

peditions like that of Alexander, than for the gross cupidity of a few merchants greedy after gold.

These noble words, in which the sincerest patriotism detracted nothing from humanity, for those two sentiments may be reconciled in a generous heart, produced a powerful effect on the English parliament. The progress of our manufactures and of our navy had been exceedingly exaggerated. Both, it is true, had begun to revive; but things scarcely commenced were represented as done and accomplished; and these exaggerations, repeated by the great merchants, were circulated with mischievous effect among all classes of the British nation. The eloquent and sensible language of Mr. Fox came seasonably to counteract that effect, and was heard with benefit, though it was galling to the national sympathies. Besides, though people were dissatisfied and alarmed at our greatness, they had yet no wish for war. The Grenville and Wyndham party had compromised itself by its violence. Mr. Fox had done himself honour in lending support to the cabinet. It was imagined from this conduct, new on his part, that he was likely to come into power. It was even asserted that he would soon reinforce that weak administration, which had acted a paltry and wavering part in the debates, approving what was said in favour of the peace, but not daring to say as much itself. For the rest, the address proposed in reply to the king's speech was voted without amendment; the supplies were voted in like manner. For a certain time, the ministers appeared to be saved, which pleased Mr. Addington, though he was not ambitious, and which was much more gratifying to Lord Hawkesbury, who was far more solicitous to keep his place than Mr. Addington. This species of good luck disposed those two statesmen to a more friendly intercourse with France; for they were desirous to preserve peace, knowing that they had come in with the peace and that they should go out with it. In fact, on the firing of the first shot, Mr. Pitt could not fail to be called by all classes of the nation to resume the reins of government.

The Swiss business, settled with wisdom and promptness, had done away with the principal grievance, and Lord Hawkesbury had desired that General Andreossi, ambassador of France, might set out for London, offering to despatch Lord Whitworth, the English ambassador, to Paris. The First Consul cheerfully complied, for, in spite of some gusts of passion excited in his soul by British malignity, in spite of an unexampled greatness of which he sometimes had glimpses as a consequence of war, he was still wholly intent upon peace. By provoking, by irritating him, his enemies no doubt urged him to say to himself that, after all, war was his natural vocation, his origin, perhaps his destiny; that he knew how to govern in a superior manner, but that before he governed he knew how to fight; that this was his profession, his *art par excellence*; and that if Moreau, with the French armies, had reached the gates of Vienna, he would go much further. These things he frequently repeated to himself, and at this mo-

ment, in fact, extraordinary visions sometimes flitted before his mind. He beheld empires destroyed, Europe reconstructed, and his consular power changed into a crown, not inferior to the crown of Charlemagne. Who ever threatened or irritated him called forth these fatal and seducing images, one after another, before his excited imagination. It was easy to perceive this in the strange loftiness of his daily language, in the despatches which he dictated to his minister for foreign affairs; lastly, in the thousand letters which he addressed to the agents of the administration. At any rate, he said to himself that all this greatness must be his sooner or later, and he thought that the peace had been too brief, that St. Domingo was not definitively reconquered, that Louisiana was not occupied, that the French navy was not re-established. In his opinion, he needed four or five years' incessant efforts in the bosom of a profound peace, before he recommenced the war. The First Consul shared that passion for the construction of great works, which is natural to the founders of empires; he took delight in those fortresses which he was erecting in Italy, in those vast roads which he was cutting over the Alps, in those plans of new towns which he was projecting in Bretagne, in those canals which were to unite the basins of the Seine and the Scheld. He enjoyed absolute power, universal admiration, and all this amidst profound peace, which could not but be the more soothing, after fighting so many battles, traversing so many countries, exposing his fortune and his life to so many risks.

The First Consul was therefore sincerely desirous of the continuance of the peace, and he assented to every thing that could tend to prolong it. In consequence, he directed General Andreossi to proceed to London, and received Lord Whitworth in Paris with great distinction. This personage, destined to represent George III. in France, was a true English gentleman, simple though magnificent in his style of living, sensible, upright, but stiff and proud like his countrymen, and utterly incapable of that skilful and delicate management which was necessary with a character alternately passionate and amiable, like that of the First Consul. It would have required a man of talent rather than a high nobleman, and both in one if possible, as ambassador to a new government, which needed to be flattered and humoured. However, it is not in the first moment that defects of character are perceptible in the intercourse of life. At the outset all goes on smoothly. Lord Whitworth was received most graciously; the most delicate attentions were paid to his wife, the Duchess of Dorset, an English lady of very high distinction. The First Consul gave splendid entertainments to the ambassador and his consort, as well at St. Cloud as at the Tuileries. M. de Talleyrand displayed all the skill and all the elegance of manners which distinguished him, in order to give them a suitable reception. The two consuls, Cambacérés and Lebrun, had ordered themselves to assist him, and they did their best. To these attentions was added the still more flattering attention of publishing them.

In the feeling of England towards France there was a great deal of wounded pride, though interest had the largest share in it. The demonstrations of respect lavished by the First Consul on the British ambassador, produced the greatest effect on public opinion in London, and for a moment instilled better sentiments. General Andreossi himself felt their influence, and met with a flattering reception, exactly similar to that given to Lord Whitworth in Paris. During the months of December and January a sort of calm prevailed. The funds, which had fallen in both countries, rose considerably, and reached the height which they had attained at the moment of the greatest confidence. The five per cents. were 57 or 58 francs in France.

The winter of 1803 was almost as brilliant as that of 1802. It appeared even still more calm, for at home the country was perfectly tranquil, whereas, in the preceding year, the opposition of the Tribunal, without exciting alarm, had occasioned a certain uneasiness. All the high functionaries, consuls, ministers, had orders to throw open their houses, as well to their subordinates as to Parisian society and foreigners. The commercial classes were satisfied with the general state of trade. A feeling of prosperity was everywhere diffused, and at length reached even the circles of the returned emigrants. Every day, some personage bearing a great name was seen quitting the idle, restless, scurrilous group of the old French nobility, and soliciting, in the grave and monotonous saloons of the Consuls Cambacérès and Lebrun, appointments in the magistracy or in the financial department. Some went to Madame Bonaparte herself, to apply for places in the new court. The others spoke ill of those who obtained them, but envied them too at bottom, and were not far from following their example.

This state of things had lasted part of the winter, and might have lasted longer but for a circumstance by which the British government began to feel itself embarrassed; the demur to the evacuation of Malta. In committing the grave fault of countermanding that evacuation, the government had produced in the people of England a very dangerous longing to keep a position which commanded the Mediterranean. Either a strong administration in England, or some kind of concession on the part of France, would have been required to render the relinquishment of so valuable a pledge possible. Now, there was not a strong administration in England, and the First Consul was not so accommodating as to create, by sacrifices, facilities for that which did exist. All that could be expected of him was not to be too precipitate in demanding the execution of the treaties.

A new circumstance rendered the danger of this situation urgent. Thus far there had been a pretext for deferring the execution of the treaty of Amiens in regard to Malta; the refusal of Russia to accept the guarantee of the new order of things established in that island. But the Russian cabinet, appreciating the danger of this refusal, and sincerely wishing to concur in the maintenance of peace, had soon

changed its first determination, from a feeling of courtesy, which did honour to young Alexander; but, to assign a motive for this change it had attached some insignificant conditions to its guarantee, such as the recognition by all the powers of the sovereignty of the Order in the island of Malta, the introduction of natives into the government, and the suppression of the Maltese tongue. These conditions made no alteration in the treaty, for they were almost expressly included in it. Prussia, equally solicitous to insure the peace, had also abandoned her first determination, and granted her guarantee in the same terms as Russia. The First Consul was eager to adhere to the new conditions added to Article X. of the treaty of Amiens, and had formally accepted them.

The English cabinet could no longer hold back. It was obliged to accept the guarantee, such as it was given, or it would be guilty of an evident breach of faith; for the new clauses proposed by Russia were so insignificant that they could not reasonably be refused. Though embarrassed by the difficulties which itself had created, it was nevertheless disposed to seize the last act of the Russian government, as a natural occasion for evacuating Malta, with the proviso of certain apparent precautions in regard to Egypt and the East, when an unlucky incident occurred, and furnished a pretext for its bad faith, if it were had faith, or a bug-bear for its weakness, if it were but weakness.

We have seen that Colonel Sébastiani had been sent to Tunis, and from Tunis to Egypt, to ascertain whether the English were ready to leave Alexandria or not, to observe what was passing between the Mamelukes and the Turks, to re-establish the French protection over the Christians, and to carry to General Brune, our ambassador at Constantinople, a new confirmation of his first instructions. The colonel had completely executed his commission: he had found the English settled in Alexandria, and apparently not disposed to leave it; the Turks engaged in implacable war with the Mamelukes; the French deeply regretted, since people were enabled to compare their government with that of the Turks; and the East still ringing with the name of General Bonaparte. He had mentioned all this; he had even added that, in the situation of Egypt, placed between the Turks and the Mamelukes, a corps of six thousand French would be sufficient to reconquer the country. This report, though guarded, could not be published without inconveniences, because it had been drawn up for the government, and contained many things fit to be said to it alone. For instance, Colonel Sébastiani complained bitterly of the English General Stuart, who occupied Alexandria, and who, by the language which he used, had well nigh caused him to be assassinated at Cairo. Altogether, the report proved that the English were not yet thinking of evacuating Egypt. This decided the First Consul to have it inserted in the *Moniteur*. He found that great liberties were taken in regard to the execution of the treaty of Amiens; and though he had not yet wished to appear pressing in respect to Malta and Alexandria, yet he was not sorry to be able to expose pub-

liely the dilatoriness of the English, by putting forth a document proving their backwardness in performing their engagements, and the ill-will of their officers towards ours. This report was inserted in the *Moniteur* of the 30th of January. But little noticed in France, it produced in England a sensation as strong as it was unexpected. The expedition to Egypt had left behind in the English an extreme susceptibility to every thing which concerned that country; and they fancied that they always had before their eyes a French army ready to embark at Toulon for Alexandria. The narrative of a French officer, exhibiting the wretched state of the Turks in Egypt, the ease with which they might be driven out of it, the favourable impression left behind by the French, and complaining, in particular, of the ill behaviour of a British officer, alarmed them, mortified them, roused them from the tranquillity in which they began to be lulled. This effect, however, would have been but transient, had not the parties made a point of aggravating it. Wyndham, Dundas, Grenville, raised a greater outcry than ever, and drowned the voices of the liberal men, such as Mr. Fox and his friends. In vain the latter contended that there was nothing very extraordinary in this report, and that, if the First Consul had any designs upon Egypt, he would not have made them public. People would not listen to them; they declaimed with violence; they alleged that the English army was insulted, and that it must have a signal reparation to satisfy its outraged honour. The impression produced in London came back to Paris, like a sound reverberated by numerous echoes. The First Consul, hurt at seeing his intentions everlastingly misconstrued, at length lost all patience. He thought it extraordinary that people who were his debtors, for they were in arrears on two essential points, the evacuation of Alexandria and of Malta, should be so ready to complain, when he, on the contrary, had complaints to make against them. He therefore directed M. de Talleyrand in Paris, and General Andreossy in London, to bring the matter to an issue, and to have a categorical explanation relative to the execution of the treaties so long deferred.

The explanation came very unseasonably at the moment. The English ministers, scarcely daring to evacuate Malta before the publication of the report of Colonel Sébastiani, were still less able to do so since the report. They refused to explain, grounding their refusal on motives, which for the first time afforded a glimpse of suspicious intentions. Lord Whitworth was directed to maintain that a compensation was due to England for all the advantage obtained by France; that the treaty of Amiens had been founded on that principle, for it was in consideration of the conquests made by one of the two powers in Europe that numerous possessions in America and India had been granted to the other; that, France, having since the peace adjudged to herself

new territories and a new extension of influence, equivalents were due to England; that, on this ground, England would be justified in refusing to give up Malta; but that, from a desire to preserve peace, she was ready to evacuate that island, without having thought of demanding any compensation, when the report of Colonel Sébastiani appeared; and that, since the publication of that report, the British cabinet had resolved not to grant any thing relative to Malta, but on condition of a two-fold satisfaction, in the first place for the insult offered to the English army; in the second, regarding the views of the First Consul relative to Egypt, views which were expressed in the report in question in such a manner as to give offence and uneasiness to his Britannic Majesty.

When this declaration was addressed to M. de Talleyrand, it excited in him the utmost astonishment. Though he could comprehend the jealousy with which every thing relating to Egypt must be viewed in England, he could not conceive that, if the disposition to give up Malta were sincere, that disposition could be changed for so insignificant a motive as the report of Colonel Sébastiani. He communicated his sentiments to the First Consul, who was astonished in his turn, but, agreeably to his character, more incensed than astonished. He was of opinion, however, and M. de Talleyrand with him, that it was necessary to extricate himself from a situation unpleasant, intolerable, worse than war. The First Consul came to the conclusion that, if the English were desirous to keep Malta, and if all their recriminations were mere pretexts, destined to cloak that desire, he ought to come to a clear explanation with them, and to make them sensible that it was impossible to deceive, to weary him out, or to shake him on this point; that if, on the contrary, the apprehensions which they professed were sincere, he ought to dispel them by communicating his intentions with a truth of language which should remove every doubt. He resolved, therefore, to see Lord Whitworth himself, to speak to that ambassador with unbounded frankness, in order to persuade him that his resolution was taken on both points—the evacuation of Malta, which he determined imperatively to insist upon, and the peace which he most sincerely determined to maintain when he should have obtained the execution of the treaties. It was a new experiment that he was about to make: to say absolutely every thing, even that which a man never says to his enemies, in order to allay their suspicions, if they were but suspicious, or to convict them of falsehood if they were insincere.

On the 18th of February, he invited Lord Whitworth to come in the evening to the Tuileries, and received him most graciously.¹ A large writing-table occupied the middle of his cabinet: he begged the ambassador to take a seat at one end of this table, and seated himself at the other.² He told him that he wished

¹ Lord Whitworth says, "with tolerable cordiality," in his admirable despatch to Lord Hawkesbury, of the 21st of February, 1803, for which see Annual Register for 1803 p. 67. — Translator.

² On this very same day the First Consul gave an account of this conversation to the minister for foreign affairs, for the purpose of being communicated to the ministers at the foreign courts. He talked of it to his

to see him, to converse with him in person, in order to convince him of his real intentions, which none of his ministers could do as well as himself. He then recapitulated his transactions with England from their origin, the rare which he had taken to offer peace on the very day of his accession to the Consulship, the refusals which he had met with, his eagerness to renew negotiations as soon as he could do so honourably, and lastly, the concessions he had made to arrive at the conclusion of the peace of Amiens. He then expressed the mortification he felt to see his efforts to live on good terms with Great Britain meet with so little return. He adverted to the unhandsome treatment which had immediately followed the cessation of hostilities; the animosity of the English newspapers; the license allowed to the journals of the emigrants, a license not to be justified by the principles of the British constitution; the pensions granted to Georges and his accomplices; the continual trips of Chouans to the islands of Jersey and Guernsey; the welcome given to the French princes, who were received with the insignia of the ancient royalty; the sending of agents to Switzerland and Italy to raise difficulties everywhere for France.—Every wind, exclaimed the First Consul, every wind that blows from England, brings me nothing but hatred and insult. Now, added he, we have come to a situation from which we must absolutely relieve ourselves. Will you, or will you not, execute the treaty of Amiens? I have executed it on my part with scrupulous fidelity. That treaty obliged me to evacuate Naples, Tarento, and the Roman States within three months: in less than two months all the French troops were out of those countries. Ten months have elapsed since the exchange of the ratifications, and the English troops are still in Malta and at Alexandria. It is useless to try to deceive us on this point: will you have peace, will you have war? If you are for war, only say so; we will wage it unrelentingly and till the ruin of one of the two nations. If you are for peace, you must evacuate Alexandria and Malta. For, added the First Consul, with the accent of imperturbable resolution, that rock of Malta, on which so many fortifications have been erected, is no doubt of great importance in a maritime point of view; but it has a much greater in my estimation, inasmuch as it interests the highest point of honour of France. What would the world say if we were to allow a solemn treaty signed with us to be violated? It would doubt our energy. For my part, my resolution is fixed: I had rather see you in possession of the heights of Montmartre than of Malta.

Fearful expression, which has been but too completely realized for the misfortune of our country!

Lord Whitworth, silent, motionless, not knowing what to make of the scene in which he was to act a part, replied briefly to the declarations of the First Consul. He alleged the impossi-

bility of extinguishing in a few months the animosities which a long war between the two nations had kindled; he laid great stress on the impediments raised by the English laws, which afforded no means of repressing the licentiousness of writers: lastly, he represented the pensions granted to the Chouans as being in remuneration of past services, not in payment of future services—strange admission from the lips of an ambassador!—and the welcome granted to the French princes as an act of hospitality towards misfortune—an hospitality nobly practised by the British nation. All this could not justify either the toleration granted to French pamphleteers, or the pensions allowed to assassins, or the insignia of ancient royalty permitted to be worn by the Bourbon princes. The First Consul remarked to the ambassador how weak his answer was on all these points, and reverted to the important object, the deferred evacuation of Egypt and Malta. As for the evacuation of Alexandria, Lord Whitworth affirmed that it was accomplished at the moment he was speaking. As for that of Malta, he accounted for the delay which had taken place by the difficulty of obtaining the guarantee of the great courts, and by the obstinate refusal of the grand-master Ruspoli. But he added, the island was at last about to be evacuated, when the changes which had taken place in Europe, and above all the report of Colonel Sébastiani, had raised fresh difficulties. Here the First Consul interrupted the English ambassador.—To what changes are you alluding? he asked. Not the presidency of the Italian Republic, conferred on me before the signature of the treaty of Amiens; not the erection of the kingdom of Etruria, which was known to you before that same treaty, for the recognition of that kingdom was asked of you, and you held out hopes that it might soon be granted. It cannot be that which you mean. Is it Piedmont? is it Switzerland? So little have those two circumstances added to the reality of things, that indeed they are not worth mentioning. But, be that as it may, you have no right now to complain; for, as for Piedmont, I told everybody, even before the treaty of Amiens, what I meant to do with it: I told Austria, Russia, and yourselves. I never consented, when I was solicited on the subject, to promise the reinstatement of the house of Sardinia in its dominions, nor would I even stipulate any determinate indemnity for it. You knew then that I designed to unite Piedmont with France; and, besides, that annexation makes no change in my power over Italy, which is absolute, which I will have so, and which shall remain so. As for Switzerland, you were thoroughly convinced that I should not suffer a counter-revolution there. But all these allegations cannot be taken seriously. My power over Europe since the treaty of Amiens is neither greater nor less than it was. I should have called upon you to share it in the affairs of Germany, if you had shown other sentiments towards me. You well know that,

colleagues and to several persons, who have left a record of it. Lastly, it was transmitted entire by Lord Whitworth to his cabinet. It circulated throughout Europe, and was related in various ways. It is from

these versions, and taking that which appeared to me the most indisputable of all, that mine is composed. I give not the terms but the substance, and pledge myself for the accuracy of the report.

in all I have done, it has been my object to complete the execution of the treaties, and to insure the general peace. Now, look, seek about: is there anywhere a State that I am threatening, or that I design to invade? None, as you well know; at least while the peace shall be maintained. What you say about the report of Colonel Sébastiani, is not worthy of the relations of two great nations. If you are jealous of my designs upon Egypt, my lord, I will endeavour to satisfy you. Yes, I have thought a great deal about Egypt, and I shall think about it still more, if you force me to renew the war. But I will not endanger the peace which we have enjoyed so short a time, for the sake of reconquering that country. The Turkish empire threatens to fall. For my part, I shall contribute to uphold it as long as possible; but, if it crumbles to pieces, I mean France to have her share. Nevertheless, be assured that I shall not precipitate events. If I had pleased, out of the numerous divisions which I despatched to St. Domingo, I might have sent one to Alexandria. The four thousand men you have there would not have been any obstacle to me. They would have been, on the contrary, my excuse. I could have pounced unawares upon Egypt, and this time you should not have wrested it from me. But I have no thoughts of the kind.—Do you imagine, added the First Consul, that I deceive myself in regard to the power which I exercise at this moment over public opinion in France and in Europe? Now, that power is not great enough to allow me to venture with impunity upon an aggression without adequate motive. The opinion of Europe would instantly turn against me; my political ascendancy would be lost; and, as for France, it is necessary for me to prove to her that war is made upon me, that I have not provoked it, in order to inspire her with that enthusiastic ardour, which I purpose to excite against you, if you oblige me to fight. All the faults must be yours, and not one of them mine. I contemplate, therefore, no aggression. All that I had to do in Germany and Italy is done; and I have done nothing but what I had previously announced, avowed, or comprehended in a treaty.

Now, if you doubt my desire to preserve peace, listen, and judge how far I am sincere. Though yet very young, I have attained a power, a renown, to which it would be difficult to add. Do you imagine that I am solicitous to risk this power, this renown in a desperate struggle? If I have a war with Austria, I shall contrive to find the way to Vienna. If I have a war with you, I will take from you every ally on the continent; I will cut you off from all access to it, from the Baltic to the Gulf of Tarento. You will blockade us, but I will blockade you in my turn; you will make the continent a prison for us, but I will make the extent of the seas a prison for you. However, to conclude, there must be more direct means; there must be assembled 150,000 men, and an immense flotilla; we must try to cross the Strait, and perhaps bury in the depths of the sea my fortune, my glory, and my life. It is an awful temerity, my lord, an invasion of England! And, having uttered these words, the

First Consul, to the great astonishment of his auditor, began himself to enumerate the difficulties and the dangers of such an enterprise; the quantity of materials, of men, of ships, which must be pushed into the Strait, and which he would not fail to push into it, for the purpose of attempting the destruction of England: and, insisting more and more strongly, and contending more and more warmly, that the chance of perishing was greater than the chance of succeeding, he added in a tone of extraordinary energy: This temerity, my lord, awful as it is, I am determined to hazard, if you force me to it. I will risk my army and my person. With me that great enterprise will have chances which it cannot have with any other. I have crossed the Alps in winter; I know how to render possible what appears impossible to the generality of men; and, if I succeed, your latest posterity shall deplore with tears of blood the resolution that you shall have obliged me to take. See, now, resumed the First Consul, if I ought, powerful, prosperous, peaceable, as I am at this moment, if I ought to risk power, prosperity, and peace in such an enterprise; and if, when I say that I am desirous of peace, I am not sincere. Then, in a calmer tone, the First Consul added: It is better for you, for me, to keep within the limit of treaties. You must evacuate Malta, not harbour my assassins in England: let me be abused, if you please, by the English journals, but not by those miserable emigrants, who dishonour the protection you grant them, and whom the Alien Act permits you to expel from the country. Act cordially with me; and I promise you, on my part, an entire cordiality! I promise you continual efforts to reconcile our interests wherever they are reconcilable. See what power we should exercise over the world, if we could bring our two nations together! You have a navy, which, with the incessant efforts of ten years and the employment of all my resources, I should not be able to equal; but I have 600,000 men ready to march under my command whithersoever I choose to lead them. If you are masters of the seas, I am master of the land. Let us then think of uniting rather than of going to war, and we shall rule at pleasure the destinies of the world. Every thing is possible, in the interest of humanity and of our double power, to France and England united.

This language, so extraordinary for its frankness, had surprised and agitated the English ambassador, who, unfortunately, though a very honest man, was not capable of appreciating the loftiness and the sincerity of the words of the First Consul. It had been well if the two assembled nations could have listened to such a conversation and replied to it.

The First Consul had not failed to apprise Lord Whitworth that in two days he should open the session of the Legislative Body, agreeably to the prescriptions of the consular Constitution, which fixed that opening for the 1st Ventôse—20th of February; that, according to custom, he should present the annual *exposé* of the state of the Republic, and people must not be surprised in England to find the intentions of the French government *es paia*

expressed there as they had been to the ambassador himself. Lord Whitworth retired, to give his cabinet an account of what he had just seen and heard.

In fact, the First Consul had himself drawn up that *exposé* of the situation of the Republic, and, it must be confessed, never had government to describe a more glorious situation, or done it in nobler language. Tranquillity everywhere infused it to men's minds, the re-establishment of religious worship effected with astonishing promptness and without disturbance, the traces of civil discord everywhere effaced, commerce resuming its activity, agriculture advancing, the revenues of the State manifestly increasing, the public works proceeding with prodigious despatch, the defensive works on the Alps, on the Rhine, on the coasts, carrying on with equal rapidity, entire Europe directed by the influence of France, and without being offended at it, with the exception of England—such was the picture which the First Consul had to present, and which he had delineated with the hand of a master. The day after the opening, the 21st of February—2d Ventôse—three orators of the government carried this report to the Legislative Body, according to the practice introduced under the Consulate, and the reading of it there produced the same thrilling effect as it was destined to produce everywhere else. But the passage relative to England, the object of general curiosity, was marked by such unmitigated pride, and above all by a precision so categorical, that it could not fail to lead to a speedy solution. After adverting to the happy conclusion of the affairs of Germany, the pacification of Switzerland and the conservative policy of France in regard to the Turkish empire, the document added that the British troops still occupied Alexandria and Malta, that the French government had a right to complain, that, however, it had just been informed that vessels which were to convey the garrison of Alexandria to Europe had entered the Mediterranean. As to the evacuation of Malta, it did not intimate whether it was likely to take place soon or not, but it added these significant words:

"The government guarantees to the nation the peace of the continent, and it has reason to hope for the continuance of the maritime peace. That peace is needed and desired by all nations. To preserve it, the government will do all that is compatible with the national honour, essentially involved in the strict execution of treaties.

"But in England two parties are squabbling for power. One of them concluded the peace, and appears decided to maintain it; the other has sworn implacable hatred to France. Hence that fluctuation in opinions and in counsels, and that attitude at once pacific and threatening.

"While this struggle of parties lasts, there are measures which prudence dictates to the government of the Republic. Five hundred thousand men ought to be, and shall be, ready

to defend and to avenge it. Strange necessity, which miserable passions impose upon two nations, that one and the same interest and the like will attach to peace!

"Be the success of the intrigue what it will in London, it will not drag other nations into new leagues, and government asserts with just pride that England single-handed is unable to cope with France.

"But let us have better hopes, and rather believe that the British cabinet will listen to the counsels of wisdom and the voice of humanity

"Yes, no doubt peace will be daily more and more consolidated; the relations of the two governments will assume that character of good-will which is suitable to their mutual interests; a happy tranquillity will banish the remembrance of the long calamities of a disastrous war, and France and England, by reciprocally making each other happy, will entitle themselves to the gratitude of the whole world."

To form a correct judgment of this *exposé*, it must not be compared with what are now called in France and England "Speeches of the Crown," but with the "Message" of the President of the United States. This may serve to explain and justify the details into which the First Consul entered. He was absolutely resolved to notice the parties which divided England, that he might have the means of expressing himself freely concerning his enemies, and yet without the possibility of his words being applied to the British government itself. It was a very bold and a very dangerous way of interfering in the affairs of a neighbouring country; it was, above all, offering a cruel and useless insult to British pride to assert, in such haughty terms, that England reduced to her unaided strength, was incapable of contending with France. Here the First Consul sinned in point of form, though he was right in regard to fact.

When this exposition of the state of the Republic, an admirable paper, but too haughty, reached London, it produced an effect infinitely stronger than the report of Colonel Sébastiani, and much stronger than even the acts for which the First Consul had been censured, in Italy, Switzerland, and Germany.¹ Those unseasonable words, asserting the inability of England to meet France single-handed, fired the heart of every Englishman. Add to this, that the First Consul had accompanied the document with a note requiring the British government to explain itself definitively on the evacuation of Malta.

The English cabinet was at length forced to take a resolution, and to declare its intentions in regard to that island, the subject of such contention, and the cause of such important events. Its embarrassment was great, for it was unwilling either to avow the intention of violating a solemn treaty, or to promise the evacuation of Malta, which its weakness rendered impossible. Urged by public opinion to do something, and not knowing what to do,

¹ I have myself heard a high personage, one of the most respectable members of the English diplomacy, declare, after the lapse of forty years, when time had effaced in him all the passions of that period, that those

words, alleging that England could not cope single-handed with France, revolted every English heart, and from that day the declaration of war was considered as inevitable.

it adopted the course of addressing a message to Parliament, which is sometimes in representative governments a way to occupy minds and to lull their impatience, but may prove very dangerous, unless one knows clearly whither one would lead them, and not merely strives to afford them a momentary satisfaction.

On the 8th of March, the following message was addressed to Parliament:—

“GROUX R.

“His Majesty thinks it necessary to acquaint the House of Commons that, as very considerable military preparations are carrying on in the ports of France and Holland, he has deemed it expedient to adopt additional measures of precaution for the security of his dominions. Though the preparations to which his Majesty refers are avowedly directed to the colonial service, yet, as discussions of great importance are now subsisting between his Majesty and the French government, the result of which must at present be uncertain, his Majesty is induced to make the communication to his faithful Commons, in the full persuasion that, whilst they partake of his Majesty's earnest and unvarying solicitude for the continuance of peace, he may rely with perfect confidence on their public spirit and liberality, to enable his Majesty to adopt such measures as circumstances may appear to require, for supporting the honour of his Crown and the essential interests of his people.”

A more clumsy contrivance than this message cannot possibly be conceived. It was founded on errors in fact, and had, moreover, something offensive to the good faith of the French government. In the first place, there was not a disposable ship in our ports; all our vessels in a state to keep the sea were at St. Domingo, most of them armed *en flûte*, and employed in transporting troops. A great deal of building was going forward in our ports, and that was no secret; but the government had no intention to equip a single ship. There was merely in the Dutch port of Helvoetsluys, a small armament of two sail of the line and two frigates, having on board 3000 men, and notoriously bound for Louisiana. They had been detained for several months by fear of the ice, and the object of their mission was announced to all Europe. To say that this armament, destined ostensibly for the colonies, might have in reality a different aim, was a most offensive insinuation. Lastly, to allege that discussions of great importance were going on with the French government was extremely imprudent; for thus far all had been confined to a few words relative to Malta, put forth by France, and left unanswered on the part of England. To represent this as a discussion was to declare at once an intention to refuse to execute the treaties; unless it were to be alleged that a few expressions picked out of the report of Colonel Sébastiani, or out of the exposition of the state of the French Republic, constituted a grievance sufficient to cause the whole force of England to be called out. This message, then, could not bear examination: it was at once inaccurate and insulting.

Lord Whitworth, who began to know the government to which he was accredited a little better, guessed immediately the impression which the message to Parliament would produce on General Bonaparte. Hence it was not without great regret that he gave a copy of it to M. de Talleyrand, urging that minister to hasten to the General, in order to appease him, and to persuade him that this was not a declaration of war, but a mere measure of precaution. M. de Talleyrand immediately repaired to the Tuileries, and could scarcely succeed with the fiery master who occupied that palace. He found him highly incensed at the initiative so abruptly taken by the British cabinet; for this extraordinary message, which there was nothing to justify, seemed to be a provocation offered before the face of the world. He felt it to be a public defiance, deemed himself insulted, and asked where the British cabinet could have picked up all the falsehoods contained in that message; for there was not, he said, a single armament in the ports of France, neither was there yet any declared difference between the two cabinets.

M. de Talleyrand prevailed upon the First Consul to curb his resentment, and, if he must resolve upon war, to let the English incur the blame of the provocation. This was, in fact, the intention of the First Consul, but it was difficult for him to contain himself, so deeply aggrieved did he feel. The message was communicated to the English parliament on the 8th of March, and known in Paris on the 11th. Unluckily, the next day but one was Sunday, the day on which the First Consul received the diplomatic body at the Tuileries. A very natural curiosity had drawn thither all the foreign ministers, who wished to observe the attitude of the First Consul on this occasion, and in particular that of the British ambassador. The First Consul had gone, till it should be time for the audience, to Madame Bonaparte in her own apartments, and was playing with the infant which was then considered as his heir, the new-born child of Louis Bonaparte and Hortense de Beauharnois. M. de Remusat, prefect of the palace, announced that the circle was formed, and mentioned among other names that of Lord Whitworth. That name produced a visible impression upon the First Consul; he left the infant with which he was engaged, abruptly took the hand of Madame Bonaparte, passed the door opening into the drawing-room, and proceeded in front of the foreign ministers, who advanced to meet him, direct to the representative of Great Britain. My Lord, said he, with extreme agitation, have you any news from England? And, scarcely waiting for an answer, he added, You are bent on war, then!—No, General, replied the ambassador with great calmness, we are too sensible of the advantages of peace.—You are bent on war, then; repeated the First Consul in a very loud tone, so as to be heard by all present. We have been fighting these ten years; do you desire then that we should fight for ten years longer! How durst you assert that France is arming! You are imposing upon the world. There is not a ship in our ports: all the snips for ser-

vice have been despatched to St. Domingo. The only armament existing is in the waters of Holland, and everybody has known, for four months past, that it is bound for Louisiana. It has been asserted that discussions subsist between France and England; I know of none. I only know that the Island of Malta has not been evacuated within the time prescribed; but I cannot imagine that your ministers mean to violate English good faith by refusing to execute a solemn treaty. At any rate, they have not said so yet. Neither do I suppose that by your armaments you design to intimidate the French people: you may kill them, my Lord; intimidate them, never!—The ambassador, surprised, and somewhat agitated, notwithstanding his self-possession, replied that his government intended neither the one nor the other, but sought, on the contrary, to live in good understanding with France.—Then, replied the First Consul, it must respect treaties. Wo betide those who do not respect treaties! He then passed to Messrs. d'Azara and de Markoff, and told them aloud that the English would not evacuate Malta, that they refused to keep their engagements, and that thenceforward "the treaties must be covered with black crape." As he made his round, he perceived the minister of Sweden, whose presence reminded him of the ridiculous despatches addressed to the Germanic Diet and published at the time. Your king, said he, forgets then that Sweden is not what it was in the time of Gustavus Adolphus, that it has sunk to a third-rate power! He finished the round of the circle, still agitated, his eyes flashing, frightful as power when enraged, but destitute of the calm dignity which becomes it so well.

Sensible, however, that he had passed the bounds of decorum, the First Consul, having completed his round, returned to the Ambassador of England, and in a milder tone made inquiries concerning his lady, the Duchess of Dorset; expressed a wish that, after she had passed the worst season in France, she might have it in her power to spend the best there. He added that this would not depend upon him, but upon England; and that, if he were obliged to resume arms, the entire responsibility would lie, in the eyes of God and man, upon those who refused to keep their engagements. This scene could not but deeply irritate the self-love of the English nation, and led to a mischievous reciprocity of incivilities. The English were in the wrong at bottom; for their ambition, so nearly undissembled, in regard to Malta, was an absolute scandal. They ought to have been left to bear the odium of the act, without the First Consul incurring that arising from violated forms. But, galled as he was, he took a sort of pleasure in making the thunders of his wrath reverberate to the extremities of the earth.

The treatment which Lord Whitworth had experienced was immediately made public, for it had been witnessed by more than two hundred persons. Each gave his own version of the affair, and exaggerated it as much as he could. It produced a painful sensation in Europe, and added greatly to the embarrass-

ment of the British cabinet. Lord Whitworth, affronted, complained to M. de Talleyrand, and declared that he would never more make his appearance in the Tuileries unless he received a formal assurance that he should not experience such treatment again. M. de Talleyrand replied verbally to these complaints, and, on this occasion, his calmness, his even temper, and his address were of great service to the policy of the cabinet, compromised by the natural vehemence of the First Consul.

A sudden revolution had taken place in the excitable and passionate spirit of Napoleon. From those prospects of a laborious and fruitful peace on which but lately he delighted to feast his active imagination, he turned all at once to those visions of war, of prodigious greatness attained by victory, of the renewal of the face of Europe, of the re-establishment of the empire of the west, which but too often haunted his mind. From the benefactor of France and of the world, as he flattered himself that he should be, he resolved to become the wonder of both. A wrath at once personal and patriotic took entire possession of him; and to conquer England, to humble her, to abase her, became from that day the passion of his life. Persuaded that every thing is possible to man, on condition of great intelligence, resolution, and perseverance, he suddenly seized the idea of crossing the Strait of Calais, and carrying to England one of those armies which had conquered Europe. He had said to himself, three years before, that the St. Bernard and the ice of winter, reputed to be invincible obstacles for the generality of men, were not so for him; he said the same thing to himself with reference to the arm of the sea between Dover and Calais, and thenceforward he was bent on crossing it, with a profound conviction that he should succeed. From that moment, that is to say, from the day on which the message of the King of England was received, are dated his first orders; and then it was that his mind, led astray in politics by the feeling of his power, again became the prodigy of human nature, when the point was to foresee and to surmount all the difficulties of a vast enterprise.

He immediately sent off Colonel Lacuée to Flanders and Holland, to inspect the seaports of those countries, to examine their form, extent, population, and naval *matériel*. He directed him to obtain an approximative statement of all the vessels destined for coasting and for fishing between Havre and the Texel, and capable of keeping up with a military squadron when under sail. He sent other officers to Cherbourg, St. Malo, Granville, Brest, with orders to review all the vessels employed in the deep sea fisheries, and to ascertain their number, value, and total tonnage. He ordered the repairs of the gun-boats, which had composed the old flotilla of Boulogne in 1801, to be commenced. He required naval engineers to submit to him models of flat-bottomed boats capable of carrying heavy cannon; he applied to them for a plan for a vast canal between Boulogne and Dunkirk, for the purpose of placing those two ports in communication. He directed the arming of the

coasts and islands from Bordeaux to Antwerp to be set about. He commanded an immediate inspection of all the forests bordering the coasts of the Channel, with a view to ascertain the nature and quantity of the timber which they contained, and what supplies could be derived from them for the construction of an immense war flotilla. Having learned from his correspondence that emissaries of the English government were bargaining for timber in the Roman States, he despatched agents with the necessary funds to buy it up, and with recommendations which left the Pope no choice of customers.

Three acts were, according to him, to mark the commencement of hostilities: the occupation of Hanover, of Portugal, and of the Gulf of Tarento, so as to effect the absolute and immediate closing of the coasts of the continent from Denmark to the Adriatic. In this view, he began with composing at Bayonne the artillery of a *corps de armée*: he assembled at Faenza a division of 10,000 men and twenty-four pieces of cannon, destined to enter the kingdom of Naples; he ordered the troops which had been embarked at Helvoetsluis for Louisiana to be put on shore. Conceiving that it would be too dangerous to send them to sea, on the eve of a declaration of war, he directed part of them upon Flushing, a seaport belonging to Holland, but placed under the power of France while we should occupy the country. He sent thither an officer, commissioned to assume all the powers belonging to a military commandant in time of war, and orders to arm the place without delay. The rest of these troops were marched for Breda and Nimeguen, two points for the assemblage of troops to form a corps of 24,000 men. This corps, placed under the command of a firm and prudent general, Mortier, was to take possession of Hanover on the first act of hostility committed by England.

This invasion, however, was not a thing politically very easy. The King of England, as sovereign of Hanover, was a member of the Germanic Confederation, and had a right, in certain cases, to the protection of the confederated States. The King of Prussia, director of the circle of Lower Saxony, in which Hanover lay, was the natural protector of that State. It was necessary, therefore, to have recourse to him, and to obtain his adhesion, which he could not but be very reluctant to give, for it was involving the north of Germany in the formidable quarrel which was about to take place, and perhaps exposing it to the blockade of the Weser, the Elbe, and the Oder, by the English. The cabinet of Potsdam affected, it is true, a warm attachment for France, which procured for it large indemnities; this attachment might extend so far as to induce it to refuse to join in any plans of coalition, to exert itself to prevent them, and even to apprise the First Consul of them; but, in the present state of things, this friendship could not be converted into such a positive alliance as that, if France had need of any signal act of devotedness, she could seriously reckon upon it. The First Consul immediately despatched his aide-de-camp, Duroc, who was

thoroughly acquainted with the court of Prussia, with instructions to inform that court of the danger of a speedy rupture between France and England, of the intention of the French government to carry the war to the last extremity, and to take possession of Hanover. General Duroc was directed to add that the First Consul had no wish to make war for the sake of war and that, if the monarchs not concerned in the quarrel, such as the King of Prussia and the Emperor of Russia, should find means to adjust the difference by inducing England to respect the treaties, he would instantly halt in that career of unrelenting hostilities into which he was ready to rush.

The First Consul also thought it right to take a step of civility towards the Emperor of Russia. He had thus far negotiated with that sovereign some of the greatest affairs of Europe, and he wished to interest him in his cause, by constituting him judge of what was passing between France and England. He addressed to him a letter, of which Colonel Colbert was to be the bearer, and in which, recapitulating all the events that had occurred since the peace of Amiens, he declared himself disposed to submit to his mediation, without soliciting it however, in case Great Britain would submit to it on her part—so strongly did he rely, he said, on the goodness of his cause and the justice of the Emperor Alexander.

To all these determinations, so promptly taken, was to be added one more relative to Louisiana. The four thousand men destined to occupy it had just been disembarked. But what was to be done? what plan was to be adopted in regard to that rich possession? There was no reason to be uneasy respecting our other colonies. St. Domingo was full of troops, and the soldiers who were disposable in the colonial depôts were hastily put on board all the merchantmen ready to sail. Guadeloupe, Martinique, the Isle of France, were likewise provided with strong garrisons, and immense expeditions would have been required to dispute them with the French. But Louisiana contained not a single soldier. It was an extensive province, which four thousand men were not sufficient to occupy in time of war. The inhabitants, though of French origin, had so frequently changed masters during the last century, that they were attached to nothing but their independence. The North Americans were by no means pleased to see us in possession of the mouths of the Mississippi, and of their principal outlet in the Gulf of Mexico. They had even applied to France to grant their commerce and navigation advantageous conditions of transit in the port of New Orleans. If we were determined to keep Louisiana, we might therefore reckon on the greatest efforts on the part of the English against us, on perfect indifference on the part of the inhabitants, and on positive ill-will on the part of the Americans. These latter, in fact, wished to have none but Spaniards for neighbours. All the colonial dreams of the First Consul were dispelled at once by the appearance of the message of King George III., and his resolution was instantly formed. I will not keep, said he to one of his ministers

a possession which would not be safe in our hands, which would perhaps embroil me with the Americans, or produce a coldness between us. I will make use of it, on the contrary, to attach them to me, and to embroil them with the English, and raise up against the latter enemies who will some day avenge us, if we should not succeed in avenging ourselves. My resolution is taken; I will give Louisiana to the United States. But as they have no territory to cede to us in exchange, I will demand a sum of money towards defraying the expenses of the extraordinary armament which I am projecting against Great Britain.—The First Consul intended not to contract any loan; he hoped with a considerable sum, which he should procure extraordinarily, with a moderate increase of the taxes, and a few sales of national domains slowly effected, to be able to meet the expenses of the war. He sent for M. Marbois, minister of the treasury, formerly employed in America, and M. Decrès, minister of the marine, and wished, though decided himself, to hear what they had to say. The First Consul listened to them very attentively, without appearing to be in the least touched by the arguments of either; he listened to them, as he often did, when he had made up his mind, to satisfy himself that he was not mistaken on any important point of the questions submitted to his judgment. Confirmed rather than shaken in his resolution by what he had heard, he directed M. de Marbois to send, without losing a moment, for Mr. Livingston,¹ the American minister, and to enter into negotiation with him about Louisiana. Mr. Monroe² had recently arrived in Europe to settle with the English the question of maritime right, and with the French the question respecting transit on the Mississippi. On his arrival in Paris, he was met by the unexpected proposal of the French cabinet. He was offered not certain facilities of transit through Louisiana, but the annexation of the country itself to the United States. Not embarrassed for a moment by the want of powers, he concluded a treaty immediately, subject to the ratification of his government. M. de Marbois demanded eighty millions, twenty out of that sum being to indemnify American commerce for captures illegally made during the late

war, and sixty for the treasury of France. The twenty millions destined for the first purpose were expected to secure us the hearty good-will of the merchants of the United States. As for the sixty millions destined for France, it was agreed that the cabinet of Washington should create annuities, and that they should be negotiated to Dutch houses, at an advantageous rate, and not far from par. The treaty was therefore concluded on these bases, and sent to Washington to be ratified. In this manner the Americans purchased from France that extensive country, which has completed their territory in North America, and made them masters of the Gulf of Mexico for the present and for the time to come. They are consequently indebted for their birth and for their greatness to that long struggle between France and England. We shall presently see to what purpose those sixty millions were applied, and what result they had wellnigh produced.

These precautions, once taken, the First Consul followed with more patience the progress of the negotiation. The involuntary storm of passion, which he was unable to repress on receiving the message of the King of England, having subsided, he promised himself, and he kept his word, that he would not suffer any thing to ruffle his temper, but submit to be so visibly pushed to extremities, that it should be impossible for France and Europe to mistake as to the real authors of the war.

M. de Talleyrand, who, under these circumstances, had conducted himself with rare discretion, had contributed more than any other person to instil these new dispositions into the First Consul. That minister was well aware that a war with England, owing to the difficulty of rendering it decisive, owing to the influence of British subsidies, which would soon make it continental, would be merely the renewal of the conflict of the Revolution with Europe; and, to prevent the calamity of a universal conflagration, he determined to use that *vis inertia* which he sometimes employed with the First Consul, in the way of water thrown upon a blazing fire to moderate its violence. If on some occasions this inertness had been attended with inconveniences, it proved at this time of great benefit; and, with any other

¹ LIVINGSTON, ROBERT R. An eminent American politician, born in New York, November 27, 1746. He was educated at King's College and graduated in 1765. He studied and practised law with great success in that city. He was elected to the first Congress of the colonies, and was one of the committee who prepared the Declaration of Independence. In 1780 he was appointed secretary for foreign affairs, and distinguished himself for his zeal and efficiency throughout the revolutionary war. At the adoption of the constitution of the state of New York he was appointed chancellor of that state. In 1801 he went as minister plenipotentiary to France, under the presidency of Mr. Jefferson. He was a great favourite of Napoleon, and conducted the negotiations, with the aid of Mr. Monroe, which ended in the cession of Louisiana to the United States. In 1804 he took leave of the First Consul and made an extensive tour throughout Europe. He was a strong personal friend of Robert Fulton, whose plans of steam navigation he aided with counsel and money. In 1805 he returned to the United States, and devoted the rest of his life to the arts and agriculture. He introduced the use of Gypsum, and the breed of Merino sheep into New York. He was president of the New York Academy of Fine Arts, and of the Society of Agriculture. He died in March, 1813,

leaving behind him the reputation of an able statesman, a learned lawyer, and a most useful citizen.—*Encyclopædia Americana*.

² MONROE, JAMES. The fourth president of the United States. Born April 28, 1758, in Westmoreland county, Virginia. He was educated at William and Mary College, and in 1776 entered the revolutionary army as a cadet, and served with great distinction until 1780. In 1782 he was elected to the executive council of his native State, and in 1783 sent as its deputy to the Congress of the United States. In 1794 he was sent as plenipotentiary to France, but in 1796, recalled by President Washington, with implied censure. In 1799, on the nomination of Mr. Madison, he was appointed governor of Virginia. In 1803 he was sent minister extraordinary to France, to act in conjunction with Mr. Livingston, the resident minister there; this mission terminated in the acquisition of Louisiana by the United States.

In the same year he was appointed minister to London, and in the next to Spain, in 1806, in conjunction with the late William Pinkney. He was subsequently elected in 1817 president as successor to James Madison, and again re-elected almost by a unanimous vote in 1821. He died on the 4th of July, 1831, in New York.—*Encyclopædia Americana*.

cabinet but that which then so feebly governed England, it might have had the effect of preventing a rupture, or at least of deferring it for a considerable time longer. In consequence, after consulting with the First Consul, he made a calm and frank communication to the British cabinet for the purpose of apprizing it that military precautions were commencing on the part of France, but that they had not commenced till that day, namely, the day on which the message of King George III. to Parliament was received. Since you are arming in England, said M. de Talleyrand, the British cabinet must not be astonished if Switzerland, which was about to be evacuated, is not evacuated; if a body of troops is marching towards the south of Italy to reoccupy Tarento; if a corps of twenty thousand men enters Holland and takes the nearest position to Hanover; if the *matériel* of a division is collecting at Bayonne, to act in case of need against Portugal; if, lastly, we extend the works going on in our ports from mere ship-building to equipping. No doubt the effect will be a redoubled sensation in England, and the usual inflamers of the public opinion will conclude that France is meditating fresh aggressions; but what is to be done! We must make up our minds to it, since the British cabinet has been the first to take those measures of precaution which end with being in reality measures of provocation;—in fact, they were actively arming in England, they were pressing on the wharfs of the Thames, in the heart of the city of London. Thus they were preparing for sea the fifty ships of the line which, according to the message sent to Parliament, were to be ready to sail on the very day that war should be declared.

The administration of Mr. Addington, feeling that it was incompetent to these circumstances, had made some overtures to Mr. Pitt, to induce him to enter the cabinet. These overtures Mr. Pitt had haughtily repelled, and he continued to live almost always at a distance from London and from the agitations of the parties. Feeling his strength, foreseeing the events which would render him necessary, he had much rather hold power from those events than from weak ministers, who were the ephemeral usurpers of it. He, therefore, refused their offers, leaving them by this refusal in cruel perplexity. The steps to which we have adverted had been taken without the consent of King George III., who would have wished to keep his cabinet; for he had an almost invincible aversion for Mr. Pitt. He found in Mr. Pitt, along with opinions which were his own, a minister who was almost a master. He found in Mr. Fox, along with a noble and engaging character, opinions that were hateful to him. He was not disposed, therefore, to have either. He was anxious to keep Mr. Addington, the son of a physician, to whom he was attached; Lord Hawkesbury, son of Lord Liverpool, his particular confidant; he was anxious also to obtain peace if possible, and, if he could not, was resigned to wage war, which had become a sort of habit for him, but to wage it with his present ministers. Mr. Addington and Lord Hawkesbury

entertained nearly the same sentiments; still they would have been glad to strengthen themselves, and, after having been an administration of peace, to constitute themselves an administration of war. In default of Mr. Pitt, who had refused them, they could not possibly admit Mr. Wyndham and Lord Grenville, for the violence of these went far beyond public opinion in England. Mr. Addington and Lord Hawkesbury would fain have applied to Mr. Fox, whose pacific ideas were perfectly suited to theirs; but here the will of the king was an insurmountable obstacle; and they were obliged to remain as they were, weak, unsupported in Parliament, and of course dependent on the parties. Now, the party which was strongest at the moment, because it worked upon the national passions, was the Grenville party, which began to be distinguished, on account of its violence, from the Pitt party, and which revenged itself for being kept out of the administration by obliging those in power to do what it would have done itself. The weakness of the cabinet, therefore, was almost as certain to plunge it into war, as if Grenville, Wyndham, and Dundas had been members of it.

Mr. Addington and Lord Hawkesbury were now extremely embarrassed, after all the fuss which they had made about the events in Switzerland, as well on account of retaining Malta, as of having replied to a haughty expression of the First Consul's by a message to Parliament. They would fain have found an expedient for extricating themselves from the dilemma; but unfortunately they had placed themselves in a situation where any thing short of the definitive conquest of Malta must appear insufficient in England, and provoke an indignation under which they must fall. As for Malta, they had no hope of obtaining it from the First Consul.

M. de Talleyrand, with a view to relieve them, insinuated that a convention, in which France should agree to the evacuation of Switzerland and Holland in return for the evacuation of Malta, and engage to respect the integrity of the Turkish empire, might perhaps be the means of pacifying public opinion in England and dispelling its jealousies.

This proposal was not answerable to the desires of the English ministers, for Malta was the absolute condition which the rulers of their weakness had imposed upon them. They must either satisfy the cupidity excited by their fault, or succumb in full parliament. They were sensible, at the same time, that in the end they would cover themselves with ridicule in the eyes of England, of France, and of Europe, if they continued in an equivocal position, not daring to say what they wanted. At length, on the 13th of April, 1803, they produced their demands. The First Consul exciting apprehensions respecting Egypt, they must, they said, retain possession of Malta as a precautionary measure capable of setting them at ease. They offered two alternatives; either the possession by England of the fortresses of the island in perpetuity, leaving the civil government to the Order: or that possession for ten years, on condition, at the expira-

tion of the ten years, of giving up the forts not to the Order but to the Maltese themselves. In either case, France was to engage to second a negotiation with the King of Naples to induce that prince to cede to England the island of Lampedosa, not far from Malta, for the avowed object of founding a naval establishment there.

Lord Whitworth strove to persuade M. de Talleyrand to assent to these demands, and even addressed himself to the First Consul's brother, Joseph, who dreaded not less than M. de Talleyrand the chances of a desperate struggle, in which they might be forced to risk perhaps all the greatness of the Bonapartes. Joseph promised to use his influence with his brother, but without any great hope of succeeding. The only proposition which appeared to him to have any chance of success with the First Consul was to leave for some time, but only a short time, the fortresses of Malta to the English, meanwhile upholding the existence of the Order with great care, that those fortresses might afterwards be placed in its hands; and to grant to France in compensation the immediate recognition of the new States in Italy. In consequence, Joseph and M. de Talleyrand exerted their utmost efforts to prevail upon the First Consul. They laid great stress upon the maintenance of the Order of St. John of Jerusalem, as a certain pledge in the eyes of the public that the occupation of the forts would be temporary, and as a salvo to the dignity of the French government. The First Consul manifested invincible obstinacy; all these palliatives appeared to him beneath his character. It would be better, he said, merely to relinquish the island of Malta to the English; that this would be a sort of compensation voluntarily granted to England for the alleged encroachments of France since the peace of Amiens; that, in the concession thus explained, there would be something frank and straightforward, and it would look more like an act of justice voluntarily performed than a weakness; that, on the contrary, the possession of Malta granted in reality, (for the forts were the whole island, and some years were perpetuity,) granted in reality, but cloaked, would be unworthy of him; that nobody could be imposed upon by it, and that the very efforts made to disguise this concession would betray the feelings of one's own weakness.—No, said he, either Malta or nothing! But Malta gives the dominion of the Mediterranean. Now, nobody will believe that I consent to surrender the dominion of the Mediterranean to the English unless I am afraid of measuring my strength with them. Thus I lose at once the most important sea in the world and the opinion of Europe, which believes in my energy, which believes it to be superior to all dangers.—But, replied M. de Talleyrand, the English hold Malta, and, in breaking with them, you do not take it from them.—Yes, answered the First Consul, but I will not give up an immense advantage without a struggle: I will fight, arms in hand, for the possession of it, and I hope to reduce the English to such a state that they shall be forced to give up Malta and a great

deal more; without taking into account that, if I once get to Dover, it will be all over with these tyrants of the seas. Besides, as we must fight sooner or later with a people to which the greatness of France is intolerable, why, the sooner the better. The national energy is not blunted by a long peace; I am young; the English are in the wrong, more in the wrong than they ever will be again: I had rather settle the matter at once. Malta or nothing, he incessantly repeated: but I am resolved they shall not have Malta.

The First Consul, however, assented to the proposal for negotiating the cession to the English of Lampedosa, or some other small island near the coast of Africa, but on condition that they should evacuate Malta immediately. Let them obtain, said he, a place in the Mediterranean to put into: I have no objection. But I am determined that they shall not have two Gibaltars in that sea, one at the entrance, and another in the middle.

This answer gave the greatest disappointment to Lord Whitworth, and, accommodating as he had at first appeared while he had hopes of succeeding, he then became stiff, haughty, and almost uncivil. But M. de Talleyrand had promised to support his proposals, for the purpose of preventing, or at least retarding, a rupture. Lord Whitworth told M. de Talleyrand that whether the First Consul staked his honour or did not stake it, was of no consequence to England: that she was not one of those petty States to which he could dictate his pleasure, and which he could force to submit to the constructions which he chose to put upon honour and policy. M. de Talleyrand replied, with calmness and dignity, that England, on her side, had no right, upon the plea of distrust, to demand the relinquishment of one of the most important points of the globe; that there was no power in the world which could impose upon others the consequences of its suspicions, whether founded or not; that this would be an extremely convenient way of making conquests, for in that case one need only say that one had apprehensions, to be authorized to lay hands on any part of the earth.

Lord Whitworth communicated this answer to the English cabinet, which, finding itself placed between the evacuation of Malta, which it considered as its downfall, or war took the culpable resolution of preferring war, war with the only man who could involve England in serious dangers. This resolution once taken, the cabinet thought it was necessary to gratify still more the party under whose domination it was, by being short, arrogant, hasty, in bringing the matter to a crisis. Lord Whitworth was instructed to require the cession of Malta for ten years at least, the cession of the island of Lampedosa, the immediate evacuation of Switzerland and Holland, a precise and specific indemnity in favour of the King of Sardinia, and to offer by way of compensation the recognition of the Italian States. To these orders, sent to the ambassador, was added the injunction to apply for passports immediately, if the conditions of England were not accepted.

The despatch was dated the 23d of April; it arrived in Paris on the 25th. The 2d of May was the fatal term. Lord Whitworth made some attempts at accommodation with M. de Talleyrand, for he had himself a dread of this rupture. M. de Talleyrand, on his part, made a point of giving him to understand that he had no hope of obtaining Malta either for ten years or for less, and that some other arrangement must be thought of. At the same time he took pains, by the turn of his expressions, to avoid an immediate conclusion. Lord Whitworth, concurring entirely in his intentions, was resolved not to forestall the term fixed, the 2d of May. There was not a man, in fact, however bold, but contemplated with dread the consequences of such a war. In this conflict, none continued unshaken but the English ministers, anxious to preserve their sorry existence at any price, and the First Consul, defying all the risks of an awful struggle, to support the honour of his government and the preponderance of France in the Mediterranean. In this manner Lord Whitworth and M. de Talleyrand reached the seventh day without breaking.

At length, on the 2d of May, Lord Whitworth, not daring to disobey the orders of his court, demanded his passports. M. de Talleyrand, to gain a little longer time, replied that he would lay before the First Consul this application for passports, and again begged him not to be in a hurry, alleging that, perhaps, if they were to consider, they might yet hit upon some unforeseen mode of arrangement. M. de Talleyrand had an interview with the First Consul, conferred a long time with him, and his conference produced a new and very ingenious proposal. It consisted in putting the island of Malta into the hands of the Emperor of Russia, and leaving it there in trust, till the conclusion of the discussions which had arisen between France and England. Such a combination could not but take from the English every pretext for distrust, since the integrity of the young emperor could not be disputed, and this constituted him judge in the quarrel. It happened opportunely that this prince had just written, in answer to communications from the First Consul, that he was ready to offer his mediation, if that could be a means of preventing war; and the King of Prussia, actuated by the same desire, made the like offer. It was therefore very certain that those two monarchs would be found disposed to take upon themselves the trouble of the mediation. To refuse it would be proving that no fears were entertained either for Malta or for Egypt, since an impartial depositary was not satisfactory, but that the English ministers wanted a conquest for the nation and an argument for the parliament.

M. de Talleyrand, happy in having devised such an expedient, repaired to Lord Whitworth's to prevail upon him to defer his departure, and to beg him to transmit this new proposal to his cabinet. The orders which that ambassador had received were so positive that he durst not disobey them. He, nevertheless, suffered himself to be shaken by the fear of taking a step perhaps irreparable, if

he insisted on having his passports immediately. He therefore despatched a courier to London, to transmit the last offers of the French cabinet, and to make an excuse for the delay, which he had allowed to take place in the execution of the orders of his court.

M. de Talleyrand likewise sent off an extraordinary courier to General Androsy, who had not seen the English ministers since their last communications, and ordered him to try a decisive step with them. General Androsy obeyed and spoke up like an honourable man. If it was not Malta that they wanted to acquire, in contempt of treaties, they could have no motive for refusing to deposit that valuable pledge in powerful, disinterested, and perfectly safe hands. Mr. Addington appeared shaken; for, at bottom, he wished for a pacific solution. This head of the cabinet said with great simplicity that he desired to be enlightened, expressing regret that he was not sufficiently so for such an important conjuncture, and wavered between the two-fold fear of committing a weakness or provoking a destructive war. Lord Hawkesbury, more ambitious, more firm, appeared immovable. The cabinet, after deliberating, refused the proposal. It had been made with a view to satisfy the national ambition, and to place Malta itself in the hands of a disinterested third party; but this was going beside the mark. To give it up, moreover, to this disinterested third party would probably be to lose it for ever; for the ministers well knew that there was no umpire in the world who could give judgment in favour of England in such a question. To colour the rejection of this last proposal, they used an argument that was absolutely false. They knew for certain, they said, that the Emperor of Russia would not accept the office which France wished to impose upon him. Now the contrary was certain, for Russia had just offered her mediation, and, soon afterwards, on being informed of the last proposal of the French government, she lost no time in declaring that she consented to it, notwithstanding the dangers attached to the deposit proposed to be placed in her hands. The English ministers, nevertheless, were desirous to reserve a last chance of obtaining Malta, and devised an expedient which was not acceptable. Judging of the First Consul by themselves, they conceived that he refused Malta only out of deference to the public opinion. They proposed, therefore, by adding some patent articles to the treaty of Amiens, to throw into a secret article the obligation to leave the English troops in Malta. The patent articles were to purport that Switzerland and Holland should be immediately evacuated; that the King of Sardinia should receive a territorial indemnity; that the English should obtain the island of Lampedosa, and meanwhile remain at Malta. The secret article was to say that their stay there was to last ten years.

This answer, discussed on the 7th of May, despatched on the same day, arrived on the 9th in Paris. On the 10th, Lord Whitworth communicated it in writing to M. de Talleyrand, whom he could not see, because the minister was kept in attendance on the Fir-

Consul, who was ill in consequence of the upsetting of a carriage. When the proposal of a secret article was made to him, he proudly rejected it, and would not hear of it on any account. He devised in his turn a last expedient, which was cleverly contrived for keeping the two national ambitions in equilibrium, both in respect to real advantages, and in respect to apparent advantages. This expedient consisted in leaving the English at Malta, for an indefinite space of time, but on condition that the French should for the same space of time occupy the Gulf of Tarento. This plan was attended with important circumstantial advantages. The English ministers would win that kind of wager which they had laid to obtain Malta; the French would occupy an equal position on the Mediterranean; all the powers would soon be tempted to interfere, to oblige the English to leave Malta in order to get the French out of the kingdom of Naples. The First Consul, however, would not propose this new arrangement unless he had a hope of its being accepted. M. de Talleyrand, therefore, had instruction: not to venture upon this last step without extreme caution.

Next day, the 11th of May, M. de Talleyrand saw Lord Whitworth at noon, and told him that a secret article was unacceptable, for the First Consul would not deceive France respecting the extent of the concessions granted to England; that, however, there was one more proposal to make, the result of which was to cede Malta, but on condition of an equivalent to France. Lord Whitworth declared that he could not admit of any proposition but that sent by his cabinet; and that, after having taken it upon himself to defer his departure a first time, he could not delay it a second time without a formal adhesion to what his government demanded. M. de Talleyrand made no reply to this declaration, and the two ministers parted, both very sorry not to have been able to effect an accommodation. Lord Whitworth applied for passports for the next day, but said that he should travel slowly, and that there would still be time to write to London and to receive an answer, before he could embark at Calais. It was agreed that the ambassadors should be exchanged on the frontiers, and that Lord Whitworth should wait at Calais till General Andréossy had reached Dover.

Great curiosity prevailed in Paris. An eager concourse beset the gate of the hotel of the English ambassador, to see whether he was making preparations for travelling. Next day, the 12th, after waiting the whole day, and leaving the French cabinet all the time possible for reflecting, Lord Whitworth took the road for Calais, making short journeys. The report of his departure produced a strong sensation in Paris, and every one foresaw that prodigious events would mark this new period of the war.

M. de Talleyrand had sent a courier to General Andréossy, to carry to him the new proposition for allowing the French to occupy Tarento, in compensation for the occupation of Malta by the English. It was by M. de Schimmelpennink, minister of Holland, that

the proposition was to be made, not in the name of France, but as an idea of his own, and of the success of which he was quite sure. The idea, submitted to the British cabinet, was not approved, and General Andréossy was obliged to leave England. Quite as much anxiety was manifested in London as in Paris. The Parliament house was incessantly thronged for some days, and every one was applying to ministers for news of the negotiation. At the moment of so important a determination, the warlike passion subsided, and men were seized with dread of the consequences of a desperate conflict. The people of London had little desire for the renewal of the war. The Grenville party and the great merchants alone were satisfied.

General Andréossy was accompanied at his departure with great demonstrations of respect and visible regret. He arrived at Dover at the same time that Lord Whitworth reached Calais, that is, on the 17th of May. Lord Whitworth was immediately conveyed across the Strait. The first thing he did was to visit the French ambassador; he loaded him with tokens of esteem, and conducted him himself to the ship that was to carry him back to France. The two ambassadors parted in the presence of a concourse, agitated, uneasy, sorrowful. At this solemn moment, the two nations seemed to bid each other adieu, not to meet again till after a tremendous war and the convulsion of the world. How different would have been their destinies if, as the First Consul observed, these two powers, the one maritime, the other continental, had united and completed themselves, for the purpose of peacefully regulating the interests of the universe! General civilization would have made more rapid advances; the future independence of Europe would have been for ever insured, and the two nations would not have paved the way to the domination of the North over the divided West.

Such was the melancholy termination of that short peace of Amiens.

We shall not attempt to conceal the vivacity of our national sentiments: it would be painful to us to condemn France; but we would do it without hesitation if she seemed to us to deserve condemnation: we shall not flinch from doing it whenever unfortunately she is in the wrong, because truth is the first duty of the historian. However, after mature reflection, we cannot condemn France for this renewal of the conflict between the two nations. The First Consul, on this occasion, conducted himself with perfect good faith. He erred, we admit, in points of form; but even these were not all his errors. He was not guilty of one in regard to things themselves. The complaints of England, respecting the change produced in the relative situation of the two countries since the peace, were unfounded. In Italy the Italian republic had chosen the First Consul for president, but in reality this made no change in the dependence of that republic which existed and which could not exist but by France. Besides, this event was dated from February, and the treaty of Amiens from the month of March, 1802. The creation of

the kingdom of Etruria, and the cession of Louisiana and the duchy of Parma to France, were public facts before that same month of March, 1802. It should be added that, at the congress of Amiens, England had almost promised the recognition of the new States in Italy. The annexation of Piedmont was likewise foreseen and avowed in the negotiations of Amiens, for the English negotiator had made some efforts to obtain an indemnity in favour of the King of Piedmont. Switzerland and Holland had not ceased to be occupied by our troops, either during the war, or during the peace; and, in more than one conversation, Lord Hawkesbury had acknowledged that our influence over those States was a consequence of the war; that, provided that their independence were definitively recognised, no complaint would be made. England, then, could not suppose that France would suffer a counter-revolution to be effected in Switzerland, or in Holland, that is, at her very door, without interfering. As for the secularizations, they were an act obligatory by treaties, an act full of justice and moderation, executed jointly with Russia, assented to by all the States of Germany, including Austria, sanctioned by the King of England himself, who had, in the quality of King of Hanover, adhered to the division of the indemnities, which was extremely advantageous for him. What was there then on the continent to reproach France with! Her greatness alone, a greatness concentrated by treaties, admitted by England at the congress of Amiens, which had, it is true, become more evident in the claim of peace and amidst negotiations which her influence and her skill decided in an irresistible manner.

The reproach of alleged designs upon Egypt was a false pretext, for the First Consul had none at that moment, and Colonel Sébastiani had been sent only as an observer, for the sole purpose of ascertaining whether the English were ready to evacuate Alexandria. The examination of the most secret documents leaves not the slightest doubt on this head.

What ground, then, could there be for the strange violation of the treaty of Amiens relative to Malta? In order to account for it, we need but call to mind the events which had occurred during the last fifteen months.

The English, passionate like all great nations, wished in 1801, after a ten years' contest, for a moment's respite, and wished for it ardently, as every change is wished for. This sentiment, enforced by the distresses of the labouring classes in 1801, became one of the impulsions which in free governments overthrow or set up administrations. Pitt retired: the feeble administration of Mr. Addington succeeded him, and made peace on clear conditions, perfectly known to its nation and to the world. It conceded the advantages gained by France in the preceding ten years, for peace would have been impossible on any other conditions. In a few months this peace appeared not to give all that was expected from it: is it ever the case that reality equals hope? The English saw, France, great by

war, become great by negotiations, great by the efforts of industry and commerce. Jealousy again inflamed their hearts. They solicited a treaty of commerce, which the First Consul refused, being convinced that the French manufactures, in their very infancy, could not thrive without strong protection. Nevertheless, the English manufacturers were satisfied, because smuggling opened outlets enough for them. But the great merchants of London, alarmed at the competition with which they were threatened by the French, Spanish, Dutch, and Genoese flags, which had again made their appearance upon the seas, deprived of the profits of the loans, connected with Pitt, Wyndham, and Grenville, the great merchants of London became hostile, more hostile than the English aristocracy itself. They were in close connection with Holland, and complained bitterly of the influence which France exercised over that country. A counter-revolution having taken place in Switzerland, owing to the good faith of the First Consul, who was in too great haste to evacuate that country, it was found necessary to enter it again. This was a new pretext. The animosity was soon at its height; and the war-party, composed of the mercantile interests, having at its head Mr. Pitt, absent from Parliament, and the Grenvilles present at all the discussions, visibly pushed things to a rupture. The British press indulged in the most horrible invectives. The press of the French emigrants took advantage of the occasion far to surpass the violence of the English papers.

Unfortunately, a weak administration, desirous of preserving peace, but fearing the war party, alarmed at the noise that was made on account of Switzerland, committed the blunder of countermanding the evacuation of Malta. From that moment, peace was irrevocably sacrificed; for, the rich prize of Malta, once held forth to British ambition, could not possibly be refused to it afterwards. The promptness and moderation of the French intervention in Switzerland having put an end to the grievance made out of it, the British cabinet would have been very glad to evacuate Malta, but no longer durst. The First Consul summoned it in the language of justice and wounded pride to execute the treaty of Amiens, and summons after summons led to the deplorable rupture which we have just recorded.

Thus the English commercial aristocracy, much more active on this occasion than the old aristocracy, leagued with ambitious spirits of the Tory party, assisted by French emigrants, not duly checked by a feeble administration, this commercial aristocracy and its associates, exciting, provoking an impetuous character, full of the two-fold feeling of its strength and of the justice of its cause—these were the real authors of the war. We believe that we are adhering to truth and justice in marking them out by these traits to posterity, which for the rest will weigh the faults of us all in scales much truer, much surer than ours, we admit, because they will be held by a cooler and more impartial hand.

BOOK XVII.

CAMP OF BOULOGNE.

Message of the First Consul to the great Bodies of the State—Speech of M. de Fontanes—Violences of the English Navy with regard to French Commerce—Reprisals—The Communes and the Departments, by a spontaneous Movement, offer Flat-bottomed Boats, Frigates, and Ships of the Line to the Government—General Enthusiasm—Assemblage of the French Navy in the European Seas—State in which the War has placed the Colonies—History of the Expedition to St. Domingo continued—The Yellow Fever breaks out—Destruction of the French Army—Death of the Captain-general Leclerc—Return of the Fleet—Character of the War between France and England—Comparative Strength of the two Countries—The First Consul boldly resolves to attempt an Invasion—He prepares for it with extraordinary Activity—Works in the Ports and in the Inner Basins of the Rivers—Formation of Six Camps of Troops from the Texel to Bayonne—Financial means—The First Consul will not have recourse to a Loan—Sale of Louisiana—Subsidies of the Allies—Concurrence of Holland, Italy, and Spain—Incapacity of Spain—The First Consul releases Spain from the Treaty of St. Ildefonso, on condition of a Subsidy—Occupation of Otranto and of Hanover—Light in which the new War was considered by all the Powers—Austria, Prussia, Russia—Their Anxieties and their Views—Russia pretends to limit the Means of the Belligerent Powers—She offers her Mediation, which the First Consul accepts with affected Eagerness—England replies coldly to the Offers of Russia—During these Parleys the First Consul sets out on a Tour to the Coasts of France, to hasten the Preparations for the grand Expedition—He is accompanied by Madame Bonaparte—The most laborious Activity mingled with the Pomp of Royalty—Amiens, Abbeville, Boulogne—Means devised by the First Consul for transporting an Army from Calais to Dover—Three Species of Vessels—Their Qualities and their defects—War Flotilla and Transport Flotilla—Immense Maritime Establishment created at Boulogne by Enchantment—Plan for concentrating Two Thousand Boats at Boulogne, when the Works in the Ports and Rivers are completed—Preference given to Boulogne over Dunkirk and Calais—The Strait, its Winds and Currents—Excavation of the Harbours of Boulogne, Vimereux, and Ambleteuse—Distribution of the Troops along the Coast—Their Labours and military Exercises—The First Consul, having inspected and regulated every thing, leaves Boulogne, to visit Calais, Dunkirk, Ostend, and Antwerp—Stay at Brussels—Concourse of Ministers, Ambassadors, and Bishops in that City—Cardinal Caprara in Belgium—Journey of M. Lombard, the King of Prussia's Secretary, to Brussels—The First Consul strives to dispel the Apprehensions of King Frederick William by frank Communications—Return to Paris—The First Consul resolves to put an end to the Russian Mediation, and announces a War with England to the last Extremity—He finally determines to oblige Spain to explain herself, and to execute the Treaty of St. Ildefonso, leaving the Choice of Means to herself—Strange Conduct of the Prince of Peace—The First Consul denounces that Favourite and his scandalous Proceedings to the King of Spain—Deep Abasement of the Court of Spain—It submits and promises a Subsidy—Continuance of the Preparations at Boulogne—The First Consul purposes to execute his Project in the Winter of 1803—He creates a small Residence for himself at Pont de Brique near Boulogne, where he frequently makes his Appearance—Assemblage of all the Divisions of the Flotilla in the Channel—Brilliant Actions of Gunboats with Brigs and Frigates—Confidence acquired in the Expedition—Perfect Harmony between the Seamen and Soldiers—Hopes of a speedy Execution of the Plan—Unforeseen Events for a Moment call the Attention of the First Consul to Internal Affairs.

Tax fondness for war which the First Consul might naturally be supposed to cherish would have awakened suspicion in the public opinion of France, and caused him to be accused of too much precipitation in breaking with England, had she not, by her manifest violation of the treaty of Amiens, taken it upon herself to justify him completely. It was evident to all minds that she had not been able to resist the temptation to keep Malta, and thus to secure a compensation not the most legitimate for our greatness. The rupture was therefore accepted as a necessity of honour and interest, though people indulged in no illusions respecting the consequences. They were aware that war with England might become war with Europe; that its duration was as incalculable as its extent, for it was not easy to go to London to terminate it, as one might go to the gates of Vienna to settle a quarrel with Austria. It must, moreover, strike a mortal blow at commerce, for the seas could not fail to be soon closed. Two considerations, however, greatly diminished the chagrin for France. Under a chief such as Napoleon, the war would no longer be the signal for new internal commotions; and people did flatter themselves that they might perhaps witness some prodigy of his genius, which should put an end at one stroke to the long rivalry of the two nations.

The First Consul, who, on this occasion, resolved to pay great deference to public opinion, conducted himself as the head of the oldest established representative government might have done. He convoked the Senate, the Le-

gislative Body, and the Tribune, and communicated to them such papers relative to the negotiation as deserved to be known. He had no need, in fact, to resort to any dissimulation; for, excepting some gusts of passion, he had in reality nothing to reproach himself with. These three bodies of the State responded to the proceeding of the First Consul, by sending deputations charged to convey to the government their entire approbation. A man who excelled in that studied and solemn eloquence which so well befits the head of great assemblies, M. de Fontanes, recently introduced into the Legislative Body through the influence of the Bonaparte family, was deputed to express to the First Consul the sentiments of that body, and did it in terms worthy of being recorded by history.

"France," said he, "is ready to cover herself again with those arms which have conquered Europe. Wo to the ambitious government which would recall us to the field of battle, and which, grudging humanity so brief an interval of repose, would plunge it back into the calamities from which it has scarcely emerged! . . . England can no longer assert that she is defending the conservative principles of society threatened in its foundations; it is we who shall be able to hold that language, if war is rekindled; it is we who shall then avenge the rights of nations and the cause of humanity, in repelling the unjust attack of a nation, which negotiates but to deceive, which demands peace only to recommence war, which signs treaties only to break

them. Let us not doubt that, if the signal is once given, France will rally with one unanimous movement around the hero whom she admires. All the parties, which he keeps in silence about him, will then vie only in zeal and courage. All are sensible that they have need of his genius, and acknowledge that he alone can support the weight and greatness of our new destinies.

"Citizen First Consul, the French people cannot entertain any but grand ideas and heroic sentiments like yours. It has conquered that it might have peace; it desires peace, like yourself, but like you, it will never be afraid of war. Does not England, who fancies herself so well protected by the ocean, know that the world sometimes sees extraordinary men arise, whose genius executes what before them appeared impossible? And if one of these men has appeared, ought he imprudently to provoke him and to force him to obtain from his fortune all that he has a right to expect? A great people is capable of every thing when it has for its leader a great man, from whom it can never separate its glory, its interests, and its happiness."

In this brilliant and polished language, one could not, to be sure, discover the enthusiasm of '89, but it exhibited the prodigious confidence which every one felt in the hero who held in his hand the destinies of France, and from whom was expected the ardently desired humiliation of England. A circumstance easy enough, it is true, to be foreseen, served greatly to increase the public indignation. Almost at the moment of the departure of the two ambassadors, and before any regular manifestation, news arrived that the ships of the royal English navy were capturing French merchantmen. Two frigates had taken in the bay of Audierne a number of trading vessels, which were going to seek refuge at Brest. These first acts were soon followed by many others, intelligence of which arrived from all the ports. It was a violence not at all conformable to the law of nations. There was a formal stipulation on this subject in the late treaty signed between America and France, (30th of September, 1800, Art. 8,) but in the treaty of Amiens, it is true, there was nothing of the sort. That treaty contained no stipulation for delaying, in case of rupture, the commencement of hostilities against commerce. But this delay resulted from the moral principles of the law of nations, placed far above all written stipulations. The First Consul, all the ardour of whose character was kindled by this new situation, determined instantly to use reprisals, and drew up an *arrêté*, by which he declared all the English travelling in France at the time of the rupture, prisoners of war. Since the English, he said, were determined to visit upon mere traders, innocent of the policy of their government, the consequences of that policy, he was authorized to do the same, and to secure means of exchange by constituting the British subjects, actually arrested on the soil of France, his prisoners. This measure, though actuated by the conduct of Great Britain, nevertheless exhibited a character of rigour which was liable to ruffle the

public opinion, and to excite apprehensions of the renewal of the violence of the last war. M. Cambacérès strongly remonstrated with the First Consul, and obtained a modification of the projected dispositions. Thanks to his efforts, those dispositions were made to apply only to such British subjects as were in the military service or held any commission whatever from the government. For the rest, they were not confined, but merely prisoners on parole in various fortified places.

All France was soon in vehement commotion. For a century past, that is to say, ever since the English navy seemed to take the lead of ours, the idea of terminating the maritime rivalry of the two nations by an invasion had possessed all minds. Louis XVI. and the Directory had made preparations for a landing. The Directory, in particular, had kept for several years a certain number of flat-bottomed boats on the coasts of the Channel; and it will be recollected that in 1801, shortly before the signature of the preliminaries of peace, Admiral Latouche Treville had repulsed the repeated attempts of Nelson to carry the Boulogne flotilla by boarding. It had become a sort of popular tradition that it was possible to transport an army from Calais to Dover in flat-bottomed boats. By an impulse absolutely electric, the departments and the great cities, each according to its means, offered the government flat-bottomed boats, cutters, frigates, even ships of the line. This patriotic idea was first broached by the department of the Loiret, which taxed itself to the amount of 300,000 francs, to build and equip a frigate of thirty guns. At this signal, communes, departments, and even corporations, came forward to imitate the example. The mayors of Paris opened subscriptions, which were soon filled with a multitude of signatures. Among the models of boats proposed by the marine were some of different dimensions, costing from 8000 to 30,000 francs. Each locality could consequently proportion its zeal to its means. Small towns, as Coutances, Bernay, Louviers, Valogne, Verdun, Moissac, gave merely flat-bottomed boats of the first or second dimension. The more considerable towns voted frigates, and even ships of the line. Paris voted a ship of 120 guns, Lyons one of 100, Bordeaux an 84, Marseilles a 74. These gifts of the great cities were independent of those made by the departments. Thus, though Bordeaux had offered an 80 gun ship, the department of the Gironde subscribed 1,600,000 francs to be expended in building vessels. Though Lyons had given a ship of 100 guns, the department of the Rhone added a patriotic gift amounting to one-eighth of its taxes. The department of the North added a million to the sum voted by the city of Lille. The departments in general levied on themselves a contribution of from two to three hundred thousand francs, up to 900,000 and a million. Some gave their share in produce of the country serviceable for the navy. The department of Côte d'Or made a present to the State of 100 pieces of cannon of large calibre, which were to be founded at Creuzot. The department of Lot and Garonne voted an addition of five cen

times to its direct contributions for the service of the year XI. and the year XII., to be expended in the purchase of sail-cloth in the country. The Italian Republic, imitating this spirit, offered the First Consul four millions of Milanese livres, to build two frigates, one called the President, and the other the Italian Republic, besides twelve gun-boats, named after the twelve Italian departments. The great bodies of the State would not be left behind, and the Senate gave a ship of 120 guns for its donation. Mercantile houses, such as that of Barillon, persons holding situations in the finances, as the receivers-general, for instance, offered flat-bottomed boats. Such a resource was not to be disdained, for it could not amount to less than 40 millions. Compared with a budget of 500 millions, it was of real importance. Added to the price of Louisiana, which was 60 millions, to various subsidies obtained from allies, to the natural increase of the produce of the taxes, it would relieve the government from the necessity of recurring to the expensive, and at that time almost impossible resource, a loan in annuities.

We shall presently describe in detail the creation of this flotilla, capable of carrying 150,000 men, 400 pieces of cannon, 10,000 horses, and which for a moment was very near effecting the conquest of England. For the present it will be sufficient to mention, that a condition imposed by the marine on these flat-bottomed boats of all dimensions was that they should not draw more than six or seven feet water. When disarmed, they were not to draw more than three or four. Thus they could float upon all the rivers, descend them to the mouth, and then be collected in the ports of the Channel, keeping close to the coasts. This was a great advantage, for our ports would not have been adequate, for want of stocks, timber, and workmen, to the building of 1500 or 2000 boats, which were required to be finished in a few months. By building in the interior, the difficulty was surmounted. The banks of the Gironde, of the Loire, of the Seine, of the Somme, of the Oise, of the Scheld, of the Meuse, of the Rhine, were all at once covered with building yards. The workmen of the country, under the direction of boatswains of the navy, were perfectly equal to these singular creations, which at first astonished the population, which sometimes furnished it with subjects of railery, but which, nevertheless, soon became a cause of serious alarm to England. In Paris, from La Rapée to the Invalides, there were 90 gun-boats on the stocks, and more than 100 workmen were employed in building them.

The first thing to be done, on occasion of the new war with England, was to collect our naval force, distributed in the West Indies, and engaged in reducing our colonies under the authority of the mother-country. This was the very first point to which the First Consul turned his attention. He lost no time in recalling our squadrons, in ordering to leave at Martinique, Guadeloupe, and St. Domingo, all the men, ammunition, and *matériel* they could. The frigates and light vessels only were to remain in America. But it was necessary to

beware of being too sanguine. The war with England, if it could not wrest from us the smaller islands, such as Guadeloupe and Martinique, was destined to cause us to lose the most valuable of all, that for the preservation of which an army had been sacrificed—we mean St. Domingo.

We have seen the Captain-general Leclerc, after well-conducted operations and a considerable loss of men, become master of the colony, having reason to flatter himself even that he had restored it to France, and Toussaint, retiring to his habitation at Ennery, waiting there for the month of August as the term of the reign of the Europeans in the island of Haiti. That terrible black predicted truly when he foresaw the triumph of the climate of America over European soldiers. But he lived not to enjoy that triumph, for he was destined to perish himself from the inclemency of our climate—melancholy retaliations of the war of races, obstinately bent on disputing with each other the regions of the equator.

Scarcely had the army begun to establish itself, when the noble soldiers of the army of the Rhine and of Egypt, transported to the West Indies, were attacked by a scourge frequent in those parts, but this time more destructive than ever. Whether the climate, from some unknown decree of Providence, was this year more fatal than usual, or whether its action was more powerful upon fatigued soldiers, crowded together in considerable number, forming a stronger focus of infection, Death swept them away with awful rapidity and violence. Twenty generals were carried off nearly at once: officers and soldiers perished by thousands. To the 22,000 men brought by several squadrons, 5000 of whom were *hors de combat*, and 5000 ill of various diseases, the First Consul had added, towards the end of 1802, about 10,000 more. The new comers, in particular, were seized at the very moment of their landing. Fifteen thousand men at least perished in two months. The army was reduced to nine or ten thousand soldiers, seasoned, it is true, but mostly convalescents, and unfit to resume arms immediately.

As soon as the yellow fever commenced its ravages, Toussaint Louverture, delighted to see his sinister predictions verified, felt all his hopes revive. From his secluded retreat of Ennery, he secretly placed himself in correspondence with his trusty followers, ordered them to hold themselves in readiness, enjoined them to obtain accurate information relative to the progress of the disease, and particularly to the state of the health of the captain-general, on whom his cruel impatience invoked the infliction of the scourge. His proceedings were not so secret but that some of them came to the knowledge of the captain-general, and especially of the black generals. These lost no time in giving notice of them to the French authority. They were jealous of Toussaint, though they obeyed him, and this sentiment had contributed not a little to their prompt submission. These *noirs durs*, (gilt blacks,) as the First Consul called them, were content with the repose and the opulence which they enjoyed. They had no desire to recommence the

war, and they were afraid lest Toussaint, if he should again become all-powerful, would make them atone for their desertion. They endeavoured therefore, to persuade General Leclerc to seize the old dictator. The secret influence exercised by the latter was revealed by an alarming symptom. The blacks formerly composing his guard, and incorporated with the colonial troops which had passed into the service of the mother-country, left the ranks, to return, they said, to work, but in reality to throw themselves among the bluffs about Ennery. The captain-general, pressed by a two-fold danger, on one hand the yellow fever, which was sweeping off his army, on the other revolt, which was manifesting itself on all sides, having moreover instructions from the First Consul, enjoining him, on the first sign of disobedience, to get rid of the black chiefs, resolved to have Toussaint arrested. Besides, the intercepted letters of the latter would sufficiently authorize this step. But it was necessary to resort to dissimulation in order to seize that powerful chief, surrounded already by an army of insurgents. His advice was asked respecting the means of inducing the return of the blacks who had run away to work, and the choice of the most suitable stations for re-establishing the health of the army. To flatter his vanity thus was the very way to entice Toussaint to an interview. You clearly see, cried he, that these whites cannot do without old Toussaint. Accordingly, he repaired to the place of rendezvous, surrounded by a party of blacks. No sooner had he arrived than he was seized, disarmed, and carried prisoner on board a vessel. Surprised, ashamed, and nevertheless resigned, he uttered only these memorable words: In overthrowing me, you have overthrown only the trunk of the tree of liberty of the negroes; but the roots are left; they will shoot up again, because they are deep and numerous.—He was sent to Europe, where he was confined in the Fort of Joux.

Unfortunately, the spirit of insurrection had spread among the blacks; it had again taken possession of their hearts, accompanied by distrust of the designs of the whites and the hope of conquering them. The tidings of what had been done in Guadeloupe, where slavery had lately been re-established, had reached St. Domingo, and produced an extraordinary impression there. A few words on the re-establishment of slavery in the West India islands, dropped in the tribune of the Legislative Body in France, words applicable exclusively to Martinique and Guadeloupe, but which, with a slight degree of mistrust, might be extended to St. Domingo, had contributed to impress the blacks with a conviction that the Europeans designed to reduce them again to slavery. From the numble labourers to the generals, the idea of again falling under the yoke of slavery thrilled them with indignation. Several black officers, more humane, more worthy of their new fortune, such as Laplume, Clervaux, even Christophe, who, not aspiring like Toussaint to be dictator of the island, were perfectly satisfied with the authority of the mother-country, provided that she respected the freedom of their race, expressed themselves

with a warmth which left no doubt of their sentiments. We are willing, said they, to remain French, to be submissive, and to serve the mother-country faithfully, for we have no desire to begin anew a life of pillage; but, if the mother-country attempts to make slaves again of our brethren or our children, she must come to the resolution to slaughter us to the last man. General Leclerc, whose integrity touched them, quieted them for a few days, by assuring them upon his honour that the intentions attributed to the whites were an imposture; but, at bottom, their jealousy was incurable. Let the general in chief do what he would, he found it impossible to remove that. If Laplume and Clervaux, sincerely reconciled to the mother-country, argued as we have just shown, Dessalines, an absolute monster, such as slavery and revolt alone can form, was intent, with deep treachery, in setting the blacks against the whites and the whites against the blacks, on urging the one to exasperate the other, on triumphing amidst the general massacre, and on stepping into the place of Toussaint Louverture, whose apprehension he had been the first to call for.

In this painful perplexity, the captain-general, having only a small part of his army left, and seeing that remnant diminishing daily, threatened at the same time by a speedy insurrection, thought it right to give orders for disarming the negroes. The measure appeared reasonable and necessary. The black chiefs whose principles were upright, such as Laplume and Clervaux, approved it; but those blacks who harboured perfidious intentions, like Dessalines, recommended it most earnestly. It was set about immediately, and downright violence was required to carry it into effect. Great numbers of blacks fled to the bluffs; others submitted to torture rather than give up what they considered as liberty itself—their musket. The black officers, in particular, showed no mercy in this kind of search. They caused men of their own colour to be shot, and acted thus, some to prevent war, others, on the contrary, to excite it. By these means, however, there were taken out of their hands about 30,000 muskets, mostly of English manufacture, and purchased through the forecast of Toussaint. These severities excited insurrections, in the north, in the west, in the environs of Port au Prince. Toussaint's nephew, Charles Belair, a negro, who possessed a certain superiority over the blacks, by his manners, his understanding, and his acquirements, and whom on account of these qualities, his uncle proposed to make his successor—Charles Belair, irritated by some executions perpetrated in the department of the west, fled to the bluffs and raised the standard of revolt. Dessalines, who resided at St. Marc, solicited most urgently to be employed in reducing him; and finding here the two-fold occasion of displaying the deceptive zeal which he effected, and to revenge himself upon a rival who had given him great umbrage, he kept up an unrelenting war against Charles Belair. At length he found means to take him with his wife, sent them before a military commission, and had both those unfortunate persons shot. Dessalines excused him-

self to the blacks for this conduct by alleging the merciless injunctions of the whites, and at the same time availed himself of the occasion for destroying a detested rival. Melancholy atrocities, which prove that the passions of the human heart are everywhere the same, and that climate, time, features, and complexion, make no perceptible difference in man! Thus every thing urged on the revolt of the blacks—the dark mistrust which had taken possession of their minds, the vigorous precautions necessary to be adopted in regard to them, and the ferocious passions by which they were divided; passions which the French were obliged to tolerate, and frequently even to employ.

To these misfortunes of situation were added faults, owing to the confusion which the disease, the danger springing up everywhere at once, the difficulty of communication between one part of the island and another, began to introduce into the colony. General Boudet had been withdrawn from Port au Prince to be sent to the Windward Islands as successor to Richepanse, who had died of the yellow fever. General Rochambeau, appointed to fill his place, was a brave officer, equally intelligent and intrepid, but had contracted in the colonies, where he had served, all the prejudices of the Creoles residing there. He hated the mulattoes, as he did the old colonists themselves. He found them dissolute, violent, cruel, and said that he liked the blacks better, because, as he alleged, they were more simple, more sober, more hardy for war. General Rochambeau, commanding in Port au Prince and in the south, where mulattoes abounded, manifested on the approach of the insurrection as strong a distrust of them as of the blacks, and imprisoned a great number. Another thing he did, which irritated them, and that was to send away General Rigaud, formerly chief of the mulattoes, long the rival and enemy of Toussaint, vanquished and expelled by him, naturally taking advantage of the victory of the whites to return to St. Domingo, and hoping for a favourable reception there. But the same fault that the whites committed at the commencement of the revolution in St. Domingo, in not allying themselves with the people of colour, they again committed at its conclusion. The mulattoes, offended, grieved, thenceforward showed a disposition to unite with the blacks; which was extremely prejudicial, especially in the south, where they predominated.

By these concurring causes, the insurrection which had at first been partial, was rendered general. In the north Maurepas and Christophe fled to the bluffs, not without expressing regret, but mastered by a sentiment stronger than themselves—the love of their threatened liberty. In the west, the barbarous Dessalines, at length throwing off the mask, joined the revolvers. In the south, the mulattoes, united with the blacks, began to ravage that fair province, hitherto left intact and flourishing as in the most prosperous times. La-plume was the only black who continued faithful, definitively attached to the mother-country, and preferring that to the barbarous government of men of his own colour.

The French army, reduced to eight or ten

thousand men, scarcely fit for service, had in the north nothing but the Cape and a few surrounding positions; in the west, Port au Prince and St. Marc; in the south, Les Cayes, Jérémie, and Tiburin. The anguish of the unfortunate Leclerc was extreme. He had with him his wife, whom he had lately sent to Turtle Island, to save her from the pestilence. He had witnessed the death of the wise and able M. Benezec, and of several of the most distinguished generals of the armies of the Rhine and Italy; he had just received intelligence of the decease of Richepanse; he was a daily spectator of the end of his most valiant soldiers, without having it in his power to afford them relief; and he saw that the moment was approaching when he should no longer be able to defend against the blacks the small strip of coast that was still left him. Tormented by these distressing reflections, he was more exposed than any other to the attack of that malady which was destroying the army. He was actually seized by it in his turn, and, after a short illness, which, assuming the character of a continued fever, at last deprived him entirely of strength, he expired, expressing incessantly noble sentiments, and his mind appearing to be wholly occupied with his wife and his companions in arms, whom he left in a deplorable situation. He died in November, 1802.

General Rochambeau, as senior officer, assumed the command. This new governor of the colony was not deficient either in valour or military talents, but he wanted prudence and the coolness of a chief untinged with the passions of the tropics. General Rochambeau reckoned upon quelling the insurrection everywhere, but it was too late. It would be as much as he could do, by concentrating his forces at the Cape, and abandoning the west and the south, to maintain his ground. Attempting to make head at all points at once, his efforts were everywhere feeble and inefficient. He returned to the Cape to take possession of his new authority. He arrived there at the moment when Christophe, Clervaux, and the black chiefs of the north attacked, in hopes of reducing, that capital of the island. General Rochambeau had for its defence a few hundred soldiers, and the national guard of the Cape, composed of planters, brave like all the men of those countries. Christophe and Clervaux had already carried one of the forts; General Rochambeau retook it with extraordinary courage, seconded by the energy of the national guard, and behaved so bravely that the blacks, concluding that reinforcements must have arrived on the island, beat a retreat. But, during this heroic defence, a frightful scene had taken place in the road. Twelve hundred blacks had been sent on board the ships, because the French knew not how to guard them on shore, and were unwilling to give such an additional force to the enemy. The crews, decimated by the disease, were much weaker than their prisoners. At the sound of the attack on the Cape, they threw—we shudder while we write—they threw part of them overboard. At the same instant, a mulatto, named Bardet, in the south

of the island, was subjected to the like treatment: he was drowned on account of an unjust and atrocious suspicion. From that day the mulattoes, who had still wavered, joined the negroes, slaughtered the whites, and completely ravaged the fine province of the south.

Let us close this doleful recital, in which history has nothing more that is worthy of record to introduce. At the period of the renewal of the war between France and Great Britain, the French, shut up at the Cape, Port au Prince, and Cayes, had difficulty to defend themselves against the united blacks and mulattoes. The new European war heightened their despair. They had no alternative but between the negroes who had become more ferocious than ever, and the English waiting till they should be forced to surrender to them, when they would be sent prisoners to England, after being stripped of the last remnant of their property.

Out of from thirty to thirty-two thousand men, sent by the mother-country, there were finally left seven or eight. More than twenty generals had perished, and among them Richepanse, the most to be regretted of all. At the moment Toussaint Louverture, ill-boding prophet, was dying of cold in France, a prisoner in the fort of Joux, our soldiers were sinking under the rays of a burning sun. Deplorable compensation, this death of a black of genius, for the loss of so many heroic whites!

Such was the sacrifice made by the First Consul to the ancient commercial system of France, a sacrifice for which he has been keenly censured. Still, to judge soundly of the acts of the heads of governments, we should always take into account the circumstances under the control of which they acted. When peace had been made with the whole world, when the ideas of old commerce poured in again like a torrent, when, in Paris and in all the seaports, the merchants, the ruined colonists, loudly demanded the re-establishment of our commercial prosperity; when they urged the recovery of a possession which once constituted the wealth and the pride of the ancient monarchy; when thousands of officers, seeing with mortification their career cut short by peace, offered to serve in any part of the world where their arms were needed; was it possible to refuse to the regrets of the former and to the activity of the latter the occasion for restoring the commerce of France? What has not England done to preserve North America, Spain to preserve South America? What would not Holland do to preserve Java? Nations never suffered any great possession to slip out of their hands, without making an effort to retain it, even though they have no chance of success. We shall see if the American war has furnished the English with a lesson, and if they will attempt to defend Canada, whenever that northern colony shall indulge the very natural predilection which attracts it towards the United States.

The First Consul had recalled to Europe all our squadrons, with the exceptions of the frigates and light vessels. They had all en-

tered our ports, one only excepted, consisting of five sail of the line, which had been obliged to put into Corunna. A sixth ship had taken refuge in Cadiz. It was necessary to collect these scattered elements, for the purpose of engaging in a conflict hand to hand with Great Britain.

* It would have been a difficult task even for the ablest and the most firmly established government to maintain a conflict with England. It was easy, it is true, for the First Consul to screen himself from her blows: but it was just as easy for England to screen herself from his. England and France had conquered a nearly equal empire, the former at sea, the latter on land. Hostilities having commenced, England was about to unfurl her flag in both hemispheres, to take some Dutch and Spanish colonies, perhaps, but with more difficulty, some French colonies. She was about to interdict navigation to all nations, and to arrogate it to herself exclusively; but, unaided, she could do no more. The appearance of English troops on the continent would but have brought upon her a disaster similar to that of the Helder in 1799. France, on her part, could, either by force or by influence, forbid England access to the coasts of Europe from Copenhagen to Venice, confine her intercourse to the shores of the Baltic alone, and oblige her to bring down from her Pole the colonial produce of which during the war she would be the sole depository. But, in this struggle of two great powers, who ruled each on one of the two elements, without having the means of quitting them to grapple one another, it was to be feared that they would be restricted to threatening without striking, and that the world, trampled upon by them, would finally rebel against one or the other, for the purpose of withdrawing itself from the consequences of this tremendous quarrel. In such a situation, success must belong to that which should contrive to get out of the element in which it reigned to reach its rival; and, if that effort proved impossible, to that which should find means to render its cause so popular in the world, as to gain it over to its side. It was difficult for both to attach nations to themselves; for England, in order to arrogate to herself the monopoly of commerce, was obliged to harass neutrals; and France, in order to close the continent against the commerce of England, was obliged to do violence to all the powers of Europe. To conquer England, therefore, it was requisite to solve one of these problems: either to cross the channel and march to London, or to sway the continent, and to oblige it, either by force or by policy, to refuse all British commodities: to realize, in short, an invasion or a continental blockade. We shall see, in the course of this history, by what series of events Napoleon was gradually led from the first of these enterprises to the second; by what a concatenation of prodigies he at first approached his aim so as nearly to attain it: by what a combination of faults and misfortunes he was afterwards hurried away from it, and finally fell. Happily, before reaching that deplorable term, France had achieved such things, that a nation which Providence permits to accomplish them

mains for ever glorious, and perhaps the greatest of nations.

Such were the proportions which this war between France and Great Britain must inevitably take. It had been from 1792 to 1801 the struggle of the democratic principle against the aristocratic principle; without ceasing to have this character, it was about to become, under Napoleon, the struggle of one element against another, with much more difficulty for us than for the English; for the whole continent, out of detestation to the French Revolution, out of jealousy of our power, must hate France much more heartily than the neutrals hated England.

With his keen glance, the First Consul perceived the drift of this war, and he took his resolution without hesitating. He formed the plan of crossing the Strait of Calais with an army, and putting an end to the rivalry of the two nations in London itself. We shall find him for three successive years applying all his faculties to this prodigious enterprise, and remaining calm, confident, even happy, so full of hope was he in anticipation of an attempt which must either lead to his becoming absolute master of the world, or bury himself, his army, his glory, in the depths of the Ocean.

The reader may say, perhaps, that Louis XIV. and Louis XVI. had not been driven to such extremities to fight England, and that numerous squadrons, contesting the plains of Ocean, had then been sufficient. We answer that, in the 17th and 18th centuries, England had not yet, by making herself mistress of universal commerce, acquired the greatest maritime population of the globe, and that the means of the two navies were much more unequal. The First Consul was determined to make immense efforts to raise the French navy, but he had doubts of any great success, though he possessed a vast extent of coast, though he had at his disposal the ports and dock-yards of Holland, of Belgium, of ancient France, and of Italy. We say nothing of those of Spain, then too unworthily governed to be a usefully. Reckoning his whole naval force now collected in Europe, he had not above 50 sail of the line to send to sea in the course of the year. He might procure 4 or 5 in Holland, 20 or 22 at Brest, 2 at Lorient, 6 at La Rochelle, 5 which put into Corunna, 1 at Cadiz, 10 or 12 Toulon, in the whole about 50. With the number with which his vast empire was covered, floated down the rivers to the docks of Holland, the Netherlands, and Italy he might build 50 more ships of the line, so that there would be 100 sail bearing his glorious tri-coloured flag. But he would want more than 100,000 sailors to man them, and he had scarcely 60,000. England would presently have 75 sail of the line quite ready for sea; it would be easy for her to raise her establishment to 120, with the number of frigates and small vessels which such an establishment supposes. She could put on board them 120,000 seamen and more, if she ceased to show any delicacy to neutrals, and pressed out of their merchantmen. She possessed, moreover, experienced admirals, confident because they had conquered, behaving at sea as Generals Lannes, Ney, and Masséna behaved on land.

The disproportion of the two fleets resulting from time and circumstances was therefore very great: the First Consul, however, was not daunted. He purposed to build everywhere, in the Texel, in the Scheld, at Havre, at Cherbourg, at Brest, at Toulon, at Genoa. He thought to introduce a certain number of land-troops into the composition of his crews, and to make amends by this expedient for the inferiority of our maritime population. He had been the first to perceive that a ship, having a crew of 600 good seamen and two or three hundred picked landsmen, kept under sail for two or three years, trained to manœuvres and firing, was capable of fighting any ship whatever. But, in employing these means and others, it would take him ten years, he said, to create a navy. Now he could not wait ten years, with his arms crossed, till his navy, running over the seas in small detachments, should have qualified itself to enter into conflict with the English navy. To employ ten years in forming a fleet without doing any thing of consequence in the mean time, would have been a plain avowal of impotence, mortifying to any government, still more mortifying to him, who had made his fortune, and who had to keep it up by dazzling the world. He must, therefore, while applying himself to reorganize our naval force, boldly attempt to cross the strait, and make use at the same time of the terror inspired by his sword, to oblige Europe to close the access to the continent against England. If with his genius of execution for great enterprises he united a skilful policy, he might, by these combined means, either destroy the British power at a blow in London itself, or ruin it for a long time by ruining its commerce.

Many of his admirals, especially Decrès, the minister, recommended to him a slow reconstitution of our navy, consisting in forming small naval divisions, and sending them out to sea to cruise about till they were sufficiently trained to manœuvre in large squadrons; and meanwhile, they exhorted him to stop there, considering as doubtful all the plans proposed for crossing the Channel. The First Consul would not submit to be bound by such opinions: he purposed, indeed, to restore the French navy, but yet to make some more direct attempt to strike England. In consequence, he ordered numerous vessels to be built at Flushing, which was at his disposal, in consequence of his power over Holland; at Antwerp, which had become a French port; at Cherbourg, at Brest, at Lorient, at Toulon, lastly at Genoa, which France occupied by the same title as Holland. He directed twenty-two ships to be repaired and equipped at Brest; two to be finished at Lorient; five to be launched and equipped at La Rochelle. He claimed from Spain the means of refitting and reequipping the squadron which put into Corunna, and despatched from Bayonne by land all that it was possible to send, in men, money, and materiel. He took the same precautions respecting the ship which had put into Cadiz. He gave orders for the equipment of the Toulon fleet, which he intended to compose of twelve ships. These various arma-

ments, added to three or four Dutch ships, would, as we have said, make the force of France amount to about fifty ships, without including what might afterwards be obtained from the Dutch and Spanish navies, or what might be built in the ports of France, and manned with a mixture of sailors and land soldiers. The First Consul, however, did not flatter himself that with such a force he should gain in pitched battle the maritime superiority or even equality, in regard to England: he resolved to employ it for keeping the sea, for going to and coming from the colonies, for opening the Strait of Calais for a few moments by movements of squadrons, of the profound combination of which the reader will soon be enabled to judge.

Towards this strait all the efforts of his genius were concentrated. Whatever means of conveyance might be devised, it was first requisite to have an army, and he formed a plan for the composition of one, which left nothing to be desired in respect to number and organization; for distributing it in several camps from the Texel to the Pyrenees; and for placing it in such a manner that it might be concentrated with rapidity at certain points of the coast judiciously chosen. Independently of a corps of 25,000 men, assembled between Breda and Nimeguen, to march for Hanover, he ordered the formation of six camps, the first in the environs of Utrecht, the second at Ghent, the third at St. Omer, the fourth at Compiegne, the fifth at Brest, the sixth at Bayonne, the latter destined to overawe Spain, for reasons which shall be given hereafter. He began with forming parks of artillery at these six points of assemblage, a precaution which he usually took before any other, saying that it was this which was always most difficult to be organized. He then sent to each of these camps a sufficient number of demi-brigades of infantry to make them amount to 25,000 men at least. The cavalry was despatched more slowly, and in less proportion than usual, because, in case of embarkation, but very few horses could be transported. It was requisite that the quality and quantity of the infantry, the excellence of the artillery, and the number of pieces, should compensate in such an army for the numerical inferiority of the cavalry. In this two-fold respect, the French infantry and artillery combined all the conditions that could be desired. The First Consul took care to assemble on the coast, and to form into four great divisions the whole arm of the dragoons. The soldiers of that arm, capable of serving on horseback or on foot, were to be separately embarked with their saddles, and to be useful as foot-soldiers, till they could become horsemen, when mounted with horses taken from the enemy.

All the dispositions were ordered for manning and horsing 400 field-pieces, besides a vast park of siege artillery. The demi-brigades, which were then of three battalions, were to furnish two war battalions, of 800 men each, taking out of the third battalion sufficient to complete the first two. The third battalion was left at the dépôt, to receive the conscripts, and to instruct and train them. Nevertheless,

a certain number of these conscripts were sent immediately to the war battalions, that with the old soldiers of the Republic there might be mixed a sufficient proportion of choice young soldiers, having the vivacity, the ardour, and the docility of youth.

The conscription had been definitively introduced into our military legislation, and regularized under the Directory upon the plan proposed by General Jourdan. The law by which it was established nevertheless still exhibited some chasms, which had been filled by a new law of the 28th of April, 1803. The contingent had been fixed at 60,000 men per year, levied at the age of twenty years. This contingent was divided into two parts of 30,000 men each. The first was to be always raised in time of peace; the second formed the reserve, and might be called out in case of war to complete the battalions. It was now the middle of the year XI.—June, 1803; the government demanded authority to levy the contingent for the years XI. and XII. without touching the reserve of those two years. There would thus be 60,000 conscripts to take immediately. By calling for them in advance, time would be gained for instructing them and training them to military service in the camps formed on the coasts. Recourse could further be had, if necessary, to the reserve of those two years, which afforded 60,000 more disposable men, but who were not expected to be wanted unless in case of a continental war. Thirty thousand men only demanded out of each class, were a small sacrifice, which could scarcely be felt by a population composed of 109 departments. Besides, there was yet left to be taken part of the contingents of the years VIII., IX., and X., which had not been called for, thanks to the peace which the country had enjoyed under the Consulate. An arrear of men is as difficult to recover as an arrear of taxes. In regard to this matter, the First Consul made a sort of compromise. And of these arrears of contingents the First Consul demanded a certain number of men, picked from among the most robust and the most disposable; he exempted a greater number on the coast than in the interior, imposing upon those who were not called the service of a coast-guard. In this manner he provided the army with about 50,000 more men, older and stronger than the conscripts of the years XI. and XII. The army was thus raised to 480,000 men, distributed in the colonies, Hanover, Holland, Switzerland, Italy, and France. Out of this effective force, about 100,000, employed in guarding Italy, Holland, Hanover, and the colonies, were no expense to the French treasury. Subsidies in money or provisions furnished on the spot defrayed the cost of their keep. Three hundred and eighty thousand were wholly made by France, and entirely at her disposal. Deducting from these 380,000 men, 40,000 for ordinary non-effectives, that is to say, for soldiers sick, temporarily absent, on the way, &c., 40,000 for gendarmes, veterans, invalids, drill-sergeants, one might reckon upon 300,000 disposable men, seasoned, and capable of taking the field immediately. If 150,000 were destined to fight England, there would be left

150,000, 70,000 of which, forming the dépôts, were sufficient for guarding the interior, and 80,000 might hasten to the Rhine, in case of any alarm on the part of the continent. It is not from the number that one ought to form a judgment of such an army. These 300,000 men, almost all tried soldiers, inured to fatigue and war, commanded by accomplished officers, were worth six or seven hundred thousand, a million, perhaps, of those that one usually has after a long peace; for, between a perfect soldier and one who is not, the difference is infinite. In this respect, the First Consul had nothing to wish for. He commanded the finest army in the world.

The grand problem to be resolved was the assemblage of the means of transport for conveying this army from Calais to Dover. The First Consul had not yet fully made up his mind on the subject. One thing only was definitely fixed, after a long series of observations—that was the form of the vessels. Flat-bottomed boats, which could run aground, and advance with sails and oars, had appeared to all the engineers of the navy the means best adapted for crossing, besides affording the advantage that they might be built anywhere, even in the upper basin of our rivers. But then they were to be collected, to be sheltered in harbours suitably situated, to be armed, to be equipped, and the best system of manœuvres for working them with order before an enemy was to be devised. For this purpose it was necessary to undertake a series of long and difficult experiments. The First Consul purposed to establish himself in person at Boulogne, on the coast of the Channel, to live there very often and for a considerable time together, to study the localities, the circumstances of the sea and of the weather, and to organize himself, in all its parts, the vast enterprise which he meditated.

Till the vessels ordered to be built throughout all France should be sufficiently forward to render the presence of the First Consul on the coast useful, his attention was engaged in Paris with two essential points, the finances and the relations with the powers of the continent; for it was necessary, on the one hand, to provide for the costs of the undertaking, and, on the other, to make sure of not being disturbed during its execution by the continental allies of England.

The financial difficulty was not the least of the difficulties attending the renewal of the war. The French Revolution had swallowed up an immense mass of national domains under the form of assignats, and ended in bankruptcy. The national domains were almost exhausted, and credit was ruined for a long time. To spare the alienation of the national domains to the value of 400 millions in 1800, they had been divided among various public services, such as public instruction, the Invalides, the Legion of Honour, the Senate, the Sinking Fund. Thus changed into endowments, they eased the budget of the state, and reserved domains that would hereafter be of immense value; thanks to the rise of landed property, steady at all times, but always greater immediately after a revolution. They would,

it is true, be diminished by some portions to be restored to emigrants, portions not considerable, because the domains not alienated were almost entirely domains of the Church. To what was left were to be added the domains situated in Piedmont, and in the new departments of the Rhine, to the value of from 50 to 60 millions. Such were the disposable resources in national domains. As for credit, the First Consul was resolved not to have recourse to that. It will be recollected that, when he completed in the year XI. the liquidation of the preceding, he availed himself of the rise of the public funds to pay in annuities part of the arrears of the years V., VI., VII., and VIII.; but this was the only operation of the kind upon which he would venture, and he paid the services of the years IX. and X. entirely in cash. In the year X., the last budget voted, he had caused it to be laid down as a principle that the annual charge on the public debt should never be allowed to exceed 50 millions, and that, if such a thing did happen, a resource should be immediately created for extinguishing the surplus in fifteen years. This precaution had been necessary to support confidence, for, notwithstanding a general prosperity, credit was so destroyed that the five per cent. annuities were scarcely ever above fifty-six, and had never exceeded sixty at the moment when peace was most firmly anticipated.

For a long time past in England, and of late in France, the public funds have become an object of regular commerce, in which the great houses, ever disposed to treat with governments for the supply of such sums as they need, take a part. That was not the case at this period. Not a house in France would have subscribed a loan. It would have lost all credit by avowing that it was connected by business with the state; and if rash speculators had consented to make a loan, they would have given at most fifty francs for a five per cent. annuity, so that the treasury would have had to bear the enormous interest of ten per cent. The First Consul, therefore, declined so expensive a resource. There was at that time another way of borrowing: it was to run in debt with the great companies of contractors for the army supplies, by not paying up all that was owing to them. They indemnified themselves by getting paid for their services twice or thrice as much they were worth. Hence bold speculators, who are fond of launching into great enterprises, instead of sticking to loans, were eager to engage in contracts. By applying to them, of course, one might have had a substitute for credit; but this expedient would have been far more costly than a loan itself. The First Consul intended to pay the contractors regularly, to oblige them to execute their services regularly, and to execute them at reasonable prices. He rejected, therefore, the resources of the alienation of the national domains, which could not yet be sold to advantage, and the resources of loans then too difficult and too dear, and lastly the resource of the great contracts, entailing abuses difficult to calculate. He flattered himself, with strict order and economy, with the natural increase of the produce of the taxes, and some accessory receipts

which we are about to mention, to escape the hard necessities to which speculators oblige those governments to submit which are destitute at once of revenues and credit.

The last budget, that of the year X.—September, 1801, to September, 1802—had been fixed at 500 millions, (620 with the expense of collection and the additional centimes.) This amount had not been exceeded, owing to the peace. The taxes alone had surpassed in their produce the anticipations of the government. A revenue of 470 millions had been assumed, and a small alienation of national domains voted to make the receipts equal the expenditure. But the taxes had exceeded the expected amount by 33 millions, and the alienation voted had therefore become unnecessary. This unexpected augmentation of resources arose from the registration, which, thanks to the increasing number of private transactions, had produced 172 millions, instead of 150; the customs which, thanks to reviving commerce, had produced 31 millions instead of 22; lastly, from the posts and some other less important branches of revenue.

Notwithstanding the renewal of the war, it was hoped, and the event confirmed the expectation, it was hoped that there would be the like increase in the produce of the taxes. Under the vigorous government of the First Consul, no fears were entertained either of further commotions or of reverses. While confidence kept up, private transactions, internal trade, the daily extending commerce with the continent, could do no other than follow an increasing progression. Maritime commerce alone was liable to suffer; and the revenue of the customs, then figuring at 30 millions in the budget of the receipts, plainly showed that from this suffering no great loss could result to the treasury. There was reason, therefore, to calculate upon receipts to the amount of more than 500 millions. The budget of the year XI.—September 1802 to September, 1803—had been voted in March, with a fear, but not with a certainty, of war. It had been fixed at 589 millions, exclusively of the costs of collection, but including in it part of the additional centimes. This was consequently an augmentation of 89 millions. The navy, raised from 105 to 126 millions, the war from 210 to 243 millions, had obtained part of that augmentation. The remainder had been divided among the public works, the clergy, the new civil lists of the Consuls, and the fixed expenses of the departments, entered this time in the general budget. It was assumed that this augmentation of expenditure would be met by the supposed increase of the produce of the taxes, by the additional centimes, formerly applied to the fixed expenses of the departments, and by several foreign receipts arising from the allied countries. The current budget might be considered as in equilibrium, excepting an indispensable excess for the expenses of the war. In fact, it was not to be supposed that twenty millions added to the charge for the navy, and thirty to the

charge for the army, could suffice for the necessities of the new situation. The war with the continent cost in general very little, for our victorious troops, crossing the Rhine and the Adige, at the commencement of the operations, went and supported themselves at the cost of the enemy; but here the case was different. The six camps established on the coast from Holland to the Pyrenees, must be substituted upon the soil of France, till the day when they should cross the Strait. It was requisite, moreover, to provide for the expenses of the ships that were to be built, and to place a prodigious mass of artillery upon our coasts. One hundred millions additional per annum would be scarcely sufficient to meet the expense of the war with Great Britain.¹ The following were the resources of which the First Consul proposed to avail himself.

We have just adverted to some foreign receipts, already carried to the budget of the year XI., in order to cover in part the sum of 89 millions, by which this budget exceeded that of the year X. These receipts were those of Italy. The Italian Republic, having as yet no army, and being unable to do without ours, paid 1,600,000 francs per month, (19,000,000 francs per annum,) for the subsistence of the French troops. Liguria, in the same predicament, furnished 1,200,000 francs per annum; Parma, 2 millions. This was a resource of 22 millions and a half, already carried, as we have just said, to the budget of the year XI. There was still to be found the whole of the sum of 100 millions, which it would probably be necessary to add to the 589 millions of the budget of the year XI.

The voluntary donations, the price of Louisiana, the subsidies of the other allied States—such were the means on which the First Consul reckoned. The voluntary donations of the towns and the departments amounted to about forty millions, fifteen payable in the year XI, fifteen in the year XII, the remainder in the following years. The price of Louisiana, sold for eighty millions, sixty of which were to be paid in Holland on behalf of the French treasury, and the net sum of fifty-four to be received for it, the expense of negotiation deducted, furnished a second resource. The Americans had not yet legally accepted the contract, but the house of Hope offered already to advance part of that sum. By dividing this resource of fifty-four millions between two years, there would be twenty-seven millions added to the fifteen arising from the voluntary donations, which would raise the annual supplement to about forty-two millions, for the services of XI. and XII.—September, 1802, to September 1804. Lastly, Holland and Spain were to furnish the surplus. Holland, delivered from the stadtholdership by our arms, defended against England by our diplomacy, which had obtained the restitution of the greater part of her colonies, would now have been glad to be released from an alliance which dragged her anew into war. She would fain have remained neuter between France

¹ This sum will appear trifling in comparison with the present amount of our budgets; but we must bear in mind the value of money at that period, and recollect

that 100 millions in those days were equivalent to 200 or 250 at the present day, perhaps more, when military expenses are in question.

and Great Britain, and, happily situated between the two countries, reaped the profits of her neutrality. But the First Consul had taken a resolution, the justice of which cannot be denied: that was to make all the maritime nations concur in our contest with Great Britain. Holland and Spain, said he incessantly, are undone if we are conquered. All their colonies in India and America will be either taken, or destroyed, or urged into revolt by England. No doubt those two powers would find it convenient not to take either side, to look on at our defeats if we are vanquished, to profit by our victories, if we are victorious; for if the enemy is beaten, it will be as much for their benefit as for ours. But that cannot be: they must combat with us, like us, with equal effort. Justice requires it, and their interest too, for their resources are indispensable to our success. If by uniting all our means we conquer the rulers of the sea, it is as much as we can do. Singly, each limited to our separate strength, we shall not succeed, we shall be beaten. The First Consul had therefore concluded that Holland and Spain should assist him; and it may be said with perfect truth that, in forcing them to concur in his designs, he merely obliged them to take care of their own interest. Be this as it may, in order to compel attention to language so reasonable, he had, in regard to Holland, force, since our troops occupied Flushing and Utrecht, and in regard to Spain, the treaty of alliance of St. Ildefonso.

For the rest, at Amsterdam, all enlightened and truly patriotic men, with M. de Schimmelpenninck at their head, thought like the First Consul. There was no difficulty therefore in coming to an arrangement, and it was agreed that Holland should assist us in the following manner. She engaged to subsist and pay a corps of 18,000 French and 16,000 Dutch, in all 34,000 men. To this land force she promised to add a naval force, composed of a squadron of ships of the line and a flotilla of flat-bottomed boats. The squadron was to consist of five sail of the line, five frigates, and transports sufficient to convey 25,000 men and 2500 horses from the Texel to the coast of England. The flotilla was to be composed of 350 flat-bottomed boats of all sizes, and capable of carrying 37,000 men and 1500 horses from the mouth of the Scheldt to that of the Thames. In return, France guaranteed to Holland her independence, the integrity of her territory, European and colonial, and the restitution of the colonies lost in the late war. The aid obtained by means of this arrangement was considerable; for 18,000 French ceased for a time to be a burden to the treasury of France; 16,000 Dutch were to swell our army, and, lastly, means of transport for 62,000 men and 4000 horses were to be added to our naval resources. It would be difficult to say, however, for what sum such aid might figure in the extraordinary budget of the First Consul.

The concurrence of Spain was yet to be obtained. That power was less disposed to devote herself to the common cause than even Holland. We have already seen her under the capricious influence of the Prince of the

Peace, meanly wavering between the most contrary directions, sometimes leaning towards France, in order to obtain an establishment in Italy, sometimes towards England, to relieve herself from the efforts imposed by a courageous and indefatigable ally, and losing in these fluctuations the valuable island of Trinidad. Alike impotent, whether friend or foe, one knew not what to do with her either in peace or war; not that the noble Spanish nation, full of patriotism; not that the magnificent soil of the peninsula, containing the ports of Ferrol, Cadiz, and Carthagena, were to be despised—very far from it. But an unworthy government betrayed, by profound incapacity, the cause of Spain, and that of all the maritime nations. Accordingly, after mature reflection, the First Consul made up his mind to derive no other advantage from the treaty of alliance of St. Ildefonso, but that of obtaining subsidies. By that treaty, signed in 1796, during the first administration of the Prince of the Peace, Spain engaged to furnish France with 24,000 men, fifteen sail of the line, six frigates, and four cutters. The First Consul resolved not to claim these succours. He considered, and very justly, that to draw Spain into a war would not be doing any service to France or to herself: that she would not cut a brilliant figure in it; that she would be stripped at once of her only resource, the piastres of Mexico, which would be intercepted; that she could not equip either an army or a fleet; that, consequently, she would be of no use, and merely furnished England with a pretext which she had long been seeking to excite all South America to revolt; that if, it was true, the participation of Spain in hostilities changed the whole coast of the peninsula into an enemy's coast for the English ships, none of her ports could have a useful influence like those of Holland on the operation of the invasion; that, consequently, the advantage of having them at one's disposal was not great; that, in a commercial point of view, the British flag was already excluded from Spain by the tariffs, and that French productions would continue to find there a sure preference, whether in peace or war. From all these considerations, he caused it to be privately intimated to M. d'Azara, ambassador of Charles IV. in Paris, that, if his court had a dislike to the war, he was willing to allow it to remain neuter, on condition of a subsidy of six millions per month, (seventy-two millions per year,) which would open to French manufactures a more extensive market than they at that moment enjoyed.

This very moderate offer war not received at Madrid with the favour which it deserved. The Prince of the Peace was closely connected with the English, and openly betrayed the alliance. It was for this motive that the First Consul, anticipating this treachery, had placed at Bayonne itself one of the six camps destined to operate against England. He was determined to declare war against Spain, rather than suffer her to desert the common cause. He, therefore, ordered General Beurnonville, his ambassador, to explain himself on this subject in a peremptory manner. The English, by usurping an absolute authority over the

seas, obliged him to exercise an absolute authority over the land, for the defence of the general interests of the world.

To the succours of the allied States must be added those about to be derived from such States as were hostile, or ill-disposed, or at least on the point of being occupied. Hanover would suffice for subsisting 30,000 men. The division formed at Faenza, and on march for the gulf of Tarento, would have to live at the expense of the court of Naples. Informed by his ambassador, the First Consul knew positively that Queen Caroline, governed by Acton, the minister, was in perfect harmony with England, and that it would not be long before he should be obliged to drive the Bourbons from the continent of Italy. He did not fail therefore to explain himself frankly to the Queen of Naples—"I will no more suffer the English in Italy," said he, "than in Spain and Portugal. On the first act of complicity with England, war shall do me justice for your enmity. I have it in my power to do you either a great deal of good or a great deal of harm. It is for you to choose. I have no wish to take your dominions from you; I am satisfied to make them subservient to my designs against England, but I will surely take them if they are employed in serving her."—The First Consul spoke sincerely, for he had not yet made himself the head of a dynasty, and had no thoughts of conquering kingdoms for his brothers. In consequence, he required that the division of 15,000 men, established at Tarento, should be subsisted by the treasury of Naples, the expense to be accounted for thereafter. He considered this charge as a contribution imposed on enemies quite as much as that which was about to burden the kingdom of Hanover.

On recapitulating what goes before, we find that the resources of the First Consul were the following. Naples, Holland, and Hanover, were to keep about 60,000 men. The Italian Republic, Parma, Liguria, Spain, were charged with the payment of a regular subsidy. America was preparing to pay the price of Louisiana. The patriotism of the departments and of the great cities furnished wholly voluntary supplements to taxes. Lastly, the public revenue promised an increasing augmentation of receipts, even during the war, thanks to the confidence inspired by an energetic government, a government reputed invincible. With all these means, the First Consul flattered himself that he should add to the 589 millions of the budget of the year XI., the extraordinary resource of 100 millions per annum, for two, three or four years. He had for the future the indirect taxes. He was thus sure of being able to keep an army of 150,000 men on the coasts, another army of 80,000 on the Rhine, the troops necessary for the occupation of Italy, Holland, and Hanover, 50 sail of the line, and a flotilla of transports of unknown extent, hitherto unexampled, since the object was to convey 150,000 soldiers, 10,000 horses, and 400 pieces of cannon.

The world was agitated, affrighted, one may say, at the preparations for that gigantic contest between the two most powerful empires of

the globe. It was scarcely possible for it to be indifferent to the consequences: the war was not confined to France and England, for neutrals would be subject to the annoyance of the British navy, and the continent obliged to promote the designs of the First Consul, either by closing its ports or by suffering inconvenient and expensive occupations. At bottom, all the powers laid the blame of this rupture on England. The pretension to keep Malta had appeared to all, even to those which were least favourable to us, a manifest violation of treaties, not justified by any thing that had occurred in Europe since the peace of Amiens. Prussia and Austria had sanctioned by formal conventions what had been done in Italy and Germany, and approved by notes what had been done in Switzerland. Russia had less expressly adhered to the conduct of France, but excepting some remonstrances, in the form of a claim for the too long deferred indemnity of the King of Sardinia, she had as good as approved all his acts. She had praised, in particular, our intervention in Switzerland as skilfully conducted and equitably terminated. None of the three powers of the continent, therefore, could find in the events of the last two years a justification of the usurpation of Malta, and on this subject they explained themselves with frankness. Still, notwithstanding this mode of viewing things, they leaned rather to England than to France. Though the First Consul had taken the greatest pains to repress anarchy, they could not help recognising in him the French Revolution victorious, and much more glorious than was agreeable to them. Two of them, Prussia and Austria, were too unmaritime to feel strongly interested in the liberty of the seas; the third, that is Russia, had also too remote an interest in that liberty to be strongly prepossessed in its behalf. All three were far more sensitive to the preponderance of France on the continent than to the preponderance of England on the ocean. The maritime law which England strove to enforce seemed to them an infringement of justice and of the general interest of commerce; but the domination which France already exercised, and which she would soon be led to exercise still more in Europe, was an immediate and pressing danger which greatly alarmed them. Hence they were angry with England for having provoked this new war, and loudly said as much; but they had turned to that aversion for France which the wisdom and glory of the First Consul had, as it were, suspended for a moment by a sort of surprise given to their hatred by his genius.

A few words, dropped by the greatest personages of the time, prove, better than any thing that we can say, the sentiments of the powers towards us. M. Philip de Cobentzel, ambassador at Paris, and cousin of M. Louis de Cobentzel, minister of foreign affairs at Vienna, conversing at table with Admiral Decrès, who by the vivacity of his ideas called forth a like vivacity in others—M. de Cobentzel could not help saying, Yes, England is to blame; she advances pretensions that cannot be maintained; that is true. But, to confess the truth, you frighten everybody too much to

let them think of being afraid of England.¹ The Emperor of Germany, Francis II., who finished his long and prudent career not many years ago, and who covered great shrewdness with apparent simplicity, speaking to our ambassador, M. de Champagny, about the new war, and expressing his sorrow for it with manifest sincerity, declared that, for his part, he was determined to remain at peace, but that he was filled with involuntary uneasiness, the cause of which he durst scarcely mention. M. de Champagny encouraging him to confidence, the emperor, with a thousand excuses, with a thousand protestations of esteem for the First Consul, said, If General Bonaparte, who has accomplished so many miracles, fails to accomplish that for which he is now preparing, if he does not cross the strait, it is we who shall be the victims; for he will fall upon us, and fight England in Germany.* The Emperor Francis, who was timid, felt regret for having said so much, and would have recalled his words, but it was too late. M. de Champagny immediately transmitted them to Paris by the first courier. It afforded proof of extraordinary foresight in that prince, but which was of little service to him; for it was not very long before he himself offered Napoleon an occasion to fight, as he said, England in Germany.

Of all the powers, however, Austria had least to fear from the consequence of the present war, if she could withstand the suggestions of the court of London. She had, in fact, no maritime interests to defend, since she possessed neither commerce, nor ports, nor colonies. The port of old Venice choked with sand, which had recently been given to her, could not create for her interests of that kind. She was not like Prussia, Spain or Naples, mistress of extensive coasts, which France was tempted to occupy. It was, therefore, easy for her to keep out of the quarrel. She gained, on the contrary, full liberty of action in the Germanic affairs. France, obliged to confront England, could no longer bear with all her weight upon Germany, and Austria, on the contrary, had free scope upon questions left unresolved. She was desirous, as we have seen, to change the number of votes in the college of the princes, to appropriate fraudulently to herself all the personal property of the secularized States, to prevent the incorporation of the immediate nobility, to wrest the Inn from Bavaria, and by all these combined means to recover her superiority in the empire. The advantage of resolving all these questions in her own way comforted her greatly for the renewal of the war, and, but for her extreme prudence, would almost have inspired her with joy.

The two powers of the continent which felt most chagrin at this moment were Prussia and Russia, and they felt it from different motives and not in equal degree. The most affected was Prussia. It is easy to conceive, from the character of her king, who hated war and expense, what pain the prospect of a new European conflagration must give him. The occupation of Hanover would have, moreover,

the most serious inconveniences for his dominions. To prevent that occupation he had attempted an arrangement, which might suit at once both France and England. He had offered England to occupy that electorate with Prussian troops, promising to hold it faithfully in trust, on condition that she would throw open the navigation of the Elbe and Weser. On the other hand, he had offered the First Consul to hold Hanover for France, and to pay the revenues of the country into the French treasury. This two-fold zeal, testified to both powers, was prompted, in the first place, by a desire to save the navigation of the Elbe and Weser from the rigorous measures of England; and, in the second, to spare the north of Germany the presence of the French. These two were important interests for Prussia. It was by the Elbe and Hamburg, by the Weser and Bremen, that all the produce of her territory was exported. The linens of Silesia, which constituted her principal exportable wealth, were purchased by Hamburg and Bremen, exchanged in France for wines, and in America for colonial produce. If the English blockaded the Elbe and the Weser, all this trade would be at end. It was a point of equal importance to her not to leave the French in the north of Germany. In the first place, their presence made Prussia uneasy. In the next, it drew upon her keen reproaches from the German princes, who were her partisans in the empire. They told her that, connected as she was with France from reasons of ambition, she abandoned the defence of the soil of Germany nay, contributed, by her pusillanimous complaisance, to draw foreign invasion upon it. They even went so far as to maintain that, by the Germanic law, she was obliged to interfere for the purpose of preventing the French from occupying Hanover. These princes were most assuredly wrong, according to the strict principles of the law of nations; for the German States, though united to each other by a federative bond, had the individual right of peace and war, and might be, each separately, at peace or at war with a power, without the confederation's being on the same terms with that power. It would have been strange, in fact, if King George III. could have alleged that he was at war for England which is inaccessible, and at peace for Hanover, which is not so. This way of interpreting the public law would have been too convenient, and the First Consul, when an attempt was made to take an advantage of it, replied by a parable equally true and ingenious.—There was, said he, among the ancients, a right of sanctuary in certain temples. A slave, fleeing for protection to one of these temples, had almost cleared the threshold, when he was caught by the foot. The right anciently established was not contested; the slave was not dragged from his asylum, but his foot which was outside the temple was cut off.—Prussia negotiated, therefore, before she spoke out definitively respecting the occupation of Hanover, announced, for the rest, by the First Consul as certain and near at hand.

* I have read this statement in a note in the handwriting of M. Decrès himself, addressed immediately to Napoleon.

* I have no need to say that this statement also is extracted from an authentic despatch of the ambassador of France.

The rupture which had recently taken place between France and England had disagreeably surprised the court of Russia, on account of the matters with which that court was then engaged. The young emperor had taken a new step in the execution of his projects, and consigned the affairs of the empire a little more to his young friends. He had dispensed with the services of Prince de Kourakin, and called to the head of his councils a considerable personage, M. de Woronzoff, brother of him who was ambassador of Russia in London. He had given to M. de Woronzoff the title of chancellor, minister of foreign affairs, and divided the administration of the State into eight ministerial departments. He had made a point of putting at the head of these different departments men of known merit, at the same time taking care to place beside them, as assistants, his friends Messrs. de Czartoryski, de Strogonoff, and de Nowosiltzoff. Thus Prince Adam Czartoryski was attached to M. de Woronzoff, as assistant in the department of foreign affairs; M. de Woronzoff, on account of his health, being frequently absent on leave at his estates, Prince Adam was charged almost entirely with the foreign relations of the empire. M. de Strogonoff was attached to the department of justice; M. de Nowosiltzoff to that of the interior. The Prince de Kotschoubey, the oldest of the personal friends of the emperor, had been made minister in title, and charged with the department of the interior. These eight ministers were to deliberate jointly on all affairs of state, and to make annual reports to the senate. It was a first considerable change to make ministers deliberate, and a still greater to make them report to the senate. The Emperor Alexander considered these changes as a step towards the institutions of free and civilized countries. Wholly occupied with these internal reforms, he was painfully affected to find himself recalled into the immense and perilous field of European politics; and manifested an evident displeasure on account of it to the representatives of the two belligerent powers. He was displeased with England, whose extravagant pretensions, and whose evident bad faith in the affair of Malta, disturbed Europe afresh; he was displeased also with France, but from different motives. France had taken little heed of the demand so frequently repeated of an indemnity for the King of Piedmont; moreover, in granting to Russia an apparent influence in the Germanic affairs, she had but too plainly arrogated the real influence to herself. The young emperor had perceived it. Very anxious, young as he was, to make people talk of him, he began to view with a sort of displeasure the glory of the great man who swayed the West. The disposition of the court of Russia, therefore, was a general dissatisfaction with everybody. The emperor, deliberating with his ministers and his friends, decided on offering the mediation of Russia, called for plainly enough by France. It would strive thereby to prevent a universal conflagration; at the same time, it would tell the truth to all; it would not fail to represent to England, how illegitimate were her claims

to Malta; and it would make the First Consul sensible of the necessity of at length acquitting himself towards the King of Piedmont, and of showing some civility to the petty powers composing the clientele of the court of Russia.

In consequence, through the medium of M. de Woronzoff, speaking to General Hedouville, and through the medium of M. de Markoff, speaking to M. de Talleyrand, the Russian cabinet expressed its strong displeasure at the new disturbance of the general peace, through the rival ambitions of France and England. It admitted that the pretensions of England to Malta were ill founded, but intimated that the continual enterprises of France might have generated, though not justified, those pretensions; and added that France would do well to moderate her action in Europe, if she would not render peace impossible with all the powers. It offered the mediation of Russia, painful as it was to her to intermeddle in differences which thus far were foreign to her, but which, if she interfered, might perhaps become personal to her. It concluded by saying that, if, in spite of his good-will, his efforts for re-establishing peace should prove unsuccessful, the emperor hoped that France would spare the friends of Russia, especially the kingdom of Naples, which had become her ally in 1798, and the kingdom of Hanover, guaranteed by her in quality of a German State. Such was the substance of the communications of the Russian cabinet.

Youth brought up in dissipation is generally volatile in its language; youth brought up in a serious manner is apt to be dogmatic; for nothing is more difficult for youth than moderation. Hence it was that the young rulers of Russia lectured the two most powerful governments of the world, the one under the guidance of a great man, the other of great institutions. The First Consul smiled, for he had long since discovered how inexperienced and presumptuous the Russian cabinet was. But, restraining himself for the interest of his vast designs, he resolved not to complicate the affairs of the continent, and thus cause a war to break out upon the Rhine, which would have diverted him from that for which he was preparing on the coast of the Channel. Receiving the lessons addressed to him from St. Petersburg, without appearing to notice them, he resolved to cut short all the reproaches of the young czar, by constituting him absolute arbiter of the great quarrel which occupied the world. He therefore offered the Russian cabinet, through M. de Talleyrand and General Hedouville, to give a bond by which he would engage to submit to the award of the Emperor Alexander, whatever it might be, confiding entirely in his justice. This proposal was as wise as it was politic. If England rejected it, she would acknowledge that she distrusted either the goodness of her cause or the Emperor Alexander; the whole blame would be upon her, and she would authorize the First Consul to war with her to the last extremity. The closing of all the ports under the influence of France, the occupation of all the countries belonging to England, became a legitimate con-

sequence of this war. Nevertheless, in regard to the kingdoms of Naples and Hanover, the First Consul, assuming the decided tone which was consonant with his plans, declared that he would do whatever was required by the war which had been raised against him, and which he had not begun.

Having taken that attitude which seemed to him at the moment to be the best in regard to the powers of the continent, the First Consul immediately proceeded to the occupation already prepared for and announced. General St. Cyr was at Faenza, in the Remagna, with a division of 15,000 men and a considerable *material* in artillery, such as would be requisite for arming the road of Tarento. He received orders, which he executed immediately, to march through the Roman States to the extremity of Italy, paying for every thing by the way, to avoid offending his Holiness. Agreeably to the convention concluded with the court of Naples, the French troops were to be subsisted by the Neapolitan administration. General St. Cyr, regarded, as he deserved to be, by the First Consul as one of the best generals of the time, particularly when he was acting alone, had an embarrassing position in the midst of a hostile kingdom; but he was capable of encountering any difficulties. His instructions left him, moreover, immense latitude. He was directed, on the first sign of insurrection in the Calabrias, to leave them and throw himself into the capital of the kingdom. Having already conquered Naples once, he knew better than any one else how to set about it.

The First Consul caused Ancona also to be occupied, after giving the Pope all the satisfaction which could mitigate that unpleasant proceeding. The French garrison was to pay punctually for what it consumed, not to give the least disquiet to the civil government of the Holy See, even to assist it, if needful, against disturbances, in case there were any.

Orders had been sent at the same time for the invasion of Hanover. The negotiations of Prussia had proved unsuccessful. England had declared that she would blockade the Elbe and the Weser, if the dominions of the house of Hanover were touched, whether Prussians or French were employed. This was certainly one of the most unjust of pretensions. Were she to prevent the French flag from appearing upon the Elbe and the Weser, nothing could be more legitimate; but to stop the trade of Bremen and Hamburg because the French had invaded the territory within which those cities were enclosed, to require all Germany to brave war with France for the interests of the house of Hanover, and to punish it for a compulsory inaction by destroying its commerce, was most iniquitous conduct. Prussia could do no more than complain bitterly of the injustice of such a proceeding, and at last make up her mind to suffer the British flag at the mouths of the two German rivers, as well as the presence of the French in the bosom of Hanover. She had no longer the same motive for undertaking the occupation, since, in any case, her commerce was to be interdicted. The First Consul caused his regret to be expressed to her, pro-

mised not to pass the boundary of Hanover, but excused himself for this invasion by the necessities of the war and the immense advantage which he should derive from closing the two great commercial channels of the continent against the English.

General Mortier had orders to march. He had proceeded with 25,000 men to the northern extremity of Holland, on the frontier of the lower part of the bishopric of Munster, belonging, since the secularizations, to the house of Aremberg. The French were sure of the consent of that house. From its territory they passed into that of the bishopric of Osnabruck, recently annexed to Hanover, and from the territory of Osnabruck into Hanover itself. They had thus no occasion to enter the Prussian territory; and this was an indispensable forbearance towards the court of Prussia. The First Consul had recommended to General Mortier to treat mildly the countries through which he should pass, and, above all, to pay particular attentions to the Prussian authorities whom he would meet with along the whole frontier of Hanover. That general, discreet and upright, as well as brave, was the fittest person who could have been chosen for that difficult commission. Marching across the barren sands and the swampy heaths of Friesland and Lower Westphalia, he entered Hanover at Meppen, and arrived in June on the banks of the Hunte. The Hanoverian army occupied Diepholz. After a few skirmishes of cavalry, it fell back behind the Weser. Though composed of excellent troops, it knew that resistance was impossible, and that it should only draw down calamities upon the country, if it persisted in fighting. It offered, therefore, to capitulate honourably, to which General Mortier cheerfully consented. It was agreed at Suhlingen that the Hanoverian army should retire with arms and baggage behind the Elbe; that it should give its word of honour not to serve during the present war, unless exchanged for a like number of French prisoners; that the administration of the country and the collection of the revenues should belong to France, saving the respect due to individuals, to private property, and to the different religious professions.

This convention, called the convention of Suhlingen, was sent to the First Consul and to the King of England, to receive their double ratification. The First Consul instantly gave his, unwilling to reduce the Hanoverian army to despair by imposing harder conditions. When the same convention was submitted to old George III., he was seized with so violent a fit of passion, as, it is said, to fling it in the face of the minister who laid it before him. This old king, in his sombre reveries, had always considered Hanover as likely to be the last asylum of his family, the cradle of which it was. The invasion of his patrimonial dominions drove him to despair; he refused to sign the convention of Suhlingen, and thus exposed his soldiers to the cruel alternative of either laying down their arms, or submitting to be slaughtered to the last man. His cabinet alleged, in excuse for so singular a determination, that the king would not have any thing

to do with matters arising out of the enterprise against his territories; that to ratify the convention would be adhering to the occupation of Hanover; that this occupation was a violation of the soil of Germany; and that he appealed to the diet on account of the violence done to his subjects. This was a most extraordinary mode of reasoning, and the most unwarrantable in every respect.

When this intelligence reached Hanover, the brave army, commanded by Marshal de Walmoden, was thunderstruck. It was drawn up behind the Elbe, in the heart of the country of Luneburg, established in a strong position, and resolved to defend its honour. The French army, which for three years had not fired a shot, desired nothing better, on its part, than to fight a brilliant battle. More prudent sentiments, however, prevailed. General Mortier, who united humanity with valour, did all that lay in his power to mitigate the fate of the Hanoverians. He did not require them to surrender themselves prisoners of war; he was satisfied with their disbanding, and agreed with them that they should leave their arms in the camp, and retire to their homes, promising never to arm or to assemble. The *matériel* of war contained in the kingdom, which was very considerable, was given up to the French. The revenues of the country were to belong to them as well as the personal property of the Elector of Hanover. To this property belonged the beautiful horses of the Hanoverian breed, which were sent to France. The cavalry dismounted and gave up 3500 superb horses, which were employed in remounting the French cavalry.

It was but in a very indirect manner that General Mortier possessed himself of the administration of the country, leaving the greater part of it in the hands of the local authorities. Hanover, if you meant not to fleece it, could well support 30,000 men. This was the force intended to be placed in the country, and which the First Consul had promised the King of Prussia not to exceed. With a view to avoid the long circuit of Holland and Lower Westphalia, he had applied to that monarch to assent to the establishment of a route for troops through the Prussian territory, punctually paying contractors designated beforehand for the maintenance of troops going to Hanover or returning from that country. The King of Prussia complied, in order to please the First Consul. Thenceforward direct communications were established, and advantage was taken of them to send a great number of horse-soldiers, who went on foot and returned with three horses, one of which they rode, and two others which they led. The possession of this part of Germany soon became very useful for our cavalry, and served to render it excellent in point of horses, as it was before in point of men.

While these different occupations were effecting, the First Consul prosecuted his preparations on the coast of the Channel. He caused naval stores to be purchased in Holland, and particularly in Russia, that he might be provided before the latter power, whose dispositions were not most satisfactory, should be

induced to refuse supplies. Flat-bottomed boats of all sizes were building in the basins of the Gironde, the Loire, the Seine, the Somme, and the Scheld. Thousands of labourers were felling the forests on the coast. All the foundries of the republic were at work casting mortars, howitzers, artillery of the largest calibre. The Parisians saw a hundred gun-boats building on the quays of Bercy, the Invalides, and the Military School. It began to be evident that such a prodigious activity could not be a mere demonstration destined only to annoy England.

The First Consul resolved to set out for the coast of the Channel as soon as the vessels everywhere begun should be somewhat more advanced, and when he had arranged the most urgent affairs. The session of the Legislative Body had been peacefully passed in giving the government entire approbation for its conduct towards England; in lending it the most complete moral support; in voting it the budget, the principal dispositions of which we have seen above: and, lastly, in discussing noiselessly, but profoundly, the first heads of the civil Code. From this period the Legislative Body was but a great council, having nothing to do with politics, and devoted exclusively to business.

By the end of June the First Consul found himself at liberty. He purposed to inspect the whole coast as far as Flushing and Antwerp, to visit Belgium, which he had not yet seen, the departments of the Rhine, which he was not acquainted with, to make in short a military and political tour. Madame Bonaparte was to accompany him, and to share the honours which awaited him. For the first time he applied for the crown jewels to the minister of the public treasury in whose custody they were, to have them made up for his wife. He wished to exhibit himself to the new departments, and even on the banks of the Rhine, in nearly the style of a sovereign; for he had been considered as such since he became consul for life and had a right to choose a successor. His ministers were appointed to meet him, some at Dunkirk, others at Lille, at Ghent, at Antwerp, at Brussels. The foreign ambassadors were invited to visit him in the same cities. As he was going to show himself to people who were stanch Catholics, he thought it right to appear among them accompanied by the papal legate. On the mere expression of this wish, Cardinal Caprara, notwithstanding his great age and infirmities, determined, after obtaining permission from the Pope, to swell the consular train in the Netherlands. Orders were immediately issued for giving this prince of the Church a magnificent reception.

The First Consul set out on the 23d of June. He first visited Compiègne, where vessels were building on the banks of the Oise; Amiens, Abbeville, and St. Valéry, where they were building on the banks of the Somme. He was hailed with transport, and received with absolutely royal honours. The city of Amiens presented him, according to ancient custom, with four swans of the purest white, which were sent to the garden of the Tuileries. His

presence everywhere called forth manifestations of attachment to his person, hatred for the English, and zeal to combat and conquer those ancient enemies of France. He listened with extreme good-nature to the addresses of the authorities and the inhabitants; but his attention was evidently engrossed by the great object which occupied him at the moment. His anxious attention was exclusively directed to the dock-yards, the magazines, the supplies of all kinds. He visited the troops which began to collect towards Picardy, caressed the old soldiers whose faces were known to him, and left them full of confidence in his vast enterprise.

No sooner had he finished these visits than he returned to his quarters, and, though exhausted with fatigue, dictated a multitude of orders which still exist, for the instruction of governments engaged in great preparations. Here, the treasury had delayed sending funds to the contractors; there the minister of the marine had neglected to order naval stores to be furnished; elsewhere, the direction of the forests had retarded the felling of timber, on account of various formalities; yonder again, the artillery had not despatched the cannon or the ammunition required. The First Consul repaired these neglects, or removed these obstacles, by the power of his will. In this manner he reached Boulogne, the principal centre to which his efforts converged, and the presumed point of departure of the great expedition planned against England.

This is the fit place for describing in detail the immense armament contrived for carrying 150,000 men across the Strait of Calais, with the number of horses and guns, and the quantity of ammunition and provisions proportionate to such an army. It is a vast and difficult operation to carry beyond sea twenty or thirty thousand men only. The expedition to Egypt, executed fifty years ago, the expedition against Algiers, executed in our days, are proofs of this. What an undertaking it must be to embark 150,000 soldiers, ten or fifteen thousand horses, three or four thousand pieces of cannon and their carriages! A ship of the line can carry on an average six or seven hundred men, in case the passage takes some days; a large frigate can contain half the number. For embarking such an army there would of course be required 200 sail of the line, that is to say, a chimerical naval force, which nothing but the concurrence of France and England in the same object could render barely conceivable. An attempt to throw 150,000 men into England, if England had been at the distance of Egypt or the Morea, would consequently have been an impracticable undertaking. But there was only the Strait of Calais to cross, that is to say, only eight or ten leagues to go. There was no necessity for employing large ships for such a passage. Neither could they have been employed, if one had had them, for there is not a single port capable of admitting them from Ostend to Havre: neither is there, without going far out of the way, a single port on the other side where they could effect a landing. The idea of small vessels, considering the passage and the nature of the

ports, had therefore at all times occurred to all minds. Besides, these small vessels were adequate to such marine circumstances as were liable to be met with. Long observations made on the coast had led to the discovery of these circumstances, and to the determination of the vessels best adapted to the purpose. In summer, for instance, there are in the Channel almost absolute calms, and long enough to enable one to reckon upon forty-eight hours of the same weather. It would take about that number of hours, not to cross, but for the immense flotilla in question to work out of the harbour. During this calm, the English cruisers, being condemned to lie motionless, vessels built to go either with oars or sails, might pass with impunity even before an enemy's squadron. Winter has also its favourable moments. The dense fogs of the cold season, being attended with no wind, or scarcely any, offered another chance of crossing in presence of an enemy's force, either immovable or deceived by the fog. There was still a third favourable occasion, namely, that offered by the equinoxes. It frequently happens that, after equinoctial storms, the wind suddenly subsides, and leaves sufficient time for crossing the strait, before the return of the enemy's squadron, which is obliged by the gale to stand off. Such were the circumstances universally fixed upon by the seamen living on the coast of the Channel.

There was one case, in which, in all seasons and in any weather, excepting a tempest, one might always cross the strait: it was when a strong squadron of the line could be brought for a few hours by skilful manœuvres into the Channel. Then the flotilla, protected by this squadron, could sail without being uneasy about the enemy's cruisers.

But the case of a great French squadron brought between Calais and Dover depended on such difficult combinations, that it could not be at all reckoned upon. It was requisite, even, to build the transport flotilla in such a fashion that it might, to appearance at least, dispense with any auxiliary force; for if it had been demonstrated by its construction that it was impossible for it to keep the sea without an assisting squadron, the secret of this great operation would have been immediately revealed to the enemy. Aware of this, they would have concentrated all their naval forces in the strait, and prevented every manœuvre of French squadrons for the purpose of getting thither.

To the considerations arising from the nature of the winds and the sea were added considerations arising from the form of the coast: the French ports in the strait were all left dry at low water, and had not a depth of more than eight or nine feet at high water. Vessels, therefore, were required, which, when laden, needed no more than seven or eight feet of water to float, and which could not take injury from grounding. As for the coast of England, the ports situated between the Thames, Dover, Folkestone, and Brighton, were very small; but whatever they might be, all that needed to be done to effect so vast a disembarkation was to run in close to shore,

and for this reason vessels fit for grounding were required. For these various reasons, flat-bottomed boats had been adopted, capable of proceeding with oars, in order to cross either in calm or in fog; capable of carrying heavy cannon, without drawing more than seven or eight feet water, in order to move about more freely in the French ports in the Channel, in order to take the ground without going to pieces on the shores of England.

To comply with all these conditions, large gun-boats, with flat bottoms, solidly built, and of two different kinds to answer two different purposes, were contrived. The first kind, properly called gun-brigs, were built in such a manner as to carry four pieces of large calibre, 24 to 36-pounders, two at the head, two at the stern, capable, consequently, of returning the fire of ships of the line and frigates. Five hundred gun-brigs, armed with four pieces, would therefore equal the fire of twenty 100-gun ships. They were rigged like brigs, that is to say with two masts, worked by 24 seamen, and could carry a company of infantry of 100 men, with its staff, arms, and ammunition.

The brigs of the second kind, which, to distinguish them from the others, were called gun-boats, were less heavily armed, less manageable, but destined to carry field-artillery as well as infantry. These gun-boats were provided with one 24-pounder at the head, and at the stern with one field-piece left upon its carriage, with the tackle necessary for hoisting it in or out in a few minutes. They carried, moreover, an artillery wagon, full of ammunition, and placed upon deck so as not to interfere with the working of the vessel, and to be put on shore in the twinkling of an eye. They contained, lastly, in the very centre of their hold, a small stable, in which were to be lodged two artillery horses, with forage for several days. This stable, placed in the centre, open above, crowned by a movable cover, was combined with the mast in such a manner that a horse, grappled on shore by a yard, was rapidly lifted up, and lowered into his stall with the greatest ease. These gun-boats, inferior in their arming to the brigs, but capable of throwing large balls, and discharging grape by means of the field-piece placed upon their deck, had the advantage of carrying, besides a portion of the infantry, the whole artillery of the army, with two horses to draw it into line at the very moment of landing. The surplus of the teams was to be put on board transports, the organization of which will be seen presently. Less adapted than the gun-brigs for manœuvring and fighting, they were rigged like the large coasting smacks, and had three great sails attached to three masts, without top or topgallant masts. Their crew consisted of no more than six sailors. They were capable of holding, like the gun-brigs, a company of infantry, with its officers, besides two artillery-drivers, and some artillery-men. Supposing that there were three or four hundred of these vessels, they could carry, besides a considerable mass of infantry, three or four hundred field-pieces, with a wagon containing ammunition sufficient for one battle. The rest of

the ammunition and the rest of the teams were to follow in the transports.

Such were the flat-bottomed boats of the first and second kind. It had been deemed necessary to build some of a third sort, still lighter and more movable than the preceding, drawing two or three feet water, and calculated for landing anywhere. These were large narrow boats, sixty feet long, having a movable deck, which could be taken up at pleasure, and distinguished from the others by the name of pinnaces. These large boats were provided with about sixty oars, carried a light sail to be used when needed, and went with extreme swiftness. When sixty soldiers, trained to handle the oar as well as the sailors, set them in motion, they glided over the sea like the light craft dropped from the sides of our great ships, and astonishing the eye by the rapidity of their course. These pinnaces could take from sixty to seventy soldiers, besides two or three seamen to steer them. They had on board a small howitzer, and likewise a four-pounder, and they were not to have any other lading than the arms of their passengers and some camp provisions, stowed as ballast.

After numerous experiments, these three sorts of vessels had been definitively fixed upon: they answered all the purposes of the passage, and, when drawn up in order of battle, presented a formidable line of fire. The gun-brigs, easier to work and more heavily armed, occupied the first line; the gun-boats, inferior in both those respects, were ranged in the second line, facing the intervals between the brigs, so as to leave none of those spaces without fire. The pinnaces, which carried only small howitzers, and which were chiefly formidable on account of the musketry, placed, sometimes in front of the line of battle, sometimes in rear or on the wings, could pull up rapidly to board, if engaged with a fleet, or throw their men on shore if the intention was to land, or sheer off if exposed to the fire of heavy artillery.

These three species of vessels were to be collected to the number of twelve or fifteen hundred. They were to carry at least 3000 pieces of cannon of large calibre, besides a great number of pieces of small dimension, that is to say, discharge as many projectiles as the strongest squadron. Their fire was dangerous, because it was horizontal, and directed so as to take effect between wind and water. When engaged with large ships, they presented a mark difficult to hit, and, on the contrary, fired at a mark which they could scarcely miss. They could move about, divide, and surround the enemy. But if they had the advantages of division, they had also its inconveniences. The order to be introduced into this moving and prodigiously numerous mass was an extremely difficult problem, in the solution of which Admiral Bruix and Napoleon were incessantly engaged for three years. We shall see by and by to what a degree of precision in the manœuvres they contrived to attain, and to what point the problem was resolved by them.

What effect would have been produced by a

squadron of large ships, dashing in full sail through this mass of small craft, running down, upsetting all before them, sinking those struck by their balls, but surrounded in their turn by this swarm of enemies, receiving on all sides a dangerous fire of artillery, assailed by the musketry of 100,000 infantry, and perhaps boarded by intrepid soldiers trained to the manoeuvre—it is impossible to say; for one cannot form any idea of so strange a scene, without any known antecedent, capable of assisting the mind to foresee the different chances. Admiral Decrès, a man of superior intelligence, but disposed to find fault, admitted that, by sacrificing 100 vessels and 10,000 men, one might probably get over an encounter with an enemy's squadron, and cross the strait. One loses them every day in battle, replied the First Consul, and what battle ever promised the results which a landing in England authorizes us to hope for! But the most unfavourable chance was that of meeting with English cruisers. There were still left the chance of crossing in a calm which should paralyze the enemy, in a fog which should conceal our flotilla from view, and lastly, the still more propitious chance of a French squadron appearing all at once in the strait for a few hours.

Be this as it may, the vessels were strong enough to defend themselves, to approach a coast and sweep it, to remove from the mind of an enemy all idea of an auxiliary squadron, to give confidence to the soldiers and seamen destined to man them. They had inconveniences, however, attached to the very form of their construction. Having, instead of a deep-sunk keel, a flat bottom, and drawing but little water, and being moreover heavily masted, they had the disadvantage of being crank, liable to heel over in a stiff breeze, and even to capsize if caught in a sudden squall. This did once happen in Brest harbour to a gun-boat lightly ballasted, in the presence of Admiral Ganteaume, who, in affright, wrote immediately to the First Consul. But such an accident never occurred again. With precautions in the stowage of the ammunition, which served them for ballast, the vessels of the flotilla acquired sufficient steadiness to stand rough weather; and no other accident befel them but that of grounding, which was natural when navigating along the coast, and in general voluntary on their part, in order to escape the English. For the rest, whenever they were obliged to run aground, they were sure to float again with the next flood-tide.

A still greater inconvenience belonging to them was that of drifting with the current. This was owing to their clumsy build, which afforded more hold to the water than their masts did to the wind. This inconvenience was aggravated when, having no wind, they plied the oars, and had nothing but the strength of the rowers for overcoming the strength of the current. In this case, they were liable to be carried far away from their goal, or, what was worse, to reach it separately, for, being of

different forms, they could not but drift unequally. Nelson experienced the same thing when, in 1801, he attacked the Boulogne flotilla. His four divisions, being unable to act altogether, made but unconnected efforts. This sort of inconvenience, troublesome in any sea, was particularly felt in the Channel, where there are two strong contrary currents every tide. When the tide is rising or falling, it produces alternately an ascending or descending current, the direction of which is governed by the configuration of the coasts of France and England. The Channel is very open to the west, between Cape Finisterre and the extremity of Cornwall; very narrow to the east, between Calais and Dover. The sea, in rising, rushes in more forcibly by the wider passage, producing with the in-coming tide a current ascending from west to east, from Brest to Calais. The same effect is produced, in a contrary direction, when the tide is falling; the water then runs off more rapidly at the wider outlet, and hence results, with the out-going tide, a current from east to west, from Calais to Brest. This double current, receiving various inflexions near the coast, and from the very form of it, must produce a certain perturbation in the course of these two thousand vessels, a perturbation more or less to be apprehended, according to the lightness of the wind and the strength of the current. This greatly diminished the advantage of crossing in a calm, which was one of the most desirable. Still, the channel between Boulogne and Dover, being not only very narrow, but also of no great depth, would admit of casting anchor at an equal distance between the two coasts. The admirals, therefore, considered it as possible to lie-to, in case the current should drift too much, and wait at anchor for the return of the contrary current, which could not occasion a loss of more time than three or four hours. This was a difficulty, but not an insurmountable one.¹

This inconvenience soon caused a species of boats called *prames* to be abandoned. These, absolutely flat, without any curve in their sides, and having three keels, were real floating pontoons, destined to carry a great number of cannon and horses. It had been at first resolved to build fifty of them, which would have furnished the means of transport for 2500 horses and a force of 600 pieces of cannon. But the inferiority of their navigating qualities caused them to be soon given up, and not more than twelve or fifteen were built. We shall say nothing of clumsy barks, short and wide, armed with one 24-pounder at the stern, which were called *raïques*, nor of cutters, having a light draught of water, carrying about ten heavy cannon, both of them built by way of experiment, and the plan of which, on trial, was relinquished. The whole of the flotilla was composed almost exclusively of the three species of vessels which I have described above, that is to say, gun-brigs, gun-boats, and pinaces.

¹ All that I am here saying, is extracted from the voluminous correspondence of the admirals, particularly that of Admiral Bruix, with the minister of the marine and with Napoleon. Be it understood that I introduce no

conjectures of my own, but give the substance as nearly as I can, and with historical precision, of all that is essential in that correspondence, which I think most justly characterized by the epithet, admirable.

Every brig and gun-boat was capable of holding a company of infantry, every pinnace two-thirds of a company. If 500 brigs, 400 boats, and 300 pinnaces, that is to say, 1200 vessels, were collected, they would afford the means of embarking 120,000 men. Supposing the Brest squadron to carry fifteen or eighteen thousand, and that at the Texel 20,000, there would be 150 or 160 thousand men, who might be thrown into England, 120,000 in a single mass on board the flotilla, thirty or forty thousand in separate divisions, on board two large squadrons, sailing the one from Holland, the other from Bretagne.

Here would be sufficient to conquer and reduce that proud nation, which pretended to sway the world from the recesses of its inviolable asylum.

But to convey the men was not the only point: they would want *matériel*, that is to say, provisions, arms, horses. The war flotilla, as it was called, could take on board the men, the ammunition indispensable for the first engagements, provisions for about twenty days, field-artillery, with two horses for each piece. They would want, besides, the rest of the draught-horses, at least seven or eight thousand cavalry horses, ammunition for a whole campaign, provisions for one or two months, a large park of artillery, in case there should be walls to batter down. The horses were particularly difficult to transport, and it would require at least six or seven hundred boats to carry only from seven to eight thousand.

For this latter purpose there was no occasion to build. Coasters and vessels employed in the deep sea fisheries would furnish a very considerable naval resource, and which was quite ready. On all the coasts from St. Malo to the Texel, and even in the interior of Holland, there could be bought vessels measuring from twenty to sixty tons, engaged in the coasting trade and in the cod and herring fisheries, perfectly sound, excellent sea-boats, and capable of taking in whatever it might be thought fit to put on board them, with suitable alterations. A commission, formed for this object, was buying up, from Brest to Amsterdam, vessels costing on an average from twelve to fifteen thousand francs a-piece. Several hundred were already procured; the remainder it would not be difficult to find.

Reckoning the war flotilla at twelve or thirteen hundred vessels, the transport flotilla at 900 or 1000, there were 2200 or 2300 vessels to be collected—a prodigious naval assemblage, unexampled in past times, and that will probably continue to be so in future ages.

The reader will now comprehend how impossible it would have been to build at one or two points of the coast that immense quantity of vessels. Small as were their dimensions, neither the materials, nor the workmen, nor the yards required for building them, could ever have been procured at a single spot. It was therefore indispensable to make all the ports and all the basins of the rivers concur in the same object. It was quite enough to reserve for the ports in the Channel, where they were to be collected, the duty of providing for and keeping these 2500 vessels.

But, after building them at a considerable distance from one another, it was requisite to collect them at a single point, from Boulogne to Dunkirk, in spite of the English cruisers intent on destroying them before they had assembled. It was then requisite to take them into three or four ports, as nearly as possible under the same wind, at but little distance, in order to weigh and to start together. It was finally requisite to lodge them without encumbrance, without confusion, protected from danger by fire, within reach of the troops, so that they could frequently run out and in, and learn to take on board and land expeditiously men, guns, and horses.

All these difficulties could be resolved only at the places themselves by Napoleon, seeing things with his own eyes, and surrounded by the ablest and the most special officers. He had summoned to Boulogne, M. Sganzin, engineer of the navy, and one of the ablest men of that distinguished body; M. Porfait, minister of the marine for a few months, possessing little talent for administration, but superior skill in the art of ship-building, full of invention, and devoted to an enterprise, of which, under the Directory, he had been, one of the most ardent promoters; lastly, Decrès, the minister, and admiral Bruix, whom I have already mentioned, and who deserve more particular notice here.

The First Consul would have been glad to possess rather fewer good commanders in his land armies and rather more in his naval armies. But war and victory only form good commanders. Of war at sea we had had enough during the last twelve years; unfortunately, our navy, disorganized by the emigration, becoming at once inferior to that of the English, had almost always been obliged to shut itself up in the ports; and our admirals had lost, not bravery, but confidence. Some were very old, others wanted experience. Four attracted, at the moment, the whole attention of Napoleon—Decrès, Latouche Treville, Ganteaume, and Bruix. Admiral Decrès was a man of extraordinary intelligence, but a fault-finder, looking only at the unfavourable side of things, an excellent critic of the operations of another, and on this account a good minister, but not an active administrator, very useful, nevertheless, at the elbow of Napoleon, who made up by his own activity for the want of it in everybody else, and who needed advisers less confident than he was himself. For these reasons Admiral Decrès was the one of the four who was most serviceable at the head of the navy office, and who would have been least so at the head of a squadron. Ganteaume, a brave officer, intelligent, well-informed, could lead a naval division into action; out, out of the fire, hesitating, irresolute, letting fortune slip past without laying hold of it, he was fit to be employed only in the least difficult enterprises. Latouche Treville and Bruix were the two most distinguished seamen of the time, and called certainly had they lived, to dispute with England the empire of the seas. Latouche Treville was all dour, all daring: he united intelligence and experience with courage, infused into the seamen the sentiments which he was full of, and in this

respect he was the most valuable of all, since he possessed that in which our navy was deficient, self-confidence. Lastly Bruix, mean in person, and infirm in health, worn out by indulgence in pleasure, endowed with vast intelligence, with a genius of rare organization, never at a loss for resources, possessing great experience, the only man who had commanded forty sail of the line at once, as clever at conceiving as executing, would have been the very man for minister of the marine had he not been so fit for commanding. These were not all our naval chiefs: there was Villeneuve, afterwards so unfortunate; Linois, the conqueror of Algeiras, in India at the time of which we are treating; and others whom we shall see figuring in their place. But the four to whom we are adverting were the principal.

The First Consul resolved to assign to Admiral Bruix the command of the flotilla, because there every thing was to be created; to Ganteaume the Brest fleet, which had only a transportation of troops to execute; lastly, to Latouche Treville the Toulon fleet, charged with a difficult, daring, but decisive manœuvre, which we shall notice hereafter. Admiral Bruix, having to organize the flotilla, was incessantly in contact with Admiral Decrès. Both were too clever not to be rivals, consequently enemies; their nature, moreover, was incompatible. To declare difficulties invincible, to find fault with the attempts made to overcome them—that was the disposition of Admiral Decrès. To see them, to study them, to seek to triumph over them, was the way of Admiral Bruix. It must be added that they mistrusted each other: they were continually apprehensive, Admiral Decrès lest the First Consul should be made acquainted with the inconveniences of his inactivity, Admiral Bruix with those of his dissolute life. Under a weak master these two men would have disturbed the fleet by their dissensions: under a master such as the First Consul they were useful from their very diversity. Bruix proposed combinations; Decrès criticised them; the First Consul decided with the certainty of infallible judgment.

It was amidst these men and on the spot that Napoleon decided all the questions left in suspense. His arrival at Boulogne was urgent; for, notwithstanding the energy and frequency of his orders, many things remained undone. No building was going forward at Boulogne, Calais, and Dunkirk, but there the old flotilla was under repair, and they were preparing to make the alterations judged necessary in the vessels built or purchased, when they should be collected. They were in want of workmen, timber, artillery of long range to keep off the English, who were in the habit of employing incendiary projectiles.

The presence of the First Consul, surrounded by Messrs. Sganzin, Forfait, Bruix, Decrès, and a great number of other officers, soon imparted new activity to his enterprise. He had employed in Paris an expedient which he resolved to apply in Boulogne and all the places that he visited. He ordered five or six thousand men, belonging to all the trades engaged in working up wood or iron, such as cabinet-

makers, carpenters, sawyers, cartwrights, blacksmiths, locksmiths, to be selected from among the conscripts. High pay was granted to those who showed intelligence and willingness, and in a short time the yards were covered with a population of workmen, whose original profession it would have been difficult to guess.

Forests abounded about Boulogne. An order had assigned all those of the environs to the marine. The wood, employed the same day that it was cut, was green, but fit for posts, thousands of which were wanted in the ports of the Channel. Boards and planks might also be obtained from it. As for the wood destined to supply knees, that was brought from the north. Naval stores, such as hemp, masts, copper, pitch, carried from Russia and Sweden to Holland, to be brought by the inland waters from Holland and Flanders to Boulogne, were at this moment detained by various obstacles in the canals of Belgium. Officers were despatched immediately with orders and funds to hasten their arrival. Lastly, the foundries of Donai, Liege, and Strasburg, notwithstanding their activity, were behindhand. The scientific Monge, who accompanied the First Consul almost everywhere, was commissioned to speed their operations, and to order large mortars and pieces of great calibre to be cast at Liege. Aides-de-camp were sent off daily by post to stimulate his zeal, and to bring an account of the guns or carriages that were in arrear. In fact, besides the artillery of the vessels, there were wanted from five to six hundred pieces in battery, in order to keep the enemy at a distance from the building yards.

These first orders given, it was necessary to direct attention to the great question of the ports of rendezvous, and of the means of proportioning their capacity to the extent of the flotilla. It was requisite to enlarge some, to create others, to defend all. After conferring with Messrs. Sganzin, Forfait, Decrès, and Bruix, the First Consul decided upon the following arrangements:

The port of Boulogne had for a great length of time been indicated as the best point of departure for an expedition directed against England. The coast of France, advancing towards that of England, throws out a cape called Cape Grisnez. To the right of this cape, it runs eastward towards the Scheld, faced by the vast extent of the North Sea. On the left it runs towards that of England, thus forming one of the two borders of the strait; then descends abruptly from north to south, towards the mouth of the Somme. The ports on the right of Cape Grisnez, such as Calais and Dunkirk, placed outside the strait, are less favourably situated for points of departure; the ports on the left, on the contrary, in the strait itself, have always been reckoned preferable. In fact, if we set out from Dunkirk or Calais, we must double Cape Grisnez to enter the strait, encounter the gusts of the Channel winds, always experienced in doubling the cape, and work to windward of Boulogne, in order to make the land between Dover and Folkestone. On the contrary, in going from England to France, one is naturally more in

clined towards Calais than Boulogne. For passing over to England, as in the case of the projected expedition, Boulogne and the ports situated to the left of Cape Grisnez, were better than Calais and Dunkirk. Only, they had the inconvenience of affording less extent and depth than Calais and Dunkirk, a circumstance accounted for by the accumulation of sand and gravel, which is always greatest in a narrow space like a strait.

Nevertheless, the port of Boulogne, consisting of the bed of a small marshy river, the Liane, was capable of being considerably enlarged. The basin of the Liane, formed by two plateaux, which separate in the environs of Boulogne, and leave a space of semicircular figure between them, might with great labour be converted into a very extensive port, dry at low water. The bed of the Liane had a depth of from six to seven feet at high water, in ordinary tides. It was possible by excavating to give it from nine to ten. It was, therefore, practicable enough to create in the swampy bed of the Liane, nearly facing Boulogne, a basin similar in form to the ground, that is to say, semicircular, capable of containing some hundreds of vessels, more or less, according to the radius that should be given to it. This basin and the excavated bed of the Liane might be made to hold twelve or thirteen hundred boats, consequently more than half the flotilla. It was not enough to have a sufficient surface; very extensive quays were required, that these numerous boats might, if not all at once, at least in very great number, get to the margin of the basin to take in their lading. The extent of the quays, therefore, was as important as the extent of the port itself. None of these things had been thought of under the Directory, because no plans had ever gone the length of projecting the assemblage of 150,000 men and 2000 vessels. The First Consul, in spite of the magnitude of the work, hesitated not to give orders immediately for excavating the basin of Boulogne and the bed of the Liane. Those same 150,000 men, who, by their number, constituted the difficulty of the enterprise, were now employed to conquer it, by digging themselves the basin from which they were to embark. It was decided that the camps, originally placed at some distance from the coast, should be immediately moved nearer to the sea, and that the soldiers should themselves take away the enormous mass of earth which would have to be got rid of.

A sluice was ordered for excavating the bed of the stream and procuring the requisite depth of water. Ports which are not, like that of Brest, formed by the sinuosities of a deep coast, and which we call *ports d'échouage*, consist in general of the mouths of small rivers; these, swollen at high water, form a basin in which the vessels float, then decrease with the ebb tide, till they look like large rivulets running through a bed of mud, leaving the vessels aground upon their banks. The sand carried down by these rivers, stopped and swept back by the sea off their mouths, forms banks or bars, which are impediments to navigation. To remove this obstacle, sluices

are constructed in the bed of the rivers, which open to the ascending tide, admit the abundance of water, and retain it by closing against the descending tide, and do not allow it to escape till the moment for clearing arrives. That moment, for which low water is generally chosen, being come, the sluice is opened: the water rushes into the river, and, driving the sand by this artificial torrent, clears a channel or passage. This is what engineers call *écluses de chasse*; and no time was lost in constructing such a sluice in the upper basin of the Liane.

Twenty thousand feet of timber, felled in the forests of Boulogne, served to line both banks of the Liane and the circumference of the semicircular basin with posts. Part of the trees sawed into thick planks, then laid like a floor upon the posts, formed spacious quays along the Liane and the semicircular basin. The numerous vessels of the flotilla could thus lie alongside these quays, to embark or disembark the men, the horses, and the *matériel*.

The town of Boulogne was situated on the right of the Liane, the basin on the left, and nearly opposite. The Liane ran longitudinally between both. Bridges were built to facilitate the communication between one bank and the other, and placed above the point where the anchorage commenced.

These vast works were far from being sufficient. A great maritime establishment presupposes workshops, building yards, magazines, barracks, bakehouses, hospitals, in short, every thing necessary for the preservation of large stores of various kinds, for the reception of seamen healthy or sick, for feeding, clothing, arming them. Only conceive what time and efforts such establishments as those of Brest and Toulon have cost! The point here was to create establishments of a different sort, magazines, hospitals, adequate to the wants of 30,000 seamen, 10,000 workmen, and 120,000 soldiers. Had even those creations not been destined to be but temporary, they would have been absolutely impossible. Still, though temporary, the difficulty of producing them, owing to the quantity of things to be brought together on one spot, was immense.

All the houses in Boulogne that could be converted into offices, warehouses, or hospitals, were hired. The villas and farm-houses in the environs fit for the same purposes, were likewise engaged. Cots were built for the shipwrights and boarded sheds for the horses. As for the troops, they were obliged to encamp in the open field, in huts constructed with the timber of the neighbouring forests. The First Consul chose the spot which the troops were to occupy, on the right and on the left of the Liane, on the two plateaux, the separation of which formed the basin of Boulogne. Thirty-six thousand men were divided between two camps: one called the left, the other the right. The troops assembled at St. Omer, under the command of General Soult, came to occupy these two positions. The other corps were successively to remove nearer to the coast, when proper quarters had been prepared for them. The troops would there be in a fine air, exposed, it is true, to violent and

winds, but provided with great abundance of wood for forming huts and for fuel.

Immense supplies of provisions were ordered from all quarters, and brought to these magazines so suddenly created. By inland navigation, which is carried to high perfection, as everybody knows, in the north of France, were brought flour to be converted into biscuit, rice, oats, salt provisions, wine, and spirits. From Holland were obtained great quantities of round Edam cheeses. These various alimentary matters were to serve for the daily consumption of the camps, and to supply the cargo of provisions which the war and transport flotillas were to carry. The reader may easily figure to himself the quantities necessary to be collected, if he considers that the army, the fleet, the numerous population of workmen drawn to the spot, were to be fed during the encampment, and then for two months of the expedition; which presupposes provisions for nearly 200,000 mouths, and forage for 20,000 horses. When we add that the allowances were on so liberal a scale as left nothing to be desired, the reader must be convinced that never was a more extraordinary creation executed by any nation, or by the chief of any empire.

But a single port was not sufficient for the whole expedition. Boulogne could not contain more than twelve or thirteen hundred vessels, and there were about 2300 to provide for. This port would have held the requisite number, but it would have taken too much time to make them all leave it by one and the same channel. In stormy or unsettled weather, it was a great inconvenience not to have a single place of refuge. If, for instance, a great number of vessels put to sea, and bad weather or the enemy obliged them to return suddenly, they might choke up the entrance, lose the tide, and be doomed to perdition. About four leagues to the south, there was a small river, the Canche, the mouth of which formed a winding bay, much choked with sand, unluckily open to all winds, and affording a much less secure anchorage than that of Boulogne. A little fishing port, that of Etaples, had been formed there. On this same river Canche, about a league inland, was the fortified town of Montreuil. It would be difficult to excavate a basin there, but one might drive a series of piles, for the purpose of mooring the vessels, and construct on these piles wooden quays suitable for embarking and disembarking troops. It was a tolerably safe shelter for three or four hundred vessels. They could leave it with nearly the same winds as at Boulogne. The distance of Boulogne, which was from four to five leagues, was certainly productive of some difficulty in regard to simultaneousness of operations; but this was a secondary difficulty; and a harbour of 400 vessels was too important to be neglected. The First Consul formed a camp there, destined for the troops collected between Compiègne and Amiens, and reserved the command of it for General Ney, who had returned from his mission in Switzerland. This camp was called the camp of Montreuil. The troops were ordered to construct cots for themselves,

like those who were encamped around Boulogne. Establishments were prepared for the reception of the provisions, for the hospitals, in short, for all the wants of an army of 24,000 men. The centre of the army was supposed to be at Boulogne; the camp of Montreuil was the left.

A little to the north of Boulogne, before you reach Cape Grisnez, there are two other bays, formed by two small rivers, the beds of which were much encumbered with mud and sand, but in which the water, at flood-tide, rose to six or seven feet. One was a league, the other two leagues, from Boulogne; they were, moreover, under the same wind. By excavating the ground, by constructing sluices, it would be possible to shelter several hundred vessels there; which would complete the means of lodging the entire flotilla. The nearest of these two little rivers was the Vimereux, discharging itself at a village of the same name. The other was the Selacque, emptying itself near the fishing village of Ambleteuse. In the time of Louis XVI., basins had been dug there; but the works executed at that period had been completely buried by mud and sand. The First Consul ordered the engineers to examine the localities, and, in case of their report being favourable to his views, troops were to be employed there and encamped in cots, as at Etaples and Boulogne. These two ports were to hold the one 200, the other 300 vessels: these made 500 more which would be under shelter. The guard, the collective grenadiers, the reserves of the cavalry and artillery, and the different corps forming between Lille, Douai, and Arras, were there to find their means of embarking.

There was still left the Batavian flotilla, destined to convey the corps of General Davout, and which, according to the treaty concluded with Holland, was independent of the squadron of the line lying in the Texel. Unluckily, the Batavian flotilla was less effectively armed than the French flotilla. It was a question whether it should start from the Scheld for the coast of England, under the escort of a few frigates, or whether it should be taken to Dunkirk and Calais, and ordered to set out from the ports situated to the right of Cape Grisnez. Admiral Bruix was desired to solve that question. The corps of General Davout, which formed the right of the army, would thus be brought near the centre. One did not even despair that, by dint of enlarging the basins and contracting the camps, it might be transferred to the other side of Cape Grisnez, and established at Ambleteuse and Vimereux. Then the united French and Batavian flotillas, to the number of 2300 vessels, carrying the corps of Generals Davout, Soult, Ney, besides the reserve, that is to say 120,000 men, might start simultaneously with the same wind from the four ports situated within the strait, with the certainty of acting together. The two great war fleets, weighing at the same time, the one from Brest, the other from the Texel, were to carry the remaining 40,000 men, whose co-operation and destination were to be the exclusive secret of the First Consul.

To complete all the parts of this vast organi-

zation, it was requisite to place the coast in security from the attacks of the English. Besides the zeal with which they would no doubt strive to prevent the concentration of the flotilla at Boulogne, by watching the coast from Bordeaux to Flushing, it was to be presumed that, in imitation of what they had done in 1801, they would endeavour to destroy it, either by setting it on fire in the basins, or by attacking it at the anchorage, when it was going out to manoeuvre. It was, therefore, necessary to render the approach of the English impossible, as well for the safety of the ports themselves as to insure free egress and regress; for if the flotilla were doomed to continue motionless, it would be incapable of manœuvring and of executing any great operation.

This approach of the English it was not easy to prevent, owing to the form of the coast, which was straight without any re-entering or salient point, and consequently furnished no means of reaching to a distance. This deficiency, however, was remedied in the most ingenious manner. Off Boulogne, two points of rock ran out into the sea, the one on the right called Point de la Crèche, the other on the left called Pointe de l'Heurt. Between the two there was a space of 2500 fathoms, perfectly safe and very convenient for anchorage. From two to three hundred vessels might here lie at their ease in several lines. These points of rock, covered by the sea at high water, were dry at low water. The First Consul ordered two forts to be erected on them, of substantial masonry, of semicircular form, solidly casemated, presenting two tiers of guns, and capable of covering the anchorage extending from the one to the other with their fire. He ordered the works to be commenced immediately. The engineers of the navy and army, seconded by the masons taken out of the conscription, fell to work forthwith. The First Consul insisted that these forts must be finished by the beginning of winter. But such was his care to multiply precautions, that he resolved to defend the middle of the mooring line by a third *point d'appui*. This *point d'appui* chosen in the middle of that line was facing the entrance of the harbour; and, as the ground there was a loose sand, the First Consul resolved to build this new fort of solid timber. Numerous hands immediately fell to work to drive at low water hundreds of piles, to serve as a foundation for a battery of eighteen twenty-four-pounders. In general, they had to drive them under the fire of the English.

Independently of these three points, projecting into the sea, lying parallel to the coast of Boulogne, the First Consul had cannon planted on every slightly salient part of the cliff; and he left not a spot capable of receiving artillery unarmed with cannon of the largest calibre. Precautions of less magnitude, but yet sufficient, were taken in regard to Etaples and the new ports which he was engaged in excavating.

Such were the vast plans definitively adopted by the First Consul, after surveying the places, with the concurrence of the engineers and officers of the navy. The building of the flotilla was proceeding rapidly, from the coasts

of Bretagne to those of Holland; but, before it should be collected at Ambleteuse, Boulogne and Etaples, it was requisite to have completed the excavation of the basins and the erection of the forts, brought the artillery *material* to the coast, concentrated the troops near the sea, and prepared the establishments necessary for their wants. He reckoned upon the completion of all these works by the winter.

On leaving Boulogne, the First Consul visited Calais, Dunkirk, Ostend, and Antwerp. He was particularly desirous to see the latter port, and to ascertain with his own eyes whether there was any truth in the very different reports that had been addressed to him. After examining the site of the city with that rapid glance and unerring eye which belonged to none but him, he had no doubt of the possibility of making Antwerp a great naval arsenal. Antwerp possessed, in his estimation, quite peculiar advantages: it was seated on the Scheld, opposite to the Thames; it was in immediate communication with Holland, by the finest of inland navigations, and consequently within reach of the richest dépôt of naval materials. By the Rhine and the Meuse, it could receive without difficulty the timber of the Alps, the Vosges, the Black Forest, Wetteravia, and the Ardennes. Lastly, Flemish workmen, naturally attracted by the proximity, would come hither to offer thousands of hands for ship-building. The First Consul, therefore, resolved to create, at Antwerp, a fleet whose flag should constantly float between the Scheld and the Thames. This would be one of the severest mortifications that he could inflict on his henceforth irreconcilable foes, the English. He ordered the ground necessary for the construction of vast basins, which still exist, and which are the pride of the city of Antwerp, to be immediately secured. These basins, communicating with the Scheld by a sluice of the largest dimensions, were to be capable of containing a whole fleet of ships of war, and to be continually provided with thirty feet water, whatever might be the height of the river. In this new port of the Republic the First Consul resolved to build twenty-five ships, and, until new experiments relative to the navigability of the Scheld should be made, he ordered several seventy-fours to be put on the stocks, without renouncing the intention of building ships of a larger rate at a future time. He hoped to make Antwerp an establishment equal to Brest and Toulon, but infinitely better situated for disturbing the slumbers of England.

He proceeded from Antwerp to Ghent, from Ghent to Brussels. These Belgian populations, discontented under their former government, showed but little docility under the French administration. The fervour of their religious sentiments rendered the administration of the department of religion more difficult than anywhere else. There the First Consul at first met with some coolness, or, to speak more correctly, a less expansive cordiality than in the old French provinces. But this coldness soon disappeared, when the young general was seen, surrounded by the clergy, respectfully attending the religious ceremonies, accompanied by his wife, who, notwithstanding her fondness for

dissipation, had in her heart the piety of a woman of the old court. M. de Roquelaure was Archbishop of Malines: he was an old man full of suavity. The First Consul treated him with infinite respect, and even restored to his family considerable property still under the sequestration of the State, showed himself frequently to the people in company with this metropolitan of Belgium, and succeeded in allaying by his demeanour the religious mistrust of the country. Cardinal Caprara was waiting for him at Brussels. Their meeting produced the best effect. The stay of the First Consul in that city was prolonged. The ministers and Cambacérès, the consul, repaired thither to hold consultation. Part of the members of the diplomatic body likewise went to Brussels to obtain audiences of the ruler of France. Surrounded thus by ministers, generals, numerous and brilliant troops, General Bonaparte held in that capital of the Netherlands a court which had all the appearances of sovereignty. One would have supposed that it was an Emperor of Germany, come to visit the patrimony of Charles V. Time had flown faster than the First Consul had conceived. Numerous matters recalled him to Paris; there were orders to give for the execution of what he had resolved upon at Boulogne; there were also negotiations with Europe, which this state of crisis rendered more active than ever. He gave up, therefore, for the moment, the idea of visiting the provinces of the Rhine, and deferred that part of his tour till his next journey, which was to take place soon. But, before he left Brussels, he received a visit, which was much remarked, as it deserved to be, on account of the personage who had come to see him.

This personage was M. Lombard, private secretary of the King of Prussia. Young Frederick William, in his distrust of himself and others, was accustomed to detain the work of his ministers, and to subject it to a fresh examination, which he made jointly with his secretary, M. Lombard, a man possessing intelligence and talent. Owing to this royal intimacy, M. Lombard had acquired very high importance in Prussia. M. Haugwitz, skilful in seizing all influences, had contrived to acquire an ascendancy over M. Lombard, so that the king, in passing from the hands of the minister into those of the private secretary, was still under the guidance of the same inspirations, namely, those of M. Haugwitz. M. Lombard, coming to Brussels, represented, therefore, with the First Consul, both the king and the prime minister, that is to say the whole Prussian government, excepting the court, ranged exclusively around the queen, and animated by a different spirit from that of the government.

The visit of M. Lombard to Brussels was a consequence of the agitation of the cabinets since the renewal of the war between France and England. The Court of Prussia was in especial anxiety, increased by the recent communications of the Russian cabinet. This cabinet, as we have seen, diverted from its internal affairs by the affairs of Europe, would

have compensated itself by playing an important part. It had at the very first endeavoured to induce the two belligerent parties to accept its mediation, and to recommend protégés to France. The result of these first steps was not of a nature to satisfy it. England had received its overtures very coldly; she had plumply refused to consign Malta to its keeping, and to suspend hostilities while the mediation was going on. Only, she had declared that she would not reject the interposition of the Russian cabinet, if the new negotiation were to embrace the whole of the affairs of Europe, and consequently to take cognisance of all that the treaties of Lunéville and Amiens had resolved. To accept the mediation on such a condition was to reject it. While England was answering in this manner, France, on her part, acceding with entire deference to the intervention of the young emperor, had, nevertheless, occupied without hesitation the countries recommended by Russia, Hanover, and Naples. The court of Petersburg was extremely mortified to find that it was so little heeded, when it pressed England to accept its mediation, and France to limit the field of hostilities. It had, therefore, cast its eyes on Prussia, for the purpose of prevailing upon her to form a third party, which should give law to the English and the French, but to the French in particular, who were far more alarming, though more polite, than the English. The Emperor Alexander, who had met the King of Prussia at Memel, who at that meeting had vowed everlasting friendship to him, who had discovered all sorts of analogies with the young monarch, analogies of age, of disposition, of virtues, sought to persuade him, in a frequent correspondence, that they were made for each other; that they were the only honest men in Europe; that in Vienna there was nothing but falsehood, in Paris nothing but ambition, in London nothing but avarice; and that they ought to unite themselves closely, in order to curb and govern Europe. The young Emperor, showing a precocious shrewdness, had, in particular, sought to dissuade the King of Prussia that he was the dupe of the caresses of the First Consul, and that for minor interests he made dangerous sacrifices of policy; that, owing to his condescension, Hanover was seized; that the French would not limit their occupations to this; that the reason which induced them to close the continent against the English, would carry them farther than Hanover, and conduct them to Denmark, in order to possess themselves of the Sound; that then the English would blockade the Baltic as they blockaded the Elbe and the Weser, and close the last outlet left to the commerce of the continent. This apprehension expressed by Russia could not be sincere; for the First Consul had no idea of pushing his occupations as far as Denmark, and it was not possible that he should have. He had occupied Hanover, as being English property; Tarento, by virtue of the uncontested domination of France over Italy. But to invade Denmark, first passing over the body of Germany, was impossible, unless one began with conquering Prussia

herself. And, fortunately, the policy of France at that time had not acquired such an extension.

The suggestions of Russia were, therefore, deceitful, but they excited uneasiness in the King of Prussia, who was already disturbed by the occupation of Hanover. This occupation had brought upon him not only the complaints of the German States, but severe commercial sufferings. The Elbe and the Weser being closed by the English, the exportation of Prussian produce had suddenly ceased. The linens of Silesia, usually brought by Hamburg and Bremen, the extensive commerce of which they fed, had become unmarketable the very day that the blockade commenced. The great merchants of Hamburg, in particular, had, out of a sort of spite, declined every kind of business, in order to stimulate the court of Prussia still more, to make it feel more keenly the inconvenience of the occupation of Hanover, the sole cause of the closing of the Elbe and the Weser. The Prussian grandees were now suffering immense losses. M. Haugwitz, in particular, had lost half his revenues; but this had not at all ruffled that composure which constituted one of the merits of his political genius. The king, beset by the complaints of Silesia, had been obliged to lend that province a million crowns, (four millions of francs,) a very great sacrifice for an economical prince, who was anxious to re-establish the hoard of the great Frederick. He was applied to at the time for double that sum.

Agitated by the Russian suggestions and by the complaints of Prussian commerce, King Frederick William was also apprehensive lest, if he suffered himself to be influenced by these suggestions and these complaints, he should be led into connections hostile to France; this would have deranged his whole policy, which, for some years, had been based on the French alliance. It was to extricate himself from this painful state of anxiety that he had sent M. Lombard to Brussels. He was instructed to observe the young general closely, to endeavour to penetrate his intentions, to ascertain if he designed, as was alleged at Petersburg, to extend his occupations to Denmark; if, lastly, it was so dangerous, as it was further said at Petersburg, to trust to this extraordinary man. M. Lombard was to strive at the same time to obtain some concessions relative to Hanover. King Frederick William would have wished the corps occupying that kingdom to be reduced to a few thousand men; which would silence the apprehensions, sincere or affected, occasioned by the presence of the French in Germany. He would have wished, moreover, for the evacuation of a little port situated at the mouth of the Elbe, that of Cuxhaven. This little port, at the very entrance of the Elbe, was the nominal property of the Hamburgers, but in reality was used by the English for continuing their commerce. If it had been left unoccupied, as being Hamburg territory, the English commerce would have been carried on there as in time of profound peace. Of course, the object proposed by France would not have been attained; and this was so

true that, in 1800, when Prussia had taken Hanover, she had occupied Cuxhaven.

In return for these two concessions, the King of Prussia offered a system of northern neutrality, copied from the ancient Prussian neutrality, which should comprehend, besides Prussia and the north of Germany, some new German States, perhaps even Russia; at least so King Frederick William flattered himself. This would be, according to that monarch, guarantying to France the harmlessness of the continent, thus leaving her the free employment of her means against England, and consequently deserving some sacrifices on her part. Such were the different points assigned to the prudence of M. Lombard.

This secretary of the king set out for Brussels warmly recommended by M. Haugwitz and M. de Talleyrand. He was deeply sensible of the honour of approaching and conversing with the First Consul. The latter, apprized of the dispositions in which M. Lombard came, gave him the most brilliant reception, and took the best method of gaining access to his mind, which was to flatter him by unbounded confidence, and by revealing all his thoughts, even the most secret. For the rest, he could exhibit himself at that moment free from all disguise, without disadvantage, and he did so with a frankness and an exuberance of language that were overpowering. He had no wish, he said to M. Lombard, to acquire a single territory more on the continent; he wanted nothing more than the powers had secured to France by treaties, patent or secret: the Rhine, the Alps, Piedmont, Parma, and the maintenance of the present relations with the Italian Republic and Etruria. He was ready to recognise the independence of Switzerland and Holland. He was firmly resolved not to interfere any more in the affairs of Germany, after the Recess of 1803. He was intent on one thing only, that was to curb the maritime despotism of the English, insupportable assuredly to others as well as himself, since Prussia, Russia, Sweden, and Denmark had united twice in twenty years, in 1780 and 1800, to put an end to it. It was for Prussia to assist him in this task, for Prussia, who was the natural ally of France, who had received for some years a multitude of services from her, and who had still such important services to expect. If, in fact, he were victorious, but signally victorious, what might he not have it in his power to do for her? Had he not in his hands Hanover, that so natural, so necessary complement to the Prussian territory? And was not that an immense and certain return for the friendship which King Frederick William should show him on this occasion? But to render him victorious and grateful, he must be seconded in an efficacious manner: an ambiguous good-will, a neutrality more or less extended, were trifling succours. It was requisite to assist him to close completely the coasts of Germany, to endure some momentary sufferings, and to connect himself with France by an open and positive union. What was called since 1795 the Prussian neutrality was not sufficient to insure the peace of the continent. To render that peace certain, there

must be a formal, public alliance, offensive and defensive, between Prussia and France. Then none of the continental powers would dare to form any plans. England would be, manifestly alone, reduced to a struggle hand to hand with the army of Boulogne, and, if to the prospect of this struggle were added the closing of the markets of Europe, she would either be obliged to compromise, or crushed by the formidable expedition preparing on the coast of the Channel. But for this, said the First Consul repeatedly, were required the effective alliance of Prussia, and a serious and entire concurrence on her part in the projects of France. Then he should succeed, then he should have it in his power to heap benefits on his ally, to make her a present which she did not ask for, but for which in her heart she ardently longed, that of Hanover.

The First Consul, by the sincerity and warmth of his explanations, and the dazzling brilliancy of his mind, had not duped M. Lombard, as a hostile faction in Berlin soon asserted, but fascinated and convinced him. In the end, he had persuaded him that he contemplated nothing against Germany; that all he wanted was to procure himself means of action against England, and that a magnificent aggrandizement would be the price of a frank and sincere concurrence on the part of Prussia. As for the concessions desired by M. Lombard, the First Consul made him sensible of the serious inconveniences attending them; for, to leave British commerce to act freely while he was engaged in a war, which, till the quite uncertain day of the descent, would be of no consequence to England, would be abandoning to her all the advantages of the contest. The First Consul even went so far as to declare that he was ready to indemnify the suffering commerce of Silesia at the expense of the French treasury. Still, in case Prussia consented to an alliance offensive and defensive, he was disposed, in such an interest, to make some of the concessions desired by King Frederick William.

M. Lombard, convinced, dazzled, enchanted by the familiarities of the great man, whose slightest attentions even princes appreciated with pride, set out for Berlin, disposed to communicate to his master and to M. Haugwitz all the sentiments with which his soul was filled.

The First Consul, after keeping a brilliant court at Brussels, having nothing further to detain him in Flanders, while the works ordered on the coast were not more advanced, set out on his return to Paris, where he had every thing to do in the two-fold departments of administration and diplomacy. He passed through Liege, Namur, and Sedan, was everywhere received with transport, and arrived in the beginning of August at St. Cloud.

While continuing to issue orders from Paris for the preparations for his great expedition, he was anxious to clear up and to fix definitively his relations with the great powers of the continent. In the uneasiness of Prussia he had clearly discerned Russian influence; he discerned that influence elsewhere, that is to say, in the ill-will shown him at Madrid. The Spanish cabinet refused, in fact, to explain

itself respecting the execution of the treaty of St. Ildefonso, and alleged that, as the Russian mediation yet afforded hope of a pacific termination, it was necessary to await the result of that mediation before taking a decided part. Other circumstances had disagreeably affected the First Consul: I allude to the evident partiality of Russia in the attempt at mediation which she had lately made. While the First Consul had accepted that mediation with entire deference, and England, on the contrary, had thrown difficulties of all sorts in its way, sometimes refusing to trust Malta to the hands of the mediating power, sometimes entering into endless arguments on the extent of the negotiation, Russian diplomacy leaned rather to England than to France, and seemed to appreciate neither the deference of the one nor the ill-will of the other. The proposals recently forwarded from Petersburg revealed that disposition in the clearest manner. Russia declared that, in her opinion, England ought to give up Malta to the Order of St. John of Jerusalem; but that, in return, it would be right to grant to her the island of Lampedusa; that France ought moreover to give an indemnity to the King of Sardinia; to recognise and respect the independence of the States situated in her vicinity; to evacuate for good, not only Tarento and Hanover, but the kingdom of Etruria, the Italian Republic, Switzerland, and Holland.

These conditions, acceptable in some respects, were wholly unacceptable on all the rest. To concede Lampedusa in compensation for Malta was giving the English the means of making with money, which they never were in want of, a second Gibraltar in the Mediterranean. The First Consul had well nigh assented to it in order to preserve peace. Now, involved in war, full of hopes of success, he was no longer willing to make such a sacrifice. To indemnify the king of Piedmont was not a difficulty for him; he was disposed to devote Parma or an equivalent to this purpose. To evacuate Tarento and Hanover, on the re-establishment of peace, would be a natural consequence of peace itself. But to evacuate the Italian Republic, which had no army, Switzerland, Holland, which were threatened with an immediate counter-revolution if the French troops were withdrawn, was desiring that States, which France had acquired the right to dispose of by ten years' wars and victories, should be given up to her enemies. The First Consul could not consent to such conditions. What decided him still more powerfully not to suffer that mediation to continue, was the form in which it was offered. The First Consul had assented to an arbitration, supreme, absolute, and without appeal, of the young emperor himself, for it was interesting the honour of that monarch to be just, and obtaining a certainty of a speedy conclusion. But to refer the matter to the partiality of Russian agents, all of them devoted to England, was subscribing to a disadvantageous and endless negotiation.

He declared, therefore, after discussing the proposals of Russia, after showing the injustice and the danger of some, that he was still

ready to accept the personal arbitration of the czar himself, but not a negotiation conducted by his cabinet in a manner not at all friendly to France, and so complicated that one could not hope to see the end of it; that he thanked the cabinet of St. Petersburg for its good offices, but declined to avail himself of them any further, leaving to war the task of restoring peace. The declaration of the First Consul concluded with these words, deeply impressed with his character: "The First Consul has done every thing to preserve peace; his efforts have been vain; he could not help seeing that war was the decree of Fate. He will make war, and he will not flinch before a proud nation, capable, for these twenty years, of making all the powers flinch from it." (August 29, 1803.)

M. de Markoff was coolly treated, and so he deserved to be, for his language and his attitude in Paris. The invariable approver of England, of her pretensions, of her conduct, he was the avowed detractor of France and of her government. When he was told that in this way he did not conform to the intentions, apparent at least, of his master, who professed a strict impartiality between France and England, he replied that *the Emperor had his opinion but the Russians had theirs*. It was to be feared that he would draw upon himself some storm like that which Lord Whitworth had experienced, and even still more disagreeable, because the First Consul had not the consideration for M. de Markoff, which he professed for Lord Whitworth.

The thread of this false mediation once cut, still without breaking with Russia, the First Consul resolved to oblige Spain to explain herself, and to say how she intended to execute the treaty of St. Ildefonso. The question was whether she would take part in the war, or whether she would remain neuter; paying France a subsidy, instead of furnishing succours in men and ships. Till this question was settled, the First Consul could not turn his whole attention to his expedition.

Spain felt extreme repugnance to come to a decision; and this feeling had produced sentiments most unfavourable to France. It was certainly onerous to have to follow a neighbouring power in all the vicissitudes of its policy; but in entering, by the treaty of St. Ildefonso, into the engagements of an offensive and defensive alliance with France, Spain had contracted a positive obligation, the consequences of which it was impossible to contest. Independently of this obligation, that power must have unworthily degenerated, to wish to keep aloof when the question of maritime supremacy was about to be discussed for the last time. If England proved victorious, it was evident that Spain had no longer either commerce, or colonies, or galleons, or, in short, any thing that for three centuries constituted her greatness and her wealth. When the First Consul pressed her to act, he pressed her not only to fulfil a formal engagement, but to fulfil the most sacred duties towards herself. Bearing in mind her present imbecility, he left her neuter, and, in thus allowing her to receive the piastres of Mexico, he asked her to devote

part of them to a war waged for the common benefit; to pay, in short, in money which she could not pay in blood, the debt incurred on account of the liberty of the seas.

Our relations with Spain, impaired, as we have seen, on occasion of Portugal, somewhat improved since, owing to the vacancy of the duchy of Parma, were again so changed as to have become absolutely hostile. They were complaining every day at Madrid of having ceded Louisiana for the royalty of Etruria, which was called nominal, because French troops guarded Etruria, incapable of guarding itself. It was said that, if France wanted to alienate that valuable colony, it was to the King of Spain that she ought to have addressed herself, not to the Americans, who would become dangerous neighbours for Mexico; that, if France had restored that colony to Charles IV., he would have undertaken to save it from the hands of the Americans and of the English. It was ridiculous, in fact, for people who were about to lose Mexico, Peru, and all South America, to pretend to be able to keep Louisiana, which was not Spanish either in manners, mind, or language. In Madrid, this alienation of Louisiana was made so serious a grievance, and one of such importance, against France, that the government held itself released from all obligation towards her. The real motive of this humour was the refusal of the First Consul to add the duchy of Parma to the kingdom of Etruria; a compulsory refusal at the moment, for he was obliged to keep some territories to indemnify the King of Piedmont, since an indemnity was so urgently demanded for that prince; and, besides, the Floridas, after the cession of Louisiana, were not an acceptable object of exchange. In its conduct towards France, the cabinet of Madrid did not confine itself to the attitude of ill-humour; it had gone to much greater lengths. Our commerce was unworthily treated. Vessels had been seized upon pretext of smuggling, and their crews sent to the presidios in Africa. All the remonstrances of persons of our nation were unheeded, and the ambassador was no longer answered upon any subject. To crown this ill-usage, French vessels had been suffered to be taken in the roads of Algeiras and Cadiz, under the very fire of the Spanish guns: this, putting all alliance out of the question, constituted a violation of territory, which it was disgraceful to put up with. The squadron which had taken refuge in Corunna was, on a false allegation of quarantine, kept outside the harbour, in which it might have found itself safe. The crews were suffered to die on board for want of the most indispensable resources, and for want, in particular, of the salubrious air on shore. This squadron, blockaded by an English fleet, could not put to sea again without rest, without a considerable refit, and without a supply of provisions and ammunition. All this was refused it even for money. Lastly, out of a bravado, which crowned all these proceedings, while the Spanish navy was left in a state of pitiable decay, extraordinary attention was paid to the army, and the militia was organized, as if to prepare for a national war against France.

What could thus drive into the abyss the stupid favourite whose sway debased the noble blood of Louis XIV. and reduced a brave nation to the most disgraceful impotence? Want of sequence of ideas, wounded vanity, indolence, incapacity, such were the miserable movers of that usurper of Spanish royalty. He had formerly leaned to France; this was quite sufficient for his inconstancy now to incline to England. The First Consul could not dissemble his contempt, while the English and the Russian agents, on the contrary, overwhelmed him with flatteries; then, and above all, France required of him courage, activity, a good administration of the Spanish affairs; this was more than enough to make him detest so troublesome an ally. All this will end, said the First Consul, in "*a clap of thunder.*" Thus did sinister flashes announce the lightning hidden in the bosom of that thick cloud, which began to gather over the ancient throne of Spain.

The sixth of the camps formed on the shores of the ocean was at Bayonne. The preparations were accelerated and augmented so as to compose a real army. Another force was collecting towards the eastern Pyrenees. Augereau was appointed commander-in-chief of these different corps of troops. The ambassador of France was ordered to demand of the court of Spain the redress of all the grievances which it had to complain of, the release of the French who were confined, with an indemnity for the losses which they had sustained; the punishment of the commandants of the forts of Algeiras and Cadiz, which had suffered French ships to be taken within reach of their guns; the restitution of the captured vessels; admission for the squadron which had taken refuge at Corunna into the docks of Ferrol; its immediate refit and revictualling, to be charged to the account of France; the disbanding of all the militia; and lastly, at the option of Spain, either the stipulation of a subsidy, or the equipment of the fifteen ships and the 24,000 men promised by the treaty of St. Ildefonso. General Beurnonville was to communicate these express requisitions to the Prince of the Peace, and to say that, if the court of Madrid persisted in its silly and culpable conduct, it was on him that the indignation of the French government would fall; that, on entering the country, it would denounce to the king and the people of Spain the degrading yoke under which they were held, and from which they came to deliver them. If this declaration made to the Prince of the Peace had no effect, General Beurnonville was to apply for an audience of the king and queen, to repeat to them what he had said to the prince, and, if he did not obtain justice, to retire from court, and wait for further instructions from Paris.

General Beurnonville, impatient to put an end to intolerable insults, lost no time in calling upon the Prince of the Peace, to tell him the harsh truths which he was instructed to communicate to him; and, to leave no doubt of the seriousness of these threats, he placed before him several passages of the despatches of the First Consul. The Prince of the Peace

turned pale, dropped a few tears, was alternately mean and arrogant, and concluded with declaring that M. d'Azara had instructions to adjust matters in Paris with M. de Talleyrand; that, for the rest, this affair did not concern him, the Prince of the Peace; that in listening to the ambassador of France he was overstepping his part, for he was generalissimo of all the Spanish armies, and had no other function in the State; and that, if the ambassador had any declaration to make, it was to the minister for foreign affairs, and not to him, that it ought to be addressed. He even refused a note which General Beurnonville was to deliver at the conclusion of this conference. "*Monsieur le prince,*" said the general in this dilemma, "*there are fifty persons in your ante-chamber. I will call them to witness your refusal to receive a note of importance to the service of your king, and to attest that, if I am not able to do my duty, the fault rests with you alone, not with me.*" The prince, intimidated, received the note, and General Beurnonville withdrew.

Making a point of executing his instructions in their fullest extent, the ambassador desired to see the king and queen, found them surprised, dismayed, seeming not to comprehend what was passing, and repeating that the chevalier d'Azara had received instructions to arrange every thing with the First Consul. Our ambassador left the court, broke off all communication with the Spanish ministers, and hastened to inform his government of what he had done, and the trifling result which he had obtained.

M. d'Azara had, in fact, received a communication most singular, most indecorous, and most disagreeable to him. That clever and discreet Spaniard was a sincere partisan of the alliance of Spain with France, and a personal friend of the First Consul's ever since the war in Italy, during which he had performed a conciliatory part between the French army and his Holiness. Unluckily, he was not careful enough to conceal the grief and disgust which the state of the Spanish court excited in him; and that court, in its displeasure, attributed the disesteem in which it was held to the ambassador who deplored it. He was, so it was said in the despatches just addressed to him from Madrid, he was the humble servant of the First Consul; he informed his court of nothing; he knew not how to save it from any exigency. They went so far as to declare that, if the First Consul had not been so anxious to keep him in Paris, another representative would have been chosen. Thus, without dismissing him, the government provoked his resignation. It instructed him, as the only conclusion, to offer France a subsidy of two millions and a half per month, declaring that this was all Spain could do, and more than that sum it was absolutely impossible for her to pay. M. d'Azara transmitted this proposal to the First Consul, and then sent off a courier to Madrid with his resignation.

The First Consul sent for M. Hermann, secretary of embassy, who had personal relations with the Prince of the Peace, and charged him with his orders for Madrid. M. Hermann

was to intimate to the prince that he must either submit, or expect an immediate downfall, prepared by means which M. Hermann had in his portfolio. The First Consul had written a letter to the king, in which he announced to that unfortunate monarch the misfortunes and the disgrace of his crown, but in such a manner as, without offending, to awaken a sense of his dignity: he then gave him his choice between the removal of his favourite or the immediate entry of a French army. If the Prince of the Peace, after he had seen M. Hermann, did not instantly, without shuffling, without sending off to Paris, give complete satisfaction to France, General Beurnonville was to demand a solemn audience of Charles IV., and to put into his own hands the thundering letter of the First Consul. Twenty-four hours afterwards, if the Prince of the Peace were not dismissed, General Beurnonville was to leave Madrid, and to send Augereau directions to cross the frontier.

M. Hermann proceeded with all expedition to Madrid. He saw the Prince of the Peace, signified to him the demands of the First Consul, and this time found him not mean and arrogant, but mean only. A Spanish minister, intent on defending the interests of his country, worthily representing his king and not covering him with ignominy, would have braved disgrace, death, any thing rather than such a display of foreign authority. But the indignity of his position left the Prince of the Peace without any resource of energy. He submitted, and affirmed, upon his word of honour, that instructions had been sent to M. d'Azara, with power to consent to all that the First Consul demanded. This answer was brought to General Beurnonville. The latter, who had orders to require an immediate solution, and not to be put off with a new despatch to Paris, declared to the prince that he had express injunctions not to believe his word, and to require a signature in Madrid itself, or to deliver the fatal letter to the king. The Prince of the Peace repeated his sorry story that every thing was settled at the moment in Paris, and agreeably to the wishes of the First Consul. That wretched court conceived that it was saving its honour in leaving to M. d'Azara the pitiful part of submitting to the will of France, and moving the spectacle of its humiliation to the distance of four hundred leagues. General Beurnonville then deemed it his duty to deliver to the king the letter of the First Consul. The directors of the king, that is the queen and the prince, would have refused the audience, but then a courier must have ordered Augereau to enter Spain. They devised a way of arranging matters. They advised Charles IV. to receive the letter, but persuaded him not to open it, because it contained expressions which might be offensive. They endeavoured to prove to him that, by receiving it, he would spare him-

self the entry of the French army, and that by not opening it he would save his dignity. Things were arranged accordingly. General Beurnonville was admitted at the Escorial, into the presence of the king and queen, but not of the Prince of the Peace, whose exclusion he had orders to insist upon, and delivered to the Spanish monarch the overwhelming denunciation of which he was the bearer. Charles IV., with a cheerfulness which proved his ignorance, said to the ambassador, "I receive the letter of the First Consul, since it must be so, but I will soon return it to you without opening it. You will know in a few days that you might have spared yourself the trouble, for M. d'Azara was directed to settle the whole business in Paris. I esteem the First Consul; I am disposed to be his faithful ally, and to furnish him with all the succours that my crown has at its disposal." After this official answer, the king, assuming a tone of familiarity quite unworthy of the throne and of the present occasion, spoke in terms of embarrassing vulgarity concerning the impetuosity of his friend General Bonaparte, and his determination to forgive him every thing rather than break the union between the two courts. The ambassador withdrew confounded, painfully affected by such a spectacle, and considering it his duty to wait for another courier from Paris, before he sent word to General Augereau to march.

This time the Prince of the Peace told the truth: M. d'Azara had received the necessary authority for signing the conditions imposed by the First Consul. It was agreed that Spain should remain neuter; that, instead of the succours stipulated in the treaty of St. Ildefonso, she should pay to France a subsidy of six millions per month, one-third of which was to be reserved for the settlement of the accounts existing between the two governments; that Spain should discharge at a single payment the instalments due for the four months which had elapsed since the beginning of the war, that is, sixteen millions. An agent named Hervas, who transacted financial business for the court of Madrid in Paris, was to go to Holland to negotiate a loan with the house of Hope, consigning to it dollars, to be brought from Mexico. It was understood that, if England declared war against Spain, the subsidy was to cease. As the price of these succours, it was stipulated that, if the plans of the First Consul against Great Britain should succeed, France should restore to her ally Trinidad in the first place, and in the next, in case of a complete triumph, the celebrated fortress of Gibraltar.

This convention being signed, M. d'Azara persisted, nevertheless, in resigning his post, though without fortune and destitute of every resource for cheering a precocious age. He died in Paris a few months afterwards.¹ The

¹ D'AZARA DON JOSEPH NICHOLAS, CHEVALIER, born 1731, at Barbarales, in Arragon. Early showed a strong inclination for the fine arts and the sciences, which was increased by his connection with the painter Mengs. He was sent to Pope Clement XIII. as royal agent for ecclesiastical affairs, in which post he highly distinguished himself. In 1786 he was sent to the con-

queror of Italy, to solicit his favour towards Rome. Bonaparte immediately conceived an esteem for him, and he was shortly afterwards sent in a diplomatic capacity to Paris. He was subsequently recalled, banished to Barcelona, again sent to Paris as ambassador, and again deprived of this important office. He died in Paris, Jan. 26, 1801.—*Encyclopædia Americana*

Prince of the Peace had moreover so little dignity as to write to his agent Hervas, and to order him to arrange, as he expressed it, all his personal affairs with the First Consul. All that had passed was, according to him, only a mistake, only one of those ordinary tiffs between persons who are attached to one another, and who are afterwards better friends than before. Such was this personage; such were the energy and elevation of his character.

It was now autumn: the unfavourable season was approaching, and one of the three occasions reputed to be the best for crossing the strait was about to occur with the fogs and the long nights of winter. The First Consul was, therefore, unremittingly engaged with his grand enterprise. The end of the quarrel with Spain had come very seasonably, not only to supply him with pecuniary resources, but to give back to him part of his disposable troops. The assemblages formed towards the Pyrenees were dispersed, and the corps composing them marched towards the Ocean. Several of these corps were placed at Saintes, quite handy for the Rochefort squadron. The others were ordered to proceed to Bretagne to be embarked in the great Brest squadron. Augereau commanded the camp formed in that province. The plan of the First Consul was gradually matured in his mind: he thought that to give the more annoyance to the British government, the attack ought to be made on several points at once, and that part of the 150,000 men destined for the invasion ought to be thrown into Ireland. Such was the aim of the preparations making at Brest. Decrès, the minister, had conversed with the fugitive Irish, who had already attempted to separate their country from England. They promised a general rising in case 18,000 men were landed, with a complete *materiel*, and a great quantity of arms. They required that, in return for their efforts, France should not make peace without insisting on the independence of Ireland.

The First Consul assented to this, on condition that a corps of 20,000 Irish should have joined the French army and fought along with it during the expedition. The Irish were confident, and prolific in promises, as all emigrants are; yet there were some among them who gave no great hopes, who would not even promise any effective aid on the part of the population. At any rate, according to these latter, one might expect to find them friendly; and this would be enough to afford a support

to our army, to give serious embarrassment to England, and to paralyze perhaps forty or fifty thousand of her soldiers. The expedition to Ireland would have the further advantage of keeping the enemy in doubt respecting the real point of attack. But for this expedition, in fact, England would have believed that there was but one plan, that of crossing the strait for the purpose of marching an army upon London. On the contrary, with the preparations at Brest, many people imagined that what was doing at Boulogne was a feint; and that the real plan consisted in a great expedition to Ireland. The doubts excited on this point were at first an extremely useful result.

The squadron lying at Ferrol was at last admitted into the docks, began to be refitted, and was supplied with refreshments, of which the crews had great need. That at Toulon was preparing. In Holland they began to equip the squadron of large ships, and to collect the mass of boats necessary to form the Batavian flotilla. But it was at Boulogne, in particular, that every thing was carried on with wonderful ardour and rapidity.

The First Consul, full of the persuasion that one ought to see every thing with one's own eyes, that the most trusty agents are often inaccurate in their reports, for want of attention or intelligence, if not from wilful falsehood, had created for himself a residence at Boulogne, a residence where he purposed to sojourn frequently. He had hired a small *château* in a village called Port des Briques, and had fitted it up with every thing necessary for lodging himself and his military household. Setting out from St. Cloud at night, and travelling the sixty leagues from Paris to Boulogne with the rapidity with which princes in general run after vulgar pleasures, he reached the theatre of his immense labours about the middle of the next day, and made a point of examining every thing before he took a moment's sleep. He had required Admiral Bruix, worn out with fatigue, sometimes agitated by his quarrels with Decrès, the minister, to live not in Boulogne itself, but on the cliff, upon a height commanding a view of the port, the road, and the camps. Here had been erected a well-caulked hut, in which that man, so much to be regretted, ended his days, having incessantly before his eyes all the parts of the vast creation over which he presided. He made up his mind to an abode so dangerous to his declining health, in order to satisfy the restless vigilance of the head of the government.¹

¹ I subjoin an extract from the correspondence of Decrès, the minister, proving the devotedness of Admiral Bruix to the enterprise, and well depicting the nature of his character: only his sufferings were less imaginary than Decrès represents, for he died in the following year.

The Minister of the Marine and Colonies to the First Consul.

Boulogne, January 7, 1804.

Citizen Consul:

Admiral Bruix had not disguised your dissatisfaction from himself, as it appeared to be a relief to him to find me disposed to talk over the subject in confidence with him. He fancies that he continually sees General Latouche* at the gates of Boulogne, and this idea is very far from agreeable to him.

This affair, said he very nobly, is so great and so important that it cannot be intrusted to any but the man

* Admiral Latouche Treville.

whom the First Consul shall think the most worthy. I am aware that no private consideration can be admitted, and if the First Consul thinks Latouche more capable, he will name him, and he will do right. For my part, at the point at which things have arrived, I cannot leave the game, but shall serve under Latouche.—But will your health permit you?—Yes, it must permit me; and I am almost sure I shall be able.—The First Consul requires so much activity, and what an extraordinary example he sets of it himself!—Yes, indeed, I plainly perceived that it was a lesson which he was giving me, and that lesson shall not be lost.—What! you mean to enter into all the details, to inspect every boat?—Yes I will, because he desires it; though I am convinced that this method is not so good as mine, which is to let people go on and to show one's self but seldom.—But the First Consul!—Oh! he may always show himself, for he always subdues: but we who are

The First Consul had even had a similar hut built for his personal use close to the admiral's, and there passed sometimes days and nights. He required Generals Davout, Ney, Soult, to reside without intermission in the camps, to be personally present at the operations and manoeuvres, and to report daily on the most trifling circumstances. General Soult, who was distinguished by a valuable quality, that of vigilance, was in this respect of great and continual utility. When the First Consul had received the daily communication of his lieutenants, which he answered at the moment, he set out to verify himself the accuracy of the reports transmitted to him, never believing any but his own eyes in all matters whatever.

The English had done their best to impede the execution of the works destined to protect the anchorage of Boulogne. Their cruisers, consisting in general of about twenty vessels, three or four of them seventy-fours, five or six frigates, ten or twelve brigs and cutters, and a certain number of gun-boats, kept up an incessant fire upon our workmen. Their balls, passing over the cliff, fell in the harbour and the camps. Though their projectiles had done very little damage, still this firing was extremely annoying, and, when a great number of boats were crowded together, might cause great mischief, perhaps even a conflagration. One night even, the English, advancing most daringly in their pinnaces, surprised the workshops in which the materials for the construction of the wooden fort were preparing, cut in pieces the machines used for driving piles, and did as much mischief to the works as it took several days to repair. The First Consul was greatly irritated at this attempt, and issued fresh orders for preventing the like in future. Armed boats, relieving one another, like sentries, were to pass the night around the works. The workmen, encouraged, piqued in their honour, like soldiers whom one is leading against an enemy, were induced to work, in presence of the English ships and under the fire of their artillery. It was at low water only that the works could be prosecuted. When the heads of the piles were left sufficiently uncovered by the water for driving, the men fell to before the tide was out, and continued, while it was returning, up to the middle in water, singing as they worked, while the balls of the English were flying around them. The First Consul, however, with his inexhaustible fertility of invention, contrived new precautions to keep off the enemy. He caused experiments to be made on the coast, to ascertain the range of heavy cannon, fired at an angle of 45 degrees, nearly as mortars are fired. The experiment succeeded; twenty-four pound balls were projected to the distance of 2300 fathoms, and the English were obliged to

keep at that distance. He did still more; thinking incessantly on the same subject, he first devised an instrument, which at this day occasions frightful ravages, and which appears destined to produce powerful effects in maritime warfare—hollow projectiles employed against shipping. He ordered large she is to be fired at the vessels; these, bursting in the timber-work of the sails, could not fail to produce fatal breaches in the hull, or large rents in the rigging. It is with projectiles which burst, he wrote, that timber must be attacked. It is not easy to introduce any thing new, especially when there are old habits to be overcome, and he had to repeat frequently the same instructions. When the English, instead of those solid balls, which dash like lightning through every thing before them, but limit their ravages to their own diameter, beheld a projectile, having it is true less impulsion, but which explodes like a mine, either in the hull of the ship or on the heads of her defenders, they were surprised and kept at a great distance. Lastly, to obtain still more security, the First Consul devised an expedient not less ingenious. He conceived the idea of establishing sub-marine batteries, that is to say, he had batteries of heavy cannon and large mortars placed at low-water mark, which were covered by the sea at high water, and left uncovered at ebb-tide. It costs great trouble to secure the platforms on which the pieces rested, so as to prevent them from sinking into the sand or being buried by it. This was accomplished, however, and at ebb-tide, which was the time for work, when the English approached to disturb the men, they were received with discharges of artillery, poured all at once from the low-water line: so that the fire advanced or receded in a manner with the sea itself. These batteries were employed only while the forts were building; as soon as they were finished they became useless.¹

The wooden fort was first completed, owing to the nature of the construction. Solid platforms were laid on the top of the piles some feet above the level of the highest tides. This work was armed with ten pieces of large calibre and several mortars having a long range: and as soon as it began to fire, the English ceased to appear off the entrance of the harbour. The whole line of the cliffs was protected by 24 and 36-pounders and mortars. About 500 pieces were placed in battery, and both French and English gave the coast the name of *Iron Coast*. During this interval, the forts of masonry were finished without any obstacle but from the sea. At the beginning of winter, in particular, the waves, lashed by the winds of the channel, sometimes became so furious as to shake and to inundate the most solid and the loftiest works. Twice they car-

not be, not even the Hephæstion of your Alexander, we ought in my opinion to show greater reserve. But he desires it, he expects it: and I will let him see that I can do all he wishes.

Such, Citizen Consul, is the summary of part of my dialogue with him. He was wonderfully well, and some generals having entered at the end of our conference, and inquired how he did, he suddenly put on his dying look, and complained in a lamentable voice of the state of his health. Involuntary sacrifice to his old habit!

From all he said, it results that he trembles lest you should take the command from him, that he has not concealed from me that he entertains that fear, and that he has promised me to do in the greatest detail all that you have set him an example of, and to begin this very day.

DEKATE.
All the details here given are extracted from the original correspondence of Admiral Bruix and Napoleon, to which we have already adverted.

ried away whole courses of building, and hurled the largest blocks from the walls commenced at the bottom of the sea. These two important works, indispensable for the safety of the anchorage, were, nevertheless, continued.

During these operations, the troops, drawn nearer to the coast, had constructed their hovels and laid out their camps so as to resemble real military cities, divided into quarters, traversed by long streets. This business finished, they had gone back to the basin of Boulogne. The task was divided among them, and each regiment had to remove a certain portion of that prodigious bed of sand and mud, which lay at the bottom of the Liane. Some excavated the bed of the river itself, or the semi-circular basin; the other drove the piles destined to form quays. The ports Vimereux and Ambleteuse, the construction of which was ascertained to be practicable, were already commenced. The sand and the mud had begun to be removed, and sluices were constructing for the purpose of excavating an entrance channel by repeated discharges of the water. Other detachments were engaged in laying out roads to connect the ports of Vimereux, Ambleteuse, Boulogne, and Etaples with one another, and those ports themselves with the neighbouring forests.

The troops employed in these laborious operations recruited themselves after they had accomplished their task, and those which had done removing mould performed manœuvres of all kinds, suitable for completing their training. Clad in the coarse dress of labourers, protected by wooden shoes from the dampness of the soil, well lodged, abundantly fed, thanks to the wages for their labour added to their pay, living in the open air, they enjoyed perfect health amidst the sharpest weather and a most inclement season. Content, occupied, full of confidence in the enterprise for which they were preparing, they were daily acquiring that two-fold force, physical and moral, which was to enable them to conquer the world.

The moment was come for concentrating the flotilla. The building of the boats of all kinds was almost everywhere finished. They had been taken down to the mouths of the rivers; they had been rigged and armed in the ports. The carpenters set at liberty in the interior had been formed into companies, and led, some to Boulogne, others to the neighbouring ports. It was proposed to employ them in jobbing and keeping the flotilla in repair, when once collected.

SEBASTIANI HORACE FRANÇOIS PORTE, French minister of foreign affairs, born in Corsica in 1775; entered the French service in 1792, and had risen to the rank of Colonel in 1799. He took an active part in the Revolution of the 18th Brumaire; was sent by the First Consul in 1802 on a mission to the Levant.—*Encyclopedia Americana*.

The following letter relative to a negligence committed, proves into what a state he had brought the coast:—

To General Davout.

October 30, 1803.

Citizen General Davout.—I have seen not without pain, from the report of the general of brigade, Meras, that the English had time to plunder and destroy the rigging of the boat which ran aground between Grave-les and Calais. In the present state of the coast, no such circumstance ever happened on this side of Bor-

deaux. It was requisite, therefore, to proceed to those concentrations impatiently awaited by the English, who made sure of destroying even to the very last of our light vessels. Now it was that the resources of the mind of the First Consul were more particularly displayed. The divisions of the flotilla, which had to repair to Boulogne, were about to start from all points of the coast of the ocean from Bayonne to the Texel, in order to rally in the Strait of Calais. They were to coast the shore, keeping constantly at a very short distance from land, and running aground when too closely pressed by the English cruisers. One or two accidents which befel boats belonging to the flotilla suggested to the First Consul the idea of a system of succour equally effective and ingenious. He had some brigs run ashore to escape the enemy, and successfully assisted by the inhabitants of the neighbouring villages. Struck by this circumstance, he ordered numerous corps of cavalry to be distributed along the coast from Nantes to Brest, from Brest to Cherbourg, from Cherbourg and Havre to Boulogne. These corps of cavalry, divided by arrondissements, had with them batteries of horsed artillery, trained to manœuvre with extreme rapidity, and to gallop over the smooth sands left dry by the sea in receding. These sands are in general so solid as to be capable of bearing horses and carriages. Our squadrons, drawing artillery after them, were to patrol the beach incessantly, to advance or retire with the sea, and to protect the boats in their course by their fire. In general only pieces of small calibre are drawn by horses; the First Consul had carried the employment of all means so far as to have 16-pounders drawn by horses, and moving as rapidly as four or eight-pounders. He had insisted and carried his point, that every horse soldier, qualified for all the services, should submit to dismount to fire the pieces, or to run, carbine in hand, to the assistance of seamen aground on the coast. "The hussars," he wrote to the minister at war, "must be taught to recollect that a French soldier must be horseman, foot-soldier, artilleryman, that he must be competent to any thing." (Sept. 29th.) Two generals, Lemarrois and Sébastiani, were charged with the command of all this cavalry. They had orders to be incessantly on horseback, to make the squadrons manœuvre every day with their pieces, and to keep themselves constantly informed of the movements of convoys, in order to escort them in their progress.²

Detachments of cavalry and movable pieces should have come up to prevent the English from plundering the vessel. This is the second time that boats aground on this coast have not been assisted. The flank lies with him whom you have appointed overseer of the coast. Give the inspection of the coast to two generals of brigade: one from Calais to Dunkirk, the other from Dunkirk to the Scheid. Let pickets of cavalry be so disposed as to cross each other incessantly, and let pieces, with horses, be so placed that, at the first signal, they may be able to reach in the least possible time the place where vessels have grounded. Lastly, these inspectors-general ought to be constantly on horseback, to make the land-batteries manœuvre, to inspect the coast-guard artillerymen, to escort the flotillas along the strand, whenever they put themselves in motion. Let me know the name of all the posts that you shall have established, and the places where you shall have stationed movable pieces.

This system produced, as we shall see, excellent results. The boats were formed into convoys of 30, 50, and even 60 sail. They were to begin about the end of September, to run out of St. Malo, Granville, Cherbourg, the river of Caen, Havre, St. Valéry. There were not many beyond the point of Brest; but at any rate the English watched that part of our coast too closely to risk that trip before making numerous experiments. It was not the same commanding officer who conducted convoys all the way from the point of departure to the point of arrival. It was conceived that a naval officer well acquainted with the coasts of Bretagne, for example, would not know the coasts of Normandy or Picardy so well. They had been distributed, therefore, according to their local knowledge, and, like coasting pilots, they never went out of the district assigned to them. They received the convoys at the limit of their district, directed them as far as the limit of the next district, and thus transmitted them from hand to hand to Boulogne. Troops were embarked in the boats, and even horses in those destined to receive them; they were laden, in short, precisely as they were to be during the passage from France to England. The First Consul had ordered the most minute attention to be paid, to ascertain how they acted at sea under the load which they were destined to convey.

Towards the end of September—the beginning of Vendémiaire, year XII.—a first division composed of brigs, gun-boats, and pinnaces, left Dunkirk, to double Cape Grisnez and proceed to Boulogne. Captain St. Haouen of the navy, an excellent officer, who commanded this division, though a very bold man, advanced with great caution. When he was off Calais, he suffered himself to be intimidated by a circumstance in reality of little importance: he saw the English cruiser sheer off, as though she were going to fetch other vessels. Apprehensive of being soon attacked by a numerous squadron, instead of crowding all sail to reach Boulogne, he ran into the harbour of Calais. Admiral Bruix, apprized of this blunder, hastened in person to the spot to remedy it if possible. The English, in fact, had soon appeared in considerable number, and it was evident that they would stick close to the port of Calais, to prevent the division which had put into it from getting out again. The admiral repaired to Dunkirk, to hasten the organization of a second division which was ready in that harbour, and to send it off to the assistance of the first.

The English were before Calais with a considerable force, including several bomb-vessels. On the 27th of September—4th Vendémiaire—they threw a great number of bombs into the town and harbour. They killed one or two men, but hit none of the vessels. The horse-batteries galloped up to the beach, answered them with a well-sustained fire, and obliged them to sheer off. They retired, quite confounded at having produced so little effect. Next day, Admiral Bruix ordered St. Haouen's division to sea in the teeth of the enemy's cruisers, to prevent a new bombardment, and, according to circumstances, to double Cape

Griznez and proceed to Boulogne. The second division from Dunkirk was to sail at the time under the command of Captain Pevrieux, and to support the first. Rear-admiral Magon, who commanded at Boulogne, had orders on his part to run out of that port with every thing that was disposable, and to keep under sail for the purpose of lending a hand to the divisions of St. Haouen and Pevrieux, if they should double Cape Grisnez.

On the morning of the 28th of September—5th Vendémiaire, year XII.—Captain St. Haouen boldly ran out of Calais and advanced to within cannon-shot. The English made a movement to get to windward. Captain St. Haouen, skillfully taking advantage of this movement, which carried them from him, made all sail for Cape Grisnez. But he was overtaken by the English a little beyond the cape, and soon assailed by a violent fire of artillery. One would have supposed that a score of enemy's ships, some of them of large size, ought to have run down our light vessels; but nothing of the sort took place. Captain St. Haouen continued his progress amidst the English balls, without suffering much from them. A battalion of the 46th and a detachment of the 22d embarked in these vessels, worked the oars with admirable coolness, under a very brisk but fortunately no destructive fire. At the same time, the hoisted batteries on the beach had hastened up and replied with advantage to the guns of the English ships. At length, in the afternoon, Captain St. Haouen came to an anchor in the road of Boulogne, joined by the detachment which had sailed from that port under the command of Rear-admiral Magon. The second division from Dunkirk had advanced on its part to within sight of Cape Grisnez; but, detained by calm and tide, it was obliged to anchor off an uncovered coast. In this position it continued till the moment when the current changing should carry it towards Boulogne. It had no wind and was obliged to use the oars. Fifteen English vessels, frigates, cutters, and brigs, were waiting for it at Cape Grisnez. At that point the depth of water being greater, and the English cruisers able to approach the shore while our vessels had not the resource of running aground, it was natural that great fears should be entertained for them: but they passed like those of the preceding day; our soldiers working the oars with extraordinary intrepidity, and the English receiving from our batteries on shore more injury than they could do to our gun-brigs. The Boulogne flotilla and St. Haouen's division, which had entered the preceding day, had again left to go to meet the division of Pevrieux. They joined it at a height called the Tour de Croy, before Vi mereux. The three united divisions there brought too; and, ranging themselves in line, and presenting their head, armed with guns, made direct for them, keeping up a very brisk fire. This fire lasted two hours. Our light vessels sometimes hit the large English ships, but were rarely hit by them. In the end the English sheered off, some of them so damaged as to be obliged to go to the Downs. One of our brigs, the only one to which this accident

happened, perforated through and through by a ball, had time to get to the beach before running aground.

This action, followed subsequently by many others, much more important and sanguinary, produced a decisive effect on the opinion of the navy and army. It was seen that these light vessels would not be so easily sunk by large ships, and that they would often hit than be hit by their gigantic adversaries: it was seen what assistance might be derived from the co-operation of land-troops, which, without any training, had worked the oars and the marine artillery with extraordinary address, and above all shown no fear of the sea and great zeal in seconding the sailors.¹

No sooner had this first experiment been made than the greatest ardour was shown to repeat it. Numerous convoys sailed successively from all the ports in the channel for the general rendezvous of Boulogne. Several naval officers, Captains St. Haouen and Pevrieux, whose names have just been mentioned, and Captains Hamelin and Daugier, distinguished themselves by their courage and skill in these coasting expeditions. Our vessels, sometimes using the sails, sometimes the oars, kept close in shore at a very small distance from detachments of cavalry and artillery ready to protect them. They were rarely obliged to betake themselves to the beach, for they navigated almost always in sight of the English, supporting their fire, and sometimes lying-to, when they had time, to face the enemy, and to show their head armed with guns of large calibre. Frequently they obliged brigs, cutters, and even frigates to sheer off. If they foundered on some occasions, it was rather owing to bad weather than to the force of their adversaries. When this did happen, the English threw themselves into boats to take possession of the stranded gun-brigs or pinnaces. But our artillerymen, hastening with their pieces to the beach, or our horse-soldiers, all at once changed into foot, almost into seamen, rushed amidst the breakers to the assistance of the sailors, kept off the English boats by the fire of their carbines, and obliged them to sheer off without any prize, nay, frequently after losing some of their most intrepid seamen.

In the months of October, November, and December, nearly a thousand vessels, gun-brigs, gun-boats, and pinnaces, sailing from all the ports, entered Boulogne. Out of this number the English took only three or four; and the sea destroyed no more than ten or twelve.

These short and frequent trips furnished occasion for many useful observations. They revealed the superiority of the gun-brigs to the gun-boats. The latter were more difficult to work, made more lee-way, and, above all, were defective in point of artillery. The defects of these gun-boats were owing to their construction, and their construction to the necessity for placing field-artillery in them. There was no help for this. The pinnaces left nothing to be desired in regard to working and speed. For

the rest, they all went tolerably, even without the assistance of the sail. There were divisions which came from Havre to Boulogne, almost all the way with oars, at an average speed of two leagues an hour. A few alterations were to be made in the mode of stowing the articles on board, in order to produce an improvement in their trim.

The experience of these trips led to a change in the disposition of the artillery, which was immediately adopted throughout the whole flotilla. The heavy cannon placed fore and aft ran in grooves, in which they could only move forward or backward in a straight line. Hence the vessels, when about to fire, were obliged to turn about and to present either the head or the stern to the enemy. It was, therefore, impossible for them, when going, to reply to the fire of the English, because these then turned only their broadside. When lying in the road, the currents obliged them to take a position parallel to the coast, that is, to present their unarmed side to the enemy. This position was changed, when the steadiness of those vessels had been put to the test, and when it was insured by a better system of stowage. Carriages were built very like those of field-pieces, which allowed the gun to be pointed in any direction. With a little use, both landsmen and seamen became competent to practise this kind of firing with precision and without danger.

Particular care was taken to produce complete harmony between the seamen and the soldiers, by the constant appropriation of the same vessels to the same troops. The dimensions of the gun-brigs and gun-boats had been calculated for them to carry a company of infantry, besides some artillery. This was the element employed to determine the general organization of the flotilla. The battalions were then composed of nine companies; the demi-brigades of two war battalions, the third remaining at the dépôt. The gun-brigs and gun-boats were arranged in conformity with this composition of the troops. Nine brigs or boats formed a section, and carried nine companies, or one battalion. Two sections formed a division and carried a demi-brigade. Thus the boat or brig answered to the company, the section answered to the battalion, the division to the demi-brigade. Naval officers of a corresponding rank commanded the boat, the section, the division. To produce a perfect coherence of the troops with the flotilla, each division was appropriated to a demi-brigade, each section to a battalion, each brig or boat to a company; and this appropriation once made was invariable. Thus the troops were always to keep the same vessel, and to attach themselves to it, as a rider attaches himself to his horse. Land and sea officers, soldiers and sailors, would by these means learn to know and to have confidence in one another, and be the more disposed to render each other mutual assistance. Each company was to furnish the vessel belonging to it with a garrison of twenty-five men, forming a fourth of the company, always on board. These twenty-five men, forming a fourth of the company, remained on board about a month. During this time, they lodged in the vessel with the

¹ We find these sentiments expressed in all the letters written from Boulogne, the day after these two actions.

crew, whether the vessel went to sea to manœuvre or lay in harbour. There they did all that the sailors themselves did, assisted in working the vessel, and exercised themselves in particular in the management of the oars and in firing the cannon. When they had passed a month in this kind of life, they were succeeded by twenty-five other soldiers of the same company, who came to devote themselves for the same space of time to nautical exercises. Thus the whole company in succession took its turn on board the brigs or boats. Each man, therefore, was alternately land soldier, sea soldier, artilleryman, sailor, and even labouring engineer, in consequence of the works carrying on in the basins. The sailors likewise took part in this reciprocal training. They had infantry arms on board, and, when they were in port, they performed the infantry exercise in the day-time on the quay. They formed consequently an accession of 15,000 foot-soldiers, who, after the landing in England, would be capable of defending the flotilla along the coasts, where it would be lying aground. By giving them a reinforcement of about 10,000 men, they might await with impunity on the shore the victories of the invading army.

The pinnaces, at first, were left out of this organization, because they were not capable of carrying a whole company, and were fitter for throwing the troops rapidly on shore than for meeting an enemy at sea. Subsequently, however, they were formed into divisions and specially appropriated to the advanced guard, composed of the united grenadiers. In the interim, they were ranged in thirds of companies in port, and every day the troops to which vessels were not yet assigned went to practise, sometimes working them by oars, sometimes firing the light howitzer with which they were armed.

This settled, attention was directed to another not less important subject, the stowage of the vessels. The First Consul, in one of his journeys, caused some brigs, boats, and pinnaces, to be several times loaded and unloaded before him, and immediately decided upon their stowage.¹ Balls, shells, ammunition, were assigned them by way of ballast, in sufficient quantity for a long campaign. In their holds were stowed biscuit, wine, spirits, salt provisions, Dutch cheese, enough to subsist the whole mass of men composing the expedition for twenty days. Thus the war flotilla was to carry, besides the army and its 400 pieces of cannon drawn by two horses, ammunition for a campaign, and provisions for twenty days. The transport flotilla was to carry, as we have said, the surplus of the artillery horses, the horses necessary for half the cavalry, two or three months' provisions, lastly, all the baggage. With each division of the war flotilla corresponded a division of

the transport flotilla; and, in sailing, one was to follow the other. In each vessel, a sub-officer of artillery had the care of the ammunition; a sub-officer of infantry that of the provisions. Every thing was to be kept constantly embarked in the two flotillas, so that, on the signal for departure, there would be nothing to put on board but the men and the horses. The men, frequently exercised in getting under arms, and on board the flotilla, by demi-brigades, battalions, and companies, would take no more time than was required to go from the camps to the port. As for the horses, means had been contrived for simplifying and accelerating their embarkation in a surprising manner. How great soever might be the extent of the quays, it was not possible to range all the vessels alongside them. They were obliged to range them nine deep, the first only touching the quay. A horse, with harness grappling him tightly round the body, raised from the ground by means of a yard, transmitted nine times from yard to yard, was deposited in two or three minutes in the ninth vessel. In this manner men and horses might be put on board the war flotilla in two hours. It took three or four to embark the remaining nine or ten thousand horses in the transport flotilla. Thus, the heavy baggage being constantly on board, one would always be ready to weigh anchor in a few hours; and as it was not possible for so great a number of vessels to get out of the ports in the space of a single tide, the embarkation of the men and horses could never occasion any loss of time.

After incessantly repeated exercises, all these manœuvres came to be executed with equal promptness and precision. Every day, in all weathers, unless it blew a storm, from 100 to 150 boats went out to manœuvre or to anchor in the road before the enemy. The operation of a sham landing along the cliffs was performed. The men first exercised themselves in sweeping the shore by a steady fire of artillery, then in approaching the beach, and landing men, horses, and cannon. Frequently, when the boats could not get close to the shore, the men were thrown into the water where it was five or six feet deep. None were ever drowned, such was the dexterity and ardour which they displayed. Sometimes even the horses were landed in the same manner. They were let down into the sea, and men in small boats directed them with a halter towards the shore. In this manner, there was not an accident that could happen in landing on an enemy's coast but was provided against and several times braved, with the addition of all the difficulties which could be thought of, even those of night,² excepting, however, the difficulty of the fire; but that would rather be a stimulant than an obstacle for these soldiers, the bravest in the world by nature and by the habit of war.

¹ To Citizen Fleurieu.

² *Boulogne, Nov. 16, 1803.*

"I have passed the day here in superintending the equipment of a brig and gun-boat. Here the stowage is one of the most important points in the plan of campaign, in order that nothing may be omitted, and the whole equally divided. Every thing is beginning to take a satisfactory turn."

² To the Consul Cambacérès.

Boulogne, November 9, 1803

"I spent part of last night in making the troops perform night evolutions, a manœuvre which well-trained and well-disciplined troops may sometimes employ with advantage against revues en masse."

This variety of land and sea exercises, these manœuvres intermixed with hard labour, interested these adventurous soldiers, full of imagination and ambitions, like their illustrious chief. With considerably better fare, thanks to the earnings of their labour added to their pay, continual activity, the kneecost and most salubrious air, all this could not but give them extraordinary physical strength. The hope of performing a prodigy added a moral force equally great. Thus was gradually trained that incomparable army, which was destined to achieve the conquest of the continent in two years.

The First Consul spent great part of his time among them. He was filled with confidence, when he saw them so disposed, so alert, so animated with his own feelings. They in their turn received continual excitement from his presence. They saw him on horseback, sometimes on the top of the cliffs, sometimes at their feet, galloping over the sands, left smooth and hard by the receding tide, going in that manner by the strand from one port to another; sometimes on board light pinnaces, going to be present at petty skirmishes between our gun-boats and the English

cruisers, pushing them upon the enemy, till he had made their cutters and frigates fall back by the fire of our frail vessels. Frequently he persisted in braving the sea, and once, having determined to visit the anchorage, in spite of a violent gale, the boat, in which he was returning, sunk not far from the shore. Luckily the men had footing. The sailors threw themselves into the sea, and, forming a close group to withstand the waves, carried him on their shoulders through the billows breaking over their heads.

One day, passing over the beach in this manner, he was animated by the sight of the coasts of England, and wrote the following lines to Cambacérès, the consul: I have passed these three days amidst the camp and the port. From the heights of Ambleteuse I have seen the coast of England, as one sees Calvary from the Tuileries. One could distinguish the houses and the bustle. It is a ditch that shall be leaped when one is daring enough to try. (16th November, 1803. *Archives of the Secretary of State's Office.*)

His impatience to execute this great enterprise was extreme.² He had at first thought of the conclusion of autumn; now he was for

On the 1st of January, 1804, he thus wrote to the Consul Cambacérès: "I arrived yesterday morning at Etaples, where I am writing to you in my hut. A south-west wind is blowing tremendously. I am just going to mount my horse, to ride along the strand to Boulogne."

He wrote previously, on the 12th of November: "I have received, citizen Consul, your letter of the 18th (lundi). The sea here continues to be very rough, and the rain to fall in torrents. Yesterday I was on horseback and in boat the whole day. That is the same thing as telling you that I was constantly drenched. In such a season as this one would do nothing if one cared about rain. Luckily, it does me no harm, and I never was so well in my life.—Boulogne, Nov. 12."

On the 1st of January, 1804, he wrote also to the minister of the marine: "To-morrow morning at eight, I shall inspect the whole flotilla, I shall see it by divisions. A commissary of the navy will call over all the officers and soldiers composing the crew. All will be at their post of battle, and in the greatest order. At the moment when I set foot in each vessel, the men will shout three times *Vive la République!* and three times *Vive le Premier Consul!* I shall be accompanied in this inspection by the engineer-in-chief, the commissary of equipment, and the colonel commanding the artillery. During the whole time of the inspection, the crews and the garrisons of the whole flotilla will remain at their posts, and sentinels will be placed to prevent any body from passing over the quay facing the flotilla."

The following letters sufficiently prove this impatience, and his desire to make the attempt in Nivôse or Pluviôse, that is, in January or February. One of them is addressed to Admiral Ganteaume, who for a moment commanded the Toulon fleet, before he was removed to that at Brest. The figures contained in these letters do not agree exactly with those given in our text, because it was not till rather later that the First Consul fixed the definitive number of men and vessels. We have adopted the numbers that were finally resolved upon.

To Citizen Rapp.

Paris, November 23, 1803.

You will be pleased to proceed to Toulon. You will deliver the accompanying letter to General Ganteaume; you will make yourself acquainted with the state of the fleet, the organization of the crews, and the number of ships in the road, or ready to move into it. Stay at Toulon till you receive further orders. Forty-eight hours after your arrival, send an extraordinary courier with General Ganteaume's answer to my letter. After the departure of this extraordinary courier, write to me every day what you have been doing, and enter into the minutest details respecting all the departments of the administration. Go every day to the arsenal for an hour or two. Learn by what route the 3d battalion of the 5th light, coming from Antibes, with orders to repair

to St. Omer to join the expedition, is to pass; go to the nearest point to Toulon through which it passes to inspect it, and let me know its condition.

Visit the Hieres Islands to see in what manner they are guarded and armed. Let me have a detailed report about every thing you see.

To General Ganteaume, councillor of State, maritime prefect at Toulon.

Paris, November 23, 1803.

Citizen General,—I am de-patching to you General Rapp, one of my aides-de-camp; he will stay some days at your port, and will inform himself in detail of all that concerns your department.

I sent you word two months ago, that, in the course of Frimaire, I depended upon having 10 sail of the line, 4 frigates, and 4 cutters, ready to sail from Toulon, and that I wished this squadron to be supplied with four months' provisions for 25,000 men, good infantry troops, who were to go on board it. I desire that in forty-eight hours after the receipt of this letter by the extraordinary courier of General Rapp, you will let me know the precise day when a similar squadron will be ready to sail from Toulon, what you have in the roads, and ready to start at the moment of the receipt of my letter, and what you shall have on the 15th Frimaire and 1st Nivôse.

I am just come from Boulogne, where great activity at this moment prevails, where I hope to have assembled, by the middle of Nivôse, 300 gun-brigs, 500 boats, 500 pinnaces, each pinnace carrying a 30-pounder howitzer, each brig 3 guns, 24-pounders, and each boat one 21-pounder. Let me have your ideas concerning that flotilla. Do you think that it will take us to the coast of England? It is capable of carrying 100,000 men. Eight hours of night, favourable for us, would decide the fate of the world.

The minister of marine has extended his tour to Flushing, to inspect the Batavian flotilla, composed of 100 brigs, 300 gun-boats capable of carrying 30,000 men, and the Texel fleet, capable of carrying 30,000 men.

I have no need to urge your zeal; I know that you will do whatever is possible. Be assured of my esteem.

To Citizen Daugler, captain in the navy, commanding the battalion of sailors of the guard.

Paris, January 12th, 1804.

Citizen Daugler,—I desire you to leave Paris in the course of the day, and to proceed direct to Cherbourg. You will there give orders for the departure of all the vessels of the flotilla which are in that port, and stay the time necessary for removing all obstacles and hastening the despatch of the boats. You will go to all the ports out of your road where you know that there are vessels belonging to the flotilla; hasten their departure, and give them instructions, that vessels may not be whole months in those ports, particularly at Dielette.

deferring it till the beginning, or, at latest, the middle of winter. But the labour was evidently increasing; and, some new improvement daily occurring either to him or to Admiral Bruix, he sacrificed time in order to introduce it. The drilling of the soldiers and sailors was rendered more perfect by these inevitable delays, which thus brought along with them their own compensation. The projected expedition might, indeed, have been attempted after these eight months' apprenticeship: but it would require six more, if one were to wait till every thing was ready, till the equipping and arming were completed, till the training of the landmen and seamen left nothing more to be desired.

But decisive considerations demanded a new delay; the principal being the backwardness of the Batavian flotilla, which was to form the right wing commanded by General Devout. On the wish expressed by the First Consul that a distinguished officer of the Dutch navy might be sent to him, Rear-admiral Verhuel was despatched. Struck with the coolness and intelligence of this commander, he had begged that every thing connected with the organization of the Dutch flotilla might be intrusted to him: this was accordingly done, and the desired rapidity was soon communicated to the operations. This flotilla, prepared in the Scheld, was to be taken to Ostend, for one was aware of the danger of setting out from points so distant as the Scheld and Boulogne. By and by, hopes were entertained that it might be brought from Ostend to Ambleteuse and Vimereux, when these two ports should be completed. This would insure the immense advantage of weighing all together, that is, to despatch 120,000 men, 15,000 sailors, and 10,000 horses, from four ports, all lying under the same wind, and contiguous to one another. But for this purpose it would take several months longer, both for the equipment of the Batavian flotilla and for the completion of the harbours of Vimereux and Ambleteuse.

Two other portions of the army of invasion were not ready—the Brest squadron, destined to throw Augereau's corps into Ireland, and the Dutch Texel squadron, destined to carry the corps of 20,000 men, encamped between Utrecht and Amsterdam. These two corps, added to the 120,000 men in the camp of Boulogne, raised the total of the army of invasion to 160,000 men, exclusively of sailors. It would take some months longer before the Texel

squadron and that at Brest were completely equipped.

A last condition of success was yet left to be secured, and this condition the First Consul considered equivalent to a certainty of the accomplishment of his enterprise. These vessels, now tried, were quite capable of crossing a straight ten leagues wide, since most of them had had one hundred or two hundred leagues to go to reach Boulogne, and had frequently by their scattered and horizontal fire replied with advantage to the downward and concentrated fire of the ships. They had a chance of passing, without being seen or attacked, either in the calms of summer or in the fogs of winter; and, under the most unfavourable supposition, if they were to fall in with the twenty-five or thirty cutters, brigs, and frigates, which the English had cruising, they must pass, were it necessary to sacrifice a hundred brigs or boats of the 2300 composing the flotilla.¹ But there was a case which appeared to be exempted from every unlucky chance, namely, when a strong French squadron, appearing suddenly in the Strait, should drive the English cruisers from it, keep possession of the Channel for two or three days, and cover the passage of our flotilla. With this case there could exist no doubt: all the objections raised against the enterprise fell at once, excepting that of an unforeseen storm, an improbable chance if the season were judiciously chosen, and moreover at all times wholly beyond the reach of calculation. But it was requisite that the third of the squadrons of the ships of the line, that of Toulon, should be completely equipped, and it was not so. The First Consul destined it to execute a grand combination, the secret of which he communicated to none, not even to his minister of the interior. This combination he matured by degrees, saying not a word about it to any body, and leaving the English under the impression that the flotilla was to act independently, since it was armed so completely, and brought forward every day against frigates and ships of the line.

That man, so daring in his conceptions, was the most prudent of captains in the execution. Though he had 120,000 men assembled at his disposal, he would not stir without the co-operation of the Texel fleet, carrying 20,000 men without the Brest fleet, carrying 18,000, without the fleets of La Rochelle, Ferrol, and Toulon, charged to clear the Strait by a profound manœuvre. He was anxious to have all these

Perform the same errand at Granville and St. Malo as at Cherbourg. Write to me from both those ports.

Fulfil the same mission at Lorient, Nantes, Rochefort, Bordeaux, and Bayonne.

The season is advancing; whatever has not reached Boulogne in the course of Pluvios would be of no use to us. You must, therefore, urge and arrange the operations accordingly.

You will inform yourself whether the dispositions which have been made for furnishing garrisons are sufficient in every port.

¹ Here is an extract from a letter of the minister Decres, who had fewest illusions of any man about Napoleon, which proves that it was believed possible to pass with the sacrifice of about a hundred vessels.

The Minister of the Marine to the First Consul.

Boulogne, January 7, 1801.

People begin to believe firmly in the flotilla, and that its departure is nearer at hand than was imagined, and they have promised me to prepare very seriously for it.

They shut their eyes to its dangers, and will not see in it any thing but Cesar and his fortune.

The ideas of all the subalterns extend no further than the road and its current. They reason about the wind, the anchorage, the line of moorings, like angels. As for crossing, that is your affair. You know more about it than they, and your eyes are better than their glasses. In every thing you do they have implicit faith.

The admiral himself is at fault there. He has never submitted any plan to you, because, in fact, he has none. Indeed you never asked him for any. It is the moment of execution that will decide. Very possibly one may be obliged to sacrifice a hundred vessels, which will draw the enemy upon them, while the rest, dashing off at the moment of the attack on the latter, will get over without obstacle.

For the rest, a folio volume would not contain the development of the ideas which he has prepared on this subject. Which of them will he adopt? That circumstances must decide.

means ready for February, 1804, and flattered himself that he should, when important events in the interior of the Republic suddenly with-

drew his attention for a moment from a great enterprise, on which the eyes of the whole world were fixed.

BOOK XVIII.

CONSPIRACY OF GEORGES.

Alarms excited in England by the Preparations at Boulogne—Effects usually produced upon England by War—Fire Impressions and subsequent Alarm produced at London by the Proceedings of the First Consul—Means suggested for resisting the French, and Parliamentary Debates upon those Means—Return of Mr. Pitt to the House of Commons: Position taken by himself and his Friends—Military Strength of England—Mr. Wyndham proposes to raise a Regular Army similar to that of France—Ministers only proceed to form an Army of Reserve and levy Volunteers—Measures taken for protecting the Coast—The British Cabinet, resorting to the former Measures of Mr. Pitt, aid the Plots of the French Emigrants—Intrigues of Messieurs Drake, Smith, and Taylor, the English Diplomatic Agents—The Refugee Princes, at London, league with Georges and Pichegru, and conspire for an Attack, by a Party of Chouans, upon the First Consul, on his Road to Malmesbury; they apply to Moreau, the Principal of the Malcontents, with the View to obtaining the Consent of the Army—Intrigues of Lajolais—Absurd Hopes founded upon some Expressions of General Moreau—First Departure of a Band of Chouans, under the Command of Georges; their Debarkation at Biville Cliff, and March across Normandy—Georges, concealed in Paris, makes Arrangements for the Execution of the Project—Second Debarkation, including Pichegru and other leading Emigrants—Interview of Pichegru and Moreau; the latter, an ardent supporter against the First Consul as to desire his Downfall and Death, but by no Means friendly to the Restoration of the Bourbons—Disappointment of the Conspirators; their Discouragement, and the consequent loss of Time—The First Consul, ill-served by the Police subsequent to the Retirement of M. Fouché, discovers the Danger by which he is threatened, and sends some captured Chouans before a Military Commission, to compel them to confess what they know: He thus procures an Informer, and the whole Plot is revealed—Surprise that Georges and Pichegru are in Paris, and that Moreau is connected with them—Extraordinary Council and Determination to arrest Moreau—Feelings of the First Consul, favourable to the Republicans and irritated against the Royalists; his Determination to proceed without Mercy against the latter—He commissions the *Grand Juge* to summon Moreau before him, that all may be settled by a personal and friendly Explanation; this well-intended Proceedure is rendered abortive by Moreau's Bearing before the *Grand Juge*—The captured Conspirators unanimously depose that they were to be headed by a French Prince, who was to debark in France at Biville Cliff—The First Consul determines that the Prince shall be seized upon and handed over to a Military Commission—Colonel Savary is despatched to Biville to await the Arrival of the Prince and arrest him—Fearful Laws denouncing Death to all who shall harbour the Conspirators—All Egress from Paris prohibited for several Days—Successive Arrests of Pichegru, of the Messieurs de Polignac, of M. de Rivière, and of Georges himself—Avowal of Georges that he had returned to waylay and despatch the First Consul—Renewed Statement that a French Prince was to head the Conspirators—Increasing Irritation of the First Consul—Fruitless stay of Colonel Savary at Biville; Inquiries made as to the then Residences of the Bourbon Princes; attention is directed to the Duc d'Enghien, resident at Ettenheim, on the Banks of the Rhine—A Sub-officer of the Gendarmes is sent thither to make Inquiries; erroneous Report of that Sub-officer, and its fatal Coincidence with a new Deposition of a Servant of Georges—Mistake and headlong Rage of the First Consul—Extraordinary Council, at which the Seizure of the Duc d'Enghien is determined upon; he is seized and conveyed to Paris—The Mistake is partially discovered, but too late—The Prince is sent before a Military Commission and shot in a *Fossé* of the Chateau of Vincennes—Character of this sad Affair.

ENGLAND began to be alarmed at the preparations which were being made within sight of her shores, and to which, at the outset, she had paid but little attention.

To an insular country, which takes part in the great contests of nations, only with its commonly victorious navies, or, at the most, with armies performing the part of auxiliaries; to such a country, war causes but little anxiety, and does not disturb the public rest, or even obstruct the daily progress of business. The stability of credit at London, in the midst of the greatest bloodshed elsewhere, is a most striking proof of this statement. If, to these considerations, we add that the army is composed of mercenaries, and that the fleet is manned with sailors to whom it is of but small consequence whether they live on board of merchant ships or men-of-war, and to whom, on the other hand, prizes hold out an infinite attraction, it will easily be perceived, that for such a country war is a burden felt only in the way of taxation; a sort of speculation, in which so many millions are expended to procure so many additional markets. It is only for the aristocratic classes, who command those fleets and armies, who shed their blood in their duty as officers, and who aspire not only to conquer new markets for their country, but also to elevate her glory, that war reas-

sumes all its gravity and perils; though even for those classes it does not present its greatest anxieties, as the danger of invasion does not seem to exist for their ocean-belted territory.

This was the kind of war that Messrs. Wyndham and Grenville, and the weak ministry whom they led in their train, imagined that they had drawn down upon their country. In the time of the Directory, they had heard mention made of flat-bottomed boats; but that mention had been made so often, and so vainly, that they at length had learned to give no credence to it. Sir Sydney Smith, possessing more experience, too, upon this subject, for he had seen, by turns, French, Turks, and English disembark in Egypt, sometimes in despite of the most efficient squadrons; at other times, in despite of excellent troops posted upon the shore—Sir Sydney Smith, in his place in parliament, gave it as his opinion, that, strictly speaking, from sixty to eighty gun-boats might be assembled in the Channel, not more than a hundred, even allowing for exaggeration; and that from twenty-five to thirty thousand men was the extreme limit of the force that could be landed in England. According to that officer, the next most serious danger was the descent upon Ireland of a French army, numbering twice, or even thrice, that which had formerly landed in that island—

an army which, having to a greater or less extent disturbed and plundered the country, would surrender and lay down its arms, as the former expedition had done. Moreover, there were still smoldering enmities existing in Europe against France—enmities which would soon blaze up again, and recall the First Consul's forces to the continent. The most, then, that was to be feared, was a renewal of the early wars of the Revolution, further distinguished by some victories of General Bonaparte over Austria, but with all the ordinary chances of civil strife in so mutable a country as France, which, for fifteen years past, had not supported any one government for three years, and with the permanent advantage to England of new maritime conquests. Thanks to numerous blunders and mishaps, these views of the case have been realized; but, for several years, as we shall by-and-by perceive, the very existence of Great Britain was in great and imminent peril.

The news of the preparations that were in progress at Boulogne speedily dissipated the confidence of the English. They heard with surprise and anxiety of from a thousand to twelve hundred flat-bottomed boats, (there were in reality upwards of two thousand,) nevertheless, they consoled themselves by doubting of their being all got together, and, still more, of the possibility of sheltering them in the Channel ports. But the concentration of these flat-bottomed boats, in the Strait of Calais, effected in spite of the numerous English squadron; their excellent behaviour at sea, and under fire; the construction of vast docks for their reception; the establishment of formidable batteries to protect them while at anchor; and the assemblage of 150,000 men ready for embarkation, destroyed, in succession, the illusions of a presumptuous confidence. It was quite clearly perceived that preparations so vast were not made by way of a mere feint, and that the ablest and the most daring of mankind had been far too carelessly or wantonly provoked. It is true, there were Englishmen, of the old school, who still held a traditional confidence in the inviolability of their islands, and gave no credit to the rise of rumours of impending peril; but the government and the leaders of party did not deem the peril so doubtful as to justify them in leaving the safety or the ruin of England to blind chance. Twenty or even thirty thousand French, however brave and well officered and commanded they might be, would not have alarmed English statesmen; but 150,000 men, led by General Bonaparte, sent a shudder through all orders of the nation. Nor did that prove any lack of courage, for the bravest people in the world might well be anxious and alarmed in presence of an army which had accomplished such great things, and was about to accomplish more.

This situation of England was rendered still more serious by the apathy of the continental powers. Austria would not for one or two millions of subsidy draw down upon herself the blows intended for England; Prussia had a community of interests, though not of sympathies, with France; and Russia blamed both

the belligerent parties and constituted herself judge of their proceedings, but without a formal declaration in favour of either. Unless the French were to carry their arms farther north than Hanover, there was no chance, for that time, at least, of drawing Russia into the war; and it was evident that there was no intention of giving her that reason for taking up arms.

It was necessary, then, for England to make preparations co-extensive with the danger which threatened her. As far as her navy was concerned, England had but little to do to maintain her superiority to France. In the first instance, on the eve of the rupture with France, sixty ships of the line had been put into commission, and eighty thousand seamen raised; the number of ships was increased to seventy-five, and that of the seamen to a hundred thousand, subsequent to the declaration of war; a hundred frigates, and a whole host of brigs and corvettes, completed this armament. Nelson, commanding a fleet of superior quality, both as to ships and men, was to cruise in the Mediterranean, blockade Toulon, and prevent any new attempt upon Egypt; Admiral Cornwallis, in command of a second fleet, was ordered to blockade Brest, in person, and Rochefort and Ferrol by his senior captains; and Lord Keith, commanding the fleets of the Channel and the North Sea, was at once to protect the coasts of England, and to watch the coasts of France. With Sir Sydney Smith for his second in command, he cruised, with seventy-four, frigates, brigs, corvettes, and a few gun-boats, from the mouth of the Thames to Portsmouth, and from the Scheldt to the Somme, protecting the coast of England, on the one hand, and blockading the ports of France, on the other. A line of light craft, corresponding along all this extent of sea, by means of signals, were to give the alarm should the least movement be perceived in our ports.

The English imagined that they had thus secured the inactivity of our squadrons at Brest, at Rochefort, at Ferrol, and at Toulon, and had secured a sufficiently strict *surveillance* in the Strait.

But something more was necessary to meet so novel a danger as that of an invasion of the British territory. The naval officers who were consulted had been almost unanimous in the opinion, formed on observation of the First Consul's preparations, that it was impossible to be secure against a descent on the English coast by the French forces, under favour of a fog, a calm, or a long winter night. The modern Pharaoh might, indeed, be buried into the abyss of waters ere he could touch the shore; but should he once succeed in disembarking, not with a hundred and fifty thousand men, but with a hundred thousand, or even with eighty thousand, how could he be resisted? This haughty nation, which had displayed so little concern for the sufferings of the continent, and had been so reckless in renewing a war prosecuted by the blood of foreigners, blood which she purchased by a lavish expenditure of treasure, was now obliged to rely upon her own strength, and to arm in defence of her soil, instead of intrust-

ing that defence to mercenaries. She, so proud of her navy, now learned to regret that she had not competent land forces to oppose to the formidable soldiery of General Bonaparte!

The formation of an army, therefore, was now the chief subject of debate in the House of Commons. And as it is in the most perilous times that the spirit of party is ever the most ardently displayed, it was upon this question that the principal parliamentary personages met and combated each other.

The weak Addington administration remained in office, in spite of its blunders; it still, though but for a short time, had the direction of that war which it had so recklessly and criminally allowed to be renewed. The Parliamentary majority knew this ministry to be unequal to the task which it had undertaken, but, unwilling to overthrow the cabinet, supported it against its adversaries, even against Mr. Pitt, though they wished to see him once more at the head of the government. That powerful leader of his party had returned to Parliament, recalled thither alike by his secret impatience, the magnitude of his country's danger, and his detestation of France. More moderate, from the first, than his supporters, Wyndham, Grenville, and Dundas, a recent vote had warned him that still greater moderation was requisite; a vote of censure upon the ministry had been proposed, but only fifty-three voted in its favour. The great majority by which the censure was thus negatived, entertained the desire very commonly felt in political bodies to place the most celebrated and able men at the helm of state, without a preliminary overthrow and disgrace of the existing ministry. While anticipating his speedy return to office, Mr. Pitt took part in all debates, almost as though he had been minister, but rather to support and carry out the government measures than to oppose and thwart them.

The principal of these measures was the formation of an army. England had one composed of Irish, Scotch, Hanoverians, Hessians, Swiss, and even Maltese; this army, which had been got together by the skill of the recruiting officers who were so numerous in Europe previous to the establishment of the conscription system, was dispersed in India, America, and divers stations in the Mediterranean. As we have already seen, it had behaved extremely well in Egypt. This army numbered about one hundred and thirty thousand men; now, it is well known that it requires very skilful management to have eighty thousand men perfectly fit for active service out of a force of one hundred and thirty thousand. To this force, a third of which was necessary for the protection of Ireland, there was added a militia which had recently been increased from fifty to seventy thousand men; a national force which could not be sent to serve out of its own county, and which had never faced an enemy. It was commanded by half-pay officers, and by English nobles and gentlemen, full of patriotism, undoubtedly, but as undoubtedly quite inexperienced in warfare, and quite unfit to be opposed to the veteran legions that had smitten

down the European coalition. How was this insufficiency of land forces to be remedied? The ministry, surrounded by the most experienced soldiers, conceived the idea of forming an army of reserve, fifty thousand strong, to consist of Englishmen, drawn by ballot, and only to be liable to service within the limits of the United Kingdom; thus forming, to that extent, a supplement and reinforcement to the troops of the line. Substitutes were to be allowed; but would necessarily under the circumstances be very expensive. This, it is true, was not doing much, but it was all that could be attempted on the instant. Mr. Wyndham, siding with the war party, attacked this proposal on the ground of its insufficiency. He proposed the formation of a great army of the line, to be formed on the French principle of conscription, to be at the absolute orders of the government, and liable to be despatched to any part of the world. He said that what the ministry had proposed was a mere increase of the militia, would be in no wise superior to that force, especially when in presence of the tried legions of France, and would obstruct the recruiting for the regular army by the proposed liberty of substitution, as individuals willing to serve would find it more advantageous to engage as substitutes for those drawn to serve in the army of reserve, than to enrol themselves in the regiments of the line; that a regular army formed of the native population, liable to serve wherever their services were required, and, consequently, having the means of acquiring warlike experience, was the only fitting force to oppose to the troops of General Bonaparte. To cut the diamond, argued Mr. Wyndham, you require a diamond.

England, already possessed of a navy, was anxious to have a land force, too; a very natural ambition, for it is a rare thing for a nation to have one of those two powers without aspiring to the possession of the other. But Mr. Pitt replied to these proposals in a cold, dogmatical spirit. All Mr. Wyndham's ideas, argued Mr. Pitt, were excellent in the abstract, but how was an army to be formed in a few days? How seasoned to warfare? How fill up its ranks and provide it with competent officers? Such an army as Mr. Wyndham desired was not to be extemporized; what had been proposed by the ministry was, in fact, the only practicable course; and, indeed, even to organize, as proposed, 50,000 men, to drill them, and provide them with competent officers of all ranks, would be found to be quite sufficiently difficult. Mr. Pitt, therefore, entreated that his friend Mr. Wyndham would, for the present, at least, give up his own plan and join with him in supporting that of the government.

Mr. Wyndham paid but little attention to the opinion pronounced by Mr. Pitt, persisted in his own plan, and supported it by new and more potent considerations. He even proposed a *levy en masse*, similar to that of France in 1792, and reproached the weak Addington ministry with not having turned its attention to this mighty resource of nations threatened in their independence. This enemy of France and of Napoleon, by a very common result of hatred, bestowed praises upon the objects of

his detestation, and in his anxiety to convict the English ministry of want of forethought, almost exaggerated our greatness, our power, and the danger with which the First Consul menaced England.

The army of reserve was voted, notwithstanding the contempt and ridicule bestowed upon it by the Wyndham party, who termed it an augmentation of the militia. This force was reckoned upon for the increase of the troops of the line; it was hoped that men whom the Ballot condemned to serve would rather enrol themselves in this army than in any other; twenty or thirty thousand recruits would probably be thus thrown into its ranks.

Nevertheless, as the danger hourly became more imminent, and, still further, as continental co-operation daily became less probable, the proposition of the most ardent party was referred to, and something like an approach was made to realizing the notion of a levy *en masse*. Ministers required, and were allowed, the power to call to arms all Englishmen from the age of seventeen to that of fifty-five. Volunteers, or, failing those, the men legally selected, were to be formed into battalions, and drilled for a certain number of hours weekly. They were to be allowed pay in compensation of their loss of time; but this regulation applied only to those volunteers who belonged to the labouring classes.

Mr. Wyndham, who could not but admit that his views were at length adopted, now complained that the adoption was both tardy and insufficient, and he severely criticised many of the details of the proposed measure. But the measure was voted, nevertheless, and ere long, in every county and town in England, the population, called to arms, was to be seen every morning at exercise in the volunteer uniform, which was now worn by men of all ranks. Even the staid Mr. Addington went down to the House of Commons in this uniform, and drew down some little ridicule upon himself by a display so little in accordance with his character and manners. The aged king, and his son, the Prince of Wales, reviewed the volunteers on Wimbledon Common; and the exiled French princes, with an unpardonable want of propriety and taste, were present at these reviews. There were some twenty thousand of these volunteers in London; this, it is true, was no very great number out of so vast a population, but in the whole extent of the country the number was sufficiently great to form an imposing force, had it only been sufficiently organized; but soldiers cannot be formed in a day, and still less can officers. If in France there was but little faith put in our flat-bottomed boats, there was still less faith in England in the value of their volunteers, who were shrewdly judged to be deficient, not, perhaps, on the score of mere courage, but assuredly in aptitude for actual war. To these measures there was added a plan of field fortifications around London upon the roads terminating at that capital, and upon those points of the coasts most exposed to attack. A part of the active force was stationed from the Isle of Wight to the mouth of the Thames. A system of signals was arranged for giving the alarm by means of beacon-fires, to be lighted

up all along the coasts at the first appearance of the French; and carriages of a peculiar form were built for the rapid conveyance of troops to whatever point might be menaced. In a word, in England as in France, invention was put to the rack for the discovery of new means of attack and defence, to subdue the elements and to press them into the service as auxiliaries. The two nations, as though they had been irresistibly attracted to these opposite shores, presented there at this instant a most imposing spectacle to the gazing and anxious world. England, uneasy when she reflected upon the inexperience of her land forces, was cheered by the view of that ocean by which she was belted as with a protecting cestus; France, full of confidence in her courage, in her warlike experience and aptitude, and in the genius of her great chieftain, measured with her glance that broad arm of the sea which interposed an obstacle to the progress for which she panted, and rapidly learned to view that obstacle as one too trifling to arrest her, led as she would be by the triumphant hero of Marengo and of the Pyramids.

Neither of the two nations suspected the existence of other preparations than those which were publicly and even ostentatiously made. The English, imagining that Brest and Toulon were strictly blockaded, did not dream that a squadron might suddenly make its appearance in the Channel. The French, daily exercised in manœuvring their gun-boats, were, on the other hand, accustomed to look upon them as the sole means of crossing the Strait. No one suspected the existence of what was, in truth, the most important part of the First Consul's plan; though some hoped in France, and some feared in England, some new and sudden invention of his daring and fertile genius, and confidence and anxiety were thus to a very lively degree excited on either side of the Channel.

It must be confessed, that supposing us fairly to have crossed the Channel, the preparations made to resist us were not very formidable. Supposing that, between the Channel and London, there could be concentrated 50,000 troops of the line, and from thirty to forty thousand of the army of reserve, and adding to this force any conceivable number of volunteers, the force thus formed would, even in actual number, have fallen short of the French army that was to cross the straits. But even supposing the English force to be numerically twice or thrice as great as it was, what would such a force avail against the 150,000 veterans who in eighteen months, led by Napoleon, combated and beat the armies of entire Europe, at Austerlitz, at Jena, and at Friedland; veterans apparently equal to the English in courage, certainly more skilled and practised in warfare, and four or five times more numerous! The land force of England, then, was in reality very insufficient, and her chief protection was the ocean still. In any event, whatever might be the final result, the conduct of the English government was already signally punished by the general agitation of all ranks of the people, by the enforced withdrawal of the working classes from their labour, the merchants

from their business and the nobility and gentry from their leisure and their pastimes; the duration of such an agitation for any considerable period would in itself be a great calamity, and might even convulse the social system.

The British government, in its great and well-founded anxiety, adopted every means of averting the danger which threatened their country; and, among those means, some which morality repudiates. During the first war, the English cabinet had encouraged and suggested insurrections against every form of government which had existed in France. Latterly, though the powerful and sagacious rule of the First Consul left but little scope for such insurrection, the rebel-staffs of La Vendée and the emigration were retained at London, and profusely subsidized even during the continuance of peace; and the tenacity with which the guilty tools of an ungenerous warfare were kept at hand, ready for use, had greatly contributed, as we have seen, to rekindle animosity between the two nations. It is quite true that diversions are among the ordinary resources of war, and to produce the insurrection of one of an enemy's provinces is a diversion which, as it is one of the most effective, is also one the least hesitatingly made available. In return for the endeavours of the English to cause a rising in La Vendée, the First Consul had met them by a like attempt upon Ireland: the measure was at once customary and reciprocal. But at the period now spoken of an insurrection of La Vendée was quite beyond the pale of probability. The employment, therefore, of the Chouans and their leader, Georges Cadoudal, could produce but one result, the endeavour to strike some abominable blow, such as that of the Infernal Machine. To urge an insurrection to the extent of overthrowing a government is a course of very disputable fairness; but to aim at overthrowing a government by personal attacks upon the members of it is a flagrant departure alike from morality and the laws of nations.

The facts of the case will sufficiently indicate the extent to which the British ministers were concerned in the criminal projects of the French emigrants who found an asylum in London. It will not be forgotten that of all the Vendean chiefs who had been formerly presented to the First Consul, the only one who had not been propitiated by him was Georges Cadoudal, the formidable chieftain of the Chouans of Morbihan. He was now living in London in a state of actual opulence, distributing among the French refugees the aid allowed to them by the British government, and associating with the emigrant princes, especially with the two most active of them, the Comte d'Artois and the Duc de Berry. Nothing could be more natural than that these princes should desire to return to France; that they should wish to do so at the expense of civil war, was a perversity common enough under such circumstances; but, unfortunately for their reputation, they could no longer reckon upon civil war—they could rely only upon conspiracies and assassins.

Princes or plebeians, all the exiled French were rendered desperate by the peace; war

had restored them to hope not only because it secured them the support of a part of Europe, but also because they anticipated that it would destroy the popularity of the First Consul. They had kept up a correspondence with La Vendée through the medium of Georges, and with Paris by the medium of the returned emigrants. The day-dreams which they indulged in England, their partisans indulged in France, and the slightest circumstances which flattered their illusions sufficed to convert, to their view, those illusions into certainties. In their lamentable correspondence they repeated to each other that war would prove ruinous to the First Consul; that this power, illegitimate, as regarded the French, who continued faithful to the Bourbons, and tyrannical as regarded the French, who continued faithful to the Revolution, had but two claims to support, the re-establishment of peace and the preservation of order; that one of these claims had been completely annihilated by the rupture with England, and that the other claim was seriously damaged, as it must, of necessity, be very doubtful if public order could be maintained amidst the excitement and anxieties of war. The government of the First Consul, therefore, argued they, would become unpopular, like the various governments which had preceded it. The peaceful multitude would necessarily be irritated against the First Consul, on account of the renewal of European hostility, and would lose their faith in his good fortune when difficulties seemed no longer to vanish at his approach. Moreover, the First Consul had a variety of enemies who could be made serviceable to the views of the conspirators; firstly the revolutionists, and then those envious of his glory and ascendancy who were so numerous in the army. The Jacobins were said to be exasperated; the French generals discontented at perceiving that their achievements had assisted an equal to become their master. Of these divers malcontents one united party was to be formed to overthrow the First Consul. The sum and substance of all missives, whether from France or from London, was this: Royalists, Jacobins, military malcontents, all who hated or envied, or feared the First Consul, must be fused into one party to crush the usurper Bonaparte. Such were the ideas entertained by the French princes at London, and by them communicated to the British cabinet as a plea for asking it for funds which it lavishly granted with, at least, a general knowledge of the use to which they were destined.

A vast conspiracy, then, was formed upon this plan, and conducted with the impatience common to emigrants; and it was communicated to Louis XVIII., then living at Warsaw. That prince, who rarely agreed with his brother, the Comte d'Artois, whose imprudent and inefficient activity he disliked, repulsed the proposed plan. Strange contrast between the two princes! The Comte d'Artois was good-hearted but imprudent; Louis XVIII. was prudent but not good-hearted; the Comte d'Artois entered into schemes which were unworthy of his heart, which Louis rejected because they were unworthy of his judgment.

Louis XVIII. resolved to remain henceforth a stranger to all the new intrigues to which the war might give birth. The Comte d'Artois, residing far from his elder brother, and urged on by his own natural ardour as well as by that of the emigrants, and, still worse, by that of the English themselves, took part in all the schemes to which the changing events of the day gave birth in minds disturbed by continual excitement. The communications of the French emigrants with the British cabinet were carried on through the medium of Mr. Hammond, the under-secretary of State, a prominent person in several negotiations; it was to him that, in England, the emigrants on all occasions applied; abroad they addressed themselves to three English diplomatic agents, viz., Mr. Tally, minister at Hesse; Mr. Spencer Smith, minister at Stuttgart; and Mr. Drake, minister at Bavaria. These three agents, stationed close upon our frontiers, endeavoured to forward all sorts of intrigues in France, and thus to aid those which were carried on in London; they corresponded with Mr. Hammond, and had considerable sums at their command. It is impossible to mistake these proceedings for obscure police plottings and schemings, such as governments sometimes resort to as the readiest way of procuring information, and to which they devote trifling funds. These, on the contrary, were veritable political plans acted upon by agents of the highest order, communicating with the most important department, that of foreign affairs, and costly to the amount of millions.

The French princes who were the most deeply concerned in these projects were the Comte d'Artois, and his second son the Duc de Berry. The Duc d'Angoulême was at that time residing at Warsaw with Louis XVIII.; the Princes de Condé were at London, but in no great intimacy with the princes of the elder branch, and in complete ignorance of their schemes. The Comte d'Artois, indeed, and the Duc de Berry looked upon the Princes de Condé as mere soldiers, always ready for battle, and fit for no other purpose. While the grandfather and father of the family were at London, the grandson, the Duc d'Enghein, was at Baden, wholly occupied by the pleasures of the chase and by the passionate affection he had conceived for a Princess de Rohan. All three of these princes were in the service of Great Britain, were under orders to be ready for active duty, and obeyed as soldiers obey the government which pays them: a melancholy position, no doubt, for the Condés; yet

not so melancholy as that of being hourly engaged in hatching conspiracies!

Let us now look at the plan of the new conspiracy. There was no longer any chance of getting up an insurrection in La Vendée; on the other hand, to make a direct attack on the First Consul in the very heart of Paris, seemed an equally sure and speedy means of attaining the desired end. The Consular government being once overthrown, no other government, according to the authors of this project, could succeed it but that of the Bourbons. Now, as the Consular government was wholly vested in the person of General Bonaparte, it was necessary that he should be destroyed: this conclusion was inevitable. But he must be destroyed without chance of failure. The dagger, the infernal machine, and similar means left too much to chance; the firmness of the assassin's heart or the steadiness of his hand might fail him; the infernal machine might explode an instant too soon or an instant too late. But there was one mode which had not yet been tried, and upon which, consequently, no stigma rested of ill success; that of assembling a hundred resolute men, with the intrepid Georges as their leader; to waylay the First Consul's carriage on the road to St. Cloud or to Malmesbury; to attack his guard, numbering only some ten or a dozen horse, disperse it, and kill the First Consul in a *quasi* battle. By this method success was deemed to be certain. Georges, who was brave and had some military pretensions, and was unwilling to be considered an assassin, required that two of the princes, or at all events one of them, should accompany him, and thus regain his or their ancestral crown sword in hand. Is it credible? These men, perverted by exile, flattered themselves that thus to attack the First Consul while surrounded by his guards was not to assassinate him, but to give him battle! They seemed to be on a par with the gallant Archduke Charles, combating against General Bonaparte at Tagliamento or at Wagram; or only inferior to him as to number of troops! Wretched sophistry, to which even those who propounded it could have given but half credence, and which stigmatizes those unfortunate Bourbons, not indeed with a natural perversity, but with a perversity acquired amidst the ferocities of civil war and in the weariness and misery of exile. There was but one of these men whose part became him, Georges Cadoudal. He was a proficient in these surprises, which he had practised in the forest wilds of Brittany; and now that he was about to exert his science at the

* THE ARCHDUKE CHARLES—CHARLES LOUIS ARCHDUKE OF AUSTRIA, son of Leopold II., and brother of the Emperor Francis. Born Sept. 5th, 1771. He commenced his military career in Brabant in 1793, commanded the vanguard of the Prince of Cobourg, and greatly distinguished himself. In 1796, he was made Field Marshal of the German Empire, and took the chief command of the Austrian armies on the Rhine; he fought several successful battles against Moreau near Rastadt, routed Jourdan in Franconia, forced Jourdan and Moreau to retreat over the Rhine, and concluded this victorious campaign by taking possession of Rehl in the winter of 1797. In April of the next year, he signed the articles of peace at Leoben. Again took the command in 1799, defeated Jourdan in Suabia, and distinguished himself greatly at Stockach. In 1800, he was forced by ill

health to leave the army, and was elected governor of Bohemia. After the unfortunate battle of Hohenlinden, when the French entered Austria, he again took command, which he held until hostilities were ended by the peace of Lunéville.—*Encyclopædia Americana*.

He was, perhaps, the first general in Europe of the second order, and would, it is probable, have ranked far higher in any other age than that in which he lived. He was as far superior to Moreau, Jourdan, and leaders of that class, as he was inferior to such geniuses as Napoleon and Wellington. In estimating his military career, it must not be forgotten that his movements were continually hampered, and his plans thwarted by the Aulic Council at Vienna. He is the author of several military works.

E. W. B.

very gates of Paris, he did not fear being degraded into the mere herd of vulgar tools who are made use of and then disowned or denounced, for he anticipated having princes for his accomplices. He had thus far secured all the dignity which could comport with the part that he was about to play, and he subsequently showed, by his bearing in the presence of his judges, that it was not he who was degraded by these events. But this was not all; it was necessary not only to prepare for the combat, but also to secure the fruits of the victory; that was necessary to provide for the certainty that France would throw herself into the arms of the Bourbons. Parties in France had been so reciprocally destructive, that as to power, they had, practically, been suicidal. The more violent revolutionists were detested; the more moderate revolutionists, taking refuge behind General Bonaparte, were impotent; the sole power that remained erect and unshaken, was that of the army; and it was the army that it was necessary to gain. But it was devoted to the Revolution, for which it had poured forth its blood like water, and it looked with something like horror and loathing upon those emigrants whom it had so often seen combating in the ranks of the Austrians and of the English.

The chief subject of conversation was the quarrel between General Moreau and General Bonaparte. We have already remarked, elsewhere, that the general of the army of the Rhine reflecting, prudent, firm on the battlefield, was, in private life, careless and weak, and governed by those who surrounded him; and that, under this fatal influence, he had not escaped from being tainted with that second-rate vice, Envy; that, although attentions and favours had been showered upon him by the First Consul, he had allowed himself to cherish hostility to General Bonaparte, for no other reason than because that hero was the first man in the State, and General Moreau only the second; that, in this temper, Moreau had been guilty of the impropriety of refusing to attend the First Consul at a review, and that the latter, always alert in returning an affront, had consequently abstained from inviting Moreau to a banquet with which he celebrated the anniversary of the Republic; and that Moreau had committed the grievous error of dining on that very day, in plain clothes, with some malcontent officers, at one of those places of public resort where one is sure to be seen; a course of conduct as offensive to all prudent men, as it was pleasing to the enemies of the Commonwealth. We have spoken but of those pettinesses of wounded vanity, which commence among women, in vulgar quarrels, and finish, among men, in tragical events. If it be difficult to prevent quarrels between eminent personages, still more difficult is it to stop them when they have fairly broken forth. From the day of the banquet above spoken of, Moreau had continually shown himself more and more hostile to the Consular government. When the Concordat was settled, he declaimed against the domination of the priests; when the Legion of Honour was founded, he declaimed against it, as the establishment of

aristocracy; and, finally, when the Consulate for Life was settled, he denounced *that* as the re-establishment of royalty. At length he had ceased to present himself either at the Chief Consul's or at either of his colleagues. On the renewal of war, he might have availed himself of that opportunity of honourably, and without the shadow of personal submission, presenting himself at the Tuileries to offer his services, not to General Bonaparte, but to France. Moreau, drawn by degrees into an evil track, that *facilis descensus avari*, had looked upon this interruption of peace far less with reference to the suffering of his country, than with reference to the check which war would present to his detested rival, and stood aloof to watch how the difficulty would be solved by the enemy whom he had so wantonly provoked. He, Moreau, was now resident at Grosbois, enjoying his well-earned opulence, like some eminent citizen, the victim of princely ingratitude.

The First Consul not only aroused envy in his own person; his family connections, too, aroused it against him. Murat, whom he had for a long time refused to elevate to the rank of his brother-in-law, and who, with much natural talent, an excellent heart, and a perfectly chivalric courage, sometimes made an extremely bad use of those gifts; Murat, with a vanity which he carefully concealed from the First Consul, but very freely paraded when out of sight of that rigid master; Murat, galled those who, being too humbly placed to be envious of General Bonaparte, felt themselves, at least, entitled to be envious of his brother-in-law. Thus, then, there were great and little foes aroused against General Bonaparte by that smallest of all possible causes of hatred, Envy. Both classes ranged themselves behind Moreau, as their natural and fitting leader. At Paris during the winter, at Grosbois during the summer, he held a kind of court, at which the malcontents spoke out without restraint. The First Consul was aware of all this, and avenged himself, not only by the onward march of his power and of his glory, but also by his emphatic contempt, unreservedly expressed. At first, he had imposed upon himself an extreme reserve; but at length he answered the small sarcasms of mediocrity by the literally *flaying* sarcasms of genius; and these were to the full as generally made known as those of Moreau's party.

Party spirit makes use of quarrels which do not exist: of course, it is no less ready to make use of those which do. Moreau became a hero on the spot; if one might credit the malcontents, he was at once the military hero, the peaceful citizen, and the virtuous man; while General Bonaparte was the imprudent but lucky chieftain, the ungifted usurper, the presumptuous Corsican, who had dared to destroy the French republic, and ascend the steps of that throne which the Revolution had overthrown, and which he had reared again.

It would be well, said the emigrants and the malcontents, to allow Bonaparte to involve himself in an absurd and ruinous contest with England, and to withhold from him the aid of their courage, their experience, and their skill.

And thus, treating the victor of Egypt and of Italy as a mere adventurer, they represented the patriotic expedition which he had so much at heart as the most extravagant of brain-feverish delusions.

In these unfortunate differences the London conspirators found new facilities for furthering the second portion of their scheme. Moreau was first to be won over, and through him the army; and then the First Consul was to be butchered on the road to Malmaison. Moreau, once won over, would lead the army, and reconcile that formidable portion of the nation to the Bourbons, whom he could represent as having bravely reconquered the throne at the point of the sword. But how was Moreau to be approached, surrounded as he was, exclusively, by Republicans, while the London cabal was as exclusively surrounded by Chouans, and ultra-Bourbonists! A mediator was absolutely indispensable, and one had just made his appearance from the far forests of America; Pichegru, the conqueror of Holland, who had been transported by the Directory to Sinnamary. Though fallen far below his former greatness, he was still an illustrious character, endowed with splendid qualities, and influential alike with Royalists and with Republicans. He had made his escape, at this juncture, from the place of his banishment, and was resident in London, where he lived in the hope of being enabled to return to France, under favour of that policy which recalled indifferently the victims and the guilty of all parties. But the war, suspended for a brief space, speedily broke out again, and with it once more sprang into life the wild delusions of the emigrants from whom Pichegru had purchased his liberty at the expense of his honour. In spite of himself, he had been drawn into the conspiracy; and he was now empowered to confer with Moreau, and to gain him to the party of the Bourbons, and thus to fuse into one party both Republicans and Royalists of every shade of opinion and feeling.

The plan resolved upon was rendered sufficiently specious by the apparent posture of affairs; but even had it been far less specious, it would have sufficed to lure on the impatient spirits to which every chance was a good chance, if it did but serve to vary with a new excitement the tedium and forced leisure of exile. The plan being determined upon, the next step was to arrange the details of its execution.

France must needs be the theatre of action. Though Georges required the presence of one or two of the princes at the decisive moment, he did not insist upon such countenance until then; he allowed that it was necessary that he should make all arrangements previous to their entering France, that they might not be unnecessarily exposed to the risks of a prolonged residence in Paris under the eyes of an acute and vigilant police. He determined, therefore, to precede them to Paris, and get together a party of Chouans to attack the guard of the First Consul. In the mean time Pichegru was to have a communication with Moreau, first through a third party, and afterwards to go to Paris and have a personal

interview with that general. Finally, when every preparation should have been made, when the Chouans should be ready to assail the First Consul, and Moreau should have engaged to secure the adhesion of the army, the princes were to arrive in France on the eve, or on the very day, of the execution of the project.

All details being thus far arranged, Georges, with a party of Chouans upon whose fidelity he could rely, set out from London for France. He and his men were armed, like so many highwaymen; and he carried in his belt bills of exchange to the amount of a million. Not for an instant can it be supposed that the French princes, reduced to all sorts of expedients to supply their own wants, could furnish such sums as circulated among the wholesale speculators in conspiracy; those sums proceeded from the old source, that is to say, from the British treasury.

An officer of the English royal navy, Captain Wright, a bold and skilful seaman, in command of a light craft, took on board at Deal or Hastings such emigrants as wished to make the French coast, and landed them at such point in France as they chose. Since the First Consul had discovered this, and had caused the coast of Brittany to be more strictly watched than ever, Captain Wright had chosen another track, and landed his passengers upon the coast of Normandy.

Between Dieppe and Tréport, in the side of the steep cliff of Biville, was a secret passage, formed in a cleft of the rock and known only to smugglers. A cable, securely fixed to the top of the cliff, descended through this cleft, as far as the surface of the sea. At a certain cry, the concealed warders of this passage let down the cable, the smugglers seized it, and, by its aid, climbed the precipice, two or three hundred feet in height, carrying heavy loads of merchandise upon their shoulders. The trusty followers of Georges had found out this path, and had readily enough purchased the use of it. To render their secret communication with Paris complete, they had established a chain of lodging places; some in solitary farms, some in the chateaux of Norman nobles, faithful and wary royalists, who rarely left their abodes. By these means it was easy to pass from the Channel coast right onward to Paris without once touching upon a high-road or entering an inn. Finally, that there might be the less risk run of discovering this secret way to enemies, it was reserved for the use, exclusively, of the most important personages of the party, and their immediate followers. The money lavished among some of the Norman royalists whose shelter was thus secured, this fidelity of others, and, especially, the distance of this secret track from all frequented roads, rendered imprudences but little to be dreaded, and, for some time at least, the secret secure.

It was by this route that Georges entered Paris, disembarking from Captain Wright's vessel at the foot of the cliff of Biville on the 21st of August, 1803, at the very time when the First Consul was inspecting the coast. Following the track of the smugglers, and ac

companied by some of his most trusty lieutenants, he proceeded from shelter to shelter, till he reached Chaillot, in one of the suburbs of Paris. There a small lodging was prepared for him, whence he could nightly steal forth into Paris, see his associates, and make all ready to strike the blow for which he had returned to France.

Resolute and sensible, Georges partook of the passions but not the illusions of his party; he judged more correctly than his associates did of what was practicable; and he was urged by his courage to those measures which his accomplices ventured upon only from blind infatuation. He had no sooner reached Paris, than he discovered that the reports of the First Consul's unpopularity, which were so current in England, were quite unfounded; that the royalists and republicans were far enough from the adventurous temper that had been attributed to them; and that now, as ever, action halted far behind profession. But Georges was not a man to be easily intimidated; still less was he the man to cool the zeal of his associates by communicating the discouraging truths which his sagacity revealed to him, and he went steadily forward with the work that he had undertaken. After all, the aid of public opinion was not required for a stroke of violence, and, the First Consul being once slain, it would be easy enough to induce France to accept the Bourbons, for want of better rulers. From the depths of his mysterious lurking-place, he despatched emissaries to La Vendée, to ascertain the feelings of that province as to the conscription; to inquire whether the conscripts there were not now, as formerly, of opinion that, if they needs must serve, it was better to serve against the Revolutionary government than under it. But he found that La Vendée had sunk into the deepest apathy; his own name was the only one which still preserved some influence, because he was looked upon as an incorruptible royalist, who had preferred exile to the favour of the First Consul; and there was much sympathy in existence for the representative of a cause which was so dear to the secret hearts of the people, but no one was willing to infest the woods and high-ways as of old. Moreover, the priests, the real leaders and prompters of the Vendean population, were attached to the First Consul; the most that could be hoped for, therefore, were some very insignificant gatherings which, to the grief of the conspirators, included fewer than ever of those daring and desperate Chouans, who were once ready to do every thing rather than return to a peaceful course of life. But it was absolutely necessary that some such men should be found; Chouans at once daring and prudent; and in the course of two months' stay at Paris, Georges had scarcely been able to get thirty such men together. These were not made acquainted with each other, or with the actual scope of the undertaking for which they were engaged; they

knew only that their undertaking was to be in favour of those Bourbons to whom they were devoted, and that they had liberal pay, to which they were no less devoted. Georges secretly prepared arms and uniforms for the day of action. From the depths of his concealment, and with infinite precautions, because his views differed from those of the republicans, he endeavoured to discover whether matters were more propitious on their part than on that of the royalists. He caused an attached Breton to sound Moreau's private secretary, Fresnières, who was also a Breton, connected with all parties, even with M. Fouché. This was running no small risk, for Fouché at this period was eagerly looking out for an opportunity of rendering himself serviceable to the First Consul. Fresnières held out but small hope as to the inclinations of Moreau; indeed, his information was so unimportant, that Georges paid but little attention to it. Resolved to venture every thing, he urged his emissaries at London to press matters forward; for, perilled as he was in the heart of Paris, his danger was as useless as it was great.

While Georges was thus occupied, the agents of Pichegru, on their part, had sounded Moreau. Some clerks of the commissariat department, a class of men who occasionally became intimate with general officers, were employed to convey Pichegru's proposals to Moreau, who was asked whether he had quite forgotten his former brother in arms, or still cherished any animosity towards him. In truth, it was not for Moreau to feel rancour against Pichegru, whom he had formerly denounced to the Directory; moreover, his present hate was too intense to allow of his cherishing an older one, and he consequently spoke kindly and even sympathizingly of the wrongs of his old friend, and thus encouraged the inquiry whether he would not exert his influence to obtain Pichegru's recall to France. And, in truth, why should the amnesty that was granted to the Vendéans, and to the soldiers of Condé, be refused to the conqueror of Holland? Moreau replied, that he fervently wished for Pichegru's restoration to his country, considered that restoration to be due to his services, and would gladly promote it, if his position with respect to the government were such as to allow of his interference, but that he had definitively broken off all connection with the rulers of France, and had fully determined never again to present himself at the Tuileries. Having gone thus far, he naturally was led to speak of his own wrongs, of his hatred of the First Consul, and of his desire to see France delivered from Napoleon's rule.

The inclinations of Moreau being thus far ascertained, one of his former officers, General Lajolais¹ was employed to communicate with him; a most dangerous connection for a man too weak for self-control. General Lajolais was diminutive and lame, but endowed with a most decided turn for intrigue, and urged

¹ LAJOLAIS, F., a French general, born at Weissembourg, in 1761; son of the king's lieutenant in that city. He early embraced the profession of arms, and, rising by degrees, became at last Brigadier General. In 1794, he served in the armies of the Rhine and Moselle; attached himself to the person of Pichegru, and partici-

ipated in all his schemes in 1795-96 and 97 to restore Monarchy in France. He was tried by court martial at Strasbourg, in 1800, and acquitted. In 1803, he endeavoured to bring about a reconciliation between Moreau and Pichegru, and was involved in the conspiracy of Georges Cadoudal.—*Biographie Moderne*. n.

onward in that direction by narrowness of fortune almost amounting to downright destitution. A deserter from the Republican army was sent to him with a considerable sum of money and letters from Pichegru; the deserter in question being disguised as a hawkier of lace. He found it a task of but small difficulty to gain over Lajolais, who fastened himself upon Moreau, and drew from him a confession of his wounded feelings, and of his wishes for the destruction of the Consular government, no matter by what means. Lajolais did not completely reveal his views, but credulous as such speculators in conspiracy usually are, he fancied that to decide Moreau to take an active part in the conspiracy, it was only requisite to propose it to him, and if he fancied more than existed, he told his employers still more than he fancied. It is thus that the meshes of this sort of conspiracy are woven by agents who impose half upon themselves and half upon their employers. Lajolais, then, held out the greatest hopes to the emissaries of Pichegru, and in obedience to their importunities set out for London to make a personal report to the illustrious personages of whom he had become the tool.

Lajolais and his guide were obliged to go to London by the way of Hamburg, that they might travel the more safely, and considerable time was thus lost. On reaching England, they found that the British authorities had given orders for their immediate reception, and they proceeded without delay to London, to put themselves into personal communication with Pichegru and the other heads of the conspiracy, whose impatient spirits were thrown into an intoxication of delight by the arrival of Lajolais. At the conferences which were now held, the Comte d'Artois had the folly to be present, thus compromising alike his rank, his dignity, and his family. It is true, that he was personally known only to the leading men among the conspirators, but the intensity of his sentiments and of his language speedily revealed him to the rest. When Lajolais, with a ridiculous exaggeration, reported what Moreau had said to him, and affirmed that the mere appearance of Pichegru would secure the adhesion of the republican general, the Comte d'Artois, unable to repress his delight, exclaimed, "Ah! let but our two generals agree together, and I shall speedily be restored to France." This speech attracted the attention of the conspirators to the prince, and caused them to identify him. They discovered, that he who thus expressed himself was a prince of the blood, a descendant of kings, and destined to be himself a king; whom the demoralizing influence of exile had urged to conduct so little consistent with his rank, and so little creditable to his heart. So great was the satisfaction, said one of the conspirators, who subsequently narrated all the particulars, that had the King of England been present he would fain have joined the party.¹

It was agreed that, without further delay, the

conspirators should proceed to France to put the finishing stroke to their designs. In truth, there was no time to be lost, for the luckless Georges, thrown forward, unaided, as an advanced guard, was exposed to terrible perils, living as he did beneath the very eyes of the keen-visioned consular police. Towards the end of December, lest he should fancy himself altogether deserted, a second party of emigrants was sent to join him. It was now resolved that Pichegru himself, accompanied by such illustrious persons as M. de Rivière and one of the Polignacs, should go to France and join Georges; and as soon as these new emissaries should have made all necessary preparations, and M. de Rivière, the coolest and most prudent of the conspirators, should announce that all was ripe² for action, the princes themselves, the Comte d'Artois and the Duc de Berry, should land in France to take their share in the pretended battle with the First Consul.

Pichegru, then, and other leading French emigrants, set out upon this exhibition, in which he was to sacrifice his already tarnished reputation, and that life which should have been more worthily employed. Early in January, 1804, he embarked on board the vessel of captain Wright, who, on the sixteenth of the month, landed him at the cliff of Biville. The conqueror of Holland, accompanied by some of the most illustrious members of the French aristocracy, climbed the smugglers' rope, met Georges who had proceeded to the coast to await them, and, proceeding from one secure lurking-place to another, reached Chailot on the twentieth of January.

Georges had not collected so large a force as he had proposed to be aided by, yet, daring as he was, he would willingly have led on the force that he had got together to make a deadly attack upon the First Consul; but, previously to proceeding to this last extremity, it was necessary to have such an understanding with Moreau as would secure the safety of the conspirators subsequently to the death of the First Consul. The agents had a fresh interview with him, at which they informed him that Pichegru had privately returned to France, and proposed that they should confer together, to which Moreau consented, but, being unwilling to receive Pichegru at home, he made an appointment to meet him at night on the boulevard de la Madeleine. Pichegru went, accordingly; he wished to go alone, for he was cool and prudent, and greatly disliked the company of the restless and vulgar people whose companionship was the first punishment of his conduct. He arrived with too large a company, including Georges, who was for seeing every thing with his own eyes, apparently that he might ascertain upon what sort of foundation he was about to risk his life in a desperate attempt.

On a dark and cold night, in the month of January, Moreau and Pichegru approached each other at a preconcerted signal; it was the

¹ The very letter, as well as the substance, of this pitiable business, are literally extracted from the minutes of the inquiry which took place, part of which was published, the rest remaining in the government archives.

We have adopted nothing as credible except what all parties unite in affirming, and what, consequently, bears the undoubted stamp of truth.

² See, further on, the deposition of M. de Rivière.

first time of their meeting since they had fought side by side in the army of the Rhine, while their conduct and character were still free from stain. Scarcely had they recovered from the emotion caused by so many reminiscences, when Georges appeared upon the scene and made himself known. Moreau, evidently amazed at the presence of Georges, suddenly became cold in his demeanour, and seemed angry with Pichegru for having subjected him to such a meeting. They were obliged to separate without having said any thing of importance; they were to meet under other circumstances, and in a different place.

This first interview with Moreau produced a most painful impression on the mind of Georges. "This will never do," were his first words. Pichegru himself began to fear that he had ventured too much; but the plotting agents communicated with Moreau, and, throwing aside all secrecy, plainly told him that they wished him to aid in overthrowing the Consular government. Moreau had no objection to the destruction of that government by means which, though not expressed, were perfectly well understood, but he manifested the strongest unwillingness personally to conspire for the service of the Bourbons. What he wished was, to benefit both the Republic and himself by the downfall of the First Consul, but it was only between him and Pichegru that such a course could be treated of. This time Moreau received Pichegru in the house of the former, and, after many accidents which threatened to discover every thing, the former companions in arms had a long and serious conference, in which they spoke out. Moreau could not emerge from a certain circle of ideas; he maintained that he had a considerable party both in the Senate and in the army, and that it was in his hands that power would be placed should France be freed of the three consuls; that power he would use for the protection of those who should free the Republic from her tyrant; but that liberated Republic should not be delivered over to the Bourbons. As for Pichegru, the former victor of Holland, and one of the most illustrious French generals, far more than mere protection would be accorded to him; he would be restored to his rank and honours, and placed in the most important offices of the state. Moreau, obstinately fixed in these notions, expressed his surprise at finding Pichegru connected with such people; Pichegru needed not Moreau's opinion on that point to render the companionship of the Chouans deeply unpalatable to him; but Moreau himself furnished a proof of the sad society into which a conspirator is of necessity plunged. Pichegru was too acute and too well-informed to share the illusions of Moreau, and endeavoured to convince him, that the First Consul, being put to death, the only government that could succeed would be that of the Bourbons. But this view of affairs was far too extensive for Moreau, who was sagacious only upon the battle-field; and he persisted in believing that on General Bonaparte's death he, General Moreau, would infallibly become First Consul. Although the murder of the First Consul was never directly mentioned, it

was perfectly well understood as the means by which he was to be got rid of. Without endeavouring to find apologies for these sad negotiations, we may, however, remark that the men of that day had seen so much of death upon the scaffold and upon the field of battle, and had issued, or been subjected to, so many terrible orders, that the death of an individual was not in their eyes of that horrible importance of which it has since been rendered, to our eyes, by the termination of civil war, and the gentle influences of peace.

Pichegru was driven to despair by this interview, and said to the confidant who guided him to Moreau's house, and thence back again to his obscure shelter, "And this man, too, has ambition, and wishes to take his turn in governing France! Poor creature! he could not govern her for four-and-twenty hours!"

Georges, when informed of what had passed between Pichegru and Moreau, exclaimed with his usual impetuosity of tone: "If we must needs have any usurper, I should prefer the First Consul to this brainless and heartless Moreau!"

Such was the tone in which they privately spoke of the man whom their hired scribes publicly held up as the model of all warlike qualities and public virtues.

The knowledge thus acquired of the actual views and feelings of Moreau threw the unfortunate and guilty emigrants into despair. Another meeting took place between him and Pichegru at Georges' retreat at Chaillot, probably without Moreau's knowledge of his host's identity. Georges was present at the commencement of this interview, but suddenly retired, saying to the two generals, "I will leave you to yourselves, and then perhaps you will come to some understanding."

But their interview produced no such understanding between the republican generals, and it now became obvious to all the conspirators that they had imprudently ventured upon a scheme which could terminate only in ruin. M. de Rivière was driven to despair; he and his friends constantly repeated what is always said by those who cannot cause their feelings and passions to be adopted, "France is apathetic, no longer faithful to her former sentiments; she covets nothing but rest." In truth, France was not, as it had been represented, virulently disposed against the Consular government, nor were all parties prepared to concur in its overthrow: it was only some envious men of mediocre ability who wished for its destruction, and even they were not prepared to go to the length of actual conspiracy. And though France grieved at the interruption of peace, and was, perhaps, somewhat suspicious of the First Consul's ambitious and warlike propensity, she yet did not the less look upon him as her saviour. Admiring his genius, she would on no account have been willing to see him and herself exposed to all the hazards of a new revolution.

Already some of the unfortunate and guilty conspirators were tempted to retire, some to Brittany and others to England. Undeceived as to the actual state of things, the most eminent among them were, moreover, still further

disgusted by the kind of company in which they were reduced to the necessity of living, and the most prudent of them all, M. de Rivière and Pichegru, confided to each other their vexations and disgusts.

One day Pichegru calling some troublesome Chouans to order, one of them said, "But, general, you are one of us." "No!" said Pichegru with biting contempt, "I am among you but not of you!" by which he meant that though his life was in their hands, his will and intellect were not so.

All were now agitated by most painful doubts, but Georges was still ready to attack the First Consul, provided only that arrangements should be made for the future; while others inquired what good would be produced by a needless delay. Things were in this position when this plotting, after going on uninterruptedly for six months, at length attracted the attention of the police, but too tardily to do much credit to its vigilance. The First Consul's sagacity saved him, and ruined the imprudent foes who had plotted his ruin. It is the common fate of those who embark in such schemes, to stop only when it is too late, and they are not unfrequently discovered, seized, and punished, precisely at the moment when conscience, good sense, and terror, have so far opened their eyes that they are preparing to abandon the evil of their ways.

These goings and comings, continued from August to January, beneath the eyes of such a man as the ex-minister Fouché, so anxious to make discoveries, could not but be sooner or later detected. We have elsewhere mentioned that M. Fouché had been deprived of the police department when the First Consul wished to inaugurate the consulate for life, by suppressing a severe ministry; and the police authority was, as it were, merged into the ministry of justice. The *Grand juge*, Regnier,¹ quite a novice in this sort of administration, turned it over to the councillor of state, Réal,² a man of intellect, but credulous and flighty, and very far from equalling Fouché in sagacity. The consequence was that the police was but poorly managed, and the First Consul was assured that there had never been a time when plotting was less rife; a confidence which the First Consul was far from sharing, and in which, indeed, Fouché took good care not to allow him to participate. The acute observer had become a senator, and, wearied of idleness, and having kept up his connection with his old agents, he had correct intelligence which he from time to time communicated to the First Consul, who, listening attentively to what was told him by Réal and Fouché, and carefully reading the reports of the gendarmerie, which are always of the greatest use because they

are faithful and accurate, felt convinced that some plot was in existence against his person. In the first place, circumstances led him to infer that the renewal of war would tempt the emigrants and the republicans to some new design, and in this inference he was confirmed by many indications, such as the arrest of Chouans and the information forwarded to him by Vendéan chiefs who were personally attached to him. On receiving information direct from La Vendée that refractory conscripts were forming themselves into troops, he sent to the departments of the west Colonel Savary, whose devotion was boundless, and whose intelligence and courage were alike well tried, to head some moving columns of picked gendarmerie to follow and disperse the insurgents. Colonel Savary carefully observed every thing with his own eyes, and clearly perceived that some movement was being secretly carried on. This movement was that of Georges, who, from his concealment at Paris, endeavoured to excite insurrection in La Vendée. But nothing was as yet discovered as to that terrible secret which Georges confined to himself and the chief of his associates. Having dispersed the refractory bands in the west, Colonel Savary returned to Paris without making any very important discovery.

There was another intrigue, a clue to which had fallen into the hands of the First Consul, who took something of pride and pleasure in following it up himself, and this clue promised to throw further light upon what was going on, though it had not done so as yet. The three English ministers at Hesse, Wirtemberg, and Bavaria, who also made it their business to hatch intrigues in France, applied themselves to that task with an assiduous but clumsy zeal. Foreigners are but ill qualified to carry on such plots. The minister at Bavaria, Mr. Drake, was the most active of the three; he even resided out of Munich, that he might be the more easily visited by agents from France, and to prevent his letters being opened, had a Bavarian postmaster in his pay. A restless and busy Frenchman, formerly a Republican, with whom Mr. Drake had undertaken his schemes, and to whom that minister revealed the intrigues of the British, divulged all that he knew to the police. Mr. Drake was anxious in the first instance to get at the consular secrets as to the descent upon the British coast, then to win over some eminent general, seize, if possible, upon some town, as Strasburg or Besançon, and there commence an insurrection. To get rid of General Bonaparte was constantly the object more or less explicitly insisted upon. The First Consul, delighted at having thus caught an English minister in the fact, caused a con-

¹ REGNIER CLAUDE ANTONIE, a barrister, deputy from the bailiwick of Nancy to the States General, employed himself in the administration and in the criminal law. In 1791 he was sent into the departments of the Rhine and Borge, in order to prevent the troubles which the escape of Louis XVI. might have occasioned there. In 1793 he was sent to the Consulate of the Ancients; in 1795 and 1798 he was secretary and president of that Council; and in 1799 was re-elected to the same post. He was an active participant in the Revolution of the 18th of Brumaire. After the organization of the constitution he was appointed to the Council of State, in

the section of Finance. In 1803 he united the two administrations of justice and the police.—*Biographie Moderne*.

² RÉAL, P. F., born in the Austrian Netherlands; was the first public accuser to the famous criminal tribunal of the 10th of August, 1792. He played a conspicuous part throughout the reign of terror, and the rule of the Directory; contributed indirectly to the Revolution of the 18th Brumaire, and was raised immediately after it to the Council of State, in the section of Justice.—*Biographie Moderne*.

siderable sum of money to be paid to the man who thus deceived Mr. Drake, on condition that he should continue to impose upon that minister, and the First Consul himself furnished the draughts of letters to be written to Drake: in these letters he gave both numerous and correct details as to his personal habits, the manner in which he formed his plans and dictated his orders, and added that the whole secret of the consular operations and views were contained in a large black portfolio which was intrusted to M. de Meneval, or to a confidential person; that M. de Meneval was above being bribed, but that the other individual was corruptible and would give up the portfolio for a million of francs. The First Consul then proceeded to hint that there could be no doubt that other plots existed in France besides that directed by Mr. Drake,

1 The following curious passages are extracts from letters dictated by the First Consul himself:—

To the Grand Juge.

9 Brumaire, An. XII.—1st November, 1803.

It is of consequence to have a secret agent to watch Drake at Munich, and notice all French who go to that place.

I have read all the reports you sent me, and found them somewhat interesting. There must not be any hurry in making arrests; when our man has given all information, a plan of action must be settled with him. I wish him to write to Drake and tell him, that while waiting an opportunity to strike the great blow, he thinks he can venture to promise that he will take from the First Consul's own table in his private study, and in the First Consul's own handwriting, his notes concerning the great expedition, and all other important papers; that this hope is founded upon the connivance of a confidential person, who, having formerly been a member of the Jacobin club, and having at present the First Consul's confidence and the charge of his private study, belongs, nevertheless, to the secret committee, but that two things are indispensable to securing his aid: that he shall receive a hundred thousand pounds sterling on delivering the important documents in the First Consul's own writing, and that a French royalist agent shall be sent to provide means of concealment to this person, who would necessarily be arrested should documents so important be missed.

Bonaparte scarcely ever writes; he walks up and down his study and dictates to a young man twenty years of age, named Meneval, who is the only person who enters the First Consul's private study, or even the three adjoining rooms. This young man succeeded Bourrienne, whom the First Consul had known from his childhood, but had dismissed.

Nothing is to be hoped from Meneval; but the notes which are of the greatest importance are not dictated by Bonaparte, but written with his own hand. On his table there is a large portfolio divided into as many compartments as there are ministries; this well-secured portfolio is fastened by the First Consul himself, and when he, for however brief a space, leaves his study, Meneval's duty is to place this portfolio in a cupboard which slides under his writing table, and which is screwed down to the floor of the room.

This portfolio being stolen, only Meneval and the confidential man who lights the fire and keeps the room in order can be suspected; means, therefore, must be provided for the escape of the latter. This portfolio must contain all that the First Consul has written during several years past, as it is the only one which he always carries on his journeys, and which is constantly on the road from Paris to Malmesbury and St. Cloud. All his private memoranda of military arrangements must be in this port-

and that it was important to become acquainted with them all, so that no one might work to the injury of the rest, but that all should render mutual assistance. Finally, he added, as a most important piece of information, that the real object of the preparations for a descent was Ireland; that what was going on at Boulogne was a mere feint to which it was sought to gain credence by the extent of the preparations, but that the only serious meant expeditions were those of Brest and the Texel. This at once guilty and clumsy diplomatist who committed the double error of compromising the most sacred functions, and of so clumsily conducting his intrigues, eagerly swallowed all those details, and no less eagerly requested additional ones, especially such as related to the Boulogne expedition, and he announced that he would communicate with his

folio, and as his authority can only be destroyed by thwarting his projects, there can be no doubt that the carrying off of this portfolio is the readiest way of attaining that end.

To the Grand Juge.

Paris, 3d Pluvidose, An. XII.—24th January, 1804.

The letters of Drake seem very important. I should wish Ménége in his next despatch to say that the committee had been delighted with the idea that Bonaparte intended to embark at Boulogne, but that it is now perfectly ascertained that the demonstrations at Boulogne are mere feints, which, though undoubtedly expensive, are far less so than they seem to be; that all the boats of the flotilla can eventually be made available for ordinary purposes, and that this very fact suffices to show that the demonstrations are merely illusive and temporary. That it must not be concealed that the First Consul is far too wary and believes himself far too well established to risk a doubtful attempt which might compromise a great force. His true design, as far as can be guessed from his foreign policy, is a descent upon Ireland, to be made at once by the squadron of Brest and by that of the Texel.

Nothing is said about the Texel expedition, though it is known to be ready, and there is considerable talk about the camps of St. Omer, Ostend and Flushing. The great number of troops assembled in camps has a political end. Bonaparte is glad of a pretext for keeping them in hand upon a war establishment, and available for a new attack on Germany, should he deem a continental war desirable.

Another expedition is decidedly fixed upon; one to the Morea. Bonaparte has 40,000 men at Tarento; the Toulon squadron is to proceed thither, and he hopes to find a large auxiliary of Greeks.

The portfolio business must not be lost sight of, and mention must be made that, to prove himself deserving of confidence, the usher has produced many portions of letters in Bonaparte's own handwriting; that this man can render vast services, but that he must be largely paid. The portfolio must in reality be delivered, and care will be taken to provide it with precisely such information as we wish Drake and his employers to believe; but in order to make them value it the more highly it must be made to cost them at least 50,000l. sterling.

To Citizen Réal.

Malmesbury, 28th Ventose, An. XII.—19th March, 1804.

I beg that you will send to Citizen Maret the last letter written by Drake, that it may be printed in the appendix to the collection of documents relating to this affair.

I have also to request that you will add two notes, one to make it known that the supposed aid-de-camp of the general is only an officer sent by the prefect of Strasbourg, and the other to explain that the faithless individual was a sheer invention of the agent, and that no person possessing the confidence of government could be tempted by the corrupting gold of England.

government as to the portfolio for which so large a sum was demanded; that as regarded other plots that were supposed to exist, he was quite ignorant of them, (and here he strictly stated the truth,) but that if any such did exist they should be forwarded, not opposed; for, added he, *it is a matter of right little consequence by whom the animal be stricken down, provided you are all in the hunt!*¹ To so vile a course, and to such vile language, an agent invested with official importance could venture to descend. But all these proceedings failed to afford the information most wanted; Mr. Drake was unacquainted with the great conspiracy of Georges, whose secret was well kept, and, consequently, his ridiculous credulity had not caused him to furnish any really important information. The First Consul was still strongly persuaded that the men who had conceived the plan of the infernal machine were still more likely to strike some new blow under existing circumstances; and struck by some arrests effected in Paris, La Vendée, and Normandy, he said to Murat, the Governor of Paris, and to M. Réal, who was at the head of the police: "the emigrants are certainly at their old tricks; there have been several arrests; some of the prisoners must be selected and sent before a military commission, and rather than be shot they will tell all that they know." What we here relate occurred between the 25th and the 30th of January, while interviews were taking place between Pichegru and Moreau, and just as the conspirators were becoming disheartened. The First Consul had a list of the arrested individuals laid before him; in this list he discovered some of the agents of Georges who had preceded or followed him into France, and, among them, an ex-doctor of the Vendean armies who had landed in Georges' company in August. After careful consideration of the individual cases, the First Consul pointed out five, and said, "Either I am greatly mistaken, or we shall find these men both able and willing to give us information." For some time past no use had been made of the laws formerly enacted for the establishment of military courts; during the peace, the First Consul had been desirous to let these laws fall into disuse, but, on the renewal of war, he thought it necessary to call them into existence again; and especially against those spies who entered France to watch the preparations that were being made there against England, and some of those spies had consequently been arrested, condemned to death, and shot. The five individuals, whom the First Consul now selected, were sent to trial, two of them were acquitted, two, being convicted of crimes punishable with death, were condemned to be shot, and suffered that punishment without making any confession, beyond a bold avowal that they had entered France to serve that legitimate king who would speedily become victorious over his republican foes. They also spoke in most hostile terms against the person of the First Consul. The fifth of these individuals, whom the First

Consul had especially pointed out as being likely to make a clean breast, declared, when on the way to execution, that he had some important information to give; and he was immediately visited by one of the most astute and experienced agents of the police. He confessed every thing, declaring that he had landed at Biville cliff in company with Georges himself, as far back as the month of August; that they had made their way through the woods, from one hiding place to another, till they reached Paris, with the intention of murdering the Consul in an attack to be made upon his escort by open force, and he pointed out several persons, especially innkeepers, who were in the habit of harbouring Chouans. This confession threw a broad and bright light upon the subject; the presence of Georges at Paris was a fact of the utmost possible importance; it was not for any unimportant attempt that a person so important to his party had lain concealed in the heart of Paris with a band of hirelings. The point of disembarkation at the cliff of Biville was now known, as also was the existence of a secret road through the woods, and of some, at least, of the secret lodgings which gave shelter to the conspirators. A most strange accident had revealed a name which put the First Consul and the police upon the track of some very important circumstances. A short time before the period of which we are writing, a party of Chouans had landed at this same cliff of Biville, and had exchanged shots with the gendarmerie; a paper wadding, which was found on that occasion, was marked with the name of *Troche*. This *Troche* was a watchmaker at Eu, and he had a son, a very young man, employed as a corresponding clerk. This young man was privately arrested and conveyed to Paris, where he was examined and confessed all he knew. He confessed that it was he who had been employed to receive the conspirators at the cliff of Biville, and had guided them to the first stations at which they were to find shelter; he gave an account of those three disembarkations of which we have already spoken; viz., that of Georges in August, and those of December and January, including Pichegru, and Messrs. de Rivière and de Polignac. He was unacquainted with the name and rank of the persons to whom he had acted as guide; but he was able to say, that early in February, a fourth disembarkation was to take place at Biville; he, in fact, being appointed to receive those who were to land.

Early in February, therefore, search was made in all the known and suspected hiding-places of the Chouans, from Paris as far as the coast, a strict watch was kept on the premises of those innkeepers who had been informed against by the agent of Georges, and in the course of a few days various important arrests took place; two of these, more especially, threw great light upon the business. In the first place, a daring young Chouan, named Picot, servant to Georges, was taken; being armed with dagger and pistols, he made a stout resistance to the police, and only yielded at the last extremity, loudly declaring that he was willing to die in the service of his king; as

¹ These are Drake's actual expressions. His letters were deposited in the Senate, and exhibited to all diplomatists who chose to see them.

the same time Bouvet de Lozier, principal lieutenant to Georges, was taken, making less resistance, and bearing himself more calmly than Picot.

These men were armed in the style of brigands ready to commit the worst of crimes, and besides their arms they carried with them large sums of gold and silver. At first they were in a state of great excitement and enthusiasm, then they grew more cool, and at length confessed all they knew. Picot, arrested on the 18th Pluviôse—8th of February—would at first confess nothing, but was gradually led afterwards to speak out. He first confessed that he had landed from England with Georges, and that he had been six months with him in Paris; and he did not conceal the purpose of their abode there. There was, consequently, no longer any room to doubt that Georges was in Paris to strike a terrible and decisive blow, but this general knowledge was all that could be then obtained. Bouvet de Lozier had as yet confessed nothing: he was very far superior to Picot in both education and manners. In the course of the night between the 13th and 14th of February, however, this Bouvet de Lozier suddenly summoned his gaoler. The prisoner had endeavoured to hang himself, and, having failed in the attempt, had been attacked by a sort of delirium, under the influence of which he demanded that his confession should be taken down.

The unfortunate man then declared that he desired ere he should die, for the cause of his legitimate king, to unmask the treacherous person who, uselessly perilling brave men, had plunged them into ruin; and he then proceeded to tell the astonished and perplexed M. Réal a very strange story. The Royalists, he said,

were at London with the princes, when Moreau sent one of his officers to Pichegru offering to head a movement on behalf of the Bourbons, and to influence the army to co-operate in that movement; and on receiving this offer they had all set out with Georges and Pichegru himself to aid in the proposed revolution. On reaching Paris, Georges and Pichegru (continued he) had an interview with Moreau, who then, however, took a different tone, and proposed that he should succeed to the Consular power on Bonaparte being overthrown; that Georges, Pichegru, and their friends had refused to agree to such a proposal, and that it was owing to the fatal delays caused by Moreau's pretensions that the arrests had been made by the police. This sad revealer of sad secrets said that he had *escaped from the shadow of death*, that he might avenge himself and his friends upon the man who had ruined them.¹

Thus from an interrupted suicide there sprang up a terrible charge against Moreau—an accusation exaggerated by despair, but still having all the characteristics of conspiracy. M. Réal, astounded at this confession, hurried away to the Tuileries, where, early as the hour was, he found, as usual, the First Consul risen from bed, and preparing for a long day of arduous toil. The First Consul was still under the hands of his valet, Constant, but as soon as M. Réal began to speak he laid his fingers upon his lips, and closed himself with him to listen to his account. It did not seem to cause him much surprise, but he could not wholly credit the charge made against Moreau. He readily comprehended that all parties were to join against him, and that Pichegru was to unite the Republicans and Royalists; but before the guilt of Moreau

¹ I now subjoin the actual words of Bouvet de Lozier's confession. This document, and those subsequently quoted concerning the conspiracy of Georges, are taken from a collection in eight volumes octavo, under the title of *Examination before the Special and Criminal Court of the Department of the Seine, sitting at Paris, of Georges, Pichegru, and others, charged with Conspiracy against the person of the First Consul*. Paris: C. F. Patras, Printer to the Court of Criminal Justice. 1804. Copy in the Royal Library. Vol. ii., p. 168.

Confession made by Athanasios-Hyacinthe Bouvet de Lozier before the GRAND JUDGE, charged with the administration of justice.

A man just escaped from the gates of the tomb, and still covered with death's shadows, calls for vengeance upon those whose treachery has plunged him and his party into ruin.

Despatched to support the cause of the Bourbons, he found himself obliged either to fight for Moreau, or to renounce the enterprise which was his sole object.

Monsieur the Comte d'Artois was to enter France to place himself at the head of the Royalists, and Moreau had pledged himself to side with the Bourbons, but refused to do so when the Royalists returned to France.

He proposed that they should labour for him, and raise him to the post of dictator.

Perhaps the accusation I bring against him is but partially borne out by proof.

The following are the facts, on which you will form your own judgment.

Lajolais, a general who formerly served under Moreau, was sent by him to the prince in London; Pichegru was too mediator between them; Lajolais, on behalf and in the name of Moreau, agreed to the essential points of the proposed plan.

The prince prepared to leave England for France, the number of Royalists in France was augmented, and at conferences in Paris between Moreau, Pichegru, and Georges, the first named avowed his design to act not for a king, but for a dictator.

Hence the delays, the dissensions, and the consequent almost utter ruin of the Royalist party.

Lajolais was with the prince at the commencement of January last past, as I have been informed by Georges.

What consists with my own knowledge is his arrival at La Poterie on the 17th of January, on the day after his landing with Pichegru by our way of communication, with which you are but too well acquainted.

Subsequently, on the 25th or the 30th of January, I saw this same Lajolais in a carriage, in which we were accompanied by Georges and Pichegru, on the way to the Boulevard Madeline, close by which Moreau was waiting for them. A conference took place among them in the Champs Elysees, at which we had reason to anticipate the proposal made by Moreau in a subsequent meeting with Pichegru alone, viz.: that the re-establishment of a king was not to be thought of, that he should be made dictator, leaving the Royalists merely to play the part of his supporters and soldiers.

I know not what weight you will attach to the assertions of a man who but an hour ago was saved from self-destruction, and who has still before his eyes the death to which an outraged government consigns him. But I cannot withhold a cry of despair, or accusing the man to whom I owe my ruin.

At all events, you will find my statements borne out in the course of the trial in which I am implicated.

(Signed)

Bouvet,

Adjutant-General of the Royal Army

could be credited, he wished that Pichegru's presence in Paris should be proved beyond all doubt. Should a clear light be thrown on this part of the business, the connection between Moreau and the Royalists would be placed beyond all doubt, and he could be proceeded against directly. Nothing in the First Consul's tone announced anger or desire of vengeance; he seemed more curious and thoughtful than irritated.

It was determined to re-examine Picot, Georges' servant, in order to discover whether he was aware of General Pichegru's presence in Paris; he was examined that very day, and by treating him with great mildness they induced him to make full and free communication of what he knew. He avowed all that he knew about Pichegru and Moreau, and, though he was less extensively informed than Bouvet de Lozier, his knowledge was more important, as it showed that the desperation produced by the conduct of Moreau had proceeded to the very lowest ranks of the conspirators. As to Pichegru, he strenuously affirmed that he had seen him in Paris not long previously, and, moreover, that he was still concealed there; as for Moreau, he affirmed that he had heard Georges' officers express regret that Moreau had ever been applied to, as his ambitious pretensions perilled every thing.¹

These facts having been elicited in the course of the 14th of February—24th Pluviose. The First Consul immediately summoned to the Tuilleries a secret council, consisting of the consuls Cambacérès and Lebrun, the principal ministers, and M. Fouché, who, though no longer in the ministry, took a leading part in this investigation. This council was held in the night between the 14th and 15th. The matter was one which required the strictest examination; the conspiracy could not be doubted, any more than the design to attack the First Consul with a band of Chouans, headed by Georges; and the guilty union of all parties, Republicans or Royalists, was proved by the presence of Pichegru, who had mediated between them. It was not easy to say precisely how far Moreau had proceeded in criminality, but neither Bouvet de Lozier in his despair, nor Picot in his subordinate simplicity, could have invented that singular circumstance of the damage done to the Royalist views by the personal ambition of Moreau. It was clear that if the inquiry went forward, and Moreau were left at liberty, he would be constantly mentioned in connection with the conspiracy, and the government would appear either to be calumniating him, or to be afraid to proceed against a great criminal, because he was the second person in the Republic.

This consideration determined the First Consul as to the course that ought to be taken, nothing could have been more trying to his pride as well as his policy than to allow the firmness of his government to be called into question. "They would say," exclaimed he, "that I am afraid of Moreau; that shall not be said; I have been one of the most merciful of men, but if necessary I will be one of the most terrible, and I will strike Moreau as I would any one else, as he has entered into conspiracy odious alike for its objects and for the connections which it presumes." Thus reasoning, he did not hesitate about arresting Moreau. He had still another motive and a most urgent one. Pichegru and Georges were not yet arrested; three or four of their tools had been taken, but the band of executioners still remained at liberty, and hidden from the police, and it was not unlikely that fear of being arrested might induce them to hasten the attempt for which they had landed in France. On this account it was especially necessary to hasten the proceedings, and to seize as many of the leaders as possible; new discoveries would thus infallibly be made. The immediate arrest of Moreau was therefore resolved upon, as well as that of Lajolais and other conspirators who had been denounced by name.

The First Consul was much irritated, but not directly or chiefly against Moreau; and he acted rather as a man who wishes to secure himself than as one who wishes to take vengeance; he wished to have Moreau in his power, to convict him, get the requisite information from him and then to pardon him, deeming that thus to terminate the business would be the very height of ability and good fortune. It was necessary to determine, now, under what jurisdiction the guilty parties should be proceeded against. The Consul Cambacérès, profoundly skilled in law, pointed out the danger of trusting such a case to the ordinary tribunals, and proposed that Moreau should be sent before a court-martial, composed of the most eminent military officers; a course justified by the existing laws. But the First Consul opposed this proposition: "It would be said," remarked he, "that I had aimed at getting rid of Moreau by causing him under the form of law to be murdered by my own partisans." He therefore proposed a middle course, that of sending Moreau before the criminal court of the Seine; but the constitution allowing of the suspension of juries under certain circumstances and within the limits of certain departments, it was determined that that suspension should be immediately pronounced in regard to the department of the Seine: this was an error, though founded upon

¹ Extract from the Second Declaration of Louis Picot, made on the 24th Pluviose, an. XII.—14th of February—at two o'clock in the morning, before the Prefect of Police.

The said Picot declares:

That the leaders drew lots for the task of assassinating the First Consul.

That they were to carry him off if they could meet him on the Boulogne road, or assassinate him while presenting a petition to him at a review or at the theatre.

That he finally believes that Pichegru is still not merely in France, but also in Paris.

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Extract from the Third Declaration of Louis Picot, 24th Pluviose—14th of February. Vol. II., p. 395.

That Pichegru has constantly passed under the name of Charles, and that deponent has often heard him thus addressed.

That deponent has often heard General Moreau spoken of, and has heard the leaders frequently express their regret that Moreau had been applied to, but is not aware when Georges saw Moreau.

I here quote the testimony of M. Cambacérès himself.

an honourable principle. The public considered the suspension of the jury as an act no less severe than sending the accused before a court-martial, and thus, without gaining the merit of respecting the forms of justice, all their inconveniences were incurred, as we shall presently perceive.

It was resolved, then, that the *grand juge*, Regnier, should draw up a report upon the conspiracy that had been discovered, and the cause of Moreau's arrest, and that this report should be laid before the Senate, the Legislative Body, and the Tribunate. The council remained in deliberation during the whole night, and, on the morning of the 15th of February, the officers of justice, supported by a detachment of picked gendarmerie, went to Moreau's residence in Paris; not finding him there they set out towards Grosbois, and met the general crossing the bridge of Charenton on his way to Paris. He was arrested quietly, and conveyed in the most respectful manner to the Temple: Lajolais and the commissariat clerks who had abetted the conspiracy were also arrested. The message containing Regnier's report was in the course of the same day presented to the Senate, the Legislative Body, and the Tribunate: it caused a painful astonishment among the friends of government, and a malignant pleasure among its more or less open enemies, of whom there still remained a considerable number in the great assemblies of the state. According to these latter, the conspiracy was a mere machination of the First Consul's, aided by the ingenuity of the police, for the purpose of ridding Bonaparte of a rival of whom he was jealous, and of repairing his damaged popularity by creating fears for his life. Slander, as usual in such cases, had free vent, and instead of being called Moreau's conspiracy, it was called the conspiracy against Moreau! The general's brother, who was a member of the Tribunate, addressed the assembly, declaring that his brother was calumniated, and that all he needed for the establishment of his innocence was to be sent before an ordinary, and not before a special, court. All that he demanded on behalf of his brother was facility for showing his innocence. These words were listened to coldly but with grief. The majority of the three great assemblies of the state were at once attached and afflicted. It seemed that since the renewal of war the First Consul's star, so proudly in the ascendent till then, had somewhat paled: his friends did not believe that he had invented the conspiracy, but they lamented that his life was again perilled, and that it could only be protected by the fall of some of the most illustrious heads of the Republic. A reply to the message of the government contained the usual expressions of sympathy and attachment to the head of the State, and the warmest entreaties that justice might be promptly and strictly done.

The noise made by these arrests could not but be great; the majority of the public was disposed to be very indignant at whatever put the very precious life of the First Consul in danger; but some doubt was expressed as to the reality of the conspiracy. After the In-

fernal Machine, to be sure, any thing might be deemed possible to be attempted by conspirators, but in that case the crime had preceded the examination, and had borne an aspect most odiously criminal; now, on the contrary, a plan of assassination was announced, and upon that mere announcement one of the most illustrious men of the Republic had been arrested—a man, too, of whom the First Consul was said to be jealous to the utmost degree. Where, it was asked, was Pichegru? where Georges? These persons, it was confidently asserted, were not at Paris; they would not be found there, for all that was said about them was merely a detestable and clumsy invention.

If the Consul was calm at the first aspect of this new danger which menaced his life, he was deeply stung by the foul calumnies of which that danger was made the occasion and the pretext. He asked whether it was not quite bad enough to be thus exposed to plots the most frightful, without being accused of being himself the inventor of those plots, of being jealous when the vilest jealousy pursued him, and of treacherous attempts upon the life of another, when the most treacherous attacks were levelled at his own life. Every new phase of the inquiry increased the violence of his indignation; he displayed a kind of enthusiasm in pursuing the investigation, not to protect his life, that he thought little about, so confident was he in his star: but he was to the greatest degree desirous of confounding and exposing the villainy of those who wished him to be deemed the inventor of the plots by which his life had been perilled, and might even yet be sacrificed.

This time it was not against the Republicans that he showed himself the most enraged, but against the Royalists. Ever since the affair of the Infernal Machine, though the guilt of that belonged to the Royalists, Bonaparte had been violently irritated against the Republicans, to whom he attributed the chief obstacles opposed to the good which he vain would have achieved. But now his anger took quite an opposite direction. Ever since he had attained power, he had rendered all possible service to the Royalists; he had raised them from oppression and recalled them from exile; he had restored them to their position as Frenchmen and citizens; he had, as far as possible, restored their property, and this, too, in opposition to the opinions and wishes of his own most trusty partisans. In recalling the priests he had braved the most deeply-rooted of the then popular prejudices, and to recall the emigrants he had braved the alarms of the most anxious of all ranks, the holders of the national property. Finally, he had bestowed some most important public trusts upon Royalists, and had even begun to employ some of them about his own person. When, in fact, we contrast the condition in which he found them at the termination of the *regime* of the Convention and the Directory, and that in which he had placed them, it is impossible not to perceive that he had rendered the greatest possible services to the men of that party, and been repaid by them with the greatest possible ingratitude. The First Consul, in rendering

services to the Royalists, had gone so far as to peril his own popularity, and, still worse, to risk the loss of confidence of the men who were the most honestly and the most sincerely attached to the Revolution; for he had thus caused them to think and to say that he meditated the restoration of the Bourbons. In return for such services and exertions the Royalists had endeavoured to destroy him by means of a barrel of gunpowder in 1800, and now they wished to butcher him on the highway; and, in their assemblies, calumniated him as the inventor of the conspiracies of their own hatching. These were the considerations which filled his ardent mind, and suddenly inflamed his hatred to the party guilty of such dark ingratitude. And thus his vengeance now sought not after the Republicans; no doubt he would have been well pleased to overwhelm Moreau with the crushing burden of his mercy; but it was upon the Royalists that he desired to heap his vengeance, and he was, he now affirmed, resolved to show them no mercy. New revelations confirmed this feeling, and inflamed it into an absolute and controlling passion.

While the most careful search was being made after Georges and Pichegru, new arrests were effected, and Picot and Bouvet de Lozier were induced to make new and more complete confessions of greater consequence than their former ones. These men, unwilling to be deemed assassins, hastened to state that they had returned to Paris in the highest company, including the first nobles of the Bourbon court, especially Messrs. De Polignac and De Rivière, and, finally, they most distinctly affirmed that they were to be headed by a prince, whose arrival they had hourly looked for, and that this prince, said to be the Duc de Berry,¹ was to accompany the final disembarcation announced to take place in February.

On that point the depositions were to the highest possible degree precise, full, and consistent; and the conspiracy grew terribly clear to the eyes of the First Consul. He saw the Comte d'Artois² and the Duc de Berry,³ surrounded by emigrants, connected by means of Pichegru with the Republicans, and maintaining in their service a horde of mercenaries, whom they proposed to lead to his murder by

means of an ambush, which they affected to look upon as an honourable and equal battle. Possessed by a kind of fury, the First Consul had now but one wish, the seizure of that prince, who was to reach Paris from the cliff of Biville. The impassioned language in which Bonaparte frequently expressed himself against the Jacobins subsequently to the affair of the Infernal Machine, was now bestowed exclusively upon the princes and nobles who could descend to play such a part. "These Bourbons fancy," he exclaimed, "that they may shed my blood like that of some wild animal; and yet, my blood is quite as precious as theirs. I will repay them the alarm with which they seek to inspire me; I pardon Moreau the weakness and the errors to which he is urged by a stupid jealousy, but I will pitilessly shoot the very first of these princes who shall fall into my hands; I will teach them with what sort of a man they have to deal." Such was the language to which he was constantly giving utterance during this terrible investigation. He was thoughtful, agitated, threatening, and, what was singular in him, he laboured less than usual; for the time he seemed to have lost all thought of Boulogne, Brest, and the Texel.

Without losing time, he sent for Colonel Savary, upon whose devotedness he confidently relied. Savary was not a bad hearted man, though he has been called so by the common detractors of every fallen power. He possessed an excellent intellect, but he had passed his life in camps, had no fixed principles upon any subject, and placed his sole morality in his fidelity to that master from whom he had received the greatest favours. He had passed several weeks in the Bocage, in disguise, and exposed to the most imminent perils. The First Consul now ordered him to resume his disguise, and to take post at Biville cliff with a body of picked gendarmes, who bore the same relation to the great body of the gendarmerie that the consular guard bore to the army in general, that is to say, they were the bravest and most trusty men in their arm of the service; men who might be sent upon the most difficult services without fear of a single error or neglect. Sometimes, on pressing emergency, two of them would set out in a post-

¹ Extract from the Fourth Declaration of Louis Picot, before the Prefect of Police, 25th Pluviose—15th February:

"I disembarked with Georges between Dunkirk and the town of Eu. I am not aware whether there had been any prior disembarcations; there have been two subsequently. There was a report of a fourth and more considerable disembarcation; it was to consist of twenty-five persons, including the Duc de Berry. I do not know whether this has taken place; I know that Bouvet and one Armand were to meet the prince."—Vol. II. p. 398.

Extract from Bouvet's Second Examination, the 30th Pluviose—20th of February:

"Question.—At what time and by what means do you imagine that Moreau and Pichegru agreed upon the plan for the restoration of the Bourbons, which Georges had returned to France to put into execution?

"Answer.—I believe that Pichegru and Moreau had long been in correspondence, and that it was only through the assurances given by Pichegru to the prince, that Moreau was making the utmost efforts to produce a rising in their favour in France, that the plan was vaguely set-

tled: the re-establishment of the Bourbons, the Councils to be gained over by Pichegru; a rising in Paris, aided by the presence of the prince; a personal attack upon the First Consul, and the presentation of the prince to the armies by Moreau, who was to prepare their minds beforehand."—Vol. II. p. 172.

² COMTE D'ARTOIS—CHARLES PHILIP, brother of Louis XVI. and Louis XVII. Till 1795 he bore the title of Comte d'Artois; till 1824 that of *Monsieur*, afterwards CHARLES X. of France.

³ BERRY—CHARLES FERDINAND, DUC DE; second son of the Comte d'Artois, and Maria Theresa of Savoy, born at Versailles in 1778. He was inadequately educated together with the Duc de Angoulême. In 1798 he fled with his father to Turin, and served under him and Condé on the Rhine. In 1801 he returned to England, where he lived alternately at London and Hartwell. After the restoration he was assassinated in 1820, just as he left the opera house, by one Louvel. He was an excellent and amiable prince, and his death produced great consternation throughout France.—*Encyclopedia Americana*.

chaise to convey millions in gold into Calabria or Bretagne, and they were never known to think of betraying their trust. They were not, then, as has been pretended, mere mercenaries, but soldiers who obeyed their orders with the most strict exactitude—a fearful exactitude, it is true, with the laws of that time, and under an arbitrary government. Colonel Savary was to take fifty of these tried men with him, well armed and in disguise, to Biville cliff. No one of the declarants had expressed any doubt that a prince would accompany the announced disembarkation; they only differed as to whether the expected prince was the Comte d'Artois or the Duc de Berry. Colonel Savary had orders to watch night and day at Biville cliff for the expected party, to seize every man of them, and to convey them to Paris. The First Consul was inflexibly resolved to send to military trial and execution whosoever of the princes should fall into his hands. Sad and terrible resolution, of which we shall by and by see the frightful results. While issuing these orders against the Royalists, the First Consul displayed very different sentiments towards General Moreau. He had him at his feet, compromised, and degraded, and intended to treat him with the most unbounded generosity. On the very day of the general's arrest, the First Consul said to the *grand juge*: "All that relates to the Republicans must be between Moreau and me. Go to his prison and question him, then bring him in your carriage to the Tuileries; let him settle every thing with me, and I will look over all the errors caused, perhaps, rather by the jealousy of his clique than by his own."

Unfortunately, it was easier for the First Consul to forgive, than for Moreau to accept his forgiveness. To confess every thing, in other words, to humble himself at the First Consul's feet, was a humility scarcely to be expected from a man whose calm soul was little liable to elation, and still less so to depression. Had M. Fouché still been chief of the police, he was the man to whom the examination of Moreau should have been intrusted. His ingratiating manner rendered him precisely the man to impress a mind hardened and soured by pride and misfortune, and to soothe that pride by saying, as he better than any other man could have said: "You wished to overthrow the First Consul, and you have failed; you are now in his power, but as he knows all, so he pardons all, and is anxious to restore you to your proper position. Avail yourself of his favourable disposition towards you; do not let a false pride mislead you into rejecting a clemency which you could scarcely have hoped for, and which is ready to replace you where you would have been had you never been so unwise as to mix yourself up with conspirators." But instead of this unscrupulous, but accomplished mediator, an honourable, but formal man, was sent, who, in parading his authority, thwarted the intentions of the First Consuls. The *grand juge*, Regnier, went to the prison in his robes, and attended by Locré, secretary to the Council of State, summoned Moreau before him, and questioned him at great length, and with something too much of

official coldness, considering the sort of man with whom he was dealing. Lajolais, who had been arrested during the day, had confessed pretty nearly every thing concerning the connection of Moreau and Pichegru. He confessed that he had mediated between those generals, that he had gone to London, brought Pichegru to France and thrown him into the arms of Moreau, with no other intention, as he averred, than that of procuring Pichegru's recall through Moreau's influence and intercession. Lajolais concealed nothing but his connection with Georges, the mere mention of which would have destroyed the rest of his statement. But this unfortunate man was unaware that the connection of Pichegru with Georges and with the emigrant princes was proved beyond doubt by other witnesses, and to confess the secret of the interviews of Moreau and Pichegru was fatally to prove the connection of Moreau, Georges, and the emigrant princes. The depositions of Lajolais, therefore, were in themselves sufficient to prove the guilt of Moreau. The first thing needful was to give the latter a friendly warning as to the other depositions, and thus save him from useless attempts at disguise: it was necessary to induce him to tell all, by proving to him that, in fact, all had already been revealed by others. If this had been done in the true language calculated to inspire him with confidence, perhaps the unfortunate general might have been led to a frankness that would have saved his life. But instead of acting thus, the *grand juge* questioned Moreau as to his connection with Lajolais, Pichegru, and Georges, and upon each of these points allowed him blindly to persist that he knew nothing, had conferred with no one, and was quite surprised that such questions should be put to him; the *grand juge* never once warned the general that he was involving himself in a labyrinth of denials which must be useless, and might be fatal. This interview of Moreau and the *grand juge* consequently failed of the effect which the First Consul had anticipated from it; an effect which would have led to an act of mercy alike noble and useful.

M. Regnier returned to the Tuileries to give an account of his interview with Moreau. "Well!" said the First Consul, "if he will not be frank with me, he must be left to the law!" Thenceforward the First Consul caused the affair to be strictly and zealously followed up, and displayed the utmost activity in searching for the guilty. He was especially anxious to save the character of his government, which would be seriously damaged unless the reality of the conspiracy should be proved by the double arrest of Georges and of Pichegru; an arrest indispensably necessary to save him from the imputation of a low and rancorous jealousy which had prompted him to aim at the destruction of the second greatest general of the Republic. Every day fresh arrests were made, and the confessions of the prisoners left no room to doubt of the plot as a whole, and as to its details, more especially as to the intended attack upon the First Consul's carriage between St. Cloud and Paris; as to the personal presence of a young prince; as to the arriva-

of Pichegru in Paris to confer with Moreau upon the antagonism of their views; and as to the consequent delays which had been so ruinous to them all. The facts, then, were ascertained, but it had not yet been found possible to capture any of those leaders whose mere presence would have convinced the most incredulous minds; nor had that expected prince arrived of whom the First Consul in his rage wished to make a terrible sacrifice. Colonel Savary, stationed at Biville Cliff, wrote thence that he had examined matters with his own eyes, and that he had found the most perfect authentication of the statements that had been made alike as to the mode of disembarkation, the chain of secret hiding-places between Biville and Paris, and the existence of a small vessel which every evening coasted off the rock, her crew being apparently at once desirous to land, and yet afraid to do so. There was reason to believe that this hesitation arose from the absence of signals which some of the conspirators were to have made to the new comers from the summit of the cliff, (which signals Savary could not imitate, as he knew not their nature,) or still more probably that, in obedience to warnings sent from Paris to London, the final disembarkation was postponed, if not wholly given up. Colonel Savary was ordered to wait and watch with untiring patience. In Paris new indications of the presence of Pichegru and Georges were daily discovered; more than once they had been nearly arrested, but their pursuers had always been a moment too late. The First Consul, shrinking from no means of attaining his end, resolved to propose a law, the nature of which will show what opinion was at that time held upon the guarantees of individual liberty, now so carefully guarded. A law was proposed to the Legislative Assembly, enacting that any person who should shelter Georges, Pichegru, or any one of sixty of their accomplices, who were mentioned by name, should be punished, not by imprisonment or the galleys, but by death; and whoever should see them, or be aware of their hiding-place, and yet fail to denounce them, should be punished with six years' imprisonment. This fearful law which commanded, on pain of death, the commission of a barbarous act, was passed without opposition on the very day of its proposal.

Scarcely was this law passed, before it was followed up by precautions not less rigid. It was feared that, harassed as they were, and deprived of hope, the conspirators might endeavour to escape; Paris, consequently, was closed as to egress; all who chose might enter Paris; no one, during some days, was allowed to leave it. To secure the strict enforcement of this order, detachments of infantry were placed at all the gates of Paris, and the horse-guard continually patrolled from gate to gate, with orders to arrest any one who should venture to scale the wall, and to shoot any one who should persist in endeavouring to escape after being challenged to stand and surrender; finally, boats manned by coast-guards rowed watch upon the Seine both by night and by day. No one was allowed to leave the capital, excepting the government messengers, and even

they were first searched and recognised, so as to render error or deception impossible.

For an instant the worst times of the Revolution seemed to have returned; Paris was once more filled with a terror like that of the worst days of the Revolution. The enemies of the First Consul passed most cruel censures on him on account of these measures, and attributed to him the guilt and cruelty which had formerly been attributed to the Committee of Public Safety. Directing the police in his own person, he was informed of all that was said against him, and his exasperation increased, till he seemed capable of the most violent acts; gloomy and harsh, he showed no consideration for any one. Since the recent events he had not dissembled his anger against M. de Markoff, and existing circumstances caused this anger to burst forth very mischievously. Among the persons arrested was a Swiss, attached in we know not what capacity to the Russian embassy; a confirmed intriguer, very unfit to be in the employment of a foreign legation; and to the impropriety of employing such a man, M. de Markoff added the still greater impropriety of demanding the prisoner to be given up to him, the Russian ambassador. The First Consul gave instant orders that the Swiss should not only not be given up, but be more closely confined than ever, and M. de Markoff thus made sensible of the whole impropriety of his conduct. On this occasion the First Consul was struck by two circumstances to which he previously had paid no attention: that M. d'Entraigues, an ex-agent of the emigrant princes, was now at Dresden, on a diplomatic mission from the Emperor of Russia; and that another emigrant, named Vernègues, also connected with the Bourbons, and despatched by them to the court of Naples, was now at Rome in the quality of a Russian subject. The First Consul sent to require the court of Saxony to dismiss M. d'Entraigues, and to the court of Rome to immediately arrest and deliver over the emigrant Vernègues; and he demanded these decisive measures in terms so peremptory as to render a refusal scarcely possible. On the first subsequent diplomatic audience, he as severely mortified the pride of M. de Markoff as he formerly had the haughty rigidity of Lord Whitworth. He told the Russian ambassador that it was most strange that an ambassador should employ a conspirator against government, and even venture to claim the release of that person when he was arrested as a conspirator. Does Russia, continued he, suppose that she is so superior to us, that she can act thus with impunity? Does she fancy that we have so utterly *laide aside the sword for the distaff* that we must needs bear such conduct? She is much deceived if she think this; I will put up with the improprieties of no prince upon the face of the earth.

Ten years earlier, the well-intentioned Revolution of '89 had become the sanguinary Revolution of '93, through the continued provocations of senseless enemies; and a similar effect was now produced upon the glowing soul of Napoleon. Those same enemies conducted themselves towards Napoleon as they had con-

ducted themselves towards the Revolution, and turned from friendship to enmity, and from moderation to violence, that great man who had governed the State so wisely and so well. The Royalists, whom he had rescued from oppression; Europe, that he had aimed at winning over by his moderation, after conquering it by the sword; all, in short, towards whom he had shown most consideration, now showed an inclination to ill-treat him alike in word and in deed; and a tempest was aroused in his great soul by the ingratitude of party, and the imprudent rancour of Europe.

The deepest anxiety prevailed in Paris. The terrible laws aimed at all who should shelter Pichegru, Georges, or their accomplices, had not intimidated any one into the base resolution to betray them; but neither was any one inclined to shelter them. These unfortunates, whom we have seen disunited, and discouraged by their differences, wandered by night from house to house, sometimes paying six or eight thousand francs for the shelter granted them only for a few brief hours. Pichegru, M. de Rivière, and Georges, lived thus in the most frightful perplexity; the last mentioned, however, courageously bearing a situation to which his experience in the chances and changes of civil war had accustomed him. Moreover, he was not oppressed by any sense of degradation; he was the partisan of the most august personages, and he only thought of saving himself now, as heretofore, by his own intelligence and courage. But the members of the French nobility, who had anticipated that France, or, at least, their own numerous party, would receive them with open arms, were plunged into despair on finding themselves met only by coldness, doubt, or censure. They now more clearly saw what odium was attached to their plans, which lost those flattering colours, with which the prospect of success covers every project. They felt the degradation of having entered France with a band of Chouans. Pichegru, who, to some deplorable faults, added the high qualities of coolness, judgment, and keen sagacity, Pichegru now only too clearly saw that, far from recovering from his former fall, he had plunged into the depths of an abyss. A first fault of former years, that of having criminally connected himself with the Condés, had led him first to treason and then to proscription, and now he found himself among the guilty projectors of an ambush and an assassination. No ray of glory now remained to the former conqueror of Holland. On learning the arrest of Moreau, he at once anticipated his own fate, and exclaimed that he was utterly lost. The familiarity of the mere herd of Chouans was detestable to him; and he sought relief from it in the company of M. de Rivière, whom he found more sensible and prudent than the other friends of the Comte d'Artois, who had been sent to Paris. One evening, reduced to a state of complete despair, he seized a pistol, and

was about to shoot himself through the head, when he was prevented by M. de Rivière. On another occasion, destitute of even a temporary shelter, he was inspired with an idea that did honour to him, and still more honour to the man to whom he had recourse. Among the ministers of the First Consul was M. de Marbois, one of those who had been included in the proscription of the 18th Fructidor. Pichegru unhesitatingly presented himself to this minister, the exile of Sinnamari asking that other exile, now become a minister of the First Consul's, to violate the law of his master; and M. de Marbois received him with grief, indeed, but without any fear on his own account. The honour done him by thus trusting to his generosity, he in his turn did to the First Consul, not doubting that he should find his conduct approved. It is some consolation for those melancholy scenes, thus to see three men of such various character, confidently relying upon each other's generosity; Pichegru relying upon M. de Marbois, and M. de Marbois upon the First Consul. Subsequently, in fact, M. de Marbois avowed what he had done, and the First Consul replied to that avowal in a letter, expressing the noblest approbation of his generosity.

But the position in which the conspirators were placed must soon end in a catastrophe: an officer who had served under Pichegru betrayed him into the hands of the police. At night, while the general was asleep, surrounded by his weapons, which he never laid aside, and by his books, of which he had been enjoying his customary perusal, his lamp being extinguished, his apartment was entered by a detachment of the select gendarmerie. Aroused by the noise they made in approaching to seize him, he endeavoured to grasp his weapons, and, being prevented, still struggled stoutly for some time against his captors. Overpowered at length, he was conducted to the Temple, there to terminate most wretchedly a life formerly so brilliant.

The arrest of Pichegru was almost immediately followed by that of M. Armand de Polignac, M. Jules de Polignac, and, finally, M. de Rivière, who had been so incessantly sought that, though not betrayed, they were discovered while on their way to a new shelter. These arrests made a deep and general impression upon the public mind; the great mass of just men, unswayed by the spirit of party, were now convinced of the reality of the plot. The presence of Pichegru and of the personal friends of the Comte d'Artois, left no room for even the shadow of a doubt upon that point. It was evident that they had not been drawn into their country by the art of the police, anxious to get up a plot. The greatness of the danger to which the First Consul had been, and even yet was, exposed, was now made evident, and a deeper interest than ever was taken in the safety of a life so precious. He was now no longer looked upon as the envious

* ARMAND DE POLIGNAC. The head of this illustrious family. He is better known as the Prince de Polignac, who was the minister and principal adviser of Charles X. in the events which preceded and led to the three

days of July. After high revolution, he was tried for high treason, and imprisoned at Kam for many years.—*Encyclopædia Americana.*

rival who wished to destroy Moreau, but as the saviour of France, incessantly exposed to the attacks of party. But the malignant and suspicious, though they were disconcerted, were not even yet quite silenced. According to them, the Messrs. de Polignac and de Rivière were imprudent men, and too restless to remain quiet, incessantly busied with the Comte d'Artois, and present in France merely for the sake of seeing whether circumstances were favourable or unfavourable to their party. But there was neither any serious plot, nor any such threatening peril as could justify the anxiety which was intended to be excited for the safety of the First Consul.

Utterly to confound and silence these babblers, one more arrest was necessary; that of Georges: it would then be scarcely possible for any one to say that Messrs. de Polignac, de Rivière, Pichegru, and Georges, had assembled together in Paris as mere lookers-on. The terrible measures taken by the government were destined speedily to furnish this decisive proof. Georges, pursued by a whole host of police, compelled to seek a new shelter daily, and unable to escape from Paris, guarded as it was both by land and by water, must needs fall. Traces of him were obtained, but, to the honour of the times be it said, though his arrest was generally wished for, no one was found to betray him. Those who ventured to shelter him, would do so only for a single day; every evening he was obliged to go to a new shelter. On the 9th of March, at nightfall, several officers surrounded a house to which suspicion had been attracted by the frequent arrival and departure of men of strange appearance. Georges, who had been sheltered here, endeavoured to get away to seek some other asylum. He quitted the house about seven o'clock in the evening, walked as far as the Pantheon, and there got into a cabriolet, the driver of which was a determined young Chouan, Georges' confidential servant. The officers in breathless haste followed the cabriolet as far as the cross-road of Bussy; Georges urged his servant to add to their already great speed, when the foremost of the police-officers dashed forward and seized the horse's bridle. Georges presented a pistol, and stretched the officer stark dead upon the spot; then, leaping from the cabriolet to endeavour to escape on foot and under cover of

the night, he fired a second shot, which seriously wounded a second of the officers; but, surrounded by a crowd, he was secured in spite of all his struggles, and given into the hands of the officers. He was at once recognised as that formidable Georges, so long sought for, and at length laid hold of, and the news of his arrest excited a very general satisfaction in Paris, where, on his account and that of his accomplices, peaceable men had lived under a sort of oppression from which they were now released. With Georges the servant who accompanied him was also arrested, having been able to run only a few paces.

Georges was taken to the prefecture of police; his first excitement over, this chieftain of conspirators had recovered the most perfect coolness. He was young and powerful; his shoulders were square, his features full, and rather mild and open than gloomy or ferocious, as they might have been supposed to be, from the part he had acted. On his person were found a dagger, pistols, and sixty thousand francs in gold and bank notes. Examined on the instant, he unhesitatingly told his name, and the object of his presence in Paris. He had arrived, he said, for the purpose of attacking the First Consul, not by stealing into his palace with four assassins, but openly, by main force, and in fighting in the open country against the Consular guard. He was to have acted in conjunction with a French prince, who was to have joined him in France for that purpose, but who had not arrived. Georges was in some sort proud of the quite new character of this plot, which he with much care distinguished from an assassination. "But," it was remarked to him, "you sent Saint Réjant to Paris to prepare the Infernal Machine."

"I sent him," replied Georges, "but with no detailed instructions as to the means which he was to employ."

A poor explanation, which but too clearly showed that Georges had been no stranger to that horrible crime. However, on every point that concerned others than himself, this bold conspirator preserved a resolute silence, repeating that there were victims enough already, and that he would not add to their number.¹

After the arrest and declarations of Georges,

¹ Extract from the First Examination of Georges by the Prefect of Police, 18th Ventôse—9th March. Volume ii., page 79.

We, councillor of State and prefect of Police, have summoned Georges Cadoudal to our presence, and examined him as follows:—

Question. What was your purpose in coming to Paris?

Reply. To attack the French Consul.

Ques. What means had you for that attack?

Reply. But few; but I hoped to collect more.

Ques. Of what kind were your means?

Reply. Main force.

Ques. Had you many followers?

Reply. No, because I was not to attack the First Consul except in presence of a French prince who has not yet arrived.

Ques. At the date of the 3d Nivôse you wrote to Saint-

Réjant, reproaching him for his delay in executing your orders against the First Consul?

Reply. I directed Saint-Réjant to assemble means at Paris, but I did not direct him to make the attempt of the 3d Nivôse.

Extract from the Second Examination of Georges Cadoudal, 18th Ventôse—9th March.

Question. How long have you been in Paris?

Reply. I came about five months ago, but I have not actually remained in Paris a fortnight in the whole.

Ques. Where have you lodged?

Reply. I will not tell that.

Ques. Why did you come to Paris?

Reply. For the purpose of attacking the First Consul.

Ques. How?

Reply. By open force.

Ques. Where did you expect to find such force?

Reply. Throughout France.

the existence of the plot was verified, and the First Consul was justified; it could no longer be argued, as it had been a month earlier, that the police had invented the plots which they affected to discover; and a Royalist could only cast down his eyes in shame on seeing a French prince presuming to enter France with a horde of Chouans, to fight a so-called battle on the highway. It might, indeed, be urged that the prince would not come, and that was likely enough; but this intended breach of promise to unfortunates whose faith in it had led them to risk their lives, was even a greater crime than the one for which it was urged as an excuse. Moreover, it was not Georges alone who

announced the expected arrival of the prince the friends of M. the Comte d'Artois, Messrs de Rivière and de Polignac, held the same language. They confessed the most important part of the plot; they repelled far from them the idea of being concerned in a project of assassination, but confessed that they had arrived in France for some purpose which they did not define; for some sort of movement which was to be headed by a French prince, whom they had preceded, in order to examine with their own eyes whether circumstances were favourable.¹

Like Georges, these gentlemen endeavoured to apologize for being found in such bad com-

Quæ. Have you and your accomplices, then, an organized force at your disposal throughout France?

Reply. That is not to be inferred of the force to which I just now alluded.

Quæ. What, then, did you mean?

Reply. An assemblage of force at Paris: that assemblage is not yet organized, but it would have been when the attack should have been finally resolved upon.

Quæ. What was the object of yourself and your accomplices?

Reply. To substitute a Bourbon for the First Consul.

Quæ. Which of the Bourbons?

Reply. Charles-Xavier-Stanislas, formerly Monsieur, now recognised by us as Louis XVIII.

Quæ. What part were you to take in the attack?

Reply. Such as should be assigned to me by the aforesaid French prince who was to come to Paris.

Quæ. The plan was then formed, and was to have been executed with the concurrence of the aforesaid French princes?

Reply. Yes, citizen Judge.

Quæ. You have conferred with those princes, then?

Reply. Yes, citizen.

Quæ. By whom were money and arms to be supplied?

Reply. I had the funds by me for some time; the arms I had not yet received.

¹ Extract from the First Examination of M. de Rivière, by the councillor of state, Réal, on the 16th Ventôse—7th March.—Volume II., page 250.

Question. How long have you been in Paris?

Reply. About a month.

Quæ. How did you come from London to France?

Reply. I was landed on the coast of Normandy by an English vessel, commanded, I believe, by Captain Wright.

Quæ. How many passengers were there, and what were they?

Reply. I do not know.

Quæ. You are aware that among those passengers were ex-generals Pichegru and Lajolais, and also M. Jules de Polignac?

Reply. As that did not concern me, I know nothing about it.

Quæ. Being landed on the coast, by what route, and how, did you travel to Paris?

Reply. By the Rouen road, sometimes on horseback and sometimes on foot.

Quæ. What were the motives of your journey and of your stay in Paris?

Reply. To ascertain the state of affairs in this country, and to communicate my observations to the French princes, that they might judge whether to come to France or to remain in England. I should observe that at this time I had no special mission from them, but having before served them with zeal—

Quæ. What was the result of your observations upon political affairs, the government, and public opinion? What would you have noted for the guidance of the princes, could you have communicated with them?

Reply. Generally speaking, I thought I saw in France a great deal of egotism, apathy, and a strong desire for peace

Extract from the Second Examination of M. Armand de Polignac, 23d Ventôse—12th March.—Volume II., page 230.

I disembarked on the coast of Normandy; after several temporary halts, I lodged near the Isle-Adam, in a place also inhabited by Georges, who was known by the name of Lorient.

We travelled to Paris together, accompanied by some officers under his orders.

When I left London this last time I was aware of the plans of the Comte d'Artois; I was too much attached to him not to join him.

His intent was to come to France and propose to the First Consul to resign the reins of government to the Count's elder brother.

If this proposition were rejected by the First Consul, he was to be openly assailed by the Comte in the endeavours to recover what he deems the rights of his family.

When I set out I was aware that the Comte was not prepared for an immediate descent in France; I preceded him, as I have already said, in my desire to see my wife, my family, and my friends.

When a second disembarkation was proposed, the Comte d'Artois said that on account of the seal which I had always served him, and his confidence in me, he wished me to make one of this expedition, and it was this expression of the prince's desire which determined me to pass over on board the earliest vessel.

I must not omit to observe that, at the instant of my setting out, I openly said that if any means were resorted to which did not bear the stamp of honour, I should at once withdraw, and retire into Russia.

Quæ. Are you aware of any interviews between General Moreau, Georges Cadoudal, and Ex-general Pichegru?

Reply. I was informed that they had held a very serious conference at Chaillot, in the house No. 6, in which Georges Cadoudal lodged.

I was assured, too, that Georges, after several explanations and offers made to General Moreau, had said to him: If you like, I will leave you *tête-à-tête* with Pichegru, and then you can more easily come to an understanding; finally, I was informed that the conference terminated only in unpleasant doubts, Georges Cadoudal and Pichegru remaining faithful to the cause of the prince, but that Moreau was undecided, and gave reasons to suspect him of personal views. I have since heard that there were other conferences between General Moreau and the Ex-general Pichegru.

Extract from the examination of M. Jules de Polignac, before state-councillor Réal, on the 16th Ventôse—7th March—quoted in the Indictment.—Vol. I., p. 61.

Being questioned, M. Jules de Polignac replied, that as it had seemed to both his brother and himself, that what was proposed had not the honourable character which they had naturally been led to anticipate, they had spoken of retiring to Holland.

Questioned as to the cause of these fears, he replied, that he suspected that instead of fulfilling some mission respecting a change of government, it was proposed to act against an individual, and that it was the First Consul whom Georges proposed to attack.

pany, by pleading that a French prince was to be with them. As this prince had not arrived in France, and did not intend to do so, they felt that nothing that they could confess would injure him, protected as he was by the breadth of the Channel; and quite overlooked the fact, that there were other French princes less securely situated, who, perchance, might be made to atone with their lives for the plots hatched in London.

Would to Heaven that the First Consul had remained contented with the means he already possessed of confounding his enemies! He could have struck awe into them, by inflicting the punishments recognised by our laws; still further, he could have overwhelmed them with confusion; for he had obtained an abundance of proofs of their guilt. He had in his hands even more than was needed for his safety and reputation. But as we have already remarked, though he at this period was well disposed towards the Republicans, the Royalists had outraged and disgusted him with their ingratitude, and he was resolved that they should feel the full weight of his power. Besides the spirit of revenge, another feeling occupied his heart, a sort of pride; he openly said to all who approached him, that he cared as little, perhaps rather less, for a Bourbon, than for a Moreau or a Pichegru; that these princes entertained a notion that they were inviolate, and that this notion led them to involve in their plots unfortunate men of all ranks, and then to shelter themselves beyond the sea; that they were greatly mistaken in putting so much trust in that shelter; and that he should infallibly finish with seizing some one of them, and having him shot to death like a common malefactor; that it was requisite to let these princes feel the sort of man whom they provoked in attacking him; that he feared no more to put a Bourbon to death, than to do the same by the merest scum of Chouannerie; that he would ere long show the world that all parties were on a level in his eyes; that whoever provoked him, no matter what their rank, should feel the whole weight of his hand; and that though he had hitherto been the most merciful of men, he would prove that when roused he could be one of the most terrible.

No one dared to urge a contradiction; the Consul Lebrun was silent, so also was the Consul Cambacérés, but he gave to his silence that character of disapprobation by which he usually opposed the First Consul. M. Fouché, who wished to regain Napoleon's favour, and who, though generally disposed to lenity, was very anxious to embroil the government and the Royalists, warmly approved the idea of making an example, and M. Talleyrand, not cruel, indeed, but incapable of opposing power, and possessed to a mischievous extent of a taste for flattering the wishes of those to whom he was attached, M. de Talleyrand, too, argued, with M. Fouché, that too much consideration had already been shown to the Royalists, and that the lavish kindness shown to them had even excited mischievous doubts in the minds of the Revolutionists, and that the time had now come when it was necessary to punish severely and to punish without exception

With the exception of the Consul Cambacérés, every one, either tacitly or in terms, encouraged that anger which needed no encouragement to render it terrible, perhaps even cruel.

This notion of heaping all the punishment upon the Royalists, and reserving all mercy exclusively for the Revolutionists, was so rooted in the mind of the First Consul, that he now attempted for Pichegru what he had previously attempted for Moreau. He was inspired with a profound pity as he thought of the terrible position of that illustrious general mixed up with Chouans, and in danger of being deprived, by a criminal trial, not merely of life, but also of the last remnant of reputation.

"What an end!" exclaimed Bonaparte to M. Réal, "what an end for the conqueror of Holland! But the men of the Revolution must not thus destroy each other. I have long thought about forming a colony at Cayenne; Pichegru was exiled thither, and knows the place well, and of all our generals he is the best calculated to form an extensive establishment there. Go and visit him in his prison, and tell him that I pardon him; that it is not towards him or Moreau, or men like them, that I am inclined to be severe; ask him how many men and what amount of money he would require for founding a colony in Cayenne, and I will supply him that he may go thither and re-establish his reputation in rendering a great service to France."

M. Réal took this noble message to the prisoner, who at first could scarcely credit what he heard, and doubted that it was a mere lure to induce him to betray his companions in misfortune. But, speedily convinced by the persistence of M. Réal, who required no confession from him as all was already known, he became much affected; his heart was softened, he shed tears, and spoke much about Cayenne. He said that by a strange forethought he had often reflected during his exile upon what might be done there, and had even formed some plans with that view. We shall presently see by what a fatal coincidence the generous intentions of the First Consul were converted into the cause of a deplorable catastrophe.

The First Consul was still very anxiously expecting news from Colonel Savary, watching with fifty men at Biville Cliff. The Colonel had now been on the look-out there for upwards of three weeks, but no disembarkation had taken place. Captain Wright's brig coasted the cliffs every evening, but never put any one ashore, whether because Captain Wright's passengers expected a signal which was not made, or because they had been warned from Paris not to land. Colonel Savary was at length obliged to say that it was useless for him to remain any longer.

The First Consul, annoyed at not having been able to lay hold of one of those princes who had conspired against his life, now glanced around at the various parts in which they, respectively, had found shelter. One morning, while in his study with Messrs. de Talleyrand and Fouché, he inquired about the various members of that unfortunate family, that was

as pitiable for its errors as for its misfortunes. He was told, in reply, that Louis XVIII., and the Duc d'Angoulême lived at Warsaw; the Comte d'Artois and the Duc de Berry in London, where, also, were the Princes of Condé, with the exception of the third, the youngest and most enterprising of them, the Duc d'Enghien,¹ who lived at Ettenheim, very near Strasburg, in which neighbourhood it was that Messrs. Taylor, Smith, and Drake, the English diplomatic agents, busied themselves in fomenting intrigues. The idea that that young prince might make use of the bridge of Strasburg, as the Comte d'Artois had intended to make use of Biville Cliff, suddenly flashed across the mind of the First Consul, and he determined to send an intelligent sub-officer into that neighbourhood to obtain information. There was a sub-officer of gendarmerie, who in his youth had served under the Princes of Condé, and he now received orders to assume a disguise, and to proceed to Ettenheim to make inquiries as to the connections of the young prince, and his way of life. The sub-officer accordingly repaired to Ettenheim. The young prince had lived there some time with a Princess of Rohan, to whom he was warmly attached, and he divided his time between this attachment and enjoying the pleasures of the chase in the Black Forest. He had been directed by the British cabinet to repair to the banks of the Rhine, no doubt in anticipation of that movement of which Messrs. Drake, Smith, and Taylor, had held out ill-founded hopes. This prince expected then, that he should shortly have to fight against his country, a pitiable task to which he had for some years been accustomed, but nothing proves that he knew any thing about the conspiracy of Georges; every thing that is known about him tends on the contrary to the supposition that he was ignorant of it. He often left Ettenheim on sporting excursions, and sometimes, it was said, even to go to the theatre at Strasburg. Certain it is that these reports had so much of probability that they induced his father to write to him from London a letter strictly cautioning him to greater prudence.² In the personal suite of the young prince were certain emigrants, among them a Marquis de Thumery.

The sub-officer who was sent to make inquiries, arrived at Ettenheim in disguise, and made his way even into the very household of the prince, and obtained a whole host of particulars, from which prejudiced judgments might easily draw the most fatal inferences.

¹ ENGHEN, L. A. J., DE BOURBON DUC DE. Born at Chantilly in 1772; son of L. H. J. Duke of Bourbon, L. M. T. B. of Orleans. He was still in his earliest youth, when the Revolution tore him from all his hopes of fortune. He served in the army of the Rhine with great distinction until the general peace. After which he remained tranquilly and peacefully in Germany, where he was arrested in violation of the law of nations, on a friendly territory, and after a mock trial, basely murdered.

² The Prince de Condé to the Duc d'Enghien.

Wanted, 16th June, 1803.

My dear son,—For six months past a report has been current here that you have paid a visit to Paris; others

The young duke was said to be very frequently absent from Ettenheim; that sometimes his absence lasted for days, and his journey extended to Strasburg. A person in his suite, who was represented as of far more consequence than he really was, bore a name which the Germans who gave these particulars to the sub-officer mispronounced in such a way, that it sounded like that of General Dumouriez. The person in question was in reality the Marquis de Thumery, of whom we have already made mention, and the sub-officer, misled by the German pronunciation, quite honestly took that name to designate General Dumouriez, and this name he put into the report, written under this unfortunate mistake, and immediately despatched to Paris.

This fatal report reached Paris on the morning of the 10th of March. On the previous evening, at night, and on the very morning in question, a no less fatal deposition had been repeatedly made, by Leridant, the servant of Georges, and arrested with him. At first this young man had resisted the most pressing interrogations, but at length he spoke out with an apparently complete sincerity; declaring that there was a conspiracy; that a prince was at its head; that this prince either soon would arrive, or had arrived already; and that his own opinion inclined to the latter state of the case, as he had frequently seen, as a visiter of Georges, a young and well-dressed man of distinguished manners, to whom all seemed to pay great respect. This deposition repeatedly renewed, and each time with fresh details, was laid before the First Consul. The report of the sub-officer of gendarmerie was presented to him at the same time, and the coincidences struck his mind with a most lamentable force. The absences of the Duc d'Enghien from Ettenheim immediately connected themselves with the pretended presence of the young prince in Paris; and that young man, to whom all the conspirators paid so much respect, could not be a prince arrived from London, so strictly as Biville Cliff had been watched. This young man could be no other than the Duc d'Enghien, travelling from Ettenheim to Paris in eight-and-forty hours, and returning in the same space of time after having in a brief conference with his guilty accomplices. But what rendered this lamentable demonstration conclusive in the eyes of the First Consul, was the supposed presence at Ettenheim of General Dumouriez, whose presence there filled up the sketch in a surprising perfection. The Comte d'Artois was to have

said that you have only ventured to Strasburg. You must admit that this is most imprudently perilling your life or liberty. As for your principles I am not at all alarmed about them; they are as deeply graven in your heart as in ours. It appears to me that you need no longer conceal the facts, and that if you have made such journeys you may tell us the result of your observations.

Now, as to your safety, so dear to us on many accounts, it is true that I told you that you might render your position very useful. But you are very close to danger: take great care of yourself, and insure timely warning to effect your retreat, should it enter the Consul's mind to order you to be seized. Do not imagine that courage requires utter neglect on this score.

(Signed)

LOUIS JOSEPH DE BOURBON.

arrived through Normandy with Pichegru, the Duc d'Enghien through Alsace with Dumouriez; the Bourbon princes, to return to France, had seduced two of the most eminent generals of the Republic to be their companions. The First Consul's mind, usually so strong and clear, could not resist so many appearances so well calculated to mislead. He was convinced. It is necessary to have witnessed minds under the bias of an inquiry of this sort, and more especially when passion, of whatever sort, disposes them to belief in what they suspect, to be able to understand how ready such minds are to jump to conclusions, and to learn how very precious are those delays and forms of law which save men from conclusions so quickly drawn from some merely accidental coincidences.

The First Consul, when he read the report which General Moncey, commanding officer of the gendarmerie, presented to him from the sub-officer sent to Ettenheim, was thrown into a state of violent agitation: and gave a very ill reception to M. Réal, who at this moment made his appearance, and whom he reproached for having so long allowed him to remain ignorant of such important particulars. He now firmly believed that he had detected the second and most dangerous party of the conspiracy. Now the sea was no longer to be a barrier to him; the Rhine, the Duke of Baden, the Germanic body, were no longer any thing to him. He instantly summoned an extraordinary council, consisting of the three consuls, their ministers, and M. Fouché, who was in reality, though not in name, minister again. The First Consul at the same time sent for Generals Ordener and Caulaincourt,¹ to attend him at the Tuileries; but while awaiting their arrival, he took up some maps of the Rhine to lay down a plan for seizure, and not finding the maps that he was in search of, he threw all that came to hand in one confused heap upon the floor.

M. de Meneval, a mild-tempered, prudent, and thoroughly incorruptible man, whom the First Consul could not spare from his presence, as it was to him that he was accustomed to dictate his most private letters, was on this day absent for some time. He was sent for to the Tuileries: when he arrived, the First Consul addressed him in terms of unmerited reproach for his absence, and then continued his study of the map of the Rhine, in a state of extraordinary excitement.

The council at length was complete; and an eye-witness gives in his memoirs an account of the proceedings.

The idea of carrying off the prince and General Dumouriez, without hesitating about the violation of the German territory, but with an after-apology to the Duke of Baden for that mode of proceeding, was immediately proposed. The First Consul asked for the opinion of the council, but appeared to have formed a very decided resolution, though he

listened patiently to the objections that were made. The Consul Lebrun seemed to be alarmed at the effect that such an abduction would produce in Europe, and the Consul Cambacérès had the courage openly to oppose the proposition. He strove to impress upon the council the dangerous nature of such a resolution, whether at home or abroad, and the violent character which it could not fail to impress upon the First Consul's government. He dwelt especially upon the fact, that, if it were a serious thing to arrest, try, and shoot a prince of the blood, even if taken in an overt act of conspiracy,—to go to a foreign territory to seize him was not merely to violate that territory, but also to seize him so as to give him all the appearances of innocence, and to bring down upon ourselves all the appearances of a detestable abuse of power; and he entreated the First Consul, alike for the sake of his policy and his personal reputation, not to allow of a proceeding which would throw his government back among the ranks of those revolutionary governments from which he had shown so much anxiety to distinguish it. He repeated his arguments with a fervour very uncommon to him, and proposed, as a middle course, to wait till this prince, or any other of the emigrant princes, should be apprehended in France, and then put the existing laws of the land rigorously in force against them. To this proposition it was replied, that it was not likely that the prince, who was to have entered by the Rhine or by Normandy, would venture to expose himself to the imminent perils of that course, now that Georges and the other agents of the conspiracy were in custody; that, moreover, by going to Ettenheim to seize this prince, they would obtain possession of his papers and of his accomplices, as well as of his person, and thus acquire proofs of his guilt, and that those proofs would justify severity; that, to allow a foreign territory to protect emigrants conspiring on the very frontiers of France, was to grant the most dangerous of impunity; that the Bourbons and their friends had an inveterate, tendency to these crimes of conspiracy; that, by once making a stern and striking example, one blow would be more effectual than ten punishments of minor tools, and the former merciful system of the Consul could be once more reverted to; that the royalists stood in need of warning; that, as to the question of territory, a lesson was no less needed by the petty German princes than others; and that, moreover, to seize on the prince without first consulting the Duke of Baden, was in reality to confer a favour on the latter; for should France call upon him for the expulsion of the Duke d'Enghien, the Duke of Baden would have no choice but to be crushed by France for refusal, or to be put under the ban of the Empire for compliance. To these arguments it was added that the only question now was the seizure of the prince, with his accomplices

¹ CAULAINCOURT, AMAND AUGUSTIN LOUIS DE, afterward Duc de Vicenza, born at Caulaincourt, in 1773. He began to serve in the army from the fifteenth year of his age, and on the breaking out of the Revolution he lost his post of staff-officer, and was for a time in prison. He

served in 1792 as a grenadier, and afterwards as a mounted Chasseur. In 1795 was restored by Hoche to his former rank of captain. In 1801 he was sent on a diplomatic mission to the Emperor Alexander.—*Encyclopædia Americana.*

and his papers; that when this was effected it would remain to be determined what should be done with him when the proofs and extent of his guilt should have been inquired into.

The First Consul, though he listened patiently to the arguments on either side, seemed to do so in the apprehensive and absent mood of a man whose mind is made up. No one could be said to have influenced his determination; though he seemed to be not ill-pleased with the opposition of M. Cambacérés, to whom he said, "I know your motive for speaking—your devotion to me. I thank you for it; but I will not allow myself to be put to death without defending myself. I will make these people tremble, and teach them to keep quiet for the time to come."

The idea of striking terror into the Bourbons, of teaching them that they had to do with a man who was not to be attacked with impunity, and of making them aware that the august blood of the Bourbons was of no more importance in his eyes than that of any illustrious person of the Republic; this thought, and others compounded equally of calculation, vengeance, and the pride of power, had taken complete dominion of his mind.

He gave his orders on the instant. In presence of General Berthier he laid down the rules upon which Colonels Ordener and Caulaincourt were to proceed. Colonel Ordener, attended by 300 dragoons, some pontoniers, and several brigades of gendarmerie, furnished with four days' provision, and a considerable sum of money to prevent their being any burden to the Germans, was to repair to the bank of the Rhine, cross that river at Rheinau, dash forward to Ettenheim, surround that town, and carry off the prince and all the emigrants by whom they might find him surrounded. In the mean time another detachment, supported by some pieces of artillery, was to proceed by Kehl to Offenbourg, and remain there in observation till the enterprise was effected; and as soon as that was the case, Colonel Caulaincourt was to hasten to present himself to the Grand-duke of Baden with a note explanatory of the seizure effected. This explanation consisted in saying, that by suffering these gatherings of emigrants, the Baden government had compelled the French government to act for itself, and that, moreover, the necessity for being both prompt and secret had rendered it impossible to apply for a previous assent.

It needs not be added, that in giving these orders to the officers intrusted with their execution, the First Consul did not trouble himself to enter into any explanation as to his views in seizing the prince, or his intentions towards him when he should have been seized. He gave his orders as a general to men who obeyed them as soldiers. Colonel Caulaincourt, however, attached by consanguinity to the ex-royal family, and especially to the Condés, was deeply grieved, although he had only to be the bearer of a letter, and, moreover, was far from anticipating the horrible catastrophe which was at hand. The First Consul did not seem to perceive Caulaincourt's sadness, and gave orders that all should set out immediately on quitting the Tuileries.

His orders were punctually obeyed. Five days later, that is to say, on the 15th of March, the detachment of dragoons set out, with all the prescribed precautions from Scheersdorf, crossed the Rhine, and surprised and surrounded the little town of Ettenheim before any news of their advance could arrive there. The prince, who had previously been warned, but who at this critical moment had no positive information of his danger, was at his usual residence in Ettenheim. On finding himself assailed by an armed force, he was at first inclined to resist, but perceiving the hopelessness of doing so with effect, he surrendered, made his name known to those who were in search of him, but unacquainted with his person, and loudly expressed his vexation at being thus deprived of his liberty, for the full extent of his danger was even yet unknown to him, and allowed himself to be conveyed as a prisoner to the citadel of Strasburg. No important papers had been found, nor General Dumouriez, who had been described as being with the prince, nor any of those proofs of conspiracy, the finding of which had been so emphatically urged as a motive to the expedition. Instead of General Dumouriez, they had found only the Marquis of Thumery, and some other emigrants of no consequence. The report of the barren details of the arrest was immediately forwarded to Paris.

The result of the expedition ought to have enlightened the First Consul and his advisers, as to the rashness of their conjectures. The mistake relative to General Dumouriez ought to have been especially significant. Let us see what fatal ideas now possessed the First Consul, and those who agreed with him. They had possession of the person of one of those Bourbon princes who were so ready to order conspiracies, and who would never find themselves destitute of madmen and desperadoes ever ready to venture everything in their service. It was necessary to make a terrible example of that prince, if they would not expose themselves to the derision of the Royalists by releasing the prince after having seized him; in the latter event, it would infallibly be said that, after acting inconsiderately in seizing the prince, they were alarmed by public opinion, afraid of the indignation of Europe; in a word, that they had the inclination to commit a crime, but not the courage. Instead of exciting contempt, their true course was to awaken terror. This Bourbon prince, after all, was at Ettenheim, so close to the frontiers, and under such circumstances, quite evidently for some purpose. Was it possible that cautioned, as letters found upon him proved that he had been, was it possible, that, thus cautioned, he braved so much danger without any motive? That he was not in some degree an accomplice in the project of assassination! At all events he was at Ettenheim for the purpose of seconding some emigrant movement in the interior, of exciting civil war, and of bearing arms against France, as he had done before. All these were crimes punishable by the laws, and the laws should be put in force against this prince.

Such were the arguments of the First Con-

sul, re-echoed by his advisers. No second council, like that we have spoken of, was held, but there were frequent consultations between the First Consul and those who encouraged his passion. This fatal notion constantly possessed him: "The Royalists are incorrigible, they must be intimidated." Orders, therefore, were given that the prince should be transferred from Strasburg to Paris, and taken before a military court, on the charge of having sought to excite civil war, and of having borne arms against France.

To state the case in these terms was, in fact, to anticipate a sentence of blood. On the 18th of March, the prince was taken, under an escort, from Strasburg to Paris.

At the approach of the moment of this terrible sacrifice, the First Consul desired solitude.

On the 18th of March, Palm Sunday, he set out for Malmaison, where, better than elsewhere, he could command quietness and solitude. With the exception of the consuls, the ministers, and his brothers, he received no one. For hours together he walked about by himself, giving to his countenance an expression of calmness which he felt not in his heart. Even his inoccupation proves the agitation to which he was a prey, for, during a whole week that he staid at Malmaison, he dictated scarcely a single letter, an unique instance of idleness in his active life; and yet, only a few days earlier, all the energies of his mind had been bestowed upon Brest, Boulogne, and the Texel! His wife, who, in common with all his family, was acquainted with the arrest of the prince, his wife, who, unable to help sympathizing with the Bourbons, thought with horror of the shedding of royal blood, his wife, with that foresight of the heart which is peculiar to women, perhaps anticipated that a cruel action would draw down retaliative cruelties upon her husband, her children, and herself, and spoke to him several times about the prince, shedding tears as she thought of his destruction, which she feared was resolved upon, though her mind revolted from such a belief. The First Consul, who somewhat prided himself upon repressing the movements of his heart, naturally so generous and kind, whatever might be said to the contrary by those who did not know him, the First Consul repelled these tearful supplications of which he feared the effect upon his resolve, and replied to Madame Bonaparte in a homely style, which he strove to render harsh: "You are a woman, and know nothing about politics; your proper part is to hold your tongue."

The unfortunate prince, leaving Strasburg with his escort, on the morning of the 18th of March, reached Paris about noon on the 20th, and was detained till five o'clock, his carriage guarded by the escort, at the Charenton gate.¹ On this fatal occasion there was some confusion in the orders given, arising, no doubt, from the agitation of those who gave them.

According to military laws, the military

commission should have been formed by the military commandant of the district, who should have assembled the commission and directed the execution of the sentence. Murat was the governor of Paris and commandant of the district. When the order of the consuls reached him he was seized with grief. Murat was, as we have remarked, brave, and, though sometimes unreflecting, extremely kind-hearted. Some days before, when the expedition to Ettenheim was ordered, he had applauded the vigour of the government; but now that he was to follow it out into its cruel consequences, his excellent heart revolted. Pointing to the facings of his uniform, he said to his friends in a tone of despair, that the First Consul was about to stain them with blood; he proceeded to St. Cloud and expressed his painful feelings, in person, to his awe-inspiring brother-in-law. The First Consul, who was more inclined than he wished to be to sharing those feelings, concealed beneath a stern countenance the secret agitation of his heart. He dreaded lest his government should be weakened by appearing to fear to strike at a scion of the hostile race of Bourbons. He spoke in harsh language to Murat, reproached his weakness in terms of contempt, and concluded by saying that he would conceal what he called the weakness of Murat, by signing with his own Consular hand the orders of the day.

The First Consul had recalled Colonel Savary from Biville Cliff, where he had vainly been on the watch for the princes concerned in the conspiracy, and to him confided the superintendence of the sacrifice of the prince who had taken no part in that conspiracy. Colonel Savary was ready to give up both life and reputation to the First Consul. He offered no advice, but obeyed like a soldier who receives orders from a master to whom his attachment has no bounds. The First Consul had all the orders of the day drawn up, signed them, and then ordered Savary to deliver them to Murat, and to go to Vincennes to superintend their execution. These orders were full and precise; providing for the formation of the commission and designating the colonels of the garrison who were to compose it, naming General Hullin as president, enjoining the immediate assemblage of the commission, that all might be settled in the course of the night; and further ordering that if, as could not be doubted, the sentence should be that of death, the prisoner should be executed on the spot. A detachment of select gendarmes was to proceed to Vincennes to protect the commission and execute the sentence. Such were the fatal orders that were signed by the First Consul's own hand: in strict legality they must be executed in the name of Murat, but in fact he had nothing to do with them, and Colonel Savary, in obedience to his orders, proceeded to Vincennes to see to their execution.

But even yet these orders were not quite

¹ An excellent account of the catastrophe of the Duc d'Angoulême has been published by M. Nougardé de Payet, whose researches, characterized alike by sagacity and conscientiousness, entitle this piece of secret history to the full confidence of the public. Nougardé de Payet

states that the prince was taken direct to the gate of the ministry of foreign affairs. It is probable that this statement is correct, but not being able to ascertain it positively, I have kept to the more general tradition.

irrevocable; there still remained one means of saving the unfortunate prince. M. Réal was to proceed to Vincennes, to question the prisoner minutely, and draw from him what he knew of the conspiracy of which they still believed him to be an accomplice, though they could find no positive and formal proof of the fact. M. Murat himself had, in the course of the evening, delivered at the house of the councillor of state, Réal, a written order to proceed to Vincennes to enter upon this examination. If M. Réal had seen the prisoner, heard from his own lips a genuine explanation of the facts, been touched by his frankness, and by his urgent request to be allowed an interview with the First Consul, M. Réal could communicate his impressions to him who held the prince's life in his powerful hands. Even after sentence, then, there was still one means left of escaping from the frightful course upon which they had entered, by giving the Duc d'Enghien a pardon, at once nobly asked and nobly granted!

This was the last remaining chance of saving the life of the young prince, and of saving the First Consul from the commission of a grievous wrong. And the First Consul thought of this means, even after the strict orders he had signed. During this evil evening of the 20th of March he was shut up at Malmaison with no other company but his wife, his secretary, and a few officers and ladies. Absent, unsociable, yet affecting to be calm, he at length seated himself at a table to play at chess with one of the most distinguished ladies of the Consular court,* who, knowing of the arrest of the prince and his transfer to Paris, trembled with dread of the consequences of this fatal day. She dared not raise her eyes to the First Consul, who, in his agitated absence of mind, murmured from time to time some of the most celebrated verses of our poets on the subject of clemency; those which Corneille puts into the mouth of Augustus, and then those which Voltaire gives to Alzire.

These muttered quotations could not be the indications of a sanguinary irony; that would be at once too vulgar and utterly useless. But this usually iron man was really much excited and shaken, and could not prevent his thoughts from wandering from projects of vengeance to the grandeur and nobleness of granting a pardon to a vanquished and disarmed foe. The lady was overjoyed, for she believed that the prince was saved: unfortunately, such was not the case.

The commission was hastily assembled, the majority of the members of it not even knowing what prisoner they were to sit in judgment upon. They had been told that he was an emigrant, proceeded against for contravening the laws of the Republic. They were told his name. Some of the soldiers of the Republic, mere children when the great monarchy was overthrown, scarcely knew that the title of Duc d'Enghien was borne by the heir pre-

sumptive of the Condés; nevertheless their hearts were pained by such a task, for the condemnation of emigrants had ceased for some years past. The prince was taken before them; he was calm, almost haughty, even, yet he did not expect the fate that awaited him. Questioned as to his name and his conduct, his replies were firm; he denied all complicity in the plot actually in question, but confessed rather too ostentatiously, perhaps, that he had served against France, and that he was upon the banks of the Rhine for the purpose of similarly serving against her again. The president dwelt upon this point in order to show him the danger of such an avowal, and he repented what he had said, with a boldness rendered noble by its peril, but offensive to the veteran soldiers who had poured out their blood in defence of their fatherland. The impression thus produced was mischievous. The prince repeatedly and earnestly demanded to be allowed to see the First Consul. He was remanded to his prison, and the court deliberated. Although his own reiterated avowals proved him to be an implacable foe to the Revolution, these warrior-hearts were touched by the youth and courage of the prince. Stated as the case was, it could have only a fatal termination. The laws of the Republic, and of all times, made it a capital offence to serve against France. Nevertheless, many laws had been violated against the prince, in seizing him upon a foreign soil, and depriving him of a defender, and these considerations ought to have influenced the decision of his judges. In their perplexity those unfortunate judges, unspeakably afflicted by their task, pronounced sentence of death; but the majority of them proposed to refer the case to the clemency of the First Consul, and to send before him the prince, who had so urgently desired to be allowed to see him. But the orders of the morning, to finish all during the night, were positive. A delay could only be procured by the arrival of M. Réal to interrogate the prince. M. Réal did not make his appearance; the night was far spent, day was at hand. The prince was taken down into a fosse of the château, and there, with a firmness worthy of his race, received the fire of those soldiers of the Republic whom, in the ranks of the Austrians, he had so often fought against. Melancholy reprisals of civil war! He was buried upon the very spot on which he fell.

Colonel Savary immediately set out to report to the First Consul the execution of his orders.

On the road the Colonel met M. Réal on his way to question the prisoner. This councillor of state, exhausted with fatigue by the continued labour of several days and nights, had given orders to his servants not to disturb him; the order of the First Consul was not placed in his hands until five o'clock in the morning; he arrived, but too late. This was not, as it has been said to be, a scheme planned to force the First Consul into a crime; not at all; it was an accident, a pure accident, by which the unfortunate prince was deprived of the sole chance of saving his life, and the First Consul of a happy opportunity of saving him.

* The lady in question is Madame de Remusat, who gives this account in her as yet unpublished *Mémoires*, which are an interesting in substance as sparkling in style.

glory from a stain. A deplorable consequence of violating the ordinary forms of justice! When these forms, invented by the experience of ages, to guard human life against the mistakes of judges, when these sacred forms are violated, men are at the mercy of chance, of mere trifles! The lives of accused people, and the honour of governments, are then sometimes dependent upon the most fortuitous coincidences! No doubt, the First Consul had formed his resolve; but he was much agitated, and could the voice of the unfortunate Condé, appealing for life, have reached his ear, that cry would not have been uttered in vain; he would have yielded, and proudly yielded, to his gentler feelings.

Colonel Savary arrived at Malmaison in a state of great emotion. His presence gave rise to a painful scene. Madame Bonaparte guessed all as soon as she saw him, and burst into tears; and M. de Caulaincourt, in accents of despair, exclaimed that he was dishonoured. Colonel Savary proceeded to the First Consul's study, found him alone with M. de Meneval, and gave him an account of what had taken place at Vincennes. The First Consul asked, "Did M. Réal see the prisoner?" Colonel Savary had scarcely answered in the negative, when M. Réal made his appearance, and tremblingly apologized for the non-execution of the orders he had received. Without expressing either approbation or anger, the First Consul dismissed these instruments of his will, went into an apartment of his library, and shut himself up in solitude there for several hours.

In the evening, there was a family dinner at Malmaison; all wore serious and saddened countenances, and no one ventured to speak, the First Consul himself being as silent as the rest. This silence at length became embarrassing, and, on rising from table, the First Consul himself broke it, addressing himself exclusively to M. de Fontanes, who had just arrived. He was alarmed at the event which was noised throughout Paris, but he could not express his feelings where he now was. He listened chiefly, and replied but little. The First Consul, speaking almost without interruption, and endeavouring to make up for the silence of his company, discoursed upon the princes of all times, upon the Roman emperors, upon the French kings, upon Tacitus, and the judgments of that historian, and upon the cruelties which were frequently attributed to the rulers of states, when these, in fact, only yielded to inevitable necessities. Having by this circuitous route approached the tragical subject of the day, he said:

"They wish to destroy the Revolution in attacking my person. I will defend it, for, I, I am the Revolution. They will be more cautious in future, for they will know of *what we are capable*."

It is not much to the credit of human nature to be obliged to confess that the terror inspired by the First Consul acted effectually upon the Bourbon princes and the emigrants. They no longer felt themselves safe, now that even the German territory had proved no safeguard to the unfortunate Duc d'Enghien, and thenceforward conspiracies of that kind ceased. But

this sorry efficiency will not justify such deeds. Better would it have been for one danger more to have threatened the First Consul, so often perilled upon the field of battle, than that his security from such a danger should have been purchased at such a cost. It was speedily rumoured in Paris that a prince had been seized, carried to Vincennes, and shot. The effect of these tidings was great and melancholy. Ever since the arrest of Pichegru and Georges, the First Consul had been the object of universal anxiety. Indignation had been aroused against all who had joined the Chouans in threatening his life; this indignation extended to Moreau, whose guilt, though less conclusively proved as yet, was, nevertheless, beginning to seem very probable, and the most ardent wishes were expressed for the preservation of the man upon whom all looked as the tielard genius of France. The sanguinary execution at Vincennes produced a sudden reaction. The Royalists were much irritated, and still more alarmed, but worthy and reasonable men were filled with regret at seeing a government, hitherto so admirable, inbruing its hands in blood like those who had put Louis XVI. to death, and imitating them, too, it must be confessed, without the excuse of the revolutionary passions which, in 1793, had perverted the coolest heads and the kindest hearts.

None were satisfied with what had been done at Vincennes, save those hot revolutionists, whose senseless rule the First Consul had brought to an end, and who now saw him in a single day reduced almost to their level. None of them any longer feared that General Bonaparte would act for the Bourbons.

Sad proof of the frailty of the human mind! This extraordinary man, of so great and accurate an intellect, and of so generous a heart, had lately been so stern in his judgment of the revolutionists and their excesses! He had pronounced upon their frenzy without qualification, and sometimes even without justice. He had bitterly reproached them with having shed the blood of Louis XVI., disgraced the Revolution, and irreconcilably embroiled France with Europe! Then he judged calmly; and now his passions being excited, he had in a single instant paralleled the deed committed upon the person of Louis XVI., and had placed himself in a state of moral opposition to Europe, which speedily rendered a general war inevitable, and compelled him to go in search of peace—a magnificent peace, it is true—to Tilis, to the other end of Europe! How well calculated are such contrasts to rebuke human pride of intellect, and to prove that the most transcendent genius is not safe from the most vulgar errors, if, even for a single instant, it is deprived of self-control and swayed by passion!

But, to be fully just, while deploring this fatal frenzy of passion, let us turn our eyes to those by whom it was provoked. What were they! Emigrants, those same emigrants who, after having roused to fury and as yet guiltless revolution, left their country to raise up enemies to France throughout the world. That Revolution, recalled from its sad wanderings, and guided by a great man, now showed

itself prudent, pacific, and humane. It had recalled these emigrants, re-established them in their country and in their possessions, and was preparing to replace them in all the splendour of their former situation. How did they repay all this clemency? If not grateful, were they, at least, peaceable? No! They went to a neighbouring nation jealous of our greatness, and made use of the liberty of that nation to turn it against France. By dint of scandalous pamphlets they irritated the pride of both countries, only too easily excited, and after having contributed to arm them against each other, they had not merely made themselves soldiers of the enemies of France, but had lent them the aid of conspiracies. They had got up an infamous plot, they had disguised under wretched sophisms a project of assassination; they had sent Georges and Pichegru into France. If there was one heart envious of the First Consul's glory, to that heart they appealed. They misled, perverted, frenzied, the weak Moreau; they deceived him, made him deceive himself; and then, when their imprudences revealed them to the vigilant eye of the man whom they sought to destroy, they had denounced each other, and fancied that they justified themselves in openly declaring that they were to be headed in their horrible exploits by a French prince! The great man against whom such horrible plots were directed, revolted and enraged at being made the object of such murderous attacks by those whom he had saved from persecution, at length yielded to a fatal anger. He had watched on the rocky coast for the prince whose coming had been announced; he had vainly watched for him, and, while his mind was excited by the confessions of his enemies themselves, he saw on the banks of the Rhine another prince who was there awaiting the renewal of war. At this sight his judgment failed him, he mistook this prince for the intended leader of the conspirators who threatened the peace of France and the life of the First Consul; and then, he felt a sort of pride in seizing that prince even upon the Germanic soil, and striking that scion of the Bourbons as he would have stricken the most vulgar individual, and he did strike him, in order to con-

vince the emigration and all Europe that it was as dangerous as unreasonable to attack his person.

Painful spectacle! where all were wrong, even the victims; where Frenchmen were to be seen serving British greatness against French greatness; Bourbons, sons and brothers of kings, and destined in their turns also to be kings, herding with highwaymen; the last of the Condés atoning with his blood for a conspiracy in which he was not an accomplice, and that Condé, whom, as a victim, one would wish to find wholly irreproachable, incurring the guilt of stationing himself once more beneath the British flag against the French flag; and, finally, a great man, misled by anger and by the instinct of self-preservation and pride, losing on the instant the prudence which all Europe had admired, and imitating the sanguinary Revolutionists whom his victorious hands had put down, and whom he had gloried in not imitating! Fatal cycle of human passions! He who is stricken wishes to return the blow; each blow received is returned on the instant; blood calls for blood, and revolutions thus become a succession of sanguinary reprisals, which would be eternal, did not a day arrive when men stop short, and lay aside this mere brute struggle and cycle of vengeance, to substitute a calm, impartial, and humane justice, and place even above this justice—if any thing can be above it—a lofty and clear-sighted policy which, selecting from the sentences of justice the most urgently necessary, allows only those to be executed, and remits the others to culprits, erring, indeed, but susceptible of repentance. To defend social order by conforming to the strict rules and forms of justice, without allowing any feeling of revenge to operate, is the great lesson to be drawn from these tragical events. Another lesson is to be drawn from them, to form an indulgent judgment of men of all parties who, preceding us in the career of revolutions, nurtured amidst the corrupting anxieties and excitement of civil war, and with bloodshed ever before them, showed not that respect for human life with which time, reflection, and a long peace have happily inspired us.

BOOK XIX.

THE EMPIRE.

Effect produced in Europe by the Death of the Duc d'Enghien—Prussia, on the very Eve of forming an Alliance with France, reverts to Russia and concludes a Secret Alliance with that Power—What would have been the best Alliance for France for 1803, and what prevented its Formation—The Proceedings of Messrs. Drake, Smith, and Taylor, denounced to the European Cabinets; the Feeling thereby excited weakens the Effect produced by the Death of the Duc d'Enghien—Sensation created at St. Petersburg—Spontaneous Court Mourning—Rash and inconsiderate Course pursued by the Young Emperor—He determines to complain to the Diet of Rastibon against the Violation of the Germanic Territory, and addresses imprudent Notes to the Diet and to France—Circumspection of Austria—That Power makes no Complaint as to what had occurred at Ettenheim, but avails itself of the supposed Embarrassment of the First Consul to indulge in the utmost Excesses of Power in the Empire—Spoliations and Violence throughout Germany—Energy of the First Consul—Merciless Retort upon the Emperor Alexander, and Recall of the French Ambassador—Contemptuous Indifference to the Complaints made in the Diet—Expedient proposed by M. de Talleyrand for making those Protests productive of an insignificant Result—Equivocal Conduct of the Austrian Ministers at the Diet—Adjournment of the Question—Austria summoned to desist from her Violences in the Empire—Defiance of the Court of Vienna—Continuation of the Proceedings against Georges and Moreau—Suicide of Pichegru—Public Sensation and consequent Reaction in Favour of monarchical Ideas—Hereditary Succession is looked upon as a Means of consolidating Public Authority, and protecting it against the Consequences of an Assassination—Numerous Addresses—Speech of M. de Fontanes on the Completion of the Civil Code—Part played by M. Fouché at this juncture—He is the Instrument of the approaching Change—M. Cambacérès offers some Opposition to that Change—Explanation of the First Consul with him—Procedure of the Senate managed by M. Fouché—The First Consul postpones replying to the Procedure of the Senate, and addresses himself to Foreign Courts to ascertain if they will recognise the new Title he intends to assume—Favourable Reply of Prussia and Austria—Conditions attached by the latter Court to the Recognition—Eagerness of the Army to proclaim an Emperor—The First Consul, after a somewhat long Silence, replies to the Senate by requiring that Body fully to explain its Views and Wishes—The Senate deliberates—Motion of the Tribune Curée for the Re-establishment of Monarchy—Discussion of that Subject in the Tribunal, and Speech of the Tribune Carnot—The Motion is carried to the Senate, which adopts it, and addresses a Message to the First Consul, proposing a Return to Monarchy—Committee appointed to report what Changes were indispensable in the Consular Constitution—Changes adopted—Imperial Constitution—Grand Dignitaries—Military and Civil Poets—Idea of the eventual Re-establishment of the Empire of the West—The new Constitutional Arrangements embodied in a *Senatus Consultum*—The Senate proceeds in a Body to Saint Cloud, and proclaims Napoleon Emperor—Singularity and Grandeur of the Spectacle—Conclusion of the Proceedings against Georges and Moreau—Georges condemned to Death and executed—Messrs. Armand de Polignac and de Rivière condemned to Death and pardoned—Moreau exiled—His Destiny and that of Napoleon—New Phase of the French Revolution—The Republic changed into a Military Monarchy.

The effect which the sanguinary catastrophe of Vincennes produced in France, was undoubtedly great; it was still greater in the rest of Europe. We do not depart from the strict truth in saying, that that catastrophe became the principal cause of a third general war. The conspiracy of the French princes, and the consequent death of the Duc d'Enghien, were reciprocal blows by which the revolution and the counter-revolution goaded each other into a new and violent contest, which speedily extended itself from the Alps and the Rhine as far as the banks of the Niemen.

We have delineated the respective situations of France and the various courts, setting out from the renewal of the war with Great Britain; the pretensions of Russia to a supreme arbitration, received coldly by England, courted by the First Consul, but speedily repulsed by him, as soon as he perceived the partial disposition of the Russian cabinet; the apprehensions of Austria, fearing to see the war become general again, and seeking to escape from its anxieties, by excesses of power in the Empire; the perplexities of Prussia, by turns agitated by the suggestions of Russia, or attracted by the caresses of the First Consul, nearly seduced by his language to M. Lombard, and ready at length to terminate its long vacillations, by throwing itself into the arms of France.

Such was the state of things a little previous to the deplorable conspiracy of which we have related the tragical phases. M. Lombard had returned to Berlin quite charmed with what he had heard at Brussels, and, in communicating his own impressions to the youth-

ful Frederick William, had determined him, definitively to coalesce with us. Another circumstance had greatly contributed towards producing this happy result. Russia had shown herself unfavourable to the policy of Prussia, which consisted in a sort of continental neutrality, founded upon the ancient Prussian neutrality, and had endeavoured to substitute for that policy a project of a European triple league, which under the pretext of restraining the belligerent powers, would speedily have terminated in a new coalition, directed against France and subsidized by England. Frederick William, stung by the reception that had been given to his proposals, and by the evident consequences that might result from the Russian project, feeling that strength was on the side of the First Consul, offered him, no longer a barren friendship, as he had done since 1800, through the enigmatical M. d'Haugwitz, but a genuine alliance. At first he had proposed, to France as to Russia, an extension of the Prussian neutrality, which should comprehend all the states of Germany, and be purchased by the evacuation of Hanover, which would infallibly have had the effect, as to us, of re-opening the continent to English commerce, and closing against us the route to Vienna. The First Consul, in conferring at Brussels with M. Lombard, would not listen to this. Since the return of M. Lombard to Berlin, and the recent conduct of Russia, the King of Prussia made quite different proposals to us. By this new scheme, the two powers, France and Prussia, were to guaranty to each other the *status preens* comprehending, for Prussia, all that she had

acquired in Germany and in Poland since 1769; *sc.* France, the Rhine, the Alps, the annexation of Piedmont, the presidency of the Italian Republic, the acquisition of Parma and Plaisance, the maintenance of the kingdom of Etruria, and the temporary occupation of Tarragona. Should peace be disturbed on account of either of these interests, that one of the two powers which should not be immediately threatened was to intervene to prevent war. Should its good offices prove ineffectual, the two powers engaged to unite their forces, and maintain the struggle in common. As the price of this serious engagement, Prussia demanded the evacuation of the banks of the Elbe and the Weser, the reduction of the French army in Hanover to the number of men necessary for the collection of the revenues of the country, that is to say, to 6000; and, finally, if on the return of peace, the successes of France should have been sufficiently great to allow of her dictating her own terms, the cabinet of Berlin required that the fate of Hanover should be determined in accordance with the views of Prussia. This was indirectly stipulating that Hanover should be given to her.

What determined Frederick William to enter thus far into the policy of the First Consul, was the maintenance of the peace of the Continent, which depended, in his opinion, upon a solid alliance between Prussia and France. He perceived, with a sagacity creditable to himself, and especially creditable to M. d'Haugwitz, by whose counsels he was here guided, that, if Prussia and France were strongly united, no continental power would dare to disturb the general peace. He, at the same time, said that in enchainning the continent he would also enchain the First Consul; for the guarantee of the existing situation of the two powers was a means of fixing that situation, and of interdicting the First Consul from any new enterprises. If Prussia had only adhered to such views, and if she had been encouraged to do so, the destinies of the world would have been changed.

The same reasons which had determined Prussia to make the proposal that we have recited, should have determined the First Consul to accept it. What he definitively desired, at least at that period, was the Rhine and the Alps as the boundaries of France, besides an absolute domination in Italy, and a preponderating influence in Spain—in a word, the supremacy of the West. He would have secured all this in obtaining the guarantee of Prussia, and he would have secured it with a degree of certainty all but infallible. Doubtless, the Continent would have been re-opened to the English by the evacuation of the banks of the Elbe and the Weser; but those facilities restored to their commerce would not have afforded them benefit at all proportionate to the injury they would have experienced from the immobility of the Continent, thenceforward secured by the union of Prussia with France. And, the Continent at peace, the First Consul was certain, by applying his genius to the subject for some years, sooner or later to strike some grand blow against England.

True it is, that in the proposition of Prussia

the title of *alliance* was wanting; the substance was unquestionably there, but the word was designedly left out by the policy of the young king.

That prince, in fact, had determined not to insert the word; he had even endeavoured to diminish the apparent importance of the treaty by terming it a convention. But of what consequence was the form when the substance was secured; when the engagement to join his forces to ours was formally stipulated; when that engagement, taken by a king, honest and faithful to his word, was one to be depended upon? This is the place in which to note one of the errors of judgment of not only the court of Prussia, but of all the courts of Europe of that day. They admired the new government of France, since it had been directed by a great man; they loved his principles as much as they respected his glory; and yet they wilfully held themselves aloof from him. Even when some object of importance compelled them to make advances to him, they were unwilling to meet him except upon terms of official formality; not that they either felt, or would have ventured to show, towards him, the aristocratic contempt of old dynasties towards new ones; the First Consul had not as yet exposed himself to comparisons of that sort, by constituting himself the chief of a dynasty, and the military glory, which was his chief title, was one of those merits before which disdain must ever prostrate itself. But each power feared, in proclaiming itself his ally, to pass in the eyes of Europe as a deserter of the cause of kings. Frederick William would have felt himself embarrassed in presence of his young friend Alexander, and even in presence of his enemy the Emperor Francis. The young and lovely queen, surrounded by a coterie brimful of the passions and prejudices of the *ancien régime*, a coterie in which M. Lombar was satirized, because he had returned from Brussels an enthusiastic admirer of the First Consul, and in which M. d'Haugwitz was detested, because he was the champion of the French alliance; the young and lovely queen and her circle would have cried aloud and overwhelmed the king with their censure. That, to be sure, was a mere domestic annoyance, such as Frederick William was by no means unaccustomed to. But he would not have been able to reconcile a formal treaty of alliance with the equivocal language, destitute of frankness, which he habitually used with the other courts. He wished to be able to hold up the engagements entered into with the First Consul, as a sacrifice that he had made, in spite of his own wishes, to the most urgent wants of his subjects. The evacuation of Hanover was, indeed, an object of the highest importance to his subjects, inasmuch as the Elbe and the Weser would thereby be re-opened to their trade. To obtain from France the evacuation of Hanover, it was indispensable, he would have said, to yield her something, and he had found himself compelled to guaranty to her that which, moreover, all the powers, and especially Austria, had guarantied to her either by treaties or by secret conventions. At this price, without any new concession, he had delivered Ger-

many from foreign troops and re-established her commerce. Add the word alliance to the proposed convention, and this representation would become impossible. It is true that the stipulation relative to Hanover was as compromising as the word alliance would have been, but it was consigned to an article which it was promised, on word of honour, should be kept secret. That court, as has been shown, was as weak as it was ambitious; but its promise, once written, could be relied upon. It was advisable, then, to deal with her such as she was, to make allowance for her weaknesses, and to hasten to profit by this rare opportunity of binding her to France.

In our time, since the breaking up of the old Germanic Empire, there remain but few subjects of rivalry between Prussia and Austria, and a very important one exists between Prussia and France, in the Rhenish provinces. But in 1804, Prussia, thrown at a considerable distance from the Rhine, had only congenial interests with France, and antagonistic interests with Austria. The mutual hatred between Frederick the Great and Austria was still in full force. The reform of the Germanic Constitution, the secularization of the ecclesiastical territories, the suppression of the immediate nobility, the partition of votes between the Catholic and the Protestant princes, were so many questions resolved, or to be resolved, which animated the two courts with retrospective and anticipative resentment. Prussia, enriched with church property, representing the revolutionary principles of Germany, and thus possessing in the eyes of the old monarchies almost the bad odour of the Revolution, as well as its interests, was our natural ally; and, unless we were desirous of having no friend in Europe, it was evidently with her that we should make common cause.

In fact, as an ally, Spain was not worthy of the name, and to regenerate her was to run the risk of being plunged at a future day into immense difficulties. Italy, torn into fragments, of which we possessed nearly the whole, could add nothing substantial to our strength; she could give us, at the most, some soldiers, capable, indeed, of being rendered good, but requiring, for that purpose, to have served for a long time with our own. Austria, abler and more astute than all the other courts combined, cherished the resolution, concealed from every one else and almost from herself, to spring upon us at the first opportunity, in order to recover what she had lost. Nor was there any thing astonishing or reprehensible even in that resolution: all who have been vanquished seek to regain their place, and have a right to do so. Inasmuch as Prussia was, so to speak, the France of Germany, inasmuch as Austria all that we can imagine of the opposite, for she was the perfect picture of the *ancien régime*. Moreover, there was a special reason for her being irreconcilable with France; Italy—the object of her liveliest desire, and of a no less lively desire on the part of the First Consul. From the moment that he aspired to the dominion of Italy, he could only hope for truces, of longer or shorter duration, with Austria. Between the two constantly opposed courts of

Germany, then, it was impossible to choose that of Vienna. As for Russia, to pretend to the dominion of the Continent was necessarily to have her for an enemy. The last ten years had abundantly proved that, even without having any interest in the war which we sustained against Germany, with an interest identical to our own in the war which we had sustained against England, she had, under Catherine, taken a hostile attitude; under Paul I. had sent forth her Suwarrow; and, under Alexander, had ended, under the pretext of protecting the lesser powers, by aiming at a continental protectorate incompatible with the continental influence that we sought to exercise. Continental jealousy made her our enemy, as maritime jealousy made us an enemy of England. Thus, then, Spain, in its abasement, having no strength to offer to us; Austria being implacable on account of Italy; Russia being our rival on the Continent, as England was our rival upon the Ocean; Prussia, on the contrary, having interests congenial to our own, and playing the part of an intruder and upstart among the old governments, Prussia was our natural and inevitable ally. To neglect her was to consent to be wholly isolated. To remain isolated permanently, and under whatever circumstances, was to invoke destruction as the consequence of our first reverse of fortune.

When alliances were in question, the First Consul was ill-advised by M. de Talleyrand. That minister, influenced by taste rather than by calculation, had a decided predilection for Austria. Filled with reminiscences of the old cabinet of Versailles, in which the Great Frederick was detested on account of his sarcasms, and in which the court of Vienna was beloved on account of its cajoleries, he fancied himself at the Versailles of bygone days, when all went smoothly with Austria. For such insufficient cause he was cool, satirical, contemptuous towards Prussia, and dissuaded the First Consul from putting trust in her. His advice, however, had but little weight in the matter. The First Consul, from the time of his attaining power, had judged with his usual sagacity as to the quarters in which alliance was desirable, or not, and he had leaned towards Prussia. At the same time, confident in his strength, he was in no hurry to choose his friends. He saw all the utility of having friends, and he appreciated all at their true respective value, but he believed that he would always have time to choose them, and he determined to do so at his leisure.

When M. de Lucchesini, in consequence of the interviews at Brussels, presented a letter from the king himself, and the project of alliance, wanting only the title, the First Consul was deeply stung. He, rightly enough, considered the connection with France to be honourable enough, and, more especially, profitable enough to be publicly avowed by Prussia. "I accept," said he, "the proposed basis, but I wish the word alliance to be inserted in the treaty. It is only Prussia's public profession of friendship with us which can intimidate Europe, and enable me to direct all our resources against England. Such a treaty one

signed, I will reduce our land force and increase our marine, and devote myself wholly to maritime warfare. Without such a formal and public alliance, I could not, without danger, effect this modification of our forces, and I should sacrifice the blockade of the rivers without any adequate advantage."

There was much correctness in this reasoning. The complete avowal of our alliance would have given us a moral power, which a half avowal could not have secured to us. But still the bare fact of a union of our strength was of immense consequence, and the substance should in this case have been preferred to the mere form. Prussia, allied with us merely to the extent of being bound to take up arms with us under certain circumstances, would speedily have been compromised in the eyes of Europe, exposed to the sneers and reproaches of the other cabinets, and thereby irritated till at length she would have thrown herself, even despite herself, into our arms. A first step towards us would have rendered the second step inevitable. It was an error, therefore, not to meet her cordially. The First Consul, independent of the world alliance, upon which he laid the utmost stress, disputed some of the conditions demanded by Prussia. As respected Hanover he was inclined to be very accommodating, and made no difficulty as to ceding it, should the opportunity offer, to Prussia, knowing that he would thus sow the seeds of perpetual discord between her and England. Nevertheless, he was still impracticable as to the opening of the rivers. He revolted at the idea of opening part of the Continent to the English, to those English who blockaded every sea. He went so far as to say to the Prussian minister:

"What! for a mere pecuniary consideration, would you have me sacrifice one of the most effective means of annoying Great Britain! You have aided the cloth-merchants of Silesia with three or four millions of crowns; you ought to aid them with as much more. Make your calculation: how much will it cost you! Six or eight millions of crowns! I am ready to supply you with that amount privately, provided that you give up the opening of the rivers."

This proposition was not to the taste of Prussia, who wished to be able to say to the European courts, that she had only gone thus far with the First Consul in order to secure the withdrawal of the French troops from the Elbe and the Weser.

When the proposal, thus modified, was returned to Berlin, the king was alarmed at the idea of an avowed and definite alliance. The Emperor Alexander, and the German courts, were incessantly present to his mind, making him a thousand reproaches for his perfidy. He was also apprehensive of the enterprising nature of the First Consul, and feared that in binding himself too completely to him, he should be drawn into war, which was precisely that which he was most anxious to avoid. The court itself was divided and excited upon this question. Although the cabinet was secret to the utmost, some inkings got abroad of the matter which so gravely oc-

cupied it; and the court was loud in its wrath against M. d'Haugwitz, whom it accused of being the parent of such a policy. This eminent statesman, whom a certain seeming duplicity, springing rather from his position than from his nature, caused to be ill-spoken of in the courts of Europe, but who at that period understood better than any Prussian—nay, we would freely add, better than any Frenchman—the mutual interests of the two powers made every effort to revive the courage of his alarmed sovereign, and, at the same time, to prevail on the First Consul not to be too excessive in his demands. But his efforts were unavailing, and in his disgust he formed the resolution of retiring from office, a resolution which he shortly afterwards put into execution. The Russian minister at Berlin, M. d'Alopeus, a Russian, as fiery and arrogant as M. de Markoff, disturbed all Potsdam with his outcry. The Austrian diplomatists filled it with their intrigues. Every passion was aroused against the idea of an alliance with France. Nevertheless, this interior agitation extended no further than the immediate circle of the court, and had not become the public rumour of Berlin.

Such was the state of affairs when the news arrived of the seizure of the Duc d'Enghien upon the Germanic territory. It produced an immense effect. The excitement of the anti-French party overstepped all bounds. The embarrassment of the opposite party was extreme. The prediction of the Consul Lebrun, that that act would cause immense excitement in Europe, was now fully justified. However to extenuate in some degree the effect of this intelligence, it was affirmed that this was purely a measure of precaution; that the First Consul had desired to secure a hostage, but that it had never entered his mind to destroy a young prince of a race so illustrious, and who, besides, was unacquainted with what had been plotted at Paris. Scarcely were these apologies made, when the intelligence arrived of the sad event at Vincennes. Thenceforth the French party was compelled to be silent—it could not even proffer apologies. The French minister, Laforest, though he enjoyed a high personal reputation, suddenly found himself deserted by the society of Potsdam, and he even mentioned in his despatches that no one would speak to him. In one of his daily reports he repeats these actual words of a lady who, nevertheless, was extremely well disposed towards the French legation: "If we may judge of the exasperation of minds from the violence of language, I have no doubt that every thing that is connected with the French government would be insulted—to say no worse—did not Prussia still possess protecting laws, and a king whose principles are well known."

M. de Laforest, at the same date, added that these *yelpers*, after having, externally at least, displayed a lively sensibility, could not conceal a sort of insulting joy, and congratulated each other, as though they had achieved an important victory.

In point of fact, this terrible event was an important advantage to the enemies of France,

for it everywhere threw the French party into the background, and cemented alliances which could only be broken up at the cannon's mouth.

The blunders of a foe are but a sorry compensation for our own. England, however, had provided that compensation for us. She had committed an act not easily to be characterized, in furnishing pecuniary aid to a conspiracy, and in ordering, or permitting three of her diplomatic servants, at Cassel, at Stuttgart, and at Munich, to engage in the most criminal intrigues. The First Consul despatched a thoroughly trustworthy officer, who, disguised, and giving himself out to be an agent of the conspiracy, wormed himself into the confidence of Messrs. Drake and Spencer Smith. He received from them, for transmission to the conspirators, and by way of a slight instalment—seeing the difficulty of raising on the instant a sufficient amount in specie—upwards of a hundred thousand francs in gold, which he immediately handed over to the French police. The report of that officer, and the autograph letters of Messrs. Drake and Spencer Smith, were placed together, and exhibited to the diplomatic corps, that their authenticity might be established. The fact was beyond denial. The report and the documents in question, inserted in the *Moniteur*, and forwarded to the courts of Europe, caused a severe censure of England to succeed to that passionate blame of which France had for some time been the exclusive object. It was quite evident to all impartial men, that the First Consul had been provoked by detestable conduct, and it occasioned them regret, for the sake of his glory, that he had not contented himself with the legal punishment of Georges and his accomplices, and the disgrace which must have attached to the misconduct of the English diplomatic agents. Messrs. Drake and Smith, indignantly dismissed from Munich and from Stuttgart, passed hastily across Germany, not daring to show themselves anywhere. Mr. Drake, especially, on reaching Berlin, received orders from the Prussian police not to stop there even for a single day. He merely passed through that capital, and hastened to embark for England, bearing with him the stigma which attaches to the profanation of the most sacred of functions.

The conduct of Mr. Drake and his colleague furnished something of a counterpoise to the death of Duc d'Enghien. Nevertheless, the Prussian cabinet, though perfectly civil in its tone, suddenly became cool, silent, and reserved toward M. de Laforest; no more mention was now made by it of alliance or of business affairs: not a word did it utter about the sad event which was everywhere so deeply deplored. It was known that Messrs. d'Haugwitz and Lombard were in despair about the occurrence which was so ruinous to their policy; M. d'Haugwitz was known to have taken the resolution of quitting the helm of state, and retiring to his estates in Silesia, much impoverished by the war. But these personages preserved unbroken silence. M. de Laforest having endeavoured to bring about an explanation, M. d'Haugwitz listened attentively to

him, and replied in these grave terms. "Be assured, sir, that throughout this affair the king had been especially anxious about all that concerns the glory of the First Consul. As to the alliance, that is no longer to be thought of. Too much was required of the king; moreover, a total change has suddenly taken place in his ideas, in consequence of an unforeseen event, the effects of which neither you nor I can prevent."

In fact, the dispositions of the King of Prussia were completely altered. He was now disposed to connect himself with Russia, and hoped to find in that power the support which he had formerly anticipated from France. He had desired to obtain from the First Consul some reduction in the army of Hanover, and the evacuation of the banks of the Elbe and the Weser, by undertaking to share whatever dangers might menace France. Now, determined to have nothing in common with France, he made up his mind to endure the occupation of Hanover, and the consequent closing of the rivers; and sought, in a closer connection with Russia, the means of preventing, or, at the least, limiting the inconveniences which might arise from the presence of the French in Germany. He therefore without delay made overtures to the Russian ambassador. It was an easy matter to conduct such a negotiation to a successful termination, for it was wholly congenial to the wishes of the Russian court.

While the effect of the tragical event which occupied the attention of all Europe grew weaker at Berlin, it developed itself at St. Petersburg. It was still greater there than elsewhere. At the court of a young, mercurial, and rash sovereign, freed by its remote locality from the necessity of being prudent, no restraint was put upon the manifestation of feelings. It was on a Saturday that the courier arrived at St. Petersburg. The following day, Sunday, was the diplomatic levee day. The emperor, annoyed by the hauteur of the First Consul, and little inclined to restrain himself in order to please him, listened, on this occasion, only to his resentment, and the outcries of an impassioned mother. He caused all his household to go into mourning, without even consulting his cabinet. When the hour for the levee arrived, the emperor and his court made their appearance in mourning, to the great astonishment even of the ministers, who had not been made aware of that intention. The representatives of all the courts of Europe joyfully beheld this testimony of grief, which was a virtual insult to France. Our ambassador, General Hédouville, present, in common with the other foreign ministers at this levee, was for some instants placed in a most painful situation. But he displayed a coolness and dignity which had a striking effect upon all the witnesses of this strange scene. The emperor passed by without addressing a single word to him. The general proved himself to be neither embarrassed nor disturbed, but with a look of the utmost tranquillity, inspired, by his dignified bearing, respect for the French nation, compromised though it was by a great misfortune.

After this imprudent display, the emperor

deliberated with his minister as to the course to be pursued. This young monarch, sensible indeed, but no less vain than sensible, was impatient to play a conspicuous part. He had already played a part in German affairs; but he had speedily perceived that he had rather been permitted to play that part by the policy of the First Consul, than conquered it for himself. He had interceded for Naples and Hanover, without being attended to; and he had been mortified by the lofty tone in which the First Consul had reproved the conduct of M. de Markoff, although he himself disapproved of that conduct. In such a temper, the slightest opportunity would have sufficed to provoke him to an outbreak; and in yielding to wounded vanity, he imagined that he only obeyed the most honourable feelings of humanity. If to this we add a temper to the utmost degree susceptible, and an utter want of experience, we shall fully explain his sudden resolutions.

To the affront of which we have spoken, he wished to add a political step, which was somewhat more serious than a court demonstration. After having vainly opposed his wishes, his ministers imagined a very hazardous means of gratifying him—that of protesting, in quality of guarantee of the Germanic empire, against the invasion of the territory of Baden. This, as we shall presently see, was an extremely rash step.

The quality of guarantee of the Germanic empire, which was here assumed by the court of Russia, was very disputable, for the recent mediation, exercised in conjunction with France, had not been followed by a formal act of guarantee. And so necessary was this act to the existence of the guarantee, that the ministers of France and Russia had frequently consulted with the German ministers upon the necessity for drawing up such a document, and upon the form which it would be expedient to give to it. The act, however, had not been drawn up. In its absence, there remained whatever claim could be founded upon the treaty of Teschen, by which, in 1779, France and Russia had guaranteed the arrangement entered into by Prussia and Austria, relative to the succession of Bavaria. Did that engagement, limited to a special object, confer the right of interfering in a question of the domestic police of the empire? The point was doubtful. At all events, if the empire had occasion to complain of a violation of its territory, it was for the injured sovereign, that is to say, for the Grand-duke of Baden, or at most for a German power, but assuredly not for a foreign power, to complain. In raising this question, therefore, Russia acted wholly without title. She was about to embarrass Germany, even to do her a disservice, for, notwithstanding that she was affronted, she had no inclination to commence a quarrel, of which the issue was easy to foresee. Finally, it was the greatest of levities to make this disturbance. Scarcely four years had elapsed since the commission of a crime, which calumniators called a parricide, which had stained St. Petersburg with blood, and raised the young monarch to the throne. The assassins of the father still surrounded the son, and

not one of them had been punished. Was not this, then, to provoke a crushing reply from the most hardy of adversaries? M. de Woronzow was ill, and replaced by the young Prince Czartoryski, and it must be mentioned to the praise of the latter, that, young as he was, he made strong objections. But the aged ministers showed no more prudence in this conjuncture than the youthful monarch himself; for, as regards prudence, the passions level all ages. The cabinet of St. Petersburg, then, determined that a note should be addressed to the Germanic Diet, to arouse its anxiety, and to provoke its consideration of the violation of territory recently committed in the grand-duchy of Baden. A corresponding note was to be addressed to the French government.

The manifestations inspired by this affair did not end here. It was resolved to evince to the court of Rome an emphatic disapprobation of the condescension it had recently manifested to France in delivering up to her the emigrant Vernègues. The Russian minister at Rome was recalled on the instant. The Pope's nuncio was dismissed from St. Petersburg. There could not be a more misplaced or more affronting censure of the proceedings of a foreign court, however blamable they might be. Saxony, alarmed at the displeasure felt by the First Consul at the presence of M. d'Entraigues at Dresden, had solicited the cabinet of St. Petersburg to recall him. The cabinet of St. Petersburg replied that M. d'Entraigues should remain at Dresden, as Russia needed not to consult the convenience of other courts in the selection of her agents.

After taking these very imprudent steps, they busied themselves in providing against the consequences by forming alliances. A willing and favourable ear was naturally lent to the language of Prussia, who, after having abandoned Russia for France, had now abandoned France for Russia, and sought to unite herself to the north. It would have gratified Russia to induce Frederick William to join in a sort of Continental coalition, independent of England, but inclining towards her. However, it was necessary to be contented with what was offered by the King of Prussia. That prince, obliged to leave Hanover in the hands of the French, since he had broken off negotiations with them, sought to provide against the ill consequences of their presence by means of an understanding with Russia. He wished no more than this, and it was impossible to lead him further.

Consequently, each party having endeavoured to bring about the result which it preferred, they agreed upon a sort of engagement, consisting of a reciprocal declaration of Prussia and Russia, drawn up in varied terms and impressed with the spirit of the two courts. The purport of this engagement was as follows:—As long as the French should confine themselves to the occupation of Hanover, and their forces should not exceed the number of thirty thousand men in that part of Germany, the two courts were to remain passive and maintain the *status quo*. But should the French troops be augmented in number, or should other states of Germany be invaded, the two

powers were to combine and resist such fresh invasion; and should their resistance to that progress of the French towards the north lead to a war, they were to unite their forces, and sustain the struggle in common. The emperor, in such a contingency, placed all the resources of his empire unreservedly at the disposal of Prussia. This deplorable engagement, signed by Prussia on the 24th of May, 1804, was accompanied, however, by a multitude of restrictions on the part of that power. The king, in his declaration, said that he did not intend to be lightly led into a war; that consequently it would not be merely the addition

of some hundreds of men to the French army in Hanover, sent for the annual and regular recruiting of that army, nor would it be a chance collision with one of the small German powers, which would lead him to risk a rupture with France, but her design, formally manifested by a real and considerable augmentation of her forces in Hanover, to aggrandize herself in Germany. The young emperor, on his part, laid no such restriction upon his engagement. He bound himself unconditionally to join his troops to those of Prussia, in the event of war.¹

This treaty, so unusual in form, was to re-

¹This treaty, in the form of a mutual declaration, must not be confounded with the secret treaty of Potsdam concluded on the 3d of November, 1805, while Napoleon was on his march from Ulm to Austerlitz, and which was wrung from Prussia in consequence of the violation of the territory of Anspach and of Bareuth. The treaty of which we here speak has never appeared in any published collection of diplomatic documents; it has even remained unknown in France. Having procured a copy of it, I here publish it, to throw a light upon an important fact, the abandonment of the French alliance by Prussia.

Declaration of the Court of Prussia.

WE, Frederick William III., &c. &c.

The war which is rekindled between England and France having exposed the north of Germany to foreign invasion, the consequences which have already resulted from it to our monarchy and to our neighbours have excited our utmost anxiety; but above all, the further consequences which may result from it have required us to devise and to mature a timely remedy for them.

However much the occupation of Hanover, and its indirect consequence, the closing of the rivers, are to be deplored, we have resolved, after making every effort short of war with a view to the cessation of this state of things, to make to peace the sacrifice of not challenging that which has been already consummated, and of abstaining from active measures so long as no fresh usurpations shall oblige us to adopt them.

But if, notwithstanding the solemn promises given by the French government, it should extend, beyond the *status quo* of the present time, its enterprises against the safety of any Northern State, we are resolved to oppose it with the forces which Providence has placed in our hands.

We have made a solemn declaration to this effect to France, and France has accepted it; but it was especially towards his Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias, that confidence and friendship rendered it our duty to explain ourselves, and we have had the satisfaction of ascertaining that our resolutions were in precise conformity with the principles of our august ally, and that he himself was resolved to join us in maintaining them. We have accordingly agreed with his Imperial Majesty upon the following points:

1stly. We shall make common cause against any new encroachment by the French government upon the Northern States unconcerned in her war with England.

2dly. To this end, we shall bestow a rigorous and sustained attention upon the preparations of the Republic. A vigilant eye will be kept upon her troops stationed in Germany; and if their number should be augmented, we shall, without loss of time, put ourselves into an attitude to uphold and give effect to the protection intended to be bestowed upon the weaker states.

3dly. Should a new usurpation actually take place, we feel that half-measures against so dangerous an adversary would be worse than useless. It would, consequently, be with forces proportioned to the vast power of the Republic, that we should march against it. Accordingly, while we accept with gratitude the offer of our august ally instantly to support our troops with an army of forty or fifty thousand men, we do not the less reckon upon the previous stipulations of the treaty of alliance between Russia and Prussia: stipulations which so closely connect the destinies of the two empires, that when the existence of one of them is in peril, the duties and sacrifices of the other should have no bounds.

4thly. To determine when a *casus federis* will exist, events and circumstances must be looked at in their true spirit and full scope. The small states of the Empire, situated beyond the Weser, may temporarily present scenes revolting to principle, whether from their

being perpetually traversed by French troops, or from their sovereigns being sold to France, like the Comte de Bentheim, or dependent upon her, from other causes, like the Comte d'Aremberg. There the insignificant deviations that a representation suffices, as in the case of Meppen, to redress, and that do not endanger the safety of any state, are foreign to a compact formed solely with a view to safety. It is upon the banks of the Weser that our interests begin to be essentially affected, because from that line Denmark, Mecklenburg, the Hanseatic towns, &c., are exposed, and, consequently, the *casus federis* will arise at the first attempt of the French upon a state of the empire situated on the right of the Weser, and especially upon the Danish provinces of Mecklenburg, anticipating, as we justly may, that the King of Denmark will then make common cause with us against the enemy.

5thly. The immense marches which the Russian troops would have to make in order to join ours, and the difficulty of their arriving in time to bear their part in decisive operations, make us deem it expedient that a different mode of transport be adopted for the different arms of the service. Thus, while the Russian cavalry and artillery horses will march through our provinces, it would seem preferable that the infantry and the guns should be transported by sea, and disembarked in some part of Pomerania, of Mecklenburg, or of Holstein, according to the operations of the enemy.

6thly. Immediately after the commencement of hostilities, or earlier still if the two contracting courts see fit, Denmark and Saxony will be invited to give their adhesion to the compact, to lend their co-operation, and furnish means proportionate to their power, as also will the other princes and states of the north of Germany who, from the proximity of their territories, must participate in the benefits of this arrangement.

7thly. Therefore, we bind ourselves not to lay down our arms, or enter into any accommodation with the enemy, unless with the consent and agreement previously obtained of his Imperial Majesty, relying with confidence upon our august ally, who has taken the like engagements towards us.

8thly. After the proposed end shall be attained, we reserve to ourselves to concert with his Imperial Majesty as to the ulterior measures to be taken for entirely freeing the north of Germany from the presence of foreign troops, and for solidly and permanently securing this happy result, by devising such an order of things as shall prevent Germany from being again exposed to the inconveniences she had suffered since the commencement of the present war.

This declaration is to be exchanged against one of similar purport, signed by his majesty the emperor of Russia, and we pledge our royal troth and word faithfully to fulfil the engagement we have herein taken.

In witness whereof, we have signed these presents with our hand, and have caused our royal seal to be affixed thereto.

Done at Berlin, this 24th of May, in the year of our Lord 1804, and the eighth year of our reign.

(Signed)
(Countersigned)

FREDERICK WILLIAM.
HARDENBERG.

Counter-declaration on the part of Russia

The critical situation of the north of Germany, and the impediments to which its commerce, as well as that of the whole of the north of Europe, is subjected by the presence of the French troops in the electorate of Hanover; further, the imminent danger which may be anticipated to the peace of the states in that part of the continent, which have not as yet been subjected to the yoke of France, having excited our utmost anxiety, we have applied ourselves to the discovery of means calculated to calm our apprehensions upon this subject.

As the invasion of the electorate of Hanover could not be foreseen, and as circumstances unfortunately

main secret, and, in fact, did remain unknown to us. Scarcely was it concluded when the King of Prussia, continually oscillating from side to side, to ward off all danger of war, feared, after making himself safe on the side of Russia, that he had laid himself too open on the side of France. The suddenness with which he had ceased to speak of alliance with us, the grave and stern silence preserved about the affair of the Duc d'Enghien, seemed to him to put peace in peril. He, therefore, ordered M. d'Haugwitz to make to the French minister a solemn declaration of neutrality, an absolute neutrality on the part of Prussia, so long as the French troops occupying Hanover should not be augmented. Accordingly, M. d'Haugwitz, suddenly quitting his reserved silence towards M. de Laforest, declared to him that his sovereign had pledged his word of honour that he would remain neuter under all circumstances, if the number of French troops in Hanover should not exceed 30,000. He added, that this was almost equal to the alliance that had been broken off, as the inactivity of Prussia, assured upon the condition she thus set upon it, secured the inactivity of the Continent. The earnestness of this declaration, which seemed so uncalled for at that juncture, surprised M. de Laforest, but revealed nothing to him; nevertheless, it appeared very singular to him. Frederick William supposed that he had now safely regulated his position with every one. Nothing is more pitiable to look upon than weak incapacity, plunging into po-

litical perplexities, and compromising itself by aiming at too much, as the weak bird fastens itself in the fowler's net by the very struggles that it makes to regain its liberty.

Thus, by the double policy of the King of Prussia, and under the deep impression made by the event of Vincennes, the foundation was laid of the third coalition. Russia, delighted at having secured Prussia, now began to direct her efforts towards Austria, and laid herself out rather more than she had previously done to ingratiate herself with that power. She had a ready means of doing this in opposing France, and siding with the court of Vienna on the still undecided questions of the Germanic empire.

We must now show what effect had been produced at Vienna by the event which had so deeply disturbed the courts of Berlin and St. Petersburg. If there was any one court more than another to which the seizure of the Duc d'Enghien upon the Germanic soil might naturally occasion concern, that one, most assuredly, was the court of Vienna. Nevertheless, the only ministers who evinced moderation on that occasion, were the ministers of the emperor. They uttered not a word that could wound the French government, took not a step of which it could complain. And yet the head of the empire, the natural guardian of the safety and dignity of the German territory, was bound, or no one was, to complain of the act committed in the grand-duchy of Baden. In truth, it must even be remarked, that every

prevented its deliverance at the time from the presence of the French troops, we have deemed it expedient for the moment, not to take any active measures, so long as the French government shall confine itself to the occupation of his Britannic majesty's German possessions; but at the same time, not to suffer the French to overstep in Germany the line behind which they at present remain.

His majesty the King of Prussia, whom in full confidence we have made acquainted with our alarms, and with the measures which seemed to us to be indispensable to the warding off of the dangers that we anticipated, having expressed his concurrence in our views, as well as his desire to aid in precautions so salutary, and to oppose all further encroachments of the French government upon the other states of the empire unconcerned in its quarrel with England, we have agreed with his said majesty upon the following points:—

1stly. As the well-known audacity and activity of the French government enables it to undertake and to execute its plans on the instant, it is absolutely necessary to keep watch over the preparations it may make for furthering its designs upon the north of Germany. A vigilant eye, therefore, will be kept upon the French troops stationed in those parts, and in the event of their number being increased, we shall lose no time in assuming a position calculated to give full effect to the protection proposed to be extended to those states which, from their weakness, are unable to protect themselves from the dangers which threaten them.

2dly. To obviate all uncertainty as to the period at which shall commence the active employment of the means before specified and destined on either side for preserving the north of Germany from all foreign invasion, it is agreed, at the outset, between us and his Prussian majesty, to define the *causa fœderis* of the present engagement. Accordingly, we have agreed to consider it to exist at the first encroachment which the French troops, stationed in the electoral territories of his Britannic majesty, shall make upon the adjacent states.

3dly. Should the *causa fœderis* occur, his majesty the King of Prussia, being nearer to the scene of action, will not wait for the junction of the respective forces herein-after specified, but will cause operations to be commenced immediately on receiving tidings that the French troops have overstepped the line they at present occupy in the north of Germany.

4thly. All the means which we ourselves propose to employ to the same end being by that time ready for active employment, we engage, in the most formal manner, to march to the assistance of his Prussian majesty at the first warning, and with the greatest possible despatch.

5thly. The forces which we shall employ in the defence of the rest of the north of Germany, will amount to forty thousand regular troops, and will be augmented, if need be, to fifty thousand. His majesty the King of Prussia, on his part, engages to employ for the same object an equal number of regular troops. Military operations once commenced, we undertake not to lay down our arms, nor come to any terms with the common enemy, except with the consent of his Prussian majesty, and after preliminary agreement with him; it being distinctly understood that his majesty the King of Prussia equally obliges himself not to lay down his arms, nor come to any terms with the common enemy, except with our consent, and after preliminary agreement with us.

6thly. Immediately after the commencement of hostilities, or earlier if it shall seem expedient to the two contracting courts, the King of Denmark and the Elector of Saxony will be invited to give their adhesion to this compact, and to co-operate with it by means proportioned to their power, as will also be invited all the other princes and states of the north of Germany, who, from the proximity of their territories, will participate in the benefits of the present arrangement.

7thly. After the proposed end shall be attained, we reserve to ourselves to concert with his Prussian majesty as to the ulterior measures to be taken for entirely freeing the soil of the Germanic empire from the presence of foreign troops, and for solidly and permanently securing this happy result, by devising such an order of things as shall prevent Germany from being again exposed to the inconveniences which she has suffered since the commencement of the present war.

This declaration is to be exchanged against one of similar purport, signed by his majesty the King of Prussia, and we pledge our imperial troth and word faithfully to fulfil the engagements we have herein taken. In witness whereof we have signed these presents with our own hand, and have caused the seal of our empire to be affixed thereto. Given at St. Petersburg, on this

1864, and fourth year of our reign

thing would have been right and consistent, if the affected indifference of the court of Austria had been displayed at St. Petersburg, and the Russian promptitude in complaining had been manifested at Vienna. No one could have been surprised if the emperor had temperately, but firmly, demanded explanations from the First Consul in respect of a violation of territory, which must necessarily cause great anxiety in Germany. But nothing of the sort occurred: precisely the contrary was the case. At St. Petersburg they were young, inexperienced, and, above all, they were far from France; at Vienna they were prudent, dissimulating, and, above all, very close to the conqueror of Marengo. They were silent. M. de Cobentzel, urged by M. de Champagny, rather than urging him, to explanation, said that he understood the hard necessities of policy, that he certainly regretted an event that was calculated to give rise to new perplexities in Europe, but that, as far as he was concerned, the cabinet of Vienna would only guard, even more anxiously than ever, against the disturbance of the continental peace.

Fully to appreciate the conduct of the cabinet of Vienna on this occasion, it must be known, that while awaiting a favourable opportunity to regain what she had lost, an opportunity which she did not wish imprudently to create, that cabinet watched with eager curiosity what was passing at Boulogne, cherishing very naturally the hope that the French armies might be overwhelmed by the ocean, but by no means wishing to attract their irresistible superiority towards the banks of the Danube. In the interval, the cabinet of Vienna availed itself of the occupation afforded to France by the maritime war, to settle in its own way the questions which had been left unsettled by the recess of 1803. These questions, left unsettled for want of time, it will be remembered, were the following:—The proportion to be established between the Catholic and the Protestant votes in the College of Princes; the maintenance or the suppression of the immediate nobility; the new division of the territory into circles for the police, and preservation of order in Germany; the reorganization of the Germanic church; the sequestration of real and personal property belonging to the secularized ecclesiastical principalities, and other matters of minor consequence. The gravest of these questions in its results, was the delay made in the new organization of the circles, as it produced an absence of police, which left every thing in the power of the stronger party. France being at this time wholly bent upon maritime war, and, moreover, separated from Russia, there was no longer any foreign influence capable of aiding the oppressed states, and the whole empire was a prey to anarchy.

At the close of the negotiation of 1803, Austria had sequestered those dependencies of the

secularized principalities which were within her grasp. It will be remembered, that some of these ancient ecclesiastical principalities possessed funds deposited in the bank of Vienna; others territories surrounded by various German states. These funds and territorial possessions naturally belonged to the indemnified princes. Austria, alleging some obscure maxim of the feudal law, had sequestered upwards of thirty millions of capital, which was lodged in the bank of Vienna, or invested in the public funds. The heaviest loss had fallen on Bavaria and the house of Orange. Austria did not stop here in her aggressions. She treated with a number of the petty princes to wring from them certain possessions which they held in Suabia, for the purpose of securing to herself a position on the lake of Constance. She had purchased the town of Lindau from the Prince of Breitenheim, having ceded to him, in exchange, certain territories in Bohemia, with the promise of a vote in the diet as formerly. She had treated with the house of Koenigseck, with the view of obtaining, on similar terms, other lands situated in that country. Finally, Austria had advocated in the diet the creation of new Catholic votes, so as to equalize the strength of the Catholic and Protestant parties. The majority of the diet not appearing disposed to gratify her, she threatened to put an end to all deliberation until this question of the proportion of votes should be decided in conformity to her wishes.

The Germanic princes, injured by the violences of Austria, avenged themselves by committing similar violences upon states weaker than their own. Hesse and Wurtemberg had caused the states of the nobility to be invaded, making no secret of their designs of incorporation. The immediate nobility of Franconia having addressed the imperial chamber of Wetzlar, to obtain an inhibition against the usurpations with which they were threatened, the Hessian government everywhere caused the placard of the decision of the imperial chamber to be torn down, thus showing an example of signal contempt for the tribunals of the empire. Their violences did not end here; they refused to pay the pensions of the clergy, who had been despoiled of their property by the secularizations. The Duke of Wurtemberg! would not pay any of them. Amidst this reciprocity of violence, each was silent as to the proceedings of others, in the hope of thus securing impunity for his own conduct. They did not complain of the sequestrations of Austria, in order that she might wink at the wrongs done to the immediate nobility, and to the unfortunate pensioners who were deprived of their bread. Bavaria, the worst treated by Austria, avenged herself upon the prince arch-chancellor, whose electorate had been transferred from Mayence to Ratisbon. Annoyed at seeing him upon the territory of Ratisbon, which she had long

* DUKE OF WURTEMBERG. Afterwards King Frederick I. In 1806, he took part with France in the war against Austria, in reward for which he was made king, and received an addition to his territories, which gave 300,000 new subjects. On the dissolution of the Empire, he became a member of the German confederation, and took part in all the French wars except that of Spain.

On the downfall of the French empire, he secured all his acquisitions by adherence to the allies. He was a tyrant, but a man of talent, and judiciously promoted the good of his subject, when it was in accordance with his own objects. He died in 1818, and was succeeded by his son William I.—*Encyclopædia Americana*

loveted, she pursued him with her threats, took from him a quantity of lands that were surrounded by her own, and caused him to feel a thousand anxieties for his existence. Prussia followed a like course of action in Westphalia, and was not behindhand with either Bavaria or Austria, in the way of usurpation.

Only two states conducted themselves honestly: firstly, the Prince Arch-Chancellor, who, owing his existence to the arrangements of 1803, endeavoured to make them respected by the members of the confederation; secondly, the Elector of Saxony,¹ who, disinterested amidst these various pretensions, remained unmoved in his ancient principality, had neither lost nor gained any thing, and voted uselessly in favour of the rights of each, in sheer prudence and honesty.

All the culpable concessions that had been made to Austria, in permitting her to oppress some in order that she might tolerate the oppression of others, failed to disarm her, especially as regarded Bavaria. Believing herself strong enough to be able to act openly as she pleased, she took up the cause of the immediate nobility, of which she was the natural and interested protectress, for the sake of the recruiting of her armies.

We have already seen that the immediate nobility, holding from the emperor, and not from the territorial princes by whom their possessions were wedged in, did not owe military contingent to these latter. Those inhabitants who were of a military turn enrolled themselves in the Austrian corps, and Franconia alone thus supplied more than two thousand recruits annually, who were still more valuable for their quality than for their number. They were, in fact, true Germans, far superior to other Austrian soldiers as to intelligence, courage, and all warlike qualities. They furnished all the sub-officers of the imperial armies, and formed in some sort the German *cadre* into which Austria drafted the subjects of all sorts that she possessed in her vast dominions. In consequence she was resolved to brave every thing except a war with France, rather than yield. Without troubling herself about the reproaches that might be made her for excess of power, she brought before the aulic council, as an act of violence cognisable exclusively by the police of the emperor, the encroachments committed upon the immediate nobility; and with a promptitude very uncommon in Germanic proceedings, had an interlocutory decision pronounced, called *conservatorium* in the constitutional language of the empire, and intrusted its execution to four confederated states—Saxony, Baden, Bohemia, and Ratisbon. By Bohemia on the one side, by the Tyrol on the other, she put eighteen battalions in motion, and threatened Bavaria with an immediate in-

vasion should she not withdraw her troops from the various lordships which she had invaded. It will easily be understood that Austria, thus situated, was extremely anxious to conciliate the First Consul, for though much occupied towards the ocean, he was not the man to recoil in any point. Moreover, the irritation to which he had been roused, rendered him more susceptible and more redoubtable than ever. This it is that explains the reserve of the Austrian diplomatists upon the death of the Duc d'Enghien, and the real or affected unconcern which they displayed at the occurrence of so grave an event.

We have already described the effect produced upon the First Consul by the attacks directed against his person. The benefits which he had taken a pleasure in heaping upon the emigrants had not disarmed their hatred. The consideration which he had shown to Europe had not calmed its jealousy. Irritated to the highest degree at being so ill-requited, he felt a sudden revolution take place in his soul, and he was more inclined to ill-treat all whom previously he had the most cherished. The reply to the manifestations of which we have spoken had not to be waited for; and after having deplored his having been misled by his passions, we shall again have occasion to admire the grandeur of his character.

The court of Prussia had become reserved, and no longer spoke of alliance. The First Consul was silent, too, towards her; but sharply reprimanded M. de Laforest, for having in his despatches too faithfully reported the public impression at Berlin. As regarded the court of Russia, the reply was instantaneou and merciless. General Hédouville had orders to quit St. Petersburg within eight-and-forty hours, without alleging any other reason for his departure than the state of his health; the customary reason by which diplomatists leave room for guessing at what they do not care to say. He was to leave it unknown, too, whether he left only for a short time or for good and all. M. de Rayneval alone was to remain in quality of *chargé d'affaires*. Since the dismissal of M. de Markoff, only an agent of that rank, M. de Obril, had remained at Paris. The First Consul then returned to the despatch of the Russian cabinet a reply which must have been bitter indeed to the emperor. He was reminded in that note, that France, after behaving in the handsomest manner towards Russia, and after conceding to her a half voice in all the great affairs of the continent, had met with no good return; that she had found the Russian diplomatic agents, without an exception, hostile and malevolent; that, in contravention of the late treaty which bound the two courts not to embarrass each other, the cabinet of St. Petersburg had accredited French emigrants to foreign courts, and covered cou-

¹ ELECTOR OF SAXONY.—FREDERICK AUGUSTUS III. In 1806 he sent 20,000 Saxons to the support of Prussia; but after the battle of Jena negotiated a peace with France, and acceded to the confederation of the Rhine. In 1807 and 1809, he received large accessions of territory, but they were merely temporary. In the war of 1813, Saxony was the scene of the great struggle between Napoleon and the northern allies, the battles of Lützen, Bautzen, Dresden and Leipzig, being all fought on Saxon

soil. The fate of Saxony was the first subject of discussion at the Congress of Vienna, and the jealousy of Austria alone preserved it from being swallowed up in Prussia. Its partition was finally determined on in 1814 and one half of the kingdom, with all its salt-works, its finest grain districts and forests, and some valuable mines, was ceded to Prussia.—*Encyclopædia Americana*.

spirators with the pretext of Russian nationality to shelter them from the police of France; that this was violating alike the letter and spirit of treaties; that if they wished for war, they had only frankly to express that wish; that though the First Consul did not wish for war, he assuredly did not fear it, for there was nothing alarming in his reminiscences of the last campaign, (allusion was here made to Suwarow's disaster;) that, as regarded what had taken place at Baden, Russia showed great officiousness in constituting herself the guarantee of the Germanic soil, as her titles to interfere were extremely disputable; that, at all events, France had exercised a legitimate right of defence against plots carried on upon her frontiers, under the eyes and with the knowledge of certain German governments, upon whom she had heaped benefits which had been repaid only with the blackest ingratitude; that she, moreover, had explained to them, and would explain to them only; and that Russia, similarly circumstanced, would have acted as France had acted; for had she been informed that the assassins of Paul I. were assembled at a march from her frontier, would she not have seized them there?

This was pitiless irony to address to a prince, who was reproached with not having punished any one of the murderers of his father, and who was therefore accused, though unjustly enough, of complicity in that horrible crime. It must have convinced the Emperor Alexander of his extreme imprudence in interfering in the affair of the Duc d'Enghien, when the tragical death of Paul I. rendered the retort so easy and so terrible.

Relatively to Germany, Russia having recently approved the conduct of Austria, and the pretension publicly avowed by that power to refer constitutional questions to the aulic council, the First Consul plainly declared, that France thenceforth separated herself from Russian policy, as regarded the future regulation of Germanic affairs; that she did not admit that questions left in suspense were to be settled by the aulic council, a simple tribunal of the emperor, rather than by the empire; that these questions, like all others, ought to be decided in the Diet, the supreme body, the sole depositary of the German sovereignty. The breach, then, was complete in all points, the resolutions as decisive as the language was plain.

As to Austria, the First Consul could not but congratulate himself upon the indifference which she had manifested for the victim of Ettenheim. But he plainly perceived that advantage was taken, at Vienna, of the difficulties which the maritime war seemed to cause him. He wished Austria to be thoroughly undeceived upon that point. There were two ways in which he could combat England, the one by actually grappling with her in the strait of Calais, the other by crushing her allies upon the continent. All things considered, the second plan was both more easy and more certain than the first, and though less direct, would not fail to be effective. Should Austria provoke him, he was determined, without the loss of an instant, to raise his camp at Bou-

logne, and to enter Germany, as he was unwilling to cross the sea until he should have disarmed all the allies, open or concealed, of Great Britain. He caused it to be intimated to the two Cobenzels, as well to the one who was ambassador at Paris as to him who was minister at Vienna, that Bavaria had for ages been the ally of France, and that he would not sacrifice her to the ill-will of Austria; that if she had done wrong in too roughly dealing with the property of the immediate nobility, Austria, by her unjust sequestrations, had forced all the German princes to indemnify themselves by violence for the violence to which they had been subjected; that Bavaria might have acted wrongly, but that he would not allow her to be crushed with impunity, and that unless Austria recalled the battalions which she had despatched into Bohemia and the Tyrol, he was resolved to march an army of forty thousand men upon Munich, where they should keep garrison until the retreat of the imperial troops.

This precise and positive declaration threw the De Cobenzels and the cabinet of Vienna into unspeakable embarrassment. They endeavoured to escape from it by new complaints of the incessant enmity of France to Austria, and of the deep despair to which the latter would be reduced. However, M. de Talleyrand and M. de Champagny were firm, and it was agreed on both sides that Bavaria should evacuate the territories of the immediate nobility, but that the Austrian troops, halting at first in their then positions, should afterwards retrograde, so as not to compromise the dignity of the emperor by too precipitate a retreat. The cabinet of Vienna again made known, that if its wishes were gratified with regard to the proportion of Protestant and Catholic votes in the Diet, the support of Austria might be reckoned upon under all circumstances, and especially in the question which was about to present itself on account of the note addressed by Russia to the Germanic Diet.

That note had arrived at Ratisbon by the same courier who took to Paris the despatches of St. Petersburg. It painfully embarrassed the German princes, for it was a foreign court that invited them to mark their sensitiveness to a violation of the Germanic territory, and should they display that sensitiveness, they would to the highest degree incur the resentment of France. There had not been time to send instructions to the ministers at the Diet, but they, anticipating the dispositions of their respective courts, had appeared inclined rather to neglect the note than to attach any great importance to it. The Prussian minister, M. de Goertz, already conspicuous in Germanic negotiations, was in favour of hushing the business up altogether. But owing to the proximity of Vienna, the Austrian ministers had already received their instructions, and playing, as was their custom, a double part, disapproving of the note when they were in presence of the French agents, and promising to secure its reception when they were in presence of the Russian agents, hit upon a middle course. The note was taken into consideration, but each minister was to refer it to his court, ultimately

decide upon its contents. "You see," said M. de Hugel to the Russian minister, "that we have got your note admitted." "You see," said he to the French minister, "that by adjourning the discussion for two months, we have rendered it harmless, for in two months the proceeding of the Emperor Alexander will no longer be remembered."

Such, in fact, was to be the fate of that rash and inconsiderate proceeding. But to secure that result, more than one embarrassment still remained to be surmounted. The German governments were unwilling to offend either France, whom they feared, or Russia, of whom they might eventually have need. Their ministers, therefore, exerted themselves at Paris to find the solution of the difficulty. "Settle the matter as you find most convenient to you," said the First Consul to them; "if the discussion take place in two months, so as to be officially brought to the consideration of France, my reply will be so lofty and so harsh, that the Germanic dignity will be cruelly humiliated. You will have no choice but to endure that reply, or to take up arms, for I am resolved, if need be, to commence on the Continent my war with Great Britain."

M. de Talleyrand, faithful to his habitual love of peace, endeavoured to find expedients for preventing the rupture. The foreign ministers, fearing the First Consul, and finding in M. de Talleyrand, on the contrary, extreme courtesy, an affability not, however, destitute of dignity, diligently courted him. Among the most assiduous and intelligent of them was M. le duc de Dalberg,¹ nephew of the Prince arch-cancellor, and at that time minister of Baden at Paris. M. de Talleyrand made use of him to influence the court of Baden. After reminding that court of all that it owed to France, who had so greatly aggrandized its territories in the arrangements of 1803, it was also reminded of how much it had to fear, should the war break out again. It was urged to declare at Ratisbon that it had received satisfactory explanations from the French government, and that it, consequently, wished that no proceedings should be taken upon the Russian note. While M. de Talleyrand required it to give a written note to this effect, the cabinet of St. Petersburg, relying upon the relationship between the house of Baden and the imperial family of Russia, endeavoured to modify this declaration, so far as to render it ineffective. But France was both nearer and more powerful, and could not but prevail. Moreover, two months were to elapse before the opening of the discussion; from Paris to Carlsruhe and from Carlsruhe to Paris, drafts of the proposed

note were exchanged and incessantly modified, and it was impossible to fail in hitting at last upon a solution of the difficulty.

The First Consul gave himself but little concern about these goings and comings, and left the matter to his minister for foreign affairs. He had affronted Russia, and had compelled Austria to remain quiet. He had alarmed Prussia by his coldness, and as for the Diet of Ratisbon, he treated it as the representative of an institution falling into decrepitude, in spite of all the efforts he had made to give it a new youth; and he was prepared to remain utterly silent towards it, or to return it some humiliating reply. All these questions, to which the catastrophe of Vincennes had given birth abroad, scarcely sufficed to turn his attention from affairs at home, which had now reached an actual crisis.

Although, in a few days, the impression produced by the death of the Duc d'Enghien underwent that diminution which the weakening power of time effects upon all impressions, however vivid, there still remained a permanent cause of excitement in the proceedings against Georges, Moreau, and Pichegru. In truth, it was a sad though inevitable necessity, that of putting upon their trial so many persons of so different a caste; some, as Messrs. de Rivière and De Polignac, dear to the ancient French aristocracy; others, as Moreau, dear to all who loved the glory of France; nothing could be more untoward and embarrassing while public curiosity was highly excited, and while the malevolent, ever ready to put the most subtle or the most absurd constructions upon the smallest circumstance, were in an unusual state of exasperation. But it was absolutely necessary that justice should be done, and this trial was still for a month or two more to disturb the usual calm of the First Consul's government.

An accident, wholly unforeseen, occurred to add to the dark and sinister aspect of that situation. Pichegru, prisoner of the First Consul, at first suspecting his generosity, and putting but little faith in the offers of clemency conveyed to him by M. Réal, had soon become reassured, and had given himself up with confidence to the idea of preserving his life, and of recovering his honour by founding a grand colony at Cayenne. The offers of the First Consul were sincere, for, in resolving to strike none but royalists, he wished to pardon Moreau and Pichegru. M. Réal, incapable of a bad feeling, experienced, in the progress of this important prosecution, a second misfortune. He had arrived too late at Vincennes, he went too rarely to the cell of Pichegru, where the interests of the prosecution but little required his

¹ DUKE OF DALBERG. FRIEDRICH JOSEPH. Peer of France, nephew of the prince primate, and son of the well-known author Wolfgang Heribert Baron of Dalberg. Born May 31, 1773, at Mentz. He began his public career under the eyes of his uncle at Erfurt, and was in the diplomatic service of Bavaria until he was appointed, in 1803, envoy of the Margrave of Baden at Paris. He then became intimate with the Prince of Benevento, Talleyrand, through whose means he was married to Mlle. de Brignolles. During the campaign of 1800, he received the portfolio of foreign affairs for Baden, without resigning his office of ambassador at Paris. After the peace, he returned to France, became a citizen, and was subsequently created a peer, and councillor of

state. After the marriage of Napoleon with Maria Louisa, the preliminaries for which Dalberg opened with Schwarzenberg, he received a donation of 4,000,000 francs. When Talleyrand fell into disgrace, Dalberg shared his fall, and retired with his patron until the restoration of the Bourbons in 1814.—*Encyc. Americana*.

The Duchess d'Abantes, speaking of the entrance of the allies into Paris, after abusing M. de Talleyrand in round terms, proceeds thus: "After him arrived M. de Dalberg. He was more unpardonable, because Napoleon, instead of giving him any cause of dissatisfaction, had loaded him and his family with wealth and honours. Ingratitude like his is doubly revolting."—*Memoirs of the Duchess d'Abantes*.

presence, seeing that nothing was likely to be drawn from a man so firm and self-possessed as that ex-general of the republic. Absorbed by a thousand cares, M. Réal neglected Pichegru, who, hearing no further mention of the First Consul's proposals, and being informed of the sanguinary execution of Vincennes, supposed that he could not rely upon the clemency which had been offered and promised to him. Death would have been of comparatively little consequence to this warrior, it was the almost inevitable *dénouement* of the culpable intrigues in which he had been engaged since his first lapse from the straight path in 1797; but he would have to appear between Moreau and Georges, the one of whom he had compromised, and to the other of whom he had delivered up his honour by joining in a royalist conspiracy. All the denunciations to which he had been exposed at the epoch of the 18th Fructidor, and which he had repulsed with a feigned indignation, were now about to be justified. With his life he would lose the poor remnants of his already compromised honour. The unfortunate man preferred instant death, but death free from the disgrace which must result from his public trial. This sentiment proves that he was somewhat better than his recent conduct indicated. He had borrowed from M. Réal the works of Seneca. One night, after reading for several hours, and leaving the book open at a passage treating of suicide, he strangled himself by means of his silk cravat and a wooden peg, of which he made a sort of tourniquet. Towards morning, the keepers, hearing some noise in his chamber, entered, and found him suffocated, his face being red, as though he had been seized with apoplexy. The medical men and magistrates who were called in left no doubt as to the cause of his death, and made it abundantly evident for all candid men.

But no proof is sufficiently clear for partisans who are resolved to believe a calumny, or to propagate without believing it. On the instant it was believed among the royalists, who were naturally well pleased to attribute all sorts of crimes to the government, and among idlers who, without malice, are yet delighted to discover in all events more complications than really exist, it was believed that Pichegru had been strangled by the hirelings of the First Consul. This catastrophe, termed that of the Temple, was the completion of the catastrophe termed that of Vincennes; the one was the sequel of the other. The character of the new Nero was thus rapidly developed. After the example of the Roman prince, he passed from good to evil, from virtue to crime, almost without interval. And as those who took the trouble to argue their falsehoods, required some ostensible motive for such a crime, they said that, despairing of convicting Pichegru, they assassinated him, that his presence might not aid his fellow-prisoners on their trial.

This was at once the most absurd and most odious of inventions. If there was any one of the accused whose presence at the trial was peculiarly necessary to the interests of the First Consul, that one was Pichegru. Pichegru, per-

sonally, could not be considered a rival of any moment, since his proven affiliation to the royalist party had destroyed him in the public opinion; moreover, the depositions of the accused of all parties alike overwhelmed him. The man to be feared, if there was one, on account of his still intact glory, and of the difficulty of convicting him, was Moreau; and if any one of the accused could be serviceable against him, it was Pichegru, who had been the connecting link between the royalists and the republicans. Pichegru, in fact, brought to trial, unable to deny either his connection with Georges or his connection with Moreau, and being as unable to explain away as to deny those connections, would inevitably have served to connect Moreau with the royalists—in other words, to cover him with merited confusion. Pichegru, then, was an immense loss to the accusation. In a word, if a crime was to be committed in order to get rid of a dangerous rivalry, it was Moreau and not Pichegru who should thus have been kept from public trial. The supposition, then, was as stupid as it was atrocious. But it was none the less assumed by the gossips of the royalist coteries that the First Consul, to disembarass himself of Pichegru, had caused him to be strangled. This unworthy accusation could not but speedily fall to the ground; but in the mean time it caused much excitement, and the hawkers of false news, by repeating it, aided the perfidy of the inventors. This new misfortune renewed for some days the sad impressions already produced by the conspiracy of the emigrant princes. Those impressions, however, could not be durable. If enlightened men, friends of the First Consul, and jealous of his glory, could not but feel in the depths of their hearts inconsolable regret, the multitude were well convinced that they could fearlessly repose under the protection of a firm and a just hand. No one seriously feared the renewal of executions, exiles, and spoliations. It must even be confessed that the men personally concerned in the Revolution, whether they had acquired public property, public functions, or an embarrassing celebrity, were secretly well pleased to see General Bonaparte separated from the Bourbons by a *foued* stained with royal blood.

However, the sensations produced by political events were then confined to a small number of persons, which every day became more and more limited. The extraordinary participation of the people in public affairs during the Revolution, had given place to a sort of inattention, partaking at once of lassitude and of confidence. In the earlier days of the Consulate, the government was still watched with some degree of anxiety; but soon, perceiving it to be at once so able and so fortunate, men gave themselves up to security and repose, and directed their attention to private affairs, long neglected during a stormy revolution, which had thrown property, commerce, and industry, alike into confusion. Of those aroused masses there now only remained attentive to passing events those classes which possess sufficient leisure and enlightenment to concern themselves with state affairs

and interested men of all parties, emigrants, priests, acquirers of national property, soldiers, and placemen.

Now in the circles thus composed, opinions were divided. If some termed the death of the Duc d'Enghien an abominable crime, others considered that the plots incessantly renewed against the person of the First Consul were no less abominable. These latter argued that in order to repossess themselves of power, the royalists risked the destruction of all government in France; that, supposing the First Consul killed, there would remain no one who could hold the reins of power with a sufficiently strong hand; that anarchy and bloodshed would resume their ascendancy; that, after all, it had been wisely done to act sternly, in order that villains and dupes should be discouraged: that the royalists were incorrigible; that though the First Consul had heaped kindness upon them, they were incapable of being grateful or even resigned; and that, to deal efficiently with them, it had been necessary to make them tremble, at least once. These were the arguments which were repeated in the circles formed around the government, and consisting of the chiefs of the army, of the magistracy, of the administration, the members of the Senate, the Tribunal, and the Legislative Body. And as the impression made by the death of the Duc d'Enghien abated, nearly the same things were repeated even among those peaceful and disinterested men who demanded that they should at length be left in repose, under the protection of the powerful arm that now governed France.

From that conflict of spirits there suddenly sprang up an idea, which was soon propagated with the rapidity of lightning. The royalists, considering the First Consul to be the sole obstacle to their projects, had desired to strike at him, in the hope that the whole government would perish with him. Well! it was now exclaimed, their criminal hopes must be baffled. This man whom they would fain destroy must be made king or emperor, that, hereditary right being added to his power, he may be provided with natural and immediate successors, and that, crime against his person thus becoming useless, there might be the less temptation to commit it. As we have seen, the reaction towards monarchical principles had been rapid during some years. For five directors named for five years, there had been substituted the scheme of three consuls named for ten years; then the scheme of three consuls had been followed by that of one consul, holding power for life. Having entered upon such a course, there was no stopping short of taking the last step; in other words, returning to hereditary power. The slightest impulse given to the public mind sufficed for that. This impulse the royalists had taken it upon themselves to give, in wishing to assassinate the First Consul; and in acting thus, they only presented a very ordinary spectacle, for it most frequently occurs that it is the enemies of a government, who, by their imprudent attacks, enable it to make its most rapid progress.

Al. at once, alike in the Senate, in the Legis-

lative Body, in the Tribunal; not only in Paris, but in the principal towns of the departments where the electoral colleges were assembled, in the camps distributed along the coasts, everywhere and almost simultaneously, monarchy and hereditary succession were extolled. This movement of opinion was natural; it was also in some degree excited by the manifestations of assemblies desirous of paying their court, by prefects who wished to display their zeal, by the generals who wished to attract the notice of an all-powerful master; all well knowing that in advocating monarchy they were in accord with that master's as yet unspoken thought, and that they assuredly would not offend him should they perchance anticipate the moment fixed by his ambition.

Though undictated, the language was everywhere uniform. It was high time, it was said, to put an end to hesitations and to false scruples, and adopt the only stable institution, that is to say, hereditary monarchy. As long as the royalists could hope to destroy the government and the Revolution at a single blow, they would renew their crimes, and perhaps would at length be successful. They would not recommence, or at least they would be the less tempted to do so, should they see beside the First Consul his children, or his brother's, ready to succeed him, and the new government, like the old one, thus possessed of the property of surviving itself. To place a crown upon that precious and sacred head on which reposed the destinies of France, was to furnish it with a buckler which would protect it against the blows of assassins. To protect it was to protect all the interests of the Revolution, to save from a sanguinary reaction the men who were compromised by their errors; it was also to preserve to the acquirers of the national domains their property, to the military their rank, to all the members of the government their position, to France, that government of equality, justice, and grandeur, which she had secured. Moreover, every one, it was added, had returned to sound ideas. Every one now wondered how senseless theorists had persuaded the nation into making of that vast and antique France a republic like that of Sparta and of Athens. Every one now perceived that in replacing the monarchy by a republic, the destroyers had exceeded the original and legitimate objects of the Revolution, which contemplated only the reform of abuses, the abolition of the feudal system, the modification of the royal authority, but not its destruction; that if, in 1802, at the institution of the Consulate for life, a false shame restrained the legislators of France, now, that this false shame had passed away, now that the crimes of the royalists had completely opened all eyes, it was necessary to come to a determination, and settle the form of government by a complete and definitive act; that, after all, this would be merely adding the *de jure* to the *de facto*, as in reality General Bonaparte was king, and an absolute king; while in decreeing him royalty, under its real form, they could treat with him, could limit that royalty, and thus, at one stroke, give durability to the government and guarantees to liberty.

Such was the general language a few days after the painful scenes of which we have spoken above.

What a spectacle was here presented by that nation which, after essaying a sanguinary republic under the Convention, a moderate but inert republic under the Directory, suddenly disgusted with this collective and civil government, loudly demanded to be governed by the hand of a soldier, and was so eager to have one, as to be on the point of selecting the unfortunate Joubert in the absence of General Bonaparte; hailed the latter on his return from Egypt, and entreated him to accept of a power which he was only too impatient to seize, made him Consul for ten years, then for life, and finally hereditary monarch, and all this that it might be guaranteed by the strong arm of a warrior against that anarchy whose frightful spectre incessantly pursued it! What a lesson for the theorists who, in the delirium of their conceit, thought to make France a republic because circumstances had made her a democracy! What had been required to dissipate these ideas! Merely four years, and an abortive conspiracy against an extraordinary man, the object of the love of some, of the hatred of others, and of the intense attention of all! And admire, too, the profundity of this lesson! That man had been the object of a criminal attempt, but he, in his turn, had committed a sanguinary act; and at that very moment men feared not to raise him on the buckler to the throne, so necessary did they feel him to be! They accepted him not less glorious, but less pure. They accepted him with his genius, they would have selected him without it; they would have taken him whatever he was, provided he was powerful; so precious was mere strength so soon after such great disorders! Have we not in our own day seen alarmed nations throw themselves into the arms of indifferent soldiers, because they presented at least the appearances of strength!

In Rome, that old republic, it required the want, long felt, of a single chief, the inconvenience often repeated of the elective transmission of power; it required many generations, Cæsar first, then Augustus after Cæsar, and even Tiberius after Augustus, to habituate the Romans to the idea of monarchical and hereditary power. It did not require so many precautions in France, for a people fashioned to monarchy during twelve centuries, and only during ten years to a republic. It required only a simple accident to return from the dream of some generous but mistaken spirits, to the living and indestructible souvenirs of a whole nation.

In every country torn by factions or threatened by an external enemy, the necessity of being governed and defended will sooner or later lead to the triumph of a powerful personage, powerful as Cæsar at Rome, rich as the Medicis at Florence. If such a country has for a long time been a republic, it will require many generations to fashion it to monarchy; but if that country has always been a monarchy, and the follies of factions have for an instant wrenched it from its natural condition to convert it into an ephemeral republic, it will

require some years of troubles to inspire it with a horror of anarchy, fewer years still to find the soldier capable of putting an end to that anarchy, and the wish of that soldier, or a dagger-thrust of his enemies, to make him king or emperor, and thus restore the country to its habits, and dissipate the dream of those who supposed it possible to alter human nature by vain decrees and by still vainer oaths. Rome and Florence, after having long been republics, tended the one towards the Cæsars and the other towards the Medicis, and were more than half a century in giving themselves to them. England and France, republics of ten years, tended in three or four years to their Cromwell and Napoleon.

Thus the Revolution in those days of rapid reaction, was obliged in the face of Heaven to confess its errors one after the other, and exhibit the most startling contradictions. Let us discriminate, however: when it sought the abolition of the feudal system, equality in the eyes of the law, uniformity of justice, administration and taxation, and the regular intervention of the nation in the state-government, it did not deceive itself; on these points it had exhibited no inconsistency, no contradiction, and it had no errors to confess. When, on the contrary, it aimed at a barbarous and chimerical equality, the absence of all social hierarchy, the continual and tumultuous presence of the multitude in the government, the Republic in a monarchy of twelve centuries, and the abolition of all worship, it was at once senseless and guilty, and could not but have one day to confess its errors before the whole world! But of what consequence are some fleeting errors compared to the immortal truths which, at the expense of its blood, it bequeathed to the human race! Even those errors themselves contained useful and grave lessons given with an incomparable grandeur. If France, in her return to monarchy, obeyed the immutable laws of human society, perhaps her course was too rapid, as is the custom of revolutions. A dictatorship, under the title of protector, sufficed Cromwell. The dictatorship, under the form of a perpetual Consulate, with a power extensive as his genius, and durable as his life, should have sufficed General Bonaparte for the accomplishment of all the good that he meditated, to reconstruct that annihilated ancient society, to transmit it, after having re-organized it, either to his heirs, if he were to have such, or to those who, more fortunate, were some day to enjoy the fruit of his toils. In sooth, it was decreed in the councils of Providence, that the Revolution, in retrograding, should go beyond the re-establishment of the monarchical form to the re-establishment of the ancient dynasty itself. To accomplish the noble task of General Bonaparte, the dictatorship, under the form of the Consulate for life, should, in our opinion, have sufficed, and in making him an hereditary monarch, that was attempted which was hurtful alike to his moral greatness and to the grandeur of France. Not that they were without full right who wished to convert a soldier into a king or an emperor: the nation, uncontestedly, could transmit to whom it chose, and to a sublime soldier still more than to any

one else, the sceptre of Charlemagne and of Louis XIV. But that soldier, in his natural and proper position of the first magistrate of the French Republic, had no earthly equal, even upon the loftiest thrones. In becoming an hereditary monarch, he was to be put in comparison with kings, little or great, and ranked as their inferior in one point—that of blood. Even though it were only to the eyes of prejudice, he was to be below them in something. Received among them and flattered, because feared by them, he would in secret be disdained by the puniest among them. But what is graver still, when he should have become king or emperor, what would he not attempt in order to become king of kings, chief of a dynasty of monarchs, holding from his new throne! What stimulants for an ambition already too much excited, and which could perish only by its own excesses.

In our humble opinion, at least, the institution of the Consulate for life was a wise and politic measure, and the indispensable completion of the dictatorship, which had become necessary: the re-establishment of the monarchy in the person of Napoleon Bonaparte was not a usurpation, (a word borrowed from the language of the emigrants,) but an act of vanity on the part of him who too readily lent himself to it, and of imprudent avidity on the part of new convertites, eager to devour that reign of an instant. If it be only considered as a lesson to mankind, we must confess that of all the lessons that Providence bestows upon nations, the most instructive and the most profound was given by this heroic soldier, and by these republicans recently converted to monarchy, all alike eager to invest themselves in the purple upon the ruins of that Republic of ten years, to which they had taken a thousand oaths. Unhappily, France, who had paid with her blood for their republican delirium, was to pay with her grandeur for their new-born monarchical zeal; for it is for the sake of having French kings in Westphalia, in Naples, and in Spain, that France has lost the Rhine and the Alps. Thus, in all things France was destined to instruct the universe: what glory and yet what calamity for a nation!

At every change there are needed men to realize the ideas which are in all minds; in other words, instruments. For the revolution that approached there was a man very singularly fitted for the purpose. Hitherto M. Fouché, with a remnant of sincerity, had blamed the rapidity of the reaction which reconducted France towards the past; he had even obtained the good opinion of Madame Bonaparte by appearing to partake her perplexed fears; but he had, on the same account, incurred the censure of her husband. By playing this unthankful part of a secret disapprover, M. Fouché had lost his post, and he was not the man to play so losing a part much longer. Accordingly he chose the very opposite course. Spontaneously directing the police in the inquiry into the recent conspiracy, he had restored himself to office. Seeing that the First Consul was much embittered against the royalists, he had humoured his anger, and had urged him on to the immolation of the

Duc d'Enghien. If the idea, which has often been attributed to the First Consul, of making a sanguinary compact with the revolutionists, and of thus obtaining the crown at the price of a frightful gage, if this idea ever entered the mind of any man of that day, assuredly it entered the mind of M. Fouché. Approving the death of the Duc d'Enghien, he also was among the most ardent of the new partisans of hereditary succession. In his zeal for monarchy he surpassed Messrs. de Talleyrand, Roederer, and Fontanes.

Doubtless, the First Consul needed no encouragement to aspire to the throne. He wished for the supreme rank, but without it having been, as the mere herd of narrators have supposed, his constant aim, from the time of his campaigns in Italy, or even from the 18th Brumaire; no, he had not conceived such desires at once. His ambition, like his fortune, had grown up by degrees. Arrived at the command of armies, he from that lofty position perceived loftier positions still in the government of the Republic, and aspired to them. Having gained those, he saw still above him that of the perpetual Consulate, and similarly aspired to that. From that eminence he saw the throne, and aspired to mount it. Such is the march of human ambition, nor was that to be called a crime. But to clear-seeing minds this incessantly excited and never satisfied ambition was a danger; for still to gratify was still to excite it.

But at the moment of seizing upon a power which does not naturally belong to him, even the most daring genius hesitates, if he does not tremble. In such situations, an involuntary shame seizes upon the most ardent ambition, and prevents it from avowing its whole desire. The First Consul, who consulted but little with his brothers upon state affairs, found in them, when his personal grandeur was in question, confidants to whom he loved to open his whole thought, and confidants more ardent than he himself was, for they burned to become princes. It will be remembered, that they looked upon the Consulate for life with no pleased eye, considering it an abortive attempt. At the period to which we now refer, Lucien was absent, and Joseph was about to quit Paris. Lucien in one of his headstrong fits of indiscretion, had married a widow, handsome indeed, but very inferior in position to the Bonaparte family. Having quarrelled with his brother on account of this marriage, Lucien had retired to Rome, playing the part of an exile, and seeking in the enjoyments of the arts, consolation for fraternal ingratitude. Madame Lætitia Bonaparte, who, beneath the humility of a woman born poor, and affecting to remember that fact, concealed some of the passions of an empress-mother, constantly and unjustly complained of Napoleon, and showed a marked preference to her son Lucien, whom she had followed to Rome. The First Consul, full of affection for his relatives, even when he had reason to be displeased with them, had accompanied his mother and brother with his all-powerful protection, and had recommended them to the kindness of Pius VII.; stating that his brother went to

Rome to indulge his taste for the arts, and his mother for the benefit of a mild climate. Pius VII. paid his illustrious guests the most delicate and anxious attentions.

Joseph, also, was discontented, but wherefore one would never guess, did not history take the trouble to relate it. He was offended because the First Consul had wished to name him president of the Senate, and he had refused that high office in the tone of an insulted man, when it was offered to him by M. Cambacérés, on the part of the First Consul. The latter, who detested idleness, then caused him to be told to go and seek greatness where he himself had found it, in the army. Joseph, named colonel of the fourth regiment of the line, set out for Boulogne at the moment the great question of the re-establishment of monarchy was mooted. The First Consul, therefore, was deprived of two confidants to whom he would gladly have unbosomed himself on what concerned his personal grandeur. M. de Cambacérés, to whom he usually spoke out upon all subjects whether general or personal—M. Cambacérés, at the epoch of the institution of the Consulate for life, had spared him the embarrassment of avowing his wishes, by taking the initiative, and becoming the instrument of a change which was universally approved. But, now, M. Cambacérés was silent for two reasons, one of them good, the other bad. The good reason was, that, with his rare sagacity, he feared the flights of an unlimited ambition. He had heard mention made of the Empire of the Gauls, of the Empire of Charlemagne, and he trembled to see the solid grandeur of the treaty of Lunéville sacrificed to gigantic enterprises in consequence of the elevation of General Bonaparte to the imperial throne. The less worthy reason was his clashing interest, for he was about to find himself separated by all the height of the throne from the First Consul, and from being a co-partner in the sovereignty, small as might be his share in it, to become the simple subject of the future monarch. The third consul, Lebrun, perfectly devoted, but never interfering in any thing but the administration, could not be of any use.

M. Fouché, in the ardour of his zeal, made himself the spontaneous instrument of the approaching change. He approached the First Consul, whose secret desires he had discerned, represented to him the necessity for taking a prompt and decisive step, the urgency of putting an end to the anxieties of France, by placing the crown upon his head, and thus definitively consolidating the work of the Revolution. He described all classes of the nation as being animated by the same sentiments, and impatient to proclaim Napoleon Emperor of the Gauls, or Emperor of the French, as might best suit his policy or his taste. He returned often to the charge, endeavouring to enforce the advantages of the opportunity now presented, when all France, alarmed for the life of the First Consul, was disposed to grant whatever he might ask. He passed from exhortations almost to reproaches, and sharply twitted the hesitations of General Bonaparte. The latter had not quitted his retreat at Malmaison since the affair of Vincennes. M.

Fouché repaired incessantly to Malmaison, and when he could not join the First Consul, while walking out, he seized upon his private secretary, M. de Menneval, and demonstrated to him, at full length, all the advantages of hereditary monarchy, and not only of monarchy but of aristocracy, as the support and ornament of the throne; adding, that if the Consul would re-establish it, he was ready to defend the wisdom of that new creation, and, if necessary, even to become a noble himself.

Such was the zeal of this ex-republican, so completely convinced of his past errors. His restless activity, more excited on this occasion than was usual, led him to move even further than there was need. He bustled about, like those people who would fain have the merit of urging forward that which goes by itself.

In fact, there was no one who was not disposed to second the wishes of the First Consul. France, having long witnessed the rise of a master, who, moreover, had heaped benefits and glory upon her, would not refuse him whatever title might be most agreeable to his ambition. The bodies of the state, the chiefs of the army, who knew how impossible all resistance had become, and who, in the ruin of Moreau, had seen the danger of an ill-timed opposition, threw themselves eagerly before the new Cæsar, that they might at least be distinguished for their zeal, and profit by an elevation which there was no longer time to prevent. It is the common disposition of mankind to profit by the ambition which they cannot combat with success, and to console their envy by their avidity. There was but one embarrassment felt by all, namely, to resume the use of words which had been proscribed, and to repudiate others which had been adopted with enthusiasm. A slight precaution in the choice of a title for the future monarch could facilitate the object. Thus, in calling him emperor, and not king, the difficulty was much diminished. Moreover, no one was better fitted to relieve the existing generation from such an embarrassment, than an ex-Jacobin like M. Fouché, taking upon himself the task of giving an example to all, master and subjects, and hastening to be the first to speak words which others, as yet, dared not have on their lips.

M. Fouché arranged every thing with some leaders of the Senate; the First Consul seeing and approving all that he did, but feigning to have no hand in any thing. They feared to take the initiative in the French journals, for their absolute dependence upon the police would have given their opinion the character of a forced one. We had secret agents in England, and they contrived to have it stated in certain English journals, that since the last conspiracy Bonaparte was anxious, gloomy, and threatening; that every one in Paris was in a state of anxiety; that it was the natural consequence of a government in which every thing depended upon one head; and that, consequently, all peaceable men wished that hereditary succession, established in the Bonaparte family, should give the existing order of things that stability of which it was destitute. Thus the English press, usually employed in calumniating the First Consul, was now em-

played in serving his ambition. These articles, copied and commented upon, caused a very lively sensation, and gave the signal that was waited for. At this period there were several electoral colleges assembled in L'Yonne, the Var, the Upper Pyrenees, the Nord, and the Rôer. It was easy to obtain addresses from them. Addresses were also suggested to the municipal councils of the great towns, such as Lyons, Marseilles, Bordeaux and Paris. Finally, the camps scattered along the coast were in their turn thrown into fermentation. Military men, in general, were of all classes the most devoted to the First Consul. With the exception of a certain number of officers and generals, some of whom were sincere republicans, and others animated by the old rivalry which divided the armies of the Rhine and of Italy, most of the chiefs of the army saw their own personal elevation, in the elevation of a warrior to the throne of France. They were consequently quite ready to take the initiative, and, as had often been done in the Roman empire, to make an emperor themselves. General Soult wrote to the First Consul, that he had heard generals and colonels demanding the establishment of a new form of government, and expressing their readiness to give the First Consul the title of Emperor of the Gauls. The general asked for orders on this point. Petitions were circulated in the divisions of dragoons that were encamped at Compiègne; these petitions were covered with signatures, and were about to arrive in Paris.

On Sunday, 4 Germinal—25th of March—some days after the death of the Duc d'Enghien, numerous addresses from the electoral colleges were presented to the First Consul. Admiral Gauteaume, one of his most devoted friends, himself presented the address of the college of the Var, of which he was president. It said, in formal terms, that it was not sufficient to seize and to punish conspirators, but that it was necessary, by a large system of institutions which should consolidate and perpetuate power in the hands of the First Consul and his family, to secure the repose of France and terminate its long anxieties. Other addresses were read at the same reception, and immediately after these manifestations came one of a more elevated order. M. Fontanes had received the presidency of the Legislative Body, and thus, by the favour of the Bonaparte family, had obtained a place that he had merited by his talents alone. It devolved on him to congratulate the First Consul upon the completion of an immortal work, the Civil Code. That code, the fruit of so many studious vigils, a monument of the strong will and comprehensive intellect of the chief of the Republic, had been terminated in the present session, and the grateful Legislative Body had determined to consecrate that souvenir by placing in its hall a marble bust of the First Consul. It was this determination that M. de Fontanes announced at this reception; and certainly, of all the services of the man whom it was intended to honour, there was not one that more merited remembrance, at the moment when he was about to be made hereditary sovereign of a

country organized by his genius. M. de Fontanes expressed himself as follows:—

"CITIZEN FIRST CONSUL:

"For four years an immense empire has reposed under the shelter of your powerful administration. The wise uniformity of your laws is about still more to unite all its inhabitants. The Legislative Body wishes to consecrate this memorable epoch: it has decreed that your bust, placed in the centre of its hall of deliberations, shall eternally remind it of your services, and of the duties and the hopes of the French people. The double right of conqueror and legislator has always imposed silence on all others; you have seen it confirmed in your person by the national suffrage. Who could again nourish the criminal hope of dividing France against France? Will she divide herself for some reminiscences of the past, when she is united by all the interests of the present? She has but one chief, yourself; she has but one enemy, England.

"Political tempests may perhaps have thrown even some wise men into unforeseen routes. But as soon as your hand raised the standard of the country, all good Frenchmen recognised and followed it. All passed over to the side of your glory. Those who conspire in the bosom of a hostile country, irrevocably renounce their natural soil; and what can they oppose to your ascendancy? You have invincible armies, they have only libels and assassins; and while the voice of religion is raised in your favour at the foot of those altars which you have restored, they cause you to be insulted by some obscure organs of rebellion and superstition. The impotence of their plottings is proven. They daily render destiny more severe by struggling against its decrees. Let them yield at length to that irresistible movement which sways the universe, and meditate in silence on the causes of the ruin and elevation of empires."

That abjuration of the Bourbons, made in presence of the designated new monarch, and with that solemnity of language, was, though indirect, the most significant of all the manifestations. However, it was determined to publish nothing until the most elevated body in the State, the Senate, charged by the Constitution with taking the initiative, had made a first movement.

In order to provoke this movement it was necessary to come to an understanding with M. Cambacérés, who presided over the Senate. For this purpose it was necessary to confer with him, and secure his co-operation; not that any resistance on his part was to be feared, but his mere disapproval, even if a silent one, would have been a real inconvenience in a case in which it was necessary that the impulse should seem to be universal.

The First Consul sent for Messrs. Lebrun and Cambacérés at Malmaison. M. Lebrun, as being the easier to persuade, was the first sent for. No effort was necessary in his case, for he was a decided partisan of monarchy, and more especially under the sovereignty of General Bonaparte than of any one else. M. Cambacérés, discontented with what was in

progress, arrived when the conference with his colleague Lebrun was already far advanced. The First Consul, after having spoken of the movement which had arisen in the public mind, asked the opinion of the second consul upon the question, then so much canvassed, of the re-establishment of monarchy.

"I shrewdly suspected," replied M. Cambacérés, "that that was what was to be spoken of. I see that every thing tends to that end, and I am very sorry for it." Then ill concealing the personal vexation which mingled with his prudent views, M. Cambacérés stated to the First Consul the grounds of his opinion. He depicted the republicans as being discontented that they were to be deprived of even the name of the phantom which they had pursued; the royalists revolted at seeing the throne re-erected without a Bourbon being seated upon it; he pointed out the danger of pushing the return to the old system so far, that very soon it would only require the substitution of one person for another to re-establish the old monarchy. He repeated the remarks of the royalists themselves, who boasted that in General Bonaparte they had a precursor charged with paving the way for the return of the Bourbons. He pointed out the inconveniences of a new change, productive of no advantage beyond a vain title, for the power of the First Consul was already unlimited; and he observed that frequently it was more perilous to change the name of things than to change the things themselves. He alleged the difficulty of obtaining from Europe the recognition of the monarchy that it was proposed to found, and the still greater difficulty of obtaining from France the effort of a third war, in order to wring the recognition from the old monarchies; in short, he put forth a variety of reasons, some good, some middling, and tinged with an ill temper by no means usual to so staid a personage. But he dared not mention the best, though he well knew them; namely, that if this new gratification of an immense ambition were granted, there was no point at which they could stop short; for in decreeing to General Bonaparte the title of Emperor of the French, they would prepare him to desire that of Emperor of the West, to which he secretly aspired, and which was by no means the least of the causes which urged him to go beyond all the limits of the possible, and to perish in so doing. Like every annoyed and constrained man, M. Cambacérés did not put forth his best arguments, and was beaten by his interlocutor. The First Consul, so dissimulating at the time of the institution of the Consulate for life, now made that step which was not made towards him. He frankly confessed to his colleague that he wished to take the crown, and he declared why. He maintained that France desired a king; that this was evident to any one capable of observation; that she daily receded from the follies which had been put into her head, and that of all those follies the Republic was the most signal; that the eyes of France were so completely opened to her defects, that she would take a Bourbon if they would not give her a Bonaparte; that the return of the Bourbons would be a calamity, for that would be a pure coun-

ter-revolution, and that, for himself, without wishing for more power than he already possessed, he yielded on this occasion to the public will and to the interests of the Revolution itself; that, for the rest, it was necessary to come to a resolution, for the excitement was such in the army, that they would probably proclaim him Emperor in the camps, and that then his elevation to the throne would resemble the act of Prætorians, which was above all things to be avoided.

These reasonings had but little weight with M. Cambacérés, who had no inclination to allow himself to be convinced, and each remained of his own opinion, vexed at having advanced too far. This unforeseen opposition of M. Cambacérés embarrassed the First Consul, who, feigning to feel less impatience than he really did feel, told his two colleagues that he would not interfere at all, but leave the public excitement to take its own course. They parted in mutual discontent, and M. Cambacérés returning to Paris with M. Lebrun, towards the middle of the night, addressed these words to him: "All is finished, the monarchy is re-established, but I have a presentiment that what is being plastered up will not be durable. We have made war upon Europe to give her republics, daughters of the French republic; henceforth we shall make war to give her monarchies, sons or brothers of our own, and exhausted France will end by sinking beneath those silly enterprises."

But this disapprobation of M. Cambacérés was the most silent and inactive of all resistances. He allowed M. Fouché and his assistants to act as they pleased. An excellent opportunity presented itself to them. According to the custom of addressing to the Senate communications upon important events, there had been presented to it a report of the Grand-juge, relative to the intrigues of the English diplomatic agents, Drake, Spencer Smith and Taylor. It was necessary to reply to this communication of the government. The Senate had named a committee to prepare the draft of a reply. The leaders, seeing a favourable occasion, exerted themselves to persuade the senators that the time had arrived for taking the initiative on the subject of re-establishing monarchy; that the First Consul hesitated, but that it was necessary to overcome his hesitations by denouncing to him the gaps in the existing institutions, and by indicating to him how they could be filled up. They hinted cautiously at the unpleasantness to which, two years previously, the Senate was exposed through halting behind the wishes of General Bonaparte. They plainly advanced a very specious reason for the Senate not allowing itself to be outstripped. The army, argued they, excited to the highest pitch in favour of their chief, was ready to proclaim him Emperor, and then the empire, as at Rome, would be the gift of the Prætorians. It was necessary to make haste, that France might be spared such a scandal. They would only imitate in this the example of the Roman Senate, which, more than once, hastened to proclaim certain emperors, in order to avoid receiving them from the hands of the legions. Then came a

reason which needed not to be spoken aloud or whispered; it was, that there still remained for distribution a great part of the senatorships instituted at the same time as the Consulate for life, which procured an endowment of land, in addition to the pecuniary salary allowed to each senator. There would also be a profusion of new places to distribute. It was necessary, therefore, as they could not resist the elevation of a new master, not to run the risk of displeasing him. It must be added, that to these baser reasonings some better ones were joined. Except a by no means numerous opposition, of which M. Sieyès was the original founder, but with which, as with every thing else, he had become disgusted, and which he had abandoned to subaltern leaders; with the exception of this opposition, the mass saw in monarchy the port in which the Revolution must seek its safety.

These reasons, so various in character, gained over the majority of the Senate, and it was determined to make a significant reply to the message of the First Consul. The following is the substance of that reply.

The institutions of France are incomplete in two respects. Firstly, there is no tribunal for great crimes against the state, which must be referred to an insufficient and weak jurisdiction. (What passed at the tribunal of the Seine, during the proceedings against Georges and Moreau, inspired every one with this opinion.) Secondly, the government of France rests upon a single head, which is a continual temptation to conspirators, who imagine that, by striking at that head, they can destroy every thing. Here is a double gap which it is necessary to point out to the wisdom of the First Consul, to awaken his solicitude, and induce him, if need be, to take the initiative.

On the 6th Germinal—27th March—the second day after the audiences reported above, the Senate was summoned to deliberate upon this draft of reply. M. Fouché and his friends had prepared every thing, without giving notice to M. Cambacérès, who usually presided in the Senate. It appeared that they had not even apprised the First Consul, in order that they might give him an agreeable surprise. That surprise was by no means so agreeable to M. Cambacérès, who was stupefied on hearing the draft of the committee read. However, he preserved an unruffled countenance, and allowed nothing to be perceived by the numerous eyes that were fixed upon him, for it was desired to know how far all this was agreeable to the First Consul, whose confidant and accessory Cambacérès was supposed to be. During the reading of the draft of the committee, a very slight but still perceptible murmuring was heard in a part of the Senate; nevertheless, the draft was adopted by an immense majority, and it was determined that it should be communicated to the First Consul on the very next day.

Scarcely had M. Cambacérès left this sitting of the Senate, when, offended at not having been advertised, he wrote to the First Consul at Malmaison instead of going thither in person, and, in a very cool letter, communicated to him all that had taken place. The First

Consul returned on the following day to receive the Senate, and wished to have a previous explanation with his two colleagues. He appeared astonished at the precipitation of the procedure, and in some sort taken by surprise. "I have not sufficiently reflected," said he to M. Cambacérès; "I need to consult farther with you, and many others, before I determine. I will reply to the Senate that I will deliberate. But I will neither receive it publicly, nor publish its message. I will not let any thing be noised abroad until my resolution shall be definitively taken." This was what was agreed upon, and executed that same day.

The First Consul received the Senate as he had announced, and replied verbally to its members, that he thanked them for their testimonies of devotion, but that he must maturely deliberate upon the subject submitted to his attention, previous to making a public and definitive reply.

Although he witnessed, and was a silent accessory to all that had taken place, the First Consul was almost outstripped in his wishes. The impatience of his partisans had surpassed his own, and he evidently was not ready. The address of the Senate, therefore, was not published; for although absolute secrecy was impossible, yet as long as no official and avowed proceedings were taken, it was always possible to recede, should any unforeseen obstacle be encountered.

Previous to advancing too far to retrograde, the First Consul wished to be secure of the army and of Europe. In the main, he did not doubt either, for he was dear to the first, and dreaded by the second. But it was a severe sacrifice to impose upon his companions in arms, who had poured out their blood for France, and not for one man; it was a severe sacrifice to impose upon them, to wish them to accept him for their sovereign. And, considering the effect produced on Europe by the death of the Duc d'Enghien, it was a singular act of condescension to ask of all the legitimate princes, to ask them to recognise as their equal a soldier who, but a few days before, had imbued his hands in the blood of the Bourbons. However much ground there might be to expect that the power of a soldier would extort assent, it was wise to be assured of it beforehand.

The First Consul wrote to General Soult, and to those of the generals in whom he had the most confidence, to ask their opinion as to the proposed change. He said that he had not come to any fixed determination, sought nothing but that which was best for France, and wished, previous to coming to any decision, to have the opinion of the chiefs of the army. Assuredly, the reply was not doubtful; but to ask it was, at the least, to fish for protestations of devotion, which would serve for example, and urge forward lukewarm or refractory spirits.

As regarded Europe, the complaisance, though probable in the main, yet presented some doubt. We were at war with Great Britain; in that quarter, therefore, nothing needed to be done, the consent of that power being wholly out of the question. The recent rela-

tions with Russia rendered it a point of dignity not to address her. There remained Spain, Austria, Prussia, and the smaller powers. Spain was too weak to refuse any thing, but the outpoured blood of a Bourbon made it imperative to allow some weeks to pass before having recourse to her. Austria had appeared the least sensible of all the powers to the violation of the Germanic territory, and in her profound indifference to every thing but her own interest, there was nothing that might not be expected from her. But in matters of etiquette she was rigid, punctilious, sensitive, as that court might well be whose antiquity and whose titles were unequalled. An emperor (for that title was decided upon as at once newer, greater, and more military than that of king,) an emperor to add to the list of sovereigns was not a very easy thing to make acceptable to the head of the holy Roman empire.

Prussia, notwithstanding her recent coolness, was still the power most easy to render favourable. A courier, therefore, was immediately despatched to Berlin, with an order to M. de Laforest to see M. d'Haugwitz, to learn from him whether the First Consul might hope to be recognised by the King of Prussia, in quality of hereditary Emperor of the French. This was to be asked in such wise as to place the young king between a lively gratitude or a bitter resentment on the part of France. M. de Laforest was ordered to leave no trace of this step in the archives of the legation. As for Austria, without writing to M. de Champagny, and without risking a direct overture, means of acting were at hand, namely to sound M. de Cobenzel, who professed to M. de Talleyrand an immediate desire to gratify the First Consul. M. de Talleyrand was the very minister for such a negotiation. He obtained very gratifying assurances from M. Cobenzel, the most satisfactory language, but nothing positive. It was necessary to refer to Vienna for positive instructions.

The First Consul was, therefore, obliged to wait for a fortnight before he could reply to the Senate, and allow the architects of his new grandeur to pursue their work. However, addresses were still allowed to arrive from the great towns, and the principal authorities. They were not, however, inserted in the *Moniteur*.

The King of Prussia was found in the best possible dispositions. That prince, after having reverted towards Russia, and secretly allied himself to her, feared that he had gone too far in that direction, and that he had too plainly manifested his censure of what had taken place at Eltenheim. He wished, therefore, for nothing better than an opportunity of doing something personally agreeable to the First Consul. M. de Laforest had scarcely

begun to broach the subject to M. d'Haugwitz, when the latter, preventing him from concluding, hastened to declare that the King of Prussia would not hesitate to acknowledge the new emperor of the French. Frederick William fully expected to encounter new censure from the restless coterie that surrounded the queen, but he knew how to brave that censure for the interests of his kingdom, and he considered a good understanding with the First Consul to be the first among those interests. It must be added, that he experienced a feeling which all the other courts were equally to experience, that of satisfaction at seeing the republic abolished in France. Monarchy alone could render them secure, and the Bourbons, appearing for the time being impossible, General Bonaparte was the new monarch whom all the princes expected to behold on the throne of France. This is a new proof, among a thousand others, of the brief duration that certain impressions have among men, especially when they have an interest in effacing them from their hearts. All the courts were about to recognise as emperor that personage whom, in their wrath, they had but a fortnight before called an assassin and a regicide.

The King of Prussia himself wrote to M. de Lucchesini a letter, which was communicated to the First Consul, and which contained the most friendly expressions.

"I unhesitatingly authorize you," said the king, "to seize the earliest possible opportunity to make known to M. de Talleyrand, that after having seen the supreme power conferred for life upon the First Consul, I should see with still greater interest the public order established by his wisdom and his great actions, consolidated by the hereditary establishment of his family, and that I should not hesitate to acknowledge it. You will add, that I indulge the hope that this unequivocal testimony of my sentiments will be equivalent, in his opinion, to all the securities and guarantees that could be offered to him by a formal treaty, of which the bases substantially exist; and that I hope that I, in my turn, may reckon upon his freely reciprocating that friendship and confidence which I should wish to see constantly maintained between the two governments." (23d of April, 1804.)

This language, though sincere in the main, was not, however, altogether consistent with the spirit of the treaty signed with Russia, but the immoderate desire of peace led this prince into equivocations most unworthy of his character.

Matters proceeded differently at Vienna. There no engagement had been entered into with Russia; they did not wish to redeem concession made to one party by concession made to another; they were guided solely by the

for a sovereign prince. By the peace of Lunéville, in 1801, he was forced to yield the Prussian provinces on the left bank of the Rhine to France, for which he was afterward indemnified by the secularized bishoprics, &c. in Germany, gaining by this exchange 4900 square miles, and 400,000 inhabitants. In 1805, England, Austria, and Russia, formed a coalition against France, when Prussia at first maintained her neutrality, but subsequently joined the coalition secretly under cond.

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* **FREDERICK WILLIAM III.**—King of Prussia, son of Frederick William II., and Louisa princess of Hesse Darmstadt, born August 3d. 1770. In the war of Austria and Prussia against France, he displayed the wonted intrepidity of his race. In this campaign he became acquainted with Louisa of Mecklenburg Strelitz, whom he married in 1793. On the death of Frederick William II., he ascended the throne of Prussia, in November 1797. He reformed many abuses, and lived a strictly domestic life, his character being fitter for a private person than

closest calculations of their own interest. The death of the Duc d'Enghien, and the violation of the Germanic territory, were considered to be of minor importance. The only subject of consideration was the return to be exacted for the sacrifice that was to be made in recognising the new emperor. In the first place, notwithstanding the inconvenience of disobliging Russia by conceding a point so eminently agreeable to the French government, it was necessary to make up their minds to recognise Napoleon, for to refuse would be to cause war, or nearly so, with France, and that, at least for the moment, was above all things to be avoided. But it was requisite to derive advantage from the recognition in question, to defer it for a short time, to sell it for certain advantages, and to represent to Russia as the effect of ill-will towards France, the delay employed in negotiating the advantages desired. Such was the Austrian policy, and it must be confessed that it was natural enough among powers which were in a state of perpetual suspicion of each other.

The Austrian party in the empire being so much weakened, it might happen that at the next election the house of Austria would lose the imperial crown. There was a means of warding off this inconvenience, by securing to the house of Austria itself, for its hereditary states, not a royal but an imperial crown, in such wise, that the head of that house would remain Emperor of Austria in the event of any future election causing him to cease to be Emperor of Germany. This is what M. de Champagny, at Vienna, and M. de Cobenzel, at Paris, were charged with demanding from the First Consul as the price of what he demanded for himself. For the rest they were to assure him that, saving the discussion of conditions, the principle of the recognition was at once admitted by the Emperor Francis.

Although the First Consul had entertained but little doubts as to the dispositions of these powers, their replies filled him with satisfaction. He lavished testimonies of gratitude and friendship upon the court of Prussia. He no less warmly thanked the court of Vienna, and added, that he consented without hesitation to recognise the title of emperor, when assumed by the head of the house of Austria. Only, he would not wish to publish that declaration immediately, lest he should appear to purchase the recognition of his own title at any price whatever. He preferred to engage himself, by a secret treaty, to recognise at a future time, the successor of Francis II., as Emperor of Austria, should he lose the quality of Emperor of Germany. Further, if the court of Vienna insisted, he was ready to give way upon this difficulty, which was not one in fact, as all these titles had ceased to have any real importance. From Charlemagne down to the eighteenth century, there was but one single sovereign who bore the title of emperor, at least in the west. Since the eighteenth century, there were two, the Czar of Russia having taken that qualification. In consequence of what was passing in France, there were going to be three. Some day there would be four, if at a future Germanic election any other

prince than the head of the house of Austria should be chosen as emperor. It was even supposed that the King of England, having called the united Parliament of England, Scotland, and Ireland the IMPERIAL PARLIAMENT, might be tempted to style himself Emperor in that case there would be five. All this did not merit to be paused upon. They were mere appellations which no longer had the value which attached to them when Francis I. and Charles V. disputed for the suffrages of the Germanic electors.

Independently of these tranquillizing assurances of the principal courts, the First Consul had received the strongest testimonials of adhesion from the army. General Bonk especially had written him a letter full of the most satisfactory declarations, and during the fifteen or twenty days which had been devoted to corresponding with Vienna and Berlin, the important cities of Lyons, Marseilles, Bordeaux, and Paris, had sent energetic addresses in favour of the re-establishment of monarchy. The impulse was general, the éclat as public as it could be; it was necessary, therefore, to proceed to official steps, and explain to the Senate the posture of affairs.

The First Consul, as has been seen, had not publicly received the Senate, and had made only a verbal reply to the message of the 6th Germinal. He had deferred his official answer for nearly a month. He made it on the 6th Floréal—25th April, 1804—and it brought about the expected dénouement.

"Your address of the 6th Germinal," said the First Consul, "has not ceased to occupy my attention....You have judged the right of inheritance of the supreme magistracy necessary to shelter the French people from the plots of our enemies, and from the agitations which might spring from rival ambitions; many of our institutions have also seemed to you to need perfecting, in order to secure, undecapingly, the triumph of equality and of public liberty, and to afford to the nation and to the government the double guarantee of which they stand in need. In proportion as I have fixed my attention upon these grave objects, I have felt more and more deeply how important to me are the councils of your wisdom and experience under circumstances at once so novel and so important. I therefore invite you fully to explain your views and wishes."

This message was not yet published any more than that to which it served as a reply. The Senate immediately assembled to deliberate. The deliberation was smooth, and the conclusion known beforehand: it was the proposal to convert the Consular Republic into an hereditary empire.

However, it was not advisable that every thing should pass in silence; it was requisite that there should be a debate somewhere, in a body whose discussion was public, of the grand resolution that was contemplated. The Senate did not discuss. The Legislative Body heard official orators, and voted in silence. The Tribunate, though narrowed and converted into a section of the Council of State, still preserved the right of speech. It was resolved to make use of it, that there might be heard, in the only

tribunal which had preserved the privilege of expressing its opposition aloud, some speeches having the appearance of being independent.

The Tribunal was then presided over by M. Fabre de l'Aude, a personage devoted to the Bonaparte family. It was agreed with him to choose a tribune whose anterior opinions had been frankly republican, and to charge him to open the proceedings. The tribune Curée, the compatriot and personal enemy of Cambacérès, was selected to play this part.

It was publicly believed that this personage, the supposed creature of the Second Consul, had been named and put forward by him. Such was not the case. It was without his knowledge, and rather in opposition to him, that M. Curée had been named. The latter, formerly an ardent republican, and now, like many others, completely reconciled to monarchical ideas, submitted a motion in which he proposed the re-establishment of hereditary succession in favour of the Bonaparte family. M. Fabre de l'Aude carried the motion to St. Cloud, to submit it to the approbation of the First Consul. He seemed not to be very fully satisfied with it, and thought the language of the converted republican neither sufficiently dexterous nor sufficiently elevated. However, it would have been inconvenient to choose another member of the Tribunal. He had the copy that was submitted to him retouched, and returned it immediately to M. Fabre de l'Aude. The text had undergone a singular alteration at St. Cloud. Instead of the words *hereditary succession in the Bonaparte family*, were inserted the words *hereditary succession in the descendants of Napoleon Bonaparte*. M. Fabre de l'Aude was a particular friend of Joseph, and one of the members of his private circle. Evidently, the First Consul, displeased with his brothers, would not take any constitutional engagement towards them. The sycophants of Joseph busied themselves round M. Fabre de l'Aude, and the draft of the motion was taken back to St. Cloud to have the words *Bonaparte family* replaced instead of the words *descendants of Napoleon Bonaparte*. The draft was returned with the word *descendants* retained without any explanation.

M. Fabre resolved not to make any stir about this circumstance, and to give M. Curée the text of the motion as it had come from the hands of the First Consul, but after inserting the version preferred by Joseph. He imagined that if the motion were once presented and copied into the *Moniteur*, no one would venture to alter it again, and he prepared himself, if need should be, to have a painful explanation with the First Consul. It was a proof that the party surrounding the Consul's brothers were strongly enough combined to brave, in their interest, even the displeasure of the head of the family. All these proceedings were communicated day by day to Joseph, who had already proceeded to the camp of Boulogne.

On Saturday, the 8th Floréal—28th of April, 1804—the motion of M. Curée was deposited at the Tribunal, and the discussion of it adjourned to Monday, the 10th Floréal. A crowd of orators pressed forward to the Tribune to support it, and vied with each other for the op-

portunity of distinguishing themselves by a dissertation upon the advantages of monarchy. The substance, which, moreover, was correct, was as follows:

The revolution of 1789 sought the abolition of feudality, the reform of our social state, the reform of abuses introduced under an arbitrary rule, and the diminution of the absolute power of royalty, by the intervention of the nation in the government. Those were its real objects. All which exceeded that limit had gone beyond the mark, and produced nothing but misfortunes. France had been taught this by bitter experience. It was necessary to profit by that experience, and to undo what had been overdone. Monarchy, then, was to be re-established upon the new bases of constitutional liberty and civil equality. Re-establishing the monarchy, there was but one monarch possible, Napoleon Bonaparte, with remainder to the members of his family.

The most zealous orators of the Tribunal seasoned their harangues with invectives against the Bourbons, and the solemn declaration that the restoration of those princes to France was for ever impossible; that it was the duty of every Frenchman, at the cost of his blood, to oppose their return. It would appear that the inconsistency which these orators now exhibited in advocating monarchy after having taken so many oaths to the Republic, indivisible and imperishable, should have been a lesson to teach them to speak less positively as to the future. But there is no lesson which can prevent ordinary men from plunging into the torrent which rushes before them: all go readily with it, especially when they hope to find honours and fortune in its course.

In the number of these zealots the most zealous were the men who had formerly been distinguished for their republican spirit, or those who at a later period were to distinguish themselves by their zeal for the Bourbons. One personage alone, in the midst of this outburst of abject adulation, displayed real dignity. He was the tribune Carnot. Undoubtedly, he deceived himself in his general theories, for, after what had occurred during ten years, it was difficult to conceive that, for a country like France, the Republic was preferable to monarchy, but the champion of error was more noble in his attitude than the champions of truth, because he had the advantage over them of a courageous and disinterested conviction. What renders his courage the more honourable to him is, that he expressed himself not as a demagogue, but, on the contrary, as a wise and moderate citizen and a lover of order. He declared that he would on the next day submit docilely to the sovereign whom the law should have instituted, but that while it was under discussion, and until it had passed, he would express his opinion upon it.

He commenced by speaking in noble terms of the First Consul, and of the services that he had rendered to the Republic. If, to secure order and a reasonable liberty in France, an hereditary ruler were necessary, it would be madness, said he, to choose any other than Napoleon Bonaparte. No one had dealt more terrible blows to the enemies of the country.

no one had done so much for its civil organization. Had he conferred nothing else on the nation but the Civil Code, his name would deservedly descend to posterity. It could not, then, be doubted that if it was necessary to raise up the throne again, it was he who ought to be set upon it, and not that blind and vindictive race, who would re-enter France only to shed the blood of the best citizens, and to re-establish the reign of the narrowest prejudices. But since, in fact, Napoleon Bonaparte had rendered such great services, was there no other recompense that could be offered to him than the sacrifice of the liberty of France?

The tribune Carnot, without plunging into endless dissertations upon the advantages and disadvantages attached to different forms of government, endeavoured to show that at Rome the times of the empire had been as much disturbed as those of the republic, and that the former had less of masculine virtues and heroism; that the ten centuries of the French monarchy had not been less stormy than those of all the known republics; that under the monarchy, the people attached themselves to families, identified themselves with their passions, their rivalries, and their hatreds, and agitated themselves as much for those causes as for any others; that if the French Republic had had its days of bloodshed, such troubles were inseparable from its origin; that this, at the utmost, only proved the necessity for a temporary dictatorship, as at Rome; that that dictatorship had been conferred on Napoleon Bonaparte; that no one disputed it with him; that it depended upon himself to make the noblest and most glorious use of it, in preserving it only during the time necessary to prepare France for liberty; but that if he would convert it into a perpetual and hereditary power, he would renounce a matchless and immortal glory; that the new states founded twenty years since on the other side of the Atlantic, were a proof that repose and happiness were to be found under republican institutions; and that, as regarded himself, he should for ever regret that the First Consul would not employ his power in securing such a felicity for his country. Examining the often used argument that there would be more chance of a durable peace by assimilating the form of government to that generally received in Europe, he demanded whether the recognition of the new emperor would be so easy as was imagined; whether they would resort to arms in case of a refusal; whether France, converted into an empire, would not be as likely as France maintained as a republic, to offend Europe, excite its jealousies; in a word, provoke war?

Glancing backward, and bidding a noble adieu to the past, the tribune Carnot exclaimed:

"Was liberty, then, shown to man that he might never enjoy her? Was she incessantly presented to his wishes as a fruit to which he could not stretch out his hand but to be stricken with death? No; I cannot consent to look upon this benefit so universally preferable to all others, and without which all others become valueless—I cannot consent to look upon it as a mere illusion. My heart tells me that liberty is possible, that its régime is easy, and more

stable than any arbitrary or oligarchical government."

He concluded with these words, worthy of a good citizen:

"Ever ready to sacrifice my dearest affections to the interests of our common country, I shall content myself with having this one more time raised the accents of a free soul, and my respect for the law will be all the more secured, because it is the fruit of long convulsions, and of that reason which imperatively commands us now to unite firmly against the common enemy, that enemy who is ever ready to foment discords, and to whom all measures are legitimate that will aid him towards his end of universal oppression, and the dominion of the seas."

The tribune Carnot evidently confound d liberty with the Republic, and that is the common error of those who reason as he did. The Republic is not necessarily liberty, any more than monarchy is necessarily order. Oppression is to be met with under a republic, as disorder is to be met with under a monarchy. But for good laws, both the one and the other would be met with under all governments. But the question to be decided was, whether, with wise laws, a monarchy would not give, in a higher degree than any other form of government, the utmost possible liberty, and, besides, the force of action necessary to great military states; and especially, whether the habits of twelve centuries had not rendered it inevitable, and thence desirable, in a country like ours. If that were the case, would it not have been better to admit it, and to organize it wisely, than to flounder about in a false position, which harmonized neither with the ancient manners of France nor with the want which was then experienced of a stable and permanent government? The illustrious tribune was right, in our opinion, only upon one point: perhaps a temporary dictatorship was all that was necessary to enable Napoleon to pave the way, at a future time, to the Republic, according to M. Carnot; to a representative monarchy, according to us. Napoleon was marvellously chosen by Providence to prepare France for a new régime, and to deliver her up, aggrandized and regenerated, to those, be they whom they might, who were to govern her after him.

The tribune Carim de Nisais undertook to reply to M. Carnot, and acquitted himself of that task to the great satisfaction of the new monarchists, but with a mediocrity of language equal to the mediocrity of his ideas. However, it was a mere pretence of discussion. Fatigue and the conviction of its profound inutility speedily put an end to it. A committee of thirteen members was appointed to examine the motion of the Tribune Curée, and convert it into a definitive resolution.

In the sitting of the 13th Floréal—3d of May—that is to say, on the Tuesday, M. Jard-Pauvillier, the reporter of that committee, proposed to the Tribunate to pass a vote, which, by the constitutional rules then in force, would have to be addressed to the Senate, and carried to that body by a deputation.

The vote was as follows:—

First, That Napoleon Bonaparte, now Consul for life, be named Emperor, and in that capacity invested with the government of the French Republic.

Secondly, That the title of emperor and the imperial power be made hereditary in his family, in the male line, according to the order of primogeniture.

Thirdly, That in introducing into the organization of the constituted authorities the modifications rendered necessary by the establishment of hereditary power, equality, liberty, and the rights of the people shall be preserved in all their integrity.

This vote, adopted by an immense majority, was carried to the Senate on the following day, 14th Floréal—4th of May, 1804. It was M. François de Neufchâteau who, as vice-president, occupied the chair at that sitting. After hearing the deputation, and having officially registered the vote it had brought up, he said to the tribunes: "I cannot remove the veil which conceals for a time the proceedings of the Senate. I may inform you, however, that since the 6th Germinal we have directed the attention of the chief magistrate to the same subject as you have. But observe your advantages: that which we for two months have meditated in silence, your constitution has enabled you to discuss in the presence of the people. The happy developments that you have given to a grand idea, have procured for the Senate, which opened the Tribune to you, the gratification of congratulating itself on its choice, and applauding your labour.

"In your public discourses we have recognised the substance of all our opinions. Like you, citizen tribunes, we do not wish the return of the Bourbons, because we do not wish counter-revolution, the only present that could be made to us by those unfortunate exiles, who have carried away with them despotism, nobility, feudal tyranny, slavery, and ignorance.

"Like you, citizen tribunes, we wish to raise up a new dynasty, because we wish to secure to the French people all the rights which they have reconquered. Like you, we wish that liberty, equality, and enlightenment, may be prevented from retrograding. I speak not of the great man called by his glory to give his name to the age in which he lives. It is not to himself, but to us, that he devotes his energies and genius. What you propose in the ardour of enthusiasm, the Senate will consider with cool deliberation."

It is evident from these words of the vice-president, that the Senate wished to take the lead, and not to expose itself this time to be anticipated or surpassed in the matter of devotion to the new master. The secret directors of the change that was in progress had well foreseen the influence which the discussion of the Tribune would exercise upon that body. They had made use of it to hasten the resolution of the Senate, urging that that resolution ought to be pronounced on the very day when the vote of the Tribune should be communicated to the Senate, so that the two assemblies should appear to agree together, but the more considerable of the two should not seem to fol-

low the other; and, consequently, the greatest haste was made to bring all to a conclusion. The mode was hit upon, of a memorial addressed to the First Consul, a memorial in which the Senate should express its views, and should propose the bases of a new organic *Senatus Consultum*. This memorial, in fact, was already cut and dried, at the moment when the deputation from the Tribune was introduced. Its form and style were approved of, and the presentation to the First Consul immediately resolved. It was determined that that presentation should take place the same day, 14th Floréal. Accordingly, a deputation composed of the bureau, and of the members of the committee which had prepared the work, waited on the First Consul, and presented him with the message of the Senate, together with the memorial containing its ideas upon the monarchical organization of France.

It was now necessary to put those ideas into the shape of constitutional articles. A committee was named, consisting of several senators, of the ministers, and of the three consuls, which committee was charged with the drawing up of the new *Senatus Consultum*. As no further precaution was needed as to publicity, they on the following day inserted in the *Moniteur* all the proceedings of the Senate, the communications it had made to the First Consul, those which it had received from him, and all the addresses which, for some time past, had demanded the re-establishment of monarchy.

The committee named proceeded to the work on the instant. It assembled at St. Cloud, in the presence of the First Consul and his two colleagues. It examined and resolved in succession, all the questions to which the establishment of hereditary power had given birth. The first which presented itself was the title of the new monarch. Should he be called king or emperor? The same reason which in ancient Rome induced the Cæsars not to revive the title of king, and to take the wholly military title of *Imperator*—this same reason decided the framers of the new constitution to prefer the title of emperor? It presented at once more novelty and more grandeur; it avoided, to a certain extent, the *souvenirs* of a past which they wished to restore in part, but not entirely. Moreover, in this qualification, there was something of the unlimited, which suited the ambition of Napoleon. His numerous enemies in Europe, daily attributing to him designs which he had not at all, or not as yet, by repeating in a host of journals that he contemplated the reconstitution of the Empire of the West, or at least that of the Gauls—his enemies had prepared all minds, and even his own, for the title of emperor. This title was in the mouths of all, whether friends or foes, before it had been adopted. It was chosen without opposition. Accordingly, it was decided that the First Consul should be proclaimed Emperor of the French.

The hereditary succession, the object of the new revolution, was naturally established upon the principles of the salic law, that is to say, from male to male, in the order of primogeniture. Napoleon having no children, and not seeming destined to have any, it was proposed

to give him the faculty of adoption, such as it existed in the Roman institutions, with its conditions and its solemn forms. In default of adoptive descent, the transmission of the crown was permitted in the collateral line, not to all the brothers of the Emperor, but exclusively to Joseph and Louis.¹ They were the only two who had acquired real public consideration. Lucien, through his habits of life, and by his recent marriage, had rendered himself improper to succeed. Jerome, but little more than a youth, had married an American, without the consent of his family. Only Joseph and Louis, therefore, were admitted to the succession. In order to prevent the inconveniences which might result from misconduct in a numerous family, so recently raised to the throne, an absolute power over the members of the imperial family was attributed to the Emperor. It was settled that the marriage of a French prince, contracted without the consent of the head of the empire, should deprive both the prince and his children of all right to succession. Nothing short of the dissolution of the marriage so contracted could enable him to recover the rights lost by it.

The brothers and sisters of the Emperor received the rank of princes and princesses, as well as the honours attached to that title. It was resolved that the civil list should be established on the same principles as that of 1791: that is to say, that it should be voted for the whole reign; that it should consist of the still existent royal palaces; of the produce of the domains of the crown, and of an annual revenue of twenty-five millions. The allowances of the French princes were fixed at a million francs per annum for each. The Emperor had the right of fixing by imperial decrees (corresponding to what we call ordinances) the interior government of the household, and the court etiquette suitable to his imperial dignity.

On entering so completely into monarchical ideas, it was necessary to surround this new throne with grand dignities, which should serve it both for ornament and support. It was further necessary to remember those secondary ambitions which had voluntarily ranked themselves below a superior ambition, had aided it to obtain its grandeurs, and were

entitled, in their turn, to receive from it the price of their private and public services. All had their eyes upon the two consuls, Cambacérés and Lebrun, who, though far inferior to their colleague in every respect, had nevertheless shared the supreme power, and rendered incontestable services by the wisdom of their counsels. Both of them were members of the senatorial committee, which drew up at St. Cloud the new monarchical constitution. The Consul Cambacérés, probably for the first time in his life unable to conceal a displeasure, showed himself cold and little communicative. He was as reserved on this occasion as M. Fouché was the contrary, and was no longer able to disguise his vexation, and the contempt that he felt for the constructors of the new monarchy. This state of affairs produced several quarrels, which were speedily terminated by the authority of Napoleon. There was a general feeling of the necessity of satisfying the two consuls who were going out of office, and especially M. Cambacérés, who, in spite of certain failings, enjoyed an immense political consideration. It had at first been proposed, in order to render the imitation of the Roman empire complete, to allow the two consuls to remain beside the Emperor. Every one is aware that, after the elevation of the Cæsars to the empire, they preserved the institution of the consuls, that one of the mad members of the family gave that title to his horse, that others gave it to their slaves, or their eunuchs, and that, in the Empire of the East, very near the time of its fall, there were still two annual consuls, charged with the regulation of the calendar. It was this any thing but flattering remembrance that inspired otherwise well-meaning friends with the idea of preserving the two consuls in the new French Empire. M. Fouché, repelling this proposal, urged that there was but little need to care about those who might lose somewhat by the new organization; the mainly important point was to do away with every trace of a régime so decried as that of the Republic had now become.

"Those who are superseded by the new régime," replied M. Cambacérés, "can console themselves, for they will carry with them what men do not always carry out of office, the public esteem."

¹ LOUIS BONAPARTE, the third brother of Napoleon, born at Ajaccio, September 2d, 1778. During the siege of Toulon, in 1793, Napoleon frequently visited Marseilles, where he saw his family, and persuaded his mother to send Louis, who was then but fourteen years old, to the school at Chalons, there to undergo the examination necessary to his entrance to the artillery.

On the capture of Toulon, Napoleon took Louis with him as a sub-lieutenant on his staff. When Napoleon joined the army of Italy in 1794, the representatives of the people wished to confer on Louis the rank of captain, but Napoleon declined it, in consequence of his brother's youth. During the following campaign he displayed much intrepidity and extraordinary attachment to his brother. He and Lannes were the first who crossed the Po, in May 1796; and at the taking of Pezzighione, Louis entered the breach with Donmartin. He was present at the battles of Brenta, Rivoli, and Arcole, in which last he nearly lost his life in endeavouring to save Napoleon, when the latter was in imminent peril, his horse sinking in a morass. During the negotiations which preceded the treaty of Campo Formio, Louis was detached to reconnoitre the outposts of the enemy. This duty lasted eight days, and was so well performed, as to gain the highest praise from Napoleon. On this duty he

first saw Bertrand, afterward grand-marshal, and introduced him to his brother. Previous to the Egyptian expedition, Louis fell in love with a school-friend of his sister Caroline's, which coming to the ears of Napoleon, the young man was sent off by an order from the minister of war to Toulon, without a moment's delay. In May, 1798, Louis embarked with the expedition to Egypt, and having remained at Alexandria, was an eye-witness of the Battle of the Nile.

On his departure for Syria, Louis obtained leave to return to France. In 1799, on Napoleon's elevation to the consulship, Louis was appointed to the command of a dragoon regiment, and sent to Normandy, where the troubles had not ceased. There he refused to preside at a court-martial held on the Chouan prisoners; protested against the sentence of death passed on them; and thus lost much of Napoleon's favour. After the return of Napoleon from the campaign of Marengo, a marriage was made up between Louis and Hortense Beauharnais, the daughter of Josephine. During the years 1802, 1803, and 1804, Louis was entirely with his regiment, or at the mineral baths. In 1804, he was made General of Brigade. On learning the arrest of the Duke d'Enghien, he hurried to Paris, but arrived too late to prevent the catastrophe.—*Court and Camp of Napoleon*

This allusion to M. Fouché, and to his first retirement from office, caused the First Consul to smile at approval of the retort, but he hastened to put an end to these disputes, which had become painful. The second and third consuls were not summoned any more to the sitting of the committee.

M. de Talleyrand, the most ingenious of inventors, when the object was to gratify ambition, proposed to borrow from the Germanic Empire certain of its grand dignities. In that ancient empire, each of the seven electors was marshal, cup-bearer, treasurer, or chancellor of the kingdom of Arles, or of Italy, &c. &c. With the idea, but vague as yet, of the possible future re-establishment of the Empire of the West in favour of France, it was to prepare the way for that measure, to surround the Emperor with grand dignitaries, chosen for the nonce from the French princes or the great personages of the Republic, and destined at a future time to be kings themselves, and to form a cortège of vassal monarchs around the throne of the modern Charlemagne.

M. de Talleyrand, in concert with the First Consul, devised six grand officers, corresponding not to so many offices of the imperial household, but to so many departments of the government. In that constitution, in which there still remained many elective functions, in which the members of the Senate, of the Legislative Body, and of the Tribunal were to be elected, and in which the Emperor himself was to be elected, in the event of a failure of collateral issue, a grand elector, intrusted with certain honorific duties relating to elections, might be conceived. A grand elector then was proposed as the first grand dignitary. For the second, an arch-chancellor of the empire was proposed, charged with duties of pure pomp, of general surveillance with reference to the judicial order. For the third, an arch-chancellor of state, charged with similar duties with reference to the diplomatic service; for the fourth, an arch-treasurer; for the fifth, a constable; for the sixth, a high-admiral. The title of each of the latter sufficiently indicates to what part of the government his dignity related.

The titularies of these grand officers were, as we have said, dignitaries and not functionaries, for they were intended to be irresponsible and irremovable. They were to have purely honorific privileges, and only the general surveillance of the department of government to which, respectively, their titles had reference. Thus, the grand elector convoked the Legislative Body; the Senate, and the electoral colleges, administered the oath to the members elected to the various assemblies, and took part in all the formalities attendant upon the convocation or the dissolution of the electoral colleges. The arch-chancellor of the Empire received the oath of magistrates, or presented them when sworn before the Emperor, attended to the promulgation of laws and *Senatus Consulta*, presided over the Council of State and the High Imperial Court, (of which we shall speak by and by,) suggested desirable reforms of the laws, and, finally, exercised the functions of civil officer of state for the births,

marriages, and deaths of the members of the imperial family. The arch-chancellor of state received the ambassadors, introduced them to the Emperor, and signed and promulgated treaties. The arch-treasurer was custodian of the great book of the national debt, gave the guarantee of his signature to all the papers delivered to the creditors of the state, audited the accounts of the accountant-general's office, previous to submitting them to the Emperor, and gave his advice as to the management of the finances. The constable with reference to the war administration, and the high-admiral with reference to that of the marine, had precisely similar duties. But Napoleon laid it down as a fixed principle, that a grand dignitary should never be a minister, in order that the department of display might be kept distinct from the real function. There were in each department of government, dignities modelled upon royalty, itself inactive, irresponsible, and honorific as it, but, like it, charged with a general and superior superintendence.

The titularies of these dignities could supply the place of the Emperor in his absence, whether in the Senate, in the councils, or at the army. They formed with the Emperor the grand council of the empire. Finally, in case of the extinction of the natural and legitimate heirs, they elected the Emperor, and in case of minority they watched over the future sovereign, and formed the council of regency.

The idea of these grand dignitaries was accepted by all the framers of the new constitution. Each titulary, provided that he was not at once a grand dignitary and an imperial prince, was to receive a salary equal to one-third of that of the princes, that is to say, the third of a million, (13,333*l.* sterling.) Here were the means of providing for the two brothers of the emperor, his superseded colleagues, and the eminent personages who had rendered important services, military or civil. After the two brothers, Joseph and Louis, every one thought of the consuls Cambacérès and Lebrun, Eugene Beauharnois, the adopted son of the First Consul, Murat, his brother-in-law, Berthier, his faithful and invaluable companion in arms, and M. de Talleyrand, his medium of communication with the European powers. To his own will alone was left the distribution of these high favours.

It was natural, at the same time, to create in the army elevated posts, to re-establish that dignity of marshal which existed in the old monarchy, and which is adopted by all Europe as the most brilliant sign of military command. It was settled that there should be sixteen marshals, besides four honorary marshals, selected from veteran generals, become senators, and, therefore, precluded from active functions. The posts of inspectors-general of artillery, of engineers, and of cavalry were also re-established. To the grand military officers were added grand civil officers, such as chamberlains, masters of the ceremonies &c., and of both was composed a second class of dignitaries, under the title of grand officers of the empire, holding their appointment for life, like the grand dignitaries themselves. To give them all a sort of root in the soil, they

were charged with the presidencies of the electoral colleges. The presidency of each electoral college was permanently assigned to one of the grand dignitaries and to one of the class of civil or military grand officers. Thus the grand elector was to preside over the electoral college of Bruxelles; the arch-chancellor over that of Bordeaux; the arch-chancellor of state over that of Nantes; the arch-treasurer over that of Lyons; the constable over that of Turin; the high-admiral over that of Marseilles. The grand officers, civil or military, were to preside over the electoral colleges of minor importance. Human artifice could invent nothing more skilful to imitate an aristocracy with a democracy; for this hierarchy of six grand dignitaries, and of forty or fifty grand officers placed upon the steps of the throne, was at once an aristocracy and a democracy: an aristocracy by the position and the honours which, thanks to our conquests, it was to have; a democracy by origin, as it consisted of lawyers, soldiers of fortune, and sometimes of peasants, become marshals, and was to remain constantly open to any man who could rise by his genius or by his courage. These creations have disappeared with their creator, with the vast empire which served as their base; but it is possible that they would finally have succeeded, had time sanctified them with that dust of antiquity which engenders respect.

While raising the throne and ornamenting its steps with this social pomp, it was indispensably necessary to secure some guarantees to the citizens, and to compensate them by some little real liberty for that apparent liberty of which they were deprived by the abolition of the Republic. For some time past it had been emphatically argued that under a well-regulated monarchy the government would be stronger, and the citizens at the same time more free. It was necessary to keep a part of these promises, if one of the kind could be kept, at a time when every one putting forward his wishes for an energetic power would, for want of using it, allow liberty to perish, how strongly soever written in the laws. It was proposed, then, to give to the Senate and to the Legislative Body some prerogatives of which they were destitute, and which were calculated to become useful guarantees to the citizens.

The Senate, composed in the first place of eighty members elected by itself, then of citizens whom the emperor judged worthy of that elevated position, and finally of the six grand dignitaries and the princes, having attained the age of eighteen, was still the first body in the state. It formed the others by the faculty of election which it had preserved; it could annul any unconstitutional law or decree, and could reform the constitution by means of an organic *Senatus Consultum*. Amidst the successive transformations to which it had been subjected within four years, it had remained quite as powerful as M. Sieyès had desired it to be. The restorers of monarchy, deliberating at St. Cloud, proposed to add two new prerogatives of the highest importance. They confided to :: the guardianship of personal liberty and of

the liberty of the press. By Article XLVL of the first Consular constitution, the government could not detain an individual in prison without bringing him, within ten days, before his natural judges. By the second Consular constitution, that which established the Consulate for life, the Senate, in the case of conspiracy against the safety of the State, had the power to decide whether the government should exceed the delay of ten days, and if so, by how long a period. It was now determined to regulate, in a popular manner, the arbitrary power thus given to the government over the liberty of the citizens. A senatorial commission was formed, consisting of seven members chosen by ballot, and to be continually renewed by the retirement of one of the members every four months. It was to receive the petitions and complaints of prisoners or their families, and to declare whether the detention was just and required by the interest of the state. When such was not the case, if, after having addressed a first, second, and third request to the minister who had ordered the arrest, that minister did not cause the claimed individual to be released, the minister could himself be cited before the imperial high court for violation of personal liberty.

A similar commission, organized in the same manner, was charged to watch over the liberty of the press. It was the first time of this liberty being named in the Consular constitutions, so little was it thought of so shortly after the saturnalia of the press during the Directory. As for the periodical press, it was left under the authority of the police. It was not for it that any interest was expressed. It was only for books that any concern was evinced, they alone being deemed worthy of the liberty that was refused to the journals. They were not to be subjected, as they were before 1789, to the arbitrary power of the police. Every printer or bookseller, having any publication restrained by public authority, had the power to apply to the senatorial commission, charged with this duty; and if, after examining the interdicted or mutilated book, the senatorial committee disapproved of the rigour of the public authority, it made a first, second, and third application to the minister, and after the third, in case of refusal to yield to its repeated opinion, it could cite the minister before the high imperial court.

Thus, besides the powers which we have already enumerated, the Senate had the duty of watching over personal liberty, and the liberty of the press. These two last guarantees were not without their value. Nothing, it is true, had any instant efficiency, under a despotism which was accepted by all. But under the successors of the depository of this despotism, should there be any such, such guarantees could not fail to acquire a real power.

Something in the same direction was done for the organization of the Legislative Body. The Tribunate, as we have observed several times, alone discussed the laws, and, after having formed its opinion, deputed three orators to sustain it against three councillors of state, before the mute Legislative Body. This dumbness, corrected, in the opinion of M. Sieyès, by the loquacity of the Tribunate, hid speedily

become absurd in the eyes of a satirical nation, which, though fearing oratory and its excesses, laughed nevertheless at the compulsory silence of its legislators. The dumbness of the Legislative Body had become more ridiculous than ever, since the Tribunal, deprived of all vigour, had also become silent. It was determined that the Legislative Body, after having heard the councillors of state and the members of the Tribunal, should retire and discuss, in secret committee, the bills which had been submitted to it; that there each member could speak, and that then the Legislative Body would resume its public sitting, and vote in the ordinary way, by ballot.

The right of speech, then, was restored to the Legislative Body—in secret committee.

The Tribunal had become, since the institution of the Consulate for life, a sort of council of state; reduced from that epoch to fifty members, and having acquired the habit of only examining bills in private conference with the councillors of state, who approved those bills, it received in the new constitution an organization conformable to the habits it had adopted. It was divided into three sections, the first of legislation, the second of home affairs, the third of finance. It was only to discuss laws in the sections, and never in general assembly. Three orators were to go, in the name of the section, to support its opinion before the Legislative Body. This was definitively to perpetuate, by a constitutional regulation, the new form which the body had only imposed upon itself in deference.

The term of service of its members was extended from five to ten years, a favour to the individual members, but a restriction of the power of the body itself, by less frequently renewing its spirit.

Finally, to all this was added an institution, necessary alike for the safety of the government and that of the citizens; it was that of a high court, which, in England, and now in France, exists in the House of Peers. The want of such a court had been felt in the prosecution of those implicated in the Georges conspiracy, and in the lamentable execution of Vincennes. It would be still more felt under a dictatorial government, whose agents offered only a nominal responsibility, since they could not be summoned before any body of the state. There was not then, as now, the means of summoning them before one of the two chambers. It was very requisite, therefore, to furnish the government with a guarantee against conspiracies, and the citizens against the agents of public authority.

It was desired to give to the institution of this high court the outward advantage which was sought for all the new monarchical institutions, that of adding as much to the liberty of the citizens as to the power of the government. Accordingly its seat was placed in the Senate, without, however, its being entirely and solely composed of senators. It was to consist of sixty senators, out of one hundred and twenty; of six presidents of the council of state; of fourteen councillors of state; of twenty members of the Court of Cassation; of grand officers of the Empire; of six grand dignitaries, and of

princes having acquired deliberative votes. Its president was to be the high chancellor. It was charged with taking cognisance of pleas formed against the security of the state and the person of the Emperor; of arbitrary acts imputed to the ministers and their agents; of magisterial derelictions or extortions; of errors imputed to land and sea generals in their commands; of offences committed by members of the imperial family, by grand dignitaries, grand officers, senators, councillors of state, &c., &c. It thus was not only a court of justice charged with the repression of great crimes, but also a political jurisdiction as to the ministers and the agents of the public authority; a tribunal of marshals as to generals and admirals; and a court of peers as to the great personages of state. A procureur-general, permanently attached to this extraordinary jurisdiction, had the duty of prosecuting, *ex officio*, in the event of complainants not themselves commencing proceedings.

The only modification made in the ordinary form of justice, was the title of *Court* being substituted for that of Tribunal, for the tribunals of high rank. The Tribunal of Cassation was to take the title of *Court of Cassation*, and the Tribunals of Appeal were to be called Imperial Courts.

It was determined that an act of deference should once more be made towards the national sovereignty, and that registers in the usual manner should be opened to receive the suffrages of the citizens as to the establishment of the imperial hereditary succession in the male line of Napoleon Bonaparte, and his two brothers Joseph and Louis.

The Emperor was, within the space of two years, to take a solemn oath to the constitutions of the Empire, in presence of the grand dignitaries, the grand officers, the ministers, the Council of State, the Senate, the Legislative Body, the Tribunal, the Court of Cassation, the archbishops, the bishops, the presidents of the courts of justice, the presidents of electoral colleges, and the mayors of thirty-six principal towns of the Republic. This oath was to be taken, said the text of the new constitutional act, to the French people, upon the Testament. It was conceived in the following terms: "I swear to maintain the integrity of the territory of the Empire, to respect and to cause to be respected the laws of the Concordat, and of the liberty of worship; to respect and to cause to be respected the equality of rights, political and civil liberty, and the irrevocability of the national property; to raise no impost, and to establish no tax except by virtue of the law; to maintain the institution of the Legion of Honour, and to govern solely with the view to the interest, the happiness, and the glory of the French people."

Such were the conditions adopted for the new monarchy in a draft of a *Senatus Consultum*, written, like all the laws of that period, in a clear, simple, and precise manner.

This was the third and last transformation undergone by the celebrated constitution of M. Sieyès. We have elsewhere explained what was the idea of that legislator of the French Revolution. The aristocratic system

is the Laven in which those Republics have found shelter, which have not ended in despotism. M. Sieyès, perhaps without suspecting it, had sought to pilot into the same port the French Republic, as much disgusted with agitations after ten years, as the Republics of antiquity and of the middle age were after many centuries; and he had composed his aristocracy of the leading and experienced men of the Revolution. To this end he had invented a Senate, inactive, but armed with immense influence, electing its own members and those of all the State bodies out of the rarely-renewed lists of notables, naming the heads of the government, revoking them, ostracizing them at will, taking no part in the making of laws, but having the power to annul them on account of unconstitutionality; in a word, not exercising power, and yet conferring it, and having always the faculty of arresting it. To this he added an equally inactive Legislative Body, which silently admitted or rejected the laws which the Council of State was intrusted to make and the Tribunate to discuss; and, lastly, a supreme representative of the executive power, called grand elector, elective, and for life, like a doge, and inactive as a king of England, named by the Senate, and, in his turn, naming the ministers who alone were active and responsible. In this manner M. Sieyès had everywhere separated influence and action; influence, which delegates power, then controls, and arrests it; action, which receives and exercises it. He had given the former to an aristocracy, indolent and exalted; the latter to elective and responsible agents. He had thus approached a sort of aristocratic monarchy, but still without hereditary succession, resembling Venice rather than Great Britain, and adapted rather to an exhausted country than to a free one.

Unfortunately for the labour of M. Sieyès, beside this aristocracy without root, composed of disabused and unpopularized revolutionists, was a man of genius whom France and Europe called a saviour. There was but small chance of this aristocracy defending itself like that of Venice against usurpation, and still less that in a time of rapid revolutions the struggle could be very long. At the outset, previous to accepting this constitution of M. Sieyès, General Bonaparte arranged his own place in it by making himself First Consul instead of grand-elector. Scarcely had he begun to govern, when the ill-timed resistances of the Tribunate restraining him from the good that he wished to accomplish, he had crushed them, amid the loud applause of the public, wearied with revolutions, and had himself made Consul for life by the Senate. On the same opportunity he had added the constituent power to the previous powers of the Senate, not fearing to render all-powerful a body that he dominated; he had annihilated the Tribunate by reducing it to fifty members, and by dividing it into sections, which discussed the laws proposed, *tête-à-tête* with the sections of the Council of State. Such was the second transformation of the constitution of M. Sieyès, that which took place in 1802, at the epoch of the Consulate for life. A vigorous hand had thus

in two years caused that aristocratic republic to terminate in a sort of aristocratic monarchy, to which nothing more was needed than hereditary succession. Consequently, many had asked themselves, in 1802, why all was not finished at once, and why hereditary accession was not given to this so evident monarch! A conspiracy directed against his life, awakening in greater force than ever the desire of more stable institutions, had at length brought about the last transformation, and the definitive conversion of the Constitution of the year VIII into a monarchy, representative in form, absolute in fact. There were almost as many remains of republicanism beside a despotic power, as in the empire founded by the Cæsars. It was not representative monarchy such as we now understand it. That Senate, with the faculty of electing all the bodies of the state out of the electoral lists, with its constituent power, with its faculty of annulling the law—that Senate, with so much power and yet subject to a master, did not resemble an Upper Chamber. That silent Legislative Body, although speech was restored to it in secret committee, did not resemble a Chamber of Deputies. And yet that Senate, that Legislative Body, that Emperor, all might one day have become a representative monarchy. We must not, then, judge of the constitution of M. Sieyès, altered by Napoleon, by the mute obedience which reigned under the Empire. Our Constitution of 1830, with the press and the chambers, would probably not have produced results sensibly different, for the spirit of the times does more than written laws. It would have been necessary to judge of the Imperial Constitution under the following reign. Then opposition, the inevitable sequel of a long submission, would have sprung up even in the Senate, for a long time so docile, but armed with an immense power. It would probably have come to an understanding with the electoral colleges to make choices conformable to the new spirit; it would have broken the fetters of the press; it would have opened the doors and windows of the palace of the Legislative Body, that the voices of its members might be heard afar off. It would have been representative monarchy as we now have it, with this difference, that the resistance would have come from above instead of from below. That is no proof that it would have been less enlightened, less constant, or less courageous. This, however, is a problem which time has borne away without solving, as it has borne away so many others. But those institutions were far from deserving the contempt which has so often been expressed for them. They composed an aristocratic republic, diverted from its end by a powerful chief, temporarily converted into an absolute monarchy, and destined, at a later day, to become a constitutional monarchy, strongly aristocratical, it is true, but founded upon the basis of equality; for under it every fortunate soldier might become constable, every able juris-consult might become arch-chancellor, after the example of its founder, who became, from a simple officer of artillery, hereditary Emperor and Ruler of the world.

Such was the work of the constituent committee assembled at St. Cloud. During the last days of its sitting, Messieurs Cambacérés and Lebrun had not attended. The altercations that had been provoked by the monarchical zeal of M. Fouché on the one hand, and by the ill-humour of M. Cambacérés on the other, were the cause of the second and third consuls ceasing to be summoned. The wisest and the most prudent of the senators who were included in the committee regretted their absence, and pointed out to Napoleon how important it was to gratify his colleagues by treating them handsomely. He did not require to be advertised of that, for he well knew the value of the second consul, Cambacérés, appreciated his unostentatious devotedness, and was anxious to attach him to the new monarchy. He therefore sent for him to St. Cloud, entered into a new explanation with him upon the last change, listened to his opinions, stated his own, and terminated the debate by the expression of his will, thenceforth irrevocable. He had determined upon the crown, and he did not conceal it. Moreover, he had a splendid compensation to offer to Messieurs Cambacérés and Lebrun. To the first, he destined the dignity of arch-chancellor of the empire; to the second that of arch-treasurer. He treated them precisely as his own brothers, who were to be comprised in the number of the six grand dignitaries. He announced this resolution to M. Cambacérés; to that announcement he added that seductive language which no one at that time resisted, and succeeded in entirely regaining him.

"I am," said he to M. Cambacérés, "and I shall be, more than ever surrounded by intrigues, and by false or interested counsels; you alone will have the judgment and the sincerity to tell me the truth. I wish, then, to bring you closer than ever to my person and to my ear. You will remain with me to possess all my confidence, and to justify it." These compliments were well merited. M. Cambacérés, having nothing more to desire or to fear in that elevated position, would be, and in fact was, the truest and the most influential of the counsellors of the new emperor.

Joseph Bonaparte was named grand elector; Louis Bonaparte, constable. The nomination to the two dignities of arch-chancellor of state and high admiral were deferred. Napoleon still hesitated among the various members of his family. He had thought of Lucien, who was absent and in disgrace, but whose recent marriage there was some hope of dissolving; of Eugene Beauharnois, who solicited nothing, but with a perfect submission awaited all from the tenderness of his adoptive father; of Murat, who solicited, not personally, but through his wife, who, young, lovely, ambitious, and very dear to Napoleon, availed herself most skillfully of the tenderness he felt for her.

M. de Talleyrand, the principal inventor of the new dignities, experienced on this occasion a first disappointment, which had a very mischievous influence on his disposition, and threw him at a later period into an opposition which was ruinous to himself and troublesome to Napoleon. The post of arch-chancellor of the empire, which had reference to judicial

functions, having fallen to the second consul, Cambacérés, M. de Talleyrand had hoped that the post of arch-chancellor of state, which had reference to the diplomatic functions, would naturally have devolved upon him. But the new emperor expressed himself quite resolutely upon that point. He did not admit the possibility of grand dignitaries being ministers: he would have for the latter only removable and responsible agents, whom he could revoke and punish at will. General Berthier was an instrument fully as valuable to him as M. de Talleyrand. He chose, nevertheless, to leave him minister, like M. de Talleyrand, compensating them both with grand endowments. The pride of M. de Talleyrand was singularly wounded, and, though a courtier, still he displayed somewhat of that attitude of a discontented courtier, which he then kept much in control, but which he subsequently kept far less so, thereby incurring some bitter disgraces.

There still remained, both in the army and at court, posts fitted to satisfy all ambitions. There were four posts of honorary marshals to give to generals who were enjoying repose in the Senate, and sixteen for those who, still full of youth, were still figured at the head of our soldiers. Napoleon reserved the four first-named for Kellermann, in remembrance of Valmy; Lefebvre, for his tried bravery, and a devotion which dated from the 18th Brumaire; and Periguin and Serrurier, for the respect in which they were deservedly held by the army. Of the sixteen posts of marshals destined for generals in active service, he determined to confer fourteen immediately, and to reserve two as the reward of future merits. These fourteen batons were given to General Jourdan, for the splendid achievement at Fleurus; to General Berthier, for his eminent and sustained services on the staff; to General Masséna, for Rivoli, Zurich, and Genoa; to Generals Lannes and Ney, for a long series of heroic deeds; to General Augereau, for Castiglione; to General Brune, for the Helder; to Murat, for his chivalric valour at the head of the French cavalry; to General Bessières, for the command of the guard, which he had had since Marengo, and of which he was worthy; to Generals Moncey and Mortier, for their warlike merits; to General Soult, for his services in Switzerland, at Genoa, and in the camp of Boulogne; to General Davoust, for his conduct in Egypt, and for a firmness of character of which he shortly afterwards gave brilliant proofs; and, finally, to General Bernadotte, for a certain renown acquired in the armies of the Sambre and Meuse, and of the Rhine, and especially for his relationship, and in spite of an envious hatred that Napoleon had discerned in the heart of that officer, and which already inspired him with a presentiment, often plainly expressed, of a future treason.

A general who had not as yet commanded in chief, but who, like Generals Lannes, Ney, and Soult, had directed considerable corps, and who inherited the marshal's baton as much as the officers just mentioned, was not included in the list of the new marshals. The general in question was Gouvion St. Cyr. If he did

not equal the warrior's nature and the battlefield glance of Masséna, he surpassed him in science and military combinations. Since Moreau had been lost to France by his misconduct, and since Kléber and Desaix were dead, he, or Masséna, was the man most capable of commanding an army; Napoleon, be it understood, being above parallel with any one. But the jealous and unsocial character of St. Cyr had begun to procure him the frowns of the supreme dispenser of favour. With sovereign power came its foibles; and Napoleon, who had pardoned Bernadotte his petty treacheries, the presage of a greater one, knew not how to forgive General St. Cyr his disparaging spirit. Nevertheless, General St. Cyr was ranked among the colonels-general, and became colonel-general of the cuirassiers. Junot and Marmont, the faithful aides-de-camp of General Bonaparte, were named colonels-general of hussars and chasseurs, and Baraguay d'Hilliers of dragoons. General Marescot received the post of inspector-general of engineers, and General Sougis that of inspector-general of artillery. In the navy, Vice-admiral Bruix, the chief and the organizer of the flotilla, obtained the baton of admiral, and was made inspector-general of the coasts of the ocean; and Vice-admiral Decrès was named inspector-general of the coasts of the Mediterranean.

The court also furnished grand posts for distribution. It was formed with all the pomp of the ancient French monarchy, and with more *éclat* than the imperial court of Germany. It was to have a grand almoner, a grand chamberlain, a grand huntsman, a grand equerry, a grand master of the ceremonies, and a grand marshal of the palace. The post of grand almoner was given to Cardinal Fesch, uncle of Napoleon; the post of grand chamberlain to M. de Talleyrand, and that of grand huntsman to General Berthier. The court posts bestowed upon the two last-named were intended as a compensation for not having obtained two grand dignities of the empire. The post of grand equerry was granted to M. de Caulincourt, to avenge him for the calumnies of the royalists, who had been outrageous against him since the death of the Duc d'Enghien. M. de Béguin, formerly ambassador from Louis XVI. to Catherine, a man eminently calculated to teach the new court the usages of the old one, was named grand master of the ceremonies. Duroc, who had governed the consular, now become the imperial, household, was still to govern it, under the title of grand marshal of the palace.

We shall not mention either the inferior posts, or the subaltern aspirants who disputed for them. History has nobler matters to deal with. She only descends to such details when they are important to a faithful painting of manners. We shall only say that the emigrants who, previous to the death of the Duc d'Enghien, tended towards a reconciliation, and after his death had again withdrawn for a moment, but who, forgetful like the rest of the world, already began to think less of a catastrophe two months old, began to figure among the number of aspirants who were eager to find berths in the imperial court. Some of

them were admitted. A lady of very old family, Madame de la Rochefoucauld, destitute of beauty but not of wit, distinguished for her education and her manners, formerly a zealous royalist, but who now laughed gracefully enough at her departed opinions, was destined to be principal lady of honour to Josephine.

All these appointments were known before they were announced in the *Moniteur*, published from mouth to mouth amidst the inextinguishable gossip of those who approved and those who disapproved, who had enough to do to express all that they felt at witnessing so singular a spectacle, each applauding or censuring according to his friendships or his enmities, or his pretensions gratified or disappointed, and scarcely any one according to his political opinions; for there were no political opinions then, except among hot-headed royalists, or implacable republicans.

To these nominations there was added another, and a far more serious one, that of M. Fouché, who was called to the ministry of police, re-established on his account, to recompense him for his services during the recent events.

It was necessary to give to these choices, and to the greatest of them all, that which made a general of the Republic an hereditary monarchy, the character of official acts. The *Senatus Consultum* was agreed upon and drawn up. It was arranged to present it on the 26th Floréal—16th of May, 1804—to the Senate, that it might be there decreed in the accustomed form. That presentation having taken place, a commission was immediately appointed to make its report. The drawing up of the report was intrusted to M. de Lacépède, the savant, and the senator most devoted to Napoleon. He had completed it in forty-eight hours, and presented it to the Senate on the 26th Floréal—18th of May. That day was appointed for the solemn proclamation of Napoleon as Emperor. It had been decided that the consul Cambacérès should preside over the sitting of the Senate, that his adhesion to the new monarchical establishment might be the more striking. M. de Lacépède had scarcely finished his report, when the senators, without a single apparent dissent, and by a sort of unanimous acclamation, adopted the *Senatus Consultum* in its entirety. They even evinced a visible impatience during the formalities indispensable to such an act, so eager were they to depart for St. Cloud. It was agreed that the Senate should go in a body to that residence to present its decree to the First Consul, and to salute him as Emperor. Scarcely was the adoption of the *Senatus Consultum* terminated, ere the senators tumultuously put an end to their sitting, and hurried to their carriages, each striving who should be earliest at St. Cloud.

Arrangements had been made at the palace of the Senate, upon the roads, and also at St. Cloud, for this unheard-of scene. A long line of carriages, escorted by the cavalry of the guard, conveyed the senators to the residence of the First Consul, on a lovely spring day. Napoleon and Josephine, pre-informed, expected this solemn visit. Napoleon, standing in

military costume, calm as he well knew how to be when men's gaze was fixed upon him, and his wife at once gratified and agitated, received the Senate, with Cambacérès at its head. He, respectful as a colleague, still more respectful as a subject, bowed low and addressed the following speech to the soldier whom he was about to proclaim Emperor.

"SIRE,—Four years ago the affection and the gratitude of the French people intrusted the reins of government to your majesty, and the constitutions of the State had already left to you the choice of a successor. The more imposing title which is now decreed to you, therefore, is but a tribute that the nation pays to its own dignity, and to the necessity it experiences of daily offering you new proofs of its daily increasing respect and attachment.

"How, indeed, can the French people reflect without enthusiasm upon the happiness it has experienced since Providence prompted it to throw itself into your arms!

"Our armies were vanquished, the finances in disorder; public credit was annihilated; the remnants of our ancient splendour were disputed by factions; the ideas of religion, and even of morality were obscured; the habit of giving and resuming power left the magistrates without consideration.

"Your majesty appeared. You recalled victory to our standards, you restored order and economy in the public expenditure; the nation, encouraged by the use that you made of them, took confidence in its own resources; your wisdom calmed down the fury of parties; religion saw her altars raised again; finally, and that is doubtless the greatest of the miracles worked by your genius, that people whom civil ferments had rendered indocile to all restraint and inimical to all authority, have been by you taught to cherish and respect a power exercised only for its repose and glory.

"The French people does not pretend to set itself up as a judge of the constitutions of other states; it has no criticism to make, no examples to follow; experience henceforth becomes its lesson.

"For centuries it tasted of the advantages attached to the hereditary succession of power; it has had a short but painful experience of the contrary system; as the effect of a free and mature deliberation, it returns to a régime conformable to its spirit. It freely uses its rights to delegate to your imperial majesty a power that its interest forbids it to exercise for itself. It stipulates for generations yet unborn, and, by a solemn compact, it intrusts the happiness of its posterity to the scions of your race.

"Happy the nation which, after so many troubles, finds in its own bosom a man capable of stilling the storms of passion, of conciliating all interests, and of winning the suffrages of all ranks.

"If it be in the principles of our constitution to submit to the sanction of the people the part of the decree which concerns the establishment of an hereditary government, the Senate has deemed that it ought to beseech your imperial majesty to permit that the organic dispositions should forthwith be put in force, and for the glory as well as for the happiness of

the Republic, at this very instant the Senate proclaims NAPOLEON EMPEROR OF THE FRENCH."

Scarcely had the arch-chancellor pronounced these words, ere the cry of *Vive l'Empereur* resounded beneath the roofs of the palace of St. Cloud. Heard in the court and gardens, that cry was repeated joyfully and with loud cheers. Confidence and hope beamed in every countenance, and all present, carried away by the exciting scene, felt that they had for a long time secured their happiness and that of France. The arch-chancellor, Cambacérès, himself carried away, seemed always to have wished for that which at this moment was accomplished.

Silence being restored, the Emperor addressed the Senate in the following terms:—

"Every thing which can contribute to the weal of the country is essentially connected with my happiness.

"I accept the title, which you believe to be useful to the glory of the nation.

"I submit to the people the sanction of the law of hereditary succession. I hope that France will never repent of the honours with which she shall invest my family.

"At all events, my spirit will no longer be with my posterity, on that day when it shall cease to merit the love and confidence of the Grand Nation."

Reiterated acclamations drowned these noble words; then the Senate, through its organ, M. Cambacérès, addressed a few words of congratulation to the Empress, who, according to her custom, listened to them with perfect gracefulness, but replied to them only by her deep emotion.

The Senate then retired, after having conferred on that man, born at so vast a distance from the throne, the title of Emperor, which he never lost, even after his fall, and in exile. We shall designate him henceforth under that title, which was his from the day of which we speak. The will of the nation, so certain that there was something puerile in the care that was taken formally to establish it—the will of the nation was to decide if he should be hereditary Emperor. But, in the mean time, he was Emperor of the French, by the power of the Senate, acting within the limits of its prerogatives.

As the senators retired, Napoleon retained the high chancellor Cambacérès, and pressed him to remain to dine with the imperial family. The Emperor and the Empress overwhelmed him with attentions, and endeavoured to make him forget the distance which henceforth separated him from his former colleague. Sooth to say, the arch-chancellor might readily console himself; in reality, he had not at all fallen; only his master had ascended, and had made every one ascend with him.

The Emperor and the arch-chancellor, Cambacérès, had to converse on some important subjects connected with the events of the day. These were, the ceremony of the coronation, and the government to be given to Italy, which could not remain a republic beside France, that had now become a monarchy. Napoleon, who loved the marvellous, had conceived a bold idea, the accomplishment of which would strike men's minds, and render still more ex-

traordinary his accession to the throne; this was, to have himself crowned by the Pope himself, brought from Rome for that purpose. The thing was without precedent in all the eighteen centuries of the Church. All the emperors of Germany, without an exception, had gone to Rome to be crowned. Charlemagne, proclaimed emperor of the West in the Basilick of St. Peter, in some sort by surprise, on Christmas day, 800, had not seen the Pope leave his abode on his account. Pepin, it is true, was crowned in France by Pope Stephen, but the latter had repaired to France to ask aid against the Lombards. It was for the first time that a pope was about to quit Rome, to consecrate the rights of a new monarch, in that monarch's own capital. What resembled the past was, the Church recompensing with the title of Emperor the successful warrior who had succoured her; a marvellous resemblance to Charlemagne, and one which abundantly supplied the place of that legitimacy which was so vainly boasted by the Bourbons, and which their defeat, their misconduct, and their co-operation in shameful plots had sunk into disrepute.

Scarcely had Napoleon conceived this idea, ere he converted it into an irrevocable resolution, and he promised himself that he would bring Pius VII. to Paris by any means, persuasion, or fear. It was one of the most difficult of negotiations, and one in which no one but himself could succeed. He determined to make use of Cardinal Caprari, who had incessantly written to Rome, that but for Napoleon religion would have been lost in France, and perhaps even in Europe. He imparted his project to the arch-chancellor, Cambacérès, and planned with him the method of setting about making the first attack upon the prejudices, the scruples, and the indolence of the Roman court.

As regarded the Italian Republic, it would, for two years past, have been a scene of confusion but for the presidency of General Bonaparte. In the first place, M. de Melzi, an honourable and tolerably sensible man, but morose, a martyr to gout, constantly on the eve of giving in his resignation as vice-president, and destitute of the firmness to support the heavy cares of government, was a very inefficient representative of the public authority. Murat, commanding the French army in Italy, threw difficulties in the way of the Italian government, which greatly added to the chagrin of M. de Melzi. Napoleon was incessantly obliged to interfere to make the two authorities agree. To these personal difficulties were added those which arose out of the state of affairs itself. The Italians, but little moulded as yet to the constitutional régime, which allowed them to participate in their own government, were either of an entire indifference, or of an extreme vehemence. To govern, there were only the moderates, few in number, and embarrassed with their part, placed as they were among the nobles devoted to Austria, the liberals, inclined to Jacobinism, and the masses, sensible only to the weight of the imposts. These masses complained of the expenses of the French occupation. *We are*

governed by foreigners—our money goes across the mountains; this grief, so common in Italy, was still heard under the new Republic, as it had been under the house of Austria. There was only a small number of enlightened men who felt that, thanks to General Bonaparte, the greater part of Lombardy, united in a single state, governed in reality by natives, and placed only under an external and distant surveillance, was thus called into a real existence, the commencement of Italian unity; that if it were necessary to pay twenty millions per annum for the French army, that was a very moderate indemnity for the support of an army of thirty or forty thousand men, indispensable if Italy would not return to the yoke of the Austrians. However, notwithstanding the gloomy colours with which the distempered spirit of M. de Melzi charged the picture of Italian affairs, those affairs, after all, went on peaceably enough, directed as they were by the hand of Napoleon.

To convert that republic into a monarchy vassal to the Empire, and to give it to Joseph, for instance, was to commence that Empire of the West which Napoleon, in his henceforth boundless ambition, already dreamed of; it was to ensure to Italy a more fixed régime; it was probably to gratify her, for she would be delighted to have a prince of her own; and were it only a mere change, it was possible that upon that sole ground it would satisfy unquiet and restless imaginations. It was agreed that the arch-chancellor Cambacérès, who was closely connected with M. de Melzi, should write to him and make the fitting overtures upon this subject.

Napoleon, after having agreed with his former colleague upon all that was to be done, sent for the cardinal legate to St. Cloud, and spoke to him in an affectionate tone, but so positively, that it did not enter the mind of the cardinal to venture upon a single objection. Napoleon told him that he charged him expressly to request the Pope to repair to Paris to officiate in the ceremony of the coronation; that he would make a formal demand to the same effect at a future time, when he should be assured that he would not be refused; that, moreover, he did not doubt of the success of his desires; that the church owed him that success, and owed it also to herself, for nothing would be more serviceable to religion than the presence of the sovereign pontiff in Paris, and the union of religious pomp and civil pomp upon so solemn an occasion. Cardinal Caprara despatched a courier for Rome, and M. de Talleyrand, on his side, wrote, to Cardinal Fesch, to inform him of this new project, and to engage him to support the negotiation.

It was spring. Napoleon would have wished the journey of the Pope to take place in autumn. He proposed, for that epoch, to add another marvel to that of a pope crowning at Paris the representative of the French Revolution; this was, the expedition to England, which he had postponed on account of the royalist conspiracy and of the institution of the Empire, but the preparations for which he had so perfected, that he no longer entertained

a doubt of success. He required but a month at the most, for it was a lightning stroke that he wished to strike. He destined July or August for that grand operation. He hoped, therefore, to have returned victorious, secure of definitive peace, and possessed of European omnipotence, towards October, and to be able to be crowned at the commencement of winter, on the anniversary of the 18th Brumaire—9th of November, 1804. In his ardent imagination he revolved all these projects at once, and it will soon be perceived, by the latest combinations he arrived at, that all was not mere phantom here.

The Arch-chancellor Cambacérés, on his part, wrote to the Vice-president Melzi about the affairs of the new kingdom of Italy. M. Marescalchi, minister from the Italian Republic at Paris, was also to support the overtures of M. Cambacérés to M. de Melzi.

The following days were employed in taking the oath to the new sovereign of France. All the members of the Senate, of the Legislative Body, and of the Tribune, were introduced in succession. The Arch-Chancellor Cambacérés, standing beside the Emperor, who was seated, read the form of the oath; the person admitted then swore, and the Emperor, half rising from his imperial chair, slightly saluted him whose homage he had received. This sudden difference introduced into the relations between subjects and a sovereign, who on the previous day was their equal, produced some sensation among the members of the State bodies. After having been in some sort hurried away to bestow the crown, they were surprised at seeing the first consequences of what they had done. The tribune Carnot, faithful to his promise to submit to the law when once enacted, took the oath with the other members of the Senate. He gave to that act the dignity of obedience to the laws, and even seemed less sensible than others to the changes that had taken place in the outward forms of power. But the senators, especially, perceived them, and more than one satirical dialogue was held upon the subject. One circumstance, especially, contributed to cause these remarks. Of the thirty and odd senatorial appanages instituted at the epoch of the Consulate for life, fifteen still remained to be given; those of Agen, Ajaccio, Angers, Besançon, Bourges, Colmar, Dijon, Limoges, Lyons, Montpellier, Nancy, Nismes, Paris, Pau, and Riom. They were given on the 2d Prairial—May 22d. Messrs. Lacépède, Kellermann, François de Neufchâteau, and Berthollet, were among the favoured. But among a hundred senators, more than eighty of whom were still to be provided for, fifteen gratified did not form a sufficient majority. However, those who had failed in their pursuit of senatorial appanages had other positions in view, and as yet there was no cause to despair. But in the mean time some ill-humour discovered itself in the language held. The *Moniteur* was daily filled with nominations of chamberlains, equerries, ladies of honour, and ladies in waiting. If the personal greatness of the Emperor caused every thing that he did to be forgiven, it was not the same with those who rose in his suite. The

eager activity of those republicans, impatient to become courtiers, of those royalists in haste to serve him whom they had called a usurper, presented a strange spectacle; and if we add to the natural effect of that spectacle, the hopes disappointed or deferred, which were avenged in evil speaking, we shall easily comprehend that they must have criticised, satirized, sneered—in a word, gossiped immensely. But the masses, delighted with a government as glorious as it was beneficent, struck with so unheard-of a scene, of which they perceived the whole, but not the details, the result but not the process, neither knowing nor envying those fortunates of a day, who had succeeded in making their children pages, their wives ladies of honour, and themselves prefects of the palace, or chamberlains, the masses were attentive, and seized with a surprise, which ended by changing itself into admiration. Napoleon, from a sub-lieutenant of artillery, become Emperor, accepted and welcomed by all Europe, and borne upon the buckler to the throne amidst a profound calm, covered with the splendour of his fortune the littlenesses that were mingled with this prodigious event. There was not experienced, it is true, that sentiment of eagerness which, in 1799, had led the alarmed nation to rush towards a saviour; there was no longer experienced that sentiment of gratitude which, in 1802, led the delighted nation to decree to its benefactor a perpetuity of power; in a word, men were less eager to pay with gratitude a man who paid himself so largely with his own hands. But men judged him worthy of the hereditary sovereignty; they admired him for having dared to take it, they approved of its being re-established, because it was a more complete return to order; in a word, they were dazzled by the marvel which they looked upon. Accordingly, although with sentiments somewhat different from those which filled their breasts in 1799 and in 1802, the citizens eagerly flocked to all the places at which registers were opened, to record their votes. The affirmative suffrages were counted by millions, and scarcely were the few negative suffrages, placed there in proof of the liberty enjoyed, perceptible amidst the immense multitude of favourable votes.

Napoleon had but one last annoyance to encounter previous to being in full possession of his new title. It was necessary to finish the proceedings against Georges and Moreau, which had in the first instance been engaged in with an extreme confidence. As to Georges and his accomplices, and even as to Pichegru himself, had he lived, the difficulty was not great. The trial was sure to cover them with confusion and prove the participation of the emigrant princes in their plots. But Moreau was included in the cause. It had been expected, at the commencement, to find more proofs than did in reality exist against him, and although his error was evident to men of good faith, yet the evil-minded were not without the means of disputing it. Moreover, there existed an involuntary sentiment of pity, at the aspect of this contrast between the two greatest generals of the Republic; one mount-

ing the throne, the other in a dungeon, and destined, not to the scaffold, but to exile. All considerations, even of justice, are set aside on such occasions, and men more willingly pronounce the fortunate party in the wrong, even when he is in the right.

Those who were accused with Moreau, by the advice of their defenders, had agreed together to exculpate him altogether. They were greatly irritated against him at the outset of the procedure; but, interest overcoming passion, they had promised to save him, if possible. In the first place, it was the greatest moral check to give to Napoleon to set his rival free from prison, victorious against the accusation made against him, clad in the colours of innocence, aggrandized by persecution, and henceforth an implacable enemy. Moreover, if Moreau had not conspired, it could be maintained that there had been no conspiracy, if no conspiracy no crime, if no crime no criminals.

The bar, always partial towards the accused, the commonality of Paris, always independent in its judgment, and willingly opposing when great events did not connect it with power, were impassioned on behalf of Moreau, and expressed their wishes in his favour. Even those who, without any ill-will towards Napoleon, saw in Moreau only an illustrious and unfortunate warrior, whose services might still be useful, wished that he might come forth innocent from this ordeal, and be restored to the army and to France.

The trial opened on the 28th of May—8th Prairial, year XII.—before a crowded auditory. The accused were numerous, and were ranged on four rows of seats. The bearing of all was not alike. Georges and his band displayed an affected assurance: they felt at their ease, for after all they could call themselves devoted victims of their cause. However, the arrogance of some of them gained them no public favour. Georges, although exalted in the eyes of the crowd by the energy of his character, provoked some cries of indignation. But the unfortunate Moreau, overwhelmed by his very glory, deploring at that moment the celebrity which drew upon him the eager gaze of the multitude, was deprived of calm assurance, which formed his principal merit in the battlefield. He evidently asked himself what he had to do among those Royalists, he who was one of the heroes of the Revolution; and, if he did himself justice, he could make but one reply, that he had merited his fate by having yielded to the deplorable vice of jealousy. Among those numerous accused, the public looked only for him. Some applauses, even, were heard from old soldiers hidden in the crowd, and despairing revolutionists, who imagined that they saw the Revolution itself seated upon that bench where the general-in-chief of the army of the Rhine was seated. That curiosity, those homages, embarrassed Moreau. While the others pronounced with emphasis their names, obscure, or sadly celebrated, he pronounced his glorious name in so low a tone that he was scarcely audible. Just punishment for having tarnished a splendid reputation!

The trial was tedious. The system of defence which it had been determined to adopt was exactly followed. Georges and Messrs. de Polignac and de Rivière had only come to Paris because it had been represented to them that the new government had become wholly unpopular, and the public mind completely favourable to the Bourbons. They did not conceal their attachment to the cause of the legitimate princes, or their inclination to co-operate in a movement, if a movement had been possible; but, added they, Moreau, whom intriguers had represented as quite ready to receive the Bourbons, had no thought of doing so, and refused to listen to any of their proposals. From that time they had not even dreamed of conspiring. Georges, interrogated upon the grounds of the project, and confronted with his first declarations, in which he had avowed having come for the purpose of attacking the First Consul on the Malmaison road, with a French prince by his side, Georges, in confusion, replied, that would have been thought of afterwards, if an insurrectionary movement had appeared opportune, but that nothing being possible at the moment, they had not even occupied themselves about a plan of attack. His attention was directed to the daggers, the uniforms intended for his Chouans, and those Chouans themselves seated beside him on the bench of the accused: he was not precisely disconcerted, but he then became silent, seeming to avow by his silence that the system invented for his co-accused and for Moreau was neither plausible nor dignified.

There was but one point upon which they all remained in conformity with their first declarations; the presence of a French prince in the midst of them. They felt, in fact, that, in order not to be classed among assassins, it was necessary to be able to say that a prince was at their head. Little mattered it to them that they compromised the royal dignity; a Bourbon gave them the appearance of soldiers fighting for the legitimate dynasty. However, when these imprudent Bourbons saved their lives at London without troubling themselves about their unfortunate victims, those victims might well endeavour to save at Paris, if not their lives, at least their honour.

As for Moreau, his system was more specious, for he had never varied. That system he had already exposed to the First Consul in a letter which was unfortunately written too late, a long time after the fruitless interrogatories of the grand juge, and when the government, engaged in the procedure, could not recede without seeming to be afraid of public debate. He admitted having seen Pichegru, but with a view to being reconciled with him, and procuring him the means of returning to France. After the civil troubles were appeased, he had deemed that the conqueror of Holland was worth the pains of being restored to the Republic. He had not chosen to see him openly, nor directly to solicit his recall, owing to his own quarrels with the First Consul. The mystery of his proceedings had no other motive. It is true that advantage was taken of this opportunity to speak to him about projects against the government, but he had repulsed them as ab-

surditities. He had not denounced them because he believed them to be without danger, and, moreover, because the occupation of an informer did not become a man like him.

This system, specious enough, if irrefragable evidence had not rendered it inadmissible, gave rise to very animated debates, in which Moreau displayed almost as true a presence of mind as was his wont when the fight was at the fiercest. He even made some noble replies, which were rapturously applauded by the auditory. "Pichegru," said the president to Moreau, "was a traitor, and was even denounced by you to the Directory. How, then, could you think of being reconciled with him, and of restoring him to France?" "At a time," replied Moreau, "at a time when the soldiers of Condé swarmed in the saloons of Paris, and of the First Consul, I might very well interest myself in restoring to France the conqueror of Holland." On this point he was asked, why, under the Directory, he was so tardy in denouncing Pichegru, and some suspicion seemed to be raised even as to his past life. "I cut short," replied he, "the interviews of Pichegru and the Prince of Condé, in putting, by the victories of my army, eighty leagues of ground between that prince and the Rhine. The danger being past, I left to the Council of War the care of examining the papers that had been found, and of sending them to the government if it deemed it expedient to do so."

Moreau being questioned as to the nature of the plot to which it had been proposed to him to associate himself, persisted in affirming that he had repulsed it.

"Yes," it was replied, "you repulsed the proposal to replace the Bourbons upon the throne, but you consented to make use of Pichegru and of Georges to overthrow the consular government, and you did so in the hope of receiving the dictatorship from their hands."

"That," replied Moreau, "is a ridiculous project to attribute to me, that of making use of the royalists in order to make myself dictator, and of supposing that if they were victorious, they would intrust the power to me. For ten years I made war, and I am not aware that in all those ten years I was guilty of absurdities."

That noble retort upon his past life was drowned with applause. But all the witnesses were not in the secret of the royalists; all were not prepared to give the lie to their first depositions, and there remained an individual named Roland, formerly in the army, who with grief, but with a persistence that nothing could shake, repeated what he had advanced from the first day. He said, that being the medium of communication between Pichegru and Moreau, the latter had directed him to declare that he would not have the Bourbons, but that if the consuls were disposed of, he would use the power which would inevitably be conferred upon him to serve the conspirators, and to restore Pichegru to honours. Others still confirmed the evidence of Roland. Bouvet de Lozier, that officer of Georges who had escaped from suicide to hurl a terrible accusation against Moreau, could not retract it, but repeated it, though with some attempt at weakening it. In

that accusation, made in writing, he had stated only the things that he had been told by Georges himself. The latter replied, that Bouvet had imperfectly heard, ill understood, and, consequently, made an incorrect report. But there remained that night interview near the Madeleine, in which Moreau, Pichegru, and Georges were all together, a circumstance irreconcilable with a simple project of restoring Pichegru to France. Why should he give a night meeting to the chief of the conspirators, a man whom no one, except a royalist, could innocently meet? Here the depositions were so precise, so consistent, and so numerous, that, with the best possible will to do it, the royalists could not contradict what they had formerly said, and when they attempted to do so, they were straightway confounded.

Moreau this time was overwhelmed, and the sympathy of the auditory at length became evidently diminished. However, the clumsy reproaches of the president somewhat awakened that sympathy just as it was becoming extinct. "You are, at least, guilty of concealment," said the president to Moreau; "and although you pretend that such a man as yourself could not become an informer, your first duty was to obey the law, which enjoins every citizen, whatsoever or whomsoever he may be, to denounce the plots of which he may have cognisance. You still further owed that to a government which has heaped benefits upon you. Have you not large salaries, a mansion, an estate?"

The reproach was an unworthy one to address to one of the most disinterested generals of the time. "Monsieur le President," replied Moreau, "do not weigh my services against my fortune; there is no possible comparison between such things. My pay amounts to forty thousand francs, I have a house, and an estate worth (to the best of my belief) three or four hundred thousand francs. I should be possessed of fifty millions if I had used victory as so many others have." Radstadt, Biberach, Engen, Mæsskirch, Hohenlinden, those glorious souvenirs, weighed against some paltry money, aroused the auditory, and called forth those applauses which the improbability of the defence had begun to render unfrequent.

The trial had lasted for twelve days, and the public excitement was very great. In our own time we have often seen a trial entirely absorb the attention of the public. The same thing now occurred, but under circumstances calculated to produce an emotion quite independent of curiosity. Opposed to a triumphant and crowned general, another general in misfortune and in bondage, offering, by his defence the last possible resistance to a power that was every day becoming more absolute; amidst the silence of the national assemblies, the voice of the bar resounding as in the most free land; illustrious heads in peril, some of them belonging to the emigration, others to the Republic, here, assuredly, were circumstances to stir men's hearts. People yielded to a just pity, perhaps also to that secret sentiment which wishes for checks to fortunate power; and even those who were not inimical to the government put up their wishes for Moreau.

Napoleon, who felt himself exempt from that base jealousy of which he was accused, and who well knew that Moreau, without favouring the Bourbons, had wished for his death, that he might seize his position, believed and openly said that the condemnation of a general guilty of a state crime was due to him, Napoleon. He desired that condemnation as his own justification; he desired it, not to bring to the block the head of the victor of Hohenlinden, but to have the honour of pardoning him. The judges knew this, and the people also.

But the law, which enters not into political considerations, and which is right in not entering into them, since if policy is sometimes humane and wise, it sometimes is also cruel and imprudent, the law amidst that conflict of passions, the last which was to disturb the profound repose of the Empire, remained unmoved, and decided with equity.

The 21st Prairial—10th of June—after a trial of fourteen days, while the court had retired to deliberate, certain of the accused royalists perceiving that they had been deceived, and that their efforts to exculpate Moreau had been of no service to them, asked for the juge-instructeur, that they might at length make more explicit declarations to him. They now no more spoke of three interviews with Moreau, but of five; and M. Réal, being made aware of this, hastened to the Emperor, who instantly wrote to the arch-chancellor Cambacérès to find some means of communicating with the judges. But that was difficult, and would have been useless, and without having received any new communications, they, on the same day, the 10th of June, gave a decision which no influence had dictated. They pronounced sentence of death upon Georges and nineteen of his accomplices. As for Moreau, finding his physical complicity insufficiently made out, but his moral conduct reprehensible, they inflicted disgrace upon him by sentencing him to two years' imprisonment. M. Armand de Polignac and M. de Rivière were condemned to death. M. Jules de Polignac and five others of the accused to two years' imprisonment. Twenty-two were acquitted.

This decision, approved of by all impartial men, gave deadly offence to the new emperor, who flew into a violent passion at the weakness of that justice which others were accusing of barbarity. He even broke through that restraint which power should habitually impose upon itself, and especially in so grave a matter. In the state of exasperation into which he was thrown by the unjust reports of his enemies, it was difficult to obtain any acts of clemency from him. But he was so prompt in calming himself, and so clear-sighted, that access was very soon re-opened to his reason and to his heart. In the few days employed in appealing to the Court of Cassation, he took proper resolutions, remitted Moreau's two years' imprisonment, as he would have remitted him the capital punishment, had it been awarded, and consented to his departure for America.

That unfortunate general wishing to sell his property, Napoleon gave orders for it to be im-

mediately purchased at the highest price. As for the condemned royalists, always severe towards them since the last conspiracy, he at first would grant no mercy to any of them. Georges alone, by the energy of his courage, inspired him with some interest, but he looked upon him as an implacable enemy, whom it was necessary to destroy in order to secure public tranquillity. However, it was not for Georges that the emigrant party was anxious. It was greatly so for Messrs. de Polignac and de Rivière; it blamed the imprudence which had placed these personages of exalted rank and superior education in a society so unworthy of them; but it could not resign itself to see their heads fall; and it is true that the enthusiasm of party, rightly appreciated, might render their fault excusable, and themselves worthy the indulgence even of the head of the Empire.

The beneficence of Josephine was proverbial: it was known that, though lapped in unheated of grandeur, she had preserved a truly affecting benignity and kindness of heart. It was also known that she lived in continual terror of the daggers that were constantly raised against her husband. An introduction to her was obtained by means of Madame de Rémusat, who was in personal attendance upon her, and Madame de Polignac was conducted to her at St. Cloud, to bathe the imperial robe with her tears. She was affected, as with so impressionable a heart she could not fail to be, at the sight of a wife in tears nobly soliciting the life of her husband. She hastened to make a first attempt with Napoleon. He, according to his custom, concealing his emotion beneath a harsh and stern countenance, roughly repulsed her. Madame de Rémusat was present.

"You still interest yourselves for my enemies," said he to them both; "they are all of them as imprudent as they are guilty. If I do not give them a lesson they will begin again, and will be the cause of there being new victims."

Josephine, being thus repulsed, knew not to what other means to have recourse. Napoleon would in a few moments leave the Council Chamber and pass along one of the galleries of the château. She determined to place Madame de Polignac in his way, that she might throw herself at his feet as he appeared. And, in fact, at the moment when he was passing, Madame de Polignac presented herself to him, and, with tears, begged the life of her husband. Napoleon, surprised, darted a stern glance on Josephine, whose complicity he readily guessed. But subdued in the instant, he replied to Madame de Polignac, that he was surprised at finding, in a plot against his person, M. Armand de Polignac, the companion of his boyhood at the military school; that, however, he would grant his pardon to the tears of a wife; and that he only trusted this weakness on his part might not have evil effects in encouraging fresh acts of imprudence. "They are deeply culpable, madame," added he, "those princes who thus compromise the lives of their most faithful servants, without partaking their perils."

Madame de Polignac, transported with joy

and gratitude, flew to recount amidst her alarmed emigrant friends this scene of clemency, which procured a moment of justice to Napoleon and Josephine. The life of M. de Rivière was still in peril. Murat and his wife sought access to Napoleon, moved him to compassion, and wrung from him a second act of mercy. The pardon of M. de Polignac involved that of M. de Rivière. It was immediately granted. For the magnanimous Murat, eleven years afterwards, there were no such generous intercessors.

Such was the termination of that sad, detestable, but blundering scheme, which had for its object the annihilation of Napoleon, but resulted in elevating him to the throne; which procured a tragical death to a French prince, who had not conspired, and impunity to those who had, although certainly with signal disgrace as the chastisement of their faults; and, finally, exile to Moreau, the only general of that period, in whom, by exaggerating his glory and lowering that of Napoleon, a rival could be found for the latter. A striking lesson by which parties should profit! To employ criminal means against government, party, or man, is ever to aggrandize and not to destroy.

Thenceforth all resistance was vanquished. In 1802, Napoleon had surmounted civil resistance, by annulling the Tribunate: in 1804, he surmounted military resistance by baffling the conspiracy of the emigrants with the republican generals. While he ascended the steps of the throne, Moreau retired into

exile. They were destined once more to catch a glimpse of each other within cannon-shot, under the walls of Dresden, both of them guilty, the one in returning from a foreign land to make war upon his native country; the other, in abusing his power so far as to provoke a universal reaction against France: there the one was to be laid low by a French bullet: the other to gain a last victory while tottering on the verge of that abyss which has swallowed up his prodigious destiny.

However, those great events were still distant. Napoleon seemed then all-powerful and for ever. Doubtless, he had recently felt some sorrows; for independently of great calamities, Providence ever alloys the joys of prosperity with some anticipative bitterness, as if to warn the human soul, and prepare it for startling misfortunes. That fortnight had been trying to him, but it was soon past. The clemency he had shown threw a mild radiance upon his incipient reign. The death of Georges saddened no one, although his courage, worthy of a better fate, inspired some regret. Soon all were absorbed by that wondering curiosity attendant on an extraordinary spectacle.

Thus expired, after twelve years' duration, not the French Revolution, still vigorous and indestructible, but that Republic which had been styled imperishable. It expired beneath the hand of a victorious soldier, as all republics do, save those which slumber in the arms of oligarchy.

BOOK XX.

THE CORONATION.

Delay of the Descent on England—Causes and Advantages of that Delay—Redoubled Care in the Preparations—Financial Measures—Budgets for the Years XI., XII., and XIII.—Creation of indirect Taxes—Old Theory of a Tax solely on Land—Napoleon refutes that Theory, and causes the adoption of a tax upon Articles of Consumption—Original organization of the Administration of consolidated Taxes—Spain pays its subsidy in Bills at long Dates—An Association of Capitalists offers to discount them—First Operations of the Company called *The Associated Merchants*—All the disposable Resources devoted to the Squadrons of Brest, Rochefort, and Toulon—Napoleon plans the Arrival of a French Fleet in the Channel in order to render the Passage of the Flotilla secure—First Combination on which he determines—Admiral Latouche-Tréville intrusted with the Execution of that Combination—That Admiral was to run out of Toulon, deceive the English by changing his Course, and make his Way to the Channel, after being joined by the Rochefort Squadron on the Passage—The Descent projected for July or August, previous to the Coronation—The Ministers of the Courts at Peace with France present their Credentials to Napoleon—The Austrian Ambassador alone delays to do so—Departure of Napoleon for Boulogne—General Inspection of the Flotilla, Vessel by Vessel—The Dutch Flotilla—Imposing Ceremony on the Sea-Coast, and Distribution of Decorations of the Legion of Honour—Course of Events in England—Extreme public Agitation—Overthrow of the Addington Administration, by the Coalition of Fox and Pitt—Return of Mr. Pitt to the Ministry, and his first Measures for renewing a Coalition upon the Continent—Suspensions of Napoleon—He compels Austria to explain herself, by insisting that the Credentials of M. de Cobentzel should be delivered to him at Aix-la-Chapelle—He breaks off Diplomatic Relations with Russia, by allowing M. d'Oubril to depart—Death of Admiral Latouche-Tréville, and Postponement of the Descent till the Winter—Admiral Latouche-Tréville replaced by Admiral Villeneuve—Character of the latter—Progress of Napoleon on the Banks of the Rhine—Great Concourse at Aix-la-Chapelle—M. de Cobentzel there presents his Credentials to Napoleon—The Imperial Court repairs to Mayence—Return to Paris—Preparations for the Coronation—Difficult Negotiation to induce Pius VII. to proceed to Paris and crown Napoleon—The Cardinal Fusch despatched as Ambassador—Character and Conduct of that Personage—The Terror of Pius VII. at the Idea of going to France—He consults a Consistory of Cardinals—Five are against his going, and fifteen for it, but conditionally—Long Debate upon the Conditions—Final Consent—The Question of the Ceremonial left undecided—The Bishop Bernier and the Arch-Chancellor Cambacérès, select from the Roman Ritual and from the French Ritual, the Ceremonies compatible with the Spirit of the Age—Napoleon refuses to allow the Crown to be placed on his Head—Pretensions of the Family—Departure of the Pope for France—His Arrival at Fontainebleau—His Joy and Confidence on witnessing the Reception which befalls him—Ecclesiastical Marriage of Josephine and Napoleon—Ceremony of the Coronation.

The conspiracy of Georges, the proceedings that resulted from it, and the change that it brought about in the form of government, occupied the whole winter of 1803-4, and post-

poned the grand enterprise of Napoleon against England. But it had not ceased to occupy his mind, and he now, with redoubled care and activity, prepared for its execution, about the

middle of the summer of 1804. In truth, this delay was by no means to be regretted, for in his impatience to achieve this vast design, Napoleon had greatly exaggerated the possibility of being ready at the close of 1803. The continual experiments daily discovered new precautions to be adopted, and new improvements to be introduced, and it was but of little consequence to strike six months later, if the postponement gave the means of striking a surer blow. It was not the army, be it distinctly understood, that caused this loss of time, for at that epoch the army was always ready for action; it was the flotilla and the naval squadrons. The construction of flat-bottomed boats, and their assemblage in the four channel ports, was all that had been effected. But the Batavian (Dutch) flotilla had not arrived: the Brest and Toulon squadrons, the aid of which was deemed indispensable, were not ready, eight months not having sufficed for their completion. The winter of 1803 had been devoted to completing them. Thus the time apparently lost, had been most profitably employed. Above all, the delay had permitted the adoption of financial arrangements, which are always closely connected with military measures, and were more so now than ever. If, in exposing oneself to great inconveniences, one can succeed in carrying on war on land with but little money, by quarantining upon the enemy, maritime warfare is not to be carried on without money, for on the immense solitude of ocean nothing is to be had but what we take with us on leaving our own ports. The financial measures, then, were not the least important part of the immense preparations of Napoleon, and they deserve our attention for a moment.

We have related with what resources the struggle had been commenced after the rupture of the peace of Amiens. The budget of the year XI.—1803—voted with a still uncertain foresight of events, had been fixed at 589,000,000 francs, (23,560,000*l.* sterling,) (exclusive of the charges of collection,) that is to say, at 89,000,000 francs above the budget of the preceding year, which had been squared with 500,000,000 francs. But the expenditure had naturally exceeded the amount sanctioned by the Legislative Body; it had exceeded it by 30,000,000 francs, and had reached 619,000,000 francs. Certainly the excess was not great, when we reflect upon the preparations of an expedition like that of Boulogne. This moderation in the increase of the budget is explained by the epoch which separated the financial years. The financial year XI. finished at the 21st of September, 1803, and the same day commenced the financial year XII. Accordingly, the principal expenses of the flotilla could not be included in the budget of the year XI. It was thus that they had been able to limit the amount to 619,000,000 francs, which, with the charges of collection, amounted to about 710,000,000 or 720,000,000 francs. The budget of the year XII. would necessarily be much higher, for it would have to cover all the items which that of the year XI. had left unpaid. This last had been provided for by the ordinary contributions, the produce of

which, notwithstanding the war, continued greatly to increase, so great was the security under the wise and vigorous government which then ruled France. The stamp and register duties had increased by 10,000,000 francs, the customs by 6,000,000 or 7,000,000 francs; and notwithstanding an alleviation of 10,000,000 francs in the land tax, the ordinary imposts had risen to 573,000,000 francs. The balance had been found in the 22,000,000 francs of the Italian subsidy, and 24,000,000 francs borrowed from the extraordinary resources, which, as we have said, consisted of the Spanish subsidy, fixed at 4,000,000 francs per month, and of the price of Louisiana, ceded to the United States. These resources, scarcely touched, remained almost entire for the year XII., which was a fortunate circumstance, for all the expenses of the war were about to press at once upon that financial year, (September, 1803, to September, 1804.) The expenditure of the year XII. could not be estimated at less than 700,000,000 instead of 619,000,000 francs; making, with the costs of collection, and some supplemental per centages not included in the estimates, a total of 800,000,000 francs. Moreover, in that amount, the new civil list was not included. It will be seen that the budgets were rapidly progressing towards the figure which they have since reached.

It was necessary to be prepared for a slight falling off in the revenue of the domains, in consequence of the alienations of the national property, and of the landed endowments conferred on the Senate, the Legion of Honour, and the Sinking Fund. The ordinary contributions would but little exceed 560,000,000 francs, unless through increased production, which was probable enough, but, from a scrupulous regard to accuracy, this was not relied on. There was required, then, no less a sum than 140,000,000 francs of extraordinary means to provide for the 700,000,000 francs, the supposed amount of expenditure, exclusive of the charges of collection and some supplemental per centages. Italy contributed 22,000,000 francs for the three states in which our army did protective duty. The 48,000,000 francs of the Spanish subsidy, the 60,000,000 francs of the American subsidy, reduced to 52,000,000 francs by bankers' charges, made the extraordinary receipts amount in all to 122,000,000 francs. There consequently remained 20,000,000 francs still to be found. The funds deposited as securities by public officers, were, as on former occasions, to supply this amount. Securities in money had already been required from the receivers-general, paymasters, receivers of the registry dues, customs, &c. These sums had been paid into the Sinking Fund, which placed the same to the credit of the depositors. The Sinking Fund, in its turn, had handed over the sums to government, which had undertaken to refund them at the rate of 5,000,000 francs per annum. It was a sort of borrowing from the officers of the revenue, perfectly legitimate, since the state was entitled to some security from these persons for their fidelity and good management. This system of securities was susceptible of extension, because there were

still revenue officials who had not as yet been subjected to the common rule. In fact, there existed a second category of receivers of the public revenue, whose position required regulating: these were the receivers of the direct taxes. Hitherto, in the country and in the towns, instead of collectors appointed by the state for collecting the direct taxes, the collection was intrusted to the contractor bidding lowest. This system had been changed in the great towns, where receivers had been permanently appointed as public servants, and were allowed by the treasury a commission on the amount of their collections, by way of salary. This new system having answered well, it was proposed, for the year 1804, to establish in all the communes, whether urban or rural, receivers nominated by government, and to require from them securities estimated in the whole at 20,000,000 francs. That sum, handed over to the treasury, was to be refunded by the government by instalments, as had been agreed upon for the previous deposits.

To this resource was added the sale of some national property, to be taken from what remained disposable, since endowments had been provided for the Senate, the Legion of Honour, Public Education, and the Sinking Fund. This afforded a fresh resource of 15,000,000 for the year XII., over and above the amount deemed to be necessary. This property was made over to the Sinking Fund, which, selling it little by little, procured, from day to day, better prices. It was agreed that the Sinking Fund should retain the proceeds, in order to repay itself the five million francs, which were annually due to it by the government, in reimbursement of the deposits lent for the public service.

Such were the financial means created for the year XII.: 560,000,000 francs of ordinary contributions, 22,000,000 francs of Italian subsidy, 48,000,000 francs of Spanish subsidy, 52,000,000 francs of the price of Louisiana, 20,000,000 francs of moneys lodged as security, besides several millions from national property. The whole exceeded the 700,000,000 francs deemed to be necessary for that financial year, September, 1803, to September, 1804.

But they were at the close of the financial year XII., as it was now the summer of 1804. It was necessary to make arrangements for the year XIII.—September, 1804, to September, 1805—which would not have the benefit of one very considerable item, the American subsidy, which was entirely appropriated to the year XII. It was indispensably necessary to supply this deficiency without delay.

Napoleon had long been convinced that the Revolution, although it had created great resources, by equalizing taxation, had nevertheless dealt too severely with landed property, in throwing upon it alone the burden of public charges, by the suppression of indirect taxes. What the Revolution had done is only too common in disturbed times. At the first outbreak, the populace, especially that of the towns, take advantage of it to refuse to pay the tax imposed upon articles of consumption, and particularly upon liquors, which constitute its chief enjoyment. This was the case in

1730, when the taxes of this sort were refused during more than six months; in 1815, when the deceptive promise of their suppression obtained for the Bourbons a momentary popularity; and in 1789, when the first popular attacks were directed against the barriers. But these imposts, the most detestable to the populace of the towns, are, nevertheless, those which characterize truly prosperous countries, which really bear more upon the rich than upon the poor, and are the least injurious to production; while taxation imposed upon the land deprives agriculture of capital, of cattle, and manure, impoverishes the soil, and thus dries up the most abundant source of wealth. In the eighteenth century a prejudice found favour, which, at the time, it must be confessed, rested on incontestable ground. Landed property, accumulated in the hands of the aristocracy and the clergy, and unequally taxed, according to the rank and quality of its possessor, was an object of aversion to those generous spirits who sought to relieve the poor. It was at that period that they devised the theory of an unique tax, bearing exclusively upon the land, and supplying the entire expenditure of the state. By this means they could suppress the excise and the gabelles, taxes which appeared to press upon the populace alone. But this theory, generous in intention, false in practice, was to fall before experience. Subsequent to 1789, landed property, divided among thousands of hands, and subjected to equal burdens, no longer deserved the animadversion which had formerly been bestowed upon it, and it was necessary, above all, to consider the paramount importance of agriculture. It was to be considered that in burdening it beyond measure, the country population was injured and deprived of the means of cultivation, to the profit of the sellers and consumers of spirituous liquors. It was to be considered that it was absolutely necessary that the revenues should equal the expenditure, as the only safeguard against a recurrence to paper money and bankruptcy, and that to equalize the revenues and the expenditure, it was indispensable to vary the sources of taxation in order not to exhaust them. It well became the man who had restored order in France, who had drawn the finance from chaos by re-establishing a regular collection of the direct taxes, to complete his work by re-opening the closed source of the indirect taxes. But, for this it required great authority and great energy. Faithful to his character, Napoleon feared not, the very day on which he sought the throne, to re-establish, under the title of Consolidated Taxes, the most unpopular but the most useful of burdens.

He first proposed it to the Council of State, and he there supported the correct view of the question with a marvellous sagacity, as though finance had been the study of his life. To the theory of the unique tax, imposed exclusively upon the land; exacting from the farmer and the land-owner the total sum necessary for the wants of the state, or at the least, obliging them to advance it even upon the supposition most favourable to them, that of the increased price of agricultural productions compensating them

for that advance; to this absurdly exaggerated theory, he opposed the true and simple theory of taxation skilfully diversified, resting at once upon all descriptions of property and industry, demanding from no one of them too considerable a portion of the public revenue, producing, consequently, no compulsory variation of prices, drawing wealth from every channel through which it abundantly flows, and drawing from each in such wise as to exhaust none. This system, the offspring of time and experience, is open only to one objection: that objection is, that the diversity of impost brings with it a diversity of collection, and consequently, an augmentation of expenses; but it presents so many advantages, and the opposite system is so violent, that this slight augmentation of expense should not be a serious consideration. When he had caused his views to be adopted by the Council of State, Napoleon sent his project to the Legislative Body, where it was not the object of any serious difficulty, owing to the preliminary conferences between the corresponding sections of the Tribunate and of the Council of State. The following were the arrangements. An establishment was created, under the title of the Board of Consolidated Taxes. That board was to levy the new taxes by means of revenue officers, as they alone were found to be efficient in seeking out taxable commodities in the places where they were grown or manufactured. These commodities consisted of wines, brandy, beer, cider, &c. A uniform and very moderate duty was laid upon their first sale, according to a tariff formed at the epochs of the harvest of manufacture. The amount of the duty was to be paid at the instant of the first removal. The principal commodity taxed, after beverages, was tobacco. There was already a customs' duty upon foreign manufactured tobacco, and a manufacture duty upon French tobaccos, (for a government monopoly had not yet been devised;) but the produce of this latter duty was lost to the treasury, in consequence of deficient inspection. The creation of a Board of Consolidated Taxes supplied the means of collecting the whole of this duty, trivial then, but destined to become considerable. Salt was not included in the taxed commodities, from fear of reviving the remembrance of the ancient *gabelles*. Nevertheless, in Piedmont a Board of Salt Tax was established, which was a measure at once of police and of finance. Piedmont, obtaining its salt at Genoa, or at the mouths of the Po, and being frequently exposed to cruelly high prices, by the interested speculations of merchants, had never been able to dispense with the intervention of government. By creating a Board of Salt Tax, charged with purchase and sale, at a moderate price, an end was put to the danger of scarcities and dearth, and at the same time there was secured a ready and certain means of collecting a tax which was tolerably productive in the aggregate, though very moderate with reference to the tariff.

These various combinations could not bring any thing into the exchequer during the year XII., the year of their creation—1803–1804—but they afforded ground for reckoning on 14

or 18 millions francs in the year XIII., 30 or 40 million francs in the year XIV., and, for the following years, amounts difficult to estimate, but, nevertheless, presumably sufficient for all the necessities of a war, even a prolonged one.

By means of these arrangements, the expenditure of the year XII.—1803–1804—would be met by the 700 million francs of ordinary and extraordinary receipts, and certain resources were secured for future years. But still, at the commencement of the system, some serious practical difficulties were experienced. The two chief existing resources consisted of the price of Louisiana, and the monthly subsidy furnished by Spain. The unavoidable delay occasioned by the vote of the American funds, had prevented the payment of that resource into the treasury. However, the firm of Hope and Co. had agreed to advance a portion of it towards the end of 1804. As to Spain, upon the 44 million francs (1,760,000*l.*) due in Floréal for the eleven previous months, she had only discharged in sundry payments, about 21 million francs, that is to say, one-half the amount due. The finances of that unfortunate country were more than ever embarrassed, and although the seas were open to her galleons, thanks to the neutrality which France had allowed her, the specie that reached her from America was squandered in idle dissipations.

To supply the place of these deferred payments, recourse was had to paper. The English have exchequer bills, and we now possess *bons royaux* payable at three, six, or nine months, which, negotiated on 'Change, constitute a temporary loan, by the aid of which the state is enabled, during a longer or a shorter period, to anticipate the revenues in course of collection. Notwithstanding that Napoleon had laboured hard and successfully in the re-establishment of the finances, the treasury had not yet sufficiently gained the confidence of the commercial world successfully to issue any paper whatever in its own name. The bills of the receivers-general, bearing the acceptance of responsible parties, and repayable at the office of the Sinking Fund in case of protest, had alone obtained confidence. They were, as we have already said, subscribed at the commencement of the financial year, to the whole amount of the direct taxes, and successively payable from month to month. The latest were at fifteen or eighteen months' date. In order to realize the revenues of the state in advance, these were discounted in sums of 20 or 30 million francs, at the rate of a half per cent. per month (six per cent. per annum) during the short peace of Amiens, and, since the war, at three-quarters per cent. per month (nine per cent. per annum.) Notwithstanding the confidence that was felt in the government, that confidence was so little shared by the treasury, that the most eminent banking houses declined this sort of operations. These discount transactions were gone into by adventurous speculators, former contractors to the Directory. M. de Marbois, wishing to emancipate himself from their co-operation, applied to the receivers-general themselves, who, having formed themselves into a committee at Paris, discounted their own paper, either with their

own funds, or with funds which, at a lower interest, they procured from the hands of the capitalists. But these government officers were limited in their speculations, and possessed neither the requisite capital nor the requisite boldness to furnish the treasury with any great assistance. There were at that time in Paris, a banker who was much experienced in this kind of operation, M. Desprez; M. Vanlerberghe, an active contractor, very skilful in the art of provisioning armies; and, lastly, one of the most inventive and ingenious of speculators in enterprises of every kind, M. Ouvrard, celebrated at that time for his immense fortune. All three had entered individually into connection with the government, M. Desprez for the discounting of treasury bills; M. Vanlerberghe, for the supply of provisions; and M. Ouvrard for all grand operations, whether of provisioning or banking. M. Ouvrard formed a co-partnership with Messrs. Desprez and Vanlerberghe, placed himself at the head of that association, and gradually became, as he had been under the Directory, the principal financial agent of the government. He succeeded in gaining the confidence of M. de Marbois, minister of the treasury, who, feeling his own incompetence, was glad to have the aid of an inventive spirit, capable of finding the expedients which he knew not how to find for himself. M. Ouvrard, on behalf of himself and partners, offered to undertake the discounting of the treasury bills. He entered into a first contract in Germinal, year XII.—April, 1804—by which he undertook to discount not only a considerable amount of the bills of the receivers-general, but even of the subsidy of Spain, who, being unable to pay her subsidy in cash, paid it in bills at long dates. M. Ouvrard made no difficulty about taking these bills for money, and paying over the amount. M. Vanlerberghe and he had claims on the state for heavy sums on account of former contracts. They were now authorized, in discounting the bills of the receivers-general and of Spain, to reckon part of the sums due to them as so much cash. Thus in the very act of discounting, they paid themselves with their own hands. Under the firm of *Associated Merchants*, then, this association began to possess itself of the business of the state. Its origin is worthy of attention, for it soon took part in immense operations, and played a very considerable part in the financial world. To render the operation it had undertaken with the treasury good, and even excellent, it was only requisite that Spain should fulfil her engagements, for the bills of the receivers-general, composing part of the security, were in the highest degree safe. These bills had only the inconvenience of being long dated, as the treasury employed in its payments those of two or three months' date, and discounted those which were at six, twelve, and fifteen months. But excepting the length of time that they had to run, they were unexceptionably good. As for the bills signed by Spain, their value depended upon the conduct of a sadly imbecile court, and on the arrival of the galleons from America. On this basis M. Ouvrard constructed vast schemes, succeeded in dazzling the credulous

mind of M. de Marbois, and set out for Madrid, in order to realize his bold conceptions. Napoleon looked with suspicion upon this second but rash spirit, and had warned M. de Marbois also to be on his guard. But M. Ouvrard discounted through M. Desprez the treasury bills, and he himself discounted those of Spain, and provisioned the army through M. Vanlerberghe. Thanks to him, all necessities were provided for at once, and the evil, if any existed, did not seem likely to extend far, since, after all, M. Ouvrard seemed always in advance to the treasury, and never the treasury to him.

Such were the means employed immediately to provide for all the expenses of the war, without having recourse to loans. The speculators were required to anticipate, by means of discounts, the receipt of the state revenues, and that of 122,000,000 francs, furnished by the allied countries, Italy, America, and Spain. As regarded the future, the long announced creation of indirect taxes, at length decreed this year, would completely provide for it.

Napoleon had resolved very speedily to execute his grand enterprise. He wished to cross the Straits towards the month of July or August, 1804; and if the incredulous, who have questioned the reality of his project, could read his private correspondence with the minister of marine, the infinite number of his orders, and the secret communication of his hopes to the Arch-Chancellor Cambacérès, they would no longer entertain any doubt as to the reality of that extraordinary resolution. All the vessels composing the flotilla were assembled at Etaples, Boulogne, Vimereux, and Ambleteuse, always excepting those which had been built between Brest and Bayonne, for the sort of craft intended for the assemblage could never have doubled Ushant. But nearly the whole being built between Brest and the mouths of the Scheldt, no considerable number were absent. There were sufficient to convey the hundred and twenty thousand men intended to pass over in the gun-boats. The remainder, as will be remembered, were always intended to embark in the fleets of Brest and the Texel.

The Dutch flotilla, built and assembled in the Scheldt, was behindhand. Napoleon had given the command of it to Admiral Verhuell, who possessed his high esteem, and deserved it. The Dutch, but little zealous, and, especially, having but little confidence in this singular project, far too bold for their cold and methodical spirit, threw but little ardour into their co-operation. Nevertheless, the zeal of the admiral, and the urgings of our minister at the Hague, M. de Sémonville, had accelerated the armament for which Holland had engaged. A fleet of seven ships of the line, attended by numerous merchantmen, was ready to transport the twenty-four thousand men of the camp of Utrecht, commanded by General Marmont. At the same time, a flotilla, consisting of some hundreds of gun-boats and large fishing-boats, had completed its formation in the Scheldt. It remained to leave those moorings and clear the mouth of the Scheldt, which was far more accessible to the enemy than the coasts of France. Admiral Verhuell,

pers: nally commanding his detachments, had fought some brilliant battles between the Scheldt and Ostend. Notwithstanding the loss of some boats, five or six at the most, he had baffled all the efforts of the English, and converted the incredulity of the Dutch sailors into confidence. The Dutch flotilla succeeded, in the spring of 1804, in assembling at Ostend, Dunkirk, and Calais, and held itself in readiness to embark the corps of Marshal Davoust, encamped at Bruges. Napoleon would have wished for more; he would have wished that the two flotillas, Dutch and French, united into one, in the ports lying to the westward of Cape Grisnez—that is to say, at Ambleteuse, Vimereux, Boulogne, and Etaples, should have all had the same wind for departure. An effort was made to gratify his wish, by concentrating the encampments of the troops and the stations of the flotillas.

The works of the armament along the coast of Boulogne were finished, the forts constructed, and the basins dug. The troops having completed their task, had now returned to their military exercises. They had acquired a truly admirable discipline and precision of movement; and they presented an army not only inured to war by numerous campaigns, and hardened by rude labours, but as perfect in manœuvres as though they had spent whole years upon the parade ground. That army, perhaps the finest that prince or general ever commanded, impatiently expected the arrival of its chieftain, newly raised to the throne. It turned to congratulate him, and to follow him to the theatre of a new and prodigious glory.

Napoleon was no less impatient to join it. But an important question had arisen among the professional men, as to whether the gun-boats composing the flotilla—*nutshells*, as they were called—could brave the English fleet. Admiral Bruix, and Admiral Verhuell had the utmost confidence in those boats. Both of them had exchanged cannon shots with the English frigates, had gone out of port in all weathers, and had acquired the conviction that these light craft were sufficient for clearing the Strait. Admiral Decrès, inclined to contradict every one, and especially inclined to contradict Admiral Bruix, thought the reverse. Those of our marine officers who were not employed on the flotilla, whether from prejudice, or from the ordinary inclination to criticise what we have no part in doing, inclined to the opinion of the minister Decrès. Admiral Gauteaume, transferred from Toulon to Brest, had witnessed an accident which we have mentioned above, and which had caused him much anxiety for the fate of the army and of the Emperor, to whom he was sincerely devoted. The sight of a gun-boat, capsized

before his eyes in Brest roadstead, almost keel upwards, had filled him with anxiety, and he had instantly written upon the subject to the minister of marine. That accident, as we have said, was of no importance. The boat had been unskilfully ballasted, the artillery had been ill-arranged, the men were not sufficiently practised, and the ill-distributed weight, added to the confusion of the crew, had led to the shipwreck.

It was not want of stability that Admiral Decrès apprehended. The flotilla of Boulogne, manœuvring for two years in the heaviest squalls, had done away with all uncertainty on that head. But he addressed the following objections to the Emperor and to Admiral Bruix.¹

"Undoubtedly," said he, "a twenty-four pound shot has the same force, whether discharged from a gun-boat or from a ship of the line. It causes the same damage, often even more, when discharged from a slight vessel, which it is difficult to hit, and whose horizontal fire takes effect between wind and water. Add to this the musketry, destructive at a short distance, and the facility for boarding, and the value of the gun-boats cannot be doubted. They carry above three thousand guns of large calibre, that is to say, as many as a fleet of from thirty to thirty-five sail of the line, a fleet which it is not often easy to assemble. But where have these boats been seen to measure themselves with the large vessels of the English? In but one situation, that is to say, close in shore, in shallows, amidst which those large craft dared not trust themselves to follow an enemy which, numerous though individually weak, was prepared to riddle them with balls. It is similar to an army enclosed in a defile, and assailed, from the summit of inaccessible positions, by a cloud of adroit and intrepid sharpshooters. But," continued Admiral Decrès, "suppose those gun-boats in mid channel, out of reach of shoals and sandbanks, and in presence of ships no longer afraid to bear down upon them; suppose, still further, a stiff breeze, which would render manœuvring easy to the ships and difficult to your gun-boats, would not these latter be in danger of being sunk in great numbers by the giants with which they would be obliged to contend?"

"Perhaps," replied Admiral Bruix, "we might lose a hundred boats out of two thousand; but nineteen hundred would pass over and they would suffice for the ruin of England." "Yes," rejoined Admiral Decrès, "supposing the disaster of the hundred boats not to strike a panic into the crews of the other nineteen hundred; supposing the number of the nineteen hundred should not prove an inevitable

¹ The private correspondence of M. Decrès with the Emperor, so private that M. Decrès wrote the whole of it with his own hand, is extant in the private archives of the Louvre; it is one of the finest productions of that time, after the correspondence of the Emperor. It does equal honour to the patriotism of the minister, to his sound sense, and to the piquant originality of his mind. It contains very precious views upon the organization of the marine of France: it should be unceasingly studied by seamen, and all connected with the administration of the navy. It is in that correspondence that I

have been able to study that profound conception of the Emperor, and to acquire a new proof of his extraordinary foresight, and the certainty of the sincerity of his projects. One of these letters contains Admiral Decrès' opinion of the flotilla, an opinion which at that time was rather suspected than known. For Napoleon ordered every one to observe silence alike upon the strong and upon the weak side of his plans. Operations were not then, as they have been, derided by the indiscretion of the very agents intrusted with their execution.

cause of confusion, and supposing the officers to preserve their coolness, for hesitation or alarm would be inevitably followed by a general catastrophe."

Attention had also been bestowed upon the hypothesis of a summer's calm, or a winter's fog, two equally propitious opportunities, for in a calm the English ships could not bear down upon our boats, in a fog they would be unable to see them, and in both cases their redoubtable encounter would be avoided. But these circumstances, though occurring twice or thrice in every season, would not afford sufficient security. Two tides, that is to say, the space of four-and-twenty hours, would be required to get out the whole flotilla, ten or twelve hours to cross over, and, allowing for the always inevitable loss of time, about forty-eight hours in the whole. Was it not to be apprehended that in this interval of two days, a sudden change in the atmosphere might surprise the flotilla in full operation?

The objections of the minister Decrès, then, were very serious. Napoleon drew his answers from his character, his confidence in fortune, and the remembrance of the St. Bernard and of Italy. He said, that his most brilliant operations were accomplished in spite of obstacles as great; and that while it was necessary to leave to chance as little as possible, something must be left to it. However, while refuting the objections, he knew how to appreciate them, and this man who, by dint of tempting fortune, at length forfeited her protection, this man knew how to spare himself a peril in order to add a chance of success to his plans. Rash in conception, he always evinced consummate prudence in execution. It was in order to meet these objections that he incessantly reflected upon the plan of bringing, by an unexpected manœuvre, a grand fleet into the Channel. If this fleet, only for three days superior to the English force in the Downs, should cover the passage of the flotilla, all obstacles would be at an end. Admiral Decrès confessed that, supposing that case, he had not another objection to raise, and that the vanquished ocean would deliver Great Britain up to our attacks. And if, as was almost certain, our fleet should have the superiority for more than two days, (for intelligence could not be rapidly enough conveyed to the English fleet which blockaded Brest, to enable it immediately to join that which observed Bologne,) there would be time enough for the flotilla to make the passage several times, to take over fresh troops, left in the camps, where, too, ten or fifteen thousand horses and considerable additional baggage, ammunition, and artillery were waiting for the means of transport. The mass of force would then be so great that all resistance on the part of England would be impossible.

Prodigious results, therefore, depended upon the sudden arrival of a fleet in the Channel. For this, an unexpected combination was requisite, such as the English could not baffle. Fortunately, the old British admiralty, especially powerful by its traditions and its *esprit de corps*, could not compete in invention with a prodigious genius, constantly reflecting on

the same subject, and free from the necessity of consulting with a collective administration.

Napoleon had at Brest a fleet of eighteen vessels, which was very soon to be increased to twenty-one; one of five at Rochefort, one of five at Ferrol, a ship lying for safety at Cadiz, and, finally, eight vessels at Toulon, which were about to be increased to ten. Nelson with his squadron was cruising off the isles of Hyères, to observe Toulon. Such was the state of the respective forces, such the field which presented itself to the combinations of Napoleon. His idea was to steal away one of his fleets, and send it unexpectedly into the Channel, in order to be superior there for some days to the English. When he proposed to act in the winter, that is to say, in the preceding February, he had thought of sending the Brest fleet to the coast of Ireland, to land there the 15 or 20,000 men on board it, and to cause it then suddenly to appear in the Channel. This bold plan had no chance of success, except in winter, as at that season the continual blockade of Brest being impracticable, advantage could be taken of bad weather to put to sea. But in summer the presence of the English was so constant, that it was impossible to get out without a battle, and vessels encumbered with troops looking upon the sea for the first time, opposed to vessels exercised by a long cruise, and but lightly laden, would run great risks unless immensely superior in point of numbers. At that time of year the facilities for getting out were greater on the side of Toulon. In June and July, strong north-westerly breezes, frequently blowing, would oblige the English to seek shelter in Corsica or Sardinia. A squadron, availing itself of such an occurrence, could set sail at the close of day make twenty leagues in a night, deceive Nelson by making false route, and, by inspiring him with fears for the East, probably draw him towards the mouths of the Nile, for since Napoleon had escaped him in 1798, Nelson was constantly engrossed with the possibility of the French throwing an army into Egypt, and he was unwilling to be taken off his guard a second time. Napoleon determined to intrust the Toulon fleet to the most daring of his admirals, Latouche-Tréville, to compose it of ten ships of the line and several frigates, and to form a camp in the neighbourhood in order to awaken the idea of a new expedition to Egypt; to embark, in reality, only a few troops, and to send this fleet out during a north-westerly breeze, assigning to it the following route. It was first to sail towards Sicily, then, bearing to the westward to steer for the Straits of Gibraltar, pass them, pick up on the way the frigate *L'Agile*, which had taken refuge at Cadiz, avoid Ferrol, whither Nelson would probably be tempted to hurry when he should learn that the French had passed the Straits, enter the Gulf of Gascony to rally the French division of Rochefort, and finally lying-to on the south of the Serin-guesser to the north of Brest, profit by the first favourable breeze to pass into the Channel. This fleet, ten sail of the line strong at its departure, reinforced with six others during its cruise, and numbering sixteen on its arrival

ought to be sufficiently numerous to command the Strait of Calais for several days. To deceive Nelson was quite possible, for that great seaman, full of the genius of battle, had not always a perfectly correct judgment, and moreover, his mind was continually disturbed with the remembrance of Egypt. To avoid Ferrol, in order to reach Rochefort to rally the squadron which lay there, was also very practicable. The most difficult was to penetrate into the Channel, and pass between the English squadron, which guarded the coasts of Ireland, and the fleet of Admiral Cornwallis, which blockaded Brest. But the squadron of Gauteaume, always kept ready for sailing, with all its people embarked, could not fail strongly to attract the attention of Cornwallis, and to compel him to keep close up to the mouth of Brest. If the latter, abandoning the blockade of Brest, should hasten after Latouche-Tréville, Gauteaume would instantly sail out, and one of the two French fleets, perhaps both of them, would be sure to arrive before Boulogne. It was almost impossible for the English admiralty to divine such a combination, and guard against it. A point of departure so distant as that of Toulon ought less than any other to give alarm for the Channel. Moreover, in fitting out the flotilla in such a manner as that it could suffice for itself, all idea of external assistance was banished, and the vigilance of the enemy put to sleep. Thus, then, every thing was combined for the success of this scientific manœuvre, which could only occur to the mind of a man conceiving and acting alone, keeping his secret well, and perpetually thinking of the same thing.

"If," said M. Decrès to the Emperor, "you would intrust a grand design to a man, it is necessary that you should first see him, speak to him, and animate him with your genius. This is especially necessary with our marine officers, demoralized by our maritime reverses, always ready to die like heroes, but thinking less of conquering than of falling nobly." Napoleon, in consequence, sent for Latouche-Tréville, who had just previously returned from St. Domingo. That officer had neither the range of mind nor the organizing spirit of Admiral Bruix, but in execution he displayed a boldness, and a ready perception, which would probably, have made him, had he lived, the rival of Nelson. He was not discouraged like others, his companions in arms, but was ready to attempt any enterprise. Unfortunately he had contracted at St. Domingo the seeds of a disease of which many brave men had already died, and even more died subsequently. Napoleon unfolded to him his plan, made its fea-

sibility palpable to him, disclosed to him the grandeur, the immense consequences of it, and succeeded in infusing into the admiral's soul the ardour which transported his own. Latouche-Tréville, full of enthusiasm, quitted Paris before he had recovered his health, and went to superintend the equipment of his squadron. All was calculated for the execution of the project in July, or, at the latest, a August.

Admiral Gauteaume, who preceded Latouche in the command at Toulon, was transferred to Brest. The Emperor relied upon the devotion of Gauteaume, and was much attached to him. Nevertheless, he did not think him enterprising enough to be intrusted with this important manœuvre. But though inferior to Admiral Bruix with respect to capacity, and to Admiral Latouche as to audacity, he preferred him to all others for courage and experience. He had, therefore, confided to him the Brest squadron, which was probably destined to throw troops into Ireland, and had charged him to complete its equipment, that it might be in a state to co-operate with that of Toulon.

The fleet, however, was behindhand, owing to the unheard of efforts that had been made for the equipment of the flotilla. Since that had been ready, all the means of the marine had again been devoted to the equipment of the squadrons. They were working hard in the ports of Antwerp, Cherbourg, Brest, Lorient, Rochefort, and Toulon. Napoleon had said that he would have a hundred ships of the line in two years, and twenty-five out of that hundred at Antwerp; that it was in that port that he placed his hopes of effecting the restoration of the French navy, and that he should, besides, find in that system of vast naval constructions, a means of employing the idle hands in the ports. But the consumption of materials, the encumbered state of the dock-yards, and also the inadequate number of the workmen, retarded the execution of the Emperor's grand designs. Scarcely any vessels were put upon the stocks at Antwerp, both the men and the materials having been employed at Flushing, Ostend, Dunkirk, Calais, and Boulogne, to supply the unceasing necessities of the flotilla. At Brest, only the eighteenth vessel was equipped; at Rochefort the fifth. At Ferrol, the poverty of the Spanish resources delayed the refitting of the division sheltered in that port. At Toulon there were only eight ships fit for instant service, and yet the winter had been most actively employed. Napoleon urged his minister of marine, Decrès, and left him to repose.*

* This was the first conception of Napoleon. We shall hereafter see that it was frequently modified according to the circumstances under which it was necessary to act.

* The following are two letters from the Emperor to the admirals, which show the energy of will with which he busied himself with the restoration of the French navy.

To the Minister of Marine.

SAINT CLOUD, 21st of April, 1804.—1st Floréal, Year XII.

It appears to me to be very desirable that an imposing ceremony should mark the laying of the first stone of the arsenal of Antwerp; but it seems to me no less desirable not to destroy the building on the pretext of regularity. It is sufficient to build nothing contrary to the

general plan of regularity. Insensibly the rest will be established. When we have to destroy, we destroy what is irregular; but I must repeat to you what I lately said, that I cannot feel satisfied with the works at Antwerp, seeing that there is but one ship on the stocks, and five hundred workmen. I should desire that before the 1st Messidor there should be at least three or twenty-four on the stocks, that before the 1st Vendémiaire, year XIII., there should be six, and before the 1st Nivôse, nine; and all this cannot be done with the small number of workmen you have there. There are many unemployed workmen in Provence, and there will be many more at Bayonne and Bordeaux; therefore collect three thousand workmen at Antwerp. Stores from the north, wood, iron, every thing easily reaches there. If we were three years at war, we ought still to build twenty-

He had even given orders that they should work by torchlight, that the ten ships intended for Latouche should be equipped in good time. Sailors were no less wanted than materials and workmen. Admirals Gauteaume at Brest, Villeneuve at Rochefort, Gourdon at Ferrol, and Latouche at Toulon, complained of being short-handed. Napoleon, after many experiments, was confirmed in his idea of supplying the deficiencies of the crews by young soldiers picked from the regiments, who, being exercised at the guns and at upon-deck manœuvres, would advantageously complete the manning of the ships. Admiral Gauteaume had already tried that measure at Brest, and had found it answer well. He bestowed great praise upon these sailors borrowed from the land service, and especially for their services at the guns. Only he requested not to have formed soldiers sent to him, who unwillingly submitted to a second training, but young conscripts, who, having nothing to unlearn, were more apt in learning what it was desired to teach them, and showed themselves more docile. However, they were taken on trial, and only those retained who showed an inclination for the sea. By this means the total number of seamen was augmented by a fourth or a fifth.

France had then about forty-five thousand seamen fit for service; fifteen thousand in the flotilla, twelve thousand at Brest, from four to five thousand between Lorient and Rochefort, four thousand between Ferrol and Cadiz, and about eight thousand at Toulon, without reckoning some thousands in India. To this total force, twelve, or perhaps fifteen thousand men could be added, which would carry the number of men embarked up to sixty thousand. The Brest fleet alone had received an addition of four thousand conscripts. They were much praised. If such squadrons could have sailed for some time under good officers, they would speedily have equalled the English squadrons. But, blockaded in the ports, they had no sea practice; and, moreover, the admirals were without that confidence which is

five vessels there. Everywhere else this is impossible. We want a navy, and we cannot be considered to have one till we have a hundred ships. We must have them in five years. If, as I think, ships can be built at Havre, two must be put on the stocks there. Two new ones must also be begun at Rochefort, and two more at Toulon; the four last-mentioned should, I think, be three-deckers.

I should also wish to keep an eye upon the port of Dunkirk. I beg that you will send me a note of the depth of the water there at low tide.

The flotilla will soon be complete everywhere. It is necessary, therefore, to find employment for that host of workmen at Nantes, Bordeaux, Honfleur, Dieppe, St. Malo, &c. We must consequently begin building frigates, brigs, and tenders. It is necessary, as a matter of public spirit, that the workmen on the coast be not allowed to die of hunger, and that the seaward departments, which have been the least friendly to the Revolution, be made to perceive that the time approaches when the sea will also be our domain. St. Domingo cost us two millions per month; the English have taken it; we must apply the two millions per month solely to ship-building. My intention is to have the same activity in that as for the flotilla, only, as we are not hurried, business will be carried on with stricter order. I am in no hurry for the completion, but I require the commencement of a great deal.

I beg you to let me have, next week, a report from which I can ascertain the present condition of our marine, of what we are building, of what we require to build, and in what ports, and what will be the monthly cost, setting out from the principle that I should prefer

only acquired by victory. However, every thing progressed under the influence of a powerful will, which exerted itself to restore confidence to those who had lost it. Admiral Latouche left nothing undone at Toulon, to be ready in July or August. Admiral Gauteaume sailed out of Brest, and returned to train his crews a little, and to keep the English in continued doubt as to his actual intentions. By dint of threatening them with a sortie, he would inspire them with an incredulity, of which he would some day take advantage.

Napoleon required a still farther supplement to his naval force, and wished to appropriate to that purpose the marine of Genoa. He considered, that with a squadron of seven or eight ships of the line and some frigates in that port, he would divide the attention of the English between Toulon and Genoa, and oblige them to keep a double fleet of observation in that sea, or else to leave one of the two ports free, while blockading the other. He ordered M. Salicetti, our minister at Genoa, to conclude with that Republic a treaty, by which she should give up to us her dock-yards for the building of ten frigates, and the same number of ships of the line. France, in return, engaged to receive into her navy a number of officers proportioned to that force, with pay equal to that of the French officers. Further, she undertook to enrol six thousand Genoese sailors, whom the Ligurian Republic, on her part, undertook to hold in constant readiness. On the conclusion of peace, France was to grant her flag to the Genoese, which would secure her French protection, very serviceable against the states of Barbary.

All the arrangements of Napoleon were now concluded, and it was necessary for him to set out. But he chose previously to receive the ambassadors charged to present him with their new credentials, in which he was styled Emperor. The Pope's nuncio, the ambassadors of Spain and Naples, and the ministers of Prussia, Holland, Denmark, Bavaria, Saxony, Baden, Wurtemberg, Hesse, and Switzerland,

your taking eighteen months to build each ship, so that I have by one-third the greater number.

As to the ships, I would construct them on the same plan, the frigates on the model of the *Hortense*, or the *Cornette*, which seem good; for the ships take the best ships, and build ships of eighty, and of three decks, everywhere except at Antwerp, where it appears to me to be prudent to commence in the first instance with seventy-four.

To the Minister of Marine.

Saint Cloud, 28th of April 1804—8th Floréal, Year XII. I this day sign a decree relative to the constructions. I will admit of no sort of excuse. Let me have an account twice a week of the orders that you give, and see to their execution; if any extraordinary measures are required, let me know. I will not admit any excuse to be valid, for with a good administration I would build thirty vessels of the line in France in a year, if that were necessary. In a country like France we ought to be able to do whatever we will. It will not have escaped you that I intend to commence numerous constructions, except at Brest, where I do not intend to build any longer. My intention is to have afloat before Vendémiaire, year XIV., twenty-six ships of war; of course their being afloat at that time will depend upon whether we are previously at peace. But henceforth all seventy-four should be built at Antwerp. Our principal building-yard should be at Antwerp. It is there only that in a few years the French navy can be reformed.

Before the year XV. we ought to have a hundred ships of war.

presented themselves to him on Sunday the 8th of July—9th Messidor—with the forms adopted by all courts, delivered him their credentials, and treated him, for the first time, as a crowned sovereign. The ambassador from the court of Vienna, with which a negotiation was still in progress relative to the imperial title for the house of Austria; the ambassador of the court of Russia, with which France had quarrelled on account of the note addressed to Ratisbon, and finally, the ambassador of England, with which power we were at war, were alone absent from this assemblage. It may be said that, Great Britain excepted, Napoleon was recognised by all Europe, for Austria was about to execute a formal act of recognition; Russia regretted what she had done, and only required an explanation which should save her dignity, to recognise the imperial title of the Bonaparte family.

Some days later, the decorations of the Legion of Honour were distributed. Although this institution was decreed two years earlier, its organization had required considerable time, and was now scarcely finished. Napoleon in person distributed those grand decorations to the first civil and military personages of the Empire, in the church of the Invalides, a monument for which he had an especial affection. He had not as yet exchanged the order of the Legion of Honour against foreign orders; but in the absence of those exchanges which he proposed to make, in order to place in every respect his new monarchy on an equal footing with others, he, in the very middle of the ceremony, called the Cardinal Caprara to his side, and detaching from his own breast the order of the Legion of Honour, he gave it to that old and respectable cardinal, who was profoundly affected by so marked a

distinction. He also commenced with the Pope's representative the affiliation to an order which, all recent as it was, was speedily to be coveted by all Europe.

Endeavouring to render serious even the things apparently most vain, he sent the cross of grand-officer to Admiral Latouche-Tréville. "I have named you," he wrote to him, "grand officer of the Empire, and inspector of the coasts of the Mediterranean; but I am very anxious that the operation you are about to attempt may enable me to raise you to such a degree of consideration and honour as shall leave you nothing to wish for. Let us be masters of the channel for six hours, and we are masters of the world."¹ (2d of July, 1804.)

Wholly occupied with his grand project, the Emperor set out for Boulogne, after having delegated to the arch-chancellor Cambacérès, in addition to the ordinary care of presiding over the Council of State and the Senate, the power to exercise the supreme authority should that be necessary. The arch-chancellor was the only personage in the Empire in whom he had sufficient confidence to delegate to him such an extent of prerogatives. He arrived on the 20th of July at Pont-de-Briques, and immediately proceeded to the port of Boulogne to inspect the flotilla, and the various works which he had ordered. The two armies, sea and land, welcomed him with transports of joy, and saluted his presence with unanimous acclamations. Nine hundred discharges of cannon from the forts and the line of broadsides, resounding from Calais to Dover, apprised the English of the presence of that man who, for eighteen months past, had so deeply disturbed the accustomed security of their isle.

Napoleon, embarking on the instant, in spite of a stormy sea, would visit the stone forts of

¹ The following is the entire letter:

By my courier, on his return, let me know on what day, wind and weather permitting, you will be able to sail: let me know what the enemy has done, and where Nelson is.

Meditate upon the grand enterprise with which you are intrusted, and before I sign your final orders, let me know the manner in which you think that they will be most advantageously fulfilled.

I have named you grand-officer, and inspector of the coasts of the Mediterranean; but I am very anxious that the operation you are about to attempt may enable me to raise you to a degree of consideration and honour which shall leave you nothing to desire.

The squadron of Rochefort, consisting of five vessels, one a three-decker, and four frigates, is ready to weigh anchor; she has but five of the enemy's vessels against her.

The Brest squadron consists of twenty-one vessels. These vessels weigh anchor to harass Admiral Cornwallis, and oblige the English to have a greater number of vessels on that station. The enemy keep also six vessels in front of the Texel, to blockade the Dutch squadron, consisting of fifty-one ships of the line, four frigates, and a convoy of eighty sail.

General Marmont's army is embarked.

Among Etaples, Boulogne, Vimereux, and Ambleteuse, two new ports that I had constructed, we have 270 gun-boats, 534 gun-brigs, 366 pinnaces, in all 1200 vessels, carrying 120,000 men, and 10,000 horses. Let us be masters of the Strait for six hours, and we are masters of the world.

The enemy have in the Downs, or before Boulogne, and before Ostend, two seventy-fours, three of sixty, or sixty-four, and two or three of fifty. Hitherto, Cornwallis has only fifteen ships; but all the reserves of Plymouth and Portsmouth have come to reinforce him. The enemy have also at Cork, in Ireland, four or five ships of war. I do not speak of frigates and smaller craft, of which they have a great number.

If you deceive Nelson, he will go to Sicily, or to

Egypt, or to Ferrol. I do not think he will fail to present himself before Ferrol. Of five vessels which are in those parts, four are ready, as the fifth will be in Fructidor. But I think that Ferrol is too plainly pointed out; and it is so natural for the enemy to suppose if your Mediterranean force enter the ocean, that it is intended to raise the blockade of Ferrol: It would appear better, then, to take a wide berth to make Rochefort, which will complete you a squadron of sixteen ships of the line, and of eleven frigates, and then, without losing a moment, without letting go an anchor, whether in doubling Ireland, keeping well out to sea, or in executing the first plan, to arrive before Boulogne. Our Brest squadron of twenty-three sail, will have an army on board, and will be daily ready to sail, so that Cornwallis will be obliged to hug the coast of Brittany, to endeavour to oppose its sortie.

For the rest, I await, ere I determine upon this operation, which has some hazards, but of which the success offers such immense results, the plan that you have promised me by the return of the courier.

You should embark as much provisions as possible, in order that under any circumstances you may not be straitened for any thing.

At the end of the month a new ship will be launched at Rochefort and at Lorient. That of Rochefort we need say nothing about, but should that of Lorient be in the road and unable to join before your appearance at the Isle of Aix, I wish to know if you think that you should make your course to pick her up; at all events, I think that going out with a good north-wester, it is above every thing preferable to execute the operation before winter; for, in bad weather, it would be possible for you to have more chance of arriving, but no less so, that there might be many days such as would render it impossible to profit by your arrival.

Supposing that you can set sail before the 10th Thermidor—10th of July—it is improbable that you should not arrive before Boulogne in the course of September, a time when the nights are already reasonably long, and the weather not bad for any length of time.

La Crèche and of L'Heurt, as well as the wooden fort placed between the two first, all destined, as we have said, to cover the line of boats. He had some shots fired under his own eyes, in order to ascertain if the instructions he had given for obtaining the longest possible ranges had been duly followed. He then put out to sea, and, within cannon-shot distance of the English squadron, witnessed the manœuvring of several divisions of the flotilla, of which Admiral Bruix had constantly boasted the improvement. He returned, highly pleased, after having lavished testimonies of satisfaction upon the chiefs, both naval and military, who, under his supreme direction, had contributed to this prodigious creation.

The following and the succeeding days, he visited all the camps, from Etaples to Calais; then returned to the interior to inspect the cavalry, which was encamped at some distance from the coasts; and, above all, the splendid division of grenadiers, organized by General Junot, in the environs of Arras. That division consisted of companies of grenadiers picked from the regiments which were not destined to make part of the expedition. There was not a finer corps, for the choice and beauty of the men. It far surpassed even the Consular guard, now become the Imperial guard. It comprised ten battalions of 800 men each. With these grenadiers the reform of the military head-dress had been commenced. They wore shakos instead of hats, and short hair, unpowdered, instead of the former long and powdered hair, which was at once inconvenient and uncleanly. Inured to warfare by numerous campaigns, and manœuvring with unequalled precision, they were animated by that pride which gives its greatest strength to a *corps d'élite*, and presented a division of about 8000 men, which no European corps of even twice or thrice their number, would have ventured to oppose. It was these grenadiers whom Napoleon intended first to throw upon the shores of England, making them cross in the light pinnaces which we have elsewhere described. On beholding their bearing, their discipline, and their enthusiasm, Napoleon felt his confidence redoubled, and he doubted not that he should enter London and there conquer the sceptre of the earth, and the trident of the ocean.

Having returned to the coast, he resolved to inspect the flotilla, boat by boat, to see if his orders had been strictly attended to, and if it were possible, at the first signal, to embark, with the requisite rapidity, all that had been got together in the magazines of Boulogne. He found things exactly to his wishes. It required some days to embark the heavy *matériel*, but when that was once got on board, which should be done several weeks previous to the expedition, the horses, men, and field artillery,

could be embarked on the flotilla in three or four hours. All was not yet ready, however. Some divisions were behind from Havre to Boulogne. The guard-boats, especially, under command of Captain Daugier, had not yet arrived. The Dutch flotilla, too, caused Napoleon more than one difficulty. He was, to the highest degree, satisfied with Admiral Verhuell, but the equipment of a part of that flotilla was not finished, whether from a lack of zeal on the part of the Dutch government, or which is more probable, from the very nature of things. The two first divisions were assembled at Ostend, Dunkirk, and Calais; the third had not left the Scheldt. There remained another element of success, which Napoleon exerted himself to secure; it was to assemble the entire Dutch fleet in the ports situated to the west of Cape Grisnez, by uniting more compactly in the four ports of Ambleteuse, Vimeux, Boulogne, and Etaples. The two flotillas would thus sail at the same time, and with the same wind, at three or four leagues distance from each other. But there are two things which are expended in grand operations with a rapidity, and to an extent, which always go far beyond the notions of matter-of-fact persons—time and money. Arrived at the commencement of August, Napoleon saw that he could not be entirely prepared before the month of September, and caused an intimation to be given to Admiral Latouche that the expedition was deferred for a month. He consoled himself for that delay, by considering that the month would be employed in getting better prepared than he at that moment was; and, that the season, moreover, being still sufficiently fine in the course of September, there would be the advantage of longer nights.¹

In the mean time, he determined to give the army a grand fête, calculated to raise the spirits of the troops, if it were possible. He had distributed the grand decorations of the Legion of Honour to the principal personages of the empire, in the church of the Invalides, on the anniversary of the 14th of July. He now proposed, personally, to distribute to the army the crosses which were to be given in exchange for the suppressed arms of honour, and to celebrate that ceremony on his birthday, on the very brink of the ocean, and in the presence of the English squadrons. The result answered his wishes, and it was a magnificent spectacle, long remembered by all who witnessed it.

He selected a spot situated to the right of Boulogne, on the high land, not far from the column which has since been erected in that part. This spot, having the form of a semi-circular amphitheatre that had been designedly constructed on the brink of the ocean, seemed to have been prepared by nature for some grand national spectacle. There was space

¹The following is the text of the new order.

To the Minister of Marine.

14th Thermidor, Year XII.—2d August, 1804.

I wish you to despatch a courier extraordinary to Toulon, to make known to General Latouche, that different divisions of the flotilla having been unable to join, I have come to the conclusion that the delay of a month cannot but be advantageous, especially as we shall then

have longer nights, but that it is my intention that he avail himself of this delay to add the ship *Berwick* to the squadron; that all possible means be used to bring about that result; that a ship more or less is no unimportant consideration, as it will bring the squadron up to eighteen ships.

I also wish the orders to be renewed for fitting out the *Algéras* with all speed at Lorient. She must be in the road on the 10th Fructidor.

enough to allow the whole army to be drawn up there. In the centre of that amphitheatre a throne was erected for the emperor, with its front to the land and its back to the sea. To the right and left of it benches were put up to accommodate the grand dignitaries, the ministers, and the marshals. In prolongation of these two wings, detachments of the Imperial guard were to be drawn out. In front, on the slope of this natural amphitheatre, were to be ranged, as formerly the Roman people were in their vast arenas, the various corps of the army, formed in closed columns, and disposed in rays terminating at the throne as their common centre. At the head of each of these columns was to be the infantry, and at the rear the cavalry, overlooking the infantry from the whole height of their horses.

On the 16th of August, the morrow of Saint Napoleon, the troops repaired to the scene of the fête, through the streams of an immense population that hurried from all the neighbouring provinces, to be present at this spectacle. A hundred thousand men, almost all of whom were veterans of the Republic, with their eyes fixed upon Napoleon, awaited the recompense of their exploits. Those soldiers and officers who were to receive the crosses, had left the ranks, and had advanced to the foot of the imperial throne. Napoleon, standing up, read to them the noble formula of the oath of the Legion of Honour, and then altogether, and accompanied by martial music and the reports of artillery, they responded, "WE SWEAR IT!" Then for several hours they in succession came forward to receive those crosses which were to replace nobility of birth. Gentlemen of the oldest lineage ascended the steps of the throne, side by side, with simple peasants, no less delighted than these were to obtain the distinctions awarded to courage, and all promising to shed their blood upon the shores of England, to secure to their country and to the man who governed it, the undisputed empire of the world.

This magnificent spectacle thrilled all hearts, and an unforeseen circumstance occurred to render it profoundly serious. A division of the flotilla, which had recently left Havre, entered Boulogne at this moment in heavy weather, and exchanged a smart cannonade with the English. From time to time Napoleon quitted the throne to direct his telescope upon the fight, and observe how his seamen and soldiers bore themselves in the presence of the enemy.

Such scenes could not but be productive of great agitation in England. The British press, arrogant and insulting, as the press ever is in free countries, jested very much upon Napoleon and his preparations, but jested like a jester who trembles at that which he affects to laugh at. The immense preparations which had been made for the defence of England, agitated the country without completely re-assuring men acquainted with the art of war. We have seen that, regretting that she had not a great army, almost as much as France regretted that she had not a powerful navy, England had wished, by means of a *corps de reserve*, to augment her

military force. A part of the men who were drawn by the ballot to serve in the reserve, had passed into the line, which was thus increased to about 170,000 men. To this force were joined local militia corps, indefinite in number, who were only bound to serve in the provinces; and, finally, 150,000 volunteers, who presented themselves in the three kingdoms, and who displayed great zeal in submitting themselves to military training. As many as 300,000 volunteers were spoken of, but there was not, in reality, above half that number in actual preparation for service. The most eminent personages in England, in order to give an impulse to the public spirit, had assumed the uniform of the volunteers. Messrs. Pitt and Addington alike wore it. The levy, *en masse*, which had been decreed on paper, was not actually carried into effect.

Making the usual allowance for defalcations, England had to oppose to us, 100,000 or 120,000 regular troops, of excellent quality, militias without organization, and 150,000 volunteers, without experience, having inferior officers, and no general; the whole distributed in Ireland and England, and dispersed upon those points of the coast at which danger was apprehended. Of regular troops and volunteers, 70,000 men were reckoned to be in Ireland, leaving from 180,000 to 200,000 men of troops of the line and volunteers, for Scotland and England. Even with the art of moving masses of men, which only Napoleon at that time possessed, it was as much as could have been done to get 80,000 or 90,000 men of these forces together at the place of danger. And what could even double their number have done against the 150,000 perfect soldiers that Napoleon could throw across the Strait! The ocean was England's true defence. The English had 100,000 sailors, 89 ships of the line, distributed over every sea, a score of fifty gun ships, and 132 frigates, besides a proportionate number of vessels on the stocks, or in the docks. Like Napoleon, perfecting their preparations with time, they had created sea *ferribles*, in imitation of the land *ferribles*. Under this title they had assembled all the fishermen and seamen not liable to the ordinary impressment, and these, to the number of about 20,000, were distributed along the coast in boats, forming a continual guard, independently of the advanced guard of frigates, brigs, and corvettes, which extended from the Scheldt to the Somme. Night signals, and carriages adapted for conveying troops by post, completed that system of precaution which we have described elsewhere, and which had been still further perfected in the course of the fifteen months which had elapsed since its commencement. Further, entrenchments had been thrown up, and in the Thames there was a line of frigates connected together by iron chains, capable of opposing a continuous and solid obstacle to all vessels. From Dover to the Isle of Wight, every approachable point of the shore was crowned with artillery.

The expense of these preparations, and the confusion which resulted from them, were immense. Men's minds, excited as they very

naturally were in presence of a threatened invasion, deemed nothing good, nothing sufficiently reassuring, and, with a weak ministry whose capacity every one felt entitled to dispute, there was no moral authority which could repress the rage for censuring and suggesting. Every measure that was proposed was pronounced to be trivial, bad, or not sufficiently strong, and something else was suggested in its stead. Mr. Pitt, who had for some time been reserved, now ceased to be so, encouraged as he was by the general outcry. He bitterly blamed the measures of ministers, either because he considered the time to have arrived for overthrowing them, or because he really deemed their measures of precaution insufficient or badly calculated. It is at the least certain that his objections were better founded than those of other members of the opposition. He reproached the ministers for not having anticipated and prevented the concentration of the flat-bottomed boats at Boulogne, to the number, according to him, of above a thousand at the lowest. Although he sought rather to exaggerate than to conceal the actual danger, he was below the truth, for, including the Dutch flotilla, the number was 2,300. He attributed this error to the ignorance of the Admiralty, which had not been able to foresee the use that might be made of gun-boats, and which had employed ships and frigates in shallows where those large craft could not follow the small vessels of the French. He maintained that with some hundreds of gun-boats, supported at a distance by frigates, the preparations of the French might be combated with equal weapons, and their immense armament destroyed ere it could be assembled in the channel. The reproach was specious, at least, if it were not well-founded.

The ministers replied, that during the last war an attempt had been made to employ gun-boats, and that they could not hold to the wind. This proved that the English seamen had applied themselves less than the French seamen to handling this sort of craft, for our boats had sailed in all weather. Sometimes they had grounded in shallows, but, with the exception of the accident which happened at Brest, not one had been lost owing to faulty construction.

Mr. Pitt, agreeing neither with the opinion of Mr. Wyndham, his former colleague, nor with that of Mr. Fox, his new ally, upon the insufficiency of the regular army, and perceiving the difficulty of instantly and at pleasure extending the proportions of an army, especially in a country which would not resort to the conscription, Mr. Pitt complained that greater use had not been made of the volunteers. He maintained that if these 150,000 English had been heartily made use of, and made to acquire that degree of training and discipline of which they were capable, they would have been rendered far less inferior than they actually were to the regular troops. This reproach, well or ill-founded, was as specious as the former one.

Mr. Pitt maintained these opinions with great warmth. In proportion as he became more strongly engaged with the opposition, he approached, if not in opinions and feelings, at

least in conduct, to the old Whig opposition, that is to say, to Mr. Fox. The two adversaries, who had combatted each other for twenty five years, now seemed to be reconciled, and there was a report in circulation that they were about to form a coalition ministry, the old majority being broken up. It has already been shown that a small part of that majority had followed Messrs. Wyndham and Grenville into opposition. A still larger part had joined them since Mr. Pitt had raised his standard. This Tory opposition consisted of all who thought that the existing ministry was incapable of making head against the circumstances, and that it was necessary to have recourse to the old leader of the war party. On the other hand, the old Whig opposition, headed by Mr. Fox, though it had sustained some losses, such as those of Messrs. Tierney and Sheridan, who were said to have joined Mr. Addington, had been singularly increased by a court occurrence. The intellect of the king appeared to be affected again, and the approaching regency of the Prince of Wales was announced. Now that prince, who had formerly quarrelled with Mr. Pitt, and recently with Mr. Addington, was greatly attached to Mr. Fox, and it was supposed would make him prime minister. Thence a certain number of members of the House of Commons, acting under his influence, had swelled the party of Mr. Fox. The two oppositions, united and augmented, the one by the demonstrations of Mr. Pitt, the other by the anticipated success of Mr. Fox, almost counterbalanced the majority of the Addington ministry.

Several successive votes speedily proved the seriousness of this state of things for the cabinet. In the month of March, Mr. Pitt had brought forward a motion for an account of the comparative state of the English navy in 1797, in 1801, and in 1803. Supported by the friends of Mr. Fox, he had succeeded in getting 130 votes for his motion, against 201. The ministry, then, had only a majority of 70 votes, and on comparing that vote with previous votes, one could not but be struck with the progress made by the opposition. Success encouraging the new allies, they pressed forward with new motions. In April, Mr. Fox moved that all measures adopted for the defence of the nation since the renewal of the war, should be referred to a committee. This was only another method of submitting to the judgment of parliament the conduct and capacity of the Addington administration. This time the majority was still further diminished. The opposition mustered 204 votes, and the ministers 256, which reduced to 52 the former majority of 70. This majority became daily weaker, and in the month of May a third motion was announced, which would place the ministry in an actual minority, when Lord Hawkesbury declared, in terms too clear to be misunderstood, that this motion was needless, as the cabinet was about to resign.

The old king, who liked Mr. Addington and Lord Hawkesbury very much, and Mr. Pitt very little, nevertheless ended by summoning the last named. That celebrated and all-powerful personage, so long our enemy, then re-

sumed the reins of state, with the task of sustaining, if possible, the threatened fortune of England. On returning to the ministry, he had left out his old friends, Messrs. Wyndham and Grenville, and his recent ally, Mr. Fox. He was reproached with his double breach of faith, of which very different explanations were given. The apparently true one was, that he was unwilling to have Messrs. Wyndham and Grenville, as being too violent Tories, and that the king was unwilling to have Mr. Fox, as being too decidedly a Whig. Mr. Pitt was accused of not having on this occasion made sufficient effort to overrule George III. It appeared to be the general wish, looking to the dangers with which the country was threatened, that the two ablest statesmen of England should unite their talents to give greater vigour and stability to the government.

Mr. Pitt, however, exercised so much influence on public opinion, he had so long enjoyed personal confidence, that he alone was sufficient to re-establish power. On entering the ministry he immediately demanded 2,400,000*l.* of secret service money. It was maintained that he wanted this money to renew the connection of England with the Continent; for he was rightly looked upon as the fittest of all ministers to re-establish those coalitions, by the great respect in which he was held by the courts inimical to France.

Such were the events that occurred in England while Napoleon assumed the imperial crown, and repaired to Boulogne to make preparations for forcing the barrier of the ocean. It seemed as though Providence had brought these two men again upon the stage to strive once more against each other, and with more fierceness and violence than ever, Mr. Pitt in forming coalitions, which he well knew how to do, and Napoleon in destroying them at the edge of the sword, which he knew how to do still better. Napoleon was indifferent enough to what was passing on the other side of the Strait. He smiled at the military preparations of the English, still more sincerely than the English journalists jeered at his flat-bottomed boats. He asked but one boon of Heaven, that but for eight-and-forty hours he might have a fleet in the Channel, in which case he undertook to have his own way full speedily with all the armies that could be assembled between Dover and London. The ministerial changes in England would only have affected him had they placed Mr. Fox in office. Believing in that statesman's sincerity, and in his friendly feelings towards France, he would in that case have been led to turn from ideas of an obstinate warfare to those of peace and even of alliance. But the appointment of Mr. Pitt, on the contrary, strengthened him in the opinion that it was necessary to end with some bold and desperate stroke, in which the two nations would stake their very existence. At the same time a demand of 60,000,000 of secret service

money, which was only explicable on the supposition of some secret proceedings on the Continent, could not fail to excite his attention. He saw that Austria was very tardy in sending new credentials, and very far from being frank at Ratisbon in the affair of the Russian note. Finally, he had received from M. d'Orbail the reply of the cabinet of St. Petersburg, to the despatch in which he had alluded to the death of Paul I. That reply of Russia appeared to him to indicate some ulterior project. With his usual sagacity, Napoleon already perceived the commencement of a coalition in Europe; he complained to M. de Talleyrand of his credulity, and of his complaisance to the two Messrs. de Cobenzel, and he added, that at the first doubt as to the dispositions of the Continent, he would throw himself, not upon England, but upon that power which should cause his anxiety; for he was not, he said, sufficiently infatuated to cross the Channel, if he were not entirely secure on the side of the Rhine. It was thus that he wrote from Boulogne to M. de Talleyrand, pointing out to him the necessity of urging Austria and Russia to explain themselves, when a sudden and ever to be regretted incident occurred, inevitably to put an end to his uncertainties, and to compel him to defer till some months later his projects of descent.

The brave and unfortunate Latouche-Tréville, a prey to an incompletely-cured malady, and to an ardour which he could not control, died in the port of Toulon, on the 20th of August, and when on the very eve of sailing. Napoleon received this melancholy intelligence at Boulogne, towards the end of August, 1804, at the moment when, prepared to embark, he was struck with some presentiment of a European coalition, and tempted, at times, to direct his blows elsewhere than upon London. The Toulon fleet having lost its commander, it was unavoidably necessary to postpone the English expedition; for, to select and appoint a new admiral, send him to his squadron, and give him time to become acquainted with it, all this would require more than a month. Now, it was the end of August; this, then, would lead to the month of October for the departure from Toulon, and to that of November for the arrival in the Channel. It would then be a winter campaign to make, and that would require new arrangements.

Napoleon immediately cast about for a man to be appointed in the room of Admiral Latouche. "There is not a moment to be lost," wrote he to the minister Decrès, "in sending an admiral competent to command the Toulon squadron. It cannot be worse placed than it is now in the hands of Dumanoir, who is not capable of maintaining discipline in so large a squadron, or of manœuvring it. It appears to me that for the Toulon squadron there are but three competent men, Bruix, Villeneuve,¹

¹ VILLENEUVE, ADMIRAL. One of the best and most gallant officers of the French navy, though constantly unsuccessful, which, when it is considered that he was constantly pitted against Nelson, is no matter of surprise, far less of disgrace. After the battle of the Nile, Villeneuve succeeded in carrying off the remains of the fleet, under his own immediate control, and thus for a

short time preserved it from the English. On the 22d of July, 1805, Villeneuve fought an action in the Channel, having fourteen French and six Spanish ships of the line, three frigates, five frigates and three brigs under his command, against Sir Robert Calder, with fifteen sail of the line, two frigates, a cutter, and a lugger; in which two Spanish ships were captured. The great merit of this

or Rossily. You can sound Bruix. I have great confidence in Rossily, but he has done nothing during fifteen years. However, the matter is so urgent that something must be done."—(28th of August, 1804.)

From this time he perceived that the naval and military establishment that he had formed at Boulogne, would be less temporary than he had at first imagined, and he busied himself on the spot in simplifying its organization, to render it less expensive, and, at the same time, to add to its perfection in manœuvring. "The flotilla," he wrote to the minister Decrès, "has hitherto been looked upon as a mere expedition; henceforth it must be looked upon as a fixed establishment, and from this moment the greatest attention must be paid to that part of it which is to be permanent, in regulating it by other rules than the squadron."—(18th of September, 1804—23d Fructidor, year XII.)

He simplified, in fact, the administrative machinery, suppressed many double employments, arising out of the connection of the land and sea forces, revised all the appointments; in a word, employed himself in rendering the Boulogne flotilla a separate establishment, which, being maintained at the lowest possible cost, could be kept up as long as war lasted, and could still exist even should the army for a time have to quit the coasts of the Channel.

He also resolved upon the formation of escadrilles, to give a greater degree of order to the movements of these 2300 boats. The following was the division that was finally resolved on: nine boats or gun-boats formed a section, and carried a battalion; two of these sections formed a division, and carried a regiment. The pinnaces, accommodating only half as many people, were to be double in number. The division of pinnaces was composed of four sections, or thirty-six pinnaces, instead of eighteen, in order to take on board a regiment of two battalions. Several divisions of boats, gun-boats, and pinnaces, formed an escadrille, and were to carry several regiments, that is to say, a *corps d'armée*. To each escadrille were added a certain number of those fishing-boats or coasters which had been got ready for the embarkation of the cavalry-horses and the heavy baggage. The whole flotilla was divided into eight escadrilles; two at Etaples, for the corps of Marshal Ney; four at Boulogne, for the corps of Marshal Soult; two at Vimeux, for the advanced guard and reserve.

victory lay however in its consequences, as it gave Nelson time to come up from the West Indies, and frustrated the French plan of raising the blockade of all their ports, collecting fifty or sixty sail of the line, and sweeping the Channel, so as to secure the transit of an invading army from Boulogne.

Villeneuve commanded with his usual gallantry, and with no lack of skill at Trafalgar, the details of which great action are too well known to require mention. After this battle, Villeneuve fell into disgrace with Napoleon, with whom the want of success was ever equivalent to dishonour, and is said to have committed suicide, although those have not been wanting who have attributed his death to the angry vengeance of Napoleon. This appears to me, however, to be an unwarrantable conclusion, borne out neither by evidence nor probabilities. The sense of unjust and unmerited dishonour is surely enough, when acting on the delicate honour of a military man, to account for so melancholy a termination to a career of valour and renown, without

The port of Ambleteuse, in the new plan which there had been time to mature, was devoted to the Dutch flotilla, which was to carry the corps of Marshal Davoust. Each escadrille was commanded by a superior officer, and independently manœuvred at sea, though combined in the unity of operations. In this wise, the arrangements of the flotilla were completely adapted to those of the army.

In the meanwhile, Admiral Decrès sent for Admirals Villeneuve and Missiessy,¹ to offer them the vacant commands. Deeming Bruix indispensable at Boulogne, and Rossily as too long unaccustomed to the sea, he looked upon Villeneuve as the fittest to command the Toulon squadron, and Missiessy that of Rochefort, which Villeneuve would leave vacant. Admiral Villeneuve, whose name is surrounded by an unfortunate celebrity, was a man of ability, courage, and practical acquaintance with his profession, but he had no firmness of character. Susceptible to the highest degree, he was apt to exaggerate beyond bounds the difficulties that presented themselves, and to sink into that state of depression which leaves no command of either head or heart. Admiral Missiessy, less able, but cooler, was but little given to elation, but as little to depression. Admiral Decrès sent for them both, and endeavoured to reason them out of that discouragement which had seized not upon the sailors and officers, who were all animated with a noble ardour, but upon the commanders-in-chief of our fleets, who had to risk in every battle that renown which they prized above life. Decrès caused Admiral Missiessy to accept the command of the Rochefort squadron, and Admiral Villeneuve to accept that of the Toulon squadron. Towards the latter he bore a friendship, which dated from their early childhood. To him he intrusted the Emperor's secret, and the immense operation to which the Toulon squadron was destined. He excited his imagination by pointing out the grand object that was to be achieved, and the great honours that were thereby to be obtained. Deplorable endeavours of an old friendship! This momentary excitement was to give place with Villeneuve to a fatal depression, and to inflict the most sanguinary reverses upon our navy.

The minister hastened to transmit an account to the Emperor of the result of his conferences with Villeneuve, and of the effect produced upon that officer by the perspectives of danger and glory which he had laid open to him.²

casting the onus of more bloodshed on Napoleon.—*Brenton's Naval History.*—E.

¹ MISSIESSY, VISCOUNT. A French vice-admiral of some ability. He was despatched in 1805, against the English islands in the West Indies. He harassed and plundered many towns, laid Martinique under heavy contribution; as also at Nevis, where he took the whole garrison and all the merchant vessels; and at St. Kitts. Landed supplies at Guadaloupe, and raised the siege of St. Domingo, where the French generals Lagrange and Claparede were on the point of being compelled to surrender to the blacks, which latter were now severely defeated, and the town thoroughly reinforced. Thence he sailed directly homeward, and reached Rochefort in safety.—*Brenton's Naval History.*—E.

² We quote the letter of Admiral Decrès, for it is important to understand the appointment of the man who lost the battle of Trafalgar.

Sire, (wrote Decrès,) Vice-admiral Villeneuve and Rear-admiral Missiessy are here.

Napoleon, who well understood men, did not expect much from the substitute of Admiral Latouche. Constantly reflecting upon his project, he again modified and extended it in accordance with the circumstances which had occurred. The winter had restored freedom of movement to the Brest fleet, by interrupting the continuance of the blockade. Although Gautaume had failed in decision, in 1801, he nevertheless had, on more than one occasion, displayed both courage and devotion, and Napoleon determined to intrust him with the most dashing and difficult part of his plan. He postponed the expedition until after the 18th Brumaire—9th of November—the epoch appointed for the coronation, and he resolved to send Gautaume out at that rough season, with fifteen or eighteen thousand men, destined for Ireland; then, when that admiral should have landed those men on some accessible point of the island, to have him speedily back into the Channel, there to protect the crossing of the flotilla. In this modified plan, Admirals Missiessy and Villeneuve were intrusted with quite a different part from that which was assigned to the Toulon and Rochefort squadrons, when Latouche-Tréville had the command. Admiral Villeneuve, setting out from Toulon, was to sail for America, to reconquer the Dutch colonies of Surinam, Berbice, Demerara, and Essequibo. A division, detached from Villeneuve's squadron, was to take the island of St. Helena, *en passant*. Admiral Missiessy had orders to throw a reinforcement of from three to four thousand men into our Antilles, then to ravage the English Antilles, taking them by surprise, and almost undefended. The two admirals then joining company, to return to Europe, had for their last instructions to raise the blockade of the squadron at Ferrol, and to return to Rochefort to the number of twenty sail. They were ordered to sail before Gautaume, in order that the English, being informed of their departure, might be induced to pursue them. Napoleon desired that Villeneuve might sail from Toulon on the 12th of October; Missiessy, from Rochefort, on the 1st of November, and Gautaume, from Brest, on the 22d of December, 1804. He deemed it certain that the twenty sail of Villeneuve and Missiessy would draw fifty sail at least beyond the European seas! for the English, being suddenly attacked in all quarters, could not fail to send succour everywhere. It was then probable that Admiral Gautaume would have sufficient freedom of movement to execute the operation intrusted to him, which consisted, after having touched

at Ireland, of presenting himself before Boulogne, either by doubling Scotland, or by sailing directly from Ireland into the Channel.

All his orders being given from Boulogne itself, where he was then located, Napoleon wished to avail himself of the time which still remained to him before winter, to clear up the affairs of the Continent. Directing the course of M. de Talleyrand by a daily correspondence, he prescribed to him the diplomatic measures which were calculated to lead to that end.

The reader will doubtless recollect the imprudent note of the cabinet of Russia, on the subject of the violation of the Germanic soil, and the bitter reply of the French cabinet. The young Alexander had deeply felt that reply, and had perceived, but too late, that the manner in which he had come to his throne had deprived him of all right to give such lofty lessons of morality to other governments. He was humiliated and alarmed at this. The soul of Alexander was rather quick than firm. He willingly threw himself forward, and then as willingly drew back, when he perceived danger. It was without consulting his ministers that he went into mourning for the Duc d'Enghien, and it was in opposition to a portion of them that he had sent to Ratisbon the note of which we have made mention. Nevertheless, they had the greatest difficulty in keeping him in his first resolutions. The prudent men of St. Petersburg, when the first excitement was gone by, perceived that too little judgment had been shown in the affair of the Duc d'Enghien, and they blamed first the young men who governed the empire, and, among those young men, the Prince Czartoryski above all, because he was a Pole, and intrusted with the ministry of foreign affairs, since the retirement to the country of the chancellor Woronzoff. Nothing could be more unjust than this censure, as regarded the Prince Czartoryski, for he had made all the resistance that he could to the vivacities of the court; but he was now desirous that the evil should be repaired without sacrifice of dignity. He consequently had directed M. d'Oubril, *chargé d'affaires*, at Paris, to complain in a note, at once firm and moderate, of the manner in which the French cabinet had thought fit to refer to certain reminiscences; to show pacific inclinations, but to require a reply upon the three or four usual subjects of Russian remonstrance, such as the occupation of Naples, the still deferred indemnity of the king of Piedmont, and the invasion of Hanover. M. d'Oubril had orders, should he obtain even only a specious explana-

I have spoken to the first about the grand project. . . . He listened coldly, and was silent for some instants. Then with a calm smile, he said: I expected to hear something of the sort, but to be approved, such projects must be achieved.

I literally transcribe his reply in a private conversation, because it will depict to you more vividly than I can, the effect which the offer produced upon him. He added: *I will not lose four hours in rallying the first; with the five others and my own I shall be strong enough. It is necessary to be fortunate, and to ascertain how far I am so, I must be enterprising.*

We spoke of the course. He agrees with your majesty as to that. He only dwelt upon the unfavourable sufficiently to show me that he was not going blindly to work. Nothing of the kind affected his courage.

The appointments of grand-officer and vice-admiral have made a new man of him. The ideas of danger are

effaced from his mind by the hope of glory, and he ended by saying, *I embark in it with heart and soul, and this with a tone and gesture cool and decided.*

He will set out for Toulon, as soon as your majesty shall have made me aware whether there are any further orders for him.

Rear-admiral Missiessy is more reserved with me; he asks to remain here for a week; he has an extreme coolness, but less defined. I have heard that he was offended that your majesty had not given him the Mediterranean squadron. He is so, because he is not vice-admiral. His great argument among his intimates is this—that not having been employed during the war, he has had no failures! I have given him orders to go and take the command of the squadron, and I reckon upon his being *en route* within a week. It will take him five or six days to reach his destination.

tion on these points, to content himself with it, and to remain at Paris, but to take his passports, should he be met by an obstinate and disdainful silence.

Prussia, which, to use the expression of Napoleon, *continually struggled between two giants*, being informed of the precise situation of the Russian cabinet, had communicated it to M. de Talleyrand, through her minister, Lucchesini, and had said to him: "Defer the reply as long as possible; then give a reply which will furnish the dignity of Russia with a seeming satisfaction, and this northern tempest, with which it is sought to alarm Europe, will be stilled."

These various communications having arrived at Paris while Napoleon was at Boulogne, M. de Talleyrand had had recourse to that procrastinating policy, in which it has been seen that he was an adept. Napoleon had willingly acquiesced in it, neither seeking nor fearing war with the Continent, and rather desiring to terminate all by a direct expedition against England. He, therefore, continued his preparations at Boulogne, leaving M. d'Oubril, in the mean time, in suspense at Paris. Nevertheless, M. de Talleyrand, not attaching sufficient importance to the Russian note, and taking too literally the intention of Prussia, had too readily trusted that all difficulty could be escaped from by delays. M. d'Oubril, after having waited through the whole month of August, had at length required a reply. Napoleon, wearied with M. d'Oubril's questions, and, moreover, inclined to come to a categorical explanation with the Continental powers, since the return of Mr. Pitt to power, desired that a reply should be made. He had himself sent the form of the note that was to be transmitted to M. d'Oubril, and M. de Talleyrand, according to his custom, had done his utmost to soften it, both as to form and substance. But, such as he transmitted it, the note was little calculated to spare the dignity of the Russian cabinet, which was unhappily involved.

This note opposed to the wrongs charged against France the wrongs which were chargeable against Russia. Russia, it argued, ought to have no troops at Corfu, yet she was daily augmenting the number of her forces there. She ought to have refused all favour to the enemies of France, and she had not confined herself to giving shelter to emigrants; she had still further bestowed upon them public functions at foreign courts. That was a positive violation of the last treaty. Moreover, the Russian agents everywhere showed themselves hostile. Such a state of things precluded all idea of intimacy, and rendered impossible that concert which had been agreed upon between the two cabinets, in conducting the affairs of Italy and Germany. As for the occupation of Hanover and Naples, that had been an inevitable consequence of the war. If Russia had engaged to cause Malta to be evacuated by the English, the cause of the war being then removed, the countries occupied by France would have been instantly evacuated. But to endeavour to press upon France, without endeavouring equally to press upon England, was neither just nor becoming. If Russia pretended to

constitute herself the arbitress between the two belligerent powers, to judge, not only of the grounds of the quarrel, but also of the means employed to decide it, the arbitration should be both impartial and firm. France was determined to accept no other. If war was wished for, she was quite ready for it, for, after all, the late campaigns of Russia in the west did not warrant her in assuming towards France so lofty a tone as that which she now appeared to take. It was necessary that they should distinctly understand that the Emperor of the French was not the Emperor of Turks, or of Persians. If, on the contrary, there was a desire to come to a better understanding with him, he was quite disposed to that; and, then, he assuredly would not refuse to do what had been promised, especially as regarded the King of Sardinia, but in the present state of relations, nothing could be obtained from him, for, as regarded him, threatening was the most inefficacious of all means.

This lofty note scarcely left M. d'Oubril any pretext for declaring himself satisfied. It was the consequence of the levities of his cabinet, which, now wishing, with reference to Naples and to Hanover, to constitute itself judge of the means of war employed by the belligerent powers, and anon wishing to interfere as to some interior act, like that of the death of the Duc d'Enghien, had laid itself open to having only unsatisfactory answers upon all the points upon which it touched. On consulting his instructions, M. d'Oubril deemed that it was his duty to demand his passports; but, that he might act in precise conformity to his instructions, he added that his departure was a simple interruption of diplomatic connections between the two courts, but not a declaration of war; that when those connections were no longer either useful or agreeable, there was no reason for continuing them; that, for the rest, Russia had no intention of resorting to arms, and that it was the French cabinet that would decide, by its posterior course of action, whether war was to follow this interruption of diplomatic relations.

M. d'Oubril, after this cold and yet pacific declaration, left Paris. Orders were sent to M. de Rayneval, who continued at St. Petersburg, as *chargé d'affaires*, to return to France. M. d'Oubril set out at the end of August, and stopped some days at Mayence, to await the news of a free departure being permitted to M. de Rayneval.

It was evident that Russia, while endeavouring to evince its displeasure by the interruption of its relations with France, would, nevertheless, not resort to war unless a new European coalition should furnish her with an advantageous opportunity of doing so. All, consequently, in Napoleon's opinion, depended upon Austria. He put her, therefore, to close proof, that he might know what he had to expect, previous to giving himself up altogether to his maritime projects. The recognition of the imperial title that he had assumed being still withheld, he peremptorily demanded it. His intention of visiting the banks of the Rhine would shortly take him to Aix-la-Chapelle, and he required that M. de Cobenzel should pay his

respects and deliver his credentials in that very city in which the Germanic emperors were accustomed to take the crown of Charlemagne. He declared that if satisfaction were not given him in this respect, M. de Champagny, who had been named minister of the interior, in the room of M. Chaptal, who had been called to the Senate, should have no successor appointed to him at Vienna, and that a withdrawal of ambassadors, between powers so closely neighbouring as France and Austria, would not pass over so pacifically as between France and Russia. Finally, he required that the Russian note, already avoided at Ratisbon by an adjournment, but the fate of which would shortly have to be decided on, should be finally rejected, or, he repeated, he would address to the Diet such a reply as must inevitably give rise to war.

All this being done, Napoleon quitted Boulogne, where he had passed six weeks, and proceeded towards the departments of the Rhine. Before setting out, he had the opportunity of witnessing a battle between the flotilla and the English division. On the 26th of August—8th Fructidor, year XII.—at two o'clock in the afternoon, he was in the roadstead inspecting the line of the flotilla, consisting, as usual, of from one hundred and fifty to two hundred boats and pinnaces. The English squadron, moored at a distance from the shore, consisted of two ships of the line, two frigates, seven corvettes, six brigs, two luggers, and one cutter, in all twenty sail. A corvette, detaching herself from the main body of the enemy's division, placed herself at the end of our line of broadsides, to reconnoitre it, and to discharge some broadsides at it. The admiral, on this, gave orders to the first division of gun-boats under the command of Captain Leray, to weigh anchor and bear down altogether upon the corvette; the order was executed, and the corvette was obliged to retire immediately. Seeing this, the English formed a detachment, consisting of one frigate, several corvettes or brigs, and the cutter, to compel our gun-boats to retire in their turn, and to prevent them from regaining their usual position. The Emperor, who was in his barge with Admiral Bruix, the ministers of war and marine, and several marshals, went into the midst of the boats that were fighting, and, to give them the example, had his barge steered right for the frigate, which was advancing, full sail. He knew that the sailors and soldiers, who admired his daring when ashore, sometimes asked each other whether he would be as daring on the sea. He wished to enlighten them on that head, and to accustom them carelessly to attack the great vessels of the enemy. He had his barge put well a-head of the French line, and as near as possible to the frigate. She, seeing the imperial barge, dressed out in colours, and, perhaps, suspecting the precious freight it bore, had reserved her fire. The

minister of marine, fearing the consequences to the Emperor of such an act of daring, was about to seize the rudder and alter the barge's course, but an imperative gesture of Napoleon stopped the movement of the minister, and the barge held on its course towards the frigate. Napoleon, with telescope in hand, was examining her, when suddenly she discharged her reserved broadside, and covered with her projectiles the barge that carried *Cæsar and his fortunes*. No one was wounded, and they got off with the mere splashing from the projectiles. All the French craft, witnesses of this scene, had advanced as rapidly as possible, in order to sustain the fire, and to cover the Emperor's barge by passing before it. The English division, assailed in its turn by a shower of balls and grape-shot, began to fall astern by degrees. It was followed, but put about and bore down again towards the shore. In the mean time, a second division of gun-boats, under the command of Captain Pevrien, had weighed anchor and made towards the enemy. Very shortly the frigate, much damaged and scarcely answering her helm, was obliged to stand out to sea. The corvettes followed the same course, some of them much damaged, and the cutter so riddled that she was seen to sink.

Napoleon quitted Boulogne, delighted with the battle he had witnessed, and the more so, that secret reports, which reached him from the English coast, gave him the most satisfactory details as to both the physical and moral effects which the battle had produced. We had had but one man killed and seven wounded, one of them mortally. The English, according to the reports addressed to Napoleon, had had from twelve to fifteen men killed, and sixty wounded. Their vessels had suffered very much. The English officers had been struck with the bearing of our small vessels, and with the rapidity and precision of their fire. It was evident, that if these boats had to fear the ships on account of their size, they could oppose to them a power very formidable from the multiplicity of their fire.¹

Napoleon passed through Belgium, visited Mons and Valenciennes, and arrived at Aix-la-Chapelle on the 3d of September. The Empress, who had gone to Plombières to take the waters, during Napoleon's stay on the coast, now joined him, to be present at the fêtes which were in preparation in the Rhenish provinces. M. de Talleyrand and several grand dignitaries and ministers were also there. M. de Cobenzel was punctual to the rendezvous given him. The Emperor Francis, feeling the inconvenience of further delays, had taken, on the 10th of August, at an extraordinary conference of state, the imperial rank, and had assumed for himself and for his successors, the title of *deceased* Emperor of the Romans, always august, *hereditary* Emperor of Austria, King of Germany, Bohemia, and of Hungary, Arch-duke of Austria, Duke of Styria,

¹ Napoleon wrote to Marshal Soult:

Aix-la-Chapelle, 5th September, 1804.

The little battle at which I was present on the eve of my departure from Boulogne has produced an immense effect in England. It has created a real alarm there. On this subject you will see some very curious details

translated for the newspapers. The howitzers which are on board the gun-boats tell admirably. The previous information that I have received makes the loss of the enemy sixty wounded, and from twelve to fifteen killed. The frigate was much damaged.—*St. Louis Paper Office*.

&c. He had then directed M. de Cobentzel to repair to Aix-la-Chapelle, there to present his credentials to the Emperor Napoleon. To this procedure, which the place at which it took place rendered still more significant, was joined a formal, and for the moment, sincere assurance of a desire to live in peace with France, and the promise, in compliance with Napoleon's desire, to take no heed of the Russian note to Ratisbon. That note, in fact, was done away with by an adjournment *sine die*.

The Emperor of the French gave M. de Cobentzel a gracious reception, and lavished upon him the most encouraging declarations in return for his own. With M. de Cobentzel there presented themselves, M. de Souza, the bearer of the recognition of Portugal, the bailiff of Ferrato, with that of the Order of Malta, and a crowd of foreign ministers, who, knowing how agreeable their presence at Aix-la-Chapelle would be, had determined upon the compliment of soliciting leave to go thither. They were received there with great pleasure, and with the grace which gratified sovereigns can always command. This assemblage was singularly brilliant by the concourse of both foreigners and French, by the splendour displayed, and by the military pomp. The reminiscences of Charlemagne were recalled there, with a scarcely disguised purpose. Napoleon descended into the vault in which the great man of the middle age had been interred, curiously examined his reliques, and gave the clergy striking proofs of his munificence. No sooner had he quitted these fêtes, than he returned to his serious occupations, and traversed all the country between the Meuse and the Rhine, Juliers, Venloo, Cologne, and Coblenz, inspecting at once the roads and the fortifications, everywhere amending the designs of his engineers, with that correctness of glance and profound experience, which belonged only to himself, and ordered new works, which would render that part of the frontiers of the Rhine invincible.

At Mayence, where he arrived towards the end of September—the commencement of the year XIII.—new pomps awaited him. All the German princes, whose states were in the neighbourhood, and who had an interest in paying court to their powerful neighbour, hastened to offer him their congratulations and homages, not through others, but in person. The prince arch-chancellor, owing to France the preservation of his title and of his opulence, came to render homage to Napoleon at Mayence, his former capital. With him there also presented themselves the princes of the house of Hesse, the Duke and the Duchess of Bavaria, and the venerable Elector of Baden, the oldest of the princes of Europe, who was accompanied by his son and grandson. These personages, and others who succeeded them at Mayence, were received with a magnificence far superior to that which they could have met with even at Vienna. They were all impressed with the promptitude with which the crowned soldier had taken the bearing of a sovereign. That was caused by his having early commanded men, not by virtue of a vain title, but by virtue of his genius, his character, and his sword; and, as regarded command, that was an ap-

prenticeship far superior to that which can be served in courts.

The rejoicings which had taken place at Aix-la-Chapelle were renewed at Mayence, in presence of the French and Germans who had hastened thither to be close spectators of the spectacle which at this moment excited the curiosity of all Europe. Napoleon invited to the fêtes of his coronation the greater number of the princes who visited him. In the midst of that tumult, withdrawing himself every morning from the vanities of the throne, he traversed the banks of the Rhine, and examined in all its details the fortress of Mayence, which he regarded as the most important on the Continent, not so much for its works as for its position on the bank of that great river, along which for ten centuries Europe has battled against France. He ordered the works which would give it the strength of which it was susceptible. The sight of this place inspired him with the idea of a most useful precaution, of which no one else would have thought, had he not gone to the very spot. The recent treaties had ordained the destruction of the forts of Cassel and of Kehl. The first forms the outlet of Mayence, and the second the outlet of Strasbourg, on the right bank of the Rhine. These two fortresses would lose their value without those two *têtes de pont*, which served them at once as means of defence, and as means of crossing to the other bank of the river. He gave orders for getting together great quantities of wood, and every kind of materials necessary for sudden works, together with fifteen thousand spades and pickaxes, so that within four-and-twenty hours from eight to ten thousand labourers could be set to work upon the opposite side of the river to reconstruct the destroyed works. The want of tools alone, wrote he to the engineers, would cause you a loss of a week. He even laid down all the plans for the immediate commencement of the works at a telegraphic order.

Napoleon, after having stayed at Mayence and the new departments long enough to arrange all his plans, set out for Paris, visited Luxembourg in passing, and reached St. Cloud on the 12th October, 1804—20th Vendémiaire, year XIII.

He had, for a time, flattered himself with the hope of presenting to France and to Europe an extraordinary spectacle, by crossing the strait of Calais with a hundred and fifty thousand men, and returning to Paris master of the world. Providence, which had reserved so much glory for him, had not permitted him to add so much splendour to his coronation. There remained to him another means of dazzling men's minds; that of causing the Pope to descend for an instant from the pontifical throne, to go to Paris itself to bless his sceptre and his throne. That was a great moral triumph to gain over the enemies of France, and he did not doubt that he should succeed in gaining it. All was prepared for his coronation, to which he had invited the principal authorities of the Empire, numerous deputations of the army and navy, and a crowd of foreign princes. Thousands of workmen had been employed upon the preparations for the

ceremony in the church of *Nôtre Dame*. A rumour of the coming of the Pope had got abroad, and the public mind was struck with wonder and admiration, the devout population enraptured, the enigrant party deeply annoyed, and Europe at once astonished and jealous. The question had been discussed where all business was discussed, in the Council of State. In that body, in which the most complete freedom had been left to opinions, the objections engendered by the Concordat were reproduced in still greater strength by the idea of, in some sort, submitting the coronation of the new monarch to the head of the Church. Those repugnances, so ancient in France, even among religious men, to ultramontane domination were all re-awakened at once. It was said that this was to raise up again all the pretensions of the clergy, to proclaim a dominant religion, to make it appear that the recently elected Emperor held his crown not from the will of the nation and the exploits of the army, but from the sovereign Pontiff, a dangerous supposition, for he who gave the crown could also take it away again.

Napoleon, out of patience with so many objections to a ceremony which would be a real triumph over European malevolence, took up the argument in person, pointed out all the advantages of the presence of the Pope at such a solemnity, the effect that it would produce upon the religious public, and upon the whole world, the strength that it would bring to the new order of things, in the maintenance of which all the men of the Revolution were alike interested; he maintained that the pretensions of a Gregory VII. were incompatible with the spirit of the times, that the ceremony in question was simply an invocation of the protection of Heaven in favour of a new dynasty; an invocation made in the ordinary forms of the worship, which was oldest, most general, and most popular in France; that, moreover, without a religious pomp there would be no real pomp, especially in Catholic countries, and that if priests were to figure at the coronation, it was better to call the greatest and most highly qualified, and, if possible, the highest of them all, the Pope himself.

Pushing his opponents as he pushed his enemies in war, that is to say, to extremities, he finished by this pointed question, which terminated the discussion at once: "Gentlemen," said he, "you are deliberating at Paris, at the Tuileries; suppose that you were deliberating at London, in the British cabinet—in a word, suppose that you were the ministers of the King of England, and that you were informed that the Pope at this moment crosses the Alps to crown the Emperor of the French; would you look upon that as a triumph for England or for France?" To this interrogation, at once so pointed and so home-thrust, no one made any reply, and the journey of the Pope to Paris encountered no further objection.

But to consent to that journey was not all; it still remained to get the consent of the court of Rome, and that was no ordinary difficulty. To succeed, it was necessary to employ great skill, to combine much firmness with much gentleness; and the French ambassador, Car-

dinal Fesch, with the irascibility of his temper and the inflexibility of his pride, was far less qualified for the task than his predecessor, M. de Cacault. This is the opportunity to describe that personage, who figured both in the church and in the empire. Cardinal Fesch was corpulent, of middle height, and of mediocre abilities, vain, ambitious, hasty, but firm; he was destined to prove a great obstacle to Napoleon. During the Reign of Terror, he, like so many other priests, had thrown aside the ensigns of the priesthood, and, with the ensigns, the obligations. Having become commissary of war in the army of Italy, as one, judging from his way of life, would have supposed him to be a former minister of religion. But when Napoleon, restoring all things to their proper places, had restored the priests to the altar, Cardinal Fesch thought of returning to his first profession, and of obtaining in it the rank which his powerful relationship warranted him in hoping for. Napoleon would only restore him on condition of an exemplary conduct; and the Abbé Fesch, with a rare moral resolution, altered his manners, concealed his habits, and gave, in a seminary, the spectacle of an edifying penitence. Having received the archbishopric of Lyons, which had been kept vacant for him, and a cardinal's hat, he immediately showed himself, not the supporter of Napoleon, but rather his antagonist in the church; and it was already evident that he intended some day to compel a nephew, to whom he owed every thing, to be dependent upon an uncle supported by the secret ill-will of the clergy.

Napoleon had complained bitterly to the prudent Portalis of this new instance of family ingratitude, and Portalis had advised him to rid himself of that uncle by sending him as ambassador to Rome.

"There," said M. Portalis, "he will have enough to do with the pride and prejudices of the Roman court, and he will employ the faults of his disposition to your service instead of to your injury." It was to this end, and not for the purpose of some day making him pope, as was pretended by the retailers of false reports, that Napoleon had accredited Cardinal Fesch to the court of Rome. No pope could have been more disagreeable, more hostile, more dangerous to him.

Such was the personage who was to negotiate the journey of Pius VII. to Paris.

As soon as Pius VII. had learned from the extraordinary courier of Cardinal Caprara the desires conceived by Napoleon, he was seized with perplexity, and for some time remained agitated by the most opposite feelings. He fully comprehended that this was an opportunity to render new services to religion, to obtain concessions for it which hitherto had been constantly refused; perhaps, even to obtain the restitution of the rich provinces which had been taken from the patrimony of St. Peter. But then, what risks were to be run! What painful remarks to endure from Europe! How many possible annoyances in the midst of that revolutionary capital, infected with the spirit of the philosophers, still swarming with their followers, and inhabited by the most

satirical people upon the face of the earth! All these prospects presenting themselves at once to the mind of the Pope, sensitive and irritable as it was, agitated him to such a degree as obviously to affect his health. His minister and favourite councillor, the Cardinal-secretary Gonsalvi, immediately became the confidant of his agitations.¹ He communicated to him his own anxieties, and received the communication of those of the cardinal, and both found themselves almost in agreement. They dreaded what the world would say of this consecration of an illegitimate prince, of an usurper, as Napoleon was called by a certain party; they feared the discontent of the courts of Europe, and especially that of the court of Vienna, which looked with a deadly dislike upon the rising of a new Emperor of the West; they feared from the party of the *ancien régime*, a far greater and better-grounded outcry than that which was raised at the epoch of the Concordat; better grounded, because in this case the interests of religion were less evident than the interests of a man. They feared that when the Pope was once in France, something unforeseen and inadmissible would be demanded from him with respect to religion, which he would have difficulty enough in refusing while at Rome, and which he could still less refuse at Paris, which would lead to troublesome, perhaps violent, disagreement. They did not go so far as to fear an actual violence, like the detention of Pius VI. at Valence; but they confusedly pictured to themselves strange and alarming scenes. It is true, that Cardinal Gonsalvi, who had been to Paris about the Concordat, and Cardinal Caprara, who had passed his life in that capital, had very different ideas of Napoleon, his courtesy, and the delicacy of his proceedings, from those which generally obtained in that court of old priests, who never thought of Paris but as an abyss governed by a fearful giant. Cardinal Caprara, especially, never ceased to repeat, that if the Emperor was the most passionate and imperious of men, he was also the most generous and amiable when no offence was offered to him; that the Pope would be delighted to see him, and would obtain from him whatever he wished for religion and for the church; that now was the time to set out, as the war tended towards some decisive crisis; that there would once more be vanquished and victors, and new distributions of territory, and that the Pope would perhaps obtain the Legations; that nothing had been promised, indeed, but that that, at bottom, was the intention of Napoleon, and that he only required an opportunity to realize it. These representations somewhat calmed the disturbed imagination of the luckless Pope; but Paris, the capital of that frightful Revolution which had destroyed kings, queens, and thousands of priests, was an object of undefinable terror to him.

Then he was assailed by the opposite fears.

¹ I do not suppose any invention here. I do not imagine any. What follows is faithfully extracted from the secret correspondence of Cardinal Gonsalvi with Cardinal Caprara, which correspondence remains in the possession of France.

No doubt Europe would speak ill, should he go to Paris; it was possible that in that capital he might be exposed to unknown and fatal dangers; but should he not go, what would be the results to religion and the Holy See? All the states of Italy were within the grasp of Napoleon. Piedmont, Lombardy, Tuscany, and even Naples, despite the Russian protection, were swarming with French troops. Out of respect to the Holy See the Roman state had alone been spared. What would not Napoleon do, if irritated and affronted by a refusal which would infallibly be known to all Europe, and which would be taken for a denial of his rights, set forth by the Holy See? All these contradictory ideas formed a most painful ebb and flow in the minds of the Pope and his secretary of state, Gonsalvi. The cardinal Gonsalvi, who had already braved the danger, and who had found Paris any thing but unpleasant, was less agitated. He was only anxious about Europe, its opinions, and the displeasure of all the old cabinets.

However, the Pope and the cardinal, expecting to receive from Paris such urgings as would put it out of their power to refuse, wished to have the sanction of the sacred college. They did not dare to consult it as a whole, for it contained cardinals connected with foreign courts, who probably would betray the secret. They selected ten of the most influential members from the congregation of cardinals, and submitted to them, under the seal of confession, the communications that had been made by Cardinal Caprara and Cardinal Fesch. Unfortunately, these ten cardinals were divided in opinion, and it was to be feared that the same would be the case with the sacred college. The Pope and his minister then judged that it was necessary to refer to ten other cardinals, making twenty. That consultation, which remained secret, gave the following results. Five cardinals were absolutely opposed to the demand of Napoleon, fifteen were favourable to it, but with some objections and upon some conditions. Of the five who were against, only two grounded their refusal upon the illegitimacy of the sovereign whose coronation was in question. All the five urged that it was to consecrate and ratify all that the new monarch had done or permitted to be done to the injury of religion; for, if he was the author of the Concordat, he was no less so of the Organic Articles, and, when he was general, had deprived the Holy See of the Legations; that again, more recently, in concurring in the secularizations, he had assisted in despoiling the Germanic church of its property; that, if he wished to be treated as a Charlemagne, he must conduct himself like that emperor, and display the same munificence towards the Holy See.

The fifteen cardinals who were inclined to consent, with some restrictive conditions, had objected the opinions and the discontent of the European courts, the inconsistency with the papal dignity of the Pope going to Paris to crown the new Emperor, while the emperors of the Holy Empire had all come to be crowned at Rome, at the foot of the altar of St. Peter the unpleasantness of meeting the constitu-

tional bishops whose retraction was incomplete, or who, subsequent to their reconciliation with the Church, had raised new controversies; the false position of the Holy Father, in presence of some high functionaries, as, for example, M. de Talleyrand, who had broken the bands of the Church to enter those of matrimony; the danger of being exposed, in a hostile capital, to inadmissible demands, the refusal of which would probably lead to a violent rupture; and, finally, the danger of such a journey for a health so delicate as that of Pius VII. Referring to the censure which had been incurred in the last century by Pope Pius VI., when he made the journey to Vienna to visit Joseph II., and returned without having obtained any thing favourable to religion; the fifteen cardinals maintained that there could, in the eyes of the Christian world, be but one valid excuse for the act of condescension that was demanded of Pius VII., which was to demand and to obtain certain obvious advantages, such as the revocation of a portion of the Organic Articles, the abolition of the measures adopted by the Italian Republic respecting the clergy, the revocation of what the French commissioner had done at Parma and Plaisance, relatively to the church of that country, and finally, territorial indemnities for the losses which the Holy See had suffered, and, above all, the adoption of the ancient ceremonial observed at the coronation of Germanic emperors. Some of the fifteen cardinals now added, as an express condition, that the coronation should take place, not in Paris, but in Italy, when Napoleon should visit his transalpine states, and insisted upon this condition, as indispensable to the dignity of the Holy See.

Somewhat re-assured by these opinions, the Pope was inclined to consent to the wishes of Napoleon, insisting, however, in a peremptory manner, upon the conditions demanded by the fifteen consenting cardinals, and he had communicated that resolution to Cardinal Fesch. But, in the interval, there had arrived at Rome the text of the *Senatus Consultum* of the 28th Floréal, and the formula of the Emperor's oath, containing these words:—"I swear to respect, and to cause to be respected, THE LAWS OF THE CONCORDAT, AND THE FREEDOM OF RELIGION." The laws of the Concordat appeared to include the Organic Articles; the freedom of religion seemed to carry with it the consecration of heresies, and never had the court of Rome, on its part, admitted such a freedom. This oath suddenly became an argument for an absolute refusal. However, the twenty cardinals were again consulted, and this time there were only five who considered that the oath was not an insurmountable obstacle; while fifteen replied that it was impossible for the Pope to anoint the new monarch.

Although the secret had been well kept by the cardinal, the news from Paris, and some inevitable indiscretions of the agents of the Holy See, caused the negotiations to be divulged, and the public, consisting of prelates and diplomatists, who surround the Roman court, overflowed with censures and sarcasms. Pius VII. was styled the *chaplain of the Emperor*

of the French, for that emperor, standing in need of the ministry of the Pope, had not come to Rome as the Charlemagnes, the Othos, the Barbarossas, and the Charles V., of the olden day, had done; he had summoned the Pope to his palace.

This outcry, added to the difficulties of the oath, shook the determination of Pius VII., and the Cardinal Gonsalvi, and they both agreed to the resolution of sending an answer, apparently favourable, but in reality negative, for it consisted in an acquiescence, loaded with conditions which the Emperor could not admit.

The Cardinal Fesch had hastened to reply to the principal difficulty raised against the oath, and drawn from the engagement of the sovereign to respect liberty of religion, by saying that this engagement was not the canonical approbation of dissenting creeds, but the promise to permit the free exercise of all religions, and not to persecute any, which was conformable to the spirit of the Church, and to the principles adopted in the present age by all sovereigns. These very sensible explanations had, according to Cardinal Gonsalvi, only a private character, not a public character, and could not excuse the court of Rome, in the eyes of the faithful, or in the eyes of God, if it were wanting to the Catholic faith.

Although of any thing but an insinuating turn, Cardinal Fesch had contrived to penetrate, by means of fear and presents, into the secrets of more than one personage of the Roman court, and was pretty correctly acquainted with both the objections and their authors. He communicated all that he knew to Paris, that the Emperor might perfectly understand how matters stood; and yet, being unaware to what extent the Pope desired to shelter himself from what was required of him, by proposing unacceptable conditions, he gave greater hope of success than he at the time had reason to entertain, adding, however, that, in order to succeed, it was necessary to give the Holy See entirely satisfactory promises and explanations.

These communications, being transmitted to Paris, cruelly embarrassed Cardinal Caprara, for they were taken for a consent, dependent only upon some explanations to be given, and the Pope's journey to Paris was held to be certain. Cardinal Caprara, who was acquainted with the real dispositions of his court, and did not dare to disclose them, was trembling and confused. The Empress Josephine was even more anxious than Napoleon himself for the coronation, which seemed to her the pronouncing of Heaven's pardon for an act of usurpation. Accordingly, she received Cardinal Caprara at St. Cloud, and lavished the kindest attentions upon him. Napoleon, on his part, testified his lively satisfaction, and both told the cardinal that they deemed the matter arranged; that the Pope would be received at Paris with all the honours due to the head of the universal church, and that religion would reap infinite benefits from his journey. Napoleon, without knowing all, yet surmised a part of the secret wishes of the court of Rome, and shunned the approach of Cardinal Caprara.

from fear of being asked either for something utterly impossible, as the revocation of the Organic Articles, or very difficult, under the circumstances, as the restitution of the Legations. The cardinal, therefore, was doubly embarrassed, by the hopes, too easily conceived in Paris, and by the difficulty of getting access to Napoleon, to obtain from him such promises as would determine the court of Rome.

The Abbé Bernier, who had become bishop of Orleans, the man whose at once prudent and profound intellect had been employed in overcoming all the difficulties of the Concordat, was again very serviceable on this occasion. He was intrusted with the replies to be made to the Roman court. He conferred, for this purpose, with Cardinal Caprara, and showed him that after the hopes that had been conceived by the imperial family, and the expectation to which the French public had been excited, it was impossible to draw back without insulting Napoleon, and risking the most serious consequences.

The Bishop of Orleans drew up a despatch which would have done honour to the most learned and practised diplomatist. He referred to the services rendered by Napoleon to the Church, and the claims that he had upon its gratitude; the benefit that religion might still expect from him; the effect, above all, that the presence of Pius VII. would produce upon the French people, and the impulse which it would give to religious ideas. He explained the proper construction to be put upon the oath, and the expressions relative to freedom of religion; moreover, he proposed an expedient, it was to have two ceremonies; the one, civil, in which the Emperor would take the oath, and assume the crown; the other, religious, in which he would have that crown blessed by the Pontiff. Finally, he positively declared that it was for the interests of religion and of the affairs cognate thereto, that the presence of the Pope at Paris was requested. There were sufficient hopes hidden beneath this language personally to win over the Pope, and to furnish him with a pretext on which he could justify to Christendom his condescension towards Napoleon.

To this official despatch of the French government, Cardinal Caprara added some private letters, in which he described what was passing in France, the good which was to be accomplished there, and the evil that was to be repaired, and positively affirmed that a refusal could not be given but with the greatest perils, and that the Pope would reap from his journey nothing but subjects of satisfaction.

A second time transported to Rome, the negotiation was destined to be successful. The Pope and the Cardinal Gonsalvi, enlightened by the letters of the legate and of the Bishop of Orleans, comprehended the impossibility of a refusal, and, urged by Cardinal Fesch, ended by agreeing. But they still felt the necessity of once more consulting the cardinals, and they were especially alarmed at that proposal of the Bishop of Orleans, in which he started the idea of a double ceremony. The Pope admitted but one of them, for he wished not only to sprinkle holy water over the new Emperor,

but also to crown him. The cardinals, therefore, were consulted anew, upon the explanations that had been sent from Paris. Cardinal Fesch obtained access to them, and struck fear into their hearts, which he was better calculated to do than he was to persuade. The reply was favourable, but they demanded an official note explanatory of the oath, promising but a single ceremony, and containing an express mention of the terms on which the Pope was to proceed to Paris.

Pius VII., therefore, caused it to be declared, that he had consented to go to Paris, on condition that the oath should be explained as not implying approbation of heretical dogmas, but the simple physical toleration of dissenting religions; that they should promise to listen to him when he should remonstrate against certain Organic Articles, or reclaim in behalf of the interests of the Church and the Holy See, (the Legations were not named;) that access to him should not be granted to the bishops who had disputed their submission to the Holy See, until after a new and complete submission on their part; that he should not be exposed to the meeting with persons in a situation repugnant to the laws of the Church, (the wife of the minister for foreign affairs was specifically pointed out;) that the ceremonial observed should be that of the court of Rome crowning the emperors, or of the archbishop of Rheims crowning the king of France; that there should be but one ceremony, by the ministry of the Pope exclusively; that a deputation of two French bishops should be the bearers to Pius VII. of a letter of invitation, in which the Emperor should say that, detained by cogent considerations in the heart of his Empire, and having much to consult upon with the holy father concerning the interests of religion, he begged him to visit him in France, to bless his crown, and treat of the interests of the Church; that no sort of demand should be addressed to the Pope; and that his return to Italy should in no wise be obstructed. The pontifical cabinet finally expressed its desire that the coronation should be postponed to the 25th of December, the day on which Charlemagne had been proclaimed emperor, for the Pope, cruelly agitated, needed to pass some time at Castel-Gandolpho, to take some little repose, and moreover, could not leave Rome without arranging many affairs of the Roman government.

There was nothing but what was very admissible in these conditions, for in promising to listen to the remonstrances of the Pope against certain of the Organic Articles, no pledge was given to act upon those remonstrances, in the event of their being contrary to the principles of the French church. Cardinal Fesch, indeed, had honestly declared that those of the Organic Articles which were most offensive to Rome would never be modified; those which required the consent of the civil authority to the introduction of papal bulls into France. Again, there could be no scruple as to promising a single ceremony; the observance of the Roman or the French ceremonial; a hope as to the territorial amelioration of the Holy See for Napoleon had after, contemplated

this; the sending a deputation solemnly to invite the Pope to proceed to Paris; or the allegation of the interests of the church as causing his journey; the repression of the four bishops who had relapsed from their reconciliation, and disturbed the church in a mischievous manner. Finally, it was quite convenient to engage not to demand any thing of Pius VII., and to leave him his liberty, for never had a contrary design entered the minds of Napoleon and his government. In fact, it was only in the minds of those trembling and enfeebled old men that the supposition could have birth, of the liberty of the Pope being at all endangered in France.

As soon as the consent was obtained, Cardinal Fesch declared that the Emperor would defray all the expenses of the journey, which, for an impoverished government, was one great difficulty removed. He further made known the details of the magnificent reception that was in reserve for the holy father. Unfortunately, he worried him by accessory exactions, which were altogether misplaced. He desired that twelve cardinals, besides the secretary of state, Gonsalvi, should accompany the Pope; he wished, contrary to the established custom, by which the cardinals take precedence in the order of seniority, to have the first place in the pontifical carriage, in quality of ambassador, grand-almoner, and uncle of the Emperor. All this was useless, and gave to timid and punctilious men as much pain as the most serious difficulties.

Pius VII. yielded upon some points, but was inflexible as to the number of cardinals, and as to being accompanied by the secretary of state, Gonsalvi. In their vague terrors, Pius VII. and Gonsalvi had determined upon a singular precaution for providing against all the dangers of the church. The holy father, who imagined his health worse than it really was, and mistook the nervous agitation into which he was thrown, for a dangerous illness, thought it very likely that he might die on his journey. He also thought it possible that advantage might be taken of his presence in France. For this second case he had drawn up and signed his abdication, and placed it in the hands of Gonsalvi, in order that he might be able to declare the papacy vacant. Further, in the event of his death or abdication, it would be requisite to convoke the sacred college, in order to fill the chair of St. Peter. It was necessary, therefore, to have as many cardinals as possible at Rome, and among them the man whose ability rendered him the most capable of directing the Church in grave conjunctures, that is to say, Cardinal Gonsalvi himself. There was still another reason that decided the Pope upon acting thus. He had not been able to avoid an explanation with the court of Austria, to cause it to agree to his journey to Paris. Austria, appreciating his position, had admitted the necessity he was under of making the journey, but demanded a guarantee, whereby he promised not to treat at Paris about the arrangements of the Germanic church, which were to be the result of the recess of 1803. It was especially on this account that Austria dreaded the Pope's stay in France. Pius VII.

had solemnly promised not to treat with Napoleon upon any question foreign to the French church. But in order that faith should be placed in his promise, it was necessary that he should not take with him to Paris the Cardinal Gonsalvi, the man by whom all the important business of the Roman court was transacted. For these reasons Pius VII. refused to take more than six cardinals with him, and persisted in his resolution to leave the secretary of state, Gonsalvi, at Rome. He consented to an arrangement as to the personal pretensions of Cardinal Fesch. He was to occupy the first place from their arrival in France.

These points being settled, the Pope proceeded to Castel-Gandolpho, where the pure air, the calm which follows a resolution taken, and the news, every day more satisfactory, of the reception that was in preparation for him at Paris, re-established his much shaken health. Napoleon considered what he had obtained as a grand victory, which put the last seal on his rights, and which, in point of legitimacy, left him nothing more to desire. At the same time he would not lay aside his proper character amidst these external pomps; he would neither do nor promise anything opposed to his own dignity, or to the principles of his government. Cardinal Fesch having informed him that it would be sufficient to depute to the Pope some general enjoying a high reputation, he sent General Caffarelli as the bearer of his invitation, and he couched that invitation in respectful, and even caressing terms, but without giving any intimation that he invited the Pope to France on any other business than that of the coronation. The letter, in which a perfect dignity was preserved, ran thus:

"MOST HOLY FATHER:

"The happy effect produced upon the morality and the character of my people by the re-establishment of religion, induces me to beg your holiness to give me a new proof of your interest in my destiny and in that of this great nation, in one of the most important conjunctures presented by the annals of the world. I beg you to come and give, to the highest degree, a religious character to the anointing and coronation of the first Emperor of the French. That ceremony will acquire a new lustre from being performed by your holiness in person. It will bring down upon yourself and our people the blessing of God, whose decrees rule the destiny alike of empires and of families.

"Your holiness is aware of the affectionate sentiments I have long borne towards you, and can thence judge of the pleasure that this occurrence will afford me of testifying them anew.

"And hereupon, we pray God that He may preserve you, most Holy Father, for many years, to rule and govern our mother, the holy Church.

"Your dutiful son,

"NAPOLEON."

This letter was accompanied by urgent treaties that the Pope would arrive towards the end of November, instead of on the 25th of December. Napoleon did not disclose his real reason for wishing the ceremony to take place

at the earlier epoch; that reason was no other than his project of a descent upon England, prepared for December. He alleged a reason, which was true, indeed, but less important; the inconvenience of too long detaining at Paris all the civil and military authorities, who were already convoked thither.

General Caffarelli, having set out, and travelled with all speed, reached Rome in the night of the 28th to the 29th of September. Cardinal Fesch presented him to the Holy Father, who gave him a truly paternal reception. Pius VII. received the Emperor's letter from the hands of General Caffarelli, and deferred reading it until after the audience. But when he had read it, and found no allegation of religious affairs as the cause of his journey to Paris, he was deeply grieved, and was thrown into a state of nervous agitation, which excited the most lively anxiety. At bottom, what really affected that respectable Pontiff, as it does all high-souled princes, was his honour, the dignity of his crown. He considered these compromised, if the interests of religion were not set forth as the cause of his journey. The nickname of *chaplain to Napoleon*, which had been given to him by his enemies, deeply wounded him. He summoned Cardinal Fesch, and said to him, "*It is poison that you have brought me.*" He added that he would not reply to such a letter; and that he would not go to Paris, for faith had not been kept with him. Cardinal Fesch endeavoured to soothe the irritated Pope, and considered that a new consultation of cardinals would overcome this last difficulty. All began to feel the impossibility of drawing back, and by means of a last explanatory note, signed by the cardinal-ambassador, the difficulty was removed. It was settled that the Pope, on account of All Saints' day, should set out on the 2d of November, and reach Fontainebleau on the 27th.

While this was going on at Rome, the Emperor Napoleon had prepared every thing at Paris to give a prodigious splendour to the ceremony. He had invited to it the princes of Baden, the prince arch-chancellor of the Germanic Empire, and numerous deputations, selected from the administration, the magistracy, and the army. He had committed to the bishop Bernier, and to the arch-chancellor Cambacérés, the task of examining the ceremonial observed at the coronation of emperors and kings, and of suggesting the modifications that the manners and spirit of the times, and even the prejudices of France against the authority of Rome, rendered it necessary to effect in it. He had prescribed the utmost secrecy to them, in order that those questions should not become the subject of mischievous disputes, and reserved to himself the final decision on whatever was doubtful.

The two rituals, the Roman and the French, contained points of procedure, which would have been equally difficult to render palatable to public taste. According to each ceremonial, the monarch arrived without the ensigns of supreme power, such as the sceptre, the sword, and the crown, and received them only from the hand of the Pope. Further, the crown was placed upon his head. By the French ritual,

the peers, by the Roman ritual, the bishops held the crown above the head of the kneeling monarch, and the Pope, laying his hands upon it, lowered it upon his brow. Messrs. Bernier and Cambacérés, after suppressing certain forms that were too much in contradiction to the feelings of the time, had decided for preserving the last part of the ceremony, substituting for the peers of the French ritual, and for the bishops of the Roman ritual, the six grand dignitaries of the Empire, but still leaving it to the Pope, according to the ancient custom, to place the crown on the sovereign's head. Napoleon, grounding his argument upon the spirit of the nation and of the army, maintained that he could not thus receive the crown from the Pontiff; that the nation and the army, from whom he held it, would be offended at the sight of a ceremony at variance with fact, and with the independence of the throne. On this point he was inflexible, saying that he, better than any one, knew the real sentiments of France, tending, no doubt, towards religious ideas, but on that very account always ready to censure those which went beyond certain limits. He was resolved, then, to present himself at the church with his imperial ensigns; that is to say, as an emperor, and only to give them to the Pope to be blessed. He consented to be blessed, consecrated, but not crowned. The arch-chancellor, admitting what was correct, in the opinion of Napoleon, pointed out the not inferior danger of offending the Pope, already much chagrined, and of depriving the ceremony of an important and valuable conformity with the antique forms in use from the days of Pepin and Charlemagne. Messrs. Cambacérés and Bernier, who were both intimately connected with the legate, were commissioned to procure his assent to the wishes of the Emperor. Cardinal Caprara, knowing how important forms were to his court, considered that he ought not to determine the question without obtaining the opinion of the Pope, but, at the same time, that it was best not to make any communication to the Holy See, lest new difficulties should be created. Satisfied that when the Pope should have once arrived, he would be at once reassured and delighted by the reception which was prepared for him, the cardinal believed that every thing would be more easily arranged at Paris, under the influence of an unexpected gratification, than at Rome, under the influence of the most vague alarms.

These difficulties being surmounted, there remained others, which originated in the bosom of the imperial family. The parts of the wife, the brothers, and the sisters of the Emperor, in this ceremony, had to be decided upon. First, it was to be settled whether Josephine should be crowned and anointed, like Napoleon himself. She ardently desired it, for it was a new tie to her husband—a new guarantee against a future divorce, which was the haunting anxiety of her life. Napoleon hesitated between his tenderness for her, and the secret presentiments of his policy, when a domestic scene almost produced the ruin of the unfortunate Josephine. All were eager and busy around the new monarch; brothers, sisters,

and relations. All were anxious, in this ceremony, which seemed to consecrate them all, for a part consistent with their existing pretensions and future hopes. On witnessing this excitement, and the importunities of which Napoleon was the object, especially on the part of one of his sisters, Josephine, agitated, and devoured by jealousy, manifested frightfully injurious suspicions of that sister, and of Napoleon himself, suspicions in accordance with the atrocious calumnies of the emigrant party. Napoleon was suddenly transported with a violent anger, and, deriving from that anger the power of rising above his affection, he told Josephine that he would separate from her;¹ that, moreover, it would at a future time be necessary to do so, and that it would be better to do so at once, previous to having formed still closer ties. He called for his two adoptive children, and communicated his resolution, and plunged them into the deepest grief by the intelligence. Hortense and Eugène Beauharnais² declared, with a resolution at once calm and sad, that they would follow their mother into the retreat to which she was to be condemned. Josephine, prudently counselled, displayed a submissive and resigned grief. The contrast between her grief, and the satisfaction displayed by the rest of the family, rent the heart of Napoleon, and he could not resolve to see exiled and unfortunate that wife, the companion of his youth, and exiled and unfortunate with her, those children who had become the objects of his paternal tenderness. He caught Josephine in his arms, and told her, in a burst of tenderness, that he should never have the strength to part from her, even should his policy require him to do so; and then he promised her that she should be crowned with him, and should receive by his side, and from the hand of the pope, the divine consecration. Josephine, with her characteristic mobility, passed from alarm to the most lively satisfaction; and gave herself up with a childish joy to the preparations for the coronation.

Napoleon, secretly cherishing the design of some day re-establishing the Empire of the

West, wished his throne to be surrounded by vassal kings. For the present, he had made his brothers, Joseph and Louis, grand dignitaries of the Empire; he intended soon to make them kings, and he had even now prepared a throne in Lombardy for Joseph. His design was, that, on becoming kings, they should still remain grand dignitaries of the Empire. They were to bear the same relation to the French Empire of the West as the princes of Saxony, Brandenburg, Bohemia, Bavaria, Hanover, &c., bore to the Germanic Empire. It was necessary that the ceremony of the coronation should correspond to that design, and be an emblem of the reality that was in preparation. He had not allowed that the bishops or the peers should hold the crown suspended above his head, or even that the chief of bishops, the Bishop of Rome, should place it on his brow. For similar reasons, it was his will that his brothers, destined to be vassal kings of the Grand Empire, should take beside him a position which should plainly indicate that future vassalage. He therefore required that when he, clad in the imperial robes, should proceed to the interior of the church, from the throne to the altar, from the altar to the throne, his brothers should bear the train of his robes. He required this not only for himself, but also for the Empress. It was the princesses, his sisters, who were to perform to Josephine the service that his brothers were to perform to him. An energetic expression of his will was required to obtain this. Although his kindness rendered domestic quarrels painful to him, he was very absolute when his resolutions concerned the views of his policy.

It was now November; every thing was in readiness at Notre Dame. The deputations had arrived; the tribunals had adjourned; sixty bishops or archbishops, attended by their clergy, had abandoned the duties of the altar. The generals, the admirals, the most distinguished officers of the land and sea service, Marshals Davoust, Ney, and Soult,³ and Admirals Bruix and Gauteaume, instead of being

¹ I here give the faithful account of a lady of unquestionable veracity, who was an eye-witness, and attached to the imperial family, and who has this reminiscence in her MS. memoirs.

² BEAUHARNAIS, EUGÈNE DE, Son of Viscount Alexander de Beauharnais and Josephine Tascher de la Pagerie, afterwards Empress of France. Born in Brittany, in 1770; educated at St. Germain en Laye. After his father's death on the scaffold, the family was so much reduced that he was bound apprentice to a joiner, and worked some time at that trade. On the marriage of his mother, in 1796, he was placed on the staff of Bonaparte; in 1797 he joined the army at Milan, and in 1798 accompanied the expedition to Egypt, at the age of seventeen. On the establishment of the consular government, in 1800, though not yet twenty, he received the command of a brigade of the consular army, and distinguished himself at Marengo. In 1804 he was created prince of the Empire, and nominated arch-chancellor of state. On Napoleon's coronation at Milan, he was appointed viceroy of Italy, and immediately entered upon the duties of his high office.—*Court and Camp of Napoleon*.

He had an excellent, fine courage, strict honour, great generosity and frankness, with an obliging and amiable temper.—*Bourrienne's Memoirs Napoleon*.

Eugene was yet but a child, yet he gave promise of being what he afterward became, a most charming and amiable young man. With the exception of his teeth, which, like his mother's, were hideous, his person was perfectly attractive and elegant. Frankness and hilarity pervaded all his actions, he laughed like a child, but never a bad taste. He was good-natured, gracious, polite,

without being obsequious, and a mimic without being impertinent, which is a rare talent.—*Duchess d'Angoulême's Memoirs*.

³ SOULT, JEAN DE DIEU, Marshal of France, Duke of Dalmezia, and minister of war to Louis Philippe. Born of humble parents at St. Amand, in the department of Tarn, in March, 1760. He entered the service as a private, and after spending some time in the royal regiment of infantry, became sub-lieutenant of grenadiers. Under Hoche and Jourdan he distinguished himself greatly, especially at Fleurus, where by his calmness he saved Moreau's division. In 1798 he was appointed general of brigade, and joined the army of Italy, with which he made the campaign of 1799 with great distinction, until he was shut up in Genoa with Massena, whose friendship and esteem he then acquired. At his recommendation he was intrusted with the command of the Consular guard. When the invasion of England was resolved upon, he was placed over the army encamped from Boulogne to Calais. In May, 1804, he received a marshal's truncheon. His subsequent career is almost too well known to require comment, and will, moreover, be fully illustrated in the text of this work. He was one of the very ablest of Napoleon's marshals, and was invariably successful until he met the Duke of Wellington. Since the fall of Napoleon, his conduct has been marked with dignity, judgment, sound sense, and moderation, and to him is due in no small degree, with the royal master, the credit of having preserved the peace of Europe, since the revolution of the three days.—*Court and Camp of Napoleon*.

at Boulogne or at Brest, were at Paris. Napoleon was annoyed at this, for however much he liked pomps, they held a very secondary place in his liking to serious business. A multitude of the curious, flocking from all parts of Europe and France, crowded the capital, and impatiently awaited the spectacle which had attracted them. Napoleon, who was far from being displeased with the crowding of which he was the object, Napoleon nevertheless was in haste to put an end to a state of things which interfered with that regular order which he loved to see existing in his Empire. He despatched officers after officers with letters to the Pope, filled with filial tenderness, but filled also with earnest importunities to him to hasten his progress. From delay to delay, the ceremony was now fixed for the 2d of December.

The Pope had at length determined on quitting Rome. After having confided all powers to Cardinal Gonsalvi, and having heaped caresses upon him, he, on the morning of the 2d of November, proceeded to the altar of St. Peter, and knelt there for some time, surrounded by the cardinals, the grandees of Rome, and the populace. At this altar he offered up a fervent prayer, as though he had been about to brave some great peril, and then entered his carriage and took the road to Viterbo. The populace of Transteveris, so devoted to their pontiffs, accompanied his carriage for a long time, weeping. The time was gone by when that Roman court was the most enlightened in Europe! Now the members of the sacred college, scarcely understanding the age in which they lived, and even blaming, for lack of comprehending it, the prudent condescension of Pius VII., were prepared to believe the most absurd fables relating to it. There were some among them who considered as probable the report of a snare set in France to make the Holy Father prisoner, and wrest his states from him: as though Napoleon need resort to such means to become master of Rome!—as if he at that moment desired any thing but the pontifical benediction, which would render the character of his power respectable in the eyes of men!

Pius VII., on setting out, had desired, notwithstanding his poverty, to carry with him some presents worthy of the host with whom he was about to reside. With his usual delicacy of tact, he had chosen, as presents for Napoleon, two antique cameos, as remarkable for their beauty as for their signification. The one represented Achilles, the other the continence of Scipio. For Josephine he destined some vases, also antique, and of admirable workmanship. By the advice of M. de Talleyrand he took for the ladies of the court a profusion of rosaries.

He set out, then, traversing the Roman state and Tuscany, amidst the population of Italy, kneeling on his path. At Florence he was received by the Queen of Etruria, now a widow, and regent for her son, of the new kingdom created by Napoleon. That princess, pious as a Spanish princess, received the Pope with demonstrations of devotion and respect which delighted him. He already began to recover

somewhat from his anxieties. He desired to avoid the Legations, in order that his presence might not consecrate the grant that had been made of them to another state than the state of Rome. He was conducted by Plaisance, Parma, and Turin. He was not yet in France, but French authorities and French troops already surrounded him. He saw the veteran Menou, and the officers of the army of Italy respectfully bowing before him, and he was touched with the respectful expression of those masculine countenances. Cardinal Cambacérés and a chamberlain of the palace, M. de Salmatoris, who had been sent forward, presented themselves on the frontiers of Piedmont, which were also those of the Empire, and presented him with a letter from Napoleon, filled with expressions of his gratitude and of his wishes for the speedy and prosperous journey of the Pontiff. Becoming more reassured every hour, Pius VII. at length ceased to feel much fear of the consequences of his resolution. He passed the Alps. Extraordinary precautions had been taken to render the journey there safe and easy to him and to the aged cardinals who accompanied him. Officers of the imperial palace provided every thing with infinite zeal and magnificence. At length he arrived at Lyons. There his alarms were changed into positive delight. Crowds of people had assembled from Provence, Dauphiny, Franche-Comté, and Burgundy, to see the representative of God on earth. The people have all at heart a confused but deep sentiment of the Divinity. Little matters the form under which it is presented to their adoration, provided that that form have been very anciently admitted, and that those above them set the example of respect. If to the natural force of this sentiment, we add the extraordinary power of reaction, and the vivacity with which the multitude reverts to ancient practices that it has temporarily abandoned, we may conceive the eagerness with which the people, both in the towns and rural districts of France, pressed forward to see the Holy Father. On beholding upon their knees those people who had been described to him as continually in rebellion, alike against earthly and heavenly authority, Pius VII. was delighted and completely reassured; and he now perceived that his veteran councillor, Caprara, spoke quite truly when he told him that this journey would be a great benefit to religion, and would procure to himself infinite gratifications. Another letter from the emperor was presented to him at Lyons, conveying new thanks to him, and new wishes for his speedy arrival. That debilitated Pontiff, suffering from an unhealthy sensibility, no longer feeling his fatigue, now that he saw himself welcomed in this manner, himself proposed to accelerate his journey by two days—an offer which was accepted. He left Lyons amidst the same homages, and passed through Moulins and Nevers, everywhere encountering on the road a multitude filled with emotion, and suing for the blessing of the head of the Church.

It was at Fontainebleau that Pius VII. was to stop. Napoleon had made this arrangement,

that he might have the opportunity of going to meet the Holy Father, and of providing him rest for two or three days in that lovely retreat. He had ordered for that day, the 25th of November, a hunting match, which was to approach the road by which the Holy Father was travelling. At the hour at which he knew that the pontifical cortège would arrive at the cross of St. Herem, he turned his horse in that direction to meet the Pope, who almost immediately arrived there. He instantly presented himself to the Holy Father, and embraced him. Pius VII., affected by this earnest eagerness, looked with mingled curiosity and emotion upon that new Charlemagne, whom for years past he had regarded as God's instrument here on earth. It was the middle of the day. The two sovereigns entered the carriage to proceed to Fontainebleau, Napoleon giving the right side to the head of the church. At the entrance to the palace, the empress, the grandees of the Empire, and the chiefs of the army, were arranged in a circle, to receive Pius VII., and to offer him their homage. He, although accustomed to the pomps of Rome, had never before seen any thing so magnificent. He was conducted, surrounded by this attendance, to the apartments intended for him. After some hours' repose, according to the rules of etiquette among sovereigns, he paid a visit to the Emperor and empress, who immediately returned that visit. Each time more completely re-assured, and carried away by the seductive language of his host, who had promised himself not to intimidate but to enchant him, he conceived an affection for Napoleon, which, at the close of his life, and after numerous and terrible vicissitudes, he still felt for the hero in exile. The grandees of the Empire were successively presented to him. He received them with perfect cordiality, and that gracefulness of advanced age, which has a very great and a very powerful charm. The at once mild and dignified countenance of Pius VII. touched all hearts, and he in turn was touched by the effect that he produced. He had not been spoken to about any of the difficulties which still remained to be removed. His sensitiveness and his fatigue had been considered. He was wholly filled with the emotion, the joy, of a welcome which to him seemed an actual triumph to religion.

The moment at length arrived to set out for Paris, to enter, at length, that dreaded city, in which for a century the human mind had so violently worked, in which for some years past the destinies of the world had been regulated. On the 28th of November, after three days of repose, the Emperor and the Pope entered the same carriage to proceed to Paris, the Pope still having the right. The Pope was lodged in the Pavilion of Flora, which had been prepared for his reception. The whole day of the 29th was left to him entirely to recover from his fatigue, and on the 30th, the Senate, the Legislative Body, the Tribunal, and the Council of State, were presented to him. The presidents of these four bodies addressed him in speeches in which his virtues, his wisdom, and his noble condescension towards France, were celebrated in language at once brilliant and dignified. But among these harangues, fugi-

tive as the sensation which inspired them, it is necessary to distinguish that of M. de Fontanes, grave and durable as the truths with which it was filled:—

“**MOST HOLY FATHER:**

“When upon the field of battle the victor of Marengo conceived the design of re-establishing religious unity, and of restoring to the French people their ancient worship, he preserved the principles of civilization from total ruin. This grand thought, occurring in the day of victory, gave birth to the Concordat; and the Legislative Body, on whose behalf I have the honour to address your holiness, converted the Concordat into a law of the land.

“Memorable day, equally dear to the wisdom of the states man, and the faith of the Christian! It was then that France, abjuring but too serious errors, gave the most useful lessons to the human race. She seemed to confess in its presence, that all irreligious ideas are impolitic ideas, and that every offence against Christianity is an offence against society. The return to the ancient worship speedily led the way to the return to a government more natural to great states, and more in accordance with the habits of France. The whole social system, shaken by the inconstant opinions of man, rested once more upon a doctrine immutable as God himself. It was religion which in the bygone times polished savage societies, but it was now more difficult to repair their ruins than to lay their foundations.

“We owe this benefit to a double prodigy. France has witnessed the birth of one of those extraordinary men, who, at rare intervals, are sent to the succour of empires that are on the brink of ruin; while Rome, at the same time, has seen shining upon the throne of St. Peter all the apostolic virtues of the earliest ages. Their gentle authority is felt by all hearts. Universal homage must be paid to a pontiff as wise as he is pious, who knows alike what should be left to the course of human events, and what is demanded by the interests of religion.

“That august religion comes to consecrate with him the new destinies of the French Empire, and observes the same solemnity as in the age of the Clovises and the Pepins.

“All things have changed around it; it alone has remained unchanged.

“It sees the families of kings become extinct like those of subjects; but upon the ruins of fallen thrones, and upon the steps of thrones that are raised up, it ever admires the successive manifestations of the Eternal designs, and obeys them with confidence.

“Never had the universe a more imposing spectacle; never had the people grander lessons.

“The time no longer exists in which the Empire and the priesthood were rivals. Both unite to repel the fatal doctrines which had threatened Europe with utter subversion. May they for ever yield to the double influence of religion and policy united together. That wish will doubtless be realized; never in France had policy so great genius, and never did the pontifical throne present to the Christian world a more respectable and touching mo-

The Pope displayed a lively emotion as he listened to that noble language, the noblest that had been spoken since the age of Louis XIV. The populace of Paris crowded beneath his windows, soliciting his appearance. The same of his mildness, and of his noble countenance, had already spread throughout the capital. Pius VII. several times presented himself at the balcony of the Tuileries, always accompanied by Napoleon, was saluted with lively acclamations, and saw the people of Paris, that people who had been the actors of the 10th of August, and had worshipped the goddess Reason, kneeling before him, and awaiting the pontifical benediction. Singular inconsistency of men and of nations! which proves the necessity of holding to those grand truths on which human society reposes; for there is neither dignity nor repose in the caprices of a day, which are embraced and abandoned with a degrading precipitation.

The gloomy apprehensions which had so embittered the resolution of the Pope were now dissipated. Pius VII. found himself the guest of a prince full of respectfulness and attention, and adding courtesy to genius; and in the midst of a great nation, that had been led back to the old traditions of Christianity, by the example of a glorious chieftain. He was delighted that he had arrived, to add to this impulse by his presence. There were still some annoyances in store for him, both as touching the ceremony, and upon the subject of the constitutional bishops, who, after their reconciliation to the church, had allowed themselves to cavil about the terms of that reconciliation. They were four in number—Messrs. Lecoz, archbishop of Besançon; Lacombe, bishop of Angoulême; Saurine, bishop of Strasburg; and Remond, bishop of Dijon. M. Portalis had sent for them and, by order of the Emperor, had enjoined them, if they desired to be presented to the Pope, to write a letter of reconciliation, drawn up in agreement with Bishop Bernier and the cardinals of the pontifical cortège. At the last moment, they wished to change an expression of this letter, which the Pope perceived and remarked upon, leaving to the Emperor the task of terminating these melancholy disputes. For the rest, he showed an equally mild and paternal countenance to all the members of the French clergy. There still remained the questions relating to the ceremonial. The Pope had admitted the principal modifications, founded upon the state of society; but he was singularly affected by the question of the crowning. He was desirous to preserve the right transmitted by his predecessors, of placing the crown upon the brow of the Emperor. Napoleon gave orders for the point not to be insisted upon, and said that he would undertake to settle every thing at the spot itself.

The eve of that grand solemnity now approached; that is to say, the 1st of December. Josephine, who had found favour with the Holy Father by a kind of devoutness much akin to that of the women of Italy, Josephine sought an interview with him, to make an avowal which she hoped to turn to good account. She declared to him that she had only

been civilly married to Napoleon, as, at the time of her marriage, religious ceremonies were abolished.

The very throne presented a strange specimen of the manners of the time. Napoleon had put an end to this state of things for his sister, the princess Murat, by begging the Cardinal Caprara to give her the nuptial benediction; but he had not chosen to do the same for himself. The Pope, scandalized by a situation which, in the eyes of the Church, was a mere concubinage, instantly demanded an interview of Napoleon, and in that interview declared that he could very well consecrate him, for the state of the consciences of emperors had never been inquired into by the Church, when they were to be crowned, but that he could not, by crowning Josephine, give the divine consecration to a state of concubinage. Napoleon, irritated against Josephine for this interested revelation, fearing to offend the Pope, whom he knew to be inflexible in matters of faith, and, moreover, unwilling to alter a programme which had already been published, consented to receive the nuptial benediction. Josephine, sharply reprimanded by her husband, but delighted with her success, received, in the very night preceding the coronation, the sacrament of marriage in the chapel of the Tuileries. It was Cardinal Fesch, having M. de Talleyrand and Marshal Berthier for witnesses, who, with the most profound secrecy, married the Emperor and Empress. The secret was faithfully kept until the epoch of the divorce. On the following morning, the reddened eyes of Josephine still bore testimony to the tears which these inward agitations had cost her.

On Sunday, the 2d of December, a cold, but clear winter's day, that population of Paris, which, forty years later, we have seen crowding in similar weather, towards the mortal remains of Napoleon, hurried to see the passing of the imperial cortège. The Pope first set out at ten o'clock in the morning, and much earlier than the Emperor, in order that the two cortèges should not obstruct each other. He was accompanied by a numerous body of clergy, attired with the most costly ornaments, and escorted by detachments of the imperial guard. A richly decorated portico had been erected all around the Place Notre Dame, to receive, at their descent from their carriages, the sovereigns and princes who were to proceed to the ancient basilick. The Archbishopric, adorned with a luxury worthy of the guests that it was to shelter, was arranged so that the Pope and the Emperor could rest there for an instant. After a brief stay, the Pope entered the church, where for several previous hours there had already been assembled the deputies of the towns, the representatives of the magistracy and of the army, the sixty bishops, with their clergy, the Senate, the Legislative Body, the Council of State, the princes of Nassau, Hesse, and Baden, the arch-chancellor of the Germanic Empire, and, lastly, the ministers of the different powers. The great door of Notre Dame had been closed, because the back of the imperial throne was placed again

it. The church, therefore, was entered by the side doors, situated at the two extremities of the transversal nave. When the Pope, preceded by the cross, and by the ensigns of the successor of St. Peter, appeared within that ancient basilick of St. Louis, all present rose from their seats, and 500 musicians pealed forth in solemn strain the consecrated chant, *Tu es Petrus*. The effect of this was instant and sublime. The Pope proceeded at a slow pace, direct to the altar, before which he knelt, and then took his place on a throne that had been prepared for him to the right of the altar. The sixty prelates of the French church presented themselves in succession to salute him. To each of them, constitutional or not, his countenance was equally benevolent. The arrival of the imperial family was now awaited.

The Church of *Nôtre Dame* was decorated with an unequalled magnificence. Hangings of velvet sprinkled with golden bees, descended from the roof to the pavement. At the foot of the altar stood two plain arm-chairs, which the Emperor and Empress were to occupy before their crowning. At the west end of the church, and opposite to the altar, raised upon twenty-four steps, and placed between columns, which supported a pediment, stood an immense throne, a sort of monument within a monument, intended for the Emperor, when crowned, and his wife. It was the custom in both the Roman and the French ritual. The monarch did not seat himself upon the throne until after he had been crowned by the Pontiff.

They now waited for the Emperor, and waited for a considerable time. This was the only disagreeable circumstance in this grand solemnity. The position of the Pope during this long delay was painful. The fear of the director of the ceremonies lest the two cortéges should meet, was the cause of the delay. The Emperor set out from the Tuileries in a carriage completely surrounded with glass, surmounted by gilt genii, bearing a crown, a popular carriage in France, and always recognised by the Parisians when it has since appeared in subsequent ceremonies. He was attired in a costume designed by the greatest painter of the day, and very similar to the costumes of the sixteenth century. He wore a plumed hat, and a short mantle. He was not to assume the imperial costume until he reached the Archbishopric, and at the moment of entering the church. Escorted by his marshals on horseback, he proceeded slowly along the Rue St. Honoré, the Quay of the Seine, and the Place *Nôtre Dame*, amidst the acclamations of immense crowds, delighted to see their favourite General become Emperor, as though he had not himself achieved this with his excitable passions, and his warlike heroism, and as if some touch of a magic wand had done it for him. Napoleon, on arriving before the portico which we have already described, alighted from his carriage, proceeded to the Archbishopric, took the crown, the sceptre, and the imperial robe, and directed his course to the cathedral. Beside him was borne the grand crown, in the form of a tiara, and modelled after that of Charlemagne. At this first

stage of the ceremony he wore only the crown of the Cæsars, namely, a simple golden laurel. All admired that noble head, noble beneath that golden laurel, as some antique medallion. Having entered the church to the sound of pealing music, he knelt, and then passed on to the arm-chair which he was to occupy previous to taking possession of the throne.

The ceremony then commenced. The sceptre, the sword, and the imperial robe had been placed on the altar. The Pope anointed the Emperor on the forehead, the arms, and the hands, then blessed the sword, with which he girded him, and the sceptre, which he placed in his hand, and approached to take up the crown. Napoleon, who had watched his movements, now, as he had promised, settled that difficulty on the spot, by firmly, though not violently, seizing the crown, and placing it upon his own head. This action, which was perfectly appreciated by all present, produced an indescribable effect. Napoleon, then, taking the crown of the Empress, and approaching Josephine, as she knelt before him, placed it, with a visible tenderness, upon the head of the partner of his fortunes, who at that moment burst into tears. This done, he proceeded towards the grand throne. He ascended it, followed by his brothers, bearing the train of his robes. Then the Pope, according to custom, advanced to the foot of the throne to bless the new sovereign, and to chant those words which greeted Charlemagne in the basilick of St. Peter, when the Roman clergy suddenly proclaimed him Emperor of the West:—*VIVAT IN ÆTERNUM SEMPER AUGUSTUS*. At this chant, shouts of "*Vive l'Empereur*" resounded through the arches of *Nôtre Dame*; the cannon added their thunder, and announced to all Paris the solemn moment of Napoleon's consecration, with all the forms received among mankind.

The arch-chancellor Cambacérès then presented him with the form of the oath, a bishop handed him the New Testament, and upon the book of Christians he took that oath which embodied the great principles of the Revolution. A pontifical high mass was then chanted, and the day was far advanced when the two cortéges regained the Tuileries, through an immense concourse of people.

Such was the august ceremony which consummated the return of France to monarchical principles. It was not one of the smallest triumphs of our Revolution, to see that soldier, sprung from her own womb, anointed by the Pope, who, for that express purpose, had quitted the capital of the Christian world. It is on this account especially that such pomp are worthy of the attention of the historian.

If moderation of desires, ascending that throne as the companion of genius, had provided sufficient liberty for France, and put a timely limit to heroic enterprises, that ceremony would have consecrated the new dynasty for ever—that is to say, for several centuries. But we were destined to pass by other tracks to a more free political condition, and to a grandeur unhappily too confined.

It was fifteen years since the Revolution had

commenced. A monarchy during three years, a republic during twelve, it had now become a military monarchy, still based upon civil equality, upon the nation's participation in the framing of the laws, and upon the free admis-

sion of all the citizens to those re-established social distinctions. It was thus that French society had progressed in fifteen years, successively decomposed and recomposed with the characteristic promptitude of popular passions.

BOOK XXI.

THIRD COALITION.

Stay of the Pope at Paris—Endeavours of Napoleon to retain him there—The Fleets having been unable to act in December, Napoleon employs the Winter in organizing Italy—Transformation of the Italian Republic into a Vassal Kingdom of the French Empire—Offer of that Kingdom to Joseph Bonaparte, and his refusal of it—Napoleon determines to place the Iron Crown on his own Head, declaring, at the same time, that the two Crowns of France and Italy will be separated on the return of Peace—Solemn Sitting of the Senate—Second Coronation at Milan fixed for the Month of May, 1805—Napoleon finds in his Transalpine Journey a Means of more completely concealing his new Maritime Projects—His Naval Resources are increased by England's sudden Declaration of War against Spain—Naval Strength of Holland, France, and Spain—Project of a grand Expedition to India—Momentary Hesitation between that Project and that of a direct Expedition against England—Final Preference of the Latter—Every thing is prepared to make the Descent in the Months of July and August—The Fleets of Toulon, Cadiz, Ferrol, Rochefort, and Brest, are to assemble together at Martinique, to return into the Channel in July, to the Number of Sixty Sail—The Pope at length prepares to return to Rome—His Overtures to Napoleon previous to departing—Replies as to the various Points treated of by the Pope—The Pope's Moribundation tempered, however, by the Success of his Journey into France—Departure of the Pope for Rome, and of Napoleon for Milan—Dispositions of the European Courts—Their Leaning towards a new Coalition—State of the Russian Cabinet—The young Friends of Alexander form a grand Plan of European Mediation—Ideas of which that Plan consisted; real Origin of the Treaties of 1815—M. de Novosiltzoff charged to procure their Acceptance at London—Reception that he met with from Mr. Pitt—The Plan of Mediation is converted by the English Minister into a Plan of Coalition against France—Return of M. de Novosiltzoff to St. Petersburg—The Russian Cabinet and Lord Gower sign the Treaty which constitutes the Third Coalition—The Ratification of that Treaty is Subject to a Condition, the Evacuation of Malta by England—In Order to preserve to this Coalition the original Form of a Mediation, M. de Novosiltzoff is to repair to Paris to treat with Napoleon—Ineffectual Efforts of Russia to engage Prussia in the new Coalition—More successful Efforts with Austria, who enters into conditional Engagements—Russia has Recourse to Prussia as a Mediator, to obtain Passports for M. de Novosiltzoff—Those Passports are granted—Napoleon in Italy—Enthusiastic personal Affection shown to him by the Italians—Coronation at Milan—Eugène de Beauharnais declared Viceroy—Military Fêtes and Visits to the various Cities—Napoleon irresistibly attracted towards certain Plans by the Sight of Italy—He projects the future Expulsion of the Bourbons from Naples, and determines forthwith to unite Genoa to France—Motives to this Union—Conversion of the Duchy of Lucca into an Imperial Fief to the Profit of the Princess Eliza—After a Stay of three Months in Italy, Napoleon prepares to proceed to Boulogne to execute the Descent—Ganteaume, at Brest, has not found a single Day favourable for Sailing—Villeneuve and Gravina, having successfully got out of Toulon and Cadiz, are instructed to release Ganteaume from Blockade, that they may all proceed together into the Channel—Stay of Bonaparte at Genoa—His sudden Departure for Fontainebleau—While Napoleon is preparing for the Descent upon England all the Continental Powers are preparing for a formidable War against France—Russia, embarrassed by the Refusal of England to evacuate Malta, finds in the Annexation of Genoa a pretext for yielding that Point, and Austria for deciding at once—Treaty of Subsidy—Immediate Armaments obstinately denied to Napoleon—He sees the State of the Case and demands Explanations, at the same time making some Preparations towards Italy and the Rhine—He is more than ever persuaded that it is at London that all the Coalitions must be broken up, and sets out for Boulogne—His Resolution to embark, and his impatience while awaiting the French Fleet—Movement of the Squadrons—Long and fortunate Passage of Villeneuve and Gravina to Martinique—Admiral Villeneuve's first Feelings of Discouragement—He suddenly returns to Europe, and sails to Ferrol to raise the Blockade of that Port—Naval Battle of Ferrol against Admiral Calder—The French Admiral might have claimed the Victory had he not lost Two Spanish Ships—He has attained his Object in raising the Blockade of Ferrol and rallying two new Divisions, French and Spanish—Instead of gaining Confidence and hastening to raise the Blockade of Ganteaume, in order to proceed with Fifty Sail into the Channel, Villeneuve becomes disconcerted, and determines to sail towards Cadiz, leaving Napoleon to suppose that he is sailing for Brest—Tedious Suspense of Napoleon at Boulogne—His Hopes on the Receipt of the first Despatches from Ferrol—His Irritation when he begins to believe that Villeneuve has sailed for Cadiz—Violent Excitement and Anger with Admiral Decrès—Positive Intelligence of the Projects of Austria—Sudden Change of Resolution—Plan of the Campaign of 1805—Estimate of the Chances of Success of the Descent, which was prevented by the Mismanagement of Villeneuve—Napoleon finally turns his Forces against the Continent.

Three days after the ceremony of the coronation, Napoleon determined to distribute to the army and the national guards, the eagles which were to surmount the colours of the Empire. This ceremony, as nobly regulated as the preceding one, had the Champ de Mars for its scene. The representatives of all the corps came to receive the eagles intended for them, at the foot of a magnificent throne, raised in front of the palace of the military school, and previous to receiving them they took the oath, which they have since fulfilled, of keeping them even unto death. On the same day, there was a banquet at the Tuileries, where the Pope and the Emperor sat side by side at the same table, clad in their pontifical and imperial ornaments, and served by the grand officers of the crown.

The multitude, ever greedy for display, was delighted with these pomp. Many, without acknowledging their import, yet admitted them to be a natural consequence of the re-establishment of monarchy. The wise and prudent put up their prayers that the new monarch might not allow himself to be intoxicated by these fumes of omnipotence. However, no sinister prognostic as yet disturbed the public satisfaction. The new order of things was believed to be permanent. With much magnificence, perhaps with too much, there yet was seen a faithful adherence to the social principles proclaimed by the French Revolution, a constantly increasing prosperity, notwithstanding the war, and a continuation of grandeur which was calculated to flatter the national pride.

The holy father had not wished to remain long in France, but he now hoped, that by remaining there, he should find a favourable opportunity to express to Napoleon the secret wishes of the Roman court, and he had resigned himself to a two or three months' stay in Paris. Moreover, the season did not admit of his immediately repassing the Alps. Napoleon, who desired to have the Pontiff by his side to show him France, to enable him to comprehend her spirit, and the conditions upon which the re-establishment of religion was practicable, and, finally, to win his confidence by frank and daily communication, Napoleon employed consummate courtesy and kindness in order to detain him, and at length succeeded in completely gaining the affection of that holy pontiff. Pius VII. was lodged in the Tuileries, at liberty to follow his simple and religious tastes, but surrounded, when he went abroad, with all the attributes of supreme power, escorted by the Imperial guard, in a word, covered with honours. His interesting countenance, and his virtues, almost visible in his person, had deeply touched the Parisians, who followed him everywhere with a mingled curiosity, sympathy, and respect. He visited, in their turns, all the parishes of Paris, where he officiated amidst extraordinary crowds. His presence added to the religious impulse that Napoleon desired to give to the public mind. The holy pontiff was rejoiced at it. He visited the public monuments, and the museums which Napoleon had enriched, and seemed to interest himself in the grandeurs of the new reign. In a visit that he made to one of our public establishments, he displayed a tact and discretion which obtained him general approbation. Surrounded by a kneeling crowd who solicited his benediction, he perceived a man, whose stern and disapproving countenance still bore the imprint of our extinguished passions, and who had turned away to withdraw himself from the pontifical benediction. The holy father approaching this person, said to him in the gentlest tone—"Do not go away, sir; an old man's blessing never injured any one." This noble and touching speech was repeated and applauded by all Paris.

The fêtes and the hospitable attentions that he had lavished upon his venerable guest, had not withdrawn the attention of Napoleon from his grand affairs. The fleets that were destined to aid in the descent, continued to occupy his full attention. That of Brest was at length ready to sail; but that of Toulon, retarded in its fitting out by the determination to increase it from eight ships to eleven, had occupied the entire month of December. Since it had been complete, foul winds had detained it in port during January. Admiral Missiessy, with five ships fitted out at Rochefort, waited for a tempest to put to sea unperceived by the enemy. Napoleon devoted this time to the interior administration of his new Empire.

Although determined upon a war of extinction against England, he thought it necessary to commence his reign by a procedure which quite useless at that time, and which, be-

sides its uselessness, had the inconvenience of being a mere repetition of another admirably well-timed proceeding which he had taken on attaining the Consulate. He wrote a letter to the King of England, proposing peace, and he forwarded that letter by a brig belonging to the English squadron before Boulogne. It was immediately communicated to the British cabinet, who sent word that an answer would be given at a future time. Peace was not only possible but even necessary to the two powers in 1800. The proceeding of the First Consul at that time, therefore, was very proper, and the rejection of his conditions of peace, followed by the victories of Marengo and Hohenlinden, covered Mr. Pitt with confusion, and was even a principal cause of the fall of that minister. But in 1805, the two nations were at the commencement of a new war, their pretensions had risen to such a height, that they could only be settled by force, and a proposal for peace seemed too obviously resorted to for the purpose of affecting moderation, or of creating an opportunity to address the King of England as monarch addressing monarch.

What was of more importance than these vain proceedings, was the definitive organization of the Italian Republic. That republic, daughter of the French Republic, was in every thing to share the lot of her mother. In 1802, at the epoch of the *Consultum* of Lyons, she had framed for herself a constitution in imitation of France, and adopted a government republican in form, but absolute in fact. Now, it was natural that she should take the last step in the track of France, and that from a republic she should become a monarchy.

In the preceding book, we have recounted the overtures that M. Cambacères and the minister of the Italian Republic at Paris, M. de Mareschalchi, had been charged to make to the Vice-president Melzi, and to the members of the *Consultum* of the state. Those overtures had been pretty well received, although the Vice-president Melzi, rendered ill-tempered by the state of his health, and by a task too onerous for his powers, had mingled some tolerably bitter reflections with his reply. The Italians had without hesitation accepted the transformation of their republic into a monarchy, because they hoped to profit by this opportunity to obtain, in part at the least, the fulfilment of their wishes. They were quite willing to accept a king, and to have a brother of Napoleon for that king, but on condition that the choice should fall upon Joseph or Louis Bonaparte, and not upon Lucien, whom they formally excepted: that their king should belong to them alone; that he should constantly reside at Milan; that the two crowns of France and Italy should be immediately separated; that they should pay no further subsidy for the support of the French army; and finally, that Napoleon should undertake to procure Austria's approval of this new change.

"On these conditions," said the Vice-president Melzi, "the Italians would be satisfied, for as yet they had felt their enfranchisement only by the imposition of new burdens."

The idea of their money being carried be

yond the Alps is in general an engrained one with the Italians, subjected, as they so long have been, to powers placed on the other side of the Alps. At the same time they had a more cogent and a nobler motive for wishing for their enfranchisement—the desire of living under a national government. The paltrier reasons disgusted Napoleon, but did not surprise him; for if he had but a sorry opinion of mankind, he never laboured to debase them. In fact no one seeks to debase them who requires great things at their hands. He consequently was indignant at the reasoning of the Vice-president Melzi.

“What!” exclaimed he, “the Italians can only consider the money which their independence costs them! That supposes them very base and very dastardly: for my part, I am far from thinking so poorly of them. Can they free themselves and protect themselves without French troops? If they cannot do so, is it not just that they should contribute to the support of the soldiers who shed their blood for them? Who, then, has consolidated into one state, to make it the body of a nation, five or six provinces formerly governed by five or six different princes? Who, I ask, but the French army, and I who command it? Had I so chosen, Upper Italy would now be cut up, distributed in separate bits, one part given to the Pope, another to the Austrians, a third to the Spaniards. At this price I should have disarmed the powers, and obtained continental peace for France. Do not the Italians perceive that the foundation of their nationality is laid in a state that already includes one-third of all Italy? Is not their government composed of Italians, and founded upon the principles of justice, equality, and a prudential liberty—in a word, upon the principles of the French Revolution? What better can they desire? Can I accomplish every thing in a day?”

Napoleon on this occasion was perfectly in the right as to Italy. But for it, the fragments of Lombardy would have gratified the Pope, the Emperor of Germany, Spain, and the house of Sardinia, and have served as an equivalent for the annexation of Piedmont to France. It was true that it was in the interests of French policy that Napoleon had laboured to constitute the Italian nationality. But was it not a great benefit to the Italians thus to be bound up with the French policy? Was it not incumbent on them to lend that policy their strenuous support? And, in truth, 22,000,000 francs per annum for the support of above 30,000 men—a fictitious number, too, for there were generally 60,000, at least, required there—was that such a very heavy burden for a country which included the richest provinces in Europe? However, Napoleon gave himself but very little uneasiness about these doleful complaints of the Vice-president Melzi. He knew that all this was not to be taken to the letter. The Italian moderate party, with whose support he governed, abandoned by the nobility and by the priests, who in general inclined towards the Austrians, and by the liberals, who were imbued with exaggerated ideas—the liberal party, in its isolation, felt a certain depres-

sion, and willingly painted its situation in the darkest colours. Napoleon attached no weight to this, and constantly anxious to withdraw Italy from the influence of Austria, he sought the means of accommodating its institutions to the new institutions of France.

The coronation had afforded an opportunity of assembling at Paris the Vice-president Melzi and some delegates of the various Italian authorities. Messrs. Cambacérès, De Marescalchi, and De Talleyrand entered into conferences with them, and came to an understanding upon all points excepting one—that of the subsidy to be paid to France; for although the Italians invoked the French occupation as their salvation, they were nevertheless unwilling to bear the expense of it.

The arch-chancellor Cambacérès was then charged to treat with Joseph Bonaparte on the question of his elevation to the Italian throne. To the great astonishment of Napoleon, Joseph refused that throne upon two pleas, one of them very natural, the other singularly presumptuous. Joseph declared that, on account of the principle of the separation of the two crowns, the condition of the throne of Italy being the renunciation of the throne of France, he preferred to remain a French prince, with all his rights of succession to the Empire. Napoleon having no children, Joseph preferred the distant possibility of some day reigning in France, to the certainty of immediately reigning in Italy. Such a pretension was only natural and patriotic. The second reason given by Joseph for his refusal was, that the kingdom offered to him was too near a neighbour to France, and consequently too dependent; that he could only reign under the authority of the head of the French Empire; and that it did not suit him to reign on those terms. Thus already broke forth those sentiments which animated the brothers of the Emperor, upon all the thrones which he bestowed upon them. It was a proof of a silly vanity, to be unwilling to have for counsellor such a man as Napoleon. It was a very impolitic ingratitude to wish to be freed from his power; for, placed at the head of a newly-created Italian state, to tend towards isolation was to tend alike towards the ruin of Italy and the weakening of France.

All persuasions employed with Joseph were in vain; and although his future royalty had been announced to all the courts with which France had amicable relations, to Austria, to Prussia, and to the Holy See, it was necessary to revert to other ideas, and to determine upon a new arrangement. Napoleon, warned by this new experience that he must not create, in Lombardy, a jealous royalty disposed to obstruct his grand designs, resolved to take himself the iron crown, and assume the title of EMPEROR OF FRANCE AND KING OF ITALY. There was but one objection to this project; it was to recall too forcibly to attention the annexation of Piedmont to France. It was to run the risk of deeply offending Austria, and to recall her from her pacific ideas to the warlike ideas of Mr. Pitt, who, since his return to office, had endeavoured to avail himself of the breaking off of diplomatic relations between France and

Russia to form a new coalition. In order to ward off this inconvenience, Napoleon resolved upon making a formal declaration that he would only wear the crown of Italy until the return of Peace; that at that epoch he would proceed to the separation of the two crowns, by choosing a successor from the French princes. For the moment he adopted Eugène de Beauharnais, the son of Josephine, whom he loved as his own son, and intrusted to him the viceroyalty of Italy.

This determination once taken, he gave himself but little trouble to make it palatable to M. de Melzi, whose somewhat unreasonable complaints began to weary him, for he perceived in him far more of hankering after popularity than of intention to labour in common for the future establishment of Italy. Messrs. Cambacères and De Talleyrand were charged to signify these resolutions to the Italians who were present in Paris, and to concert with them the means of execution. These latter appeared apprehensive lest the three grand permanent colleges of *possidenti, dottori, and commercianti*, to which was intrusted the task of electing the authorities and modifying the constitution when there was need, might resist the project of any other than a Lombard monarchy, completely distinct from the French monarchy, and might cloak their opposition under Italian nonchalance, by voting neither for nor against. Napoleon, then, renounced the employment of constitutional forms; he acted as a creator who had made Italy what she then was, and who had the right still to make her whatever he believed it useful that she should become. M. de Talleyrand addressed a report to him, in which he demonstrated that those provinces, some of which were dependent on the ancient Republic of Venice, some of them on the house of Austria, these on the Duke of Modena, those on the Holy See, depended, as conquered provinces, upon the will of the Emperor; that what was due to them was an equitable government, adapted to their interests, and founded upon the principles of the French Revolution; but that, for the rest, he could give to that government whatever form might best accord with his vast designs. A decree followed, constituting the new kingdom, a decree which was to be adopted by the State *consultum* and the Italian deputies who were then at Paris, and then communicated to the French senate, as one of the grand constitutional acts of the Empire, and promulgated in an imperial sitting. However, it was necessary that Italy should seem to be more or less a party to these new arrangements. It was determined to prepare for her, also, the pageant of a coronation. It was resolved to take out of the treasury of Monza the famous iron crown of the Lombard kings, that Napoleon might place it upon his head, after its being blessed by the Archbishop of Milan, according to the ancient custom of the Germanic emperors, who received the crown of the West at Rome, but that of Italy at

Milan. The ceremony would impress the Italians, revive their hopes, regain the nobles and priests, who especially missed in the domination of the Austrians the monarchical forms, and gratify the populace, always captivated by the state of their rulers; for that very state while it charms their sight also feeds their industry. As for the enlightened liberals, they could not fail ultimately to perceive that the future security of Italy could only be provided for by the association of her destinies with those of France.

It was agreed that after the adoption of the new decree, the Italian deputies, the Minister Marescalchi, and the grand master of the ceremonies, M. de Segur, should precede Napoleon to Milan, there to arrange an Italian court, and prepare the programme of the coronation.

At this moment a thousand rumours were circulated among the European diplomatists. Now it was affirmed that Napoleon was about to give the crown of Holland to his brother Louis, now that he was about to confer that of Naples upon Joseph, and anon that he was about to annex Genoa and Switzerland to the French territory. There were even some who maintained that Napoleon wished to promote Cardinal Fesch to the papacy, and who already spoke of the crown of Spain as being reserved for a prince of the House of Bonaparte. The hatred of his enemies anticipated his projects on some points, exaggerated them on others, attributed to him some designs which he had not as yet formed, and undoubtedly facilitated them by preparing the mind of Europe for them. The sitting of the Senate for the promulgation of the decree constituting the kingdom of Italy, was to reply to all these suppositions, whether true or false, and, for the time at least, pushed too far.

The Italian deputies were previously assembled at Paris; the decree was submitted to them, and they unanimously agreed to it; and then the Imperial Session was ordered for the 17th of March, 1805—26th Ventôse, year XIII. The Emperor proceeded to the Senate at two o'clock, surrounded by all the state of the constitutional sovereigns of England and France when they hold a royal sitting. A grand deputation received him at the door of the palace of the Luxembourg, and he proceeded to seat himself upon the throne, around which were ranged the princes, the six grand dignitaries, the marshals, and the grand officers of the crown. M. de Talleyrand read his report, and, after the report, the imperial decree. A copy of the same decree, in the Italian language, and bearing the adhesion of the Lombard deputies, was then read by the Vice-president Melzi. Then the Minister Marescalchi presented those deputies to Napoleon, to whom, in his quality of King of Italy, they took the oath of fidelity. That ceremony being terminated, Napoleon, seated, and wearing his hat, delivered a firm and concise speech,

* SEIGUR, PAUL PHILIP, COMTE. Son of Louis Philip, Peer of France, &c.: born in 1760. Served with distinction on various occasions, and executed several diplomatic missions. In 1812 he was created *marshal of camp*, distinguished himself in 1813 and 1814 in several bloody

actions. In 1831 he was created Peer of France for life. His "History of Napoleon and the Grand Army during the year 1812," is a standard work, has caused several controversies and a duel between the author and General Gougauld.—*Encyclopædie Américaine*. ■

such as he well knew how to make, and of which the intention will easily be perceived.

"SENATORS,

"We have willed, on this occasion, to come among you, fully and freely to acquaint you with our views upon one of the most important subjects of state policy.

"We have conquered Holland, three-fourths of Germany, Switzerland, and Italy. Amidst the greatest prosperity we have been moderate. Out of so many provinces we have kept only those which were necessary to maintain France in the rank of consideration and power to which she has been accustomed. The partition of Poland, the abstraction of provinces from Turkey, the conquest of India, and of almost all the colonies, had, to our injury, disturbed the general balance of power.

"All that we have deemed not absolutely necessary for the re-establishment of this balance we have restored.

"Germany has been evacuated; their possessions have been restored to the descendants of many illustrious houses, who would have been irredeemably ruined had we not granted them a generous protection.

"Austria herself, after two unsuccessful wars, has obtained the state of Venice. At any time she would gladly have exchanged for Venice the provinces which she has lost.

"Scarcely was Holland conquered ere she was declared independent. Her annexation to our Empire would have been the completion of your commercial system, as the greatest rivers of one-half of our territory have their mouths in Holland. Nevertheless, Holland is independent, and her customs, her commerce, and her administration, are regulated at the will of her own government.

"Switzerland was occupied by our armies; we defended it against the combined forces of Europe. Its annexation would have completed our military frontier. Nevertheless, Switzerland, by the act of mediation, governs itself according to the pleasure of the nineteen free and independent cantons.

"The annexation of the territory of the Italian Republic to the French Empire would have aided the development of our agriculture; nevertheless, after its second conquest, we confirmed, at Lyons, its independence. We this day do still more, we proclaim the separation of the crowns of France and Italy, appointing for that separation the epoch when it shall be practicable and safe to our Italian subjects.

"We have accepted, and we will place upon our head, the iron crown of the ancient Lombards, that we may temper anew and strengthen it. But we do not hesitate to declare that we will transmit this crown to one of our lawful children, whether of our own issue, or adoptive, as early as we shall be without fears for the independence which we have guaranteed to the other states of the Mediterranean.

"The Genius of Evil will in vain seek for pretexts for rekindling war upon the Continent; that which has been annexed to our Empire by the constitutional laws will remain

annexed to it. No new province will be incorporated with it, but the laws of the Dutch Republic, the act of mediation of the nineteen Swiss cantons, and this first statute of the kingdom of Italy will be constantly under the protection of our crown, and we will never permit them to be attacked."

At the conclusion of this lofty and peremptory address Napoleon received the oath of some senators whom he had named, and then returned, surrounded by the same attendance, to the palace of the Tuileries. Messrs. de Melzi, De Marescalchi, and the other Italians, were directed to proceed to Milan, to prepare the public mind for the new solemnity which had been determined upon. Cardinal Caprara, the Pope's legate to Napoleon, was Archbishop of Milan. He had accepted that dignity only in obedience, being very old and oppressed by infirmities, and after a long life passed in courts, he was far more inclined to leave the world than to prolong his part. At the request of Napoleon, and with the consent of the Pope, he set out for Italy to crown the new king according to the ancient custom of the Lombard church. M. de Segur instantly set out, with orders to hurry on the preparations. Napoleon fixed his own departure for the month of April, and his coronation for the month of May.

This excursion into Italy agreed perfectly well with his military projects, and, indeed, even considerably forwarded them. Napoleon had been all the winter waiting till his squadrons should be ready to run out of Brest, Rochefort, and Toulon. In January, 1805, it was about twenty months since the naval war with England had been proclaimed, for the rupture with England took place in May, 1803, and yet the fleet of men-of-war had been unable to set sail. The administration had not been without the strong impulse of Napoleon, but in naval matters nothing can be hurried, as all nations well know who endeavour to create a naval power. At the same time we must admit that the Brest and Toulon fleets would have been sooner ready if it had not been determined to increase their original strength. That of Brest had been increased from eighteen sail to twenty-one, and was calculated to embark seventeen thousand men and five hundred horses, with a great *matériel*, without any aid from transports borrowed from the merchant service. In the project of sailing in winter, and during bad weather, it had been necessary to give up the idea of being accompanied by vessels of small tonnage, which were equally incapable of following vessels of the line, and of being towed by them. Old men-of-war were, in consequence, taken up, cleared of their guns, and laden with men and munitions. By this means the squadron could run out altogether, and in all weathers, touch at Ireland, land its seventeen thousand men and its munitions, and then return into the Channel. For the rest, it had been ready, as desired, in November. That of Rochefort, consisting of five ships of the line, and four frigates, carrying three thousand men, four thousand muskets, and one hundred cwt. of powder, was

ready at the same period. Only that of Toulon, increased from eight to eleven sail, had required the whole month of December. General Lauriston, Napoleon's aid-de-camp, had been appointed to form a corps of six thousand picked men, with fifty cannon and a battering train, and to embark the whole in the Toulon fleet. That fleet, as we have mentioned, was to detach a division to St. Helena, to take possession of that island, then proceed to Surinam to retake the Dutch colonies, and then join the squadron of Missiessy, which, on its part, would have relieved our own West India islands, and ravaged the colonies of the English. Both, then, after having thus decoyed the English towards America, and liberated Gauteaume, were to return to Europe. Gauteaume, whose preparations were completed, had during the whole winter awaited the moment when Missiessy and Villeneuve, running out of Toulon, should draw off the English. Missiessy, who wanted energy, but did not want courage, ran out of Rochefort on the 11th of January, during a frightful storm, and steering through the narrow passes, gained the open sea without being overtaken or even seen by the English. He made sail for the West Indies with five ships of the line and four frigates.

He received some damage, which was repaired at sea. As for Villeneuve, to whom the minister Decrès had communicated a factitious and merely temporary excitement, he was instantly cooled on obtaining a close sight of the Toulon squadron. To make eleven crews out of eight, it had been necessary to divide, and, of course, to weaken them. They had been completed with conscripts drafted from the land service. The materials used in the port of Toulon were not of good quality, and it was found that the iron-work, cordage, masts, and spars, easily broke. Villeneuve was in great, perhaps too great, anxiety about the risks to be run in facing with such craft and such crews, the ships of the enemy, trained by a cruise of twenty months. His soul was shaken, even before he put to sea. However, urged by Napoleon, and by the minister Decrès, he got ready to weigh anchor towards the end of December. A head wind detained him in Toulon Roads, from the end of December to the 18th of January. On the 18th the wind having shifted, he set sail, and, by shifting his course, succeeded in evading the enemy. But in the course of the night a heavy tempest arose, and the inexperience of the crews, and the bad quality of the materials, exposed all our vessels to serious accidents. The squadron was dispersed. In the morning, Villeneuve found himself separated, with four ships of the line and one frigate. Some had carried away their topmasts, others had sprung leaks, or had received damage not easily repaired at sea. Besides these misadventures, two English frigates were watching us, and the admiral was afraid of the enemy coming up with him at the moment when he had but five sail to oppose to him. He therefore determined to put back to Toulon, although he was already seventy leagues distant from it; and notwithstanding the entreaties of General Lauriston, who reckoning four thousand and some hun-

dreds of men on board the vessels which still remained together, demanded to be taken to his destination, Villeneuve returned to Toulon on the 27th, and succeeded in assembling his whole squadron there.

The time was not thrown away. The damages that had been sustained were repaired, the masts and rigging were repaired, and every thing put in order for sailing again. But Admiral Villeneuve was much affected; on the very day of his return to Toulon, he wrote the minister: "I declare to you, that vessels thus equipped, short-handed, encumbered with troops, with superannuated or bad materials, vessels which lose their masts or sails at every puff of wind, and which, in fine weather, are constantly engaged in repairing the damages caused by the wind, or the inexperience of their sailors, are not fit to undertake any thing. I had a presentiment of this before I sailed; I have now only too painfully experienced it."

Napoleon was sensibly displeased on hearing of this useless sortie. "What," said he, "is to be done with admirals who allow their spirits to sink, and determine to hasten home at the first damage that they receive! It would be requisite to give up sailing, and to remain wholly inactive even in the finest weather, if an expedition is to be prevented by the separation of a few vessels. The whole of the captains," he added, "ought to have had sealed orders to meet off the Canary Islands. The damages should have been repaired *en route*. If any vessel leaked dangerously she should have been left at Cadiz, her crew and the troops being transferred to the *Eagle*, which was in that port and ready for sailing. A few topmasts carried away, some casualties in a gale of wind, were every-day occurrences. Two days of fine weather ought to have cheered up the crews and put every thing to rights. But the great evil of our navy is, that the men who command it are unused to all the risks of command."

Unfortunately, the right moment for the expedition to Surinam had gone by, and it was necessary that Napoleon, with his usual fertility of invention, should devise a new plan. The first, which had consisted in Admiral Latouche proceeding from Toulon into the Channel, had fallen to the ground, owing to the death of that valuable officer. The second, which had consisted in decoying the English into the American seas, by sending Villeneuve's squadron to Surinam, and Missiessy's to the Antilles, and in taking advantage of this diversion to bring Gauteaume's squadron into the Channel, had equally failed from delays in organization, foul winds, and an unsuccessful sortie. It was necessary, therefore, to resort to another plan. A new loss, that of Admiral Bruix, different from Admiral Latouche, but at least his equal in merit, added to the difficulty of naval operations. The unfortunate Bruix, so remarkable for his firmness, experience, and strength of mind, had died through his zeal and devotion to the organization of the

* Despatch of the 1st Pluviose, year XIII.—21st of January, 1805,—dated on board the ship *Bucanar*, in Toulon road.

* Letter to Lauriston, of the 1st of February, 1805.

flotilla. Had he lived, Napoleon would certainly have placed him at the head of the squadron charged with the grand manœuvre that he meditated. One would have said that Fate, conjured up in hostility to the French navy, had purposely deprived it in the course of ten months of its two most eminent admirals, either of them, undoubtedly, capable of opposing the English admirals. It was, in consequence, necessary to be content with Admirals Gauteaume, Villeneuve, and Misssiessy, until the events of war should develop new officers of merit.

A grave event had recently taken place as to the sea, where it greatly altered the situation of the belligerent powers. England, in an unlooked-for and very unjust manner, had declared war against Spain. For some time she had perceived that the neutrality of Spain, without being friendly in intention towards France, was, nevertheless, useful to her in more than one respect. Our squadron, lying at Ferrol, had refitted there while waiting for the blockade to be removed. The *Eagle* did the same at Cadiz. Our privateers entered the ports of the Peninsula for the purpose of selling their prizes. As matter of reciprocity, England had a right to the same advantages; but she preferred to forego them rather than suffer France to enjoy them. Accordingly, she announced to the court of Madrid, that she considered as a breach of neutrality what was taking place in the ports of the Peninsula, and threatened war if our vessels continued to repair or fit out there, and if our privateers continued to find an asylum and a market there. She had still further required Charles IV. to guaranty Portugal against all attempts on the part of Napoleon. This last was an exorbitant exaction, going beyond the limit of the neutrality that was required from Spain. At the same time, France had permitted the court of Madrid to show itself accommodating towards England, and even to grant a part of her demands, in order to prolong a state of things which answered our purpose. In fact, the military co-operation of Spain was not worth so much to us as a subsidy of forty-eight million francs per annum, and that subsidy could only be paid by means of the neutrality, which alone permitted the arrival of specie from the New World. We were, consequently, ready to consent to every thing; but England, becoming more exacting in proportion as her demands were complied with, had required that all repairs and outfitting should cease in the ports of Spain; by which she meant that our ships were immediately to be sent out of Ferrol, in other words, to be given up. Openly violating the law of nations, she, without any previous notice, ordered the capture of all Spanish vessels that might be met with at sea. Considering that such an order had no other object than the capture of vessels coming from America laden with gold, we may justly term it a measure of downright piracy. At this time four Spanish frigates, laden with twelve million dollars, (2,400,000*l.*) on their passage from Mexico to Spain, were captured by an English squadron. The Spanish commander, having refused to give up his vessels, was

barbarously attacked by an immensely superior force, and made prisoner, after a gallant defence. One of the frigates was blown up, the other three were taken to ports of Great Britain.

This odious measure excited the indignation of Spain and the reprobation of all Europe. Charles IV. unhesitatingly declared war against England. He at the same time ordered the arrest of the English who were found on the territory of the Peninsula, and the sequestration of all their property, to answer for the property and persons of Spanish merchants.

Thus, in spite of her inaction, and in spite of the skilful forbearance of France, Spain was dragged into war by the maritime violences of England. Napoleon, having no longer any ground for requiring the subsidy of 48,000,000 francs, hastened to settle the manner in which Spain should co-operate in the war, and especially endeavoured to inspire her with resolutions worthy of herself and of her ancient greatness.

The Spanish cabinet, with the desire of gratifying Napoleon, and from a sense of justice towards merit, had chosen Admiral Gravina as its ambassador to France. He was at the head of the Spanish navy, and beneath a simple exterior concealed a rare intelligence and great courage. Napoleon was much attached to Admiral Gravina, who was equally attached to Napoleon. For the same reasons that had caused him to be named ambassador, he had the principal command of the Spanish navy given to him, and previous to quitting Paris, he was instructed to concert with the French government on the plan of naval operations. To this end, the admiral, on the 4th of January, 1806, signed a convention which detailed the part which each of the two powers should take in the war. France engaged constantly to keep at sea forty-seven ships of the line, twenty-nine frigates, fourteen corvettes, and twenty-five brigs; and to hasten as much as possible the finishing of the sixteen ships and fourteen frigates which were on the stocks; to concentrate all the troops which were encamped near the ports of embarkation, in the proportion of five hundred men to each ship, and two hundred to each frigate; to keep the French flotilla constantly ready to transport ninety thousand men, exclusive of the thirty thousand intended to be embarked in the Dutch flotilla. Reckoning the flotilla as equal to so many ships and frigates, and adding our ships of war, we may be said to have had an effective total of sixty ships and forty frigates, at that time at sea.

Spain, on her part, promised instantly to fit out thirty-two ships of the line, furnished with provisions for six months, and with water for four months. The division of them was thus fixed: fifteen to Cadiz, eight to Carthage, and nine to Ferrol. Spanish troops were to be assembled at the points of embarkation, at the rate of four hundred and fifty men to each ship, and two hundred men to each frigate. Further, she was to be prepared with vessels *en suite*, (i. e. converted into transports by having their guns taken out,) in the proportion of four thousand tons at Cadiz, two thousand at

Carthagena, and two thousand at Ferrol. It was agreed that Admiral Gravina should have the chief command of the Spanish fleet, and should correspond directly with the French minister Decrès. In other words, he was to receive instructions from Napoleon himself, and Spanish honour needed not to blush for accepting such a direction. Some political conditions accompanied these military stipulations. The subsidy naturally ceased on the day on which England commenced hostilities against Spain. Further, the two nations agreed not to make peace separately. France promised to cause the colony of Trinidad to be restored to Spain, and Gibraltar also, should the war be attended with some signal success.

The engagement entered into by the court of Madrid was far above its means. Instead of thirty-two ships, it was much if she fitted out twenty-four, and but of middling quality, though with gallant crews. If, then, the whole forces of France, Spain, and Holland, be summed up, we may consider the three nations to have possessed ninety-two ships of the line; of which sixty belonged to France, twenty-four to Spain, and eight to Holland. But the flotilla must be reckoned for fifteen, which reduced the actual naval force of the three nations to seventy-seven sail of the line. The English had eighty-nine, perfectly armed, well found, manned with experienced crews, and in every respect superior to those of the two allies, and this number was about to be increased to a hundred. The advantage, therefore, was on their side; they could only be beaten by superior combinations, which are far from being as efficacious by sea as they are by land.

Unfortunately, Spain, formerly so powerful in her navy, and still so much interested in being so, on account of her vast colonies—Spain, as we have already often remarked, was in a state of absolute destitution. Her arsenals were abandoned, and contained no wood, hemp, copper, or iron. The magnificent establishments of Ferrol, Cadiz, and Carthagena, were empty and deserted. They had neither stores nor workmen. The seamen, few in number in Spain, since her commerce was almost reduced to the conveyance of specie, were just now still further diminished in number by the yellow fever, which had ravaged all the sea-board, and had driven them abroad or into the interior. When to this we add a great scarcity of grain, and extreme financial distress, increased by the loss of the galleons that had recently been captured, we shall still have but an inadequate idea of all the miseries which afflicted that power, once so great, but at that period so sadly reduced.

Napoleon, who had so often and so vainly counselled Spain, during the late peace, to devote at least a portion of her resources to the re-organization of a navy—Napoleon, although with but little hope of being attended to, resolved to make another effort with that court. This time, instead of employing threats, as in

1803, he employed encouragements and caresses. He had recalled Marshal Lannes from Portugal, to place him at the head of the grenadiers, who were to be the first of our troops to land in England. He had appointed General Junot to replace Lannes in Portugal. He was partial to Junot, who had natural talent and a boundless devotion, though somewhat too ardent a temperament. He ordered him to stop at Madrid, to see the Prince of Peace, the queen, and the king. Junot was to pique the honour of the Prince of Peace, to make him feel that the fate of the Spanish monarchy was in his hands, and that he had to choose between the part of a contemptible and detested favourite, and that of a minister making use of the favour of his sovereigns to restore power to his country. Junot was authorized to promise him the full friendship of Napoleon, and even a principality in Portugal, if he would zealously serve the common cause, and endeavour to infuse an adequate activity into the Spanish administration. Napoleon's envoy was then to see the queen, to declare to her that her influence over the government—that is to say, over the king and the Prince of Peace—was well known in Europe; that her personal honour, as well as the honour of the kingdom, was interested in great and successful exertions being made; that if the power of Spain was not put forth on this occasion, she, the all-powerful queen, would, in the eyes of the world and of her children, be responsible for the disorders which would have weakened and ruined the monarchy. Junot was to try all possible means to inspire this princess with better principles. As regarded the king, no such efforts were necessary, for his sentiments were excellent; but the weak king had neither attention nor energy. He was brutalized by the chase, and by mechanical labours.

Junot had orders to make some stay at Madrid, previously to proceeding to Portugal, and to play the part of ambassador extraordinary, in order to reanimate in some degree that degenerate court.

The great matter now was to make the best possible use of the naval resources of the three nations, France, Holland, and Spain. The project of suddenly bringing a more or less considerable portion of his navy into the Channel, a project which had twice been modified, had incessantly occupied the attention of Napoleon. But a grand and sudden idea now for a moment turned him aside from it.

Napoleon had frequently received reports from General Decaen, commandant of our factories in India, who had retired to the Isle of France since the renewal of war, and, in conjunction with Admiral Linois, had done great damage to the English commerce. General Decaen had an ardent spirit, well qualified to command at a distance, and in an independent and perilous position, had formed connections with the Mahrattas, who were still insubordinate. He had procured some curious infor-

* DECAEN. Born at Creully near Caen. His parents kept an inn. He was employed in the armies of the Rhine and Moselle. Distinguished himself under Moreau, gained a series of advantages, and was mentioned with distinction at the battle of Ettlingen. In

February, 1796, he was cashiered, but restored in the following April. In 1800 he was made general of division, and in 1802 captain-general of the French settlements in India, and grand officer of the legion of honour. *Biographie Moderne.*

mation as to the dispositions of the recently vanquished princes, and had arrived at the conviction that six thousand French, disembarked with a sufficient war *material*, and speedily joined by a multitude of insurgents eager to throw off the yoke, could shake the British Empire in India. It will be remembered that it was Napoleon who, in 1803, had suggested this to General Decaen, who had ardently seized the idea. But it was no mere mad enterprise that Napoleon contemplated; if any thing was to be attempted, it was a grand expedition worthy to rival that of Egypt, and adequate to wresting from the English that important conquest which forms at once their glory and their grandeur in the present century. The distance alone would render that expedition far more difficult than that of Egypt. To transport, in a time of war, thirty thousand men from Toulon to Alexandria, was a difficult operation; but to convey them from Toulon to the shores of India, doubling the Cape of Good Hope, was a gigantic enterprise. Napoleon was of opinion, founded on his own experience, that, the immensity of the ocean rendering meetings there very unfrequent, only invention was required to venture upon and succeed in the boldest movements without falling in with an enemy, though very superior in number. It was thus that in 1798 he had passed through the English fleets with some hundreds of vessels and an entire army, taken Malta, and reached Alexandria, without being met by Nelson. It was thus that he hoped to get a fleet into the Channel. The success of such enterprises required profound secrecy and great art to deceive the British admiralty. He had elaborately prepared every thing for perplexing the English nation. Having troops assembled and ready for embarkation wherever he had squadrons, at Toulon, at Cadiz, at Ferrol, at Rochefort, at Brest, and at the Texel, he at all times had it in his power to send out an army without the English being aware of either its strength or its destination. The project of the descent had this use, that the attention of the enemy being constantly directed towards that object, they would anticipate an expedition against Ireland or the coasts of England. The moment, then, was favourable for attempting one of those extraordinary expeditions, which Napoleon was so prompt in planning and deciding upon. He considered, for instance, that to wrest India from the English was a result sufficiently grand to warrant him in deferring all his other projects, even including that of the descent, and upon that expedition he was inclined to employ all his naval resources. The following were his calculations upon this subject. In the outfitting ports he had, besides the squadrons ready to sail, a reserve of old vessels not very fit for active service. He had also among his crews, besides able and experienced seamen, very young novices, and conscripts newly put on board ship. It was upon this double consideration that he based his plan.

He determined to combine with a certain number of new vessels, all those which were past service, but which were still fit to make a voyage. He resolved to arm them *en flûte*, that is, to remove their guns, to put on board, in-

stead of them, a great mass of troops, complete the crews with all sorts of men from our ports, and thus to send out from Toulon, Cadiz, Ferrol, Rochefort, and Brest, fleets which, without being accompanied by a single transport ship, could land a considerable army in India. He proposed to send thirteen ships from Toulon, and twenty-one from Brest, in all thirty-four, one-half of them at least old vessels, and to add to them a score of frigates, one half of them almost past service. These two fleets, running out to sea almost at the same time, and being appointed to join company at the Isle of France, would be capable of carrying soldiers and sailors to the number of 40,000. On reaching India, the vessels in bad condition were to be broken up, and only those preserved which were fit for sailing, which would be fifteen ships out of thirty-four, and ten frigates out of twenty. There were also two divisions to be made in the crews. All the good sailors were intended to man the vessels that were to be preserved, while the inferior sailors, capable, however, of being converted into soldiers, were to complete the army of disembarkation. Napoleon judged that it would require about 14,000 or 15,000 seamen efficiently to man the fifteen ships and ten frigates which were to return to Europe. We should then have in India from 25,000 to 26,000 troops, out of the 40,000 seamen and soldiers sent from Europe, and we should have back a fleet of fifteen sail, excellent alike for the quality of the vessels, the choice of the men, and the experience acquired in a long voyage. In reference to the navy, the only loss would be worthless hulks and the rag ends of crews, and we should leave in India an army sufficient to conquer the English, especially if it were commanded by so enterprising a man as General Decaen. Napoleon still further prepared to send out 3000 French in the Dutch fleet of the Texel; 3000 in a new fleet, organized at Rochefort; and 4000 Spaniards in the Spanish fleet of Cadiz; which would form a new reinforcement of 9000 men, and raise the army of General Decaen to 35,000 or 36,000 men. It is extremely probable that, India being scarcely subjected, such a force would have overthrown the British power there. As regarded the voyage, nothing was less likely than meeting the English. It would have been difficult to escape from them if the war squadron had to be accompanied by some hundreds of transport ships. But the old ships and old frigates, armed *en flûte*, rendered that unnecessary. The principle, then, on which the project rested, was to sacrifice the inferior or bad portion of the navy, alike as to men and vessels, and resolve to bring back only the portion which was excellent. At this cost the miracle would be performed of transporting to India an army of 36,000 men. Indeed, the sacrifice was not as great as it appeared to be, for every sailor knows that at sea, as on land, and even more at sea than on land, the quality of forces is every thing, and that more can be done with ten good vessels than with twenty inferior ones.

This project implied the momentary postponing of the descent; but it was possible that it would favour it in an extraordinary

manner, for, after some time, when the English should learn the departure of our fleets they would follow them, and thus leave the seas of Europe open, while the squadron, returning from India with fifteen ships and ten frigates, could pass into the Straits of Dover, where Napoleon, in constant readiness, would be prepared to avail himself of even the shortest gleam of good fortune. It is true that this latter part of the plan supposed a double success; success in going to India and success in returning; and Fortune rarely heaps her favours to this extent upon any man, however great. During four weeks Napoleon remained in suspense between the idea of sending this expedition to India, and the idea of crossing the Straits of Dover. The overthrow of the English power in India appeared to him to be so important a result as to dispense with the necessity for risking himself and his army in so perilous an attempt as the descent. For a whole month, then, he hesitated between these two plans, and his letters bear testimony to the fluctuations of his mind between those two extraordinary enterprises.

However, the Boulogne expedition gained the preference. Napoleon considered that stroke the prompter of the two, the more decisive, and even the more infallible, if a French fleet should suddenly appear in the Channel. He set his mind to work again, and he hit upon a new arrangement, grander, more profound, and more promising than the two former ones, for assembling without the knowledge of the English all his naval forces between Dover and Boulogne.

His plan was resolved upon early in March, and the orders accordingly given. In this plan, as in that of Surinam, the English were to be decoyed towards India and the West Indies, whither the squadron of Admiral Missiessy, which had sailed on the 11th of January, already called their attention, and the French were then suddenly to return to the seas of Europe, with an assemblage of force superior to any squadron the English could muster. It was in some degree the same project as that of the previous December, but increased and completed by the junction of the forces of Spain. Admiral Villeneuve was to sail with the first favourable wind, pass the Strait, call at Cadiz for Admiral Gravina, with six or seven Spanish ships, besides the *Eagle*, then proceed to Martinique, and, if Missiessy were still there, join him, and wait for a further junction more considerable than all the others. This junction was that of Gautaume. He, profiting by the first equinoctial gale which should disperse the English, was to sail from Brest with twenty-one ships, the best of this arsenal, steer for Ferrol, be joined by the French division in port there, and the Spanish division which would be ready to sail, and then steer for Martinique, where Villeneuve would be awaiting him. After this general assemblage, which presented but few real difficulties, there would be at Martinique twelve sail under Villeneuve, six or seven under Gravina, five under Missiessy, and twenty-one under Gautaume, besides the Franco-Spanish squadron of Ferrol, that is to say, about fifty to

sixty vessels—an enormous force, the concentration of which had never been witnessed at any time or on any sea. The plan was now so complete, so well-calculated, that it necessarily produced in the mind of Napoleon a rapture of hope. Even the minister Decrès confessed that it presented the greatest chances of success. It was always possible to run out of Toulon with the (*Mistral*) north-west wind, as the late sortie of Villeneuve showed. The junction with Gravina at Cadiz, should Nelson be outwitted, was easy, for the English had not yet thought it necessary to blockade that port. The Toulon squadron, thus increased to seventeen or eighteen sail, was almost certain to reach Martinique. Missiessy had touched there without meeting any thing during his voyage, except some merchantmen, which he captured. The most difficult point was to get out of Brest road. But in March there was every reason to expect some equinoctial gale. Gautaume, on arriving before Ferrol, which was only blockaded by five or six English vessels, would, on presenting himself with twenty-one, put all idea of fighting out of their minds, and, without striking a blow, succeed in adding to his force the French division commanded by Admiral Gourdon, and those Spanish vessels which were ready, and then proceed to Martinique. It could not be suspected by the English that there was any design of assembling, at a single point like Martinique, from fifty to sixty vessels at once. It was probable that their ideas would turn towards India. At all events, Gautaume, Gourdon, Villeneuve, Gravina, and Missiessy, having once effected a junction, no English squadron that they might meet, and numbering at most only from twelve to fifteen sail, would venture to oppose fifty, and the return into the Channel was consequently secured. All our forces, then, were to be assembled together between the shores of England and France, at the moment when the fleets of England would be sailing towards the East or the West Indies. Events speedily proved that this grand plan was practicable even with an inferior execution.

Every precaution was taken to preserve the most profound secrecy. The plan was not confided to the Spaniards, who had engaged to follow with docility the directions of Napoleon. Villeneuve and Gautaume alone of the admirals were to be intrusted with the secret, and they were not to have it on sailing, but when fairly at sea, and without opportunity of communicating with land. Then their sealed orders, which they were only to open upon reaching a certain latitude, would instruct them what course to steer. None of the captains of these vessels were let into the secret of the expedition, but they had certain fixed points at which to rejoin each other in case of separation. None of the ministers were acquainted with the plan excepting Admiral Decrès. He was expressly instructed to correspond directly with Napoleon, and to write his despatches with his own hand. The report of an expedition to India was circulated in all the ports. It was pretended that great numbers of troops were embarked; in reality, the Toulon squadron was charged to take

scarcely three thousand men, and the Brest squadron six or seven thousand. The admirals were instructed to land half that force in the West Indies, to reinforce the garrisons there, and to bring back four or five thousand of the best soldiers, to add to the force of Boulogne.

By arranging matters thus, the fleets would not be greatly encumbered, but free and comfortable. They were all victualled for six months, so that they might remain at sea a long time without putting into port. Couriers were despatched to Ferrol and Cadiz, bearing orders to have every thing prepared for weighing, because, at any moment, the blockade might be raised by an allied fleet, without saying which or how.

To all these precautions for outwitting the English, one more was added, which was not less calculated to deceive them—the journey of Napoleon into Italy. He computed that his fleets, sailing towards the end of March, and employing the month of April to go to Martinique, the month of May to assemble together, and the month of June to return, would get into the Channel in the beginning of July. He was to remain all that time in Italy, reviewing troops, and giving fêtes, hiding his profound designs beneath the appearance of a vain and sumptuous life; then, at the appointed moment, to set off secretly by post, travel in five days from Milan to Boulogne, and while he was supposed to be still in Italy, strike his long meditated blow upon England; that blow which she had so much expected for two years, that she now began to disbelieve it. Europe now considered it a mere feint, intended to convulse the British nation, and oblige it to exhaust itself in useless efforts. While this idea was adopted, Napoleon, on the contrary, had incessantly been increasing his army of invasion by drafting from the dépôts the number of men necessary to increase the effective force of the war battalions, and by filling up, from the conscription of the year, the void thus caused in the dépôts. The army of Boulogne was thus augmented by nearly thirty thousand men, without any one knowing it. He had always kept this army in such a state of activity and readiness, that it was scarcely possible to judge of its greater or less effective force. The opinion of a mere demonstration intended to harass England, daily became the prevalent opinion.

Every thing being thus arranged, with the firmest resolution to attempt the enterprise, and with a deep conviction of success, Napoleon prepared to set out for Italy. The Pope had remained during the whole winter at Paris. He at first intended to set out in the middle of February on his return to his own states. Heavy snow-storms in the Alps delayed his departure. Napoleon so winningly urged his further stay, that the holy father yielded, and consented to defer his departure to the middle of March. Napoleon was not ill pleased that Europe should note this long

visit, that his intimacy with the Pope should become greater every day, and that his holiness should remain on this side of the Alps while preparations were making at Milan for a second coronation. The courts of Naples, Rome, and even Etruria, did not without regret perceive the creation of a vast French kingdom in Italy, and if the Pope had been at the Vatican, besieged by all sorts of suggestions, perhaps he would have been induced to show himself unfavourable to it.

Pius VII., after having learned to put full confidence in Napoleon, had ended by intrusting him with his secret desires. He was delighted with the honours paid to his person—honours which benefited religion—with the good which his presence appeared to do, and also with what the new emperor had done in France to aid the restoration of public worship. But though a saintlike man, Pius VII. still was a man, and a prince; and the triumph of spiritual interests, while it filled him with satisfaction, did not cause him to forget the temporal interests of the Holy See, damaged since the loss of the Legations. Six cardinals had accompanied him, one of whom, Cardinal Borgia, had died at Lyons. The others, especially Antonelli and Di Pietro, were of the ultra-montane party, and strongly opposed to Cardinal Caprara, who was too prudent and enlightened to suit them. They, consequently, had induced the Pope to conceal his proceedings from that cardinal, who, in his quality of legate, ought to have been informed of all negotiations attempted in Paris. He certainly would not have taught them the way to succeed in their projects, for what could be done for the Church, Napoleon did spontaneously, and without being urged. But that personage, full of prudence and experience, would have dissuaded them from useless efforts, which are always to be regretted, as they most frequently became the cause of quarrel.

They began to dogmatize with Napoleon upon the four propositions of Bousset, which Louis XIV., towards the close of his reign, was said to have promised to annul. Napoleon, gentle in manner, but inflexible as to the essential, made it manifest that nothing was to be expected from him as to the revocation of the famous Organic Articles. There remained the manner of executing them. He appeared inclined to attend to the observations which they might offer to him upon this subject. At first they spoke to him of the jurisdiction of bishops over the ecclesiastics, of which much had been said to him, and which Pius VII. did not deem to be sufficiently complete. To this, Napoleon, concerting his replies with M. Portalis, replied that every spiritual offence was, and would continue to be, left to the ecclesiastical jurisdiction, but that every civil offence against the civil law would continue to be referred to the ordinary tribunals, for the priests were citizens, and therefore must be held accountable to the common laws. It was pretended that

* BORGIA, STEFANO, Cardinal, superintendent of the propaganda, one of the noblest protectors of science of the 18th century. Born at Velletri, in 1731. Died at Lyons, in 1804. The dictatorship of Rome was intrusted

to him with two other cardinals, by Pius VI., when the French attacked the city. His "Historical Notices of Beneventum from the 8th to the 18th Century," show his ability as an historian and antiquary.—*Encyc. Amer.* s

88,000,000 francs per annum (1,520,000*l.*) were required for the support of religion, while there were but 13,000,000 francs (520,000*l.*) devoted to it in the budget of the state, which left a deficiency of 25,000,000 francs (1,000,000*l.* sterling.) Napoleon replied by enumerating what he had done in that respect, and that which he still intended to do, in proportion to the gradual increase of the revenues of the state. Mention was made to him of various other objects, foreign to the Organic Articles, and their execution, especially of divorce, which was permitted by our new laws. Napoleon, still consulting M. Portalis, replied, that divorce had appeared to the legislator to be indispensable as a remedy to certain disorders of morals, but that the priests remained free to refuse the religious benediction to divorced persons who wished to contract a new marriage; that the conscience of the priests, therefore, was not outraged; and that, moreover, that was not a matter opposed to the dogma, inasmuch as divorce had existed in the ancient Church. From this subject they turned to that of Sundays and holidays, which, notwithstanding the re-establishment of the Gregorian calendar, were not generally enough observed by the people. Napoleon replied that already, towards the close of the last century, manners, more potent than laws, had brought about a relaxation; and that, before the Revolution, workmen in the towns used to work on Sundays; that penalties applied in this case would be less serviceable than example; that the government would always set good ones; and that workmen paid by the state should never work on holidays; that the Sunday was faithfully observed by the country people, and only neglected by the population of the towns; and that in the towns, to compel the people in the towns to be idle, would, besides the inconvenience of having recourse to the penal law, be giving to drunkenness and vice the time taken away from labour; and, finally, that every thing had been tried that was permitted by a religious, but also a prudent policy.

Another subject was touched upon; that of education—and they demanded for the clergy the power of superintending the schools. Napoleon replied, that in the Lyceums there would be almoners chosen from among priests conforming in doctrine with the Church; that they would virtually be ecclesiastical inspectors of houses of education, and could point out to their bishops those in which the religious teaching was defective, but that there would be over the educational establishments no other authority than that of the state. Some mention was also made of the bishops dissentient with the Holy See, and it was agreed to reduce them to that peace, voluntary or forced, in which Napoleon was resolved that the whole clergy should live. This series of questions of spiritual interests was terminated by the discussion of a plan which had unceasingly occupied the court of Rome—that of obtaining that the Catholic religion should be the established religion of the State. On this subject Napoleon was inflexible. He maintained that that religion was dominant,

in fact, since it was the religion of the majority of the French people, and since the important actions of the government, such, for instance, as the taking of the crown, had been surrounded by Catholic ceremonies. But a declaration of that kind was calculated to alarm all the dissenting faiths; now his intention was to ensure perfect repose to them all, and he would not allow that the re-establishment of the Catholic faith, a re-establishment which he had willed, and frankly willed, should be any diminution of the security of any other religion.

On all these points Napoleon was extremely mild in form, unalterably firm as to substance. At length they passed to the essential point, that which touched Rome more nearly than all the points of ecclesiastical discipline—the business of the Legations. A memorial was drawn up, which Pius VII. himself delivered to Napoleon, and which related to the losses which the Holy See had sustained during a century past, alike in revenues and in territories. In this memorial various revenues were enumerated, which the Holy See formerly collected in all Catholic states, and which, under the influence of the public spirit in France, had been diminished or wholly suppressed in France, in Austria, and even in Spain.

The memorial recalled the manner in which the Holy See had been kept out of its reversion of the duchy of Parma, on the extinction of the Farnese house, the still older privation of the county Venaissin, which had been ceded to France; and the gravest of all the losses, that of the Legations, incorporated in the Italian Republic. Thus reduced, the Holy See could no longer, it was urged, make head against the inevitable expenses of the Catholic worship in all parts of the world. It could neither put the cardinals in a position to support their dignity, nor support foreign missions, nor provide for the defence of its weak states. They reckoned upon the modern Charlemagne vicing in munificence with the ancient one. Here Napoleon did not fail to feel some embarrassment at so direct a demand. He had made no promise to attract the Pope to Paris; but all along he had, in a general way, left room to hope that he would ameliorate the worldly circumstances of the Holy See. To restore the Legations to the pontifical court was a thing impossible, without odiously betraying that Italian Republic of which he was the founder, and was about to become the monarch. That would have been to destroy all the hopes of the Italian patriots, who looked upon that new state as the commencement of the independent existence of their country. But he had at his disposal the duchy of Parma, which he would not grant either to the house of Sardinia as an indemnity for Piedmont, nor to Spain as an aggrandisement of the kingdom of Etruria, and which at this time he reserved as a family endowment. It would no doubt have been prudent to employ it as an indemnity to the house of Sardinia, or even to add it to Etruria, while obliging the latter to indemnify the house of Sardinia with the Siennese. At the same stroke peace would have been purchased with Russia, and great pleasure given to Spain

But if it were not thought worth while to keep on good terms with Russia, who had withdrawn her *chargé d'affaires*, or to gratify Spain, whose inertness was scarcely to be roused into energy by friendly actions, it would have been a destination worthy of the lofty designs of Napoleon, to give the duchy of Parma to the Pope. In ceding it to the Holy See, Napoleon would have put an end to many rumours as to his designs in Italy; he would have destroyed the chief argument used to induce Austria to join in a new coalition, and, what was no less important, he would for ever have bound the Pope to him, and prevented that painful rupture with the Holy See, which at a later period did him so much moral injury, and which, in reality, had no other origin than the ill-disguised discontent of the court of Rome on this occasion. All this would have been better than reserving Parma, as Napoleon then resolved to reserve it, as a family endowment. His having, in 1804, allowed the alliance of Prussia to escape him, and sent home the Pope in 1805, covered with honours, but wounded in his interests, formed, in our opinion, the first essential errors of that powerful policy, whose mistake it was to account only with itself, and never with others.

Napoleon took advantage of these applications being confined solely to the Legations, to make the simple and easy reply which sprang out of the very state of the case. He could not betray a state which had chosen him for its head—a legitimate and decisive reason as to the Legations; and he announced his intention of, at a future time, ameliorating the situation of the Holy See. He charged Cardinal Fesch to enter into an explanation with the Pope. He would at that time render him pecuniary aid, and he held out the prospect of new distributions of territory at no distant day, by means of which the Pope could be indemnified. For the rest he was sincere, for he despaired these distributions in a not distant future. He saw, in fact, an early rekindling of war upon the Continent,—Italy wholly conquered, Venice wrested from Austria, and Naples from the Bourbons, and he deemed that in all this he could easily find wherewithal to satisfy the Pope.

But the deferring of these good intentions allowed a present displeasure to arise, which speedily became the source of mischievous consequences.

Napoleon and the Pope separated without being so much displeased with each other as the demands made and refused might have given reason to fear. The Pope, in lieu of the dangers which blunderers had predicted on his leaving Rome, had experienced a magnificent reception at Paris, had augmented the religious impulse by his presence; in short, had occupied in France a position worthy of the palmiest days of the Church. On the whole, if his interested councillors were discontented, he departed satisfied. He left Paris on the 4th of April, 1805, in the midst of a greater crowd of people than had welcomed his arrival. He was to stay some days at Lyons to celebrate Easter.

Napoleon had prepared every thing for his
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journey at the same period. After having given his final orders to the fleet and the army, and reiterated his urgent directions to the court of Spain, to have every thing ready at Ferrol and at Cadiz, and after giving the arch-chancellor Cambacérès, not the ostensible, but the actual direction of the Empire, he, on the 1st of April, proceeded to Fontainebleau, where he was to remain for two or three days. He departed, delighted with his projects, and full of confidence in their success. He had a first pledge of that success in the fortunate departure of Admiral Villeneuve. He had at length set sail on the 30th of March, with a favourable wind, and he had been lost sight of from the heights of Toulon, without any fear existing of his having met the English. One thwarting circumstance alone prevented the satisfaction from being complete. On the 1st of April the equinox was not yet felt at Brest, and the existing calm and clear weather was not that which was needed for dispersing the English, or concealing from them the movements of a squadron, so that the departure of Gautaumes had been rendered impossible. Had he once been clear of Brest, the success of the assemblages would have been almost made certain; and it was to suppose a phenomenon in the seasons, to entertain a doubt that the equinox would not bring on a gale in the course of April. Napoleon departed from Fontainebleau on the 3d of April, proceeding by Troyes, Châlons, and Lyons, and preceding the Pope by the rapidity with which he travelled, so that the two trains should not interfere. While he journeyed towards Italy, busied with his grand ideas, and occasionally allowing his attention to be diverted by the homages of the people, Europe, variously excited, was in travail with a third coalition. England, alarmed for her existence, Russia wounded in her pride, Austria deeply annoyed at what was in progress in Italy, and Prussia, constantly hesitating between opposing fears, formed, or suffered to be formed, a new European league, which, far from being more successful than the former ones, was to procure Napoleon a colossal empire, which, unhappily, was too disproportioned to be permanent.

The Russian cabinet, regretting the errors which the ardour of the young sovereign had caused him to commit, would have been glad to have discovered in the replies of France a pretext for retracing its inconsiderate course. The pride of Napoleon, which withheld even a specious explanation of the occupation of Naples, of the refusal to indemnify the house of Savoy, or of the invasion of Hanover, considering them as matters which might be explained to a friendly court, but not to a hostile court—this pride had disconcerted the cabinet of St. Petersburg, and compelled it, in spite of itself, to recall M. D'Oubril. The Emperor Alexander, who had not firmness enough to bear the consequences of a first movement, was disconcerted, and almost intimidated. Messrs. de Stroganoff, De Nowositzoff, and Czartoryski, more firm, but perhaps less penetrating, had surrounded him, and made him feel the necessity of upholding the dignity of his crown in the eyes of Europe. The Russian cabinet had re

verted to the not very practicable, but seductive ideas of a supreme arbitration, exercised in the name of justice and right. Two powers, France and England, disturbed Europe, and oppressed it, for the interests of their rivalry. It was necessary to head the ill-treated nations, and propose to them a common plan of pacification, in which their rights should be guaranteed, and the points of dispute between France and England set at rest. It was necessary to rally Europe to this plan, propose it in the name of Europe to England and France, then side with that one of the two powers which adopted it, against the one which refused it, and to overwhelm this latter with the force and just right of the whole world. Men not quite so young, nor so crammed with theory, would have seen in all this just simply a coalition with England and part of Europe against France. This plan, in fact, which was conceived in a spirit entirely favourable to England, which managed Russia, and unfavourable to France, which did not, was sure to be tolerably acceptable to Mr. Pitt, and unacceptable to Napoleon, and productive, sooner or later, of a war against the latter. It brought about a third coalition. The proposals presented to the Emperor Alexander were mingled with so many specious and brilliant ideas, and with some so generous and so just, that the young czar, alarmed at first at what was proposed to him, was at length struck and seduced to the extent of immediately putting his hand to the work.

Previous to giving an account of the negotiations which followed, we must describe this plan of European arbitration, and point out its author. It will be seen, from the gravity of the consequences, that they merit to be known.

One of these adventurers, sometimes endowed with rare and eminent abilities, who carry into the north the intellect and learning of the south, had proceeded to Poland to find a field for his talents. He was an abbé, named Piatoli, and had in the first instance been attached to the court of the last king of Poland. After the various partitions he had passed into Courland, and from Courland into Russia. He was one of those active spirits, who, unable to rise to the government of states, placed too far above them, conceive plans, which, though commonly chimerical, are not always contemptible. The man of whom we speak had meditated much upon the affairs of Europe, and chance having brought him into connection with the young friends of Alexander, he seized the opportunity of exercising a great though secret influence, and of causing a part of his conceptions to prevail in the resolutions of the powers. Those subaltern thinkers rarely have such an honour. The abbé Piatoli had the melancholy advantage of furnishing, in 1805, some of the principal ideas, which ended by being admitted into the treaties of 1815. On this account he is worthy of notice, and the ideas which we attribute to him are not mere suppositions, for they are contained in secret memorials sent at that time to the Emperor Alexander.¹ This foreigner, discovering in

Prince Czartoryski a more earnest and thoughtful spirit than animated the other young men who governed Russia, associated himself more closely with him, and their ideas became identical to such an extent, that the plan proposed to the Emperor belonged almost as much to one as to the other. The following was this plan.

The ambition of the northern powers, and the conquests of the French Revolution, has for thirty years disturbed the balance of Europe, and oppressed all the second-rate nations. It was necessary to remedy this by a new organization, and by the establishment of a new law of nations, placed under the protection of a grand European confederation. To this end, it was necessary that there should be one perfectly disinterested power, which would cause that disinterestedness to be shared by all the others—and which would labour for the accomplishment of the proposed object.

One power alone bore all the marks of that noble mission, and that power was Russia. Her true ambition, if she rightly understood her part, would be to acquire, not territory, as England, Austria, or Prussia would, but moral influence. For a great state influence is every thing. After a long influence come territorial acquisitions. This Italian was right. By appearing to protect, against what is called the Revolution, the European princes, great or small, to whom it was a bugbear, Russia has gained Poland. It is not impossible that she may yet gain Constantinople. The first thing needful is influence—conquest follows.

Russia, then, was to propose to the other courts, not a war against France, which would not have been either politic or just, but a *mediatory alliance for the pacification of Europe*. There would certainly be no difficulty in procuring the adhesion of Austria and England to this alliance, but every thing was in peril without the concurrence of Prussia. It was necessary, therefore, to drag that astute court from its interested hesitations, or even to trample her down with European armies, should she refuse to concur in the common project. No consideration was to be shown to Prussia, or to any other power that should resist the proposed plan, *because (by such resistance) they would have deserted the cause of humanity.*

The co-operation of all the European states, with the exception of France, being once secured, three grand masses of troops were to be formed; one to the south, consisting of Russians and English transported into Italy by sea, and intended to ascend, with the Neapolitans, the Italian peninsula, to join a column of one hundred thousand Austrians, operating in Lombardy; a mass to the east, consisting of two grand Austrian and Russian armies, marching by the valley of the Danube towards Suabia and Switzerland; finally, a mass to the north, consisting of Russians, Prussians, Swedes, and Danes, proceeding straight from north to south upon the Rhine. These three grand masses of troops were to act independently of each other, in order to avoid the inconveniences of coalitions, which strive in vain to produce an impracticable

¹ There is a copy of these memorials extant in France.

concert. Each of the three was to act as an army, having to think only of its own safety and its own action. It was by endeavouring to combine their movements, that the Archduke Charles and Suwarrow produced the disaster of Zurich.

The three masses of troops being thus composed, proceedings would be taken in the name of a general congress, representing the *Mediatory Alliance*. To France conditions would be offered compatible with her existing grandeur; conditions to which the consent of England would be preliminarily obtained, and war would not be resorted to except in the case of a refusal. The bases treated upon would be these: the treaties of Lunéville and Amiens, but, those treaties as expounded by Europe. Assuredly a high idea may be formed of our power at that period, merely by looking at the plans elaborated by our jealous enemies.

France would be allowed to keep the Alps and the Rhine, that is to say, Savoy, Geneva, the Rhenish provinces, Mayence, Cologne, Luxembourg, and Belgium. Piedmont would be restored. The new state created in Italy would not be restored in order to give the fragments to Austria, but would be employed to construct an independent Italy. With that view, Austria would be required even to give up Venice. Switzerland, preserving the organization bestowed upon it by Napoleon, would be closed against the French troops, and declared perpetually neutral. It would be the same with Holland. In a word, France, maintained in her grand limits of the Alps and the Rhine, would be obliged to evacuate all Italy, Switzerland, and Holland, not to mention Hanover, which, the war over, could not longer be occupied.

In return for these concessions demanded from France, England would be compelled to give up Malta, to restore the colonies which she had seized upon, and even to aid the French in another enterprise against St. Domingo, for Europe was interested in seeing that magnificent country wrested from the barbarism of the revolted negroes. England would also be obliged to agree with all the nations upon an equitable maritime code. As the last condition, all the courts were to acknowledge Napoleon Emperor of the French.

Undoubtedly, if Russia had been strong enough to make Austria consent to the independence of Italy, and England to the freedom of the seas, Napoleon would have been very blamable for refusing the proposed conditions! But, far from abandoning Venice to those benevolent organizers of a new Europe, Austria was eager to regain possession of Milan, and to extend her frontier into Suabia; and England was determined to keep possession of Malta, and not to recognise the rights of the neutrals. If, then, Napoleon was bent, as doubtless he was, upon keeping Piedmont, Switzerland, and Holland, in order to turn to his own advantage those countries which his enemies desired to combine against him, we certainly may excuse his ambition in the face of that of all the other governments of Europe.

This plan, conceived, in the first instance, sincerely and with generous intentions, had

been wholly equitable if wholly accepted by all parties. But it was to be a pretext in the hands of a hypocritical coalition for urging France to a refusal which would rouse the whole power of Europe once more against her. The facts will speedily prove this.

Supposing France to refuse, which was probable, military measures were to be employed against her. In that case it would be requisite rather to conceal than to publish the intention of changing her government, to spare her pride, re-assure the holders of national property, promise to the military the preservation of their ranks, (all of which was done in 1814,) and, if the weariness of a war-like and agitated government should turn the public mind of France towards the old dynasty, then, but then only, to think of restoring it, because that dynasty, owing its restoration to Europe, would be more easily reconciled than the Bonaparte family with the remnant of a kingdom left to it.

The war might have various results. If it were only half successful, Italy and Belgium would be taken from France; if it were completely successful, France would also be deprived of the Rhenish provinces, that is to say, of the territory lying between the Meuse and the Rhine. Still, it was necessary to bear in mind the error committed against Louis XIV., and beware of imitating the lofty proceedings of the Pensionary Heinsius, for if France were too sternly treated she would never remain at rest. It was necessary, then, to leave her some of her existing conquests, by drawing a line from Luxembourg to Mayence, and conceding to her, besides the fortress of Mayence, what is called Rhenish Bavaria. It is evident that the plans of this policy not having yet been modified by Mr. Pitt, did not bear the imprint of passionate hate which marked those which prevailed ten years later.

On the double hypothesis of a war more or less fortunate, Europe was to be distributed in the following manner:

It was before all things necessary to guard against that French nation that was endowed with *such dangerous talents*, and was of so enterprising a turn. For this purpose it was necessary to surround her with powerful states capable of protecting themselves. It was, in the first place, requisite to strengthen Holland, and for this purpose to give her Belgium, to make of the two countries what was called *the kingdom of the two Belghims*, which should be given to the house of Orange, which had suffered so severely from the consequences of the French Revolution. Prussia would be maintained as she was, on the Rhine; perhaps she would have restored to her the small provinces that she had ceded to the French Republic, such as the duchies of Cleves and Gueldres, and, as far as possible, she would be established in Westphalia, around Holland, to separate her from all contact with France. Nevertheless, in accordance with the principle of disinterestedness that was imposed upon the great courts, a principle without which Europe could not be established upon a durable footing, but little would be given to Prussia, in order that there might be means of

giving a fitting organization to Germany and Italy. After creating the kingdom of the two Beligiums on the north of France, they would create to the south and east the kingdom of Piedmont, under the name of the *Subalpine Kingdom*. This crown would be adjudged to the then dethroned house of Savoy, which had suffered even more than the house of Orange, for the common cause of kings. Savoy would not be restored to it, but it would be put in possession of all Piedmont, all Lombardy, and even the Venetian state, taken with this object from Austria, which was to receive compensation as specified hereafter. Finally, to this vast territory Genoa was to be added. This *Subalpine Kingdom*, thus forming the most considerable state in Italy, would be capable of holding the balance between France and Austria, and of serving at a future time as the foundation of Italian independence.

Italy, that splendid and interesting country, was to be separately constituted, and to enjoy that independent existence so much and so vainly desired by her. To consolidate her into one single nation was for the time impracticable. She was to be composed of several states united by a federal bond, a sufficiently strong bond to render common action at once prompt and easy. Besides the *Subalpine Kingdom*, comprising all upper Italy, from the Maritime Alps to the Julian Alps, and having two ports, such as Venice and Genoa, there would be the kingdom of the Two Sicilies preserved within its existing limits, which would be placed at the other extremity of the Peninsula; at the centre would be the Pope, with the Legations restored to him, enjoying a perpetual neutrality, and, like the elector of Mayence in the Germanic body, performing the duties of chancellor of the Confederation; also at the centre would be the kingdom of Etruria, left to Spain; and then either between these or at the extremities, the Republic of Lucca, the Order of Malta, the Republic of Ragusa, and the Ionian Islands. This Italian body, in its federative organization, would have a head like the Germanic body, but not like him elective. The King of Piedmont and the King of the Two Sicilies were alternately to enjoy that dignity.

There, undoubtedly, was a grand and a skilful combination, for which France ought to have imposed some sacrifices upon herself, if the young heads that governed Russia had been capable of seriously and resolutely carrying out any scheme truly great.

Savoy, taken from the crown of Sardinia, was not to be given up to France, but, together with the Valleline and the Grisons, converted into a Swiss canton. Switzerland, divided into cantons, was to be joined to Germany, as one of the confederated states.

The Germanic empire was to be absolutely modelled anew. It had been alternately oppressed by Austria and Prussia, who had striven with each other for preponderance. Those two powers would be excluded from the confederation, in which they played only the part of ambitious party leaders. The Germanic Body thus left to itself, diminished by these two great members, but increased by the

kingdom of the two Beligiums and by Switzerland, freed from all mischievous influence, and having only the interests of Germany in view, would no longer be dragged in its own despite into wars, unjust in themselves, or hostile to its real interests. The crown was to cease to be elective in Germany. The principal States of the Confederation would in succession have the supreme power, as it was proposed for Italy. By means of new territorial delimitations, Baden, Wurtemberg, and Bavaria, were to be strengthened. The mischievous quarrel between Bavaria and Austria would be terminated, by giving the frontier of the Inn to the latter.

The three great states of the Continent, France, Prussia, and Austria, would thus be separated from each other, by three great independent confederations:—the Germanic confederation, the Swiss confederation, and the Italian confederation, extending themselves from the Zuyderzee to the Adriatic.

Even supposing these combinations to be correct and practicable, we cannot refrain from pointing out, that to cut off Prussia and Austria from the Germanic Body, was not to enfranchise Germany, for those two powers, remaining excluded, would have acted towards Germany as absolute states, adjoining a free state; as Frederick and Catherine had acted towards Poland; they would have convulsed and divided it; instead of seeking to influence it, they would have tried to conquer it. The true independence of Germany consisted, then, in a strong organization of the Diet, and in an equitable division of votes between Austria and Prussia, in such wise, that the confederation could hold the balance between them. Add to this, such European arrangements, as should not render Prussia the natural enemy of France, (as was done in 1815, by giving the former the Provinces of the Rhine) and the two German powers remaining rivals, but kept in equilibrium by the Diet, Germany would have been free; that is to say, capable of making her interests and resolutions coincide.

The suppression of the election to the imperial crown, would not, as it seems to us, have been a whit more useful. Although for two centuries that crown had not gone out of the house of Austria, the election, nevertheless, was a dependent tie, which put that house under obligations to the states of Germany. Now it is sometimes useful to render the great dependent upon the little, when anarchy is not the consequence. Germany, constituted as she had been in 1803, by Napoleon, with some votes given to the Catholics, to re-establish the balance that had been too much disturbed at the expense of Austria, would, in our opinion, have presented a better and more natural arrangement than that which was conceived by the authors of the new European organization.

Although disinterestedness was the fundamental principle of the proposed plan, that disinterestedness could readily go so far as not to acquire aught, and to content itself with a better arrangement of Europe, as the sole indemnity for the costs of war but it could

not go so far as actual loss. It was necessary, therefore, to indemnify Austria for the required cession of the state of Venice. In consequence, it was proposed to give her Moldavia and Wallachia, to extend her thus to the Black Sea, and secure her against the danger of seeing herself at a future time hemmed in by Russia.

The Ottoman Empire was to be maintained, such as it was, with the exception of some restrictions, which will be hereafter mentioned.

There still remained the north to be arranged. In that quarter a great deal was to be done, according to the singular organizer of Europe, who carved out so freely the map of the world. Prussia and Russia were separated by an ill-chosen frontier. Poland was divided between these two powers. In the judgment of the Abbé Piatoli, in that of the young men whom he inspired with his policy, and especially in that of Prince Czartoryski, and, finally, in the judgment even of Alexander, the partition of Poland was a great crime. Alexander, in fact, in unoccupied and oppressed youth, during the life of Paul, had often, in the outpourings of his confidence, declared that the dismembering of Poland was a crime of his predecessors which he should be happy to repair. But how reconstruct that Poland? How replace her, erect and isolated, between the rival states which had destroyed her? There existed one means—it was to reconstruct her entirely, to restore her all the parts of which she was formerly composed, and then to give her to the Emperor of Russia, who would bestow independent institutions upon her, in such wise that Poland, intended in the ancient ideas of Europe to serve as a barrier to Germany against Russia, would now serve as a barrier, or rather an advanced post of Russia against Germany.

Such was the dream of these young politicians—such was the ambition with which they imbued Alexander! That grand indignation against the crime of the preceding century, that noble disinterestedness imposed upon all the courts, for the purpose of restraining the ambition of France, was to end in reconstructing Poland for the purpose of giving her to Russia! It is not the first time that beneath displays of virtue, ostentatiously claiming the esteem of the world, towering ambition and consummate vanity have been concealed. This court of Russia, which at that time pushed to the utmost extent its affectation of justice and disinterestedness, and which pretended to lecture England and France, was in secret dreaming of the possession of Poland! However, amidst these projects, there was a sentiment to which we must pay due honour. It was that of the Prince Czartoryski, who, seeing no immediate possibility of re-establishing Poland, solely by Polish hands, was willing, for want of others, to use Russian hands. He, at least, had a legitimate object. He was open to reproach only upon one point, which was often perceived by the Russians, and more than once denounced to the Emperor Alexander; namely, that the Prince Czartoryski was less zealous for the interests of Russia than

for those of his native country, and was thus led to urge his master into an imprudent war. The Abbé Piatoli, long attached to Poland, partook all those ideas. It was difficult, however, to propose to this *Mediator Alliance*, founded upon the principle of disinterestedness—it was difficult to propose to it the abandonment of Poland to Russia; still there were means of attaining the end. Prussia, strongly attached to the peace, and the profits of neutrality, would probably not give her adhesion. Then, to punish her for her refusal, she would be attacked, deprived of Warsaw and the Vistula, and with those vast portions of ancient Poland, added to those which Russia already possessed, that new Poland would be founded, of which Alexander would be the king and the legislator.

To these ideas were added some others, accessory to the plan, some of them whimsical, and others just and generous.

England was to be compelled to restore Malta to the order, Russia would give up Corfu, which would thenceforth be reckoned among the Ionian islands. England had conquered India, which there was no choice but to leave to her; but Egypt could be made immensely serviceable to the civilization of the world, to general commerce, and to the balance of naval power. It would be taken from the Porte, and given to France, that the latter might undertake the task of civilizing it. It would be formed into an eastern kingdom, subject to France. The Bourbons would reign there, if, on the return of peace, Napoleon were to be kept on the throne of France; and Napoleon, if the Bourbons were restored. The Barbary States were to be restored to the Porte, and that power would even be assisted in reconquering them, that their piracy might be suppressed, which was a barbarism disgraceful to Europe. Finally, there were certain possessions contrary to the nature of things, although consecrated by time and conquest, which it would be both wise and humane to put an end to. For instance, Gibraltar enabled the English to keep up a system of smuggling in Spain, at once shameful and demoralizing to that country; the islands of Jersey and Guernsey assisted the English in stirring up civil war in France; Memel, in the possession of Prussia, was to the Russian territory a sort of Gibraltar for the purposes of smuggling. If possible, it was requisite to induce, by means of compensations, the possessors to renounce posts of which so reprehensible a use was made.

Spain and Portugal were to be reconciled and united by a federal tie, which should protect them from the French influence on the one hand, and from the English influence on the other. It was requisite that England should be obliged to redress the wrongs she had inflicted on Spain, and constrained to restore the captured galleons; by this course Spain, which demanded nothing better, would be wrested from the tyranny of France.

To complete this grand work of European reorganization, the Emperor of Russia was to address himself to all the learned men of Europe, to demand from them a code of the laws of nations, including a new maritime law

It was urged that it was inhuman and barbarous, that a nation should declare war without having previously submitted the cause of dispute to a neighbouring and disinterested state; and it was especially so, that one nation should commence hostilities against another, without a previous declaration of war, as England had lately done towards Spain, and that innocent merchants should thus find themselves ruined, or deprived of their property, by a sort of ambush. It was also intolerable that neutral nations should be made victims of the fury of powerful rivals, and could not cross the seas without being exposed to the consequences of a quarrel in which they had no part. The honour of the grand reforming court demanded that all these evils should be provided against by international laws.

It was by this mixture of heterogeneous ideas, some lofty, others merely ambitious, these wise, those chimerical, that ardour was communicated to the heart and the head of this young, mercurial, and sprightly emperor, who was as vain of his honest, but fugitive intentions, as one should be of long-practised virtues. He believed himself really called upon to regenerate Europe; and if he sometimes awakened from his splendid dreams, it was when he thought of the great man who ruled the West, and who was not of a temper to tolerate any regeneration without his aid or against his policy. Those who had the opportunity of closely observing Alexander, plainly perceived that his heart failed him, when he perceived war with Napoleon to be the probable final consequence of all his plans.

This strange conception would not have merited the honour of being introduced at such length, any more than the thousand and one projects with which schemers often pester those courts which have the weakness to listen to them, if it had not captivated the good will of Alexander and his friends, and if, which is still more important, it had not become the text of all the succeeding negotiations, and served, at last, as the basis of the treaties of 1815.

One thing is worthy of remark. This epoch of the French Revolution is reproached with having promised, and not given, liberty, independence, and happiness, to the nations, and having thus been guilty of breach of promise to humanity. Now, observe absolute power at work. Young men of ability, some of them honest and sincere, others of them merely ambitious, all reared in the school of the philosophers, united by their birth and the uniformity of their tastes, and surrounding the inheritor of the mightiest despotic empire upon the face of the earth, were possessed with the idea of rivaling the French Revolution, as respected generous and popular intentions. That Revolution which, according to them, had not even procured liberty for France, as it had given her a master, and which had given nothing to other nations but a humiliating dependence upon the French Empire, that Revolution they resolved to confound, by opposing to it a European regeneration, founded upon an equitable distribution of territories, and upon a new law of nations. There was to be an independent

Italy, a free Germany, and a reconstructed Poland. Each great power was to be restrained by efficient counterpoises. France herself was to be not humiliated, but merely brought back to respect the rights of others. The abuses of war would disappear alike from sea and land; piracy would be abolished; the ancient road of commerce would be re-established by Egypt; and finally, science would be called upon to codify the public law of nations. All this was not merely laid down by some vulgar scribbler of memorials, but seriously proposed to all the courts of Europe, and discussed with the least chimerical of men, with Mr. Pitt! We know now, we who are forty years older, what has been the upshot of all those philanthropic views of absolute power. The inventors of these plans, beaten and baffled, during ten years, by him whom they wished to destroy, but at length conquerors in 1815, have made neither a code of the laws of nations, nor a code of maritime laws; they have freed neither Italy, nor Germany, nor Poland. The English have not been deprived of Malta nor of Gibraltar; and the territorial boundaries of Europe, traced according to temporary interests, and without any view to the future, are the least prudent that can be imagined.

However, let us not anticipate the sequel of this history. To describe how all those ideas became common to Alexander and his young friends, would be useless. What is certain, is, both he and they were fully possessed with those ideas, and with the desire to make them the basis of the Russian policy, Prince Czartoryski, seeing in this system a chance of reconstruction for Poland, was most ardently desirous of having it carried into execution. The Prince, since the retirement of M. de Woronzoff, had become, from a mere assistant in the Foreign Office, the directing minister of that department. Messrs. de Nowosiltzoff and De Stroganoff, subalterns, one in the Department of Justice, and the other in the Home Department, devoted their energies to far other matters than those of their ostensible employments; they, with their young colleague and the Emperor, employed themselves in poisoning the world upon new bases. It was agreed that the most dexterous among them, M. de Nowosiltzoff, should be sent to London to confer with Mr. Pitt, and promise his assent to the project of the court of Russia. It was necessary to bring round the ambitious British cabinet, and render acceptable the disinterested views of the project, in order to found the *Mediatory Alliance*, and, in the name of that alliance, speak to France in such wise as to be attended to. A cousin of M. de Stroganoff set out for Madrid, with the double view of reconciling England and Spain, and of binding Spain and Portugal together by indissoluble bonds. It was decided that M. de Stroganoff should proceed to London, before going to Madrid, in order to commence in that capital his conciliatory mission. In the judgment of all Europe, the procedure of the British government against the Spanish shipping had been unjust and odious. That government was to be told that if it did not exhibit more moderation it would be left alone to contend with France, and that

Russia, with all the continental powers, would observe a neutrality which would be mortal to Great Britain.

The two young Russians who were charged to present the policy of their cabinet for acceptance abroad, set out for London at the close of 1804. M. de Nowosiltzoff was presented at the court of St. James's by the ambassador Woronzoff, brother of the retired chancellor, and was received with distinction and attention, well calculated to affect a young statesman, admitted, for the first time, to the honour of treating upon the affairs of Europe. Roughness and haughtiness, rather than astuteness, usually characterize English diplomatists. Nevertheless, Lord Harrowby, and especially Mr. Pitt, with whom the Russian envoy entered into direct conference, could soon discover with what sort of minds they had to do, and conducted themselves accordingly. The veteran Pitt, a veteran still more by the part he played than by age, rendered flexible by danger, lofty as he was, was too happy to regain the alliance of the Continent, to show himself unaccommodating. He was complaisant as it was necessary to be towards inexperienced young men, nurtured in chimeras. He listened to the singular proposals of the Russian cabinet, and appeared to receive them with great consideration, but modified them to suit his own policy, abstaining from refusal, and confining himself to postponing till the general peace those points which were incompatible with the interests of English policy. He had the proposals of the Russian envoy delivered to him, and added his own observations.¹ At first, Mr. Pitt tolerated even the reproofs of the young Russian envoy; he allowed himself to be reproached with the ambition of England, with the harshness of her proceedings, and with her encroaching system, which served as a pretext for the encroaching system of France. He allowed himself to be told, that in order to form a new alliance, it was necessary to found it upon a grand disinterestedness on the part of all the contracting powers. The head of the British cabinet became animated on this subject, much approved of the ideas of Alexander's ambassador, and declared, that, in fact, it was necessary to display the most perfect freedom from all personal views, if the mask was to be torn away that covered the ambition of France; that it was indispensably necessary that the allies should not appear to think of themselves, but only of the enfranchisement of Europe, oppressed by a barbarous and tyrannical power. The gravity of men, and the gravity of the interests which they treat, do not prevent them from frequently presenting a very peurile spectacle! Was there not something, in fact, truly peurile in the sight of these diplomatists, representatives of ambitious nations, which for centuries have agitated the world, reproaching France with her insatiable greediness? As if the English minister wanted in this instance aught less than Malta, the Indies, and the empire of the seas? As if the Russian minister really aimed at aught less than Poland, and a

dominant influence on the Continent! How pitiable to hear the heads of states addressing such reproaches to each other! No doubt, Napoleon was far too ambitious for his own interest, and still more so for ours; but Napoleon considered, if we may so speak, in his moral position, Napoleon, was he aught else than the reaction of the French power against the encroachments of the European courts in the last century, against the partition of Poland, and the conquest of India? Ambition is the vice or the virtue of all nations—vice, when it agitates the world, without benefitting it; virtue, when it civilizes while agitating it. Thus considered, the ambition of which the nations have still the least reason to complain, is that of France, for there is not a country which has been traversed by her armies, which France has not left ameliorated and enlightened.

It was agreed, then, between Mr. Pitt and M. de Nowosiltzoff, that the new alliance should lay great and public stress upon its disinterestedness, in order to make more than ever evident the insatiable cupidity of the Emperor of the French. While admitting that it would be very important to disembarass Europe of that redoubtable personage, it was, nevertheless, agreed that it would be imprudent to announce the intention of imposing a new government upon France. It was necessary to wait till the nation should declare itself, second it to the utmost, should it show a disposition to shake off the yoke of the imperial government, and especially to take great pains to assure the heads of the army of the preservation of their ranks, and the holders of national property, of that property being preserved to them. All the proclamations addressed to the French nation were to abound in the most tranquillizing assurances on these points. So important did Mr. Pitt consider this precaution, that he even stated himself to be ready to make, from the funds of England, a provision (his own words) to indemnify the emigrants who surrounded the Bourbons, and thus deprive them of any motive for alarming the holders of the national property. Mr. Pitt, then, thought of the famous indemnity to the emigrants, twenty years before it was voted by the Parliament of France. In wishing to render such pretensions disinterested, he assuredly knew not what he undertook; but in showing himself disposed to try it, at the expense of the British treasury, he proved the immense importance which England attached to the downfall of Napoleon, who had become so menacing towards her.

The idea of assembling an imposing mass of forces, in whose name the Mediatory Alliance could treat, previous to fighting, was naturally admitted by Mr. Pitt with extreme readiness. He consented to the mockery of a preliminary negotiation, well knowing that it would lead to no result, and that the conditions proposed would never be reconciled to the pride of Napoleon. The latter could, on no account, suffer that, without him, or against him, Italy, Switzerland, and Holland should be organized, under the specious pretext of their independence. Mr. Pitt, therefore, allowed the young rulers of Russia to fancy that they were

¹ I have myself perused the minutes of these conferences, of which a copy is extant in France.

labouring for a grand mediation, because he was well convinced that they were simply and merely progressing towards a third coalition. As regarded the distribution of the forces, he opposed certain parts of the project. He agreed readily enough to three grand masses; one to the south, composed of Russians, Neapolitans, and English; another to the east, composed of Russians and Austrians; and one to the north, composed of Prussians, Russians, Swedes, Hanoverians, and English. But he declared that he could not, on the instant, supply a single Englishman. He maintained, that in keeping them upon the coasts of England, constantly ready to embark, a very important result would be produced, that of threatening the sea-board of France on all points at once; which signified that, living in constant terror of the expedition prepared at Boulogne, the British government was unwilling to send troops from its own territory; which, after all, was natural enough. Mr. Pitt promised subsidies, but not nearly to the amount asked; he offered six millions sterling. He insisted upon one point, to which it seemed to him that the authors of the Russian project had by no means attached sufficient importance; that was, the concurrence of Prussia. Without her, all seemed to him to be difficult, even impossible. To him it seemed requisite to have the concurrence of all Europe, in order to destroy Napoleon. He approved of attacking Prussia, if she could not be persuaded to giving her adhesion, for Russia would thus permanently ally herself to English policy he offered, even in that case, to send to St. Petersburg the portion of the subsidy intended for Prussia; but he considered this a matter of grave importance, and considered that the most advantageous proposals should be made to the cabinet of Berlin, in order to seduce it. "Do not imagine," said he to M. de Nowosiltzoff, "that I am at all favourable to that hypocritical, astute, and greedy cabinet, which now asks from Napoleon, and even from Europe, the price of its perfidies. No: But upon that cabinet depends the fate of the present, and even of the future. Prussia, jealous of Austria, and fearing Russia, will always have a leaning to France. We must detach her from that country, or she will never cease to be the accomplice of our irreconcilable enemy. With reference to her alone, you must depart from your ideas of disinterestedness; we must give her more than Napoleon can offer; something, especially, which will irrevocably embroil her with France." Mr. Pitt, then, aided by hate, which sometimes enlightens, if it sometimes blinds, Mr. Pitt proposed a modification of the Russian plan, as fatal for Germany as for France. He confessed that it was a luminous and profound idea, that of surrounding our soil with kingdoms able to resist us, a kingdom of the two Belguims, and a Subalpine kingdom; the one for the house of Orange, protected by England; the other for the house of Savoy, protected by Russia. But he thought that the precaution was insufficient. He desired that, instead of separating Prussia and France by the Rhine, they, on the contrary,

should be placed in immediate contact; and he proposed that if Prussia pronounced for the coalition, she should receive all the country enclosed between the Meuse, the Moselle, and the Rhine, which we now call the Rhenish provinces. This appeared to him to be indispensable, if it were desired, for the future, to withdraw Prussia from her interested neutrality, and her leaning to Napoleon, in whom she had incessantly sought and found a support against Russia. This project was extended in 1815, when, besides Prussia, Bavaria was placed upon the Rhine, in order to deprive us of all our ancient allies in Germany. When Germany shall some day need support against the dangers which will threaten her from the north, she will appreciate the services rendered to her by those who have studied to create causes of dispute between her and France.

From these conferences there sprang a new idea, destined to complete the creation of a kingdom of the two Belguims: it was to construct a chain of fortresses, like those which Vauban formerly planned to cover France, in that country without frontiers, and to construct those fortresses at the expense of the alliance.

As regarded Germany and Italy, the English minister showed how impossible it was to execute these vast projects immediately; how they would offend the two powers who were most needed, Prussia and Austria. Neither one nor the other would consent to quit the German confederation; Prussia, in particular, would not agree to the crown of Germany being made hereditary; Austria would oppose a constitution for Italy that would exclude her from that country. Of the project as to Italy, Mr. Pitt only admitted the constitution of the kingdom of Piedmont. He wished Savoy to be added to all which the Russian project already bestowed upon Piedmont.

Finally, scarcely any mention was made of Poland; all that portion of the project rested on the supposition of war with Prussia, and that Mr. Pitt was especially anxious to avoid. The Russian diplomatist, who was imbued with such generous ideas when he quitted St. Petersburg, dared not even make mention of Egypt, Gibraltar, Memel, in a word, of that which was loftiest in the original project. Upon two very important subjects Mr. Pitt was by no means favourable, that is to say, he was almost negative—we mean Malta and the maritime law. As regarded Malta, Mr. Pitt peremptorily declined the discussion, and postponed all explanations on that point till it should be known what sacrifices France was inclined to make. As regarded the new law of nations, he said that it would be necessary to refer that work, a moral, but somewhat impracticable one, to a congress which would assemble after the war to conclude a peace, in which all the interests of the nations would be equitably weighed. The idea of a new law of nations seemed to him to be a very admirable one, but difficult of realization; for various populations do not easily adopt uniform dispositions, and observe them still less readily when they have adopted them. However, he had no objection to allowing these matters to

be treated in the congress, which at a future time would settle the conditions of a general peace.

These conferences ended with a singular explanation. The object of it was the East and Constantinople. Very recently, by her policy in Georgia, and by her connection with the insurgents of the Danube, Russia had given some umbrage to England, and provoked a note from her, in which the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire were already professed as principles of the European policy. "That is not the way to proceed in order to produce confidence between allies," said M. de Nowosiltzoff to Mr. Pitt. "My master is the noblest and most generous of all men; it is sufficient to trust to his honour. But to endeavour to stop him by menaces, or only by insinuations, is uselessly to affront him. He will be rather excited than restrained by such means." In reply, Mr. Pitt made many apologies for having shown suspicions so ill-founded, which, however, were natural previous to the establishment of that full mutual confidence, though, of course, in the intimate connection which was about to be established, they, for the future, would be quite impossible. "Moreover," added M. de Nowosiltzoff, "what inconvenience would there be in Constantinople belonging to a civilizing people like the Russians, instead of belonging to a barbarous people like the Turks? Would not your commerce in the Black Sea be greatly improved by it? No doubt were the East subjected to this ever-encroaching France, there would be a real danger, but, to Russia, there would be no danger." Mr. Pitt replied, that assuredly these considerations had great importance in his view; that, as far as he was concerned, he had no prejudice upon this subject, and could not see the great danger if Constantinople should fall to Russia; but that it was a prejudice of his nation, which he must avoid offending, and that it was essentially necessary to avoid touching upon such a subject at that period.

Relatively to Spain, M. de Strogonoff obtained nothing, or next to nothing. She gave up all her resources to France, argued the British cabinet, and to serve or gratify her would be merely to be her dupe. However, if she would declare against France, her galleons would be restored to her.

M. de Strogonoff set out for Madrid, and M. de Nowosiltzoff for St. Petersburg. It was agreed that Lord Gower, since Lord Granville, then ambassador from England to St. Petersburg, should be furnished with detailed powers to conclude a treaty upon the bases agreed upon by the two courts.

The Russian plan had only undergone a few days' elaboration at London, and it returned divested of every thing generous, and also of whatever was impracticable, that it had contained. It was reduced to a destructive project against France. No more mention of independent Italy, independent Germany, or independent Poland! The kingdom of Piedmont,

the kingdom of the two Belguims, with a profoundly inimical idea, Prussia upon the Rhine; the restitution of Malta evaded, the new law of nations postponed for a future congress; finally, previous to the commencement of hostilities, a pretence of negotiation, a very vain pretence, for general and immediate war was at the very heart of the proceeding—such was all that remained of the boastful project of European reconstitution, the production of a sort of fermentation of mind in the young heads which governed Russia. The negotiation was opened at St. Petersburg by Lord Gower upon the points agreed upon at London between Mr. Pitt and M. de Nowosiltzoff.

While this sort of league was being formed with England, it was necessary to undertake a similar labour with Austria and Prussia, to draw them into the new coalition. Prussia, who had engaged with Russia to declare war if the French should go beyond Hanover, but who, at the same time, had promised France to remain unalterably neutral if the number of French in Germany were not augmented—Prussia would not quit that perilous equilibrium. She affected not to understand Russia, and entrenched herself in her old system, become proverbial, of the *neutrality of the north of Germany*. This manner of evading the question was the more facile to her, because, from fear of seeing the secrets of the new coalition divulged to Napoleon, the Russian diplomatists dared not openly explain. The cabinet of Berlin, by its hesitations, had got such a reputation for duplicity, that it was thought impossible to intrust it with a secret which it would not immediately communicate to France. Nothing, therefore, was said to that cabinet about the project sent to London, and the subsequent and consequent negotiation; but Prussia was daily reminded of new encroachments by Napoleon, especially the conversion of the Italian Republic into a kingdom, which, it was argued, amounted to an annexation of Lombardy to France, equal to the annexation of Piedmont. The most gigantic plans were announced. It was reported that Napoleon was about to convert Parma, Placenza, Naples, and, finally, Spain herself, into kingdoms for his family; that Holland would very soon share the same fate; that Switzerland would be incorporated, under the pretext of rectifying the French frontiers; that Cardinal Fesch would soon be raised to the papacy; that it was necessary to save Europe, which was threatened with a universal domination; that the courts which should persist in want of forethought would be the cause of the general ruin, and would at length be themselves involved in it. Well knowing that the rivalry of Austria and Prussia was the principal cause of the latter inclining to France, an endeavour was made to reconcile the rivals. Prussia was asked to fix her pretensions, and to make them known; she was told that an endeavour would be made to draw from Austria an avowal of her pretensions, and to reconcile the pretensions of both parties by a definitive arbitration. It was announced that, in consideration of some addition to the Catholic votes in the College of Princes, an unimportant concession, Austria

⁴These details are contained in a very curious letter of M. de Nowosiltzoff to his cabinet

would be permanently contented with the recess of 1803, and would consecrate, by her irrevocable adhesion, the new arrangements by which Prussia had so largely profited. It was even insinuated that if, unfortunately, a struggle should become inevitable, Prussia would be largely indemnified for the risks of the war. However, it was not avowed that a coalition was on the point of being formed, still less that its basis was agreed upon; only the wish seemed to be expressed, that Prussia would unite herself to the rest of Europe to guaranty the equilibrium of the nations, which was seriously threatened.

In order to get into closer communication with the court of Prussia, a Russian general was sent to it, an officer of the staff, well acquainted with what was in agitation, M. de Vinzingerode,¹ who was to explain matters by degrees to the king, but to the king alone, and who, being acquainted with the military plan, could, if he succeeded in obtaining his majesty's attention, propose the means of execution, and regulate the whole future warfare and its details. M. de Vinzingerode arrived at the close of the winter of 1804, at the time when Napoleon was preparing to set out for Italy; the general observed a great reserve towards the Prussian cabinet, but was somewhat more communicative with the king, and, invoking the friendship which had commenced between the two sovereigns at Memel, endeavoured to win this prince in the name of that friendship, and of the common cause of kings. The young Frederick William, finding himself closely pressed, and comprehending at length what was in question, dwelt upon his personal affection for Alexander, and his warm sympathies in the cause of Europe, but objected that he was the first who would be exposed to the attacks of Napoleon; that he did not believe himself able to resist so powerful an adversary, that the aid for which he was led to hope had so far to come that it must needs be tardy, and that he should probably be vanquished before aid arrived. He also pointed out the danger of acting on the suggestions of England, and even proposed, in order to prevent a general war, of which he was greatly in dread, to mediate between Russia and France.

In this delicate state of things, the king had called for the advice of M. d'Haugwitz, who had for some time retired to his estates in Silesia, and found in his opinions a new encouragement to his ambiguous and pacific policy. If it had been necessary, however, to take a positive resolution, M. d'Haugwitz would

rather have inclined to France. M. de Hardenberg,² who had succeeded him, would rather have inclined to Russia, but this latter was ready, he said, to determine in favour of France, as soon as to determine in favour of Russia, provided only that some positive course were determined upon. With less talent, tact, and prudence than M. d'Haugwitz, he was fond of censuring that statesman's tergiversations, and, in order to distinguish himself from his predecessor, professed a liking for decided measures. It was requisite, in his view of affairs, to side with France, if it were thought useful to do so, and to embrace her cause, but in that case to secure the advantages and reap the reward of a decided support. In this he was less agreeable to the king than M. d'Haugwitz, who allowed that prince to enjoy the pleasure of indecision; and already there arose between M. d'Haugwitz and M. de Hardenberg that discrepancy of language by which quarrels between rival ministers are preceded, whether in despotic courts or in free states.

The king, in acknowledgment of the mission of M. de Vinzingerode, determined to send a confidential agent to St. Petersburg, and despatched M. de Zastrow, with the mission of explaining to the Emperor Alexander the position of the king, to reconcile him to his reserved conduct, and, if possible, to become better acquainted with the still hidden secret of the new coalition. While he despatched M. de Zastrow to hold this language at St. Petersburg, Frederick William claimed credit of Napoleon for the resistance that he had made to the suggestions of Russia; he spoke of the neutrality of the north of Germany, not as of a real neutrality, as it really was, but as of a positive alliance, which to the north covered France against all the enemies whom she could have to combat; further, this prince offered Napoleon, as he had already offered Russia, to play the part of a conciliator.

M. de Vinzingerode, after having prolonged his stay at Berlin, until he had rendered himself unwelcome to the court, which feared to be compromised by the prolonged presence of a Russian agent, repaired to Vienna, where the same efforts were made as at Berlin. With Austria there was not so much dissimulation required as with Prussia. None at all, indeed, was needed with the former. Austria was full of hatred towards Napoleon, and ardently desired the expulsion of the French from Italy. With her it was not necessary, as with the King of Prussia, to conceal the truth under specious professions of disinterested-

¹ VINZINGERODE. A general of very considerable ability. He was a native of the Prussian provinces on the Rhine, ceded to France. He served in the ranks of Austria with distinction at Austerlitz, and commanded the Cossacks against the grand army during the retreat from Moscow. He was taken prisoner at Verreia, and it was with great difficulty that Napoleon was prevented from putting him to death. He played a considerable part in the invasion of France, in 1813, but was severely defeated by Napoleon, with very superior forces, near Doulevant.—*Lockhart's Napoleon. Alison's Europe.* &c.

² HARDENBERG, CHARLES AUGUSTUS, Baron and Prince of Prussian chancellor of state. Born at Hanover, in 1759, studied at Leipzig and Göttingen. Entered the civil service of his country, in 1770. In 1778 he was made a privy councillor in England, where he had re-

sided several years. But in 1782 he entered the service of Brunswick, the duke of which state sent him to Berlin on diplomatic business. He was afterward minister to the last Margrave of Anspach, and after that minister to the King of Prussia. In 1795 he signed the treaty of peace between France and Prussia. In 1804 he carried the court of Prussia, against Haugwitz, to the English interests. In 1805, after the treaty of Vienna, and the allies of Prussia, he resigned in favour of Haugwitz, whom he again succeeded in 1806. He signed the peace of Paris, went to London with the sovereigns, and was one of the most prominent actors at the congress of Vienna. He has written memoirs of his own time, which were sealed up by the King of Prussia, not to be opened until 1850. He died at Götting in 1822.—*Encyclopædia Americana.*

ness. Here the plain truth and the real object might be avowed, for Austria desired what was desired at St. Petersburg; true, she indulged in none of the illusions of youth, and disdained false sentimentality, which fell short of her veteran experience. Moreover, Austria could keep a secret. If, in appearance, she was infinitely anxious to show her complaisance towards France, and if towards Napoleon personally, her language was constantly flattering, she, in her heart, nourished all the resentment of a balked ambition, constantly ill-treated for ten years. From the first, then, she had entered secretly into the passions of Russia, but, remembering her defeats, she had only with extreme prudence consented to enter the alliance, and had taken only conditional engagements of pure precaution. She had signed with Russia a secret convention, which was, as to the south of Europe, what the convention signed by Prussia was as to the north. She promised, in this convention, to abandon her inactive policy, if France, committing new

usurpations in Italy, should extend further the occupation of the kingdom of Naples, then extending to the gulf of Taranto, make new incorporations, like that of Piedmont, or threaten Egypt or any part of the Turkish Empire. Three hundred and fifty thousand Austrians were, in that case, to be her war contingent. She had the assurance, should fortune favour the arms of the coalitionists, of obtaining Italy to the Adda and the Po, which left the Milanese beyond. She was also promised the replacement of the two archdukes of Tuscany and Modena in their ancient states; and to give her the then vacant territories of Salzburg and the Brisgau. The house of Savoy was to have a grand establishment in Italy, consisting of the Milanese, Piedmont, and Genoa. Here, then, was the upshot of the Russian scheme: at Vienna, as at London, there remained no portion of it but what was hostile to France and advantageous to the coalitionists. Austria desired and obtained, that this convention¹ should be buried in the most profound secrecy,

¹ This convention is dated 6th of November, 1804. We give the hitherto unpublished text of it, as also that of the convention with Prussia.

Declaration signed the 25th of October, (6th of November,) 1804:

The preponderant influence exercised by the French government upon the circumjacent states, and the number of countries occupied by its troops, inspiring just anxieties for the maintenance of the general tranquillity and safety of Europe; his majesty the Emperor of all the Russias shares with his majesty the Emperor-King the conviction that this state of things calls for the mutual and most serious solicitude, and renders it necessary that they should unite to that end by a close concert, adapted to the state of crisis and of danger to which Europe is exposed.

The undersigned, furnished in consequence with instructions and powers for negotiating and concluding a work so salutary with the plenipotentiary of his majesty the Emperor-King, to treat with him upon it, and having mutually communicated full powers, found in due form, have agreed with the said plenipotentiary upon the stipulations contained in the following articles:—

Article I.—His majesty the Emperor of all the Russias promises and engages himself to establish, in consideration of the crisis and danger above-mentioned, the closest concert with his majesty the Emperor-King, and the two monarchs will be careful to give mutual notice and explanations of all negotiations and agreements that they shall be enabled to make with other powers, for the same object as that upon which they have agreed, and their measures in that respect will be so taken as in nowise to compromise the present engagement determined upon between them, until they shall mutually have agreed to its being made public.

Art. II.—His majesty the Emperor of all the Russias, as his majesty the Emperor-King, will not neglect any opportunity and facility to be in a condition efficiently to co-operate in the active measures judged necessary for preventing the dangers which immediately threaten the general safety.

Art. III.—If, in revenge for the opposition which the two imperial courts, in virtue of their mutual agreement, will make to the ambitious views of France, one of them be immediately attacked, (the Russian troops presently stationed on the Seven Ionian Isles are included in the present stipulation,) each of the two high contracting powers obliges himself, in the most formal manner, to put in motion, for the common defence, as speedily as possible, the forces below enumerated in Article VIII.

Art. IV.—If it shall occur that the French government, abusing the advantages procured to it by the position of its troops, which now occupy the territory of the empire of Germany, shall invade the adjacent countries, of which the integrity and independence are essentially connected with the interests of Russia, and that, consequently, being unable to look upon such an encroachment with an indifferent eye, his majesty the Emperor of all the Russias shall find himself obliged to carry his troops thither, his majesty the Emperor-King will look upon such conduct on the part of France as an

aggression which will impose upon him the duty of placing himself, as speedily as possible, in a condition to furnish prompt succour, according to the stipulations of the present agreement.

Art. V.—His imperial majesty of all the Russias fully participates the lively interest that his imperial and royal Apostolic Majesty takes in the maintenance of the Ottoman Porte, whose vicinity concerns them both; and as an attack upon European Turkey, by any other power, cannot but compromise the safety of Russia and Austria, and as the Porte, in its present disturbed state, would not be able to repel with its own force and enterprise directed against it, on that supposition, and if war on that account be engaged directly between one of the two imperial courts and the French government, the other will immediately prepare to assist, as speedily as possible, the power at war, and to aid in concert towards the preservation of the Ottoman Porte, in its present state.

Art. VI.—The state of the kingdom of Naples being of necessity influential upon that of Italy, in the independence of which their imperial majesties take an especial interest, it is understood that the stipulations of the present agreement will have effect in the event of the French determining to extend themselves in the kingdom of Naples, beyond their present limits, to seize upon the capital, or the fortresses of that country, or to penetrate into Calabria; in a word, if they shall force his majesty the King of Naples to peril his whole state, in resisting such encroachments upon it, and forcibly to oppose this new violation of his neutrality; and that if his imperial majesty the Emperor of all the Russias, through the succour which, in such case, he will furnish to the King of the Two Sicilies, shall be engaged in a war against France, his imperial and royal majesty obliges himself to commence on his part the operations against the common enemy, in accordance with the stipulations, and with especial reference to Articles IV., V., VIII. and IX., of the present agreement.

Art. VII.—In consideration of the uncertainty in which the two high contracting powers still at this present remain, as to the future designs of the French government, they reserve it to themselves, beyond what is stipulated above, to agree, according to the urgency of the circumstances, upon the different cases which may also require the employment of their mutual forces.

Art. VIII.—In all cases in which the two imperial courts resort to active measures, in virtue of the present agreement, or of those which hereafter may be made between them, they promise and engage to co-operate simultaneously and according to a plan which will immediately be agreed upon between them, with sufficient forces to combat the enemy with the probability of success, and of driving him back into his own territories, which forces will not be fewer than 350,000 men under arms for the two imperial courts; his imperial and royal majesty on his part will furnish 235,000 men, and the rest will be given by his imperial majesty the Emperor of Russia. These troops will be put and constantly kept on both sides on a complete footing, and there will further be a corps of observation left to secure the non-activity of the court of Berlin. The respective armies will be so distributed as shall prevent the forces of the two imperial courts, acting in concert, from being a-

that she, Austria, might not be too early compromised with Napoleon. Thus much justice must be done to Austria, that at least she did not, like Prussia, make a display of pretended virtues. She pursued her interests steadily, sternly, and without pretence. She can be censured for nothing on the present occasion, but the falseness of her language at Paris.

At the same time, in signing this convention, she flattered herself that it would be but an act of simple precaution, for she had not ceased to dread war. Accordingly, after having signed it, she resisted all the solicitations of the Emperor of Russia to proceed immediately to military preparations; she even angered him by her inertness. But on receiving tidings of the arrangements made by Napoleon in Italy, she was suddenly drawn from her inaction. The title of King, taken by Napoleon, and, above all, so general a title as that of "King of Italy," which seemed necessarily to apply to the whole Peninsula, had alarmed Austria to the highest degree. On the instant, she commenced those armaments, which, at first, she had desired to defer, and called to the war department the celebrated Mack, who, al-

though destitute of the qualities of a general-in-chief, was not without talent in the organization of armies. Henceforward, she paid quite a new attention to the urgent proposals of Russia, and, without engaging herself, as yet, in writing, to an immediate war, she lent to Russia the task of pushing forward the common negotiations with England, and of treating with that power upon the difficult question of subsidies. In the meanwhile, she discussed with M. de Vinzingerode a plan of war, conceived under all imaginable hypotheses.

It was at St. Petersburg, then, that was finally to be formed the new coalition; that is to say, the third, reckoning from the commencement of the French Revolution. That of 1792 ended in 1797, at Campo Formio, under the blows of General Bonaparte; that of 1768 ended in 1801, under the blows of the First Consul; the third, that of 1804, was to have a no more prosperous issue under the blows of the Emperor Napoleon.

Lord Gower, as we have said, had powers from his court to treat with the Russian cabinet. After long discussions, the following

terior in number to those of the enemy they will have to combat.

Art. IX.—In conformity with the desire manifested by the imperial royal court, his imperial majesty of all the Russias undertakes to use his good offices to obtain from the court of London, for his imperial and royal Apostolic Majesty, in the cases of war with France, set forth in the present declaration, or which may result from the future agreements, which by Article VII., the two imperial courts reserve the power of making, subsidies alike for the opening of the campaign, and annually for the whole duration of the war, which shall be, as far as possible, suitable to the court of Vienna.

Art. X.—In the execution of the plans determined upon, a just consideration will be paid to the obstacles arising, as well from the present state of the frontiers and forces of the Austrian monarchy, as from the imminent dangers to which she would, in that state, be exposed, by demonstrations and armaments, which would provoke immediately a premature invasion on the part of France. Consequently, in the determination of the active measures mutually agreed upon, and so far as the safety of the two empires and the essential interests of the common cause will permit, the greatest care will be taken to combine with the employment of them, the time and means of putting the forces and frontiers of his majesty the Emperor-King into a condition for opening the campaign with the energy necessary to attaining the object of the war. When once, however, the encroachments of the French shall have established the cases in which his said imperial and royal Apostolic Majesty will be engaged to take part in the war, by virtue of the present agreement, and of those which may hereafter be mutually formed, he engages not to lose an instant in rendering himself effective in the shortest possible space of time, and which shall not exceed three months after demand made for efficient co-operation with his imperial majesty of all the Russias, and for vigorously proceeding to the execution of the plan which will be settled.

Art. XI.—The principles of the two sovereigns will not in any case permit them to desire to constrain the free will of the French nation, the object of the war will be not to operate the counter-revolution, but solely to provide against the common dangers of Europe.

Art. XII.—His majesty the Emperor of all the Russias admitting that it is just that, in the event of a new breaking out of war, the house of Austria should be indemnified for the immense losses that it has suffered in its recent wars with France engages to co-operate in procuring it such indemnification in such event, as far as may consist with the success of their arms. Nevertheless, in the most successful result, his majesty the Emperor-King will not extend his limits beyond the Adda on the west, and the Po in the south; it being distinctly understood that of the different embouchures of the latter river, it is the most southerly which will in this case be employed. The two imperial courts desire that, in the supposed case of success, his royal highness the Elector of Salzburg may be replaced in Italy, and that to this end he either be put into possession of the

grand duchy of Tuscany, or that he obtain some other fitting establishment in the north of Italy, supposing events to render such arrangements possible.

Art. XIII.—Their imperial majesties, on the same supposition, will be anxious to procure the re-establishment of the King of Sardinia in Piedmont, even with a great ulterior aggrandisement. In less fortunate events, it will still be agreed to secure him a fitting establishment in Italy.

Art. XIV.—In the same case of great successes, the two imperial courts will agree upon the destination of the Legations, and will concur in causing the duchies of Modena, of Massa, and of Carrara to be restored to the legitimate heir of the last duke; but, in the case of events compelling a limitation of these projects, the said Legations or the Modenese shall form the establishment of the King of Sardinia; the Archduke Ferdinand will remain in Germany; and his majesty will content himself, if need be, with a frontier nearer than that of the Adda to that now existing.

Art. XV.—If the circumstances shall permit the replacement of the Elector of Salzburg in Italy, the territories of Salzburg, Berchtesgaden, and Passau, will be annexed to the Austrian monarchy. That would be the sole case in which his majesty would obtain also an extension of his frontier in Germany. As to the part of the territory of Aichstaedt, at present possessed by the Elector of Salzburg, it would then be disposed of in such manner as the two courts should mutually agree upon, as especially in favour of the Elector of Bavaria, if, by his part taken in the common cause, he has placed himself in a position to be benefited. In like manner, in the case supposed in the preceding Article, of the re-establishment of the heirs of the late Duke of Modena in his ancient possessions, the property of Brignano and Ortenau would become a means of encouragement to the good cause to one of the principal princes of Germany, particularly to the Elector of Baden, in whose favour it then would be renounced by the House of Austria.

Art. XVI.—The two high contracting powers engage not to lay down their arms, and not to treat of an accommodation with the common enemy, except by mutual consent, and after preliminary agreement between them.

Art. XVII.—In limiting for the present to the above objects and points, this present preliminary agreement, upon which the two monarchs mutually promise the most inviolable secrecy, they reserve to themselves, without delay and directly, to agree by ulterior arrangements, as well upon a plan of operations, in the event of war becoming inevitable, as upon all which relates to the support of the respective troops, as well in the Austrian states as upon foreign territory.

Art. XVIII.—The present declaration, mutually recognised as being equally obligatory with the most solemn treaty, will be ratified in the course of six weeks, or earlier if that can be, and the acts of ratification mutually exchanged at the same time.

In witness whereof, &c. &c.

conditions were agreed upon. A coalition was to be formed among the powers of Europe, comprising England and Russia, at the outset, and, subsequently, those whom they could influence. The object was to procure the evacuation of Hanover, and of the north of Germany, the effective independence of Holland and Switzerland, the evacuation of the whole of Italy, including the Isle of Elba, the reconstitution and aggrandisement of the kingdom of Piedmont, the consolidation of the kingdom of Naples, and, finally, the establishment in Europe of an order of things which would guaranty the safety of all the states against the usurpations of France. The object was not more precisely defined, in order that a certain latitude might remain for treating with France; at the least, deceptively. All the powers were to be invited to give their adhesion.

The coalition had determined to assemble, at fewest, 500,000 men, and to enter upon action as soon as it had 400,000 men. England furnished an annual subsidy of 1,250,000*l.* sterling, per 100,000 men. She further granted a sum down, amounting to three months' subsidy, to defray the expenses of opening the campaign. Austria engaged to supply 250,000 men, out of 500,000; the remainder was to be furnished by Russia, Sweden, Hanover, England, and Naples. The very grave question of the adhesion of Prussia was settled in a very summary way, and hardy style. England and Russia promised to make common cause against any power, which, by hostile measures, or by its too close connections with France, should oppose the designs of the coalition. It was determined, in fact, that Russia, dividing her forces into two masses, should send one by Galicia, to the aid of Austria; the other, by Poland, to the limits of the Prussian territory; and if, definitively, Prussia should refuse to enter into the coalition, overrun that power, before she could put herself in a state of defence; and as it was desirable not to forewarn her by the assemblage of such an army upon her frontiers, it was agreed that the pretext should be taken of a desire to hasten to her aid, in the event of Napoleon suspecting her, and throwing himself upon her states. The name, then, of auxiliaries and friends, were to be given to eighty thousand Russians, who were intended to trample Prussia under their feet.

This projected violence against Prussia, although it appeared to England to be somewhat rash, was very acceptable to her, as she could do nothing better towards saving herself from invasion, than to kindle a vast flame upon the Continent, and excite a frightful war there, no matter whom the combatants, or whom the vanquished or the victors. On the part of Russia, on the contrary, this resolution was a great imprudence; for to risk throwing Prussia into the arms of Napoleon, was to insure herself a certain defeat, even were the invasion of the Prussian territory as prompt as it was proposed to be. But Prince Czartoryski, the most obstinate of those young men in pursuing an object, saw in all this only a means of wresting Warsaw from

Prussia, in order to reconstitute Poland, in giving her to Alexander.

The military plan that was indicated by the situation, was still to attack in three masses; by the south, with the Russians of Corfu, the Neapolitans, and the English, ascending the Italian peninsula, and joining a hundred thousand Austrians in Lombardy; by the east, with the grand Austrian and Russian army, acting upon the Danube; lastly, by the north, with the Swedes, the Hanoverians, and the Russians descending upon the Rhine.

As to the diplomatic plan, it consisted of an intervention, in the name of a *Mediatory Alliance*, and an offer of a preliminary negotiation previous to fighting. Russia was much attached to this portion of her original project, which preserved to her that attitude of arbiter, which flattered her pride, and which, it must be added, was also agreeable to the weakness of her sovereign. He still entertained a vague hope that Prussia would be prevailed upon, provided that she were not too much alarmed, by being made aware of the fixed design of a coalition, and that Napoleon would thus have only to choose between an alarming league of all Europe, and reasonable concessions.

From England, consequently, was obtained the most singular dissimulation, the least dignified, but also the best adapted to her views. England consented to be left out, to be unmentioned in the negotiations, especially with Prussia. In the efforts upon the last-mentioned power, Russia was to represent herself as being unconnected with Great Britain, by any project of common war, but as wishing to impose a mediation, in order to put an end to a state of things that was burdensome to all Europe. In a solemn proceeding with respect to France, Russia, without ostensibly acting in the name of a coalition, was to offer her mediation, affirming that she would cause every one to accept equitable conditions, provided that Napoleon would accept similar ones. Here was a double means, intended to avoid alarming Prussia, and irritating the pride of Napoleon. England lent herself to every thing, provided only, that Russia, compromised by this mediation, were definitively drawn into the war. As to Austria, the greatest pains were taken to leave her in the shade, and not even to name her; for, should she appear to be in the plot, Napoleon would throw himself upon her before preparations were completed for aiding her. She actively prepared herself without taking any part in the negotiations. It was necessary to pursue the same course as to the court of Naples, which was the first exposed to the blows of Napoleon, as General St. Cyr was at Tarent, with a division of from fifteen to eighteen thousand French. Queen Caroline had been advised to take all the engagements of neutrality, and even of alliance, which Napoleon would have imposed upon her. In the mean time, Russian troops were by degrees conveyed in vessels through the Dardanelles, and disembarked at Corfu. Here a strong division was preparing, which at the last moment was to be joined at Naples, by a reinforcement of English, Albanians, and others. It would then

be time to throw aside the mask, and to attack the French by the extremity of the Peninsula.

In order to attempt a preliminary negotiation with Napoleon, it was necessary to be able to offer him some at least specious conditions. There were none such apart from offering to cause Malta to be evacuated by the English. The Russian cabinet had thrown aside all the brilliant portion of its plan, such as the re-organization of Italy and of Germany, the reconstitution of Poland, and the framing of a new maritime law. If, in addition, it conceded Malta to the English, instead of playing the part of arbiter between France and England, it only became the agent of the latter, or, at the very most, her docile and dependent ally. The Russian cabinet consequently held to the evacuation of Malta with an obstinacy not common to it, and, when the moment arrived for signing the treaty, was inflexible. Hitherto, Lord Gower had prepared for every thing, in order to compromise Russia, by means of any contract whatsoever with England; but now he was asked to abandon a maritime position of the greatest importance, a position which, not the only, was, at least, the principal cause of the war, and he would not yield. Lord Gower deemed it incompatible with his instructions to go any further, and he refused to sign the abandonment of Malta. The project was in danger of falling to the ground. However, on the 11th of April, the Emperor Alexander consented to sign the convention, at the same time declaring that he would not ratify it, unless the English cabinet would give up the island of Malta. A courier, therefore, was despatched to London, bearer both of the convention and of the condition which was annexed to it, and upon which depended the Russian ratifications.

It was settled that, without loss of time, lest the season for military operations should be lost, the step agreed upon should be taken as to the Emperor of the French. For this part the personage was selected, who, at London, had fastened the first link of the coalition, M. de Nowosiltzoff. As assistant to him the Abbé Piattoli was selected, the actual author of that plan of a new Europe, which since had been so disfigured.

M. de Nowosiltzoff was extremely proud of being about to proceed to Paris to present himself to that great man, who for years past had attracted the gaze of the whole world. If, as the decisive moment drew nearer and nearer, the Emperor Alexander more and more warmly desired to see this preliminary mediation successful, M. de Nowosiltzoff desired it no less. He was young and ambitious; he considered it infinitely glorious in the first place to treat with Napoleon, and in the second place, to be the negotiator who, at the moment when Europe seemed about to return to war, would suddenly pacify her by his able intervention. It could thence be relied upon that he would not himself add to the difficulties of the negotiation. After long deliberations, the conditions were agreed upon which he was to offer to Napoleon, and it was also agreed that they should be kept a profound secret. He was charged to offer a first, a second, and a

third project, each more advantageous to France than the preceding one, but was recommended not to pass from one to the other until after a great struggle.

The basis of all these projects was the evacuation of Hanover and of Naples, the practical independence of Switzerland and Holland, and, in return, the evacuation of Malta by the English, and the promise of subsequently composing a new code of maritime law. Thus far Napoleon would oppose no serious difficulties. In fact, in the event of a solid peace, he had no objection to evacuate Hanover, Naples, Holland, and even Switzerland, on condition of the act of mediation being maintained as to the last named. The real difficulty was Italy. Russia, already obliged to forego her plans of European reconstitution, had promised, in the event of war becoming inevitable, one part of Italy to Austria, another part to the future kingdom of Piedmont. Now, on the supposition of a mediation, it would be quite necessary, on pain of seeing the negotiator sent away from Paris on the day after his arrival there, to concede to France a part of this same Italy. It was necessary in order that the mediation should appear serious, above all, that it should appear serious to Prussia, that she might be persuaded and compromised by the appearance of a negotiation attempted in good faith. It was resolved, in the first place, to demand the separation of Piedmont, but saving its reconstitution as a separate state for a branch of the Bonaparte family, and further, the abandonment of the existing kingdom of Italy intended, together with Genoa, for the house of Savoy. Parma and Plaisance remained to furnish another endowment for a prince of the Bonaparte family. This was only the first proposition; the second was then to be substituted. Piedmont would remain incorporated with France; the kingdom of Italy, with the addition of Genoa, would, as in the first proposition, be given to the house of Savoy, Parma and Plaisance would remain the only endowment of the collateral branches of the house of Bonaparte. From this second proposition the envoy was finally to pass to the third, which would be as follows: Piedmont continuing to be a French province, and the existing kingdom of Italy being given to the Bonaparte family, the indemnity of the house of Savoy would be reduced to Parma, Plaisance, and Genoa. The kingdom of Etruria, assigned for four years past to a Spanish branch, would remain as it was.

It must be allowed that if to these last conditions the evacuation of Malta by the English had been added, Napoleon would have had no legitimate reason for refusing peace, for they were the conditions of Lunéville and Amiens, with the addition of Piedmont for France. The sacrifice demanded of Napoleon being in reality confined to that of Parma and Plaisance, which had become French property by the death of the last duke; and of Genoa, hitherto independent; Napoleon might consent to such an arrangement, if, however, care was taken to give no offence to his dignity in the form of the propositions.

Al. the five projects, then, of the friends of Alexander, led to a very slender result! After having dreamed of a reconstitution of Europe, by the means of a powerful mediation; after having seen that reconstitution of Europe converted at London into a destructive project against France, Russia, alarmed at having advanced so far, reduced her grand mediation to obtaining Parma and Plaisance as an indemnity for the house of Savoy; for the evacuation of Hanover and Naples, and the independence of Holland and Switzerland, which she further demanded, had never been contested by Napoleon, peace being once re-established. And should so small a matter not be obtained, she had a terrible war upon her hands. The rash and inconsiderate conduct of Russia had hemmed her up in a very narrow pass.

It was further agreed upon, that passports should be solicited for M. de Nowosiltzoff, through the medium of a friendly court. There was only the choice between Prussia and Austria. To apply to Austria would be to draw upon her the penetrating glance of Napoleon, and, as we have already said, it was desired to have her as much as possible kept in oblivion, in order that she might have time to make her preparations. Prussia, on the contrary, had offered herself as mediatrix, which furnished a natural reason to make use of her mediation to get passports for M. de Nowosiltzoff. He at the same time was to proceed to Berlin, see the King of Prussia, make another effort with that prince, communicate to him alone, and not to his cabinet, the moderate conditions proposed to France, and make him perceive that if she refused to accede to such arrangements, it must be from her having views alarming for Europe, views irreconcilable with the independence of all states, in which case it was the duty of all to unite and march against the common enemy.

M. de Nowosiltzoff, then, set out for Berlin, where he speedily arrived, eager as he was to commence the negotiation. He was accompanied by the Abbé Piattoli. He showed himself mild, conciliating, and perfectly reserved. Unfortunately the King of Prussia was absent, engaged in visiting his provinces of Franconia. This was a vexatious circumstance. There was a double danger: of a refusal on the part of England relative to Malta, which would render all negotiation impossible, or of some new enterprise of Napoleon upon Italy, where he then was, an enterprise which would ruin beforehand the various projects of reconciliation taken to Paris. The prompt arrival of M. de Nowosiltzoff in Paris was, consequently, of immense importance for the peace. Moreover, the young Russians, who governed the empire, were so impressionable, that their first contact with Napoleon might attract them to him, and seduce them, as the contact with Mr. Pitt had drawn them far indeed away from their first plan of European regeneration. There was, consequently, reason greatly to regret the time which was about to be lost.

The King of Prussia having learned that he was required to demand passports for the Russian envoy, greatly congratulated himself upon that circumstance, and upon the probabilities

of peace, which he deemed he could discern in it. He did not suspect that, masked behind this endeavour at reconciliation, there was a project of war more mature than had been entrusted to him, more mature than it was deemed to be by those who had so inconsiderately engaged in it. The pacific Frederick William gave the order to his cabinet immediately to solicit from Napoleon passports for M. de Nowosiltzoff. The latter was not to assume at Paris any official character, in order to avoid the difficulty of recognising the imperial title borne by Napoleon; but in addressing him, he would do so only with the title of Sire and of Majesty, and he was, moreover, provided with full and positive powers, which he was to show as soon as they should be agreed, which authorized him on the instant to concede the recognition.

While the powers of Europe were thus exerting themselves against Napoleon, he, surrounded by all the pomps of Italian royalty, was brimful of ideas the very opposite to those of his adversaries, even to the most moderate of them. The sight of that Italy, the scene of his first victories, the object of all his predilections, filled him with new designs for the grandeur of his empire, and for the establishment of his family. Far from designing to share Italy with any one, he proposed, on the contrary, wholly to occupy it, and to create there some of those vassal kingdoms which were to strengthen the new Empire of the West. The members of the Italian *consultum*, who had assisted at the formality of the institution of the kingdom of Italy, accompanied by the vice-president Melzi, and the minister Marescalchi, had preceded him to prepare his reception at Milan. Although the Italians were proud to have him for their king, though his government reassured them more than any other, yet the hope lost, or at the very least deferred, of a purely Italian royalty, the fear of war with Austria in consequence of this change, and even the generality of that title of King of Italy, calculated to please them, but also to alarm Europe, all this had much disturbed them. Messrs. Melzi and Marescalchi found them more disturbed and also less zealous than previous to their departure. The ultra-liberal party receded more every day, and the aristocracy did not draw closer. Napoleon alone could alter this state of things. Cardinal Caprara had arrived, and endeavoured to inspire the clergy with his own devotion to Napoleon. M. de Segur, accompanying M. Marescalchi, had selected the ladies and officers of the palace out of the best Italian families. Some at first declined. The exertion of M. de Marescalchi, of some members of the *consultum*, and the general attraction of the fêtes which were in preparation, had brought over the froward, and finally the arrival of Napoleon had determined every one. His presence as general had always deeply moved the Italians; his presence as Emperor and King could not but strike them still more forcibly; for that prodigy of fortune whom they had delighted to gaze on, had become a prodigy still more vast and marvellous. Magnificent troops assembled upon the battle fields of Marengo and Castiglione, prepared to execute grand manœuvres,

and to represent immortal combats. All the foreign ministers were convoked to Milan. The crowds of gazers who had flocked to Paris, to see the coronation there, now flocked to Milan. The impulse was given, and the Italian imaginations were again seized with love and admiration of the man who for nine years had so much excited them. The youth of the great families formed, in imitation of the towns of France, guards of honour to receive him.

On his arrival at Turin, he had there met Pius VII. and exchanged tender and filial adieux with him. Then he had with an infinite gracefulness and affability received his new subjects, and had busied himself about their interests, which were still distinct from those of the rest of the French Empire, with that intelligent solicitude which marked all his journeys. He had repaired the blunders or the injustices of the administrations, decided upon a whole host of demands, and displayed, to seduce the people, all the attractions of the supreme power. He had then employed several days in visiting the stronghold, which was his grand creation, and the foundation of his establishment in Italy, that of Alexandria. Thousands of workmen were assembled there at this instant. Finally, on the 5th of May, in the middle of the plain of Marengo, from the summit of a throne raised in that plain where, five years previously, he had gained the sovereign authority, he had witnessed some splendid manœuvres representing the battle. Lannes, Murat, and Bessières, commanded those manœuvres. There wanted only Dessaix! Napoleon had laid the first stone of an intended monument to the memory of the brave who died upon that field of battle. From Alexandria he had proceeded to Pavia, whither the magistrates had repaired to bear him the homages of his new capital, and he had entered Milan itself on the 8th of May, amidst the pealing of bells, the thunder of cannon, and the acclamations of a population excited to enthusiasm by his presence. Surrounded by the Italian authorities and the clergy, he had gone to kneel in that old Lombard cathedral, which was admired by all Europe, and which was destined to receive from him its final completion. The Italians, sensitive to the highest degree, sometimes agitate themselves for sovereigns whom they do not love, seduced thereto, like all other people, by the power of grand spectacles; what, then, must they not have felt at the sight of that man whose grandeur commenced under their eyes, that star that they could boast of having been the first to perceive upon the European horizon!

It was amidst these intoxications of grandeur that the proposal of admitting M. de Nowosiltzoff to Paris reached Napoleon. He felt every inclination to receive the Russian minister, to hear him, to treat with him, no matter under what form, official or not, provided it was seriously; and that in endeavouring to influence him, no partiality of condescension was shown to England. As for the conditions, he was far enough from reckoning as the Russians did. But he was unaware of their offers; he saw only the advance, which was made in becoming terms, and he cautiously avoided the error

of repulsing it. He replied that he would receive M. de Nowosiltzoff at Paris towards the month of July; his maritime projects, to which he never ceased to be attentive, notwithstanding his apparent abstraction from them, would not recall him to France until that period. He proposed then to receive M. de Nowosiltzoff, to judge if it was worth while to attend to him; and he would at the same time hold himself in constant readiness to interrupt this diplomatic communication, to go to London and there cut the Gordian knot of all the coalitions.

Although he did not know the secret of what had been organized, and was far from believing it to be so far perfected as it really was, he well understood the character of the Emperor Alexander, and the unreflecting impulses which had rapidly drawn him towards the English policy, and on sending to Prussia the passports for M. de Nowosiltzoff, he caused the following observations to be communicated to that court:

"The Emperor," wrote the minister for foreign affairs to M. de Laforest, "the Emperor having read your despatch, finds that it fully justifies the fears that he had manifested in his letter to the King of Prussia, and all that his majesty hears of the language that has been held by the British ministers, tends to keep him in that state of suspicion. The Emperor Alexander is led away in spite of himself; he has not perceived that the design of the English cabinet in offering him the part of a mediator, was closely to connect the interests of England and those of Russia, and eventually to lead the latter to take up arms to sustain a cause which would have become her own."

From the instant that, by experience in public affairs, the Emperor Napoleon had acquired precise ideas of the character of the Emperor Alexander, he felt that, at one time or another, that prince would be seduced into the interest of England, who had so many means of gaining over so corrupt a court as that of St. Petersburg.

Probable as that future appeared to the Emperor Napoleon, he contemplated it coolly, and he had taken steps to meet it, as far as that rested with him. Independently of the conscription of the year, he had made a call upon the reserve of the year XI. and of the year XII., and has augmented by fifteen thousand men the call made upon the conscription of the year XIII.

"At the slightest word of menace that may be uttered by M. de Nowosiltzoff, of threatening, of affront, or of hypothetical treaties with England, he will no longer be listened to. If Russia, or any other continental power, wish to interfere in the affairs of the time, and to press equally upon France and upon England, the Emperor will have no objection to that, and will readily make some sacrifices. England, on her part, should make equivalent sacrifices: but if, on the contrary, sacrifices are only required from France alone, then, whatever be the union of the powers, the Emperor will avail himself, to their utmost extent, of his good right, of his genius, and of his armies." (Milan, 15 Prairial, year XIII.—4th of June, 1805.)

On the 26th of May, Napoleon was crowned in the cathedral of Milan, with as much pomp as that with which he had, six weeks pre-

iously, been crowned, at Paris, in presence of the ministers of Europe, and of the deputies of all Italy. The crown of iron, reputed to be the ancient crown of the Lombard kings, had been conveyed from Monza, where it is carefully kept. After Cardinal Caprara, arch-bishop of Milan, had blessed it with the forms anciently used in the case of the German emperors, when crowned kings of Italy, Napoleon placed it upon his own head, as he had placed that of Emperor of the French, pronouncing, in Italian, these decisive words, "*God has given it to me, let him beware who shall touch it!*" (*Dio m'è ha, quai a chi la toccherà!*) He sent a thrill through all present by the significant accents in which he spoke those words. This pomp, prepared by Italian hands, and especially by the painter Appiani, surpassed all of the most beautiful that had previously been seen in Italy.

After this ceremony, Napoleon promulgated the Organic Statute, by which he created in Italy a monarchy in imitation of that of France, and named Eugene de Beauharnais viceroy. He then presented that young prince to the Italian nation in a royal sitting of the Legislative Body. He employed the whole of the month of June in presiding over the Council of State, and in giving to the administration of Italy the impulse that he had given to the administration of France, by daily occupying himself with its affairs.

The Italians, for whose satisfaction there needed only a government present in the midst of them, had one now beneath their eyes, which, to its real value, added a prodigious magic of externals, and thus, withdrawn from their discontents, and from their repugnance to foreigners, they had already rallied, great and small, around the new king. The presence of Napoleon, supported by those formidable armies which he had formed and organized for every event, had dissipated the fear of war. The Italians began to believe that they should see it no more upon their soil, even should it again break out, and that its shoutings and its thunders would come to them from the banks of the Danube, and from the very gates of Vienna. Every Sunday, Napoleon held grand reviews of troops at Milan; then he returned to his palace, and gave public audience to the ambassadors of all the courts of Europe, to foreigners of distinction, and, above all, to the representatives of the great Italian families and the clergy. It was at one of these audiences that he exchanged the insignia of the Legion of Honour with the insignia of the most ancient and illustrious orders of Europe. The Prussian minister first presented himself, to deliver to him the Black Eagle and the Red Eagle. Then came the ambassador of Spain, who delivered him the Golden Fleece; and then the ministers of Bavaria and Portugal, who delivered him the orders of St. Hubert and of Christ. Napoleon gave them in exchange the Grand Cordon of the Legion of Honour, and bestowed a number of decorations equal to that which he received. He then distributed those foreign decorations among the principal personages of the Empire. In a few months his court was on the same footing as all the

other courts of Europe; the same insignia were worn in it, with rich costumes, inclining to the military. In the midst of all this brilliancy, remaining simple in his personal appearance, having for his sole decoration a star of the Legion of Honour upon his breast, wearing a coat of the chasseurs of the guard, without gold embroidery; a black hat, having no ornament but a tri-coloured cockade, would have it well perceived that the luxury by which he was surrounded was not for himself. His noble and handsome countenance, around which the imagination of men ranged so many glorious trophies, was all that he chose to display to the eager gaze of the people. Yet his person was the only one that they sought, that they desired to gaze upon, amidst that train, glittering with gold and bedizened with the ribands of all Europe.

The various towns of Italy sent deputations to him to obtain the favour of seeing him within their walls. It was not only an honour but an advantage that they ambitioned, for everywhere his penetrating eye discerned some good to be done, and his powerful hand found the means of accomplishing it. Having resolved to devote the spring and half the summer to Italy, the better to divert the attention of the English from Boulogne, he promised to visit Mantua, Bergamo, Verona, Ferrara, Bologna, Modena, and Placenza. These tidings completed the joy of the Italians, and gave them all hopes of participating in the benefits of the new reign.

His abode in this splendid country soon affected him with those formidable impulses which were so much to be dreaded for the maintenance of general peace. He began to feel an extreme irritation against the court of Naples, which, wholly devoted to the English and to the Russians, and publicly protected by the latter in all negotiations, incessantly displayed the most hostile feelings towards France. The imprudent queen, who had allowed the government of her husband to be compromised by odious cruelties, had now taken a most unfortunately imagined step. She had sent to Milan the most clumsy of negotiators, a certain Prince de Cardito, to protest against the title of King of Italy, taken by Napoleon, a title which many people translated by those words that were inscribed upon the Iron Crown: "*Rex totius Italia—King of ALL Italy.*" The Marquis de Gallo, ambassador from Naples, a man of sense, well esteemed at the imperial court, had vainly endeavoured to prevent this perilous proceeding. Napoleon had consented to receive the Prince de Cardito, but upon a day of diplomatic audience. On that day he first gave the most gracious reception to the Marquis de Gallo, and then, in Italian, he addressed the most crushing harangue to the Prince de Cardito, and declared to him in terms equally harsh and contemptuous to the queen, that he would drive her out of Italy, and scarcely leave her Sicily for shelter. The Prince de Cardito was led away nearly fainting. This burst produced a great sensation, and speedily filled the despatches of all the European ministers. Napoleon from this moment conceived the idea of making the

kingdom of Naples a family kingdom, and one of the fiets of his grand empire. By degrees the idea had entered his mind of expelling the Bourbons from all the thrones of Europe. However, the accidental zeal that those of Spain had displayed in the war against the English, banished this formidable idea as concerned them. But Napoleon, under the strong presentiment that he should speedily have to reconstruct Europe, whether he should become all-powerful by crossing the Straits of Dover, or whether, withdrawn from the maritime war by continental war, he should succeed in expelling the Austrians from Italy, Napoleon promised himself that he would unite the Venetian states to his kingdom of Lombardy, and that he would then effect the conquest of Naples for one of his brothers. But all this portion of his designs was for the moment postponed. Exclusively occupied with the descent, he would not actually provoke a continental war. Nevertheless, there was one disposition which seemed to him to be opportune and without danger—it was to put a period to the evil situation of the Republic of Genoa. That Republic, placed between the Mediterranean, which was commanded by England, and Piedmont, which France had annexed to her territory, was, as it were, imprisoned between two great powers, and saw herself deprived of her ancient prosperity, for she had all the inconveniences of being annexed to France, without any of its advantages. In fact, the English had refused to recognise her, considering her as an annexation of the French empire, and had attacked her flag. Even the Barbary states pillaged and insulted her without mercy. France, treating her as a foreign country, had separated her from Piedmont and from the territory of Nice, by lines of custom-houses and by exclusive tariffs. The trade of Genoa was consequently stifled between the sea and the land, which were alike closed against her. France received no more benefit from Genoa than she bestowed upon her. The Apennine, separating Genoa from Piedmont, formed a frontier that was infested by brigands: it required the bravest gendarmerie in great numbers to render the roads safe there. With reference to the navy, the treaty that had recently been made, only very partially secured the services which Genoa was capable of rendering us. That borrowing of a foreign port for the purpose of founding a naval establishment there, was an essay leading to other things. By uniting the port of the Genoa, and the population of both shores of the Gulf of Genoa to the French empire, Napoleon would give himself from the Texel to the extremity of the principal gulf of the Mediterranean, an extent of coasts, and a number of seamen which, with time and persevering

attention, might render him, if not England's equal upon the seas, at least her respectable rival.

Napoleon could not resist all these considerations. He considered that England alone could take any real interest in this question. He would not have ventured to deal with the duchy of Parma and Placenza; whether on account of the Pope, for whom that duchy was a motive to hope, on account of Spain, who coveted it to extend the kingdom of Etruria, or, finally, on account of Russia herself, who did not despair of the indemnity of the ancient King of Piedmont, so long as it remained a vacant territory in Italy. But Genoa, appearing to him to possess but little interest for Austria, who was too far removed from it, and of no consideration to the Pope and Russia, was of importance, in his opinion, only to England; and having no occasion to avoid offending her, and not supposing her to be as strongly bound up as she was with Russia, he resolved to annex the Ligurian Republic to the French empire.

This was an error, for in the then temper of Austria, to pronounce a new annexation was to throw her into the arms of the coalition; it was to furnish to all our enemies, who filled Europe with perfidious rumours, new and not unfounded pretext for exclaiming against the ambition of France, and, especially, against her violation of promises, since Napoleon, himself, on instituting the kingdom of Italy, had promised to the Senate that he would not add a single province more to his Empire. But Napoleon sufficiently well knew the inimical designs of the Continent, to deem himself warranted in dispensing with considerations towards it, yet not sufficiently to perceive all the danger of a new provocation; flattering himself, moreover, that he should speedily solve all European difficulties at London; he did not hesitate, but determined to add Genoa to the naval establishments of France.

His minister to that Republic was his countryman Salicetti,¹ whom he instructed to sound and prepare the public mind. The task was not a difficult one, for the public mind of Liguria was well disposed. The aristocratic and Anglo-Austrian could not become more hostile than it was. The existing protectorate under which Genoa was placed, seemed to that party to be as hateful as annexation to France. As for the popular party, it saw in that annexation the freedom of its commerce with the interior of the Empire, the certainty of a great future prosperity, a guarantee against ever again falling beneath the yoke of oligarchy, and, finally, the advantage of belonging to the greatest power in Europe. The minority of the nobility, favourable to the Revolution, only viewed with some pain the destruction

¹ SALICETTI, CHRISTOPHE. Born at Bastia, in 1757. Studied at Pisa, became a barrister in the superior council at Corsica, and was sent as a deputy from the tiers-etat of that island to the States-General. On the 20th of November he pressed the assembly to declare Corsica united to France, and its inhabitants French citizens. In 1793 he returned to Corsica, where he actively opposed Paoli and the English party, was forced to fly thence, joined the army of Cartaux and served at the siege of Toulon. After the fall of the Montagne he was recalled from Toulon. He was implicated in the

conspiracy of Prarrail in the year III. against the Convention, but was saved by an amnesty. In 1796 he was appointed government army commissioner in Italy. From 1797 to 1801 he was employed in Corsica. In 1802 he was sent minister extraordinary to Lucca, in order to prepare for the establishment of a new constitution. In the following March, he went as minister plenipotentiary to Genoa. In January, 1806, he went to Naples to prince Joseph, who appointed him minister of the general police of that city.—*Biographie Moderne*.

of the Genoese nationality, but the grand employments of the imperial court were a sufficient attraction to console the principal personages of that class.

The proposition, prepared in concert with some senators, and presented by them to the Genoese senate, was there adopted by twenty members out of twenty-two, who deliberated upon it. It was then confirmed by a species of *Plebiscitum*, given in the form employed in France in the Consulate. Registers were opened, upon which every one could inscribe his vote. The people of Genoa hastened, as those of France had formerly done, to give their suffrages, almost all of which were favourable. The Senate and the Doge proceeded to Milan, to present their request to Napoleon. They were introduced to him amidst a pomp and ceremony which recalled the times, when vanquished nations were wont to repair to Rome, to solicit the honour of making part of the Roman Empire. Napoleon, on the 4th of June, received them on his throne, told them that he acceded to their wish, and that he would visit Genoa on quitting Italy. To this incorporation was added another, which was of small importance in itself, but which was like the drops of water which overflows the vessel. The Republic of Lucca was without a government, and incessantly tossed about between Etruria become Spanish, and Piedmont become French, like a rudderless vessel, a very small vessel indeed, upon a very small sea. The same prompting that had been resorted to at Genoa, caused Lucca to offer herself to France, and her magistrates, like those of Genoa, went to Milan to solicit a government and a constitution. Napoleon acceded to their request also, but considering them too distant to be annexed to the Empire, he made their territory the dowry of his eldest sister, the Princess Eliza,¹ a woman of capacity and judgment, indulging in some pretensions as a wit, but endowed with the qualities of a queen regnant, and possessed of the talent to make her authority popular in that little state which she governed wisely; which procured her the title, smartly enough imagined by M. de Talleyrand, of the *Semiramis of Lucca*. Napoleon had already conferred the duchy of Piombino upon her; he now gave to her and her husband, the Prince Bacciocchi,² the territory of Lucca, in the form of an hereditary principality, dependent on the French Empire, and reverting to the crown in the case of failure of the male line; consequently, with all the conditions of the ancient fiefs of the German Empire. This princess was, for the future, to bear the title of Princess of Piombino and Lucca.

¹ LUCIA, PRINCESS OF. MARIA-ANNE ELIZA, eldest sister of Napoleon, born in 1779. She received an excellent education at St. Cyr, and in 1797 married Felix Bacciocchi, a native of Corsica, who was then only a captain of infantry. In 1800 she came to reside in Paris with her brother Lucien, who was then minister of the interior. It is said that she here fell in love with the poet Pontanes. In 1805, the republics of Piombino and Lucca were erected into a principality, and bestowed on Eliza, her husband being created prince, a dignity for which he was wholly unfit. In March, 1800, she was created Grand-duchess and Governor-general of Tuscany, and displayed much energy and some talent. She was handsome, luxurious, a patroness of literature, and

M. de Talleyrand was directed to write to Russia and to Austria, to explain these proceedings which Napoleon considered of no consequence to those powers, or, at least, insufficient to rouse the court of Vienna from its inertness. Nevertheless, secret as were the military preparations of Austria, they had partially been perceived, and had not failed to strike the experienced glance of Napoleon. Troops were in motion towards the Tyrol and towards the ancient Venetian provinces. The march of those troops could not be denied, and Austria did not attempt to deny it, but hastened to declare that, the grand assemblages of troops at Marengo and at Castiglione, appearing to her to be too vast for mere reviews, she had made some musters as a mere measure of precaution, musters which, moreover, were sufficiently justified by the yellow fever, which was raging in Spain and Tuscany, especially at Leghorn. To a certain extent this excuse was plausible; but the point to be ascertained was, whether this was a mere shifting of the quarters of some troops, or whether the army was in reality being put upon a war footing by the filling up of regiments and the remounting of cavalry; and more than one secret intimation, sent by Poles attached to France, began to render these things probable. Napoleon instantly sent some disguised officers into the Tyrol, into Friuli, and into Carinthia, to ascertain with their own eyes the nature of the preparations which were being made there, and he at the same time demanded decisive explanations from Austria.

He determined upon another method of fathoming the intentions of that court. He had exchanged the Legion of Honour against the orders of friendly courts; he had not as yet effected that change against the orders of Austria, and he desired to place himself on the same footing with this court as with others. He conceived the idea, then, of making an immediate proposition to Austria upon this subject, and thus to ascertain her real sentiments. He thought, that if she had really determined upon an early war, she would not venture, in the face of Europe and of her allies, to give a testimony of cordiality, which, in the usages of courts, was the most significant that could be given, especially to a power so recent as that of the French Empire. M. de la Rochefoucauld was minister at Vienna, in the room of M. de Champagnys, who had become minister of the interior. The former was directed to demand explanations from Austria of her military preparations, and to propose to her an exchange of her orders against the order of the Legion of Honour.

a friend of improvement. She was by far the ablest of Napoleon's sisters. After the final success of the allies, in 1825, she resided for a time in Bohemia with her sister Caroline. Ex-queen of Naples, and finally settling at Trieste, where she died in 1820.—*Court and Camp of Napoleon.*

² BACCIOCCHI, FELIX. A native of Corsica; entered the military service of France, married Eliza Bonaparte before the elevation of her brother; was created Prince of Lucca in 1805. He was a peaceable, indolent, good sort of a man, equally destitute of ambition and ability. He acquired considerable wealth, which he retained after his fall from authority, and lived respectably at Boulogne.—*Camp and Court of Napoleon.*

Napoleon, continuing from the heart of Italy to keep the English under the delusion that the descent so often announced and so often put off, was but a mere feint, busied himself incessantly in providing for its execution for the summer. Never did an operation cause the sending of so many couriers and despatches as that which he at this period meditated. Consular agents and naval officers, stationed in the Spanish and French ports, at Carthagena, at Cadiz, at Ferrol, at Bayonne, at the mouth of the Gironde, at Rochefort, at the embouchure of the Loire, at Lorient, at Brest, and at Cherbourg, having couriers at their orders, transmitted to Italy all naval intelligence, even the slightest. Numerous secret agents, kept in pay in the ports of England, forwarded their reports, which were immediately sent to Napoleon. Finally, M. de Marbois, who was well acquainted with English affairs, had the especial duty of reading all the journals published in England, and of translating the slightest news relating to naval movements; and, it is a circumstance worthy of remark, that it was especially from these journals that Napoleon, who could with perfect correctness anticipate all the plans of the English admiralty, received the best information. Although their statements were for the most part false, they yet furnished to his prodigious sagacity the means of guessing at the real facts. There was something more singular still. By dint of attributing to Napoleon the most extraordinary, and, frequently, the most absurd plans; several of them, without knowing that they did so, hit upon his real project, and said that he had sent his fleets on distant voyages, only to re-assemble them on a sudden in the Channel. The admiralty did not fasten upon this supposition, which, however, was the true one. Their measures, at all events, give reason to suppose that they did not take it to be the true one.

With the exception of one circumstance which annoyed him greatly, and which had led to a last modification of his vast plan, Napoleon had every reason to be satisfied with the progress of his operations. Admiral Missiessy, as we have seen, had sailed in January towards the Antilles. The details of his expedition were not yet known, but it was certain that the English were greatly alarmed for their colonies; that one of them, the Island of Dominica, had been taken, and that they had sent strong reinforcements into the seas of America, a diversion all in our favour in the seas of Europe. Admiral Villeneuve, who sailed from Toulon on the 30th of March, had touched at Cadiz after a voyage of which the particulars were not known, rallied Admiral Gravina with a Spanish division of six ships of the line and

several frigates, besides the French frigate *l'Aigle*, and had steered for Martinique. No subsequent tidings of him had arrived, but it was known that Nelson, who guarded the Mediterranean, had not been able to intercept him either on his running out of Toulon, or on his getting clear of the strait. The Spanish seamen did their best in the state of destitution in which they were left by an ignorant, corrupt, and indolent government. Admiral Salcedi had assembled a fleet of seven sail at Carthagena; Admiral Gravina, as we have just seen, one of six at Cadiz; Admiral Grandellana a third of eight at Ferrol, which was to operate with the French fleet in harbour there. But sailors were scarce, owing to the epidemic and to the depressed condition of Spanish commerce, and fishermen and the working men of the towns were taken to form crews. Finally, a scarcity of grain, added to scarcity of money, and the epidemic, had so exhausted the resources of Spain, that the six months' biscuit could not be procured which was necessary for each squadron. Admiral Gravina had scarcely enough for three months when he had joined the squadron of Villeneuve, and Admiral Grandellana, at Ferrol, had scarcely enough for a fortnight. Fortunately, M. Ouvrard, whom we have seen undertaking to transact business for and with France and Spain, had arrived at Madrid, had delighted that debt-laden court with the most charming projects, obtained its confidence, concluded a treaty with it, a treaty which we shall describe by and by, and by various combinations put an end to the horrors of the dearth. He at the same time provided the Spanish navy with a considerable quantity of biscuit. Matters, therefore, in the ports of Spain, went on as well as the impoverished and wretched state of the Spanish administration would allow.

But while Admiral Missiessy spread dismay in the English Antilles, and Admirals Villeneuve and Gravina, with their combined squadrons, sailed without accident towards Martinique, Gautaume, who was to have joined company with them—Gautaume, owing to a sort of phenomenon in the season, had not had a single day such as would admit of his running out of the port of Brest. Within the memory of man the equinox had never before been unattended by a gale. The months of March, April, and May, (1805,) however, had gone by without the English fleet having once been compelled to abandon the Brest station. Admiral Gautaume, well knowing how immense an operation he was called upon to take part in, was so impatient for the moment of departure as actually to be rendered ill by his vexation.²

The weather was almost always calm and

intention of the naval expedition, which some persons bent upon seeing feints where no feints, in fact, exist, have supposed to be a mere demonstration. These are not the only letters of the same sort, but I select these for quotation:

Gautaume to the Emperor.

On board of *l'Imperial*, 11th Floral, year XIII.—1st of May, 1805.

SIR:

The extraordinary weather which we have had since we were ready for sea is quite disconcerting; I cannot possibly describe to you the painful feelings which I

¹ OUVRARD, GUSTAVUS JULIAN. Born at Nantes, in 1775, where he was a merchant and acquired a large fortune. He became an extensive contractor for supplies during the republic and in the reign of Napoleon. In 1810 Fouché sent Ouvrard on a secret mission to England, while Napoleon had another secret agent. Both failed, and were obliged to quit England. Ouvrard was thrown into prison, and Fouché lost his office. Ouvrard has left an interesting work. "Memoirs of his Life and financial Operations."—*Encyclopædia Americana*. H.

² viz. the two following letters, which will prove state of mind of the admiral, and the serious

clear. Occasionally a gust from the west, accompanied by stormy clouds, gave hopes of a tempest, and suddenly all became clear again. There was no resource but to fight a disadvantageous battle with a squadron which was now very nearly equal in number to the French squadron, and very superior to it in quality. The English, without precisely suspecting what threatened them, yet struck with the presence of a fleet at Brest and another at Ferrol, and put still more on the alert by the sorties from Toulon and Cadiz, had augmented the force of their blockade. They had twenty sail before Brest, commanded by Admiral Cornwallis,¹ and seven or eight before Ferrol, commanded by Admiral Calder.² Admiral Gauteaume in this position passed out of the road and returned into it, anchored at Bertheaume, or returned to the inner moorings, having for two months all his hands kept strictly on board, land forces as well as seamen. In his vexation he asked if he should give battle in order to get out to open sea, but this he was expressly forbidden to do.

Napoleon, calculating that, on arriving at the middle of May, it would be dangerous to

leave Villeneuve, Gravina, and Missiesy waiting any longer at Martinique, and that the English squadrons sent in their pursuit would end by overtaking them, once more altered this part of his plan. He determined that if, by the 20th of May, Gauteaume had not been able to sail, he should not do so at all, but remain at Brest until relieved from blockade. Villeneuve, therefore, had orders to return with Gravina to Europe to do what was in the first instance intrusted to Gauteaume; that is to say, to raise the blockade of Ferrol, where he would find five sail of French and seven of Spanish, then, if he could, to touch at Rochefort, and be reinforced by Missiesy, who would then probably be returned from the Antilles, and, finally, to present himself before Brest to open the sea to Gauteaume, which would increase his whole force to fifty-six sail. He was to sail into the Channel with this squadron, the largest ever assembled upon the ocean.

This plan was perfectly practicable, and even had great chances of success, as the result will presently prove. Nevertheless, it was less secure than the preceding one. In

have endured on finding myself kept in port, while the other squadrons are in full sail for their destinations; and may be cruelly compromised by our difficulties; this last and most afflicting idea allows me no rest, and if I have thus long resisted the impatience and the sufferings by which I am racked, I have done so because I have seen not one chance in my favour, should I run out, and all chances in favour of the enemy; a disadvantageous battle was and is inevitable as long as the enemy shall keep his present position, and then our expedition would be irreparably ruined, and our forces for a long time paralyzed.

Nevertheless, at the moment when I received your Majesty's despatch of the 3d Floréal, I had determined to run out at all hazards; all the vessels had weighed anchor; a westerly wind, which had become fresher and fresher during twelve hours, had led me to hope that the enemy might be driven out to sea, when his look-out vessels were perceived from our moorings, and his squadron signaled off Ushant, and the shifting and lightness of the wind prevented me from carrying out my intention. Feeling sure that I should be obliged to bring up in Bertheaume road, and there attract the notice of the enemy, I abandoned all thought of movement, and I wish to make it appear that we never had any real intention of running out.

Here I allow myself to repeat to your Majesty the assurance I have already given you, as to the order and preparation in which I keep all the vessels; the crews are all mustered on board, no communications take place with the shore except for indispensable objects of duty, and at all hours every vessel is ready to obey the signals which may be made to it; these arrangements, which alone can enable us to profit by the first favourable moment, will be kept up with the utmost exactitude.

Gauteaume to Desré.

This 7th Floréal, year XIII.—27th of April, 1805.

I doubt not, my friend, that you share all that I am suffering. Every day that passes is a day of torment to me, and I tremble lest I should after all be forced upon some precious blunder! The wind, which, for two days, was in the west, but light, although with rain and a dirty sky, has shifted to the north-north-east, and freshened, and I have been tempted to run all risks, although the enemy was still signaled as being in the Yroise, and though his advanced ships were in the road, and the weather was very clear. The certainty, however, which his position and his force gave me of having to fight to disadvantage, and the variability of the wind, restrained me, and I am now glad of it; but I am none the less in a state of horrible anxiety.

The length of the days, and the fineness of the weather, make me now almost despair of getting out, and then, how shall I hear the idea of keeping our friends waiting in vain at the place of rendezvous, and of compromising them by exposing them to delays and to an extremely dangerous return? These ideas leave me not an instant of a pace, and I dare say that they harass you also.

However, my friend, you may rest perfectly assured that I have done the best that I could, unless I had run the risks of an affair which, independent of the chances that the enemy would have derived from his superior force, would equally have spoiled the expedition. As I have already reported, the weather has constantly been such as to render it impossible for us to elude the observation of the enemy.

Although in your last you recommended me to write frequently to the Emperor, I dare not write to him, as I have nothing favourable to say; I remain silent, awaiting events, being unwilling to trouble him about mere trifles, and I confine myself to saying that I trust that he will do us justice.

¹ CORNWALLIS, THE HONOURABLE WILLIAM. An English admiral of great merit. A braver, a more upright and honest man, or one more jealous of his country's honour, never trod a quarter-deck. In 1750 he commanded a squadron in the West Indies, and effected a settlement on the Andaman Islands, which was afterward abandoned. In 1795 he fought an action, very celebrated as "the retreat of Cornwallis," against thirteen sail of the French line, fourteen frigates, two brigs and a cutter, with five ships of the line, sustaining a heavy attack with almost incredible coolness, and bringing off all his little squadron. It is very remarkable that this was the only occasion on which he came in contact with the enemy during the remainder of the revolutionary war. His perseverance was equal to his bravery, and perhaps neither was ever surpassed.—*Brenton's Naval History*.

² CALDER, SIR ROBERT. An English admiral of more merit than fortune. He was distinguished in the battle off Cape St. Vincent, in 1797. In January, 1801, he pursued Admiral Gauteaume to Barbadoes, but in vain. In July, 1804, he fought an action against Villeneuve in the Channel, with fifteen sail of the line, two frigates, a cutter and a lugger, against six Spanish and fourteen French sail of the line, and seven heavy frigates. Four of the English ships were of ninety-eight guns, two of eighty, the rest of seventy-four. The French and Spaniards had one of ninety, two of eighty-four, and four of eighty; five of their frigates were of forty-four, the remaining two of thirty-eight guns. The action was fought in a fog, the French having the weather-gage. It resulted in the capture of San Rafael 94, and San Firmé 74, Spanish ships of the line. Sir Robert Calder was tried by court-martial, and severely reprimanded for error in judgment in not renewing the action on the following day. It is very generally conceded that this sentence was too harsh; Calder's bravery was acknowledged, but he lacked promptness and decision. It should not be forgotten that he defeated a superior fleet, that this action prevented the raising of the blockades of all the ports, and the sweeping of the Channel; and that it was the immediate forerunner of Nelson's great victory at Trafalgar, by driving Villeneuve into Cadiz. In 1810 he was appointed to the command at Plymouth; he died in 1818.—*Brenton's Naval History*.

fact, if Gauteaume could have got out to sea in April, raised the blockade of Ferrol, which was possible without fighting, for only five or six English vessels then blockaded that port, and then proceeded to Martinique, his junction with Villeneuve and Gravina would have taken place without any probability of battle, they would have returned to Europe to the number of fifty sail, and needed to touch nowhere previous to entering the Channel. There were no other risks to run than those of rencontres at sea, risks so rare that they might be wholly left out of question. The new plan, on the contrary, had the inconvenience of exposing Villeneuve to a battle before Ferrol, and to another before Brest; and though he would have a great superiority of force, there was no certainty that the two squadrons whom he had relieved from blockade would have time to go to his aid and take part in the battle. In fact, both Ferrol and Brest are quitted by narrow passes; there, as elsewhere, the wind that suits vessels going in is not that which suits them on coming out, and it was very possible for a battle to take place at the entrance of those ports, and be brought to a termination before the fleets within could arrive to take a share in it. Even a battle of doubtful result would suffice to discourage the officers, whose confidence at sea was not very great, however great their personal courage. Admiral Villeneuve, especially, though a brave warrior, had not a firmness equal to these risks, and it was to be regretted that the serenity of the weather had prevented the execution of the first plan.

There was another which Napoleon had in contemplation for a moment, which would have consolidated less forces, indeed, but which would have taken Villeneuve with certainty into the Channel: it was, not to send Villeneuve before either Ferrol or Brest, but to cause him to double Scotland, and then steer into the North Sea, and before Boulogne. It is true that he would have arrived with only twenty sail, instead of fifty; but this would have sufficed for three days; and the flotilla, sufficiently protected, would certainly have crossed. This idea presented itself for an instant to the mind of Napoleon; he sketched it, and then wishing for still greater security, he preferred a greater consolidation of forces to a greater certainty of making the Channel, and he reverted to the plan of raising the blockade of Ferrol and Brest by Villeneuve.

This was the last change of his plan that was produced by circumstances. It was in the midst of a fête, as he himself relates in a postscript to one of his letters, that he had ruminated on all these combinations, and decided upon his course. He immediately gave the necessary instructions. Two ships of the line had been prepared at Rochefort; Rear-admiral Magon¹ commanded them. He im-

mediately sailed for Martinique, to announce the change that had taken place in Napoleon's determination. Frigates fitted out at Lorient, at Nantes, and at Rochefort, were ready to leave their ports as soon as it was known that Gauteaume was to make no further attempt at getting out, and they were commissioned to take orders to Villeneuve, to return immediately to Europe, there to execute the new plan. Each frigate was to be accompanied by a brig, furnished with a duplicate of these orders. The despatches were enclosed in leaden boxes, and intrusted to confidential officers, who were to throw them into the sea in case of danger. These precautions, and those which follow, are worthy of being mentioned for the instruction of governments.

In order that the fleets of Brest and Ferrol might be able to second those which were to raise the blockades for them, great precautions had been taken. Gauteaume was to anchor outside the road of Brest, in the creek of Bertheaume, an open place of doubtful safety. To correct this defect, a general of artillery was sent from Paris, and a hundred and fifty guns were placed in battery, in order to cover the squadron. Gourdon, commanding at Ferrol, in the room of Admiral Boudet,² who was ill, had orders to pass from Ferrol to Corunna, where the anchorage is open, and to conduct the French division thither. Admiral Grandanella was directed to do the same with the Spanish vessels. The court of Spain was solicited to take precautions similar to those taken at Bertheaume, to secure the anchorage by means of batteries. Finally, anticipating the case of the vessels that were to raise the blockade having consumed their provisions, there were prepared at Ferrol, at Rochefort, at Brest, at Cherbourg, and at Boulogne, barrels of biscuit amounting to many millions of rations, which could be embarked without loss of time. An order was awaiting Admiral Missiessy at Rochefort, should he return thither. That order enjoined him to set sail again on the instant, to go and alarm Ireland by his presence for a few days, and then to cruise at a distance from Ferrol in a given latitude, where Admiral Villeneuve, instructed by a frigate, was to join company with him.

While these measures of foresight were taken for the marine force, continual and secret pains were bestowed upon the land force, to increase the effective force of the war battalions on the coasts of the ocean. The troops of the expedition now amounted to one hundred and sixty thousand men, without the Brest corps, which had been broken up since the new destination was assigned to the fleet of Gauteaume. Admiral Verhuell³ had orders to repair to Ambleteuse with the Dutch fleet, in order that the whole expedition might be able to set out altogether from the four ports do-

¹ MAGON. A French admiral of the second order. He was second admiral in the French rear in Villeneuve's action with Sir Robert Calder. The Duchesse d'Abrantes states that he purposely blew up his ship, the *Achille*, at Trafalgar, to avoid surrendering. Admiral Collingwood's official letter states that he surrendered, but was burnt up by some subsequent mismanagement of the French. Two hundred of her men were saved by the English commanders. The English Gazette states that the *Achille* was

commanded by Monsieur de Nieuport; and that Rear-admiral Magon was killed in the Algeiras, which surrendered, but in the gale following the action got off and was dismantled into Cadiz.—Brenson's Naval History. *Duchesse d'Abrantes*.

² BOUDET. A man of no great mark in his profession.

³ VERHUELL. A Dutch admiral, an officer of mark and ability.

pendant on Boulogne. Those ports, artificially created, had become choked up with sands in the four years that had elapsed since their construction. New labours had cleared them. Further, repairs had been given to the vessels of the flotilla, which had suffered a little from their continual sorties and an exposed anchorage ground.

At the same time that he sent forth this multitude of orders, Napoleon had continued his journey in Italy. He had visited Bergamo, Verona, and Mantua, and been present at a representation of the battle of Castiglione, given by a corps of twenty-five thousand men, upon the actual field of that battle; he had stayed several days at Bologna, and delighted the learned men of its celebrated university; then he had traversed Modena, Parma, Placenza, and, finally, "Genoa the superb," acquired by a dash of the pen. Here he remained from the 30th of June to the 7th of July, amidst fêtes worthy of the city of marble palaces, and even surpassing the most splendid of those with which he had been welcomed by the Italians. At Genoa he met with an illustrious personage, weary of an exile which had lasted for twelve years, and with an opposition which his religious duties no longer justified: that person was the Cardinal Maury. The Pope had given him an example which he had at length determined upon following, and he had come to the resolution of espousing the cause of the restorer of religion. It was at Genoa that an opportunity had been provided for him to return to favour. Like those partisans of Pompey, who, one after the other, endeavoured to meet with Cæsar in some one of the cities of the Roman Empire, voluntarily to deliver themselves to their allurements, Cardinal Maury, in the city of Genoa, bent before the new Cæsar. He was received by him with the courtesy of a man of genius, who desires to ingratiate himself with a man of talent, and could see that his return into France would be recompensed with the highest dignities of the Church.

After having received the oath of the Genoese; planned, with the engineer Forfait, the future naval establishment that he wished to create in that sea, and intrusted to the arch-chancellor Lebrun the task of organizing this new portion of the Empire, Napoleon set out for Turin, where he pretended to occupy himself with reviews; then, on the evening of the 8th of July, leaving the empress in Italy, he started with two very humble post-carriages, caused himself to be represented on the road as the minister of the interior, and, in eighty hours, reached Fontainebleau. He arrived there on the morning of the 11th. The arch-chancellor Cambacérès, and the ministers, were already awaiting there to receive his final orders. He was about to depart on an expedition which was to render him absolute master of the world, or plunge him, like another Pharaoh, into the abysses of the deep. Never had he been more calm, cheerful, or confident. But no matter what even the greatest geniuses may will, their will, however powerful it may be, is still but the will of man; it is scarcely a caprice without strength, when the will of Providence is opposed to it. Here is a memorable

example of it. While Napoleon had every thing prepared for the meeting with armed Europe between Boulogne and Dover, Providence prepared that meeting for him in very different places!

The Emperor Alexander had adjourned the ratification of the treaty which constituted the new coalition to the moment when England should consent to evacuate Malta. Not doubting of a favourable reply, he had demanded passports for M. de Nowosiltzoff, in order to put himself as early as possible in communication with Napoleon. The Emperor Alexander, less martially disposed as he approached the denouement, hoped, by this promptitude to increase the chances of peace. But he had misjudged the cabinet of London. That cabinet, resolved to preserve a capital position, which the course of events, and an act of bad faith had thrown into its hands, had positively refused to abandon the island of Malta. That intelligence, which arrived at St. Petersburg while M. de Nowosiltzoff was at Berlin, had thrown the Russian cabinet into indescribable confusion. What was to be done? To give way to whatever England chose, to submit to all the exactions of her intractable ambition, would be to accept, in the eyes of Europe, a very inferior part, and to give up the negotiation of M. de Nowosiltzoff, for he would be dismissed from Paris on the very day of his arrival there, and probably in a humiliating manner, should he not take with him the evacuation of Malta. It was, therefore, immediate war for the profit of England, at her beck, at her wages, and Europe would know that it was so. On the other hand, to break with her on account of this refusal, was publicly to confess having engaged in a course of policy without understanding it; to decide, before the whole world, in favour of Napoleon, and to place Russia in a ridiculous isolation, involved in a quarrel with England on account of exactions, and with France on account of levities. To avoid being at the mercy of England was to become at the mercy of Napoleon, who would be master of the conditions of reconciliation with France.¹ If Napoleon had not come to the aid of the Russian cabinet, by his error in annexing Genoa to France, he would now have seen his enemies plunged into the greatest confusion. In fact, the Russian cabinet was busily deliberating upon this grave situation, when it was informed of the annexation of Genoa. It was a real subject of rejoicing, for that unforeseen event released from their embarrassment, statesmen, who had most imprudently committed themselves. It was resolved to noise the tidings abroad to the utmost, and to declare very plainly that it was impossible to treat with a government which daily committed new usurpations. A very natural pretext was hereby furnished for recalling M. de Nowosiltzoff from Berlin, and an order was instantly despatched to him to return to St. Petersburg, leaving behind him a note to the King of Prussia, explanatory of this change of determination. The Russian cabi-

¹ It is from authentic documents, that I describe this embarrassment of the Russian cabinet.

net now held itself released from the necessity of urging England to the evacuation of Malta, and ratified the treaty which constituted the third coalition, alleging the recent usurpations of the Emperor of the French.

M. de Nowosiltzoff was at Berlin, whither the King of Prussia had at length arrived. The order for his return surprised and deeply annoyed him, for it was an opportunity lost of undertaking the finest of negotiations. He did not disguise his displeasure from the king himself, made him aware of his own personal inclination to do every thing to win over the Emperor of the French, had he gone on to Paris, and disclosed to him even the concessions to which he would have subscribed in the name of his court. It was an additional reason for the King of Prussia to deplore the new impulse to which Napoleon had yielded, and to make his usual complaints of it, complaints very mild, as was his custom, but also very melancholy, for every additional risk added to the already very numerous risks of war affected him deeply.

At Vienna the effect was still more decisive. It was not from an embarrassment arising out of inconsiderate conduct that the cabinet of Vienna was drawn, but from long prudential hesitations. That cabinet had long perceived that Napoleon desired to possess himself of the whole of Italy, and could not resign itself to abandon her to him without making one last resistance with all the courage of despair. But the Austrian finances were in a deplorable condition, and a frightful dearth of grain afflicted upper and lower Austria, Bohemia, Moravia, and Hungary. Bread was so dear at Vienna, that the usually mild and submissive population of that capital grew so enraged, as even to plunder the shops of some bakers. Thus situated, Austria would still have hesitated for a long time ere she would have plunged herself into the expense of opposing so formidable an enemy as Napoleon; but on learning the annexation of Genoa, and the creation of the duchy of Lucca, all doubts ceased on the instant. The resolution to fight was immediately taken. Despatches were sent to St. Petersburg announcing the resolution, and were received with joy by the Russian cabinet, which, seeing itself drawn into a war, looked upon the concurrence of Austria as the most fortunate of events.

The adhesion of that court to the coalition was signed forthwith. Russia undertook to negotiate with England; to provide Austria with the largest possible sum of subsidy. They asked and obtained for the first expenses of opening the campaign, 100,000,000*l.* sterling, besides the immediate advance of the moiety of the annual subsidy, that is to say, 200,000,000*l.* sterling more. The plan of the campaign, discussed between M. de Vinzingerode and the Prince of Schwartzberg,¹ was settled on the 16th of July. It was agreed that

ten thousand Russians and some thousands of Albanians should be opportunely thrown into Naples, to prepare a movement upon Lower Italy, while one hundred thousand Austrians should march upon Lombardy; that the grand Austrian army, supported by a Russian army of sixty thousand men at fewest, entering by Galicia, should operate in Bavaria; that an army of eighty thousand Russians should advance towards Prussia; that another army of Russians, English, Hanoverians, and Swedes, assembled in Swedish Pomerania, should proceed upon Hanover; and that, finally, the Russians should have considerable reserves to bring up wherever needed. The English were to effect disembarkations upon the points of the French Empire which were deemed the most accessible, as soon as the diversion with which Napoleon was threatened should have led to the dissolution of the army of the coasts of the ocean. It was settled that the troops destined to aid Austria should be ready to march before the autumn of the current year, to prevent Napoleon from taking advantage of the winter to destroy the Austrian army.

It was further agreed that the court of Vienna, continuing its system of deep dissimulation, should persist in denying its military preparations, while making them more actively than ever; and then, when dissimulation was no longer possible, should speak of negotiating and of resuming on her own part, and that of Russia, the negotiations abandoned by M. de Nowosiltzoff. This time, also, all connection with England was to be disavowed, and the Continent alone to seem to be treated for. The usual falsehood of weakness characterized all this conduct. Prussia was in a state of cruel anxiety. Without completely penetrating it, she had had a presentiment of this determination to go to war, and she had kept herself aloof from all engagement, by alleging to Russia that she was too much exposed to the blows of Napoleon; and to Napoleon, who had renewed his offers of alliance to her, that she was too much exposed to the blows of Russia.

M. de Zastrow had returned from St. Petersburg after a disagreeable and bootless mission. An unforeseen circumstance nearly led to the sudden discovery of the coalition and the obligation of Prussia to pronounce. Since a treaty of subsidies concluded between England and Sweden had secured that, at least thus far, insane royalty to the coalition, Stralsund swarmed with troops. It is known that that important place was the last foothold that Sweden possessed in the north of Germany. Napoleon had perceived from certain reports of the diplomatic agents that something was brewing in that quarter, and had given notice of it to the King of Prussia, telling him to take care of that neutrality of the north of Germany, that great object of his anxiety, and that

¹ SCHWARTZENBERG, CHARLES PHILIP, Prince of. An Austrian field-marshal. Born at Vienna, in 1771, served in the early wars of the French Revolution with distinguished ability. In 1805 he commanded the right wing of the Austrian army, and after the day was lost cut his way through the enemy with a body of horse. The battle of Austerlitz, at which he was present, was

fought against his advice. In 1808 he was ambassador to Russia; in 1809 commanded the rear-guard after Wagram. In 1812 he commanded 30,000 men in Galicia. In 1813 was appointed generalissimo of the allied forces, and gained the great and final victory of Leipzig.—*Encyclopædia Americana*.

he, for his part, would send thirty thousand more men into Hanover at the first danger. These few words had sufficed to alarm the King of Prussia, who immediately desired the King of Sweden to cease from his military preparations in Swedish Pomerania. The King of Sweden, feeling secure of support, replied to the King of Prussia that he was master in his own territory; that he made preparations which he deemed to be necessary to his own safety; and that if the King of Prussia wished to restrict his liberty, he reckoned upon the King of England and the Emperor of Russia, his allies, to aid him in compelling respect to the independence of his states. His gasconading did not end there; he returned to king Frederick William the orders of Prussia, saying, that he would not wear them from the moment that they had been given to the most cruel enemy of Europe.

This affront deeply irritated Frederick William; extremely prudent as he was, he would have taken vengeance for it, had not Russia, immediately interfering, declared to Prussia that Swedish Pomerania was under the protection of Russia, and should remain inviolable. This sort of prohibition of action signified to Prussia, gave her much cause for reflection, and humiliated her no less. She determined to make no reply, confining herself to dismissing the Swedish minister, and declaring to Napoleon that she could not answer for what would take place in Hanover; but, nevertheless, she would guaranty that the Prussian territory should not serve as the road of an invading army.

The horizon, then, grew dark on all sides, and in a manner very visible to the dullest sight. From all parts assemblages of troops were announced, in Friuli, in the Tyrol, and in upper Austria. It was not simple concentrations of men that were spoken of, but of the organization of special services, which was more significant. Cavalry remounted, artillery provided with horses, and conducted in numerous trains to the banks of the Adige, considerable magazines were everywhere formed, bridges thrown over the Piave and the Jagliamento, and field-works thrown up in the lagunes of Venice; all this could scarcely leave any doubt. Austria denied with a falsehood of which there are but few examples in history, and confessed only some precautions in the Venetian states, caused by the French assemblages formed in Italy. As for the exchange of grand decorations which had been demanded of her, she had declined it under various pretexts.

It was upon this concatenation of circumstances that Napoleon had to come to a resolution in the few days that he was to pass at Fontainebleau and St. Cloud, previous to his departure for Boulogne. It was necessary to decide for the descent, or for an overwhelming march upon the continentals. On the 11th of July, the very day of his arrival at Fontainebleau, the arch-chancellor Cambacérès had repaired thither, and commenced consulting with him on the grand affairs of the moment. That grave personage was alarmed at the state of the Continent, and at the striking symptoms of an approaching war, and rightly looked upon

the annexations in Italy as being the inevitable cause of a rupture. In such a state of things he could not well comprehend that Napoleon should leave Italy and France open to the blows of the coalition, to throw himself upon England. Napoleon, full of confidence and enthusiasm for the vast maritime plan, of which he had not intrusted the whole secret even to the arch-chancellor, Napoleon was not embarrassed by any of these objections. In his opinion the acquisition of Genoa and Lucca did not concern Russia, for Italy was not calculated to be subject to her influence. That court ought to think it fortunate that he asked no account of the Russian proceedings in Georgia, in Persia, and even in Turkey. Russia had allowed herself to be engaged in the English policy; she was visibly in a state of coalition with her; M. de Nowosiltzoff was a mere English commissioner, whom they had wished to send, but whom he would have received accordingly. It was very evident that Russia and England were strongly engaged together, but those two powers could do nothing without Austria, without the armies and the territories of that power, and Austria, still impressed with a great dread of France, would still hesitate for some time ere she would be entirely gained over. At all events, she would not be ready soon enough to prevent the English expedition. A few days would suffice for the execution of that expedition, and the Channel being once crossed, all the coalitions would be destroyed at a single blow; and the arm of Austria, now raised against France, would be stricken down on the instant. "Leave it to me," said Napoleon to the arch-chancellor Cambacérès; "trust it to my activity: I will surprise the world by the grandeur and the rapidity of my strokes!"

He then gave some orders concerning Italy and the Rhine. He enjoined Eugene, who remained at Milan, and Marshal Jourdan, the young prince's military mentor, to set about provisioning fortresses, getting together field-artillery, purchasing draught-horses, and forming parks of artillery, and stores of ammunition and provisions. He ordered the troops who had been reviewed at Marengo and Castiglione to be moved towards the Adige. He had some time previously posted a reserve division in the neighbourhood of Pescara, to support General St. Cyr, should he need it. He directed that general to obtain all possible information, and, should he discover the slightest attempt of the Russians or the English upon any part whatever of the Calabrias, to pass from Tarento to Naples itself, drive the court from the kingdom, and keep possession of it.

He sent forward upon the Rhine the heavy cavalry which was not intended to embark for England, and directed upon that same point the regiments which were not to be included in the expedition. He gave especial orders to commence the formation of field batteries at Metz, Strasburg, and Mayence.

He then gave his last instructions to M. de Talleyrand, with reference to diplomatic business. As often as any new information was received of the preparations of Austria, that court was immediately to be made aware of

he, convicted of its bad faith, and made to tremble for the consequences of its conduct. This time it would perish, and have no mercy shown, should it interrupt the expedition to England. As to Prussia, communications had long since been opened with her upon the subject of Hanover. It was necessary to seize upon the present opportunity to sound her about this valuable acquisition, to stimulate her known ambition, and, should she nibble at that bait, to offer it to her immediately, on condition of an alliance with France, concluded on the instant, and publicly proclaimed. With such an alliance, Napoleon was certain to freeze Austria with terror, and render her motionless for many a year. In any case, he was convinced that between Boulogne and Dover he was about to arrange matters better than they could be arranged by the most skillful and successful negotiations.

Time pressed, every thing was prepared on the coasts of the ocean, and at any moment Admiral Villeneuve might arrive before Ferrol, before Brest, and in the Channel. Admiral Missiessy had returned to Rochefort, after having traversed the Antilles, taken Dominica from the English, thrown troops, arms, and munitions in Guadaloupe and Martinique, taken numerous prizes, and displayed the French colours upon the ocean, without suffering a repulse. Nevertheless, he had returned too soon; and as he displayed some unwillingness to put to sea again, Napoleon had replaced him by Captain Lallemand, an excellent officer, whom he sent off before the ships were repaired, to give the meeting to Villeneuve in the latitudes of Ferrol. All this being finished, Napoleon repaired to Boulogne, leaving Messrs. Cambacérès and De Talleyrand at Paris, taking Marshal Berthier with him, and giving orders to Admiral Decrès to join him without delay. He arrived at Boulogne on the 3d of August, amidst the enthusiastic joy of the army, which began to be weary of daily repeating the same exercises, during two years and a half, and which firmly believed that, this time, Napoleon arrived to place himself at its head, and finally cross into England.

On the very morrow of his arrival, he had all the infantry mustered on the shore at low water-mark. It occupied above three leagues, and presented the enormous mass of 100,000 infantry, drawn up in a single line. In his whole warrior-life he had seen nothing finer. Accordingly, on returning to his head-quarters in the evening, he wrote these significant words to Admiral Decrès: "*The English know not what awaits them. If we have power of crossing for but twelve hours, England is no more!*"¹

He had now assembled, in the four ports of Ambleteuse, Vimereux, Boulogne, and Etaples, that is to say, to the leeward of Cape Grisnez, and to the windward of Boulogne, all the corps which were to embark on the flotilla. The

wish formed two years before was now realized, thanks to the pains taken in consolidating, and thanks to a splendid battle fought by the Dutch flotilla, under Admiral Verhuell, in doubling Cape Grisnez in presence of the English. That battle, fought on the 18th of July—29th Messidor—a few days previous to the arrival of Napoleon, was the most important that the flotilla had given to the English. Several divisions of Dutch gun-boats had fallen in at Cape Grisnez with forty-five sail of the English, consisting of ships of the line as well as frigates and corvettes, and had fought them with a rare coolness and complete success. The meeting at the Cape was dangerous, because, the water being deep there, the English vessels could press our slightly constructed vessels close, without fear of grounding. Notwithstanding this advantage of the enemy, the Dutch gun-boats supported themselves in presence of their powerful adversaries. The artillery that guarded the shore hastened to sustain them, the Boulogne flotilla ran out to their support, and, amidst a shower of projectiles, Admiral Verhuell, with Marshal Davoust by his side, passed at half cannon-shot from the English squadron without losing a single vessel. This battle established the reputation of Admiral Verhuell, who already enjoyed great esteem in the expedition, and infused confidence into the hundred and sixty thousand men, soldiers and sailors, ready to cross the Channel upon the French and Dutch flotillas.

Napoleon had now his whole army under his hand. In two hours both men and horses could be embarked, and in two tides, that is to say, in twenty-four hours, they could be conveyed to Dover. As for the *materiel*, it was embarked.

The army assembled on this point, successively increased, now amounted to nearly one hundred and thirty-two thousand fighting men, and fifteen thousand horses, independently of the corps of General Marmont stationed at the Texel, amounting to twenty-four thousand men, and of the four thousand Brest men destined to sail with the squadron of Gautaume.

The one hundred and thirty-two thousand who were to go on board the flotilla and sail from the four ports of Ambleteuse, Vimereux, Boulogne, and Etaples, were divided into six corps. The advanced-guard, commanded by Lannes, fourteen thousand strong, consisting of the Gagan division and of the famous grenadiers united, encamped at Arras, was to embark at Vimereux. Those ten battalions of grenadiers, forming by themselves a corps of eight thousand men, of the finest infantry in the world, embarked on a light division of pinnaces, were called to the honour of being the first to throw themselves upon the shore of England, under the inspiring impulse of Lannes and Oudinot.² Then came the main

¹ Letter to M. Decrès, of the 16th Thermidor, year XIII. — 4th of August, 1805. — *Archives of the Secretary of State.*

² OUDINOT, CHARLES NICHOLAS. Born in 1767, at Bar sur Ornin, the son of a brewer. He entered the army young, and soon obtained a commission by his bravery and daring. He distinguished himself so much under — he, Pichegru, Moreau, Masséna, and Napoleon, that

it was a matter of surprise that he was not made a marshal. After Wagram, he was made Duke of Reggio, &c. In the Russian expedition he commanded the twelfth corps with his wonted valour and skill.

He received twenty wounds in battle, and though he had abundant opportunities of amassing wealth, continued honourably poor. — (*Fort and Camp of Napoleon.*)

body, divided into right wing, centre, and left wing. The right wing, under the command of Davoust, numbering twenty-six thousand men, consisting of the valiant divisions of Mirand,¹ Friant, and Gudin, which have since distinguished themselves at Awerstaedt and in a hundred fights, was destined to embark at Ambleteuse upon the Dutch flotilla. The centre, under Marshal Soult, numbering forty-six thousand men, distributed into four divisions, at the head of which were Generals Vandamme,² Suchet, Le Grand, and St. Hilaire,³ were to embark upon the four escadrilles that were assembled at Boulogne. Finally, the left, or camp of Montreuil was under the command of the intrepid Ney. It consisted of twenty-two thousand men; it reckoned three divisions, and especially the Dupont division, which soon after covered itself with glory at Albex, at the bridge of Halle, and at Friedland. This corps was to depart from Etaples upon two escadrilles of the flotilla. A division of the *déte* of the guard, three thousand strong, and already on their march, was about to arrive at Boulogne, there to join the centre.

Finally, the sixth subdivision of that grand army was what was called the reserve. It was under the command of Prince Louis; it comprised the dragoons and the foot chasseurs, commanded by Generals Klein and Margarm; the heavy cavalry commanded by Nansouty,⁴ and an Italian division, perfectly disciplined, and not yielding in steadiness of bearing to the finest French divisions. Napoleon had said, that he would show the English what they had never seen since Cæsar, Italians in their island, and teach those Italians to esteem themselves in bringing to fight as well as the French. This reserve, amounting to twenty-seven thousand men, and posted in the rear of all the other camps, was to march to the shore when the five first corps of the army had sailed; and as it was supposed that a squadron covered the passage, we should for some days be masters of the Strait; the transport flotilla, parting company for a few hours with the war flotilla, was to come and embark this reserve, as well as the second half of the horses. In fact, out of fifteen thousand horses, the flotilla could only embark eight thousand at a time. A second transport was to take the other seven thousand.

Thus, besides the twenty-four thousand men of Marmont, embarked in the fleet of the Texel, and the four thousand men embarked at Brest, Napoleon could at once put in motion a total mass of one hundred and thirty-two thousand men, being one hundred thousand infantry,

seven thousand mounted, and twelve thousand dismounted cavalry, and thirteen thousand artillery.⁵

It was in this formidable array that Napoleon awaited the squadron of Villeneuve.

That admiral, as we have seen, had sailed on the 30th of March from Toulon, with eleven vessels, of which two were eighty-gun ships and six frigates. Nelson cruised towards Barcelona. Endeavouring to make it believed that his intention was to remain in those latitudes, he had suddenly steered to the south of Sardinia, in the hope that the French, misled by the reports that he had circulated, would endeavour to avoid the coast of Spain, and so meet him by their own act. The French fleet having run out with a fair wind, and being informed of the truth by a Ragusan vessel, steered between Majorca and Minorca on the one hand, and Carthage on the other, touched at the last-named place on the 7th of April, and lay there one day owing to a dead calm. Villeneuve offered the Spanish admiral, Gálcedo, permission to join his squadron, an offer which, for want of orders, the latter could not accept; and Villeneuve, resuming his course with a favourable wind, arrived on the 9th of April at the entrance of the Straits of Gibraltar. On the same day, at noon, he entered the Strait, in two columns, his frigates in advance, all his vessels cleared for action, and every thing prepared for fighting. The French fleet was perceived by the look-out at Gibraltar, the alarm-bells rung, and the alarm-guns were fired, for there was only a very weak division in the port. On the same evening, Villeneuve hove in sight of Cadiz.

Advised by his signals, the captain of l'Aigle hastened to run out of port, and the brave Gravina, who had neglected nothing to be in readiness, hastened to weigh anchor to join the French admiral. But many things were still left undone at Cadiz. The two thousand five hundred Spaniards, who were to be conveyed to the islands, were not even embarked. All the provisions were not yet got on board. It would have required at least eight-and-forty hours more for Admiral Gravina to have been fully ready; but Villeneuve was in a hurry to be gone, and said that he would not wait if they could not join him at once. Although somewhat recovered from the anxiety of his first sortie, he was still haunted by the image of Nelson, whom he constantly fancied he saw in pursuit of him.

Gravina, deeply devoted to the projects of Napoleon, embarked *pêle-mêle*, determining to complete stowage and other arrangements at

¹ At that time the Bissou division.

² VANDAMME, DOMINIQUE. Born at Cassel, in 1771, the son of an apothecary. He entered the army early in the Revolution, and rose rapidly, owing to his desperate courage. In 1799 he was appointed general of division, and commanded the left wing of the army of the Danube. He distinguished himself much in the campaign of 1800; but a quarrel with Jerome prevented his sharing the perils of the Russian expedition. In 1813 he brought up a body of troops to re-enforce the grand army, and was defeated and made prisoner by Ostman. In the Hundred Days he commanded the third corps d'armée under Grouchy, and distinguished himself at Wavres. After the route of Waterloo, though in danger of being crushed by superior numbers, he made good his retreat in perfect order, with his corps almost untouched. He died at Cassel, in 1830.—*Encyclopædia Americana*

³ SAINT HILAIRE. A very gallant general of division. He distinguished himself greatly at Austerlitz, where he lost a leg.

⁴ NANSOUTY. One of the most distinguished of the French cavalry officers. His carabineers were as well known as the cuirassiers of Milhaud, and he had perhaps no superior except Murat.

⁵ I have taken all these numbers from the memorandum-book of the Emperor; the very book which he carried with him. This memorandum is deposited at the Louvre, and it alone gives the true statistics of the army of the Ocean, which are not to be found in the archives of either the war or the navy department. Consequently all military works have given incorrect numbers relatively to the composition of the army.

sea, and sailed out of Cadiz during the night. Such, it deed, were the hurry and confusion of this sort, that one vessel actually took the ground.

About two o'clock in the morning, Villeneuve, who had been riding at a single anchor, took advantage of the wind, and resumed his course to the west. On the 11th, he was well out at sea, having escaped the dreaded observation of the English. During the 11th and 12th he awaited the Spanish ships, but only two of them hove in sight, and, being unwilling to lose any more time, he made sail, reckoning that they would rejoin him either *en route*, or at Martinique, for every commander had received information of that general rendezvous. Moreover, no one but Villeneuve knew the main destination of the squadron.

Villeneuve should now have felt reassured, and have taken some confidence in himself, for he had conquered the most serious difficulties of his undertaking, in quitting Toulon, crossing the strait, and rallying the Spaniards, without accident. But the sight of his crews filled him with vexation. He saw that they were far inferior to those of the English, and to those of France in the time of the American war. It was very natural that they should be so, seeing that they had just left port for the first time. He complained not merely of the quality of his seamen, but also of the vessels themselves, and of their equipment. Three of his ships were inferior or bad sailers: these were *le Formidable*, *l'Intrepide*, and especially *l'Atlas*. A new vessel, *le Pluton*, had bad iron work, which frequently broke. Admiral Villeneuve was annoyed by all this, to an extent which affected his confidence. The Emperor's aide-de-camp, Lauriston, had made every effort to cheer him, but to little purpose. For the rest, he had excellent captains, who supplied, as far as possible, the inexperience of the crews and the defects of the fleet. Villeneuve was not consoled until he saw the condition of the Spanish ships, which were inferior to his own. However, the voyage though retarded by their slow sailers, which is not uncommon when sailing in a squadron, appeared a fortunate one, and continued without accident.

Nelson, outwitted, had in the first instance sought after the French squadron to the south and to the east of the Mediterranean. He had learned, on the 16th of April, that the French squadron had steered for the Straits, had been detained by westerly winds till the 30th, had anchored, on the 10th of May, in the bay of Lagos, and, after detaching one of his ships to escort a convoy, he had not made the ocean till the 11th of May, to sail for the Antilles, whither he supposed our squadron to have steered.

At this period, Villeneuve had very nearly reached his destination, for, on the 14th of May, he made Martinique, having been six weeks on the passage. On touching there, he had the gratification of recovering the four

Spanish sail which had parted company with the squadron, and which arrived nearly at the same time that he did. It was a great advantage, and he ought now to have felt a little more confidence in his fortune, which hitherto had given him none but favourable events.

This voyage had been of great service. It had given experience to the crews, as the weather had been moderate, to put the rigging into ship-shape. "*We are,*" wrote General Lauriston to the Emperor, "*stronger by one-third than we were when we sailed.*"¹

A fleet already disciplined and practised, gains nothing by a voyage of twelve or fifteen hundred leagues the more, but a fleet which has never before been out of sight of port, will, in such a voyage, acquire the main of the instruction it required, and such was the case with ours.

Admiral Villeneuve, alarmed at this responsibility, and not setting due value upon any of the advantages which had been procured for him, considered that we were destitute of so many requisites, that some improvements, made on the passage, would not suffice to supply our deficiencies. He had the folly, like a man whose moral courage is shaken, to exaggerate the merit of the enemy, and to under-rate that of his own men. He said that with twenty French or Spanish ships he would not venture to offer battle to fourteen sail of English, and this language he held in the presence of his own officers. Fortunately, the soldiers and sailors, full of zeal, were not so much impressed as their commander with the insufficiency of our means, but full of confidence in their own courage, ardently desired to engage the enemy. General Lauriston, whom the Emperor had attached to Villeneuve, that he might sustain and excite him, fulfilled his duty with untiring zeal, but rather contributed to vex and irritate him by contradiction. Gravina, simple, sensible, and full of energy, agreed with Villeneuve as to the quality of his squadron, but with Lauriston, as to the necessity of unwavering devotion, and was resolved, if necessary, to sacrifice his own existence in seconding the designs of Napoleon.

Now that they had escaped all the perils of the voyage, it was necessary to wait forty days at Martinique, for the arrival of Gauteaume, unaware of his detention at Brest by that rare occurrence, an equinox, without a single gale. Villeneuve, then, having arrived at Martinique on the 11th of May, had to remain in those latitudes until the 23d of June, and he reflected, with vexation, that that was a space of time even more than sufficient to allow of his being overtaken by Nelson, and blockaded in Martinique, or beaten if he ventured out.

His orders were, to wait for Gauteaume, which implied a sort of inaction; and, like all men who are ill at ease, he wished to be in motion. He complained of being unable to

¹ All our vessels are in good order, and in better order, in my opinion, than when we first sailed from Toulon. The moderate weather has afforded the opportunity of setting up the rigging by degrees; notwithstanding this, the chains, and, generally speaking, all the iron work of the *Pluton* and of the *Horwien* are of such bad quality,

as well as the mast and spars, that many of them have been sprung.

At present, every thing is refitted; the sailors have learned a great deal; there is a sensible difference in the working of the ships; we are stronger by one-third than at the moment of our first sailing.—Letter of General Lauriston to the Emperor.

go and ravage the islands of the English, which, but for his orders, he easily could have done with twenty sail. To pass away the time, they took the Diamond fort, which is in front of Martinique, and which Admiral Missiessy, to the great regret of Napoleon, had neglected to capture. It was cannonaded by several ships, and then some hundreds of men landed from the boats, and carried it by assault. They now would fain have completed the occupation of Dominica, by the capture of the Bluff of Cabry, of which, also, Admiral Missiessy had neglected to make himself master; but this position, strongly defended by nature and art, required a regular siege, and that they could not venture to undertake. Villeneuve sent his frigates, which were excellent and fast sailers, to cruise in the Antilles, to make prizes, and procure him tidings of the enemy.

They had brought troops; Missiessy had also brought some; there were about 12,000 men in the French Antilles. Such a force would have sufficed for the execution of important operations, but they could not be ventured upon, from the fear of missing Gauteaume. For the rest, the French islands were in the best conditions, garrisoned, provided with munitions, thanks to the privateers, with abundance of provisions, and, moreover, animated by the best spirit. However, to prevent the crews from further contracting the sickness which had begun to prevail among them from their stay in this climate, and also with the view of preventing desertion, to which the Spaniards showed a strong inclination, it was determined to attempt a *coup de main* upon Barbadoes, where the English had important military establishments. It was in that island, in fact, that they kept all the *dépôts* of their colonial troops. General Lauriston had brought with him an excellent division of five thousand men, organized and equipped with the greatest care. It was intended for this service. General Lauriston determined to go by Guadaloupe to take up another battalion there, for it was expected to find some ten thousand men at Barbadoes, half militia, and half troops of the line. It was determined, then, to set out on the 4th of June; but on the very day appointed Rear-admiral Magon arrived with the two vessels, from Rochefort, which Napoleon had despatched to convey the first tidings of the change which had taken place in his projects. Magon brought word, that as Gauteaume had not been able to get out of Brest, it was necessary to go and release from blockade, not only him, but also the Ferrol squadron, and, after rallying the fleets which were in those parts, steer in a body for the Channel. However, he, at the same time, brought orders for remaining at Martinique till the 21st of June, as, up to the 21st of May,

it was possible for Gauteaume, in which case, allowing a month for the passage from Brest to Martinique, it could not be definitively known until the 21st of June, whether that admiral had sailed or not. There was sufficient time, therefore, for persisting in the project as to Barbadoes. Magon had brought troops and munitions in his ships. He joined the squadron, now twenty-seven sail strong, fourteen being French sail of the line, six Spanish sail of the line, and seven frigates. On the 6th of June they reached Guadaloupe; here they took up a battalion; on the 7th they had got up to Antigua, on the 8th they had got clear of that island, which had incessantly fired upon them, when they came in sight of a convoy of fifteen sail which had left Antigua. They were merchantmen, laden with colonial produce, and conveyed only by a corvette.

The admiral instantly gave the signal to give chase, according to sailing, as the sailors have it; that is to say, that each vessel should do its best, and take the rank that it could get by its speed. Before evening the envoy was taken. It was of the value of from nine to ten millions of francs. Some American and Italian passengers gave intelligence of Nelson. They stated that they had arrived at Barbadoes, as they left that island. They varied as to the strength of his squadron. But he had been joined by Admiral Cochrane,¹ who guarded those seas. This intelligence produced an extraordinary effect upon the mind of Admiral Villeneuve. He fancied he saw Nelson, with fourteen, sixteen, perhaps even eighteen sail; that is to say, with a force nearly equal to his own, ready to come up with him, and give him battle. On the instant he formed the determination of returning to Europe. Lauriston, on the contrary, resting upon the assertion of the prisoners, which gave only two sail to Cochrane, which must suppose that Nelson had at most only fourteen, maintained that with twenty we were able to fight him to advantage, and that, after having rid ourselves of his pursuit, by a battle, our expedition would be far more secure of success. Villeneuve was not of this opinion, but would absolutely make sail for Europe. So much in haste was he, that he would not even return to the French Antilles, to restore the troops he had taken thence. To do this, it would have been necessary to beat up against the wind that blows from east to west, along the Antilles, and they were now at Antigua, far to the west of Martinique. Ten days, perhaps, would have been lost, and they would have run the risk of meeting with the English. He, therefore, determined to select his four best frigates, to stand as many troops on board them as he could, and to despatch them for Martinique. He gave them orders to rejoin

¹ COCHRANE, THE HONOURABLE ALEXANDER, afterward Sir Alexander, and vice-admiral. An officer of merit. In 1795 he fought an action with the *Thetis* 38, and *Husar* 28, against a French squadron of five sail off Cape Henry. Three of the five surrendered; but one got off again, owing to the disabled state of the British. In 1800 he led the division of boats into Aboukir Bay with Abercromby's army, landing gallantly under a tremendous fire. In 1805 he sailed with a squadron of six ships of the line in pursuit of Missiessy to the West Indies, but missed him and was soon afterward joined by Nelson

at Jamaica. In 1806 he fought in the spirited action off St. Domingo under Sir John Duckworth, with six seventy-four gun-ships, against five sail of the French line, one of one hundred and twenty, two of eighty-four, two of seventy-four, two frigates, and a corvette. One French eighty-four and two seventy-fours taken. In 1808, in concert with General Beckwith, he reduced Martinique, and in 1811 he took Guadaloupe, and was appointed governor of that island. In 1814 he commanded on the North American station.—*Brenton's Naval History* a.

the squadron at the Western Islands. But there still remained some four or five thousand troops on board, and these were a very embarrassing freight. By keeping them, he would deprive the colonies of a very valuable force, which it was very difficult to send to them from the mother country; besides having so many more mouths to feed, which was very vexatious, seeing that he was somewhat short of provisions, and had barely water enough for the passage. Further, there was the risk of missing Gauteaume, as it was as yet uncertain whether he had left Brest for Martinique. As to the fact, they were right in supposing that Gauteaume had not set out, but they did not certainly know it, and the course proposed was, therefore, a serious blunder. To these objections, Villeneuve replied, that if Gauteaume had set out, it was so much the better; that in that case they would not have to raise the blockade of Brest, but could pass that port without difficulty, to enter into the Channel.

Villeneuve at once formed his determination, put all the troops that he could on board the frigates, and sent them to Martinique. Unwilling either to hamper himself with the convoy, or to lose it, he gave it in charge to another frigate, to escort it to one of the French islands. On the 10th of June he was on his passage to Europe. His resolution, though censurable in principle, was not bad in effect, if he had returned to Martinique to land his troops, to revictual and to take in water, and to receive tidings from Europe.

Nelson, whom he so much dreaded, had arrived at Barbadoes early in June, after a prodigiously rapid voyage, sailing fearlessly with only nine ships. Imagining that the French intended to retake Trinidad from the Spaniards, he had embarked two thousand men at Barbadoes, rallied the two vessels of Admiral Cochrane, without staying to revictual or refit, and on the 7th he was in the Gulf of Persia, before Trinidad. There he discovered his error, set sail again, and on the 10th made Grenada. He prepared to return to Barbadoes, to land there the troops he had needlessly brought thence, and to return to Europe with eleven sail. What activity! what energy! It is a new proof that in war—and in war by sea still more than in war by land—the quality of the forces is always of more consequence than their quantity. Nelson, with but eleven sail, was full of confidence, on those seas on which Villeneuve trembled with twenty sail, and those manned by heroic sailors!

Villeneuve steered for Europe, bearing to the north-west with pretty favourable weather. On making the Western Islands, on the 30th of June, he there found his frigate, who had occupied but four days in landing their troops, and who had not fallen in with the English; which shows that Villeneuve might safely have done the same. The four detached frigates had fallen in with the fifth, which was escorting the captured convoy, and could not conduct it. They had therefore determined to burn it, which involved a loss of ten millions. All had then assembled at the Western Isles, and Villeneuve now resumed his voyage with the

twenty ships and seven frigates, shaping his course towards the coast of Spain. They were repaid for the loss of the burned convoy by the capture of a rich galleon from Lima, laden with dollars to the amount of from seven to eight millions, 280,000*l.* to 320,000*l.* sterling. It was a resource which soon became very valuable. Suddenly, at the commencement of July, when they were sixty leagues from Cape Finisterre, the wind blowing from the north-east, became entirely against them. They began to tack, in order to gain time without being driven back. But the wind continued in the same quarter, and became so violent that several vessels were damaged; some even losing their topmasts. The two ships that Magon had brought from Rochefort, had brought the Charente fever on board them. They were crowded with sick. The troops who had been carried from Europe to America, and from America to Europe, almost without touching land, were attacked by sickness of all sorts. Misery reigned throughout the squadron. Eighteen hours of a contrary wind completed that misery, and helped still further to depress the courage of Admiral Villeneuve. He wanted to go to Cadiz, that is to say, directly away from the point at which Napoleon expected him, and to which his instructions directed him. Lauriston resisted as strongly as possible, and at length prevailed over him. The wind, too, having shifted about the 20th of July, they again made for Ferrol.

The bad weather had caused two misfortunes: the first, the depression of the moral courage of both the squadron and its commander; and the second, giving intelligence of its course to the British Admiralty. Nelson had despatched in advance of him the brig *Le Curieux*, to convey to England the bulletin of his passage. This brig had seen the French squadron, and, making all sail, had arrived at Portsmouth on the 7th of July. On the 8th, the despatch had been delivered at the Admiralty. Though still unaware of the object of the French squadron, yet thinking it likely that it was to raise the blockade of Ferrol, the Admiralty had ordered Admiral Sterling, who was detached from the blockade of Brest, to watch Rochefort, to take five sail, and join Calder, who was cruising off Cape Finisterre. The long time which had elapsed since Napoleon thought of his grand naval plan; the various sorties that he caused to be attempted; the departure of Villeneuve; his passage to Cadiz; his junction with Gravina; his return to Europe, where two fleets, for a long time ready to sail, seemed to be waiting for him to raise their blockade; all these circumstances had at length by degrees led the English, at the least vaguely, to suspect a part of the projects of Napoleon. They did not exactly contemplate a junction of the French squadrons in the Channel, but they resolved to prevent the raising of the blockade of Ferrol or of Brest, which appeared to them to be the probable design. Accordingly, they had increased the blockading squadron of Cornwallis, before Brest, to twenty-four sail, of which five were detached to watch Rochefort, and ten to that of Ferrol. The latter was about to receive fourteen or fifteen sail.

by the junction of the division of Rochefort. Every delay is a misfortune for a project which requires secrecy. It gives the enemy time to reflect, sometimes to guess by dint of reflecting, and frequently thus to receive such indications as end by putting him on the right scent.

On the 22d of July, Villeneuve, sailing in three columns, was making for Ferrol, that is to say, to the north-east, with a tolerable north-west wind on his quarter. Towards the middle of the day he saw twenty-four sail,¹ of which fifteen were ships of the line; it was Admiral Calder's English squadron coming up in the opposite direction to meet him, and cut him off from Ferrol. They were forty leagues from that port.

There was not much room to doubt that a battle must take place. Villeneuve no longer thought of avoiding it; for it was responsibility, and by no means danger, of which he was afraid; but still worn to pieces with anxieties, he lost some precious time in ranging himself for battle. General Lauriston, urging him incessantly, pressed him to give at eleven o'clock in the morning the orders which he did not give until one. The best part of the day was thus wasted, which there was soon good reason to regret. The vessels of the two combined squadrons consumed two hours in forming in order to battle, and it was not until three o'clock in the afternoon that the twenty French and Spanish ships were brought into a regular line, the Spaniards occupying the head of the column, and Magon, with the Rochefort division and several frigates, its rear. The English admiral Calder, with fifteen ships of the line, several of them carrying a hundred guns, while our strongest of them were only of eighty, in his turn ranged up for battle, and formed a long line parallel to ours, but tacking in the opposite direction. The English bearing to the south-west, and we to the north-west, and the wind blowing from the north-west, both squadrons had it on their quarter. Each desfling, and in opposite directions, they would speedily have ended by avoiding each other, when Calder turned the head of his column to the rear of the other, in order to enclose it. Villeneuve, to whom danger restored the resolution of a man of courage, perceiving that the English admiral, according to a manœuvre often repeated in our age, wished to enclose our rear, so as to place it between two fires, imitated the manœuvre of his enemy, and coming, as seamen say, *luff by luff by the stern way*, brought off the rear of this column, and presented its head to the head of that of the enemy. In this double movement, the two squadrons meeting, the first Spanish vessel, the Argonaut, with Admiral Gravina on board, found itself engaged with the first English vessel, the Hero. English and French, following up this movement, were speedily engaged from one end of the line to the other. But the English squadron being less numerous than ours, the fire did not reach on one side further than to the thirteenth or fourteenth vessel. Our rear-guard, without

enemy before it, and merely receiving some stray shots, now was the time for some decisive manœuvre. Unfortunately, a heavy fog which at this moment prevailed over several hundreds of leagues, for it was visible at Brest, darkened the two fleets to such an extent, that the English admiral was for some time unaware whether he had an enemy on the starboard or on the larboard. Each ship could perceive only the one that was opposite to it, and fought only that. A smart and well-sustained, but not quick cannonading was heard. The French and Spaniards, notwithstanding their inexperience, fought coolly, and in good order. Our crews had not attained to that precision of fire which now distinguishes them; nevertheless, in this kind of duel, of ship to ship, the English suffered as much as we did; and if our rear, which had no enemy to engage it, could have discovered what was passing, and had doubled upon the English line, so as to place part of it between two fires, the victory would have been secured to us. Villeneuve, making nothing out through the fog, had difficulty in giving his orders. Magon, it is true, had made his inaction known to Villeneuve; but this information, owing to the state of the atmosphere, having been transmitted, not by signals, but by frigates, arrived too late, and induced no determination on the part of the French admiral, who, after a momentary decision at the commencement of the battle, had fallen back into his customary uncertainty, fearing to act in the dark lest he should make false movements. All that he ventured upon was to fight his flag-ship gallantly.

After a long cannonade, the English ship, the Windsor, had suffered so severely, that a frigate was obliged to tow her out of the line of battle to prevent her from falling into our hands. Other English vessels had also been much damaged. The French vessels, on the contrary, though they stood up gallantly, had been fortunate enough to escape serious damage. Our Spanish allies, who formed the first third of the line of battle, had suffered much more, without being at all in fault. Their three ships nearest to us, l'España, the San Firmo, and the San Rafaël, were in a sad condition. The San Firmo, especially, had lost two masts. As the wind blew from us to the English, these vessels, being unable to manœuvre, were drifting towards the enemy. Seeing this, the brave captain of the Pluton, M. de Cosmao, lying nearest to the Spaniards, quitted the line, and advanced to cover with his ship the disabled Spanish vessels. The first three Spaniards thus drifting, the San Rafaël, a heavy sailer, endeavoured to let herself run between the two lines towards the rear-guard, in the hope of escaping by this movement. The San Firmo, which had suffered more, was in vain protected by M. de Cosmao, who could not prevent her from going to leeward and thus falling into the hands of the English. M. de Cosmao succeeded in saving l'España, which, thanks to him, was kept in our line. About six o'clock a gleam of clear weather disclosed this spectacle to Admiral Villeneuve. The San Rafaël was seen escaping to the rear-guard, and the San

¹ See note to p. 669. Sir Robert Calder.

Firme, already surrounded by enemies, drawn gradually towards the English squadron. As they fought at long shot, there was sufficient space between the two to allow of a forward movement, by which movement our disabled vessels would again have made part of our line. General Lauriston kept by the side of Villeneuve, and he heard the officers of the squadron proposing that movement. He therefore advised him to make the signal for bearing up all together, that is to say, for yielding to the wind, which, blowing towards the English, would have enabled us to envelop our endangered vessels. We should have been nearer to the enemy, and he, damaged and inferior in number, would probably have given way before this offensive movement. Villeneuve, in consequence of the fog, seeing but imperfectly what was passing, and fearing to derange his line of battle, and to run new risks, preferred the loss of two ships to the chance of recommencing the action. He consequently refused to give the order, which was solicited on all hands. At this moment night drew on, and the firing had almost ceased. The English drew off, towing with them two of their ships which were much shattered by the fire, and the two Spaniards that were abandoned to them by our blunder.

As for us, we had suffered but little; there was not one of our crews that was not ready to recommence the fight, and who did not believe himself a conqueror on seeing the field of battle left to us. The loss of the two Spanish vessels was unknown in the fleet.

All night the English were visible far away to leeward, with lights astern, busied in repairing damages.

The same was done on our side. At day-break of the day, the situation of the two squadrons was clearly discernible. The English were retreating, but taking the two Spanish vessels with them. Grief and exasperation became general on board our vessels. The crews asked to renew the fight and have a decisive action. The wind was in our favour, as on the previous evening, blowing from us toward the English. If at this instant Villeneuve had given the signal to bear down upon the enemy, without any other order of battle than the order of speed in sailing, fourteen of the eighteen vessels we still possessed, being of an equal rate of speed, would have fallen upon the English at once; the other four would have arrived soon afterwards, and the battle would certainly have been in our favour. Roused by the cry which arose among all the officers, Villeneuve at length gave orders for that movement, and went with Lauriston on board the frigate l'Hortense, to give his orders verbally to each chief of division. The Argonaut, the Spanish admiral ship, having sprung her mizen-top-yard, required time to fish it. Villeneuve would wait for her, which took till near noon. Then he commenced the chase; but the wind had slackened, and he saw the English steal away from him without his being able to gain much upon them even under a press of sail. Imagining that he should not overtake them till night, he waited till morning, in order to fight by daylight. But on the morrow the wind had shifted

to the north-east, that is to say, in the very contrary direction. The English now had the weather-gage; to come up with them was difficult. Villeneuve had now good reason to halt. In pursuing the contrary course he would have been getting further and further from Ferrol, and have run the risk of finding the English reinforced, and thus, for two damaged and captured vessels, have sacrificed his main object, the raising the Ferrol blockade and pursuing his mission.

Thus ended the battle, which might have been taken for a victory on our side but for the loss of the two Spanish ships. The crews notwithstanding their inexperience, had fought bravely and well; but, on the other hand, the fog, which had increased the natural indecision of Admiral Villeneuve, his exaggerated want of confidence in himself and in his seamen, had paralyzed the resources that he had at his command, and prevented this battle from ending in a brilliant success. There, as in so many naval battles, one wing of our fleet did not aid the other; but, on this occasion, it was not the fault of the wing that remained inactive, for rear-admiral Magon was not the officer who would willingly keep out of fire. In the first moments after the battle, Villeneuve was almost happy that he had met the English without experiencing a disaster; but having left the scene of action, and having had time for reflection, his discouragement and habitual melancholy deepened down into a profound grief. In his imagination, he saw himself exposed to the censure of Napoleon and of public opinion for having lost two ships while fighting with twenty against fifteen. He believed himself disgraced, and fell into a kind of depression that bordered upon despair. The severe judgment of his people, who openly complained of his want of resolution, and were loud in their praise of the bravery and decision of Admiral Gravina, cut him to the heart's core. To complete his misfortune, the wind, which for two days had been favourable, had now become contrary again. To the sick, whose numbers had increased, the wounded had now to be added. There were not the necessary refreshments for them, and there was only water for five or six days. Thus situated, he again wanted to proceed to Cadix. Lauriston again opposed that they split the difference, and run into Vigo.

This port was far from being secure, and, moreover, had no great resources to offer. However, succour was found there for the sick and wounded. Three vessels, one French, l'Atlas, and two Spanish, l'America and l'Española, were such heavy sailers that they could not keep together with the squadron. The Atlas was turned into an hospital, into which the sick and wounded were conveyed. General Lauriston had brought with him, for the use of his division, the necessaries for a field hospital; and he employed it for the succour of the sailors who were left at Vigo. The treasure of the Spanish galleon was now in part employed in supplying the various wants of the squadron. Fresh provisions were laid in, and water for a month; wages were paid to the whole squadron; and having somewhat

reanimated the men's spirits, no difficult matter with sailors of a mercurial temperament, they set sail again after a stay of five days, which had been serviceable. The wind not being foul, the squadron stood up from Vigo to Ferrol, and, on the 2d of August, entered the open roadstead which separates Ferrol from Cerogue.

The moment the French squadron hove in sight, the consular agents, who were stationed on the shore by the orders of Napoleon, communicated to Admiral Villeneuve the orders which awaited him. These orders enjoined him not to enter Ferrol, which was difficult of egress; barely to allow himself time to rally the two divisions which awaited the junction, and then to proceed to Brest. Villeneuve transmitted this order to Gravina; but he was already in the pass, and could not retrograde, and a part of the squadron entered with him. The rest, obeying Villeneuve, brought up opposite, that is to say, at Corunna.

This separation placed the two squadrons at three or four leagues distance from each other. The greatest evil that could result from that was the loss of three or four days in getting out again. This loss would have been greatly to be regretted, with an admiral who was not in the habit of losing days at a stretch; but with Villeneuve it was of minor importance.

That admiral found at Corunna the pressing orders of Napoleon, his encouraging words, and his magnificent promises, as well as the private communications of the Minister Dercès, the friend of his boyhood. The Emperor and the minister both urged him not to remain for an instant; to hasten to Brest, and give battle to Cornwallis, at the risk even of annihilation, provided that Gauteaume succeeded in getting out safe and sound, and to rally what might remain entire of the squadron which he would have released from blockade. All these things, for a moment, revived the spirits and courage of Villeneuve. The little consequence that Napoleon attached to the sacrifice of ships, provided only that a fleet should arrive in the Channel, greatly tended to reassure him. Had he rightly comprehended the task intrusted to him, he would have been gratified, rather than sunk into despondency. After all, if the enemy had captured two vessels from him in the late battle, he had regained Ferrol safe and sound, escaped the enemy's squadrons, and eluded the precautions of the English Admiralty. Of the two admirals, the English and the French, Calder, not Villeneuve, was the most ill-treated by fortune; for Villeneuve, had achieved his object, and Calder had failed in his. Deducting the two vessels which had been taken, and the three which had been left at Vigo, he had now twenty-nine French and Spanish vessels assembled at Ferrol, which might at any moment be increased to thirty-four by the division of Lallemand, and then strong enough to attempt to raise the blockade of Brest. Moreover, the English Admiralty itself, and Napoleon, were of the same opinion; the Admiralty sent Admiral Calder before a court-martial,¹ and Napoleon publicly addressed great praises to Villeneuve, for having fulfilled his mission,

said he, although two ships remained in the hands of the enemy.

What fear, then, could an officer conceive for his reputation, to whom an all-powerful master, disposing of the reputation and the fortunes of his lieutenants, constantly said: "Give battle, risk all, provided only that your efforts open the port of Brest." But it seems that there was a sort of fatality attached to this unfortunate seamen, to disturb his spirit, and to lead him from pang to pang to the result which he fain would have shunned, that is to say, to losing a great battle, and losing it without obtaining the only result that Napoleon demanded of him, that of being four-and-twenty hours in the Channel.

Nevertheless, he felt some consolation on seeing the division of Rear-admiral Gourdon, which division had sailed much previously to being shut up in Ferrol, had been carefully repaired and completed, and merited every confidence. He saw, with no less satisfaction, nine Spanish ships equipped by M. de Grandellana, and far superior to those of Admiral Gravina, because that time had been bestowed upon equipping them, which could not be spared for those which had sailed from Cadiz. "Would to Heaven," wrote Villeneuve, when he had compared the division of Ferrol and that of Cadiz, "that the Spanish squadron (l'Argonaut, and the line-of-battle ship l'Atlas, alone excepted) had never made part of my squadron. Those vessels are absolutely fit for nothing but to peril their consorts. They alone have brought us to the lowest depths of misfortune." This language shows how deeply Villeneuve's feelings were shocked, since he characterizes as "the lowest depths of misfortune," a cruise which, thus far, had fulfilled the object prescribed by Napoleon, and which had even won him the approbation of a master who was not easily pleased.

Villeneuve was now all concerned about what awaited him on his quitting Ferrol. He imagined that Calder would be at him again, joined by Nelson or Cornwallis, and that a new battle awaited him in which he might reasonably look for destruction. Letters from Cadiz informed him, in fact, that Nelson had returned to Europe, that he had been seen at Gibraltar, but that he had steered for the ocean, in order to form a junction with Calder before Ferrol, or with Cornwallis before Brest. The truth is, that Nelson, sailing with prodigious speed, had touched at Gibraltar towards the end of July, at the very epoch when Villeneuve gave battle to Calder; that he had repassed the Straits, and strove against contrary winds to get into the Channel, that he had only eleven sail, that he had rallied neither Calder nor Cornwallis, and that his intention, after two years of constant sailing, was to go into harbour for a short time to revictual his exhausted division. Villeneuve was unaware of these facts; but he knew his orders, which for a man of courage were easy of execution, since he was not ordered to conquer, but to fight as long as he had a ship to swim, in order to raise the blockade of Brest. If, before Brest, he should be seconded by Gauteaume, it was not likely that the battle, fought with fifty five

¹ See note to p. 660.

sail against twenty or twenty-five, would be a lost battle. If, on the contrary, the weather or other circumstances should prevent Gauteaume from taking part in the action, Villeneuve, in fighting desperately, even to the utter destruction of his fleet, would render it impossible for Cornwallis to put to sea and continue the blockade, and Gauteaume, rallying to his fleet the remains of a fleet gloriously vanquished, could still command the Channel for some days. That was all that Napoleon demanded of his admirals.

Unfortunately, Villeneuve had made port. All the captains of the vessels that had been in the action were anxious to refit. They would have sailed for another month or two, had they been kept out at sea; but, being within reach of a grand arsenal, they all found some damage to repair. Masts were replaced, rigging mended, leaks were to be stopped; the surplus stores of some ships were to be removed to others. The whole squadron was thus detained for forty-five days. Owing to the Spanish dearth, it had not been possible to execute at Ferrol the orders of Napoleon, to have biscuit, to the number of two or three millions of rations, in each port. But they would find biscuit at Brest, at Cherbourg, and at Boulogne. Moreover, forty-five days sufficed. At length, on the 10th of August, they prepared to weigh anchor. Villeneuve stationed himself off Corunna, in the bay of Ares, waiting for Gravina and the second Spanish division to run out of Ferrol, which was no easy matter on account of the wind. He waited three days, which he employed in worrying himself. He wrote thus to the minister Decrès: "I am made the arbiter of vast interests; my despair redoubles with the confidence shown me, because I see no prospect of success, take what course I may. It is quite evident to me that the navies of France and Spain can do nothing in great squadrons. Divisions of three, four, or five vessels, are, at the utmost, all that we are capable of commanding. Let Gauteaume put to sea, and he will judge for himself. *As regards the public, the question will be decided.*

"I am about to sail; but I know not what I shall do. Eight vessels remain in sight of the coast, at eight leagues off. They will follow us; I cannot wait for them; and they will go and join the squadrons before Brest or Cadiz, according as I steer for the one or for the other of those two ports. No doubt it is thought that, sailing hence with twenty-nine sail, I am considered as able to fight vessels of any thing like the same number; I am not afraid to confess to you, that I should be very sorry to meet with twenty. Our naval tactics are out of date; we only know how to range ourselves in line, and that is precisely what the enemy wishes for. I have neither time nor means to agree upon another system with the commanders of the vessels of the two nations. . . . I foresaw all this before I left Toulon; but all my delusions did not vanish until the day on which I saw the Spanish ships which are joined to mine; . . . then I was obliged to despair of "very thing."

At the moment of sailing, the fever broke out again in the vessels from Rochefort, l'Algesiras and l'Achille; some Spanish vessels ran foul of each other on leaving Ferrol, breaking their bowsprits and tearing their sails. These accidents, of no consequence in themselves, yet, being added to all the mishaps that Villeneuve had already experienced, completed his despair. Ready, at length, to set sail, he gave his orders to Captain Lallemand. The latter, with an excellent division of five ships of the line, and several frigates, was to touch at Vigo on the 15th or 16th of August. It would have been sufficient for Villeneuve to have taken his whole squadron thither, to rally that division, and thus procure a considerable augmentation of his strength; but not venturing to move, still haunted by the fear of Nelson, he sent an officer to Captain Lallemand, and directed him to repair to Brest, without being sure that he would go thither himself; thus exposing this division to destruction should it arrive there alone. He wrote to Admiral Decrès a despatch, in which, exposing all the griefs of his soul, he manifested an inclination to steer for Cadiz rather than for Brest. To Lauriston, whose troublesome presence reminded him of the Emperor, he said that they would proceed to Brest. Lauriston, grieved to see him in such a state of mind, delighted with his professed determination, wrote to the Emperor, by a courier, whom he despatched from Ferrol, that at length they were going to Brest, and from Brest into the Channel.

In the midst of these deplorable anxieties, Villeneuve departed from Corunna, and lost sight of land during the day of the 14th. To crown his misfortunes, a pretty strong north-easterly wind which was blowing, was far from impelling him towards his destination. Melancholy consequence of a want of confidence, which often makes us neglect the most splendid favours of fortune. At that very moment, Calder and Nelson were not united near Ferrol as Villeneuve feared. Nelson, after having vainly sought after the French at Cadiz, had returned northward, and had long to beat up against that same north-easterly wind that then prevailed, and had at length rejoined Cornwallis before Brest, on the very day, the 14th of August, when the French squadron put out from Ferrol. He left with Cornwallis the few vessels which could still keep the sea, and went with the others to refit at Portsmouth, where he arrived on the 18th of August. Calder, on his part, after the battle of Ferrol, had rejoined Cornwallis with his damaged fleet. A part of his vessels were despatched to the Channel ports to refit. Cornwallis had immediately composed for him another division of seventeen or eighteen sail, and had sent him back to Ferrol, keeping at the most only eighteen sail to blockade Brest. Calder then returned, to find Ferrol evacuated. If Villeneuve, regaining a little confidence, had rallied Lallemand at Vigo, and proceeded by open sea to the Channel, he would have crossed, without encountering Calder, who would have gone to blockade the empty Vigo

he would have surprised Cornwallis, separated from Nelson and Calder, and with, at the most, seventeen or eighteen sail, and have attacked him with thirty-five, without reckoning the twenty-one of Gauteaume. What an opportunity was lost to him by the depression of his soul! For the rest, General Lauriston overwhelmed him with the most urgent persuasions; a momentary shifting of the wind, a momentary revival of the depressed spirits of Villeneuve, and the grand idea of Napoleon might yet have been realized.

It would not be easy to imagine the impatience with which Napoleon was racked upon that coast of Boulogne, where he every instant expected the appearance of his fleets, and the so much coveted opportunity of invading England. All his forces were embarked from the Texel to Etaples. At the Texel, the horses of the artillery and of the cavalry, had been many weeks on board. The troops, without an exception, were on board the boats. The line squadron, charged with conveying the forces, only awaited the signal to weigh anchor. In the four ports of Ambleteuse, Vimeux, Boulogne, and Etaples, the one hundred and thirty thousand men intended to pass on the flat-bottomed boats had several times been put under arms. They had been marched to the quays and all made to take their respective places on the boats. The time necessary for this operation was ascertained. At Ambleteuse, the men of Davoust's corps had been embarked in a quarter of an hour, and the horses in an hour and a half. It had been the

same at Etaples and Boulogne, allowing for the different number of men and horses.

All, then, was ready, when Napoleon a length received tidings of the battle of Ferrol. of the putting in at Vigo, and of the entry at Corunna. Whatever displeasure he felt at the naval condition of Villeneuve, however sternly he judged his conduct, he, nevertheless, was gratified by the whole result, and by his orders all the gazettes contained an account of the sea-fight, with the most flattering praises of Villeneuve, and of the two combined squadrons. The loss of the two vessels appeared to him to be a mere accident, attributable to the fog, to be regretted, doubtless, but of very minor importance, compared to the result obtained, that of the entrance into Vigo, and the junction of the two fleets.¹

Now he no longer doubted that Villeneuve would make his appearance at Brest. Gauteaume was at Bertheaume, that is to say, outside the inner roadstead, in face of the open sea, and supported by a hundred and fifty cannon, ranged in battery upon the coast. Nothing short of a concatenation of misfortunes could prevent Gauteaume from taking part in the battle of the blockade; and the French, having a force of fifty sail, twenty-nine under Villeneuve and twenty-one under Gauteaume, from scattering the enemy from their path, and entering the Channel with thirty or forty sail, even should they lose ten or twenty.

"You clearly perceive," said Napoleon to Decrès, who was with him at Boulogne, "that notwithstanding a host of blunders and unfavourable

¹ The following letters were written upon the subject by Napoleon to Admiral Villeneuve, and the Emperor's aid-de-camp, General Lauriston:

To Admiral Villeneuve.

Boulogne, 25th Thermidor, year XIII.—13th Aug., 1805.

VICE-ADMIRAL VILLENEUVE:

I perceive with pleasure, by the battle of the 3d Thermidor, that several of my ships have borne themselves with the bravery that I anticipated from them. I am much pleased with the admirable manœuvre which you executed at the beginning of the action, and which baffled the designs of the enemy. I could have desired that you had employed your numerous frigates in aiding the Spanish ships, which, being the first engaged, must necessarily have been most in need of support. I could equally have desired that on the day after the action, you had not given the enemy time to place his ships, the Windsor Castle and Malta, in safety, as well as the two Spanish ships which, having lost their rigging, must have been heavy and embarrassing sailers. This would have given to my arms the *éclat* of a grand victory. The tardiness of this manœuvre gave the English time to send them into their ports. But I am justified in concluding that the victory remained on my side, since you have entered Corunna. I hope that this despatch will not find you there: that you will have repulsed the enemy's squadron, so that you may make your junction with Captain Lallemand, sweep away every thing that you find before you, and come into the Channel where we await you with great impatience. If you have not done so, do it. Bear down boldly upon the enemy. The preferable order of battle appears to me to intermix the French and Spanish vessels, and to station behind each Spanish vessel to aid them in the battle, and thus turn your numerous frigates to useful purpose. You can still further increase their number by means of la *Guerrière* and la *Revanche*, and that without retarding your operations. You at this time have under your command eighteen of our ships, and twelve, or, at the least, ten of those of the King of Spain. It is my desire, that wherever the enemy presents himself before you with fewer than twenty-four vessels, you give him battle.

By the return of the frigate le *Président*, and of several others that I had despatched to you at Martinique, I have learned that, instead of your having landed troops in those islands, they are weaker than they were before.

Nevertheless, Nelson had but nine sail. The English are not so numerous as you imagined. They are everywhere in a state of uncertainty and alarm. Should you make your appearance here for three days, nay, even for twenty-four hours, your mission would be fulfilled. Make the moment of your departure known to Admiral Gauteaume by an extraordinary courier. Never for a grander object did a squadron run such risks, and never have our soldiers and seamen poured out their blood for a grander and nobler result. For this grand object of forwarding the descent upon that power which for six centuries has oppressed France, we may all die without regretting the sacrifice of life. Such are the sentiments which should animate all my soldiers. England has in the Downs only four ships of the line, which we daily harass with our prams and our flotillas.

And with this, &c.

On the 14th of August he is still bent, and even more than ever bent, upon the expedition, malgré Decrès.

To General Lauriston.

Boulogne, 25th Thermidor, year XIII.—14th of Aug., 1805.

I have received General Lauriston, your two letters of the 9th and 11th Thermidor. I hope that this letter will find you no longer at Ferrol, but that the squadron will have set sail and proceeded to its destination. I do not understand why you have not left the 67th and the 10th regiments at Martinique and at Guadaloupe. It was very distinctly expressed in your instructions. The consequence is, that after so extended an expedition I have not even the pleasure of seeing my islands secure from all attack. There are only 3000 men there now, and after Vendémiaire there will only be 2500. I hope that Villeneuve will not allow himself to be blockaded by a squadron inferior to his own. Aid and urge the admiral as much as you possibly can. Arrange with him about the troops that you have on board, and send me an exact account of their condition: you can leave them on board. If the admiral deems fit, you can aid them and form them into a division.

Take measures for forming a dépôt of the men whom you have landed at Vigo, whether an officer was sent, in the supposition that Villeneuve had not made his appearance on the 20th Thermidor. We are ready every where. Your presence in the Channel for twenty-four hours will suffice.

With this, &c.

valuable accidents, the plan, as a whole, is essentially so good that all the advantages are still on our side, and that we are on the eve of success." Decrès, who was in the secret of the misgivings of Villeneuve, and who shared his doubts of fortune, was not so tranquil. "As this is possible," he replied, "for all this has been perfectly calculated; but if this fall out to our hopes, I shall see the finger of God in our success! However, it has so often been visible in the operations of your majesty, that I should not be surprised to behold it in them once more."¹

It was from the 18th to the 20th of August that Napoleon was in the most lively expectation. Signals prepared in the most elevated points of the coast, were to inform him if the French fleet became visible upon the horizon. Attentive to every courier who arrived from Paris or from the ports, he every moment gave new orders for guarding against accidents that might have thwarted his designs. M. de Talleyrand having informed him that the preparations of Austria were daily becoming more significant and more threatening, and that a continental war was to be framed; but that, at the same time, Prussia, seduced by the brilliant temptation held out to her, that of Hanover, was ready to agree to an alliance with France; Napoleon, without taking an hour to deliberate, had summoned Duroc, and delivered him a letter for the king, and all the powers necessary for signing a treaty. "Set out directly," said he to him; "proceed to Berlin without passing by Paris, and determine the King of Prussia to sign a treaty of alliance with me. I give him Hanover, but on condition that it be decided immediately. The present that I make him is an ample equivalent. In a fortnight I will not make him the same offer. At present I require to be covered on the side of Austria while I embark. To obtain this service from the King of Prussia, I grant him a vast territory, which will add forty thousand men to his army. But if by-and-by I should be obliged to quit the sea-shore to return inland, my camps being broken up, and my projects against England being abandoned, I should have no need of any one to bring Austria to her senses, and I would not pay so dear for a service which would be useless to me."

Accordingly, Napoleon required that Prussia should immediately put troops in motion for Bohemia, and would not allow, moreover, that the treaty should be laden with conditions relating to Holland, Switzerland, and Italy. He ceded Hanover, and chose that Prussia should join him without any other condition.²

One can judge from a step so important, and so promptly resolved upon, how great a consequence Napoleon at this moment attached to the free accomplishment of his projects. On the very day on which he gave instructions to Duroc, that is to say, on the 22d of August, the courier who had been despatched from

Ferrol as Villeneuve sailed thence, arrived at Boulogne. Napoleon immediately received at the little château of Pont de Briques, the despatch of Lauriston; while that of Villeneuve, addressed to Decrès, was delivered to Decrès, at the coast, in the hut in which he had his quarters.

Napoleon, delighted with those words of Lauriston, *we are going to Brest*, had immediately dictated two letters for Villeneuve and Gautaume. They are too worthy to be preserved in history to allow of our omitting their insertion here.

To Gautaume he said:

"I have already made known to you by telegraph, that it is my desire that you do not allow Villeneuve to lose an hour, in order that, profiting by the superiority given to me by fifty ships of the line, you instantly put to sea to fulfil your destination, and make sail for the Channel with all your forces. I reckon upon your firmness, your talents, and your character, under circumstances so important. Set out and come hither. We will take vengeance for six centuries of insults and disgrace. Never have my soldiers and sailors exposed their lives for a grander object." (From the Imperial Camp of Boulogne, 22d of August.)

To Villeneuve he wrote:

"I hope, Vice-admiral Villeneuve, that you are arrived at Brest. Set out, lose not a moment, bring my united squadrons into the Channel, and ENGLAND IS OURS! We are all ready, every thing is embarked. Be here but for twenty-four hours, and all is ended." (Imperial Camp of Boulogne, 22d of August.)

But while Napoleon, misled by the despatch of Lauriston, addressed these burning words to the two admirals; Decrès, by the same courier, had received a widely different despatch, which left but little hope of Villeneuve steering for Brest. He hastened to wait upon the Emperor, and to make known to him the melancholy moral condition in which Villeneuve had quitted Ferrol.

On hearing this contradictory intelligence, Napoleon was thrown into a fury. The first bursts of his anger fell upon Admiral Decrès, who had given him such a man to command his fleet. He inveighed all the more violently against that minister, because he attributed to him, besides his choice of Villeneuve, opinions analogous to those which had deprived that unfortunate admiral of all courage. He reproached him alike with the weakness of his friend, and with decrying the French navy, which had carried despair into the hearts of all the fleet. He complained of not being seconded in his grand designs, and of being able to find only men who, in order to spare their persons or their reputations, did not even know how to lose a battle, when nothing more, after all, was required of them but the courage to fight it and lose it. "Your Villeneuve," said he to Decrès, "is not even fit to command a frigate. What can be said of a man who, on account of a few sailors falling sick on board a couple of vessels of his squadron, for a broken bowsprit or a torn sail, or for a report of a junction of Nelson and Calder, loses his self-possession, and renounces his plans!

¹ I have confined myself to a correct analysis of the numerous notes which Napoleon and Admiral Decrès daily exchanged, although they were within half a league of each other. One was at Pont de Briques, the other on the coast.

² This is the substance of the instructions given to the grand-marshal Duroc.

They would have been at the very entry of Ferrol, ready to pounce upon the French, and not upon the open sea! All this is so simple, that it must strike the eyes of every one who is not blinded by fear."¹

Napoleon even went so far as to call Villeneuve a coward and even a traitor, and orders to be instantly drawn up for bringing him by force from Cadiz into the Channel, if he were gone to Cadiz; and, in the case of his having made sail for Brest, for giving the command of the two united squadrons to Gauteaume. The minister of marine, who had not yet ventured to give his entire opinion upon the assemblage of the fleets in the midst of the Channel, and under existing circumstances, but who considered that assemblage to be horribly dangerous, since the English, on their guard, had concentrated between Ferrol, Brest, and Portsmouth, supplicated the Emperor not to give so fatal an order, urged that the season was too far advanced, that the English were too much upon their guard, and that should he persist, some horrible catastrophe would take place before Brest. To all such objections Napoleon had but one reply, that fifty sail would be assembled at Brest, should Villeneuve present himself there; that the English would never have that number; that, at all events, one of the two fleets being lost, would be of no consequence to him, provided that the other, being liberated, could enter the Channel and keep the command of it for twenty-four hours.

Decrès, overwhelmed by the Emperor, determined to write to him what he could not venture to say in person.

"4th Fructidor, Year XIII.—22d of August.

"On my knees I supplicated your Majesty not to associate the Spanish vessels in the operations of your squadron. Far from conceding this point, your Majesty required that that association should be increased by the vessels of Cadiz and those of Carthagea.

"With such an addition, you willed that a thing should be undertaken, difficult in itself, and rendered still more so by the elements composing the force, with the inexperience of the leaders, their want of the habit of commanding, and other circumstances with which your Majesty is as well acquainted as I am, and which, therefore, it is superfluous to recapitulate.

"In such a state of things, when your Majesty allows my reasoning and my experience to go for nothing, I know of no situation more painful than mine. I beg that your Majesty will take it into your consideration, that I have no interest but that of your flag and the honour of your arms; and if the squadron is at Cadiz, I supplicate you to consider that as a decree of Providence, which reserves it for other operations. I entreat you not to compel it to come from Cadiz into the Channel, for the attempt at this moment cannot be unproductive

¹ These scenes, of which there are now no living witnesses, would have been lost to history, but for the private and autograph letters of Admiral Decrès and the Emperor. They are evidence of the stormy emotions of those memorable days. There are a great number of them for the same day, though the Emperor and Decrès were within half a league of each other.

of misfortunes. Above all, I entreat that this passage may not be ordered to be attempted with two months' provisions, for M. d'Estaing I believe, has taken seventy or eighty days to come from Cadiz to Brest, (and, perhaps more.)

"If these entreaties which I address to your Majesty, seem to you to be of no weight, you should judge of what passes in my heart.

"It is especially at this moment, when I can still arrest the issuing of these fatal orders, that, in my opinion, it is my duty to your Majesty most strongly to urge this. May I be more fortunate on this occasion than I have formerly been!

"But it is unfortunate for me to be acquainted with the naval profession, since that acquaintance obtains me no confidence, and produces no results upon the plans of your Majesty. In truth, sire, my situation becomes too painful. I reproach myself with being unable to prevail with your Majesty. I doubt if any one man can do so. Condescend, as regards naval affairs, to form yourself a council and admiralty, whatever your Majesty may deem best; but for myself, I feel that instead of growing stronger, I grow weaker every day. And, to speak the whole truth, a minister of marine, subjugated by your Majesty in naval affairs, serves you badly, and becomes useless to your arms, if not actually injurious to them.

"It is in the bitterness of my soul, which in no wise diminishes either my devotion or my fidelity to your person, that I beg your Majesty to accept my profound respects.

(Signed) "Decrès."

The Emperor, angry, and yet touched, replied to him on the instant from Pont-de-Briques.

"I beg you to send me in the course of the day a memorial upon this question:—As matters stand, if Villeneuve remain at Cadiz, what is he to do? Raise yourself to the height of the circumstances, and of the situation in which France and England are placed; do not write me another letter, such as that which you have written; all that says nothing. For my part, I have but one want—to succeed." (22d of August, Dépôt of the Louvre.)

On the following day, the 23d, Decrès proposed his plan to the Emperor. It was, in the first place, to adjourn the expedition till the winter, for it was too late to bring the fleet from Cadiz into the Channel. They would be obliged to execute the enterprise in the midst of the equinoctial gales. Moreover, the English were warned. Every one had at length perceived project of a junction between Boulogne and Brest. According to Decrès' opinion, it would be necessary to divide the too numerous squadrons into seven or eight squadrons, of five or six sail each. What Lallemand was at this very time doing, was the proof of what might be expected from these detached squadrons. They should be composed of the best officers and of the best ships, and sent out upon the ocean. They would drive the English to despair, by ruining their commerce, and form excellent sailors and naval commanders. Thence could be drawn the elements of a fleet for a grand ulterior project.

"That," said Admiral Decrès, "*is the system of war which I would fain pursue.*"

"If, finally, in the winter," added he, "you wish for a fleet in the Channel, there are means of bringing one. You will have at Cadiz forty sail. Assemble there an army of embarkation, and give to this project the appearance of a project upon India or Jamaica. Then divide the squadron into two parts. Select, among the vessels, the swiftest sailers; among the officers, those who, for a year, have proved themselves the boldest and most skillful; go out secretly, with only twenty sail, taking care to leave the others to attract the attention of the English; then take these twenty sail round Ireland and Scotland, and thence into the Channel. Summon Villeneuve and Gravina to Paris, re-animate their courage, and to a certainty they will execute this manoeuvre."

On reading this plan, Napoleon entirely gave up the idea of recalling the fleet immediately from Cadiz, if indeed it was there. With his own hand he thus endorsed this despatch: "*To form seven squadrons, distributed among Africa, Surinam, St. Helena, the Cape, the Windward Islands, the United States, the coasts of Ireland and Scotland, and the mouth of the Thames.*" Then he read and re-read the despatches of Villeneuve, of Lauriston, and of the consular agent, who for a long time had watched, through a glass, the progress of the French squadron, after it was out of sight of the heights of Ferrol. In those despatches he sought, as in the book of destiny, a reply to this question: "Is Villeneuve steering for Cadiz or for Brest? The uncertainty in which these despatches left him, irritated him still more than would the certainty of the squadron having gone to Cadiz. In that state of agitation, and especially as Europe was situated, it would have been the greatest of all services to inform him how the case really stood, for the news from the frontiers of Austria became more alarming every instant. The Austrians now scarcely aimed at concealment; the troops were assembling in considerable force upon the Adige, and threatened the Inn and Bavaria.

Now, if he did not strike a crushing blow upon London, which would make all Europe tremble and draw back, it was necessary that he should make forced marches upon the Rhine, to prevent the outrage preparing for him, that of being on his frontiers before him. In this strong necessity of knowing the truth, he wrote several letters to Admiral Decrès, from Pont-de-Briques to the camp, to learn his personal opinion as to the probable determination of Villeneuve. Decrès, fearing to irritate the Emperor too much, and at the same time conscientiously averse from deceiving him, replied each time in an almost directly contradictory manner, now saying yes, and then no, and partaking of the anxiety of his master, but evidently inclining towards the opinion that Villeneuve had gone to Cadiz. In fact, he had, himself, no doubt of it. It was then that Napoleon, that he might not be taken

wholly unprepared, was divided between two plans, and passed several days in one of those ambiguous situations which are so insupportable to characters of his stamp, ready, at once, to cross the sea or to throw himself upon the Continent, to make a descent upon England or a military march towards Austria. It was an especial trait in his character, when action became necessary, instantly to control himself, suddenly to lay aside those gusts of passion to which, for an instant, he had chosen to give his soul up, as if to be the same entirely master of resuming it, and governing it, at the moment when he needed it. After numerous perplexities, on the day of the 23d, he gave the necessary orders for a double hypothesis. "My resolution is fixed," he wrote to M. de Talleyrand. "My fleets were lost sight of from the heights of Cape Ortegal, on the 14th of August. If they come into the Channel, there is time yet: I embark and I make the descent; I go to London, and there cut the knot of all coalitions. If, on the contrary, my admirals fail in conduct or in firmness, I raise my ocean camps, I enter Germany with two hundred thousand men, and I do not stop until I have scored the game at Vienna, taken Venice, and all that she still possesses of Italy from Austria, and driven the Bourbons from Italy. I will not allow the Austrians and the Russians to assemble; I will strike them down before they can form their junction. The Continent being pacified, I will return to the ocean, and work anew for a maritime peace." Then, with his profound and incomparable experience of war, with that unparalleled discernment of that which was of the most or the least consequence to hasten forward in the arrangements, he gave his first orders for the continental war, without, as yet, deranging any thing of his maritime expedition, which was still in constant readiness, as all still remained on board or alongside the vessels. He commenced with Naples and Hanover, the two parts furthest removed from his will. He ordered that there should be added to the division which was being organized at Pescara, under General Reynier, several regiments of light cavalry, and some batteries of horse-artillery, in order to form movable columns in that country of guerillas. He sent orders to General St. Cyr, at the first sign of hostility, to call in this division of Reynier, join it to the division he had brought from Tarento, and to throw himself upon Naples with twenty thousand men, so as to prevent the descent into Italy of the Russians from Corfu, and of the English from Malta.

He then commanded Prince Eugene, who, though viceroy of Italy, was under the military direction of Marshal Jourdan, to assemble on the instant all the French troops who were distributed from Genoa to Bologna and Verona, to direct them upon the Adige, to purchase artillery-horses all over Italy, and to get a hundred guns horsed immediately. As the French troops were formed in divisions, and kept upon a war footing, these arrangements were easy to make, and prompt of execution. He ordered the recruits from the dépôts to be sent to them. He, at the same time, gave orders for baking biscuit everywhere, for victualing the fortresses

* I transcribe these details from the document itself.

of Italy. Alexandria not being yet completed, he ordered that the citadel of Turin should serve as the magazine for Piedmont.

He made similar arrangements for Germany.

On the same day, the 23d, he despatched a courier for Bernadotte, who had succeeded General Mortier in the command of Hanover. He ordered him, under the pledge of the utmost secrecy, and without giving any outward sign of his new destination, to assemble at Güttingen, that is to say, at the extremity of that electorate, the greatest part of his *corps d'armée*; to commence by despatching to that quarter the artillery and heavy baggage; to execute those movements so that they could not be clearly discerned for ten or twelve days, and in order to procrastinate the doubt, to show himself in person at the opposite point, and, finally, to await further orders for putting himself in actual march. His idea was, if he should agree with Prussia, as he doubted not that he should, relatively to Hanover, to evacuate that kingdom, and to traverse, without permission, all the small states of central Germany, to carry into Bavaria the *corps d'armée* withdrawn from Hanover.

By the same courier he ordered General Marmont to the Texel, immediately to prepare his trains and *matériel*, so as to be able in three days to march with his *corps d'armée*, recommending him carefully to keep the secret, and to make no change in the embarkation of his troops until further orders. Finally, he made at Boulogne a first and only diversion of the troops under his own hand, that of the heavy cavalry and the dragoons. He had assembled far more cavalry than he really wanted, and especially, far more than he could embark. He sent the cuirassiers of Nansouty a march to the rear, and assembled at St. Omers the foot and horse dragoons, under the command of Baraguay d'Hilliers.¹ To these he added a certain number of pieces of horse-artillery, and instantly sent them on to Strasburg. He at the same time ordered the assemblage at Alsace of all the heavy cavalry remaining in France, despatched the general-in-chief of artillery, Songis, to prepare a part of the country between Metz and Strasburg, with funds for purchasing in Lorraine, in Switzerland, and in Alsace, all the draft-horses that could be procured. The same order was given for the infantry stationed near the eastern frontier. Five hundred thousand rations of biscuit were ordered to Strasburg. His numerous cavalry, accompanied by horse-artillery, and supported by a species of infantry, that of the dragoons,

might furnish a first support to the threatened Bavarians, who loudly demanded aid. Some regiments of infantry would speedily be ready to assist them. In fact, Bernadotte could reach Wurtzburg in ten or twelve marches. Thus, in a few days, without withdrawing any thing from his embarked forces, nothing but some divisions of heavy cavalry and dragoons, he was ready to support the Bavarians upon whom Austria wished her first blows to fall.

These arrangements being made with the promptitude of a great character, he resumed a little tranquillity of mind, and set himself to awaiting what the winds might bring him.

He was gloomy, absent, and harsh towards Admiral Decrès. Upon his countenance he seemed to see imprinted all the opinions which had shaken Villeneuve, and he was incessantly upon the sea-shore looking for some sudden appearance upon the horizon. Naval officers, stationed with their glasses upon the various points of the coast, had it in charge to observe all that was visible upon the sea, and to report to him. Thus he passed three days in that uncertainty which is the most intolerable to strong and ardent souls who have decided determinations. At length Admiral Decrès, whom he continually questioned, declared to him that, in his opinion, seeing how long a time had passed, and the winds that had prevailed upon the coast, from the Gulf of Gascony to the Strait of Dover, and looking also at the moral condition of Villeneuve, he was persuaded that the fleets had sailed for Cadiz.

It was with deep grief, mingled with violent bursts of anger, that Napoleon at length gave up all hope of seeing his fleet arrive in the Strait. Such was his irritation, that a man for whom he entertained no ordinary friendship, the learned Monge, who almost every morning made a very military breakfast with him in the imperial but on the sea-shore, Monge, on seeing him in that disposition, discreetly retired, judging that his presence would be troublesome. He went to M. Daru,¹ then principal secretary at war, and told him what he had seen. At the same instant M. Daru himself was called, and had to repair to the Emperor. He found him agitated, talking to himself, and not seeming to perceive the persons who arrived. Scarcely had M. Daru arrived, and as he stood silent and waiting for orders, when Napoleon went up to him, and addressing him as if he had been acquainted with every thing, said, "Do you know where Villeneuve is? He is at Cadiz!" Then he

the brilliant operations of the campaign of Ulm.—*Bibliographie Moderne*.

¹ DARU, PIERRE ANTOINE NOEL BRUNO. Count, Peer of France, and one of the ablest statesmen of the Revolution. He was born at Montpellier, in 1767. He early embraced the principles of the Revolution, and a military career; but never relinquished his literary pursuits, even in the bustle of the camp. His masterly translation of Horace makes him a poet of high order. In 1806, 1806, and 1809, he was intendant-general of the French in Austria and Prussia, and displayed great ability and unbounded attachment to Napoleon. He filled almost all the high offices of the administration in succession. In 1818 he was called to the Chamber of Peers by Louis XVIII. Since the restoration he has devoted himself to historical studies in which his works are both voluminous and able.—*Encyclopedia Americana*.

¹ BARAGUAY D'HILLIERS, LOUIS. General of division, colonel-general of dragoons, grand officer of the Legion of Honour. Born at Paris, of a noble family, in 1764. He was an officer at the breaking out of the Revolution, in favour of which he declared himself early. He was general of brigade and chief of the staff under Custines, when that general was arrested, and shared his imprisonment; but in 1794 he was reinstated under Menou, and with him again disgraced. In 1796 he joined the army of Italy. In 1797 he was made general of division, and accompanied Bonaparte to Egypt. On his return thence he was captured in the frigate *Sensible*, and carried to England. In 1799 he was chief of the general staff with the army of the Rhine. He took the side of Bonaparte on the 18th of Brumaire and shared his success. In 1804, he was appointed to command the cavalry reserve in the army of England; and in 1805 went with that force to Germany, and contributed greatly to

launched out into long and fierce invectives against the weakness and incapacity of all who surrounded him; said that he was betrayed by the cowardice of mankind, deplored the ruin of the most splendid, the most secure of all the plans he had ever conceived in his life, and displayed in all its bitterness the grief of genius abandoned by fortune. Suddenly mastering this agitation, he suddenly calmed himself, and with a surprising facility recalling his mind from those closed roads of the ocean to the open roads of the Continent, he dictated for several hours in succession, with an extraordinary precision and presence of mind, the plan which will be given, in the following book. It was the plan of the immortal campaign of 1805. There was no longer the slightest trace of irritation either in his voice or in his countenance.¹

The grand conceptions of genius had dissipated the griefs of his soul. Instead of attacking England directly, he was about to combat her by the long and sinuous route of the continent, and he was about to find upon that route an incomparable grandeur, previous to finding his ruin there.

Would he more surely have attained his end by the direct road, that is to say, by the descent? That is a question which will often be asked, both in our days and by future generations, and which it is not easy to solve. However, supposing Napoleon to have once effected his landing at Dover, we do not affront the English nation in believing that it would have been vanquished by the army and by the captain who, in eighteen months, conquered and subjected Austria, Germany, Prussia, and Russia. Not a man was added to that ocean army which, at Austerlitz, at Jena, and at Friedland, beat the eight hundred thousand soldiers of the continent. It must be added, too, that the territorial inviolability, so long enjoyed by England, has not familiarized her with the danger of invasion, nor tested her means and courage to repel it; a circumstance which by no means diminishes the glory of her fleets and regular armies. It is therefore very improbable that she would have ventured to oppose the soldiers of Napoleon, not yet exhausted by fatigue, and not yet decimated by war. A heroic resolution of her government, taking refuge, for instance, in Scotland, and leaving England to be ravaged until Nelson, with all the English squadrons, could come and cut off all retreat from Napoleon. Such a resolution, exposing Napoleon, the conqueror, to be made a prisoner in his own proper conquest, would, doubtless, have brought about some singular conjunctures; but it is beyond all probability to suppose that it would have been adopted, firmly persuaded that had Napoleon reached London, England would have treated.

All the difficulty lay in the crossing of the Strait. Although the flotilla could pass in a summer calm, in the fogs of winter the passage was full of danger. Accordingly Napoleon had planned the co-operation of a fleet to cover the expedition. But then it may be urged, the difficulty was, after all, coincident

with the original one, that of being superior to the English on the sea. By no means. The point in question was, not to be superior, or even equal to them. All that was proposed was, by an able plan to bring a fleet into the Channel, by taking advantage of the chances of the sea, its immensity which renders encounters on it so uncertain. The plan of Napoleon, so often modified, and reproduced with so much fecundity, had every chance of success in the hands of a firmer man than Villeneuve. Doubtless, Napoleon experienced here, under another form, the disadvantages of his naval inferiority. Villeneuve, keenly alive to that inferiority, became discouraged, but he was too much discouraged, and in a manner to affect his honour in the eyes of posterity. After all, his fleet fought well at Ferrol: and if we suppose that he had fought before Brest the disastrous battle which he shortly afterwards lost at Trafalgar, Gauteaume would have run out; and as for losing that battle, could it not have been well lost, in order to secure the passage of the Channel? Nay, under such circumstances, could it be said to be lost? Villeneuve, then, acted wrongly, although he has been too much decried, as is usually the case with those who are unfortunate. A practical seaman, too forgetful, that by dint of energy and resolute courage, one can often supply what is deficient in *matériel*; he knew not how to elevate himself to the height of his mission, and do that which, in his situation, Latouche-Treville would assuredly have done.

The enterprise of Napoleon, then, was no chimera; it was perfectly possible, as he had prepared it; and, perhaps, in the eyes of discerning judges, this unfinished enterprise will do him more honour than those which have been crowned with the most brilliant success. Neither was it a mere feint, as it has been supposed to be by some people, who discover depths where there are none: some thousands of letters of the ministers and the Emperor, put an end to all doubt on that point. It was a serious enterprise, followed up and matured for several years, with a real passion. It has also often been asserted, that if Napoleon had not repulsed Fulton's offer of steam navigation, he would have crossed the Strait. It is not possible, even now, to predict what part steam navigation will play in future warfare. That it will add to the forces of France against England is very probable. Whether it will, or not, render the Strait more easy to be crossed, will solely depend upon the efforts which France shall see fit to make for securing a superiority in the employment of this wholly new power; that will depend upon her patriotism and her foresight. But with respect to the refusal of Napoleon, it may be affirmed that Fulton presented him with an art in its infancy, and which at that moment would have rendered him no aid. Napoleon, then, did all that he could. On this occasion there was not the shadow of a fault to reproach him with. It was, doubtless, the will of Providence that he should not succeed. Yet why? He who was not always in the right against his enemies, had, in this instance the right upon his side.

¹ I extract this account from a fragment of memoirs written by M. Daru: a copy of which is now in my possession, thanks to the kindness of his son.

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